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Perception
[A. Empiricism and intellectualism in the theory of aphasia, equally insufficient]
Right from the jumping off point of the essay, we are able to situate the
phenomenon of speech and acts of signification within MPs work more broadly of
distancing philosophy from the Cartesian project of rigid division between the
subject of certainty and the surrounding objects of the natural world. MP tells us
that it is the actual speaking subject that problematizes the rational, dualistic
subject. However, the former, the subject of the immediate experience of speech,
signification, and gesture cannot be located in any accounts of speech circulating at
the time of his writing. The comparatively reductionist account of speech and
language, those notions which fail to grasp the complexity of the speaker and
speech, theorize language as a series of verbal images left as traces from words
spoken and heard. For MP, language as verbal images fails to explain many
constitutive elements of the act of signification regardless of whether traces or not
these images are considered to be bodily or regarded as deposits in the
unconscious. Whether words are responses produced through the workings of the
nervous system or if consciousness brings forth appropriate words based on
acquired associations, there is no intentional speaking subject found in either of
these accounts.
In cases of aphasia, there are a number of cases that beg more nuanced
conceptions of speech than those mentioned. With some patients, spoken language
is under siege while written language remains intact, and vice versa. MP explains
that this is because language is constituted by many independent components and
because speech is a being that comes from reason. However, we can be sure that
this being from reason does not connote a flatly intellectual account of speech
based on associations, but a conditioning of language by thought that exceeds the
mind in isolation from the body. He goes on to suggest that accounts of aphasia fail
to see that what aphasia patients lose is not a certain stock of words, as if these
images were excised from a storehouse in the mind, but a particular manner or
style of deploying them. Surely considered anomalous from traditional perspectives
on aphasia, MP points to oddities in tests done with patients as a means of drawing
up the intentional elements of language over and above its articulatory-motor
moment of production, wherein common understanding pegs the deficit that
characterizes the disorder. Here we find the first stirrings of his own construction of
an alternative theory of speech and the speaking subject:
Even when they proceed correctly at the beginning of the test [matching like
color samples], it is not the participation of the samples in a single
idea that guides them, but rather the experience of an immediate
resemblance, and this is why they can only classify the samples after
having brought them together. (181).