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ISSN: 2249-8389

Journal of Positive Philosophy
Volume V, No. 01
(March, 2015)

Desh Raj Sirswal

Centre for Positive Philosophy and Interdisciplinary Studies

(CPPIS) Pehowa (Kurukshetra)-136128 (Haryana)

Lokyata: Journal of Positive Philosophy (ISSN 2249-8389)

Lokyata: Journal of Positive Philosophy is an online bi-annual interdisciplinary journal of the
Center for Positive Philosophy and Interdisciplinary Studies (CPPIS) . The name Lokyata can be
traced to Kautilya's Arthashastra, which refers to three nvkiks (logical philosophies), Yoga,
Samkhya and Lokyata. Lokyata here still refers to logical debate (disputatio, "criticism") in
general and not to a materialist doctrine in particular. The objectives of the journal are to
encourage new thinking on concepts and theoretical frameworks in the disciplines of humanities
and social sciences to disseminate such new ideas and research papers (with strong emphasis on
modern implications of philosophy) which have broad relevance in society in general and mans
life in particular. The Centre publishes two issues of the journal every year. Each regular issue of
the journal contains full-length papers, discussions and comments, book reviews, information on
new books and other relevant academic information. Each issue contains about 100 Pages.
Centre for Positive Philosophy and Interdisciplinary Studies, Pehowa (Kurukshetra)

Dr. Desh Raj Sirswal (Assistant Professor (Philosophy, P.G.Govt. College for Girls, Sector-11,
Associate Editors:
Dr. Merina Islam, Dr. Sandhya Gupta
Editorial Advisory Board
Prof. K.K. Sharma (Former-Pro-Vice-Chancellor, NEHU, Shillong).
Prof. (Dr.) Sohan Raj Tater, Former Vice Chancellor, Singhania University , Rajasthan).
Dr. Ranjan Kumar Behera (Patkai Christian College (Autonomous), Nagaland).
Dr. Geetesh Nirban (Kamala Nehru College, University of Delhi).
Dr. K. Victor Babu (Department of Philosophy and Religious Studies, Andhra University,
Dr Rasmita Satapathy (Department of Philosophy, Ramnagar College, West Bengal.)
Mr.Pankoj Kanti Sarkar (Department of Philosophy, Debra Thana Sahid Kshudiram Smriti
Mahavidyalaya, Paschim Medinipur, West Bengal).

Declaration: The opinions expressed in the articles of this journal are those of the individual
authors, and not necessary of those of CPPIS or the Chief-Editor.

In this issue..

Author & Title of the Paper

Page No.




Pankojini Mulia, A K Behura, Sarita Kar



Poulami Chakraborty


John Daniel


Guneeta Chadha


Urmi Saha


Hiralal Mahato

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izdk'k pUnz cMok;k




Poonam Sharma, Ira Das




Pankojini Mulia, A K Behura, Sarita Kar
This paper attempts to examine the concept and the practices of Corporate Social Responsibility.
It would also accentuate one of the central themes of corporate social responsibility i.e., the
notion of sustainability with special reference to the environmental sustainability. At present
most of the companies are more inclined towards their economic growth rather than considering
its adverse effect on environment and society. With the passage of time, corporations face a
number of challenges to overcome the threatening impacts on environmental and social issues. In
recent years both corporate social responsibility and environmental sustainability have received
greater attention as a part of sustainable development across the world. This paper would show
the responsibility of the corporations is essential for a sustainable social and environmental
Keywords: Corporate Social Responsibility, Sustainable Development, Environmental
Sustainability, Modern Business Practices
The social responsibility movement arose mostly during the 1960s regarding the role of business
organizations in helping to persuade and prolong ethical practices in society and predominantly
in the natural environment. Corporations are slowly being challenged to act in such ways that it
must serve the best interest of society. Many companies are directly seeking strategies that can
allow them to do well by doing good, leaving a positive footprint on the world and avoiding
actions that could harm consumers, employees, investors, competitors, suppliers, the general
public and the environment at large (Bernhard, 1996).
It is traced from historical facts, that business was rooted in local community exchanges, which
required a high sense of morality, responsibility and character; but in the present situation most
of the businesses are done for the sake of business only, somewhere lacking social
responsibilities. Well-known economist, Milton Friedman (1970) says The social responsibility
of business is to increase its profit. In order to avail long term profit business organization
should adopt sustainable business practices. Thus, it is the responsibility of managers to
determine how their organizations can become more socially responsible, environmentally
sustainable and economically competitive.

Development and Environmental Challenges

The power of technology has overwhelmed in almost all areas of human life, whether it is
education, business or any social mode of interaction. As every development has its merits and
demerits likewise the modern technology has also its merits and demerits. Despite having all
benefits from the technology business organizations are not recognizing their responsibility
towards environment and as a result it is still suffering from epidemic consequences.
Industrialization too is responsible for the environmental degradation which impedes
environmental sustainability. Thus, here it would be relevant to show few environmental
problems arising out of excessive industrial growth.

One of the major environmental challenges is global warming caused by the excessive emission
of carbon dioxide (CO2). It is estimated that 250 million tons of carbon emission are caused by
electricity, 550 million tons from motor vehicles and 600 million tons from deforestation
(Haque, 2000). Global warming obstructs the sustainable development viz. excessive of heat can
lead to rapid melting of polar glaciers and ice caps, which can cause the sea level rise, land loss
and species extinction. The impact of Global warming has already witnessed in different coastal
cities like Bangkok, Dhaka, Karachi, Songhai, etc. (Brown and Younh, 1990). Thus, the global
warming is a serious threat to humans as well to other living beings.

Deforestation is yet another daunting situation which is the outcome of increasing population
growth and rapid industrialization all around. Deforestation causes not only global warming, soil
erosion and land desertification but also inhalation problems to the living organisms. It is
estimated that:
Almost 90% of the original forests in the Central America, Southwest Asia,
and West Africa has been cleared about 20% of the worlds tropical rain
forest has been lost and each year the Earths tree covers is diminished by
17 million hectares. (Brown, 1991)
Another pertinent stumbling block of environmental sustainability is pollutions like air pollution,
water pollution, radioactive pollution etc. Water is the most viable carrier of pollutants which
cause a threat to both humans and non-humans. There are different sources of water pollution.
The table below has listed the major categories of water pollution and their effect on human
health and ecosystem (UNEP, 2010). All the categories shown in the table shows that most of the
pollutants generate from industrial and household sources, cause serious health problems in all
living beings.

Major Categories of Water Pollutants





Infectious Agents

Bacteria, Viruses, Parasites

Human And Animal Wastes

Organic Chemicals

Fertilizer, Industrial,
Plastic, Paper, Detergents, Household

Inorganic Chemicals


Radioactive Materials Uranium, Thorium, Radium, Mining Ores, Power Plants,

Cesium, Iodine, Krypton, Weapons, Natural Sources






Salts, Industrial,
Cleansers, Surface Runoff

Demanding Animal Manure and Plant Sewage, Agricultural Runoff,

Paper Miles, Food Processing




Source: (UNEP, 2010)

Hence environmental challenges have become a serious concern for the world.

The concept of sustainability was first introduced by German forester, Hans Carlowiz, in his
book Sylvicultura Oeconomica in the year 1712. In the words of Hawken (1993), Sustainability
is defined in terms of carrying capacity of the ecosystem and described with input output modes
of consumption. Sustainability approach is very much similar to Lovelocks concept of Gaia
hypothesis, which states, a model on which the whole of the ecosphere, and all living matter
therein, is co-dependent upon its various facets and formed a complete system (Aras and
Crowther, 2009). In other words, according to this hypothesis all the components both biotic and
a-biotic are necessary for maintaining the sustainability capacity of the earth and other living
Corporate societies influence every aspect of individual, social and environmental life.
Corporations dominate all aspects of our lives. Their power affects the quality
of life, food, water, gas, electricity, seas, rivers, environment, schools,

hospitals, medicine, news, entertainment, transport, communications, and even

the lives of unborn babies. Unaccountable corporate power is damaging the
fabric of society, the structure of families, the quality of life and very future of
the planet. (Mitchell and Sikka 2005)
The concept of sustainable development has evolved and received recognition from many
organizations all over the world. The Brundtland Report (1987) emphasizes the urgency to
manage problems like environmental destruction, increase in population, biodiversity loss,
poverty etc by implementing the principle of sustainable development. WCED defines,
Sustainable development is a development that meets the needs of the present without
compromising the ability of future generation to meet their own needs (Brundtland Report,
Scholars from worldwide continue to debate on the concept of sustainability and its different
aspects. According to Vucetich and Nelson (2010), there are five critical dimensions of

Developing technologies and markets for satisfying human needs

Understanding the state and nature of ecosystem

Understanding human exploitation that affect ecosystems

Understanding how exploitation affects ecosystems

Interpreting normative concepts, like ecosystem health, human needs etc.

Ciegis et al., (2009) mentioned, sustainability is used differently in different subject areas as

In Economics, it is the development, ensuring that the per capita income of the future
generations is not less than the per capita income of the present generation.

In Sociology, it is meant that there must be a close relationship between the communities.

In Environment, sustainability is used to preserve the biodiversity of biological species,

essential ecosystems, and ecological processes.

Corporate Social Responsibility and Sustainable Business Practice

In the business dictionary Social Responsibility stands for, the obligation of an organization
towards the welfare and interests of the society in which it operates. There is a growing debate
about what and how business organizations, managers and decision makers can genuinely
contribute towards an environmental sustainability. In addressing what constitutes environmental
responsibility, we suggest the need for focusing on interrelationships and interdependencies of
ecological and social factors. Such attention is required in terms of both nurturing and caring for
the environment and ensuring guidance and accountability for any harm done to the

Corporate Social Responsibility is, the integration by companies of social and environmental
concerns in their business operations and in their integration with their stakeholders on a
voluntary basis (Harris et al., 2001). In the words of Milton Friedman,
There is only one social responsibility of business- to use its resources and
engage in activities to increase its profit so long as it stays within the rules of the
game, which is to say, engages in open and free competition, without deception
or fraud. (Friedman 1962)
A business to be socially responsible must go beyond its financial concerns like profit
maximization, ensuring fair competition and refraining from corruption. The concept of
corruption should not be understood to mean deception or fraud towards people alone but may be
broadened to include the environment. Destruction of environment to the extent of exceeding the
clause of the Government is also equally an instance of corruption.
Alison (2007) says CSR is, a voluntary firm action designed to improve social and
environmental conditions. According to Christine (2009) CSR is the way in which business
seeks to align its values and behavior with those of its various stakeholders, such as, employees,
customers, suppliers, government and environmental groups.
Sustainable Business Practice is an activity done by business houses considering the well-being
of the environment (WCSD, 2004). The Brundtland Report prescribes sustainable development
as a central guiding principle for the business enterprise to deal with environmental, social, and
economic issues. To meet the challenges of 21st century, the Rio Earth Summit in 1992
introduced sustainable development into business practices. The philosophy behind sustainable
development is to encourage business to become more completive, innovative, and
environmentally responsible. This led to the formation of bodies like World Business Council for
Sustainable Development (WBCSD) and the Business Action for Sustainable Development,
whose sole responsibility is to promote sustainable development in business communities.
The concept of sustainable development relies on the following three basic ideas (UNCED,
Sustainable development is persistent not only on human needs but also considers the other
biotic and non-living things. According to the principle of the Rio Declaration on Environment
and Development Human beings are at the center of concerns for sustainable development.
They are entitled to a healthy and productive life in harmony with nature (UNCED 1992).
The idea of inter- and intra-generational equity is taken into account in the WBCED definition
of sustainable development, i.e., to meet the needs of the present generation without
compromising the ability of the next generation to meet their own needs.
Three pillars of sustainable development comprising social, economic and environmental
objectives should be considered equally.
Hence, corporations should take into account the environmental issues within their objectives as

an easy step towards sustainability. It has been proved in many cases in the countries like Japan,
USA and Germany that most successful companies are those that focus not only on profits, but
also on its social and environmental activities (Scoons, 2007).

In order to achieve environmental sustainability, corporations must focus from economy to
ecology; not because it adds material values to the business organizations but because it has
value in itself. So, from the intrinsic value perspective, the environment has to be protected in
order to have a sustainable world. A holistic approach is needed to include environmental values
into business practices to achieve environmental sustainability. Companies should also make
sustainability as a department whose aim is to protect the environmental and social interests.
While taking business decisions, organizations should prioritize environment and society along
with economies.
Alison M., Tyson B. M., Jay B. B. (2007). Corporate Social Responsibility and Firm
Performance: Investor Preferences and Corporate Strategies. Academy of Management
Review, 32(3): 817- 835.
Aras, G., Crowther, D. (2009). Corporate Social Reporting: A Study in Disingenuity.
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Bernhard, S. (1996).A Note on Ethics and Strategy: Do Good Ethics Always Make for
Good Business. Strategic Management Journal.17 (6):499-500.
Brown, L.R., (1991). The New World Order. New York: W. W. Norton & Company.
Brown, L. R., Younh, J.E. (1990).Feeding the World in Nineties. New York: W. W.
Norton & Company.
Brundtland, H. (1987). Our common future: World Commission on Environment and
Development. New York: Oxford University Press.
Christine A. M. (2009). Corporate Social Responsibility: A Case Study Approach. UK:
Edward Elgar Publishing Limited.
Ciegis, R., Ramanauskiene, R., Martinkus, B. (2009).The Concept of Sustainable
Development and its use for Sustainable Scenarios. Inzinerine Ekonomika- Engineering
Economics, 2: 28-36.
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Foster, J.B. (1995).Global Economy and Common Good. Monthly Review Press, New
York, 46: 1-10.
Friedman, M. (1962).Capitalism and Freedom. Chicago: University of Chicago Press

Friedman, M. (1970). The Social Responsibility of Business is to Increase Its Profits. The
New YorkTimesMagazine, 13 (33):122-26.
Harris et al., (2001). A Survey of Sustainable Development: Social and Economic
Dimensions. Washington: Island Press.
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and Limitations. Ethics and Environment, 5(1):1-19.
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Leopold, A. (1969).A Sand Country Almanac and Sketches Here and There. Oxford
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Scoons, I. (2007). Sustainability, Development in Practice. Routledge Publishing,
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Organization http://www.ilo.org/public/portugue/region/eurpro/lisbon/pdf/adhoc.pdf



Poulami Chakraborty
In this paper I mainly advocate the comparative and critical account on two prominent views of
the east and west, i.e. the Bhagavad-Gita of the Hindus and Kants notion of duty. Both systems
preach duty for the sake of duty without being actuated by any sensuous inclinations. Gitas
niskama karma is reminiscent of the notion of a Kants categorical imperative. But in this paper
I also examine the critical account on both these school of thought. It also contains the point and
issues on which the two ethical views differ. Here I focus on the ethical and philosophical
aspects of the Gita. They differ from each other in some essential points. Some scholars who
consider the Gitas philosophy to be deontological may not agree with my observations. Here I
have argued that the concept of niskama karma is not a deontological concept, rather than it is a
teleological concept. It also contains the difference between two systems on the fundamental
questions of law of duty.
Key-Word: Bhagavad-Gita, Niskama Karma, Immanuel Kant, categorical imperative, law of
The Indian philosophical tradition seems to have two basic characteristics: First, they discuss
different problems of metaphysics, ethics, religion, but it does not discuss them separately. In
Indian system they are closely bound up with one another. Second, they believed that reason and
religion are two fundamental pillars of their system. Indian philosophy is intensely spiritual and
emphasizes the need of practical realization of truth. Hindu ethics is practical in the sense that it
does not merely confine itself to intellectual theories about moral principles, but it insists on
every individual to lead a righteous and meaningful life and finally assists them towards the
attainment of moksha or liberation. They discuss philosophy as a way of life. In Indian
philosophy religious thought always insisted on the experimental and existential nature of the
object of religion. Direct experience is one of the essences of Indian philosophy. It is termed in
Indian philosophy the vision of truth (Darsana).
It has been said that there is a radical difference between the western and the eastern methods of
approach in the pursuit of philosophy. Western philosophers are generally distinguished from
the eastern by their exclusively rational approach to the ultimate reality of the universe. If there
are metaphysical principles, a man in the east wants to raise the level of experience, but the man
in the west treats them as theoretical, brings them down to a human level and applies them to his
life. Western philosophers believed that philosophy and religion are two different disciplines.
They have faith in human reasons only. Kantian ethics is the good example: Kants whole ethical
and moral philosophy is based on human reasons only, not on human religion.

Yet despite this basic distinction between the philosophical traditions of east and west, they have
many things in common. On morality, if there is a resemblance between any ethical theory of
Indian and Western tradition, it is no doubt between the Bhagavad-Gita s Niskama karma and
Immanuel Kants categorical imperative. Kant believed that morality could be summed up in one
ultimate principle from which all our duties and obligations are derived. Kant called the ultimate
moral principle as the duty for dutys sake - popularly known as the principle of the categorical
imperative. The notion of the Kants categorical imperative is reminiscent of the notion of
Bhagavad-Gitas niskama karma. Many philosophers believe that both enjoin the performance of
duties for the sake of duty without being actuated by love, hatred, fear, anger and other emotions.
Both enjoin the performance of duties without any desire of fruits or any consideration of ends
and consequences and so they resemble each other. The Gita ethics is anti-hedonistic and antiutilitarian like that of Kant. But in this paper I examine the critical account on both these school
of thought. It also contains the points and issues on which the two ethical views differ. There is
some similarity between them, but they differ in some essential points. Here I have discussed
three points of divergence between the Gitas and Kants theory of duty. It is argued that they
are similar in their deontological nature. Some people who consider that the Gitas philosophy to
be deontological, may not agree with my observation. My purpose of this paper is to establish
that the niskama karma of Bhagavad-Gita is not a deontological concept, rather than it is a
teleological concept. Here I have raised a question that what is the source of our duties: self or
nature. My purpose of this paper is to explore the differences between them on the fundamental
questions of free will, the moral problem and the law of duty. To understand the differences
between them it is necessary to understand the Gitas concept of niskama karma.
The Bhagavad-Gita is one of the most popular and holy text of the Hindus. It is a part of the
great epic, the Mahabharata, contained in the Bhismaparva. Most scholars believe that
Mahabharata was written at about 1000-500 BCE. In this whole text there is a philosophical
dialogue between lord Krishna and his favourite warrior Arjuna, who is reluctant, to fight a war
against his kith and kin. The whole philosophy of the Bhagavad-Gita is based on jnana, karma
and bhakti. One can attain the ultimate goal in life, that is, liberation, by anyone of these three
different paths. Karmayoga is considered better of the two paths by Lord Krishna not only
because it is easier to practice for anybody but also it is a prerequisite for the path of knowledge.
The Bhagavad-Gita is one source for the Hindu ethics of performing our duty without
attachment to the fruits of our action. Niskama karma literally means action without desire or
disinterested action. A man should never be motivated by the results of the actions he performs
nor should he/she have any affinity for not doing his/her prescribed actions. They should always
act according to duties prescribed by society for the sake of righteousness as a moral virtue.
Niskama karma is a universal moral law determined by society. Action is done from a desire or
an attachment, has no moral worth. In this respect The Gitas interpretation of niskama karma
looks similar to Kants categorical imperative. Kant claims that consequences are irrelevant in

determining our duty. For Kant the intention behind an action is more important, but not its
consequences. According to Kant any act done out of inclination lacks real moral worth. The
moral worth of an action depends on good will, or doing ones duty for the sake of duty. Thus
according to both Gita and Kant, the highest type of morality consists in doing duty for dutys
sake, without any personal attachment. A man must do his duty simply because it is duty. Both
systems are anti-hedonistic and anti-utilitarian and so they resemble each other. In spite of the
similarities there is an underlying sense of difference between them. Whereas the Gita proposes
us to perform our moral duties by the proper judgement of our impulses that is by controlling our
senses; Kant advocates that we should perform our duties with pure reason, excluding our
inclination. Kant enjoins the extirpation of feelings and emotions. He defines that duty is an
action which is to be performed with compulsion to a purpose unwillingly adopted.
When karma is performed with selfless motive and is done for the common good or the welfare
of humanity, it is called karmayoga. The calmness of the mind in both success and failure is
karmayoga. Gita says that, do your duty to the best of your ability. Acting in this kind of yogic
manner brings peace and equanimity in his/her mind. This type of karma does not create a
karmic bondage. The gist of karmajoga is giving up the selfish motive behind an action.
The basic idea underlying the Bhagavad-Gita is action. The world has grown on the basis of
karma. The bondage of karma is due to the existence of attachment which binds us to this world
and it leads to rebirth. The Gitas concept of niskama karma is not negation of actions, but
negation of desires attached to ones duty. Bhagavad-Gita propounds the philosophy of action.
The renunciation of action consists in the giving up of action and the giving up of action is
equivalent to non-action which the Bhagavad-Gita does not propound anywhere. It is true that
one might give up all actions in order to avoid all moral conflicts. If we follow the path of nonaction we will be able to follow a life which will not be morally reprehensible. Niskama karma
does not mean renunciation of action, but renunciation in action. Inaction or abstention from
action is neither possible nor desirable. If one wishes to give up action, he did not do so because
of his psycho-physical structure. Man is composed of three gunas-sattva, rajas, tamas- these
gunas necessarily create activity in all men. Karma is a name for the sum total of the tendencies
with which a man is born. The Bhagavad-Gita itself declares that action less is impossible.
Bhagavad-Gita does not teach motiveless action, but that action must be performed without the
egoistic motives of affection. Thus we can say that niskama karma is not an intentional action
because it is done with intension of doing it. Gita preaches the performance of actions in a
detached spirit. The philosophy of karmayoga consists in the practice of the philosophy of
niskama karma.
According to Gita, karma or actions has two types- sakam karma and niskama karma. An action
done with some expectations about the outcome is called sakam karma. Sakam karma is an
action that is done from the motive of achieving something. It simply means that you do karma
with the result in mind. Whole concept of samsara is based on the debits and credits of sakam

karma. Material desires, emotions, expectations make an individual to doing sakam karma. Most
of the human being lives in the world of sakam karma. Niskama karma is a selfless or desire less
action, which is performed without any expectation of fruits and results. But in this world it is
very difficult to find out a niskami person who instead of being guided by his senses works for
the sake of duty only which is identical with the notion of Kants categorical imperative. Because
detaching from sensuous inclinations is not easy for ordinary people.
According to the Gita, karma or action means, acting according to ones own varna and asrama.
People are classified into four varnas, or classes on the basis of their gunas, to perform different
functions in society. Varna-dharma is the social duty and every individual should perform the
duties on the basis of his varna. Ones varna is not based on birth but only on qualities and
actions, determined by a domaining quality. Here a question arises; what is a source of duty?
According to the Bhagavad-Gita duties are the prescribed actions that need to be performed by
the members of the different casts of the fourfold order. Relying on the samkhya theory of nature
as constituted by three gunas, the Bhagavad-Gita points out that everything that exist including
the God are constituted by innumerably different admixtures of these three gunas. These qualities
are present in different variations in different things. These variations consist of the
predominance of one guna in different degrees over the other two. Krisna is the creator of the
system of four castes. Bhagavad-Gita lists the different duties for four castes. In short for
Bhagavad-Gita , ones duties are determined by ones nature. Svadharma morally push a person
to perform his/her duty detached from worldly affairs.
In the preface of his foundations Kant begins with the pronouncement that only goodwill is
unqualified good and concludes that only the willing of an action should be considered good or
not. Kant defines duty as the practical unconditional necessity of action and this unconditional
necessity is derived from the laws of reason. For Kant reason is an essential faculty of all human
beings. The law of duty is determined by the law of reason. For Kant human beings are
essentially rational and autonomous. So ultimately for Kant, duties come from human reason and
not from something external to it. Kant holds that the voice of conscience is inescapable. Kant
points out that the conscience would ultimately tell a person what his/her duties are or whether a
particular action is from duty or not. Kant says that an action can be called a duty if that is
accepted universally as a duty. To recognize ones duties one should follow his/her own reason
and nothing something external. So it can be conclude that, according to Gita the source of our
duty is nature but for Kant it is self or pure reason.
The Bhagavad-Gita maintains social welfare or the good of all creatures as the highest empirical
good. The disinterested performance of ones specific duties in society leads one to perfection, if
they are performed for human welfare. It is means to the attainment of God or liberation. Now in
this part I am advocate that concept of niskama karma which though not acceptable to those who
takes the notion of niskama karma as deontological like Kants categorical imperative. My view
is for the support for the teleological concept of niskama karma. Here I have argue that the

doctrine of niskama karma of the Bhagavad-Gita , like the Kantian doctrine of duty, does not
prescribed actions just for the sake of actions. It prescribes action as a means for the attainment
of some specific ends i.e. moksha and lokasamagraha. The doctrine of niskama karma is a
doctrine of action which was advocated by the Bhagavad-Gita to protect dharma in the society
and dharma was being formulated keeping in view the goodness of both the individual and the
society. Unlike the deontological concept where niskama karma is to perform duty for the sake
of duty only which is devoid of the hope of any result, the Bhagavad-Gita advocates that one
ought to perform duties obligatory upon him for the sake of lokasamgraha. So this doctrine is not
completely unconnected with the notion of the end. Thus when we understand the notion of
niskama karma from this angle, we find that it is actually a teleological concept, and not a
deontological concept, as it is understood by some thinkers.
From the notion of niskama karma it is clear that the ethics of the Gita is completely theological
and Kants ethics is rational. The Bhagavad-Gitas philosophy of action shows a theistic faith in
a supreme entity. The Bhagavad-Gita admits that the good of all creatures as the highest good. It
is means to the attainment of God. But though rational in somewhere of Kants ethics we can
find a hidden touch of theology. Kants prospect of the Holy will is clear enough to prove this.
Kants notion of the Holy will looks like the will of the God. For Kant the existence of God is
another postulate of morality. God will harmonize virtue with happiness in the life beyond. He
guarantees the realization of the complete good or the harmony of virtue with happiness. From
the above discussion it is obvious that Kants ethics though rational at the same time it is also
Yet despite this basic distinction between the philosophical traditions both the Bhagavad-Gita
and Kant have shown a very close resemblance. Both ideas stresses on the non-attachment to
sensuous inclinations and desires. Thus morality for both these two theorists requires that one
should perform ones duty for the sole reason that it is his/her duty. No other consideration,
about inclinations, emotions, feelings or outcomes should cloud ones mind in following ones
duties. For them ethics deals with morality or human conduct. So in order to establish justice in
the society we can never deny the importance of the two notions of east and west. Finally it can
be concluded that these two doctrines elevates a person towards self-realization which is the final
destination of every human beings.


Radhakrishnan, S., Indian Philosophy, Vol. I, New Delhi, Oxford University Press, 2002,
p. 519.
Wikipedia, the free Encyclopaedia.
Sarma, Manmohan, Ghagavad Geeta Gyaan, Delhi, Kalpaz Publications, 2007, p.29.

Bhagavad-Gita , Chapter-III, Sloka-8

Sinha, Jadunath, Indian Philosophy, Vol. I, Calcutta, New Central Book Agency, 1987,
pp. 216-217.
Roy, D.K., The Bhagavad Gita, India, Hind Pocket Books, 2000.
Yogi, M.M., Bhagavad Gita: A New Translation and Commentary, Penguin Books,
Prasad, Rajendra, Karma, Causation and Retributive Morality, New Delhi, 1989, p.245.
R.K. Gupta, A look at the Ethics of the Gita, JICPR, Vol. 11, No. 2, 1994, pp.122-125.
Sinha, Jadunath, A Manual of Ethics, Sinha Publishing House Private Limited,1962,
pp.165-169 .



John Daniel
Origin and the development of both eastern and western philosophies and religions are explained
using terminologies understandable to professional scientists and engineers. Then the
relationship between the scientific and religious theories is explained. Finally, integration of all
cultures of the world by the most advanced culture of the world is recommended for the birth of
future ages of discoveries and inventions. Then, why always good or righteous persons or
organizations win over the bad or wrong persons or organizations at the end of any struggle is
explained in terms of logical principles as concluding remark.
A brief introduction to philosophy and theology for professional scientists and engineers:
To do good or right deeds, both in social and professional life, a person has to know all about
what is good and bad and what is right and wrong. But mans reasoning is not sufficient to know
completely all about social moral and ethical values since man is a partial observer of both the
inner and outer worlds. He knows too little about the world. But to live a happy life, from birth to
death all need to know the complete social moral and ethical values. God the creator of the world
knows all and more. Therefore, Gods message contains complete set of social moral, ethical and
religious values. Both Gods message/religion and reason/philosophy are required for living a
happy life. Reason is required to properly understand the Gods message and to develop science,
technology, law, medicine, arts, etc. Therefore, religion and reason are complimentary parts of
life. Religion is about living a life bound by social moral, ethical and religious values. Science
and technology are about this material world and mind. Religion is about beyond the material
world and the rational mind.
All religions of the earth could be classified into three types. One is nature worshiping religions,
the other one is social religions and the third one is self worshipping religions. All primitive
jungle dwellers worshipped the nature for finding the way of eliminating all pains of jungle life
since very often threat to peaceful life came from natural disaster or events. Man could kill wild
animals and protect himself from the danger of getting killed by them. But ancients could not
have found the way of protecting themselves from diseases, bodily sufferings, flooding, earth
quakes, etc. They also must have noticed that jungle fire, rain, seasonal changes, change of time,
power of sun, birth and death, etc. were beyond their control. Therefore, they must have become
obedient to these forces and started to worship them not to damage or destroy them. In this way
all primitive people worshipped the nature. Then, following such worship, they also must have
started to worship powerful men like great warriors and fighters who protected and saved the
people from bad elements.


Ancient Indians found the divine nature of man and therefore, they developed Hinduism based
on divine self worship. Caste divisions were made to make all to realize the divine nature of
individual. Since knowledge originates from the self, Hindus permitted all forms of nature
worship. Since knowledge created the world and exists in all parts of the world, they worshipped
all in the world. In this way, Hinduism was developed from caste based economy and politics
and the nature worship. Therefore, Hinduism is not based on any social moral, ethical and
religious values.
But Gautama Buddha found during the Vedic period of Hinduism that truth of life exists or the
path of eternal peace and happiness exists in the middle path of individual and the social life. He
called this path as Dharma path meaning that righteous path. Therefore, he advised the righteous
way of life as the best way of life to attain eternal peace and happiness. In this way, Buddha
developed Buddhism based on a set of social moral and ethical values.
The ancient Hebrews while they were living in jungles found that the God who created the world
alone can tell the way of living happy and peaceful life, since the creator knows all about the
world and more. They also found that God exists outside the world. Therefore, they worshiped
this ultimate God for getting message to live a happy life. They received the message from God
and lived as per Gods message and when they found that Gods message was not sufficient, they
again prayed to God for further message and so on. In this way both Christianity and Judaism
were developed. During this period, whenever, Jews violated the laws given by God, they went
into painful life. Once again, they prayed to God for happy life and God did forgive their wrong
deeds and gave new laws. In this way, Hebrew history continued.
Since human life is finite, they believed that God message must be finite. Therefore, at the end of
Jewish history, they believed that God will send his son to the world to save the people from
painful life. As per their expectation, when Jews were suffering and going through great pains,
Jesus Christ was born and gave new message to the people and defended the truth given by him
by sacrificing his life. He died to prove that he is son of God and to save the world. In this way
Christianity was born. Those who followed Jesus Christ became Christians. The Jews who did
not follow Jesus Christ remained as Jews. Then based on the teachings of Jews and Christians
Mohamed founded Islam. Islam considers many as Gods messengers including Jesus Christ.
They do not accept Jesus as the only messenger of God. But God of Jews, Christians and
Muslims are one and the same.
Western religions and Buddhism are social religions. But Hinduism is based on economy and
politics. Hindu economy and politics are based on caste divisions. Hindus worship all forms of
material world. Hinduism is not based on any social moral, ethical and religious values. Hindus
did not receive Gods message. Hindu religious stories are about heroic activities of kings and
emperors or struggle between good and bad kings and emperors. Therefore, Hinduism is
classified as a Philosophy as per the western view of Philosophy and religion. As per western

view of God and religion, they are beyond the material world and rational mind. Son of God
must have been born in Jewish History and at the end of Jewish History. Jesus Christ did was
born in Jewish History and at the end of Jewish History. Therefore, he is the one and only son of
God. In other peoples history, people followed Gods or Goddesses different from that God of
Jews. Therefore, they cannot be considered as messengers of God. Great philosophers cannot be
Gods messengers since philosophy is based on reason. Religion is about God given truth or
revealed truth. Therefore, teachings of Mohamed contain both religious and philosophical facts
like Hinduism. Therefore, teachings of Mohamed are classified as Philosophy. Buddhism teaches
pure social moral and ethical values. Therefore, Buddhism is also a Philosophy.
These philosophies are religious philosophies. But Greek philosophy is scientific philosophy.
With this brief introduction, one can understand both religion and various philosophies of the
world and by following them in day to day life all the benefits can be received.
On the Relationship between Scientific and Religious Theories:
Modern science, technology and philosophy have its roots in ancient Greek science, technology
and philosophy. This age of discoveries and inventions was reborn after Christianization of
Europe in the European Christian traditions. Modern age of discoveries and inventions begins
with the conflict between science and religion on the subject of Cosmology. Church believed on
Earth centered Universe and scientists believed on sun centered Universe. Science is about
natural world. But religion is about the complete world. Therefore, religion includes both natural
and human worlds. Since only earth has both living and non living things, earth is a special place
and considered as center of the world. This fact believed by the church is true even today. Based
on this fact Churches in the beginning of renaissance believed that all planets revolve around the
earth. But science has proved that all planets are revolving around the sun. As per the modern
cosmological principle earth is not a special place in the universe. However, so far no evidence is
found for the existence of life in other parts of the universe.
After the age of Jesus Christ, Christians united all cultures in Europe and made all to think in a
constructive, healthy and creative ways. These thoughts and experiences were stored in the
languages of Europeans and at appropriate time, age of discoveries and inventions were born,
when Europeans learned Greek science, technology and philosophy from Arabs. These
accumulated creative experiences and experiences gained from other cultures of the world, made
Europeans to invent and discover further and now this age is over since creative experiences
were accumulated over a limited period of time. All accumulated creative powers are used and
all possible inventions to satisfy all human senses and mind were made from non living matter.
Man is a microcosm. All possible discoveries in physics is over. The next big breakthrough will
be on linking physics with plants and life forms.


Religion is from God to man. But science is from man to God. One cycle of scientific progress is
over since all possible technologies based on non living matter have been made. Therefore, the
next age of renaissance will begin with the plant world. But there is a gap between dead matter
and a plant or living organism. We have found the link between soils, solids, liquids and gases.
But there is a big gap between non living matter and living matter. Both bible and science says
that world originated from light. Both bible and science also says that the living (organisms)
matters originated from the earth. But in science there are various theories about the origin of
living world. Three theories are Darwins theory of evolution, theory of mutation and theory of
seed dissemination on earth by aliens.
A scientific theory has to be made based on what is well known facts and not based on what is
unknown. Existence of aliens is not known to us. Therefore, theory of seed dissemination on
earth by aliens is not a scientific theory. As per the Darwins theory of evolution, complex
organisms originated from simpler organisms over a period of time and then this evolutionary
process has stopped. Theory of mutation states that complex organisms originated from simpler
organisms suddenly (not over a period of time like Darwins theory) and then this mutation
stopped except in some lower forms of life. Darwins theory of evolution is a continuous process
and theory of mutation is a discrete process.
Both the theories of bible and science rely on very concrete fact that there is a big discontinuity
exists between different forms of life and non living matter. We do not know much about the link
between non living matter and plants, plants and animals and animals and human beings in the
context of their origin. But bible clearly says that god made man from the earth. Man is the most
complex body of the world known to us. Therefore, if this biblical theory is combined with the
scientific theories, then all living organisms must have originated from the earth. Both biblical
and scientific theories say that earth originated from the sun.
Modern physical theory of cosmos was obtained by combining the theory of particle physics
with the theories of astrophysics. As per this theory the big universe originated from energy
(electromagnetic energy/ light). This theory of origin and evolution of the universe is very much
similar to the Darwins theory of evolution. Since earth and other planets of our solar system
originated from the sun, since the solar power originates from thermo-nuclear reactions, the
origin of life on the earth could be better understood, if the thermo-nuclear processes of the sun
are studied when an earth size part of bigger star/sun is separated and cooled by translational and
rotational motion of the hot body around the sun or by studying the thermo-nuclear reactions of
the sun at reduced temperatures in the laboratory.
The thermo-nuclear products in a earth size part of sun at reduced temperatures by rotational and
translational motion of this hot body around the sun must have generated the seeds of all life
forms on the earth. There must have been three types of seed materials generated, one type for

each world (plants, animals and human beings). Plant world must have originated first lower
temperature as compared with that of sun. Animals must have originated at lower temperatures
as compared with the temperature of origin of plants. Finally human beings must have originated
at lower temperature as compared with that of temperature of origin of animals. To make higher
level organisms, lower temperatures are required. Since all three types of life forms (plants,
animals and human beings) originated from three different and related types of seeds and seeds
of higher level organisms gone down to lower temperatures from the temperatures of origin of
lower level organisms, all the three forms of life have similarities and differences and appears to
have originated from the lower type materials.
But the problem is getting the break through idea to take the humanity to the next or plants level
of thinking from the bottom level or ground level or non living matter level. Idea originates from
the accumulated human experiences of the past. God made the world and made different
geographical conditions on the earth and as a consequence different types of human beings.
Therefore, human experiences and culture varies from place to place on the earth all over the
world. Therefore, complete truth of the world is divided among the different cultures of human
race. Man is a miniaturized world. If we know all about human beings we will know all about the
world since man originated from elementary particles of the world like other living and non
living matter. But human race is made up of different types of men. Their experience, history and
culture are different. Therefore, complete truth of the world could be understood if and only if all
cultures of the world are integrated by the advanced culture of the world and thoughts are
experiences are accumulated in a common culture. The first cycle of renaissance was made by
integrating European cultures. This cycle of progress is over. Therefore, next cycle of progress
could only be made if we integrate all cultures of the world and accumulate creative thoughts and
experiences in that common culture.

In any competition or struggle, always good or right minded person or organization wins at the
end. This is so because the good or right minded person or organization will not get satisfaction
and peace of mind unless it solves the problems faced. Therefore, this mind is a perfect mind.
But bad or wrong mind is believes that it knows all and therefore, does bad or wrong deeds very
secretly. But the truth is man is imperfect being and therefore, there is always imperfection in
his/her evil design. This imperfection is visible to the good or right minded person/ organization
at the end of the struggle and bad are defeated. This fact is valid at all levels of humanity and at
all times. Therefore, only the best person or organization can survive at the end of struggle. This
is extended version of Darwins theory valid in the human domain. Therefore, to survive, social
value is more important than intelligence.




E.G.Seebauer and R.L.Barry, Fundamentals of ethics for scientists and

engineers Oxford University press, 2001, pages 4-8.

Albert Einstein, Ideas and Opinions Rupa and Co. 1979.

Ronald W. Clark, Einstein- The Life and Times Avon Books, New York, 1984.

John Daniel, Social Information and Communication Theory (S.I.C.T.) and Its
Applications for the Welfare of Humanity, CLICK-2014, February 12-13, 2014,
Sankara College of Arts and science, Ennathur, Kancheepuram, Tamil Nadu,

John Daniel, A Brief History of Knowledge, CLICK-2014, February 12-13,

2014, Sankara College of Arts and science, Ennathur, Kancheepuram, Tamil
Nadu, India.

John Daniel, Indian Culture - Most Advanced Culture Of The World, CLICK2014, February 12-13, 2014, Sankara College of Arts and science, Ennathur,
Kancheepuram, Tamil Nadu, India.

John Daniel, Importance of Uniting Socio- Cultural Values of India and the
World, CLICK-2014, February 12-13, 2014, Sankara College of Arts and
science, Ennathur, Kancheepuram, Tamil Nadu, India.

John Daniel, A Christian Philosophy and Theology based Analysis and Design
of Indian and Global Social, Economic and Political System, Ph.D. thesis,
October, 2013, I.I.C.M., Florida, USA.




Guneeta Chadha
One major thing that differentiates human beings from other living creatures is their
innate urge, desire to create or replicate the beauties of nature and things around them.
The imaginative capacity of humans to visualize and then create has made us the superior
living beings. It is said that art makes us more human and a drawing much more than a
thousand words. According to Oscar Wilde, Art is the only serious thing in the world.
And the artist is the only person who is never serious. Painting, sculpture, music,
literature and the other arts are often considered to be the repository of a societys
collective memory. Art preserves what fact-based historical records cannot show and how
it felt to exist in a particular place at a particular time.
Broader Definition of Art:
Art is defined broadly as the creation of beautiful or thought-provoking works. Art can be
understood as a painting, photography, or sculpture that appeals primarily to the visual
sense and typically exists in permanent form.
There are various categories of art, especially of the visual arts like painting, drawing,
fine art, graphic arts, and sculpture and in the most recent times installation, assemblage,
performance and digital art.
What is Society?
Society is the relationship among groups of humans .It is the structured community of
people bound together by similar traditions, institutions, or nationality. Each society will
be having the customs of a community and the way it is organized, e.g. its class structure,
civilization, culture, the social order, humanity, the world.
Are Art and Society interlinked?
Art and Society have a very relevant relationship. Both exist within each other and
complement each other. Art encourages the growth of a society and society provokes the
direction of its Art.
Art began, one may argue, when civilization was borne. With each civilization, we form a
society, a group of people with individual characteristics, philosophies and cultures
within which all sorts of ideas, thoughts and opinions are always brought to challenge
and evaluation. Evolution of the human race and recorded historical events are a proof of


the development of human society. Art has been used as a vehicle to illustrate and
illuminate history as historians recognize that some Art may help them to identify and
explain the nature of a society or a period. The historians and sociologists have used art
and artefacts to understand and study the various cultures and societies all over the world.
As the topic is vast, I will therefore be focusing on the relationship between painting and
society. I will be referring to different periods of Art movement to view its contribution
to its society, and how Art and society have counteracted in bringing forth new Arts and
new societies for generation to come.
Art serves multitude of purposes in society. Its impact can be both positive and negative.
As Leonardo Da Vinci, The famous Renaissance painter expresses, Painting is poetry
that is seen rather than felt, and poetry is painting that is felt rather than seen. Art can
bring awareness to people. It is a powerful means of presenting truths about humankind
that cannot be expressed any other way. Art also connects people in a society by
presenting an idea that everyone can relate to in a universal way. The awareness that
comes from art will only lead to a better society if the people take action based on the
ideas they discover in art.
Art and culture are not black and white concepts; there is no way to say that one affects
the other absolutely. But they do affect each other, in many instances. For example, art
reflects culture in that the society and environment in which the form of art was created
may have affected the person, place, and reason behind why that piece of art was created.
It can show the economic status of that nation in the art and the materials used to make it.
Aristotle once said, The aim of art is to represent not the outward appearance of things,
but their inward significance.
Art has the possibility of making society better, but there are several steps involved. First,
the art must reach the public. Then the people must appreciate the value of the art. The
last step involves people changing their behaviour to improve the society. Art influences
a particular society stimulating or affecting human consciousness. Socrates, the famous
Greek Philosopher, was among the first to articulate and understand the impact art can
have on human mind and can collectively have a much deeper impact upon society.
Art and Society are ever changing and ever evolving:
As a society cannot exist without human beings, similarly, art cannot thrive and survive
in isolation. An artist is a part of the society, and also his thoughts, ideas and expression,
and the language of art is reflective of his surroundings. His imagination and creativity
also have some roots of his cultural ideologies and his society.



Ideas trigger responses and therefore arouse innumerable influences on background;

heredity and environments. These influences then get translated into new ideas; the circle
begins again. With the passage of time, everything changes. As society changes,
progresses the ideas in the works of Art are in themselves changing, flowing inspirations
to succeeding generation of viewers. This is reviving and self-renewing circle of
exchange in ideas result in new Art and new society. The process is forever interchanging
and inter-relating.
The History of Art coincides with the history of evolution of Man as a Social.
Art is the product of our society, which can reflect its nature, the reflection of art let us,
experience the changes and behaviour of our civilization. Each piece of Art is a history
reference of the society at that particular time.
If we look back from the Pre-historic times, man has always developed into a social being
and started to live in groups. The creative urge of man to express himself has always
been the predominant nature of human race since times immemorial. When we study the
history of Indian art, we understand that it has been highly patronized by the kings and
rulers and directly reflective of the social settings of those particular times. Be it the
Mauryans, The Guptas or the Mughals, Art was used as a means of expression, a means
of connecting with the masses, with the society.
Paintings, sculptures and architectures in the Renaissance were almost always produced
by Artists at the specific request of another person i.e. the patron; who might be the King,
the Pope, a duke or a rich citizen. Artists, did not on the whole, produce works of Art in
their workshops and wait for a patron; instead, the patrons specifically requested works.
Therefore the contents of Art at that period were mainly an expression of papal power,
the aspiration of the community, and the indication of the wealth of a ruler or any
significant figures. Powerful images brought contrast to the hierarchy of life styles; they
divided up the rich and the poor. Its a reflection of a society that ruled by class division.
A good example of art reflecting culture in history is the Renaissance Era. During the
Renaissance, Europe had an immediate renewal in art and learning. Europe was
recovering from the bubonic plague; there was a rejuvenation of wealth in prosperity.
There was a somewhat excess in wealth, which resulted in many people becoming
patrons of the art, or wealthy people that sponsored artists to continue their craft.
The very essence of the Renaissance was encapsulated by the work of three Masters ,
who were Leonardo Da Vinci, Raphael Sanzio, and Michelangelo Buonarottio. Leonardo
Da Vinci was seen as the perfect man of the Renaissance. I personally like his work,
Mona Lisa 1506. (Left) The expression on her face was the key to the painting. During
the Middle Age, figures were painted with no life, and quite often strictly on biblical


subjects. There was always a sense of rigidity and server ness. The transformation from
this into a painting with life and flesh was seen as being cursed and scandalous. But,
precisely for this reason Leonardo Da Vinci broke the boundary of Art, with a smile and
a glimpse of life. Here Art was used to challenge the society and give it a new direction.
Art and Society was constantly encouraging each other to move towards a goal, an ideal
society. If we see from the Indian context, and study the history of India and History of
Indian art, we see that both have progressed and grown, and changed together. Right
from the Indus valley to the Buddhist to Hindu art and to the onset of Medieval period
with Muslim ideology, the changes are seen in art which are directly reflective to social
changes. Then the coming of The British, and the fight for independence leading again
the revival of the Indian values and Indian aesthetics lead by the Bengal Nationalist
movement to the Indian Contemporary art of Modern Free Independent India.
Hence we see how society has inflicted an influence on Artist and how each movement
began because of the society in the time it took place. There is a sometimes-confusing
attitude, weather Art reflect society or is it the society that reflects Art?
We can scan through the millions of famous paintings throughout history and I think,
without too much resistance from the critics, we can say that every work of art contains
and speaks its own history. There is immediate reference to differing social climates,
ideas, dreams and politics, let alone style
We can enjoy, be proud of the achievements or ashamed of the disgrace in the course of
human history. Art also has a deeper meaning that reveals something truthful to the
society; it is an advancement that can carry the society into a new era. It induces critical
thinking, which allows the society to re-think the values in us, the materialistic values and
the human values. It is in this sort of exercise Art that brings society to movement, in
fashion, in technology and in human values; greater movements are described as
When we understand the beliefs in a society, the pressure, and the experiences of
particular events at the time the artwork was produced only then we can form our
judgment about that piece of Art. Creative Art in this sense is communication which
allows people from different cultures and different times to communicate with each other
via images, sounds and stories. Art is often a vehicle for social change and many a times
is used to voice the politically or socially disenfranchised issues as well. Today, there are
many hopes and obstacles for the future of Modern Art, although it is a difficult struggle
for Art and their Artists, but we may at least be certain that there is an inseparable
interaction between Art and Society, which will shape the future of our lives. Thus, we


can say that Art not only fosters the human need for self-expression and fulfillment; it is
also economically viable. The creation, management and distribution of art also are a
major source of employment for a large section of society.


Albrecht, Milton,C., James H.Barnett & Mason Griff (eds.), The Sociology of
Art and Literature, Praeger Publishers, New York, 1970.
Arnold W, Foster Judith R.Blau,, Art and Society: Readings in the Sociology of
Arts, Surrey Press, 1989.
Baumol, William, G.Bowen, Performing Arts- The Economic Dilemma,
Cambridge, M.I.T Press, 1966.
Constable, W.G., Art and Society: The Influences of Social Movements on Art
The Sociological Review, Volume 14, pg 123-130, 1922.
Craven, R.C., A Concise History of Indian Art, Praeger Publishers, New York,
Majumdar, R.C. History and Culture of Indian People Vol.II &III.




Urmi Saha

Like everything metaphysical the harmony between thought and reality is to be found in
the grammar of the language
The Philosophy of language, its an important area in philosophy thats why it raises both
important and difficult, so its importance of language to human life is surely obvious.
What is language? How does it relate to the world? How does it relate to the mind?
Should our view of language influence our view of the world? These are among the
central issues covered in this spirited and unusually clear introduction to the philosophy
of language. What is Philosophy of Language? and What are the relation between
Language and reality in accord to Ludwig Wittgenstein Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus?.
My main concern will be briefly focused on this. The relation between reality and
language depending on choice If choice (and thus reality, too) is granted, the language
generates an exact image of reality in itself; if not, only some simile can exist expressible
within it only by metaphors However then reality cannot be isolated from language.
There is a common universe containing indistinguishable elements, which can be called
elements of being: both reality and language if that is the case, the metaphors rather than
scientific concepts (representations) are the relevant tool for the being to be studied.

Over View of Tractatus Logico- Philosophicus:

In his (Ludwig Josef Johann Wittgenstein) Tractatus, there he presents seven numbered
propositions (17), with various sub-levels (1, 1.1, 1.11).The propositions of the
Tractatus (Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus) are designed to provide lighting to be
recognized as nonsense, yet many exhibitors dedicate their work to clarify and make the
myth that embodies the work more credible. They fail to take the necessary to destroy
that myth leap for its own absurdity. I have argued elsewhere that the ontology of objects
forming part of the world.1 The work seems as if given a theory of language - a semantic
theory of how propositions can be true or false - which is based on the ontology. But in
fact, cannot, on their own principles, given by the language or truth and falsity of
propositions any account that is based on describable features the world. On this account
would be metaphysical and the work itself is a subtle form of rejection of metaphysics.



It seems to be the positive goal of TLP is to explain the philosophy and logic through
elements necessarily belonging to any language. These logic functions can be shown or
exhibited, but do not describe or represent. That's why the main point of the work (as
Wittgenstein himself said)2 is the theory which can be expressed by propositions and
what cannot be expressed, but only a sample. In particular, we cannot give, and
Wittgenstein does not give an account of language simple building it from existing
elements. Thus, the presupposed objects, eternally existent and setting limits on what we
can say, truly becomes a feature of our thought and language - but one feature that eludes
our ability to express.
I think it's not too difficult to connect this anti-realism about the "objects" with various
slogans Wittgenstein: that the world consists of facts, not things (TLP 1); and realism,
idealism and solipsism match (TLP). On the other hand observations on the "existence"
of the objects are interpreted as part of the "myth" of TLP, the story we were told that
highlights its own unsustainability. What, then, is particularly recommended this
interpretation (a methodological issue) and if this is a correct interpretation,
recommended as a way of seeing the world? It is necessary to show that is all consistent
with TLP (from inconsistencies in a work of this nature cannot be excluded), and if TLP
is, as it seems, an important and suggestive work, the proposed interpretation has an
application of some philosophies value. I use the word 'suggestive' deliberately, because a
notable feature of TLP is suspected that the reader that behind his words, there is a body
of thought that quite unable to express. Of course, this is exactly what is said in the book,
so the style is right for the message.
First, the question of whether this position is consistent with, and the only one compatible
with most TLP. On the downside, I have argued that TLP no understanding of
propositions rests on a process of extensive definition. Not supposed to elementary
propositions in which use of certain names is connected to reality by the correlation of
these names regardless identifiable objects. This is because the concept of independent
identification of objects in that one TLP is incoherent. Only a proposition does a name
make sense, so it cannot be an act of pre-propositional to make sense of a name, for
example, pointing to an object. This can be put another way, also in terms TLP system,
saying the situation point to an object and naming (preferably enough in a macroscopic
world) cannot be applied to objects of TLP because that situation demands the existence
of an object as a matter of fact, while TLP objects exist independently of what is the case
in the world. One of the main points of the book is to insist that the "experience" needed
to understand the language (the experience that there is a world) is quite different from
the experience of what is in the world (TLP). The first is not an experience of facts while
confronting a particular object is an experience of reality. The first is rather, as Aristotle
said about the relationship of their simple intelligence, a kind of contact. The reader may


think that Wittgenstein is incorrect to call both experiences things if your point is to warn
against identified. If this is an error, it is interesting to note that Aristotle also does; but in
the case of Wittgenstein is certainly part of its ironic treatment of himself and his readers.
Commits errors or flirts with TLP, to teach us not to. I hope that at the end to show
convincingly that this is not an unfair trick. The apparent objection - that Wittgenstein
after all, says things that are not meant to be predictable - can be dismissed, because the
point is that not only accepts, but wants to see their own say about him, that what he says
is unsayable.
This rejection a priori of the ostensive definition of names of objects brings another point
to be clarified. Is not the case that we sense proposals to mentally associate words (and
implicitly the element names that occur if the proposition is completely analyzed) with
objects. Such mental association would otherwise simply reject the ostensive definition.
Thinking about the meaning of the proposition is identical with the projection method.
The meaning is that the use of the proposition is what gives meaning to their names, not
one act more mental dubbing or intent. This is, I believe, a crucial point in the TLP
understanding. The image theory is understood as an account or model it is for the
propositions that make sense and names that mean. If you describe how "images" can be
built and then say that their reference elements take themselves acquire truth value under
an act of meaning or intent, you have done nothing. Would like peasants to the machine
operating steam locomotive is carefully explained, then asked: But where to go horse?
The point is that the theory of the image and the account associated with it language is
intended to be an account of mental phenomena: no need mental power - the power of
thought - well, unless the account is a complete failure. We will see shortly in
Wittgenstein's account of knowledge and belief in TLP et seq. In general it cannot
explain what images are introducing human action. Rather, human action by the notion of
external image is explained. It is not the man who takes pictures as it were, but the
images that do a man.3
All this is intended to exclude certain types of response to the question, How do you
ensure reference? Not by ostensive definition, not the mental act of associating a word
with one thing. The words are learned, of course, and learned of their occurrence in
ordinary propositions. It's not like we learn a (primary) proposition of the form 'a is
between B and C' and then asked, What objects are a, b and c? What we learn much more
(mostly implicitly) is the way to understand the propositions of the form "if it is the
center of a circle and b and c endpoints of a line then the angle ". In that judgment, as
Hide Ishiguro6 noted as well, could not ask for, but the points a, b, and c? The language
learner faces a spoken language, consisting of propositional facts or images. Each them is
of a complexity that eventually realizes, can have only one meaning, can only indicate or
affirm a state of things. Here we come to a more subtle Wittgenstein, but, in my opinion,


most of the distinctions consistent and rigorous between show and tell. a proposition
shows its sense, shows how it is, if it is true, and is said to do standing (TLP 4.022). The
idea here is that while the complexity, organization the proposition, fully understood,
properly indicates what state of affairs is concerned, is not the additional function of
sense to be added to the proposition or rather understood it. Here (ie in my observations)
sense means something like direction: we must understand how the proposition is to be
taken. Does this mean that p or not-p? Or, more accurately, determine what or what is the
p says here that the non-p. Later in these interesting propositions, numbered 4.0,
containing his account of truth and his criticism of Frege, Wittgenstein points out that
from the point of view of complexity (multiplicity) p alone and not-p are equivalent. p
and not-p can say the same, so what show is the same (TLP 4.0621). They have opposite
directions but sense indicated by the use. If I'm not mistaken, this gives us the key to how
to address the issue raised above Wittgenstein. I asked how sure reference in general and
as a first step denied that began with the granting of reference in simple signs for the
ostensive definition equivalent procedure. Reference is a function of the fact-stating, not
vice versa. So the question is how the truth conditions are attributed phrases, i.e. how
learning a language to try to associate truth with every sentence prerequisite speaker. This
is very relevant to the overall theme of realism, for reasons that will be familiar to any
reader of Michael Dummett. (TLP) Wittgenstein obviously thinks that the meaning of a
proposition is given by its truth conditions and that every proposition is true or false.
(Dummett) This seems to be possible only in a realistic framework as Frege, which
involves both a set of views on the reference (realism about objects) and a realism about
facts implicit acceptance of bivalence. For every proposition p, we know it or not, it does
not correspond either that po that not-p. In his Notes on Logic Wittgenstein seems to put,
a point like this by saying that every proposition has a meaning that is the fact that in
reality. The view that realism with respect to the objects is not compatible with TLP, but
that leaves me (1) with the question of how the truth conditions of sentences are given in
(2) (depending on the answer to this) with a residual realism with regard to the facts.
Now would seem natural to say that TLP is realistic about the facts - it starts after all,
with the assertion that the world consists of facts. In that case, the truth conditions could
be learned or granted by associating the expression of a sentence with the appropriate
fact. There are two flaws in this: (1) as I have already indicated, while the complexity of
the judgment may be sufficient to indicate that the area should indeed be consulted, will
not in itself indicate whether the sentence is to be understood as making assert or deny
that fact. (2) How is the comparison of the proposal with the reality that will take place?
What is the act of pre-linguistic grasp a fact? This may seem like an easy thing to
understand if we had something like the knowledge of the constituent objects. The
process could be described as the named objects look and see the relationship they are in.
But (if I'm right about TLP) Wittgenstein has isolated himself in this way to see the same


Perhaps this is healthy - we know (now) little is said by an account of the truth that
defines a proposition as true when the objects referred to have the relationship given to
them. But certainly, our observations are in the spirit of TLP. The apprehension of a fact
in order to compare a photo with itself should be a picture "in mind". Here is necessary to
examine Wittgenstein's account, first what to believe or understand something, then what
is known something. These occur mainly in its compressed form usual, the TLP 5.541ff
as part of their discussion and correction of the modern theory of knowledge "" A thinks /
believes / p says. 'Is actually of the form' "p" says p 'I expand and interpret this
assumption that in appropriate cases, be of the form:.'. "P" believes that p 'in all these
expressions, the second' p 'is an expression in the language of the speaker (usually not a),
which is not reflected in their own language or describe it, but use it as a form of
language in general (what Wittgenstein called "the only language they understand '). He
imagined the fact that p with a subject, A is not correlated, but only one occurrence, a
fact, a thought. This belongs to a series also connected in other ways, the series is called
'A'. Thus, the "subject" or "soul", A, is not really supposed composed of thoughts, and
therefore is complex, and therefore truly a soul. (Such is Wittgenstein's criticism of
"superficial psychology of today ' in TLP 5.5421).4
'A says / thinks p' thus becomes:
'There is a conformation in the sense that p' Or: "This conformation [such a confirmation
that] is the effect that [should be understood as meaning that] p ' that is, 'It is a fact that
the "p" and what this means / dice / It is believed that p '. This is a possible declaration
only if "p" may correspond to the state of the issues involved. What constitutes such a
belief? Or perhaps the question could also be, what is a saying as a mere phrase and not
the expression of a belief? Wittgenstein tells us, but it is possible infer the outline of your
answer and TLP. We will have completed a lack of stretch of the graph.
First, it seems as if here uses "belief" as equivalent to "trial" so that that "A believes p
'here means' to reach (or: nods) the judgment p '. The actual difference in meaning is
probably unimportant for our present purposes. Either a mental or physical expression,
then, expressed a belief or an idle fancy depend on the nature of the series to which it
belongs. Constant assertion and a certain range of seal the belief contexts, other contexts
quite entertaining a hypothesis. By analogy 'A knows that p' will essentially mean '"p"
knows that p'. We are forced to ask: How can 'p' know anything? How can 'p' being a
known or cognition that p, a piece of knowledge? Again, it is restricted, and from an
artificial eye, idiomatic sense of place the word "know", where 'A knows that p' means
something close to 'A correctly (or: nods a) the statement that p 'or' A recognizes that p '.
Suppose (as with the belief) that these notions are related interdefinable, and concentrate
on the case of cognition or current p A, that is, as it appeared, by 'p'. 'p' may be a
knowledge that p only if the occurrence of 'p' warrants p. This follows from TLP 5.1362.


I cannot find anything that is in the future because (here is to fill a step) can only know
something This now will make what is in the future. But causality is not an inner or
logical necessity, so my knowledge cannot be extended to the future as the logical
necessity lack the knowledge necessary for us. Importantly, the logical necessity for
knowledge is required, not an internal need for knowledge content. Wittgenstein
explicitly noted in this context that if p (written, ins brands) is a tautology, 'A knows that
p' is meaningless. When nothing to be known, knowledge that cannot be guaranteed. No,
the need for question extends from the cognition of 'p' itself, the fact that p. The "theory
of knowledge" TLP - the implicit analysis of terms as "belief" and "knowledge" - which
brings us to the idea that if there is any knowledge in all that will live in or depend on the
propositions known act of being formulated. It doesn't take as true knowledge seems
clear: it would be too weird to rule knowledge of the future if Also excluded were
knowledge of this. So, we can say with justice that TLP presupposes observation
sentences, which Wittgenstein later called "Aussagen '(' statements'), instead of
'Hypothesen' ('hypothesis'). 8 It is not our purpose here to consult length if they were
designed by Wittgenstein is physicalist or information pertaining to the senses, but TLP
6.3751 suggests rather old Alternatively, or in any case an indifference between
alternatives. Perhaps the two were thought to agree on a more complete analysis. The
application of these doctrines, or to the extent that meet these ideas, our main problem of
obtaining the reference is clear.
A proposition itself tells us - more correctly, it shows - it actually refers to (ie what is
actually said or inaccurate terms). There is a separate act of correlation with that fact, but
it is not the act of acquisition of the language, it is, the use of images as used in language.
In extreme cases the use of the language will be taken to be true or doubtful - here I do
not mean to be carried tautological or contradictory, but taken to be obvious once
declared. The important thing is that this "being taken at such and such "is something that
occurs within the language. The use of language shows that something is taken as a true
elementary proposition, that the other things that are then unhesitatingly said reflect their
being well taken. Put this means mentalistically5 it is based inferences, that means a
proposal and if it is true depends on (a) in its multiplicity (which is the only feature that
will tell us what kind of thing is on - the only feature that allows a new description of
matter) and (b) in its relation to the propositions that are or would be unhesitatingly
accepted as truth in language. Note again that the acceptable means something very
similar happens frequently in appropriate contexts. But if that is true, the facts fall of the
account. No verification procedures, which correspond to the analysis of a given
proposition elementary propositions, and these may lead to verification, falsification, or
more frequently probabilification. In many cases, you should not whether a proposition is
true or false. Language is, however, such we talked as if each such proposition is true or
false. That is because we cannot exclude the use of the language of the situation in that


proposition would be conclusively verified or falsified. It can happen or it could have

happened. That is a possibility contained in language or (which is the same) in thought.
The system allows. Wittgenstein remarks about facts are then more than a way of
affirming the principle of bivalence, for which no reason can be given. The ontological or
realistic myth of TLP is apparently an attempt to give a reason, but suffers from the
Selbstaufhebung - self-canceling nature of TLP assembly. We are destined to give up
that conversation, as a result of the talk himself. That is, in a way, well and good - but
extremely frustrating. We feel that talking about what is required in the world at large, for
truth, which the nature of reality, and so is philosophy. Read any work of Michael
Dummett. Above all read - but TLP is a way of saying that it cannot be done.
It would be presumptuous to claim that TLP is correct. It is not clear that the principle
prevalence is a compatibility mode with Wittgenstein required Verificationism implied.
But work is in any case an important stimulustry to get a way to treat logical or
methodological issues which is free of metaphysics.
Wittgenstein method has its own temptations - not only that allows it to use or pretend to
use whole metaphysical in the task of getting rid of metaphysics. This type of
Abschreckungsmethode a deterrent for example, it may be legitimate. But when we
finished talking strictly thought everything, then (in my previous quote Wittgenstein) we
see that the realism coincides with idealism (even with solipsism although I have not
done justice to this last item here). Now we can easily get the idea that we are studying a
vast system, a system, which is common in the world, with language, and thought, and
compels us to speak in certain ways. I myself have previously used vocabulary recalls
that view. Thus, it seems that we are tracing the lines some cosmic countenance. Of
course, you can say (and you see traces of this in Wittgenstein) than well reveal or
discover not found a limitation for us, we are discovering, rather, the nature of our own
Consultation (this would be another consequence of the character auto-cancellation of
philosophy). But it is not philosophy also a human activity, a human being we need to
show us something about ourselves? All this has its echoes in the later work of
Wittgenstein and shows how the protein metaphysics impulse is. Maybe we will draw a
lesson from that too.
Without pretense of neutrality, philosophical theory of language as an empirical theory
like any other and see the people as nothing more than complex parts of the physical
world. This leads them, controversially, to a deflationary view of the importance of the
study of language: the idea that the philosophy of language must be pre-eminent in
philosophy are discarded.
Some languages are structured around quite different categories and basic word
relationships. They project very different images of the basic nature of reality as a result.


The language of the Nootka Indians in the Pacific Northwest, for example, has a word
first-class; denoting events or events. A verbal form as "complete test" might best
describe this word-class, unless that form does not sound good in English, with its
emphasis on nominal forms. We could think of Nootka as composed entirely of verbs,
except that subjects or objects as English verbs do refrain. The Nootka then perceive the
world as a flow of transient events, rather than as a collection of more or less permanent
objects we see. Even something we see clearly as a physical object such as a house, the
Nootka perceived as a temporary long event. The literal English translation of Nootka
concept could be something like "housing occurs;" or "housing. The reality is the way of
life, which is rarely the way it really is. And our experience of reality is largely a function
of our beliefs about reality, how reality for us occurs, and the language we use to describe
1. See The supposed realism of the Tractatus, Chapter 8 in the present volume.
2. Letter to Russell of 19 August 1919 CL, p. 124
3. This line of thought is very well expressed in Warren Goldfarbs seminar notes
(unpublished as far as I know) where he discusses Hacker 1972.
4. This interpretation of TLP on belief is in accordance with Russells account, see
Appendix C to the second edition of Principia Mathematica.
5. Compare and contrast Wittgensteins analysis of the role of mathematical propositions
we use them to get from one proposition not belonging to mathematics to another such
(TLP 6.211).


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A Critical Exposition of Its Main Lines of Thought. 1960. Excerpt from
<http://www.ditext.com/stenius/ 11.html>.
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University of Chicago Press: 1980.
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Hiralal Mahato
The present paper discusses some philosophers views on morality, and going to open on
a calmer apocalyptic note through modern moral philosophy. Moral philosopher failed till
date to clear about the questions themselves. Especially they even failed to distinguish
between the questions, what we ought to do (what kind of actions ought we to perform)?
Or what we ought not to do (what kind of things ought to exist for their own sake)?
Finally, we found in the preface to G.E. Moores Principia Ethica-1903.The answer to the
question: What kind of actions ought we to perform? i.e. those "who make more good
that exists in the universe that any kind of alternative. Thus, we are brought to ask what
states of affairs are good, what kind of things must exist for their own sake. Moore takes
things that ought to exist by themselves are what we call intrinsically good. How do we
know, what is intrinsically good? The answer is that we cannot fail to recognize the
ownership of the intrinsic goodness when when confronted with it. The proposals on
which is intrinsically good, in contrast to what is good just because it is a means to
something inherently good- are susceptible neither of proof or disproof. This is because
good is the name of a simple property, not analyzable, Moore calls "unnatural"1 because
it cannot be identified with any natural property. Moore holds that the good is
indefinable, in part, under an analogy that he advocated between good and yellow, and
partly because a discussion of the consequences of holding good to be definable. But both
analogy and the argument depend in part on the curious feeling that you assign to the
definition. To define argues, is to break a complex whole into its constituent parts. So the
definition of horse will be a statement that it has four legs, a head, a heart, a liver, etc., all
arranged in certain relationships to each other. Now if this is what is meant by definition,
is not difficult to agree how good is indefinable, but this sense of the definition is so
idiosyncratic that nothing has been gained. Moore also tries to strengthen their case for an
appeal to what we are supposed to recognize when we have a given "before" our minds
idea. He says that if we consider good and, say, pleasant or any other idea we might be
tempted to confuse good, we can see that "we have two different notions before our
mind." More unjustified and unjustifiable claims are perhaps they did in Principia Ethica
than any other book of moral philosophy, but what they are made with such good
manners, despite slightly intimidating certainty that seems almost gross disagree. But
what, then, is the case of Moore?
According to Moore, the good is a simple idea, yellow as it is a simple idea; that just as
you can not, by any means, explain to someone who does not already know, which is
1 See- G.E. Moore-Principia Ethica Chapter-ii


yellow, so it cannot explain what is good. The definitions of the class I was asking,
definitions that describe the real nature of the object or concept denoted by a word, and
not just tell us what the word is used to mean, are only possible when the object or idea in
question It is complex. May provide a definition of a horse as a horse has many different
properties and qualities, all of which can be enumerated. But when you have listed all of
them; when it has reduced to a horse to its simplest terms, since you can not define those
terms. It is simply something you think or perceive, and for anyone who cannot think or
perceive, can never with any definition, make unknown nature. Perhaps it may be
objected to this that we are able to describe to other people, objects that have never seen
or thought. We can, for example, make a man understand what a chimera, although they
have never heard of one or seen one. You can tell that this is an animal with head and
body of a lion with the head of a goat growing from the middle of her back, and with a
snake tail instead. But here the object you are describing is a complex object; is
composed entirely of pieces with which we are all perfectly familiar-a snake, a goat, a
lion; and we know, too, how the parties have to be together, because we know what the
middle of the back of a lioness, and where his tail tends to grow. And so it is with all
previously unknown objects, which are able to define: they are complex; all composed of
parts, which may themselves, first, a definition can be similar, but it must be at the end
reducible to simpler parts that no longer can be defined. But yellow and good, we say, are
not complex: they are notions that simple type, of which the definitions are made and
which power ceases defining further.
Moore genuine argument is used to demonstrate that good cannot be the name of any
complex whole. Either whole, however defined, we can always ask significantly, if itself
good. This argument can be implemented not only against the attempt to define good as
the name of a resort, but also against the attempt to define at all. Suppose I identify well
with nice. My mistake can be displayed for showing me that I can always ask
significantly leisure or something nice, is it good? But although named the same property
as nice names, ask, what is nice good? would be equivalent to asking, Is what is pleasant
enjoyable? -ie, it would emptily tautological. Moore framed this argument to refute
hedonists, who conceived hold two incompatible positions: hold that pleasure is good, in
fact good, in an important sense, nontautological; and seek to demonstrate this urging that
good means anything but what it means pleasant. But the first position requires that
"pleasure is good" be taken as analytical. However, it cannot be both. So the hedonistic
position collapses. But of course, collapses only for that hedonistic imprudence of trying
to keep these two positions.



Moore criticizes philosophers who are mainly JS Mill and Herbert Spencer. For Mill,
criticism of Moore is misdirected,2 if only because he reads Mill from a definition of
good in the sense of pleasant, while all that Mill at the most say is that pleasure gives us
our only criterion of goodness. It is by now almost commonplace to recognize that Moore
misrepresented Mill; is a measure of the degree to which contemporary philosophers read
Mill, but do not read Spencer, who recognized that Spencer Moore also misrepresented.
Moore accuses Spencer have thought that a good meant the same as "more evolved.3"
Spencer however was a much more complex, if rather implausible position. Spencer held
first, that human society has evolved, like the human species evolved, and indeed the
evolution of species and society can be placed in one continuous scale. Second, consider
that the largest of a society is at this scale the most perfect of its morality; and thirdly,
that the behavior tends increasingly towards in order to preserve life, assuming that in life
there, especially as it rises towards the ideal, more pleasure than pain. As with Mill,
Spencer can in unguarded moments have given the impression that it was defining the
moral vocabulary. But the real Herbert Spencer is so far from being the front man for
Moore as the real JS Mill.
For the doctrine that was good name of a natural property Moore gave the name
"naturalistic fallacy." For Moore this fallacy is committed in the course of any attempt to
treat well as the name of an identifiable property under any other description. Good can
not mean "commanded by God," more than what it can mean pleasant, and
A brief history of ethics the same reasons, the term "naturalistic fallacy" because it has
been adopted by the adherents of the view that one cannot logically deduce ought from an
is; but although the latter is a consequence of doctrine Moore, is not identical to it.
It's good, then, the name of a simple property, not analyzable? For the doctrine is, there
are at least two conclusive objections. The first is that we can only use the name of a
single intelligible property where we meet some standard example of property with
reference to which we have to recognize if it is present or absent in other cases. In the
case of a simple property as yellow examples we can use standard color of yellow
recognize other cases. But how could he have learned to recognize a good friend to help
us recognize a good watch? However, if Moore is right, the same simple property is
present in both cases. For this, a disciple of Moore could answer that we are confusing
the issue by our example. A good watch is not "inherently" good. But how, then, can we
recognize the inherently good? The only answer is that Moore has just done. Or put this
point another way: the story of Moore could only reach the level of intelligibility when
complemented with an explanation of how one learns the meaning of good and an
2 See- John Skorupski -The Cambridge Companion to Mill
3 .see- Alberto Mingardi -Herbert Spencers Offspring


account of the relationship between learning on some cases and know how to apply it in
The second objection is that the story of Moore leaves entirely unexplained and
inexplicable why something is being good we should never provide a reason for action.
The analogy with the yellow is both a difficulty for his thesis at this point,4 since it is a
help to him elsewhere. One can imagine a connoisseur with a special flavor for yellow
objects to which something is being yellow forward a reason to acquire it; but something
to be "good" can hardly be supposed to present a justification for the measure only for
those who have the interest of a connoisseur in goodness. Any account of good that is
appropriate should be intimately connected with ac-tion, and explain why they call
something good is to always provide a reason to act on them one way and not another.
Not connect well with the action is the main virtue of another seminal moral philosophy
of the twentieth century, John Dewey. For Dewey the main trap all epistemology5 is the
tendency to abstract knowledge of both the methods by which we have acquired and the
uses to which we put it. I just acquired all the knowledge we have now because we had
certain purposes, and the point that knowledge is for us inseparable from our future
purposes. All reason is practical reason. Moral knowledge is not a separate branch of
knowledge; is simply the knowledge we have in physics, biology, history, or what you
believe-a in relation to those purposes. To characterize something as good i.e. we will
satisfy our purposes. As a means or an end, as both, and Dewey is concerned to
emphasize what it takes to be the interrelated nature of good-as-a-half finish and good
asan-. We are as far as possible be from the concept of "intrinsically good" with its sharp
separation of means and ends of Moore. Dewey focuses on the agent, while Moore
focuses on the viewer. Dewey almost blurs the distinction between facts and values,
between is and ought, while Moore emphasizes it. Dewey thinks that decisions are guided
by the considerations expressed in statements of an ordinary empirical, statements that
assume the leadership of the purposes and interests of the agent, but does not differ from
that in fact are statements of our Empirical studies. That Dewey has not been more
influential, particularly in England, is perhaps explained by the fact that so seldom
explicitly attends to the problem that has been at the center of Anglo-Saxon moral
philosophy in this century, the meaning of moral predicates Y where Dewey did exert a
major influence was indirectly in a discussion that led to Moore.
Moore's immediate heirs were of two types. There wearer in moral philosophy of the
same type as that of Moore, intuitionistic called as Prichard, Ross and Carritt.6 It should

4 . see- Joshua Gert- Beyond Moore's Utilitarianism

5 See- Jennifer Welchman -Dewey and Moore on the Science of Ethics
6 H.A. Prichard, W.D. Ross - Moral Writings and The Right and the Good


be emphasized that both these writers did not, in fact, the acquisition of their views of
Moore, but independently, and that the value of his writings is not only a question of how
convincingly presented their own views. Carritt, for example, will be remembered for his
power as a critic of utilitarianism. Prichard says-that something is good does not mean
that it is obligatory on me to carry it out. This first type of argument is a list of Prichard
presumably what it takes to be the only possible types of alleged justification. Your
second is called that of which we are all accused of being aware. The apprehension of
duty is said to be immediate and unquestioned, and therefore must not be motivated.
In other intuitionist writers like Sir David Ross, who argues that we have independent
intuitions of "righteousness" and "goodness" rules of argumentation are much higher. But
all intuitionist writers suffer from a difficulty: they are, in their own view, which tells us
only about what we all already know. The fact that sometimes disagree about just what
we all know it less boring at the expense of making it even less convincing.
Moral judgments are understood in terms of a triple classification of judgments. We can,
however, easily separate the emotive theory of moral judgment of this dubious
classification; all we need to retain it is the contrast between the factual and the
emotional. In this way the most powerful exponent of emotivismo was CL Stevenson.
Stevenson's writing has many influences, especially those of Moore and Dewey, and its
position can perhaps more easily expose to return Moore. Moore had two classes of heirs,
the first of which were the intuitionistic. What is the philosophical intuitionistic still use
what we all recognize are accused of moral issues. But Moore himself was especially
eager to clarify the philosophical confusion about the concept of goodness so that he
could proceed to a second task, that things are actually good. In his chapter on behavior
which makes clear that the right action is valuable only as a means to what is good. In his
chapter on The Ideal, Moore tells us what is good. "Once the meaning of the question is
clearly understood the answer to it, in broad outline, which seems so obvious that it runs
the risk of looking like a truism. By far the most valuable things we know or can imagine
are certain states of consciousness that can be described roughly as the pleasures of
human relationships and enjoyment of beautiful objects. "Everything depended, of
course, that" one "was and what social class one belonged. The values, Moore praises
belong to the private sphere rather than public life; and supremely important as they are,
all values related to intellectual research and work are excluded. Moore values are a
protected leisure, although it is in what it excludes rather than making value classbound
parochial character and their attitudes displayed. Worth comment on this feature view of
Moore, just to emphasize the fact that they are not, since apparently supposed, beyond
dispute. For Moore combines highly controversial moral views with an appeal to the
simple recognition evidence to establish them.



Not only tend to confuse of meaning and use, but the main use is assigned to moral
expressions is not, nor can be, its main use. For the purpose for which we are witnessing
is the use of the second person I try to move others to adopt our own views. Examples of
Stevenson entire image of a thoroughly unpleasant world in which everyone is always
trying to get everyone else. But in reality it is only in terms of trying to convert others to
their own moral views when it has formed a view of self; however, none of these uses of
moral language that are necessary for the formation and expression of views of one eye
on treasury shares in the initial story of Stevenson.
A reason can complain about the emotive theory is not only wrong, but also that it is
opaque. To proponents try to elucidate moral expressions in terms of the notions of
attitudes and feelings, and is relevant to ask for further characterization of the attitudes
and feelings in question. How, for example, we will identify these attitudes and feelings
so that we can distinguish them from other attitudes and feelings? Emotivist writers are,
in fact, largely silent on this point; but the suspicion is strong, which would be required to
characterize the attitudes and feelings in discussion as only those attitudes and feelings
that give its final expression in acts of moral judgment. However, if this is so, the whole
theory is imprisoned in uninformative circularity.
However, some of its main characteristics are preserved by his immediate successors.
The moral neutrality of philosophical analysis, logic gap between fact and value,
interminality of disagreement were all over the scene. What is altered in later writers is
the attention paid to two topics closely related, the question of the criteria used to call
things, acts or good people or bad, and the question of the nature of moral reasoning. If I
call a good or praise otherwise, you can always ask what criteria I trust. If I say that I
should do something, always be asked, what if I do? and because of what should you do?
What is the relationship between my answers to these questions and my beliefs about
what is good and as to what I ought to do?
All value judgments are practical, but in different ways. Sentences, for example, if they
are genuinely evaluative, entail imperatives addressed to anyone in the relevant situation,
and nobody here includes the person who issues the statement. The criteria should
pronounce the sentence is sincerely with relevant reason and if he can actually act of
obedience to the imperative duty involved uttered to him. Good, on the contrary, is used
to recommend; to call Y is good to say that's the kind of Y must choose if we wanted a
job Y. The criteria for calling something good are criteria that, if I am engaged in
authentic assessments, I have chosen, and I endorse myself use them. Evaluative
expressions and moral standards are therefore the two expressions of the fundamental
decisions of the agent. But the role of choice in Prescriptivism Hare is much clearer and
much less objectionable than the role of attitudes or feelings was in emotivismo. Unlike
the latter, does not preclude the use of moral arguments.


Hare was, in fact, one of the pioneers in the logic research imperatives7. He noted that
the imperative speech, conclusions can be derived from the premises of a perfectly clear,
violating any of the ordinary rules of linking. In other words, Hare reiterates the thesis
that should not be inferred simply is. So the doctrine of the language of morality goes, it
seemed to follow the pattern of moral argument is a transition from a moral major
premise and a factual minor premise to a moral conclusion. This same major premise
may appear as the conclusion of another syllogism, but at some point in the chain of
reasoning must end in a principle that cannot justify more arguments, but which I should
just commit by choice. Again, it seems to follow, as it did with our emotions, that in
matters of ultimate principle, a statement that cannot be met by the argument, but only for
counter assertion. In freedom and reason, Hare argues that this was not implicated by its
terms; that the universality of moral judgments provides an argumentative weapon
against those who hold unacceptable moral principles. For a man who has, for example,
that men should be treated in certain unpleasant ways simply because their skins are
black, we can always ask, Are you then willing to let you be treated in the same way if
your skin were black? And Hare believes that only a minority, which called fanatics,
willing to accept the consequences of answering yes to this. This last argument is a
question of fact on which I think the recent social history does not perform Hare. But I do
not fight with this part of the vision of Hare enough to emphasize that remains true in
view of the hare, as a matter of logic and concepts involved, what I call good and what I
argue that it should not depend on the choice of my fundamental assessments, and there is
no logical limit what can choose evaluations. In other words, prescriptivism Hare is,
ultimately,8 a reissue of the view that behind my moral evaluations and there can be no
higher than my own decision authority. To understand the evaluative concepts is
understood that the use of these concepts in itself make no commitment to any particular
set of moral beliefs. The criteria for true belief in matters of fact are independent of our
decisions; but our evaluations are governed by no criteria but those who choose to impose
ourselves on them. This is a repeat of view of Kant's moral subject as a legislator; but
makes an arbitrary ruler who is the author of the law, he pronounced, and that law is
speaking as a universal recipe.
Ambiguity in any company Hare, an ambiguity noted by Mary Warnock, becomes
important. When Hare characterizes testing and prescription, is, in fact, the definition of
these terms so that its position is protected against possible counterexamples? If we
produce an example of duty that does not involve a first person imperative, or an example
of good in which the criteria are not a matter of choice, will be Hare be able to answer
that is uses just not prescriptive and not evaluative duty and good? Hare certainly

7 The Moral Philosophy of R. M. Hare: A Vindication of Utilitarianism?

8 . Hares Universal Rational Prescriptivism , chapter-4.


recognizes that there are some non-prescriptive and not evaluative purposes. But if you
simply legislated for testing and prescription will be what he says they are, why we must
assent to legislation? If he is not legislating, then we have the kind of evaluative
expressions and prescriptive defined by us independently of the characterization of the
hare, in a way that Hare himself never delimits. Indeed seems to depend on an almost
intuitive understanding of what should be included or excluded from the class of
evaluative expressions.
Philippa Foot and Peter Geach have challenged Hare with convincing primafacie
counterexamples. Philippa Foot Care has focused on evaluative expressions related to the
virtues and vices, as rude and courageous; Geach of good and evil. The criteria for the
correct application of rude and brave they are, so Mrs. Foot argues, in fact. If certain
conditions are met fact, this is enough to show that these epithets are applied and their
application can only be held by someone who does not understand its meaning. So if a
man at a concert spits in the face of an acquaintance who knows little and has not done
anything hostile to him, then he is certainly unpleasant. Similarly, if a man with a
reasonable prospect of saving the lives of others by sacrificing his own no sacrifice his
own life, which is certainly brave. But in each of these cases, where it is shown that the
necessary and sufficient conditions apply to justify the epithet, we could rewrite what we
say so that the necessary and sufficient conditions appear as premises under the meaning
of rude or brave involving the conclusion "So he was rude" or "So he was brave." But if
the conclusions are evaluative, these are. Thus, some factual premises appear to involve
evaluative conclusions.
Similarly, it is clear that in many cases at least where I call something or someone good,
appropriate criteria are determined by the type of event it is and are not open to choice.
The criteria for calling something "good X" depend, as Geach noted, on the nature of X.
"A good watch", "a good farmer," "a good horse" are examples. But what about "a good
man"? Here undoubtedly one could argue, we use a variety of criteria and we have to
choose between them. Here certainly an argument like Hare is convincing. I do not want
to continue this argument further still unfinished; I want rather to ask what kind of
argument is, and why it appears. It is important to see that a number of interconnected
differences of view are involved here. On the one hand, it is argued that facts can never
involve assessments, philosophical inquiry is neutral between evaluations, the only
authority they have moral views is what we, as individual agents give to them. This view
is the final conceptualization of individualism which has had a recurring mention in this
story: the individual becomes his own final authority in the most extreme possible sense.
In the alternative point of view, to understand our central evaluative and moral concepts
is to recognize that there are certain criteria can not fail to recognize. The authority of
these standards is that we must recognize, but which are in no way the creators. The


philosophical reflection that reveals this, therefore, is not morally neutral. And sometimes
factual premises which involve evaluative conclusions.
Each view systematically insulates itself from the other by the choice of examples. And
neither allows the issue between them might be resolved by empirical research on how
they are actually used evaluative concepts. To each is quite willing to allow use ordinary
morality can sometimes be confused, or even perverted, through the influence of
misleading philosophical theory. Perhaps, however, this controversy is that which can not
be resolved, and perhaps the reason that can not be resolved you can see if we try to put
into historical perspective of the concepts that generate it. But before we can do that we
must consider some very unsophisticated points that put this controversy as one not only
to philosophers but to all contemporary moral agents. Emotivism and prescriptivism9
principle alienate us because their explanations of evaluative language in terms of the
notions of feelings, taste, choice, and imperatives leave us wondering why there should
be no specific evaluative language above the ordinary language of feelings, taste, choice,
and imperatives. When I say, "You ought to do this" or when I say: "This is good," I want
to protest say more and who is not. "! You or anyone else, do this", or "I like it Do the
same. "If that's what I mean, that's what I could and would. If that's what I say, then
certainly what I say no authority, but I give it by saying it. My attitudes and my
imperatives have authority to me just because they are mine. But when I invoke words
like should and is either at least try to appeal to a standard that has another and more
authority. If I use these words to you, I seek to appeal to you in the name of those
standards and not my own. However, although this may be what I want to do, it does not
necessarily follow that I succeed. Under what conditions can I succeed? Under what
conditions should I fail?
If a society of the kind I have tried to characterize as discussed Greek society, in which
lifestyle entails an agreement about ends. Here are agreed by the use of good criteria, not
just when we speak of "good horse" and "good farmer," but also when we talk about
"good man". In this society, there is a list of virtues recognized an established set of
moral standards, institutionalized connection between obedience to the rules, the practice
of virtue, and the attainment of ends. In a society like the contrast between evaluative
language and the language of taste or choice will be very clear. I can say what I like or
choose, and I could tell you what to do; but the second makes a statement about you that
the former does not. You can ignore what to do through nuisance or negligence; but you
can not use the moral vocabulary and systematically deny the force of duty, and may not
remain in the social commerce community, and abandon the moral vocabulary. It is
moral criticism in such an impossible society? No way; but must proceed by an extension
of, and not a complete break with the established moral vocabulary. Does this mean that
9 Stavroula Tsinorema -Emotivism and Prescriptivism


the authority of morality does not extend beyond the community whose social practices
are concerned? One is tempted to reply, Does the authority of arithmetic rules extend
beyond the community in which the practice of counting was established? This is
intended as a real threat, not as a rhetorical question, which deserves a fuller answer; but,
at least, to connect the rules and social practice in this way is obviously not give moral
rules under a dominion over us than mathematical, except that no society could progress
much without the same kind of simple counting, while there may be wide variations in
social practice that moral standards are relevant.
In the discussion of Greek society, I suggested what might happen when a so
wellintegrated of moral life fell apart. In our society individualism acids for four
centuries have eaten in our moral structures, both for good and for bad. But not only this:
we live with the legacy of not just one, but a series of well-integrated moralities.
Aristotelianism, primitive Christian simplicity, the Puritan ethic, the aristocratic ethic of
consumption, and traditions of democracy and socialism have left their mark on our
moral vocabulary. Within each of these there is a proposed morals end or ends, a set of
rules, a list of virtues. But extremes, rules, virtues differ. For Aristotelianism, sell
everything you have and give to the poor would be absurd and meanspirited; for early
Christianity, the magnanimous man is unlikely to pass through the eye of the needle,
which is the gateway to heaven. A conservative Catholicism tries obedience to authority
established as a virtue; democratic socialism as Marx labeled the same servile attitude
and sees it as the worst of vices. To Puritanism, saving is an important virtue, Laziness a
serious defect; for traditional aristocrat, saving is a vice; and so on.
It follows that we are responsible for finding two types of people in our society, those
who speak from within one of these surviving moralities, and those outside of them all.
Among supporters of rival and between supporters of a moral and acceding any
moralities there is no court of appeal, there is a neutral impersonal standard. For those
who speak from within a particular moral, the connection between the facts and the
valuation is established by virtue of the meanings of the words they use. For those who
speak from the outside, those who speak from within them were to pronounce
imperatives that express your taste and private decisions. The controversy between our
emotions and Prescriptivism one hand, and his critics, on the other expresses the
fundamental moral situation of our own society.
In the history of moral philosophy we put certain writers usefully in terms of this account.
Kant, for example, is at the point where the loss of moral unity means that morality can
only be specified in terms of the shape of their rules, not any purpose that rules can serve.
Hence his attempt to infer the content of moral norms of their form. Kant also situated at
the point where moral rules and goals of human life, divorced such a degree that seems at
once the connection between respect for the rules and the achievement of the objectives is


not more than one quota and, if this is so, is intolerable. Its understanding of Kant on the
previous point and the vagueness of the goals that had led to the notion of happiness
become vague and undefined, which leads us to forbid search not be happy, but to be
worthy of happiness . It is your understanding of this last point that leads him to invoke
God as a power crowning virtue with happiness after all. Kant tries to hold together a
front and a rear view of morality; the tension between them is clear.
English moralists of the eighteenth and nineteenth century utilitarians10 write from
within a society where individualism has conquered. Therefore present social order not as
a framework in which the individual has to live his moral life, but as the sum of wills and
individual interests. A moral psychology crude rule makes moral instructions as an
effective means to achieve the purposes of private satisfaction. Hegel, Green, and to a
lesser extent, Bradley are not the only critics of this view of morality, try to specify the
type of community in which the moral vocabulary, may have a specific and distinctive set
of applications. But the philosophical analysis of the necessary form of that community is
no substitute for writing recreate it; and their natural successors are emotivists and
prescriptivists, giving us a false account of what was authentic moral discourse, but a true
account of the meanings impoverished evaluative expressions that have come to have in a
society where moral vocabulary is emptied every content again. Resembles Marx and
Hegel's idealistic English in seeing a Community framework as presupposed by morality;
unlike them, is that no longer exists; and proceeds characterize the situation as one in
which moralizing can no longer play a genuine role in solving social differences. It can
only be an attempt to invoke an authority that no longer exists and to mask the sanctions
of social coercion.
Does not imply that traditional moral vocabularies can no longer using. Does not mean
that we cannot expect to find in our society with a unique set of moral concepts, a shared
interpretation of the vocabulary. Conceptual conflict is endemic in our situation, because
of the depth of our moral conflicts. Each of us therefore has to choose who we want to be
both morally bound and so it ends, rules and virtues who wish to be guided. These two
options are inextricably linked. By choosing to consider this purpose or virtue highly,
make certain moral relationships with other people, and other moral relationships with
others impossible. Speaking from within my own moral vocabulary, I'll find myself
subject to the criteria set out in it. These criteria will be shared with those who speak the
same moral language. And I must take some moral vocabulary if I want to have any
social relationship. Because without rules, without the cultivation of virtues, I cannot
share with anyone else ends. I am condemned to social solipsism. However, I choose for
myself who have to be morally obligated. I must choose between alternative forms of
social and moral practice. Not that I am morally naked until I have chosen. For our social
10 Utilitarianism Philosophy Written by: Brian Duignan


past determines that each of us has some vocabulary with which to frame and make your
choice. I can not look at human nature as a neutral standard, wondering what form of
social life and moral will give her the idiom. For every life form carries its own image of
human nature. The choice of a way of life and the choice of a view of human nature go
together. This view, each part in contemporary philosophical controversy will respond on
their own terms. Prescriptivists, emotivists and highlight the role of choice in my account.
His critics will emphasize how the agent should come to the act of choice with an
existing evaluative vocabulary. Each will try for his choice of examples to redefine the
case of his opponent away. And at the same attempt is already doing in other disputes
elsewhere. In fact, it is a reinforcement of the view that this philosophical controversy is
an expression of our social and moral situation that should have happened in a very
different context in the arguments that have proceeded in France among Catholic
moralists, Stalinists, Marxists and Sartrean existentialist.
Catholics and Stalinists the moral vocabulary is defined in terms of certain alleged facts.
Each has their own characteristic list of virtues. For Sartre, by contrast, at least for the
Sartre of the immediate postwar period, to live within a ready-made moral vocabulary is
necessarily an abdication of responsibility, an act of bad faith. Authentic existence is to
be found only in a self-conscious awareness of an absolute freedom of choice.
Kierkegaards view of the act of choice is detached from its theological context, and
made by Sartre the basis for political as well as for moral decision. Sartre does not locate
the source of the necessity of the act of choice in the moral history of our society, any
more than Kierkegaard did. He locates it in the nature of man: a conscious being, trepour-soi, differs from a thing, tre-en-soi, in his freedom and his consciousness of
freedom. Hence, mens characteristic experiences of anxiety before the gulf of the
unmade future, and their characteristic attempts to pretend that they are not responsible.
Thus Sartre locates the basis of his moral view in a metaphysics of human nature, just as
much as the Catholic or the Marxist does. Sartre, the prescriptivist and emotivist do not
trace the source of the necessity of choice, or of taking up ones own attitudes, to the
moral history of our society. They ascribe it to the nature of moral concepts as such. And
in so doing, like Sartre, they try to absolutize their own individualist morality, and that of
the age, by means of an appeal to concepts, just as much as their critics try to absolutize
their own moralities by means of an appeal to conceptual considerations. But these
attempts could only succeed if moral concepts were indeed timeless and unhistorical, and
if there were only one available set of moral concepts. One virtue of the history of moral
philosophy is that it shows us that this is not true and that moral concepts themselves
have a history. To understand this is to be liberated from any false absolutist claims.




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tokgjyky usg: ds fopkjksa dh ,sfrgkfld leh{kk

izdk'k pUnz cMok;k
fo'o lEiznk; vkSj fo'o'kkafr usg: dk liuk FkkA1 os tkurs Fks fd ijek.kq gfFk;kjksa ds bl nkSj esa vxj
;q gksrk gS rks lH;rk ds lHkh ewY; u"V gks tk,axsA blhfy, mudk ekuuk Fkk fd vkt vxj nqfu;k Hkj
ds jktusrkvksa dks dqN djuk gS rks ;gh fd os txg&txg QSys ruko vkSj la?k"kZ dks de djrs gq,
vkilh ln~Hkkouk vkSj le> ls vUrjk"Vh; eqn~nksa vkSj leL;kvksa dks nwj djus dh dksf'k'k djsA 2 usg:
ijLij fo'okl] 'kkafr] lg;ksx vkSj HkkbZpkjs dh Hkkouk ls leL;kvksa dk lek/ku fudkyus esa fo'okl j[krs
FksA blhfy, mUgsa 'kkafrnwr dgk tkrk gSA3
,y ,y ch] cSfjLVj] Hkkjrh; jk"V ds d.kZ/kj] vUrjkZ"Vh; jktuhfr ds vkpk;Z vkSj fo[;kr ys[kd
iafMr tokgjyky usg: Hkkjrh;ksa ds n;&lezkV FksA og egkRek xka/h ds xkSjo'kkyh mkjkf/dkjh FksA tc
ls ns'k ds 'kklu dh ckxMksj muds gkFk esa vk;h Fkh] lalkj esa loZ=k Hkkjr dk lEeku] e;kZnk vkSj izfr"Bk
c<h FkhA usg: th tUetkr fonzksgh FksA 'ks"k.k] mRihMu] vR;kpkj vksj vU;k; ds fo: mUgksaus ges'kk
vkokt mBk;h FkhA og lPps vUrjkZ"Vh;rkoknh FksA og Li"Voknh] fuHkhZd vkSj U;k;;qDr ckr ds leFkZd
jktuhfrK FksA muds b'kkjs ij djksMksa tulk/kj.k pyrs Fks] ysfdu fQj Hkh og rkuk'kkg ugh FksA ^^[kqn
ftank jgks vkSj nwljksa dks Hkh ftank jgus nks** dh uhfr ij fo'okl j[krs FksA4
izLrqr 'kks/ i=k esa usg: th ds fopkjksa ls lEcfU/r uohure~ vuqlU/kuksa vkSj uwru fopkjksa dks x`fgr
djrs gq, vius Lora=k fopkj dks O;Dr fd;k x;k gSA lkFk gh blesa usg: th ds fopkjksa dk
fo'ys"k.kkRed fof/ ls v;;u fd;k x;k gSA ;gka usg: th ls laEcf/r lkfgR; dk fo'ys"k.k djds vkt
ds lanHkZ esa mudh izkalafxdrk vkSj mi;ksfxrk [kkstus dh dksf'k'k dh xbZ gSA
jk"Vh; Lora=krk laxzke ds ,d kafrdkjh usrk ds :i esa usg: th us tks egku izfr"Bk vftZr dh mlds
QyLo:i lektokn ds izfr usg: ds n`f"Vdks.k dk turk ds cgqr cM+s fgLlksa ds lkspus le>us ds rjhdksa
ij izHkko iM+kA tokgj yky usg: th dh izfrHkk ds vusd i{k vc bfrgkl dk vad cu pqds gSA fdUrq
ge bl egku eqfDrnkrk ds vkn'kksZa vkSj uhfr;ksa dks rc rd ugha le> ik;sxs] tc rd ge ml n'kZu
dks u le> ys] tks bu vkn'kksZa vkSj uhfr;ksa esa lek;k gqvk Fkk vkSj ; u tku ys fd fdl izdkj blus
muds fopkjksa ds fuekZ.k esa lgk;rk dhA5
fpUru dh n`f"V ls usg: th dk n`f"Vdks.k ,s'kks&vkjke ds thou dh mit ugha Fkk tks pkjks vkSj O;kIr
vkUnksyu vkSj mFky&iqFky ls vyx gksA bl n`f"Vdks.k dk tUe Vdjkoksa vkSj la?k"kksZa ds chp gqvk FkkA
usg: th dk n'kZu ekStwnk ifjfLFkfr dks cnyus rFkk 'kks"k.k vkSj mRihM+u] Hkw[k] jksx rFkk vKku ls eqDr
,d ubZ lekt O;oLFkk dk fuekZ.k djus dh ,d ifr vkSj lpsru iFk&funsZ'kd Gsa
usg: dk tUe jk"Vh; tkxj.k ds ;qx esa ,d laHkzkr ifjokj esa gqvk FkkA mudk cpiu lqjf{kr vkSj
vkeksn&xeksn Hkjs okrkojj.k esa chrk Fkk fdUrq ns'k dh jktuhfrd ifjfLFkfr esa rsth ls cnyko vkus ls
gj pht cny xbZA izFke egk;q vkSj mlds nq"ifj.kke] fryd vkSj ,uh cslsaV ds gkse:y vkUnksyu]



tfy;kaokyk ckx gR;kdkaM rFkk mldk O;kid fojks/&bu lcdk tokgjyky usg: ds laosnu'khy efLr"d
ij xgjk izHkko iM+kA
usg: th us viuk jktuhfrd thou fryd vkSj xka/h ds f'k"; ds :i esa vkjaHk fd;kA egkRek xka/h ds
vkg~oku ij tokgj yky usg: vkUnksyu esa dqns vkSj 1921 esa fons'kh ljdkj ds 'kklu esa mudks
dkjkokl dk igyk vuqHko gqvkA vlg;ksx vkUnksyu ds okil ys fy;s tkus ij og fdlku leqnk; ds
?kfUk"B lEidZ esa vk;s] fdlkuksa dh fu/Zurk] nfjnzrk vkSj daxkyh dks ns[kdj ;g fopfyr gks mBsA vc
mUgsa fo'okl gks x;k fd ;fn Hkw[k] vKku vkSj xjhch dks feVk;k ugha tkrk rks jktuhfrd Lora=krk dk
dksbZ vFkZ ugha gSA
tokgj yky usg: us ,d u;h 'kfDr vkSj Li"V n`f"Vdks.k ds lkFk Lora=krk izkfIr vkSj lkezkT;okn fojks/h
dk;Zokb;ksa esa tqV x;sA mUgksaus Lora=krk laxzke dks u;k :i vkSj ubZ vUrZoLrq iznku dhA muds fy,
jktuhfrd Lora=krk vius vki esa ,dek=k y{; ugha FkhA Lora=krk rks muds erkuqlkj] nwljs y{; ds fy,
ek;e Fkh lektokn ds y{; ds fy,A dkaxzsl ds ykgkSj esa gq, vf/os'ku esa ftlesa iw.kZ Lora=krk dks
Hkkjr dk vafre y{; ?kksf"kr fd;k Fkk] vius v;{kh; Hkk"k.k esa mUgksaus dgk ^^eS ;gka lkQ&lkQ dg
nsuk pkgrk gw fd eSa lektoknh vkSj iztkra=koknh gw vkSj eSa jktkvksa vkSj egkjktkvksa vFkok ,slh O;oLFkk esa
tks m|ksx /a/ks ds vk/qfud jktk&egkjktvksa dks iSnk djrh gS] fo'okl ugha djrkA
egkRek xka/h ds usr`Ro esa vlg;ksx vkUnksyu ds dkj.k usg: th dks tsy tkuk iM+k Fkk] fdUrq tsy dh
;krukvksa vkSj ihM+kvksa ls usg: dk eukscy vkSj Hkh QkSyknh cukA tsy esa mUgksaus ^^fo'o bfrgkl dh
>yd** fy[krs gq, vius fnu xqtkjsA lEHkor% og igys Hkkjrh; ys[kd Fks] ftUgksaus fo'o ?kVukp ds
lanHkZ esa Hkkjr ds bfrgkl dk i;Zos{k.k fd;k vkSj Hkkjr ds Lora=krk laxzke dks lkezkT;okn ds fo:
fo'oO;kih la?k"kZ dk ,d fgLlk ekukA Hkkjr ds vrhr esa mUgksaus xgjs xksrs yxk;s&bfrgkl ds ,d Nk=k
ds :i esa ugha oju~ Lora=krk rFkk ,d u;h lekt O;oLFkk ds fy, Lka?k"kZ esa lf;rk ls tw>usokys ;ksk
ds :i esaA og jk"Vh; vkUnksyu ds le> ,d ,sfrgkfld lanHkZ izLrqr djuk pkgrs Fks rFkk mu fu;eksa
dks [kkst fudkyuk pkgrs Fks] tks lkekftd fodkl rFkk lelkef;d lekt ds rsth ls cnyrs gq,
yksdkpkj dks fu;af=kr djrs FksA
tokgjyky usg: tc tsy ls fudys rks ,d egku jk"Vh; usrk ds :i eas turk us mudk Lokxr fd;k
vkSj og fQj la?k"kZ esa dwn iM+sA 1936 esa dkaxzsl ds y[ku esa gq, vf/os'ku esa mUgksaus dgk&Hkkjr dh
turk dh daxkyh] csjkstxkjh] n;uh;rk vkSj xqykeh dks nwj djus dk eS lektokn ds vykok nwljk jkLrk
ugha ns[k ikrk gwA bldk eryc gS fd ges vius jktuhfrd vkSj lkekftd <kaps esa cgqr cM+s vkSj
kafrdkjh ifjorZu djus gksxsa tehuksa vkSj m|ksx&/a/ksa ij f'kdatk tek;s cSBs fufgr LokFkksZa dks vkSj lkFk
gh lkeUrh rFkk fujdqa'krkoknh Hkkjrh; jtokM+ksa dh O;oLFkk dks Hkh [kRe djuk gksxkA 6 lektokn u dsoy
Hkkjr ls daxkyh] csjkstxkjh] fuj{kjrk] chekjh vkSj xanxh feVkus ds fy, t:jh Fkk oju~ ekuo O;fDrRo
dks fodflr djus ds fy, Hkh t:jh FkkA7


;g ,d ,slk le; Fkk tc fczfV'k lkezkT;oknh rFkk jktuhfrd izfrf;koknh] ns'k esa gj izdkj dh
lkeqnkf;drk vkSj i`Fkdrkokn dks izksRlkfgr dj jgs FksA ,d vksj :f<+oknh fgUnw /eZ ds leFkZd ^^fgUnh]
fgUnw] fgUnqLrku** dk ukjk ysdj ^^jktuhfr dk fgUnwdj.k vkSj fgUnw /eZ dk lSU;hdj.k djus dk iz;Ru
dj jgs FksA oh Mh lkojdj dk nkok Fkk fd dsoy fgUnw gh Hkkjrh; jk"V ds la?kVd gSa 8 nwljh vksj
eqfLye yhx ds usrk fgUnw vkSj eqfLye laLd`fr;ksa esa fdlh izdkj dk rkyesy u gks ldus dh nqgkbZ nsrs
FksA9 usg: us bu /kj.kkvksa dk iwjh 'kfDr ls fojks/ fd;k vkSj crk;k fd laLd`fr vkSj jk"V dh /kfeZd
O;k[;kdkj u dsoy voSKkfud gS oju gkfudj Hkh gSA10 usg: us Lohdkj fd;k fd Hkkjr eas uLyh vkSj
lkaLd`frd fHkUurk, gS fdUrq bu fHkUurkvksa dk /kfeZd foHkktuksa ls dksbZ laca/ ugha gSA 11 Hkkjr esa fgUnw
vkSj eqlyekuksa ds chp dVqrk ds dkj.k eqfLye jk"Vokn etcwr gqvk D;ksafd eqlyeku vius leqnk; dh
vksj T;knk rFkk eqYd dh vksj de ns[kus yxsA muds lkEiznkf;d Lrj ij gh mUgsa ijkftr djus ds fy,
fgUnw lkEiznkf;d laxBu eSnku esa vk;s fdUrq ;s mrus gh ladh.kZrkoknh vkSj raxfny Fks ftrus fd nwljsA12
tokgjyky usg: dk ekuuk Fkk fd fgUnqvksa] eqlyekuksa] bZlkbZ;ksa vkSj flD[kksa lHkh ds lSkfUrd
,d:ihdj.k ls gh lPph jk"Vh;rk dh o`f dks ldrh gSA bldk vFkZ ;g Fkk fd ,d leku jk"Vh;
n`f"Vdks.k dk fodkl gksxk rFkk lkEiznkf;d njkj feV tk;sxhA13 mUgksaus ,d txg dgk gS fd fgUnqLrku
dh ,drk esjs fy, vc ,d dfYir ckr u jg xbZA ;g ,d vkarfjd vuqHko Fkk vkSj eSa blds cl esa
vk x;kA 14
usg: dk mikxe (Approach) ewyr% oSKkfud n`f"Vdks.k ls izHkkfor FkkA og HkkokRed vkSj /kfeZd
vuqHkoksa ds lEcU/ esa Hkh oSKkfud fof/;ksa dh lEHkkouk esa fo'okl djrs FksA mUgksaus cM+h gh rh[kh Hkk"kk
esa vU/ fo'oklksa] va/kuq;kf;rk rFkk :f<+oknh fopkjksa dh fuank dh vkSj fujFkZd deZdk.Mksa dh vkykspuk
tokgjyky usg: us ;g le> fy;k Fkk fd vk/qfud foKku vkSj rduhd ds vk/kj ij gh Hkkjr izxfr
dj ldrk gSA fdUrq] blds lkFk gh og bl ckr ij tksj nsrs Fks fd uSfrd vkSj vk;kfRed fodkl ds
fcuk oSKkfud vkSj HkkSfrd {ks=k esa reke izxfr fujFkZd fl gks ldrh gSA usg: th dh 'kkafriw.kZ
lgvfLrRo vkSj xqV fujis{krk dh uhfr] Hkkjh m|ksxksa vkSj lkoZtfud {ks=k ij cy nsus okyh vkfFkZd
fodkl dh uhfr] dk mnns'; turk ds okLrfod fgrksa dh iwfrZ djuk gSA16
viuh e`R;q ls nks eghus igys ukS ekpZ 1964 dks mUgksaus dgk Fkk& ^^Hkkjr ls lkk dh ckxMksj fdlh ds
Hkh gkFksa esa D;ksa u gks] xqVfujis{krk vkSj 'kkafr iw.kZ lg&vfLrRo dh gekjh uhfr] lektokn dh vksj c<us
ds fy, fu;kstu rFkk lqO;ofLFkr fodkl dh gekjh uhfr] dk;e jgsxhA dkj.k ;g gS fd gekjs ns'k dh
turk ds fo'kky cgqer dh bPNk dks ;s gh uhfr;ka izfrfcfEcr djrh gSA17
fopkj/kjkRed n`f"V ls tokgjyky usg: ds flkUr vSj O;ogkj esa tks Hkh detksfj;ka jgh gks] mUgksaus ubZ
ih<h ds efLr"d dks ,d izxfr'khy] oSKkfud fn'kk iznku dhA mudh nwjnf'kZrk vkSj lkgl us lkFk gh


muds maps vkn'kkZsa us dksfV&dksfV tuksa dks Lora=krk] tura=k vkS lektokn dh vksj vxzlj gksus ds fy,
iszfjr fd;kA
1. nso's k Bkdqj vkSj ;rh ftUny&vktknh dh vk/h lnh vkSj vke vkneh (Hkkx&1)] ubZ fnYyh] 1998] i` 125
2. usg: vkSj foKku% 'kdnso izlkn] i`"B 18
3. ch ,u ik.Mo&usg:] i`"B 348
4. MkW ,l ih xqIrk& jk"V ds egku O;fDrRo] ,l ih ifCyds'ku] p.Mhx<+ 2006] i`"B 44
5. ds nkeksnju&Hkkjrh; fparu ijeijk] ihiqYl ifCyf'kax gkl (izk) fy] ubZ fnYyh] i` 484
6. tokgjyky usg:& bf.M;k ,.M fn oYMZ] i` 82&83
7. tokgjyky usg:&, osUp vkWQ ysVlZ] i` 353
8. ,e- ,l- xksyodj&oh vkSj fn us'kugqM fMQkbUM] i` 55
9. fFk;ksMksj ns csVh rFkk vU;&lkslsZt vkWQ bafM;u VsfM'ku] i 836
10. tokgjyky usg:&vkWVksck;xzkQh] i` 361
11. tokgj yky usg:& jhlsUV ,lst ,.M jkbfVaXl
12. tokgjyky usg:&fxYEIlst vkWQ oMZ fgLVh
13. tokgjyky usg:&jhlsUV ,lst ,.M jkbfVaXl
14. tokgjyky usg:&fgUnqLrku dh dgkuh 1957] i` 21
15. tokgj yky usg:&fn fMLdojh vkWQ bafM;k] i` 10
16. ds jkeksnju& Hkkjrh; fpUru ijEij] ihiqYl ifCyf'kax gkl (izk) fy] ubZ fnYyh] i`"B 500
17. ds jkeksnju& Hkkjrh; fpUru ijEijk] ihiqYl ifCyf'kax gkl (izk) fy] ubZ fnYyh] i`"B 500





Poonam Sharma, Ira Das

A disturbing trend in university students health is reported increase in student stress
nationwide. Stress among students depends upon the students perception or appraisal of
stressor. In this study a correlational design was used to determine the role of
Psychological Functions (Extrovert, Sensing, Feeling, and Perceiving) in determining
Stress among university students. The sample of the study consisted of 120 university
students (girls and boys); with the age range of 20-26 years. The sample was taken
randomly from different colleges of Agra city. It consisted of 60 girls and 60 boys.
Psychological Functions was measured by Myers Briggs Type Indicator Scale (MBTI) by
Myers and Briggs. Stress was measured by ICMR Psychosocial Stressor Questionnaire
by Srivastav. Coefficient of correlation for psychological functions (Extrovert, Sensing,
Feeling, and Perceiving) and Stress scores indicated no significant relationship. Multiple
Regression Analysis indicates that Perceiving psychological function has highest
contribution (b= 1.10) in the determination of stress. Feeling psychological function has
second strongest negative contribution (b=-.85) in the determination of stress. Extrovert
and Sensing psychological functions have negligible contribution in the determination of
Keywords: Stress, Psychological Functions (Extrovert, Sensing, Feeling, and
Stress is a necessary phenomenon in human beings lives because stress adds flavor, challenge
and opportunity to our world. It is also a part of students daily life. At optimal level, stress
can be healthy, or even enjoyable. Though it provides many benefits; it can be very damaging
for students when stress becomes excessive. This may be due to psychological types or
personality types. Individuals differ dramatically in their response to a problem or a stressor.
Emotional responses to a situation are determined by student appraisal of both the situation
and coping abilities, as well as temperament. So the present researcher wants to study if
certain psychological functions or psychological types are more prone to experience of the
stress. The four pairs of preferences or dichotomies according to MBTI are shown in the
following table:



So the present researcher wants to study if certain psychological types or personality types are
more prone to experience of the stress. The four pairs of preferences or dichotomies according
to MBTI are shown in the following table:
Extraversion (E)

(I) Introversion

Sensing (S)

(N) Intuition

Thinking (T)

(F) Feeling

Judging (J)

(P) Perception

Rational of the Problem

A disturbing trend in university students health is reported increase in student stress
nationwide. A number of stressor has been found to create stress among students, but it
depends upon the students perception or appraisal of stressor.
Students may understand themselves by figuring out their own priorities and what really
matters to them, leaving aside the current trends and whatever is popular at the moment.
They need to learn to say 'no' to unnecessary experience and start focusing on a purpose
that satisfies their inner values. So the investigator wants to study the relationship
between preference scores of different psychological functions with the scores of stress.

To study the relationship of stress, with Psychological functions among university


To study the contribution of psychological functions in the determination of stress

among university students.


There is no significant relationship between stress and Psychological functions

among university students.

There is no significant contribution of Psychological functions in the

determination of stress among university students.



Operational definitions of the terms:

Stress: Stress occurs when normal homeostatic regulatory mechanism of the body
fails to adapt to a situation.
Extrovert / Introvert: Extroverts focus more on people and things in the outside
world, introverts on internal thoughts and ideas.
Sensing / Intuition: Sensing dominant personalities prefer to perceive things
through sight, sound, taste, touch, and smell, while intuition dominant types look
to past experience and are more abstract in their thinking.
Thinking / Feeling: Thinking types use logic to judge the world, while feeling
types tend to view things on the basis of what emotions they elicit.
Judging / Perceiving: Everyone judges and perceives, but those who are judging
dominant are said to be more methodical and results-oriented, while perceiving
dominant personalities are good at multitasking and are flexible.

Sample description:
In the present study a sample of a 120 university students is used. These students were
selected randomly from a population of university students. The sample included both male
and female students, undergraduate as well as post graduate students from the two universities
of Agra, DEI (Deemed University) and Ambedkar University. All students have been taken
from middle socio economic status (income - Rs. 20,000 - 50,000 per month). The age range
of the university students were selected for this research is 20-26 years.
Tables 1 Sample distribution




Tables 2 Sample distribution by class



Post Graduate

A.U. D.E.I

A.U. D.E.I.
20 20
10 10









1. Criterion variable: Stress

2. Predictor variable: Psychological types (Extrovert, Sensing, Feeling, and

Myers Briggs Type Indicator:

Myers-Briggs type indicator is a self report questionnaire designed to make a Jungs theory of
psychological types understandable and useful in everyday life. The MBTI identifies 16 types
based on Jungs distinctions between extraversion-introversion (E-I), thinking-feeling (T-F),
and sensation-intuition (S-N) plus Myerss distinction between judging and perceiving (J-P).
Examples of items in the Myers-Briggs Type Indicator are:
Favorite world: Extraversion (E) or Introversion (I).
Information: Sensing (S) or Intuition (N).
Decisions: Thinking (T) or Feeling (F).
Structure: Judging (J) or Perceiving (P).

ICMR Psychosocial Stressor questionnaire:

ICMR Psychosocial Stressor questionnaire of stress by Srivastav (1992) was used to

measure the stress of university students. The Questionnaire was designed to assess the
extent of individuals feeling of the basic components of psychological stress ( such as
pressure, tension, anxiety, conflict, frustration etc.) resulted in form perceived stress
situations ( such as adversities, hardships, threats, afflictions, failure, constraints,
excessive demands, conflicting roles etc.) in various spheres of his social life.



Research Design:
Correlational design was used for the present study, so that multiple regression equation
was formed to estimate the role of predictor variables in the determination of criterion
variable Stress.
Table 3 Descriptive statistics











Standard Error






















3.460218092 2.846148314

Sample Variance




11.97310924 8.100560224










0.031856764 -0.61421848





























This research study includes :

(I) Product Moment Coefficient of Correlation (r) between each variable.
(II) Multiple Regression Analysis for computation of regression coefficients of predictor
variables for the formation of multiple regression equation.
(I). Coefficient of correlation
First of all Product Moment Coefficients of correlation (r) were found between different
psychological types such as extrovert, introvert, sensing, intuition, thinking, feeling,
judging and perceiving and stress of university students.
Table: 4 Correlation Matrix: Relationship between psychological types and stress of
university students (N=120)





Extrovert 0.022732171 1

0.006768102 0.41990519


0.118760445 3



0.136609066 0.27643745



The correlation matrix indicates that Extrovert Psychological type is positively

correlated with stress (r= 0.022, p>.05), through the correlation is very low. So the null
hypotheses There is no significant relationship between stress and Psychological types
Extrovert is accepted. This indicates that the Psychological Type Extrovert is not
related to stress.

It indicates that Sensing Psychological types is positively correlated with stress

(r= 0.006, p>.05), though the coefficient of correlation is negligible. So the null
hypotheses There is no significant relationship between stress and Psychological types
Sensing is accepted. Hence it can be said that Psychological Type Sensing is not related
to stress.


It indicates that Feeling Psychological type is negatively correlated with stress (r=
-0.118, p>.05). Since the relation is not significant even at .05 level, the null hypotheses
There is no significant relationship between stress and Psychological types Feeling is

Feeling type is related to Perceiving type (r=.36) and is positively related to

extrovert type (r= -.19). It is slightly related to intuitive type (r= .091) and highly
negatively related to feeling type (r = -975).

It indicates that Perceiving Psychological types is positively correlated with stress

(r= 0.136, p>.05). So the null hypotheses There is no significant relationship between
stress and Psychological types Perceiving is accepted. This indicates that the
Psychological Type Perceiving is not related to stress.

Highest correlation is found between Perceiving Psychological Type and Stress

(r= 0.13, p>.05) and 2nd highest correlation is found between Feeling Psychological
Type and Stress (r= .136, p>.05).
(II) Multiple Regression Analysis
In order to determine the specific contribution of each of the predictor variable in the
determination of stress of university students, Multiple Regression Analysis was done
from the data obtain on 120 cases and to generalize the results multiple regression
equation was formed.

Multiple R

Table 5 Regression Statistics


R Square


Adjusted R Square


Standard Error




Table shows that the value of R square for Stress (criterion) is .051 which shows that
about 5% of contribution is accounted by the predictor variables Extrovert (X1), Sensing
(X2), Feeling (X3) and Perceiving (X4).


Table 6 Multiple Regression Coefficient for Predictors of Stress


























Coefficients (b)






Regression Equation between Criterion Variable (Y, stress) and Predictor variables
(Extrovert, Sensing, Feeling, Perceiving)
Y = .0249 X1 -.0455 X2 -.8598 X3 +1.1093 X4
Discussion and Conclusion:
Among psychological function variables predictor variable Perceiving Type has
1st highest Positive contribution in the determination of criterion variable stress.
Its regression coefficient (b) is 1.10. Perceiving Psychological Type is positively
correlated with stress. Perception here means all the ways of becoming aware of
things, people, events or ideas. They prefer to use perceiving process in the outer
world like to live in a flexible, spontaneous process, seeking to experience and
understand life, rather than control it. People who prefer perceiving tend to like a
flexible and spontaneous approach to life and prefer to keep their option open.
Therefore they are more under stress.

Feeling Psychological Type is negatively correlated with stress and second

contributing variable. Feeling is the function by which one comes to the decision
by weighting related values and merits of the issues. Feeling relies on an
understanding of personal values and group values; thus it is more subjective than
thinking. People who prefer feeling tend to base their decisions primarily on




human values and on subjective evaluation of person centered concerns. They

prefer to be kind hearted. They are devoted to their leaders.
Sensing Psychological Type has very low positive correlation with stress and
third contributing variable. Sensing refers to the perceptions observable by way of
the senses. Sensing establishes what exists. Because the senses can bring to
awareness only what is occurring in the present moment, persons orientation
towards sensing focus on the immediate experiences available to their five senses.

Extrovert Psychological Type is slightly positively correlated with stress.

Extraversion is "the act, state, or habit of being predominantly concerned with and
obtaining gratification from what is outside the self". An extroverted person is
likely to enjoy time spent with people and find less reward in time spent alone.
They tend to be energized when around other people, and they are more prone to
boredom when they are by themselves. Person who prefer extroversion feel more
stress, because they tend to focus on the outer world of people and things. The
more they get involved with worldly material and people, the more they are

Implication of the Study:

Stress is also a part of students daily life. At optimal level, stress can be healthy,
or even enjoyable. Though it provides many benefits; it can be very damaging for
students when stress becomes excessive.
Students whether extrovert type, whether sensing type are not much prone to
stress. Too much Feeling type or too much perceiving type are more under stress
although these types are more successful in materialistic achievements of life. So
the information of psychological types and their relation to stress among
university students may help them in self understanding, self motivation and the
natural strength, so that they can manage their stress and can find out the potential
areas of their growth.
Abouserie, R. (1994). Sources and Levels of Stress in Relation to Locus of
Control and Self Esteem in University Students. Educational Psychology: An
International Journal of Experimental Educational Psychology, 14(3), 323-331.
Buck, R. & Buck, R. W. (1988). Human Motivation & Emotion. Wiley
Publication: Canada.



Cooley, E. J. & Keesey, J. C. (2010). Moderator variables in life stress and illness
relationship. Journal of Human Stress, 7(3), 35-40.
Fontana, D & Abouserie, R (2011). Stress levels, gender and personality factors in
teachers. British Journal of Educational Psychology, 63(2), 261270.
Kowalski, K. M., Vaught, C. (1994). Judgment and decision making under stress.
International Journal of Emergency Management, 1(3) 278-289.
Lewis, S. L. & Campbell, M. A. (1994). Personality, stress, coping, and sense of
coherence among nephrology nurses in dialysis settings. American Nephrology
Nurses' Association journal, 21(6), 325-36
Myers, I. B., Cauller, M. H., Quenk, N. L. & Hammer, A. L. (2009). Myers
Briggs Type Indicator (MBTI). 3rd ed. Mountain View: California.
Selye, H. (1956). The Stress of life, McGraw Hill : New York. 53, 55.
Srivastava, A. K. (1992). ICMR Psychosocial Stressor Questionnaire. Indian
Council of Medical Research, New Delhi.




International Seminar on Epistemology and Indian Logic
Shri Mata Vaishno Devi University, Katra
Jammu & Kashmir - 182320
Diamond Jubilee Session (60th Session)
All India Philosophy Association
3rd - 5th June, 2015
The rationality of the theme epistemology and Indian logic lies in the fact that logic
in India has been part and parcel of different systems of philosophy and therefore
has been inseparably linked to their epistemological and metaphysical beliefs. As
there is no single system called Indian philosophy, Indian logic is also studied in a
systemic form such as the Nyya logic, the Buddhist logic and the Jaina logic. Despite
a wide range of differences in the metaphysical beliefs of different systems, there
are some recognizable similarities in epistemological thinking. For example, there
are focused debates on the nature and function of knowledge, number of the sources
of knowledge, the conditions leading to illusory cognition and the role of reasoning
and testimony in dispelling the ignorancea sine qua non to the attainment of the
ultimate objective. These debates drove the attention of thinkers to the patterns of
reasoning as early as in the second century B.C.E. The modern sense of logic is
traced back into the intellectual activity called anvk (investigation) which
consists in the reviewing (anu-kaa) of a thing previously apprehended (kita)
through perception or verbal cognition. The science that makes this activity as the
subject matter of its study is variously named nvkik, nyyavidy, or hetuvidy, the
science of reasoning (logic). Anumna (anu means after and mna means
knowledge) thus becomes a natural term to refer to the process of reasoning.
What is significant in the above definition of logic is the nuptial link of inferential
knowledge to a previously acquired knowledge, perceptually or otherwise. Logic, in
the classical Indian philosophy, is therefore discussed as a part of epistemology, not
as an independent discipline. And, the manifest goal of inference is to generate true
cognition or knowledge whether for oneself or for other, and not to prove validity or
invalidity. What is crucial to the production of inferential knowledge is the
necessary relationship between the reason (hetu) and the claim (sdhya). A careful
and elaborate discussion on ascertaining and apprehending this relationship is seen
in the Indian logical tradition. It is also observed that a great amount of energy is
invested by the Indian logicians in establishing the universal proposition
(udharaathe statement of necessary relation between the hetu and the sdhya
along with actual instance) than developing formal techniques of reasoning. This is
not to suggest that the discussions do not involve any structure. The logical section
of the Carakasahit (c. first century C.E. text on health care) delineates the
methods of discussion. It is not surprising to see the elaboration of the technique in


this text given the urgent nature of the medical profession. On the basis of the
symptoms (hetu) the medical professionals ascertain the presence of a particular
disease (sdhya) in a body. The certainty of their inferential knowledge enables
them to prescribe suitable treatment.
The pragmaticity of the above kind however has not hindered the Indian logicians to
delve deeply on various issues pertaining to generation and authenticity of
inferential knowledge. After particularly 4th or 5th century C.E., a plethora of texts
can be seen undertaking logical issues for separate discussions. There has not been
a concerted effort to explore the insights available in the Indian logical thinking. The
discussion is required from not only historical perspective but also in relation to the
concepts developed in rational sequence. For example, whereas the ancient thinkers
relied on the analogical method of reasoning, the later thinkers engaged in hetucentric discussion, the Navya-nyya method being the latest one. Similarly, whereas
the non-Buddhist thinkers adopted primarily the technique of demonstration, the
Buddhist thinkers opted primarily for the technique of refutation. What could have
been the reason for such development? An answer to this question may reaffirm the
close ties between the logical thinking and epistemological and metaphysical beliefs.
The participants of the seminar are expected to stimulate the discussion of
theoretical and/or practical relevance. The following are the suggestive themes:
The Concept of Prama
Analgocal Reasoning in Ancient Debates
The Question of Truth, Validity and Soundness with regard to Anumna
The Nature of Necessity between Hetu and Sdhya
Anupalabdhi and Abhva
Reducibility of the Sources of Knowledge
The Navya-nyya Concept of Negation
The Issue of Psychologism in Indian Logic
The Jaina Synthesis of the Logical Structure
The Nature of Universal Proposition
The Concept of Prasaga
The authors are expected to choose any topic from the wide range of Indian logical
Overseas participants are also expected in this section. Any reseach scholar can
participate in this section by sending a good quality reseach paper within the
stipulated time. The final list of speakers will be published after receiving research
papers and confirmed participation.
Registration Fee (per person):
Faculty and other delegates: 2500/- (two thousand and five hundred Indian rupees)
Student delegates: 1500/- (one thousand and five hundred Indian rupees)
Local delegates (with only luncheons): 1000/- (one thousand Indian rupees)


Accompanying persons (beyond 12 yrs. age): 2000/- (two thousand Indian rupees)
Overseas (non-SAARC) delegates: $100 (one hundred US Dollar)
[The registration fee for the SAARC delegates is the same as for general delegates. It
includes conference kit, hospitality and local transport. The fee for accompanying
person however does not include conference kit.]
Mode of Payment:
There are two ways to submit registration fee:
Through a Demand Draft in favour of Registrar, SMVDU payable at Jammu/Katra,
Or Through NEFT transaction in the following account:
Name of the Account: Registrar, SMVDU
Address: SMVDU, Katra, J&K (INDIA) -182320
Account No.: 0477040100000023
Name of the Bank: J&K Bank
Branch: Shri Mata Vaishno Devi University
Offline Registration
The Registration Form along with original DD/copy of NEFT transaction should be
sent to:
Dr. Anil K. Tewari, Organizing Secretary Conference Secretariat, School of
Philosophy & Culture Shri Mata Vaishno Devi University, Katra, J&K (INDIA)
182320 Telefax: +91 1991 285693; Email: darshan.parishad@smvdu.ac.in

For more details of seminars, conferences, jobs and workshops etc. kindly visit to
Philosophy News in India:




Ms. Pankojini Mulia, Research Scholar, Department of Humanities

and Social Sciences, Indian School of Mines, Dhanbad.
Dr. A K Behura, Associate Professor, Department of Humanities
and Social Sciences, Indian School of Mines, Dhanbad.
Dr. Sarita Kar, Assistant Professor, Department of Humanities and
Social Sciences, Indian School of Mines, Dhanbad.
Ms.Poulami Chakraborty, Contractual Lecturer in Philosophy,
Hiralal Majumber Memorial College for Women, Dakshineswar,
Dr. John Daniel, Director, Saroj Institute of Management and
Technology, Lucknow-Sultanpur Road, Lucknow.
Dr.Guneeta Chadha, Head, Fine Arts Department, P. G. Govt.
College for Girls , Sector-11, Chandigarh.
Ms. Urmi Saha, Jadavpur University, Kolkata.
Mr. Hiralal Mahato, University of Deusto, Bilbao, Spain.
Dr. Prakash Chandra Badwaya, Assistant Professor, Department of
History, P. G. Govt. College for Girls , Sector-11, Chandigarh.
Ms. Poonam Sharma, Research Scholar (Psychology), Department
of Psychology, Faculty of Social Sciences, Dayalbagh Educational
Institute (Deemed University), Agra.
Dr. (Mrs.) Ira Das, Professor & Head, Department of Psychology,
Faculty of Social Sciences, Dayalbagh Educational Institute
(Deemed University), Agra.



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