EXHIBITS To Compl Kamala Harris VOL II Exh12 To Exh22 Mailed 4-10-15.compressed

Local Rule 591.
3 Judgment Forms Counsel must prepare, serve, and present to the Court forms for all orders and judgments, which
require the Courts signature. If no objection is forthcoming within ten days, the order or judgment may be signed as presented.
Complaints in intervention under the Labor Code do not require supporting documentation. (San Bernardino Local Rules)
CRC, Rule 2.400. Court records
(a) Removal of records Only the clerk may remove and replace records in the court's files. Unless otherwise provided by these
rules or ordered by the court, court records may only be inspected by the public in the office of the clerk and released to authorized court
personnel or an attorney of record for use in a court facility. No original court records may be used in any location other than a court
facility, unless so ordered by the presiding judge or his or her designee.
CRC, Rule 2.550. Sealed records
(c) Court records presumed to be open
Unless confidentiality is required by law, court records are presumed to be open.
CRC, Rule 3.1109. Notice of determination of submitted matters

(a) Notice by clerk When the court rules on a motion or makes an order or renders a judgment in a matter it has taken under
submission, the clerk must immediately notify the parties of the ruling, order, or judgment. The notification, which must specifically
identify the matter ruled on, may be given by mailing the parties a copy of the ruling, order, or judgment, and it constitutes service of notice
only if the clerk is required to give notice under Code of Civil Procedure section 664.5
CRC, Rule 3.1112. Motions and other pleadings
(a) Motions required papers Unless otherwise provided by the rules in this division, the papers filed in support of a motion must consist
of at least the following:
(1) A notice of hearing on the motion;
(2) The motion itself; and
(3) A memorandum in support of the motion or demurrer
CRC, Rule 3.1113. Memorandum
(a) Memorandum in support of motion A party filing a motion, except for a motion listed in rule 3.1114, must serve and file a
supporting memorandum. The court may construe the absence of a memorandum as an admission that the motion or special demurrer
is not meritorious and cause for its denial and, in the case of a demurrer, as a waiver of all grounds not supported
CRC, Rule 3.1312. Preparation and submission of proposed order
(a) Prevailing party to prepare Unless the parties waive notice or the court orders otherwise, the party prevailing on any motion must,
within five days of the ruling, serve by any means authorized by law and reasonably calculated to ensure delivery to the other
party or parties no later than the close of the next business day a proposed order for approval as conforming to the court's order.
Within five days after service, the other party or parties must notify the prevailing party as to whether or not the proposed order is so
approved. The opposing party or parties must state any reasons for disapproval. Failure to notify the prevailing party within the time
required shall be deemed an approval. The extensions of time based on a method of service provided under any statute or rule do not
apply to this rule. (Subd (a) amended effective January 1, 2011; previously amended effective July 1, 2000, and January 1, 2007.)
(b) Submission of proposed order to court The prevailing party must, upon expiration of the five-day period provided for approval,
promptly transmit the proposed order to the court together with a summary of any responses of the other parties or a statement that no
responses were received.(Subd (b) amended effective January 1, 2007; previously amended effective July 1, 2000.)
CRC, Rule 3.1347. Discovery motions in summary proceeding involving possession of real property
(a) Notice In an unlawful detainer action or other action brought under chapter 4 of title 3 of part 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure
(commencing with section 1159), notice of a discovery motion must be given in compliance with CCP 1013 and 1170.8.
(b) Opposition and reply at hearing Any opposition to the motion and any reply to an opposition may be made orally at the
time of hearing or in writing as set forth in (c).
(c) Written opposition in advance of hearing. If a party seeks to have a written opposition considered in advance of the hearing,
the written opposition must be served and filed on or before the court day before the hearing. Service must be by personal delivery,
facsimile transmission, express mail, or other means consistent with Code of Civil Procedure sections 1010, 1011, 1012, and 1013, and
reasonably calculated to ensure delivery to the other party or parties no later than the close of business on the court day before the hearing.
The court, in its discretion, may consider written opposition filed later.
CCP 86. Specific cases and proceedings that are limited civil cases
(a) The following civil cases and proceedings are limited civil cases:
(1) A case at law in which the demand, exclusive of interest, or the value of the property in controversy amounts to twenty-five
thousand dollars ($25,000) or less. This paragraph does not apply to a case that involves the legality of any tax, impost, assessment, toll,
or municipal fine, except an action to enforce payment of delinquent unsecured personal property taxes if the legality of the tax is not
contested by the defendant.
CCP 88. Unlimited civil case
A civil action or proceeding other than a limited civil case may be referred to as an unlimited civil case.
CCP 664.5. Notice of entry of judgment
(a) In any contested action or special proceeding other than a small claims action or an action or proceeding in which a prevailing party is
not represented by counsel, the party submitting an order or judgment for entry shall prepare and mail a copy of the notice of entry
of judgment to all parties who have appeared in the action or proceeding and shall file with the court the original notice of entry of
judgment together with the proof of service by mail. This subdivision does not apply in a proceeding for dissolution of marriage, for
nullity of marriage, or for legal separation.
APPENDIX-1
CCP 663a. Notice of intention to move to set aside and vacate judgment; Filing and service; Contents; Time limits; Entry of order; Review
(a) A party intending to make a motion to set aside and vacate a judgment, as described in Section 663, shall file with the clerk
and serve upon the adverse party a notice of his or her intention, designating the grounds upon which the motion will be made,
and specifying the particulars in which the legal basis for the decision is not consistent with or supported by the facts, or in which
the judgment or decree is not consistent with the special verdict, either:
(1) After the decision is rendered and before the entry of judgment.
(2) Within 15 days of the date of mailing of notice of entry of judgment by the clerk of the court pursuant to Section 664.5, or service
upon him or her by any party of written notice of entry of judgment, or within 180 days after the entry of judgment, whichever is earliest.
(b) Except as otherwise provided in Section 12a, the power of the court to rule on a motion to set aside and vacate a judgment shall
expire 60 days from the mailing of notice of entry of judgment by the clerk of the court pursuant to Section 664.5, or 60 days after service
upon the moving party by any party of written notice of entry of the judgment, whichever is earlier, or if that notice has not been given,
then 60 days after filing of the first notice of intention to move to set aside and vacate the judgment. If that motion is not determined within
the 60-day period, or within that period, as extended, the effect shall be a denial of the motion without further order of the court. A motion to
set aside and vacate a judgment is not determined within the meaning of this section until an order ruling on the motion is (1) entered in the
permanent minutes of the court, or (2) signed by the judge and filed with the clerk. The entry of an order to set aside and vacate the judgment
in the permanent minutes of the court shall constitute a determination of the motion, even though that minute order, as entered, expressly
directs that a written order be prepared, signed, and filed. The minute entry shall, in all cases, show the date on which the order actually is
entered in the permanent minutes, but failure to comply with this direction shall not impair the validity or effectiveness of the order.
CCP 1005. Requirement of written notice for certain motions
Time for serving and filing; Method of serving
(a) Written notice shall be given, as prescribed in subdivisions (b) and (c), for the following motions:
(1) Notice of Application and Hearing for Writ of Attachment under Section 484.040.
(2) Notice of Application and Hearing for Claim and Delivery under Section 512.030.
(3) Notice of Hearing for Claim of Exemption under Section 706.105.
(4) Motion to Quash Summons pursuant to subdivision (b) of Section 418.10.
(5) Motion for Determination of Good Faith Settlement pursuant to Section 877.6.
(6) Hearing for Discovery of Peace Officer Personnel Records pursuant to Section 1043 of the Evidence Code.
(7) Notice of Hearing of Third-Party Claim pursuant to Section 720.320.
(8) Motion for an Order to Attend Deposition more than 150 miles from deponent's residence pursuant to Section 2025.260.
(9) Notice of Hearing of Application for Relief pursuant to Section 946.6 of the Government Code.
(10) Motion to Set Aside Default or Default Judgment and for Leave to Defend Actions pursuant to Section 473.5.
(11) Motion to Expunge Notice of Pendency of Action pursuant to Section 405.30.
(12) Motion to Set Aside Default and for Leave to Amend pursuant to Section 585.5.
(13) Any other proceeding under this code in which notice is required and no other time or method is prescribed by law or by court or judge.
(b) Unless otherwise ordered or specifically provided by law, all moving and supporting papers shall be served and filed at least
16 court days before the hearing. The moving and supporting papers served shall be a copy of the papers filed or to be filed with the court.
However, if the notice is served by mail, the required 16-day period of notice before the hearing shall be increased by five calendar days if
the place of mailing and the place of address are within the State of California, 10 calendar days if either the place of mailing or the place of
address is outside the State of California but within the United States, and 20 calendar days if either the place of mailing or the place of
address is outside the United States, and if the notice is served by facsimile transmission, express mail, or another method of delivery
providing for overnight delivery, the required 16-day period of notice before the hearing shall be increased by two calendar days.
Section 1013, which extends the time within which a right may be exercised or an act may be done, does not apply to a notice of
motion, papers opposing a motion, or reply papers governed by this section. All papers opposing a motion so noticed shall be filed
with the court and a copy served on each party at least nine court days, and all reply papers at least five court days before the hearing.
(c) Notwithstanding any other provision of this section, all papers opposing a motion and all reply papers shall be served by personal
delivery, facsimile transmission, express mail, or other means consistent with Sections 1010, 1011, 1012, and 1013, and reasonably
calculated to ensure delivery to the other party or parties not later than the close of the next business day after the time the opposing papers
or reply papers, as applicable, are filed. This subdivision applies to the service of opposition and reply papers regarding motions for summary
judgment or summary adjudication, in addition to the motions listed in subdivision (a).
CCP 1170.5. Time for trial; Extension; Payment of damages pending termination of action
(a) If the defendant appears pursuant to Section 1170, trial of the proceeding shall be held not later than the 20th day following the
date that the request to set the time of the trial is made. Judgment shall be entered thereon and, if the plaintiff prevails, a writ of
execution shall be issued immediately by the court upon the request of the plaintiff.
CCP 1170.7. Motion for summary judgment
A motion for summary judgment may be made at any time after the answer is filed upon giving five days notice.
Summary judgment shall be granted or denied on the same basis as a motion under Section 437c.
CCP 1170.8. Discovery motion
In any action under this chapter, a discovery motion may be made at any time upon giving five days' notice.
Section 1170.8 is new. The section provides for an expedited hearing on a discovery motion in a forcible entry or forcible or unlawful
detainer case, consistent with the precedence for such cases expressed in Section 1179a. The section is modeled on Section 1170.7
(five days notice required for summary judgment motion in action under this chapter).
APPENDIX-2
CRC, Rule 10.603. Authority and duties of presiding judge

(a) General responsibilities The presiding judge is responsible, with the assistance of the court executive officer,
for leading the court, establishing policies, and allocating resources in a manner that promotes access to justice
for all members of the public, provides a forum for the fair and expeditious resolution of disputes, maximizes the
use of judicial and other resources, increases efficiency in court operations, and enhances service to the public.
The presiding judge is responsible for:
(1) Ensuring the effective management and administration of the court, consistent with any rules, policies,
strategic plan, or budget adopted by the Judicial Council or the court;
(2) Ensuring that the duties of all judges specified under rule 10.608 are timely and orderly performed; and
(3) Ensuring that the court has adopted written policies and procedures allowing the presiding judge to perform
efficiently the administrative duties of that office. (Subd (a) amended effective January 1, 2007.)
(b) Authority
(1) The presiding judge is authorized to:
(A) Assign judges to departments and designate supervising judges for divisions, districts, or branch courts;
(B) Apportion the business of the court, including assigning and reassigning cases to departments;
(C) Call meetings of the judges;
(D) Appoint standing and special committees of judges;
(E) Act as the spokesperson for the court;
(F) Authorize and direct expenditures from the court's Trial Court Operations Fund; and
(G) Perform all acts necessary to accomplish the duties specified by the rules of court.
(2) No local rule or policy may limit the authority of the presiding judge as granted in the rules of court.(Subd (b)
amended effective January 1, 2007.)
(c) Duties
(1) Assignments The presiding judge has ultimate authority to make judicial assignments.
The presiding judge must:
(A) Designate a judge to preside in each department, including a master calendar judge when appropriate,
and designate a presiding judge of the juvenile division and a supervising judge for each division, district, or branch
court. In making judicial assignments, the presiding judge must take into account the following:
(i) The needs of the public and the court, as they relate to the efficient and effective management of the
court's calendar;
(ii) The knowledge and abilities demanded by the assignment;
(iii) The judge's judicial and nonjudicial experience, including specialized training or education;
(iv) The judge's interests;
(v) The need for continuity in the assignment;
(vi) The desirability of exposing the judge to a particular type of assignment; and
(vii) Other appropriate factors. Judicial assignments must not be based solely or primarily on seniority;
(B) Assign to a master calendar judge any of the duties that may more appropriately be performed by that
department;
(C) Supervise the court's calendar, apportion the business of the court among the several departments of the
court as equally as possible, and publish for general distribution copies of a current calendar specifying the judicial
assignments of the judges and the times and places assigned for hearings;
(D) Reassign cases between departments as convenience or necessity requires; and
(E) Designate a judge to act if by law or the rules of court a matter is required to be presented to or heard by a
particular judge and that judge is absent, deceased, or unable to act.
APPENDIX - 3
(2) Judicial schedules

(A) The presiding judge must adopt a process for scheduling judges' vacations and absences from court for
attendance at schools, conferences, workshops, and community outreach activities, and must prepare a plan for these
vacations and absences from court.
(B) The plan should take into account the principles contained in standards 10.1110.13 (on judicial education)
and standard 10.5 (on community activities) of the Standards of Judicial Administration.
(C) The presiding judge must review requests from judges for time absent from court and may approve any
request that is consistent with the plan and with the orderly operation of the court.
(D) The presiding judge must allow each judge to take two days of personal leave per year. Personal leave may
be taken at any time that is approved by the presiding judge.
(E) The presiding judge must allow the following number of days of vacation for each judge annually:
(i) 24 days for judges with less than 7 years of service as a California judge;
(ii) 27 days for judges with at least 7 but less than 14 years of service as a California judge; and
(iii) 30 days for judges with 14 or more years of service as a California judge.
(F) The presiding judge may authorize a judge to take more time off than is specified in (c)(2)(E) as justified by
extraordinary circumstances, if the circumstances are documented and the authorization is in writing.
(G) The presiding judge, in his or her discretion, may allow a judge to take additional vacation days equal to the
number of vacation days that the judge did not use in the previous year, up to a maximum of 30 such days. A court
may, by local rule, establish a lower maximum number of such days. This paragraph applies only to vacation days
accrued after January 1, 2001. It does not affect any unused vacation days that a judge may have accrued before
January 1, 2001, which are governed by local court policy, nor does it create any right to compensation for unused
vacation days.
(H) The court must, by local rule, define a day of vacation. Absence from court to attend an authorized
education program, conference, or workshop for judges, or to participate in Judicial Council or other authorized
committees or community outreach activities, is not vacation time if attendance is in accordance with the plan and has
the prior approval of the presiding judge. Absence from court due to illness is not vacation time. This rule does not
limit the time a judge may be absent from court when unable to work because of illness.
(I) To ensure compliance with the plan, the presiding judge must establish a system to monitor judges' absences
from court and maintain records of those absences.
(3) Submitted cases The presiding judge must supervise and monitor the number of causes under submission
before the judges of the court and ensure that no cause under submission remains undecided and pending for longer
than 90 days. As an aid in accomplishing this goal, the presiding judge must:
(A) Require each judge to report to the presiding judge all causes under submission for more than 30 days and,
with respect to each cause, designate whether it has been under submission for 30 through 60 days, 61 through 90
days, or over 90 days;
(B) Compile a list of all causes under submission before judges of the court, designated as the submitted list,
which must include the name of each judge, a list of causes under submission before that judge, and the length of
time each cause has been under submission;
(C) Circulate monthly a complete copy of the submitted list to each judge of the court;
(D) Contact and alert each judge who has a cause under submission for over 30 days and discuss ways to ensure
that the cause is timely decided;
APPENDIX - 4
(E) Consider providing assistance to a judge who has a cause under submission for over 60 days; and
(F) Consider requesting the services of the Administrative Office of the Courts to review the court's calendar
management procedures and make recommendations whenever either of the following conditions exists in the court
for the most recent three months:
(i) More than 90 civil active cases are pending for each judicial position; or
(ii) More than 10 percent of the cases on the civil active list have been pending for one year or more.
(4) Oversight of judicial officers The presiding judge must:
(A) Judges Notify the Commission on Judicial Performance of:
(i) A judge's substantial failure to perform judicial duties, including any habitual neglect of duty, persistent
refusal to carry out assignments as assigned by the presiding judge, or persistent refusal to carry out the directives of
the presiding judge as authorized by the rules of court; or
(ii) Any absences caused by disability totaling more than 90 court days in a 12-month period, excluding
absences authorized under (c)(2);
(B) Notice Give the judge a copy of the notice to the commission under (A) if appropriate. If a copy is not given
to the judge, the presiding judge must inform the commission of the reasons why so notifying the judge was deemed
inappropriate;
(C) Commissioners
(i) Prepare and submit to the judges for consideration and adoption procedures for receiving, inquiring into,
and resolving complaints lodged against court commissioners and referees, consistent with rule 10.703; and
(ii) Notify the Commission on Judicial Performance if a commissioner or referee is disciplined or resigns,
consistent with rule 10.703(k).
(D) Temporary judges Be responsible for the recruitment, training, supervision, approval, and performance of
temporary judges as provided in rules 2.8102.819 and rules 10.74010.746; and
(E) Assigned judges For each assigned retired judge:
(i) Complete a confidential evaluation form;
(ii) Submit the form annually to the Administrative Director of the Courts;
(iii) Direct complaints against the assigned judge to the Chief Justice, by forwarding them to the
attention of the Administrative Director of the Courts, and provide requested information in writing to
the Administrative Director of the Courts in a timely manner; and
(iv) Assist the Administrative Director in the process of investigating, evaluating, and making
recommendations to the Chief Justice regarding complaints against retired judges who serve on assignment.
(5) Personnel
(A) The presiding judge must provide general direction to and supervision of the court executive officer, or, if
the court has no executive officer, perform the duties of the court executive regarding personnel as specified in rule
10.610(c)(1).
(B) The presiding judge must approve, in writing, the total compensation package (salary and all benefits)
offered to the court executive officer at the time of the executive officers appointment and any subsequent changes to
the executive officers total compensation package.
(6) Budget and fiscal management The presiding judge must:
(A) Establish a process for consulting with the judges of the court on budget requests, expenditure plans, and
other budget or fiscal matters that the presiding judge deems appropriate;
(B) Establish responsible budget priorities and submit budget requests that will best enable the court to achieve
its goals;
APPENDIX - 5
(C) Establish a documented process for setting and approving any changes to the court executive officers total
compensation package in a fiscally responsible manner consistent with the courts established budget; and
(D) Approve procurements, contracts, expenditures, and the allocation of funds in a manner that promotes the
implementation of state and local budget priorities and that ensures equal access to justice and the ability of the court
to carry out its functions effectively. In a court with an executive officer, the presiding judge may delegate these
duties to the court executive officer, but the presiding judge must ensure that the court executive officer performs
such delegated duties consistent with the court's established budget.
(7) Meetings and committees The presiding judge must establish a process for consulting with the judges of the
court and may call meetings of the judges as needed. The presiding judge may appoint standing and special
committees of judges as needed to assist in the proper performance of the duties and functions of the court.
(8) Liaison The presiding judge must:
(A) Provide for liaison between the court and the Judicial Council, the Administrative Office of the
Courts, and other governmental and civic agencies;
(B) Meet with or designate a judge or judges to meet with any committee of the bench, bar, news media, or
community to review problems and to promote understanding of the administration of justice, when appropriate;
and
(C) Support and encourage the judges to actively engage in community outreach to increase public
understanding of and involvement with the justice system and to obtain appropriate community input
regarding the administration of justice, consistent with the California Code of Judicial Ethics and standard
10.5 of the Standards of Judicial Administration.
(9) Planning The presiding judge must:
(A) Prepare, with the assistance of appropriate court committees and appropriate input from the
community, a long-range strategic plan that is consistent with the plan and policies of the Judicial Council,
for adoption in accordance with procedures established by local rules or policies; and
(B) Ensure that the court regularly and actively examines access issues, including any physical, language, or
economic barriers that impede the fair administration of justice.
(10) Appellate records The presiding judge is responsible for ensuring the timely preparation of records on appeal.
(A) The presiding judge ordinarily should delegate the following duties to the executive officer:
(i) Maintaining records of outstanding transcripts to be completed by each court reporter;
(ii) Reassigning court reporters as necessary to facilitate prompt completion of transcripts; and
(iii) Reviewing court reporters' requests for extensions of time to complete transcripts in appeals of criminal cases.
(B) After reasonable notice and hearing, the presiding judge must declare any reporter of the court who is
delinquent in completing a transcript on appeal not competent to act as a reporter in court, under Government Code
section 69944.
(11) Local rules The presiding judge must prepare, with the assistance of appropriate court committees,
proposed local rules to expedite and facilitate court business in accordance with Government Code section
68071 and rules 2.100, 3.20, and 10.613.(Subd (c) amended effective July 1, 2010; previously amended effective
January 1, 2001, January 1, 2002, January 1, 2006, July 1, 2006, and January 1, 2007.)
(d) Delegation The presiding judge may delegate any of the specific duties listed in this rule to another judge.
Except for the duties listed in (c)(5)(B) and (c)(6)(C), the presiding judge may delegate to the court executive officer
any of the duties listed in this rule that do not require the exercise of judicial authority. The presiding judge remains
responsible for all duties listed in this rule even if he or she has delegated particular tasks to someone else.
APPENDIX - 6
EXHIBIT 1 2
SEP 8 20i4
SAN BERNARDINO COUNTY SUPERIOR COURT

APPELLATE DIVISION
STUBBLEFIELD PROPERTIES,
Plaintiff - Respondent
VS.
BONNIE SHIPLEY,
Defendant - Appellant
case NO. ACIAS 1400026

[Trial Court UDDS 12041301
Appeal from a Final Judgment in

San Bernardino Superior Court
Entered on March 20,2014
Honorable Michael A. Sachs
APPELLANT'S OPENING BRIEF

Clerk's Transcript on Appeal and Reporter's Transcript filed 713 1/14
Nancy D McCarron, CBN 164780

950 Roble Lane
Santa Barbara, CAP93 103
nancyduffysb@yahoo.com
805-450-0450 fax 805-965-3492
Attorney for AppellanVDefendant Below
TABLE OF CONTENTS
CERTIFICATE OF INTERESTED PARTIES ................
first
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES.
ISSUE ON APPEAL
APPEALABILITY .. .....
DE NOVO STANDARD OF APPEAL ....
INTRODUCTION
Pertinent Facts and Procedural History ...
A. Former Panel Held, As the Sublessee of a Mobile Home Owner Petitioner

Does Not Fall Within the Category of an Unlawful Occupant .
B. Former Panel Never Held Shipley Was An Unlawful Occupant ..
C. The Trial Court Never Held Shipley Was An Unlawful Occupant ...
II. Serial Violations of Codes, Rules & Ethics in a Star Chamber Court Exceeded
Limits on Judicial Power Imposed by Article III, 3 and Article VI, 13 ...
I.
A.
Judge Sachs was not Assigned by Presiding Judge per Local Rule 530 ...
B.
Judge Sachs Stepped Out of His Role as Independent Arbiter

and Into a New Role of De Facto Advocate for Stubblefield ....
15
C. Court Had No Power to Grant Declaratory Relief to a Loser in the Judgment
18
D. Chronological Summary of Judge Sachs Serial Violations
19
CONCLUSION ...........................................
21
PRAYER FOR RELIEF .
21
CERTIFICATE OF WORD COUNT .....
21
MOTION TO AUGMENT RECORD
22
CERTIFICATION OF COUNSEL ..
24
PROOF OF SERVICE ............
26
TO BE FILED I N THE COURT OF APPEAL

I
COURT OF
APPEAL, SanBernardin APPELUTE
A ~ ~ O R N E V OP*RNV~HOUTA~ORIIEV
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Nancy Duf@ M&at-rob
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Petitioner [Writ of Mandate. Prohibition and Review]
E-U*lL*DwESS@&ul:
~\PPELJANT&ITI~NER:
Bonnie Shipley
RESPONDENT^ ELL PARTY IN INTEREST:Michael Sachs, Stubblefield Properties
CERTIFICATE OF INTERESTED ENTITIES OR PERSONS

(Check one):
INITIAL CERTIFICATE
0SUPPLEMENTAL CERTIFICATE
Notice: Please read rules 8.208 and 8.488 before completing thls form. You may use this form for the innla1
certificate in anappeal when you file your brlef or a prebriefing motion, application, or opposltlon t o such a
motion o r appliCation in the Court o f Appeal, and when you file a petitlon for a n extraordinary writ. You may
a k o use thlS fohn as a supplemental certificate when you learn of changed or addltional information that must
be disclosed.
1. ThiSfDrm IS belng submitted on behalf otthe follwring party (name):Petitioner
2. a.
0There ate no Wrested e m e s or pemns that must be ~~sted

inth~scertificate under rule 8.208.
Interested entitles or persons required to be listed under rule 8 208 are as follows:
b.
Fqll name of Interested

entity or person
Nature of interest
IEYDlaln):
-
(1)
Sfubblefield Pmperties, Partners
Business BankcorplCA; see more- SEC filing Attachment 2
(2)
~tubblefieldQuail Point Company
D. William Bader; Neal Baker; William Cozzo, Alan J Lane
(3) Eva Stubt)LefieldHazard, partner

(4)
Arnold HStubbletield, Gen Partner
(5) Thomas Panish, General Partner
John E. Duckworth; Joh~iRiddell; Robert L Nottjngham;

John L Ridell; James W Andrews; Ruth E Adell
Neil Dcrry,SB Cty Suprrace; Bill Postmus;Dale Stubblefield
Conhnded on attachment2
The underelgned certifies that the above-llsted persons or entltks (corponUona, partnershipa, finns, or any other
easoclion, but not including government e d e s or thelr agencies) have either ( I )an ownership interest c4 10 percent or
mare
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should consldPr in detemr~nlngne&ther
t o disqualify ihemselvea, as defined in rule 8.208(4(2).
Date:
+$14
Nancy
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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
CASES
Com. for Green Foothills v. Santa Clara Board of Supervisors (2010) 48 C.4th 32,42 . 1
CONSTITUTION and STATUTES

Article III, Section 3....................................................................................1, 3, 9,16,18
Article III, 3 and Article VI, 13 ....................................................................2, 3, 4, 9
Civil 798.12 ...............................................................................................................15
Civil 798.55 ...............................................................................................................20
Civil 798.56 ...........................................................................................1, 6, 15, 16, 18
Civil 798.75[c] .......................................................................................5, 6, 10,11, 14
Civil 798.85 ...............................................................................................................21
Civil 1717 .................................................................................................................. 21
CCP 86 ...................................................................................................................... 18
CCP 580 .................................................................................................................... 18
CCP 663a(b) ............................................................................................3, 7, 9, 18, 19
CCP 798.56 ...............................................................................................................15
CCP 904.2(a) ..............................................................................................................1
CCP 1005 ............................................................................................................. 9, 19
RULES OF COURT
CRC 3.110 ................................................................................................................9,19
CRC 3.113 .................................................................................................................. 16,
CRC 3.1103 .................................................................................................................19
CRC 3.1201 ................................................................................................................16
CRC 3.1300 ...................................................................................................................9
CRC 3.1312 .........................................................................................................3, 9, 19
CRC 3.20 ....................................................................................................................... 9
CRC 8.104 ..................................................................................................................... 7
CRC 8.841 ................................................................................................................... 22
LOCAL RULE 530 .......................................................................................................8
LOCAL RULE 591.3 ......................................................................................16, 17, 20
OTHER AUTHORITIES
Committee on Judicial Performance ..........................................................................4
CJE Canons 2, 2A Comment,2B, 2C .........................................................................4
Judicial Ethics, Preamble 2
Public Corruption-Maximizing Remedies by Michael Sachs, Esq.
Chief Deputy County Counsel and Leonard Gumport, Esq ............................. 2
Star Chamber Court ..............................................................................................1, 2, 8
0
ISSUE ON APPEAL
Did the court exceed its power, constitutionally limited in Article III, Section 3,
by running a Star Chamber Court 1 to revise a statute by judicial proclamation,
transmuting prevailing partys judgment into a victory for the non-prevailing party?
APPEALABILITY
Under CCP 904.2(a), appellant Bonnie Shipley appeals from a final judgment
[CT 223: 3/20/14], after a former Panel directed final judgment entered in her favor
[CT 57: 8/13/13] by way of a Notice of Appeal [CT 269: 4/14/14] and NDR [CT 275].
Shipley was forced to appeal because the courts paraphrasing of former Panels
conclusions, coupled with revising a statute by judicial proclamation, effectively
authorized respondent Stubblefield to evict her directly, contravening former Panels
conclusion that Stubblefield could not evict Shipley directly because there was no
privity of contract between them---a statutory prerequisite to a direct eviction.
DE NOVO STANDARD OF APPEAL 2

The court revised Civil 798.56[d] in a judgment prepared by Stubblefield,
despite Shipleys objection to directing a non-prevailing party to write the judgment.
It was delivered to chambers ex parte on 3/20/14. Judge Sachs signed and entered
the judgment immediately, depriving Shipley of any opportunity to object to its form.
Because the judgment transmuted loser Stubblefield into a winner, by gratuitously
granting him the same relief requested in his sham complaint [judicial authorization
to evict Shipley directly without privity of contract between them] she was forced to
appeal her own judgment or face the eviction former Panel rescued her from last year.
1
Star Chamber Court [15th Century] was permitted to inflict any punishment except
death, without being bound by normal court rules or procedures. Modernly, it is
used metaphorically to describe a runaway court, where a judge disregards codes,
civil procedures, rules of court, or attempts to revise statutes by proclamation.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Star_Chamber
2
Com. for Green Foothills v. Santa Clara Board of Supervisors (2010) 48 C.4th 32,42
[do novo standard of appeal is applied where the Panel must interpret a statutory dispute]
INTRODUCTION
Our legal system is based on the principle that an independent, fair
and competent judiciary will interpret and apply the laws that govern us.
The role of the judiciary is central to Americanjustice and the rule of law.
Intrinsicareprecepts that judges, individually and collectively, must
respect and honor the judicial office as a public trust and strive to enhance
and maintain confidence in our legal system. Judicial Ethics, Preamble
A public office is a public trust. Public Corruption-Maximizing Remedies
by Michael A. Sachs, Esq., Chief Deputy County Counsel and Leonard Gumport 3
After 7 years as judge and 13 years as county counsel prosecuting public trust abuse,
Judge Sachs knew he could not run a Star Chamber Court, disregard codes & rules,
or revise a statute by judicial proclamation to transmute a loser into a winner.
Judge Sachs ran a Star Chamber Court by ordering non-prevailing party to
write prevailing partys judgment [and deliver it ex parte to chambers] which revised
a statute to authorize Shipleys direct eviction without privity of contract. This ruse
flouted former Panels conclusion that Stubblefield could not evict Shipley directly
because he was not in privity of contract with her, as well as its conclusion that such
eviction attempts would be illegal. This gratuitous gift exceeded constitutional limits
on judicial power imposed by Article III,3 and ArticleVI,13.
Forcing a second appeal imposes an undue burden on the Appellate Division.
Once judgment for defendant is ordered by Writ of Mandate, and a plaintiff has
exhausted appeals up to the Supreme Court, the burden to defend should be over.
Paraphrasing former Panels conclusions, affirmed on appeal, to transmute a loser
into a winner---to advance a political agenda---should not be condoned by this court.
After prevailing last year by writ petition, Shipley is forced to prosecute a second
appeal to eschew a tainted judgment from ripening into an un-appealable judgment.
3
by Michael Sachs 9/14/05-Annual Meeting of County Counsels in Los Gatos
Presiding Panel is not the same panel who issued a writ of mandate last year.
Former Panel held Stubblefield could not evict Shipley directly as no privity of
contract existed between them because she was co-resident of a homeowner on a lease.
[CT 177, 184].
Former Panel found Stubblefields remedy was to proceed directly
against the homeowner for an alleged rule violation by a co-resident or homeowner.

[CT 185]
Privity of contract is a statutory prerequisite to any lawful eviction.
To comply with a 7/22/13 writ, Judge Alvarez granted her summary judgment,
[CT 124:10/21/13], but never entered final judgment on the merits, although Shipley
offered one with the summary judgment order. [CT 148] After voluntary recusal on
1/7/14 Judge Alvarez reassigned the case to Judge Sachs. [RT 17] On 2/19/14, rather
than enter any one of three final judgments Shipley had submitted [CT 161: 2/10/14] ,
Judge Sachs decided to vacate Judge Alvarezs prior summary judgment order,
without any pending motion for such relief. [CT 163] In fact, jurisdiction to vacate
expired 60 days after Judge Alvarez entered the order on 10/21/13. CCP 663a(b).
Ignoring Shipleys oral & written objections to bizarre Star Court process, Judge
Sachs ordered Stubblefield to compose a new summary judgment order, to replace the
one he vacated after jurisdiction expired, combined with final judgment [CT 163, 165].
This violated Rule 3.1312 calling for the prevailing party to submit a final judgment.
Seizing an opportunity to transmute his loss into a win Stubblefield paraphrased a trial
court finding and Panel conclusions to grant the relief requested in his sham complaint.
Judge Sachs inserted or resident into a statute to expand a homeowner eviction remedy
to all residents. This not only contravened former Panels conclusion that Stubblefield
could not evict Shipley directly, but also revised a statute by judicial proclamation,
exceeding constitutional limits on judicial power in Article III, Section 3. 4 [CT 245]
Article III, Section 3.The powers of state government are legislative,

executive, and judicial. Persons charged with the exercise of one power may
not exercise either of the others except as permitted by this Constitution
Vacating a summary judgment on 3/20/14 5 months after its entry on 10/21/13

exceeded limits imposed by Article VI, 13 on jurisdiction to vacate a judgment. 5
Judge Sachs signed the hybrid judgment on 3/20/14--the same day it was
delivered to chambers ex parteviolating Rule 3.1312. Judge Sachs signing,
as soon as the judgment hit his desk, not only consecrated blatant violations of
Rule 3.1312 but also failed to comply with Local Rule 591.3 requiring judges to
withhold entry of judgment for 10 days to afford a party opportunity to object.
Judge Sachs ordered a deputy to reject objections Shipley tried to file on 3/21/14.
The deputy said they were late as the order had been signed yesterday [3/20/14]
S-33 is a runaway court in which Judge Sachs ignores Codes of Civil Procedure,
Rules of Court, Statutes of Limitation and constitutional limitations on his power.
Judge Sachs acted as Stubblefields de facto advocate. Shipley prayed for Presiding
Panel to hold him in contempt of former Panels writ of mandate and to refer profligate
violations to Committee on Judicial Performance.6 Shipleys prayer for contempt was
rejected by Presiding Panel, 4th Dist. Court of Appeal, Division 2, and Supreme Court.
Shipley was forced to prosecute a second appeal or be summarily evicted through
express authorization of a judicial officer by an evictor without privity of contract.
Article VI,13 No judgment shall be set aside, or new trial granted, in any cause,
on the ground of misdirection of the jury, or of the improper admission or rejection
of evidence, or for any error as to any matter of pleading, or for any error as to any
matter of procedure, unless, after an examination of the entire cause, including the
evidence, the court shall be of the opinion that the error complained of has resulted
in a miscarriage of justice.
6
Whether disciplinary action is appropriate, and the degree of discipline

to be imposed requires a reasoned application of the text and consideration of such
factors as seriousness of the transgression, whether there is a pattern of improper
activity, and the effect of the improper activity on others or on the judicial
system. CJE, p. 3, Impropriety includes conduct that violates the law, court
rules, or provisions of this code, and conduct that undermines a judges
independence, integrity, or impartiality. Canons 2, 2A Comment,2B, 2C
I.
RELEVANT FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On 8/1/12 Shipley moved into Space 333 as the homeowners co-resident
in Stubblefields park. On 8/2/12 the homeowner delivered the same co-resident
application she used for all former co-residents since 2005 to the park office.
After homeowner left the park manager confronted Shipley at Space 333,
and threatened to lock her out of the park if she did not move out the next day.
Manager told Shipley if she wanted to live in the park she would have to find a
sugar daddy over 55 who lived in the park and move into his mobile home.
On 8/11/12 a process server nailed a 5-day Notice to Surrender Possession
onto the mobilehome citing Civil Code 798.75[c] as the basis of the demand.
The notice was invalid as subsection [c] applied only to a purchaser or transferee
who occupies a mobile home without a park lease. Shipley was neither one.
Despite warning of invalidity, Stubblefield served a sham eviction on 8/27/12.
[CT 3]. The court overruled Shipleys demurrer ordering her to answer. [CT 5]
After enduring 6 months of scorched earth litigation, Shipley petitioned the
Appellate Division to reverse denial of summary judgment. On 5/6/13 a former
Panel granted relief [CT 189] Former Panel found Civil 798.75[c] did not apply
to Shipley because she was not a purchaser/transferee of a mobile home and as a
lawful co-resident she was not an unlawful occupant. Former Panel found the 5day notice Stubblefield served was invalid and direct eviction was unauthorized:
CT 185
5
A. Former Panel Held, As the Sublessee of a Mobile Home Owner Petitioner

Does Not Fall Within the Category of an Unlawful Occupant.
CT 183
Panel concluded Stubblefield could not evict Shipley directly because there
was no privity of contract between them and Stubblefield did not own the home:
CT 184
Because Stubblefield argued there was no remedy to evict co-residents directly
former Panel opined his remedy was to proceed directly against the homeowner if
he wanted to evict a co-resident for any purported violation of a reasonable rule:
CT 185
Former Panel did not opine as to the reasonableness of Stubblefields park rules.
CT 185
B. Former Panel Never Held Shipley Was An Unlawful Occupant

Former Panel expressly found Shipley did not fall within such definition.
CT 183
Former Panel recited the trial courts 2/14/13 erroneous finding verbatim:
Rather the court found that Section 798.75, subdivision [c]
is not limited in its application , only in the escrow, sale or
transfer of a mobile home. It applies when an occupant of a
mobile home has no right of tenancy and is not otherwise
entitled to occupy the mobile home pursuant to this chapter.
6
CT 181
C. The Trial Court Never Held Shipley Was An Unlawful Occupant.

On 2/14/13 the trial court denied Stubblefields summary judgment, based on
arguing Shipley was an unlawful occupant subject to summary eviction. If the trial
court had found Shipley was an unlawful occupant the court would have granted
Stubblefields summary judgment rendering him the prevailing party. Instead,
the court set a trial date to let a jury decide if Shipley was an unlawful occupant.
On 7/22/13 former Panel issued a writ of mandate directing the trial court
to vacate its denial of summary judgment, to grant summary judgment, and to enter
final judgment on the merits for Shipley, with costs. CT 189
Because Stubblefield appealed Panels order to the Court of Appeal [ CT 132]
and the Supreme Court [CT 143] the trial court was unable to comply with former
Panels mandate until 10/21/13 by entering summary judgment for Shipley. CT 124
Department S-32 clerk served the order on all parties by mail on 10/22/12.
CT 125
The clerks service by mail triggered the clock on Stubblefields window to appeal
[60 days in CRC 8.104] or to move the court to vacate the order. Civil 663(a)(2)
[15 days from clerks mail service]. Stubblefield failed to appeal or move to vacate
the 10/21/13 order granting summary judgment to Shipley. CCP 663(b) recites,
the power of the court to rule on a motion to set aside and
vacate a judgment shall expire 60 days from the mailing of
notice of entry of judgment by the clerk.
Two weeks after Dept. S-32 clerk mailed notice of a summary judgment order,
reciting, DEFENDANT/MOVING PARTY to prepare JUDGMENT Shipley offered
a proposed final judgment to Judge Alvarez on November 4, 2013---accompanied
by Stubblefields objections to it, and his alternate proposed judgment.
CT 153
Judge Alvarez never signed the proposed final judgment Shipley offered or the
alternate final judgment Stubblefield submitted. The court never composed its
own final judgment. The court failed to comply with former Panels directive.
II. Serial Violations of Codes, Rules & Ethics in a Star Chamber Court Exceeded
Constitutional Limits on Judicial Power Imposed by Art. III, 3 & Art. VI, 13
A. Judge Sachs was not Assigned by Presiding Judge per Local Rule 530
On 1/7/14 Shipleys Fee Motion came on for hearing. McCarron asked Judge
Alvarez to recuse as bias is presumed after reversal. Shipley feared he would gut
fees, just as he had done in other pro bono cases, forcing each party to appeal.
After self-recusal Judge Alvarez reassigned the case to Judge Sachs. Judge Alvarez
continued the attorney fee motion to February 10, 2014. [CT 158] Local Rule 530
required the presiding judge to reassign cases. Something was rotten in Denmark.
Why would Judge Alvarez reassign a judicial brother in a department right next door?
Why didnt Judge Alvarez transfer the case to the presiding judge for reassignment?
On 2/10/14 McCarron appeared in S-33 to present the same three judgments she
had submitted to Judge Alvarez on 11/4/13--except the words prevailing party were
deleted because Stubblefield had objected to the words in November. Judge of San
Bernardino Superior Court was substituted for Donald Alvarez, Judge. [CT 161]
Judge Sachs refused to sign any judgment McCarron presented. [RT 26, 29, 30, 36]
A minute order recited counsel for plaintiff to submit proposed judgment to the court.
Judge Sachs continued the 2/10/14 hearing to 2/19/14. Court Rule 3.1312 called for
prevailing party to submit the order. Judge Sachs ignored McCarrons objection to
his failure to comply with 3.1312. Judge Sachs conducts Star Court proceedings.
On 2-19-14 McCarron objected to vacating summary judgment 5 months later.
[RT 40:16]
McCarron objected to no jurisdiction to amend a summary judgment
order as the window to appeal or vacate expired three months earlier--on 12/23/13.
[RT 40:20] McCarron told Judge Sachs he could not paraphrase trial court or Panel
findings. [RT 46:22]. McCarron urged him to consider reciting former Panels twosentence directive while attaching a 10-pg decision for clarity [RT 41:21, 42:14, 47:1]
or enter the order Shipley offered containing genuine findings as shown at CT 209.
McCarron objected again to no jurisdiction to paraphrase findings not recited in the

official transcript or former Panels order. Judge Sachs responded I dont want to
reargue what we just did. RT 47:10 Judge Sachs runs Star Court proceedings.
Judge Sachs exceeded jurisdiction in waiving CCP 663(a)(2)s 60-day statute of
limitations to vacate the Alvarez order. Even if the statute of limitations had not
expired, no judge can vacate a prior judges order unless movant serves Notice of
Motion under CCP 1005 reciting statutory grounds for relief. CRC 3.110, 3.1300.
Under CRC 3.20 local rules cannot be used to preempt California Rules of Court.
This ultra vires act violated Article III, 3 and Article VI, 13 of the Constitution.
The 2/19/14 Minute Order recited, counsel for plaintiff to prepare judgment
as proposed by court by 3/5/14. Objections shall be due no later than 3/12/14.
Judge Sachs ordered Stubblefields counsel to compose a hybrid judgment, violating
Rule 3.1312, calling for prevailing party to prepare the judgment. Who ever heard
of a Judge ordering a loser to write an appellate winners final judgment? No unbiased judge would make such order. Judge Sachs runs Star Court proceedings.
On 3/4/14 Stubblefield offered a judgment reciting both courts found Shipley was
an unlawful occupant. Neither court ever made any such finding. CT 173:24-25
On 3/4/14 Shipley filed objections highlighting the words such as defendant in
RED which were artfully inserted into a paraphrased version of a 2/14/13 transcript
of trial courts findings. CT 165:20. A Court Reporters official transcript [2/14/13]
shows the words such as defendant never appeared therein as shown below:
2/14/13 RT, p.11 of 24
The actual finding recited, It applies when an occupant of a mobile home has no
right of tenancy and is not entitled to occupy the mobile home pursuant to this chapter.
In a paraphrased version of the official 2/14/13 transcript, Stubblefield artfully inserted
the words such as defendant in the middle of a sentence to create a pretext that the
court found Shipley was within a class of unlawful occupants defined in findings.
Below is the paraphrased version Judge Sachs adopted in a judgment entered 3/20/14.
CT 173
Above words such as defendant never appeared in the official 2/14/13 transcript.
Stubblefields paraphrased version also recited that former Panel found Shipley
was a sublessee of the mobilehome --an unauthorized sublessee of a mobilehome-thus, an unlawful occupant. Former Panel actually found exactly the opposite; i.e.
that Shipley was the sublessee of a mobilehome owner-----not a mobilehome!
CT 183 top, ln 2
Judge Sachs refused to consider entering Shipleys proposed judgment reciting the
trial court and former Panels findings and conclusions verbatim as shown at CT 209.
On 3/17/14 McCarron appeared for a third round of Star Court. The transcript
shows bias against McCarron while deferring to Mr. Williamson. Judge Sachs
addressed him as Counsel while calling McCarron maam in a condescending,
loud and misogynist tone of voice. Bias shown: RT 51:17, 52:1, 52:21,54:2, 62:26
10
The following excerpt shows deference to Mr. Williamson, bias against McCarron.
RT 51:17, 52:1, 52:21,54:2, 62:26
Disparate treatment of female attorneys does not comport with Judicial Ethics.
11
The transcript also shows when McCarron objected to paraphrasing former Panels
findings Judge Sachs interrupted to thwart recording of oral objections. RT 54:1
RT 51:24; 52:1
Judge Sachs facilitated Williamsons distortion of Panel findings on the record.
RT 52:18
Williamsons statement there was no particular finding on that was knowingly false.
Williamson and Judge Sachs knew former Panel did make a particular finding on exactly
that issue; i.e. that Shipley was the sublessee of the homeowner and not the sublessee of
the mobile home. Williamson and Judge Sachs also knew former Panel concluded
Shipley was a subtenant of the homeownernot the home.
12
Former Panel found evidence established Shipley was a subtenant of the homeowner.
CT 180-top
Judge Sachs knew former Panel found Shipley was not an unlawful occupant.
CT 183-top
Judge Sachs rebuffed McCarrons request that findings be quoted in full sentences.
RT 53:15-26
Judge Sachs facilitated attorney Williamsons total distortion of Judge Alvarezs
finding on the record by refusing to cross out the words such as defendant from
Stubblefields paraphrased version of findings typed into the proposed judgment.
Judge Alvarez set a trial date for a jury to decide if she was an unlawful occupant.
13
Former Panel quoted the trial courts finding verbatim on 2/14/13 as recited below:
Words such as defendant were not in Panels verbatim quote from a 2/14/13 transcript:
CT 181:5 top
When McCarron objected to Stubblefields distortion Judge Sachs insisted it is accurate.
RT 54:21 bottom
Judge Sachs consecrated Stubblefields distortion by approving his paraphrased
conclusions in the final judgment to create a pretext that both courts found Shipley was
an unlawful occupant not entitled to reside in Space 333 under park rules. Judge Sachs
wrote the words or resident onto his copy of the judgment Stubblefield had submitted,
authorizing Stubblefield to proceed directly against residents under Civil 798.56(d).
McCarron asked why she could not file the order to avoid his paraphrasing. RT 60:25
The court responded It is his motion, it is his work and offered to give us his copy.
The S-33 deputy made copies of the judgment with the Judges notes on it. RT 61:1
RT 63:13
14
Stubblefield cited Civil 798.56(d) verbatim on the Judges working copy.

Judge Sachs took it one step further by interlineating the words or resident
into his cited text, effectively revising Civil 798.56(d) by judicial proclamation,
authorizing Stubblefield to evict residents directly, which contravened former
Panels conclusion on 5/6/13 that Stubblefield could not evict a resident directly
as he was not in privity of contract with the resident who was not a homeowner.
It subjected Shipley to the same type of eviction the Panel rescued her from last year.
B. JUDGE SACHS STEPPED OUT OF HIS ROLE AS INDEPENDENT ARBITER
INTO A NEW ROLL OF DE FACTO ADVOCATE FOR STUBBLEFIELD
Judge Sachs expanded the summary eviction remedies in Civil 798.56[d] to be
invoked not only against homeowners but also against non-homeowner residents.
Only a homeowners tenancy may be terminated under 798.56(d) for a rule violation.
Civil Code 798.56. Reasons for termination of tenancy;
written notice; cure of default
A tenancy shall be terminated by the management only
for one or more of the following reasons:
(d) Failure of the homeowner or resident to comply with

a reasonable rule or regulation of the park that is part of
the rental agreement or any amendment thereto.
Shipley is a resident but not a homeowner; there is no privity with Stubblefield.

Mobile Home Residency Law defines tenancy as only applying to the homeowner.
Civil Code 798.12. Tenancy
Tenancy is the right of a homeowner to the use of a site within a
mobilehome park on which to locate, maintain, and occupy a
mobilehome, site improvements, and accessory structures for human
habitation, including the usef the services and facilities of the park.
Civil 798.55 & 798.56 apply only to homeowners-not to non-owner residents.

Under 798.56[d] Stubblefield may not proceed directly against a resident who is not
a homeowner as there is no tenancy to terminate where there is no privity of contract.
15
Stubblefield cannot proceed directly against Shipley under Civil 798.56[d],

for the same reason former Panel held he could not proceed directly against Shipley
under any statute---because there is no privity between Stubblefield and Shipley.
CT 184 bottom
Judge Sachs ultra vires expansion of Civil 798.56[d] to be used against residents
violated not only his oath to be impartial, but also constitutional limits on his judicial
powers imposed by Article III, 3 and Article VI, 13 of Californias Constitution.
Judge Sachs had no power to transmute the loser into a winner by revising a statute for
his sole benefit. To guarantee entry of this gratuitous gift before Shipley could file
written objections Judge Sachs orchestrated the following Star Court Proceedings:
On 3/17/14-Judge Sachs made a bizarre journal entry: Files retained in department.
CT 71 top.
By retaining all case files in his own department---rather than returning
them to the public records department [available for daily public filings and review]
Judge Sachs gained exclusive control over which pleadings were accepted for filing and
entered into the online case docket. Stubblefield hired First Legal Support to deliver
the debauched judgment to Judge Sachs chambers ex parte. CT 223 [see logo on top].
Williamson could shift the blame for violating Rules 3.113, 3.1201 & Local Rule 591.3
from his firm to First Legal Support, who delivered a proposed judgment to chambers
ex parte on 3/20/14. Judge Sachs signed the order the same day---on 3/20/14. CT 223
Attorney Williamson knew if he tried to file a proposed final judgment in the
records department a clerk may have rejected it for failure to comply with Rules
3.113, 3.120 and Local Rule 591.3. McCarron did not see a proposed final judgment
---delivered ex parte on 3/20/14---until the next morning---Friday 3/21/14. It was
already too late as Judge Sachs entered the judgment when it was delivered to him.
Shipley was deprived of any opportunity to object before entry of her final judgment.
16
McCarron wrote objections and emailed them to Shipley to print out in Highland
and deliver by hand to Dept. S-33 that same dayFriday 3/21/14. Shipley was unable
to file objections at the public filing window as Judge Sachs maintained the files in
Department S-33 on 3/17/14. Shipley took her objections upstairs to Dept. S-33.
The S-33 clerk told Shipley she had to wait outside the courtroom while she checked
with Judge Sachs. The S-32 clerk returned to say she could not accept the objections
because Judge Sachs already signed/entered the order the day beforeon 3/20/14.
Shipley dropped her objections into the drop box in front of the Appellate Division
at 4:00 p.m. as the window closed at 3:00 p.m. Judge Sachs refusal to accept
objections only one day after a judgment arrived ex parte violated Rule 3.130(d).
Even if objections were late Judge Sachs was still required to accept them on 3/21/14.
(d) Filing of late papers No paper may be rejected for filing
on the ground that it was untimely submitted for filing. If the
court, in its discretion, refuses to consider a late filed paper,
the minutes or order must so indicate
Even if late, under LOCAL RULE 591.3 Judge Sachs was required to wait at least
ten (10) days before entering a judgment.
Sachs runs Star Court proceedings.
On Friday 3/21/14 McCarron printed the online case docket. There was no
journal entry reciting that a final judgment had been entered on 3/20/14.
On Monday, 3/24/14 there was still no evidence a judgment was entered on 3/20/14.
McCarron called Marsha Lenihan, Legal Processing Supervisor, at 4:00 p.m. to ask
why there was no journal entry by 3/24/14 for a judgment purportedly entered 4 days
earlier on 3/20/14. On 3/25/14 Marsha Lenihan called McCarron to notify her that
a journal entry would be made showing the judgment had been entered on 3/20/14.
As of 4/2/14 no camera image icon appeared online to download the final judgment.
On 4/2/14 Shipley drove over to court to obtain a copy of the 3/20/14 judgment.
A records clerk said she could not provide a copy because Judge Sachs was maintaining
the case files in Dept. S-33. CT 71- top. Shipley walked up to Dept S-33 to get a copy.
The S-33 clerk told Shipley to return to the records department to get the judgment.
17
Shipley told the S-33 clerk the records department had directed her to go up to S-33.
The S-33 clerk told Shipley to return the next day. On 4/3/14 when Shipley returned a
second time the S-33 clerk directed her to download the judgment from court online.
Shipley told the S-33 clerk there was no camera image icon to enable downloading
the judgment, which is why she had driven over to the court to obtain a hard copy.
The S-33 clerk told her to return the next day. On 4/4/14 Shipley returned a third time.
The S-33 clerk said she still did not have the final judgment and did not know how to
obtain a copy of it. After three trips to S-33 Shipley was unable to obtain a copy of a
final judgment as prevailing party. On 4/1/14 Stubblefield served Notice of Ruling
by mail. McCarron finally received the Notice of Ruling by mail service on 4/4/14.
This was fourteen [14] days after Judge Sachs had entered final judgment. CT 242
C. Court Had No Power to Grant Declaratory Relief to Stubblefield in Final Judgment
Under CCP 580 a court may not grant declaratory relief in a limited jurisdiction case,
except as recited in CCP 86. When an appellate court directs judgment on the merits
for the defendant a court has no power to grant any relief to a losing plaintiff, especially
where plaintiff did not even request such relief in his complaint. Plaintiff never prayed
for the trial court or former Panel to interpret Civil 798.56[d] or grant declaratory relief.
Expanding a remedial statute by judicial proclamation, to be used against non-owner
residents, where express language circumscribes the remedy to homeowners only,
exceeded constitutional limits on judicial powers imposed by Article III, Section 3.
Revising statutes may only be done through legislation. Judge Sachs ultra vires act
was prohibited under CCP 580 as well as Article III, 3. This ultra vires act of vacating
a prior order after jurisdiction to vacate it had expired three months earlier, violated
CCP 663a(b) and Article VI,13. There was no miscarriage of justice in entry of
summary judgment for Shipley on 10/21/13, after former Panels mandate to do so.
Shipley fought like a gladiator through 2 years of scorched earth litigation to thwart an
illegal eviction. Judge Sachs deprived her of victory by authorizing her direct eviction.
It was a miscarriage of justice to Shipley and 675,000 residents now subject to eviction.
18
D.
Chronological Summary of Judge Sachs serial violations:
1. 2/10/14 Violation of CRC 3.1312 (prevailing party to prepare her judgment)

Judge Sachs refused to sign a judgment prevailing party submitted at the hearing.
Judge Sachs invited non-prevailing partys attorney to prepare the final judgment.
2. 2/19/14 Violation of Civil 663(b) (power to vacate judgment expired in 60 days)
McCarron objected to revisiting a summary judgment order entered on 10/21/13.
McCarron told Judge Sachs jurisdiction to vacate the order expired months ago.
3. 2/19/14 Violation of CRC 3.1103; 3.112; 3.1113. CCP 1005 (no motion notice
with basis for relief or Points & Authorities was filed as required) CCP 1005
4. 2/19/14 Violation of CRC 3.1312 (prevailing party to prepare judgments)
Minute Order recited Counsel for Plaintiff to Prepare Judgment
5. 3/17/14 Violation of Judicial Oath to apply the law-violation of due process
Judge Sachs thwarted McCarron from reciting objections on a transcript record,
depriving Shipley of an opportunity to be heard and an opportunity to object.
Disparate treatment-calling counsel maam instead of by her name or counsel.
6. 3/17/14 Violation of Judicial Oath to Apply the law- violation of due process
Judge Sachs actively advocated for Stubblefield by distorting prior findings of
two courts and allowing Stubblefield to paraphrase findings to alter its import.
Judge Sachs advocated for Stubblefield by inserting the words or resident into
his judge notes, and then giving the notes to Stubblefields counsel for insertion
into the final judgment (a contrivance even Stubblefield didnt think of doing).
This violated Shipleys right to due process under federal and state constitutions.
The deck is stacked against a party where the Judge is the opponents advocate.
19
Judge Sachs made a bizarre journal entry files retained in department which
enabled him to exercise exclusive control over which documents would be filed
or rejected. Judge Sachs then refused to accept the objections Shipley tried to file
on 3/21/14only one day after Stubblefield submitted a debauched judgment
ex parte to chambers on 3/20/14. This deprived Shipley of opportunity to object.
9. 3/20/14 Violated Local Rule 591.3 (no entry of judgment for 10 days)
Rule 591.3 was amended on 1/1/13 to afford opposing parties a chance to object
Stubblefield hired Legal Support Services to hand deliver a paraphrased final
judgment directly to chambers ex parte on 3/20/14, without first serving the
proposed judgment to opposing counsel, who represented prevailing party.
Judge Sachs signed the judgment the same day it was delivered [on 3/20/14]
without waiting even one day to afford Shipley an opportunity to object to form.
Judge Sachs prevented Shipley from obtaining the judgment entered 3/20/14.
Shipley appeared 3 consecutive days to try to get it. [3/21/14, 3/24/14, 3/25/14]
because his clerk had not scanned it to the online docket. Each time she appeared
in Dept. S-33 for a copy of the judgment she was told to return the following day.
Shipley was never able to obtain a copy of the judgment despite three attempts.
This was not one isolated incident or a few inadvertent mistakes. The 10 incidents
above displays a serial pattern of intentional violations of Codes of Civil Procedure,
Rules of Court, Statutes of Limitations, Local Rules, and the Judicial Code of Ethics.
By inserting the words or resident Judge Sachs paved the way for park owners to
evict residents directly on 5 days notice, instead of proceeding against homeowners,
who can invoke statutory protections against arbitrary evictions under Civil 798.55.
20
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Shipley prays for Presiding Panel to direct Judge Sachs
to vacate the final judgment entered on 3/20/14, reinstate a summary judgment order
Judge Alvarez entered on 10/21/13, and enter the final judgment on the merits for
defendant--which prevailing party Shipley submitted on 3/4/14 as shown at CT 209.
PRAYER FOR RELIEF
Appellant Shipley prays for the Presiding Panel to order the following:
1. Direct Judge Michael A. Sachs to vacate a final judgment entered on 3/20/14,

contravening the directives of former Panel's Writ of Mandate issued July 22,2013
and reinstate the summary judgment order Judge Alvarez entered on 10121113.
2. Direct Judge Michael A. Sachs to enter Judgment on the merits as submitted by
Shipley, as the prevailing party, on 3/4/14 as shown at CT 209, with all costs and
attorney fees pursuant to Mobile Home Residency Law, Civil Codes $798.85; $1717.
3. Direct Judge Michael A. Sachs to award appellant attorney fees as costs, as the
prevailing party in all proceedings below, including all writ proceedings, in an

amount to be determined by separate motion, and as costs and fees on this appeal.
4. Direct Judge Michael A. Sachs to recuse himself and transfer the case files to
the Presiding Judge for re-assignment to a retired judge who is not afraid to rule
. campaigns.
against Stubblefield for fear of political retribution in future judicial
5. Direct any additional relief the Appellate (30~1-tdeems equitable and just.
./
CER~~FICATE
OF WORD COUNT
This Opening Appellant Brief contains 6,015 words [excluding cover & tables]
and is size 13 roman typeface font. I relied on a word count generated by MS
Word 2010 as recited in the status bar.
September 8,2014

APPELLATE DIVISION
Plaintiff Respondent
vs.
BONNIE SHIPLEY,
Defendant Appellant
Case No. ACIAS 1400026

[Trial Court UDDS1204130]
Appeal from a Final Judgment in

Entered on March 20, 2014
Honorable Michael A. Sachs
MOTION TO AUGMENT THE RECORD

Clerks Transcript on Appeal and Reporters Transcript filed 7/31/14

950 Roble Lane
Santa Barbara, CA 93103
805-450-0450 fax 805-965-3492
Attorney for Appellant/Defendant Below
MOTION TO AUGMENT RECORD [RULE 8.841]

Appellant Bonnie Shipley moves the Presiding Panel, under Appellate Rule 8.841,
to augment the record with two documents Judge Sachs prevented her from filing.
Exhibit 1 Objections to Second [Proposed Order] Rewriting a Prior Judges Order
Without Jurisdiction and Rewriting an Appellate Order in Contempt of that Courts
Order; Notice of Intent to Appeal Illegal Order and Hold Michael Sachs in Contempt
of an Appellate Divisions Writ of Mandate; Objections to Sachs Acting as Advocate
for Plaintiff and Request for Recusal - Dept S-33 Clerk Refused to file it on 3/17/14.
As shown below in the official transcript of a hearing on the judgment on 3/17/14
McCarron asked Judge Sachs to file the proposed final judgment because she knew
Stubblefield would paraphrase holdings and corrupt the final judgment. [RT 60:25]:
25|
26|
1|
2|
3|
4|
11|
12|
13|
14|
15|
Ms. McCARRON: Why Cant I file it, you Honor? He

is going to paraphrase again.
RT 60:25-26
THE COURT: It is his motion, it is his work I am

working off of and I am assuming counsel will do what I have
asked him to do. In fact, I am happy to give him my notes,
you can make a copy and both of you can share it.
RT 61:1-4
THE BAILIFF: Your honor, did you want me to make
copies?
THE COURT: The record should reflect that I have
handed to Mari, my courtroom attendant, my worked up order
that she is going to make copies for everybody.
RT 63:11-15
The bailiff gave both counsel a copy of the Judges worked up order on 3/17/14.
This is pages 11, 12, 13 of Exhibit 1 attached herein. McCarron was shocked to
discover Judge Sachs interlineated the words or resident into the proposed text:
Exh. 1, p. 12
Three days later, on 3/20/14 rather than serve McCarron with the newly typed up
judgment, as required by Rule 3.1312, Stubblefield delivered it to chambers ex parte.
McCarron did not receive it until 3/21/14 at which time she wrote objections, emailed
them to Shipley to hand deliver. Dept. S-33 refused to accept them for filing as late.
22
Dept. S-33 clerk said objections were late because judgment had been entered.
Even if late, this nonetheless violated Rule 3.130(d) which required a clerk to accept
a late filing, mark it late, and recite in the Minute Order a remark about a late filing.
This was not done. The S-33 clerk refused to accept the objections for filing in court.
Shipley then dropped her objections [Exhibit 1] into the Appellate Divisions outside
box drop at 4:00 p.m. because the filing window at that court had closed at 3:00 p.m.
An Appellate Division clerk confirmed that she has the original objections in this case.
Shipley included the objections in her Designation of Record, but the clerk could not
locate a copy of the Objections to insert into the Clerks Transcript from the trial court.
Judge Sachs also violated Local Rule 591.3 by not waiting 10 days to enter judgment,
to afford Shipley an opportunity to object to the form of it. Instead, the court signed and
entered judgment as soon as it was delivered ex parte to his chambers before she saw it.
Judge Sachs deprived Shipley of opportunity to object and refused to accept objections.
To comport with equity under the circumstances the Panel should augment the record to
include these objections. Exhibit 1, p.12 shows Judge Sachs acted as an advocate for
Stubblefield by inserting new language into the judgment, which authorized him to evict
Shipley directly---the remedy sought when he first served a sham complaint on 8/27/14.
EXHIBIT 2 - May 9, 2014 Letter to RESIDENTS from Stubblefields Park Manager
Exhibit is a 5-page exhibit containing a Letter to RESIDENTS served on Shipley.
The parks letter threatens to use Civil Code 798.56(d) to evict RESIDENTS directly.
McCarron wanted to let Judge Sachs know Stubblefield was already capitalizing on his
gratuitous gift---interlineating or residents to authorize evicting RESIDENT directly.
On June 23, 2014 at a hearing on a motion to expunge lis pendens McCarron tried to
offer the letter to the Bailiff to give Judge Sachs so he would understand the trouble he
caused by authorizing Stubblefield to use Civil 798.56(d) to evict residents directly.
Judge Sachs refused to look at the letter, stating that the matter was not before him.
In oral & written objections McCarron predicted the harm from a debauched judgment.
RT 46:22, 51:24, 53:22, 60:25. Judge Sachs knew it would be used to evict residents.
23
To comport with equity under these circumstances the Panel should augment the
record to include Exhibit 2 because it is a highly relevant document on this appeal.
It proves that McCarron was correct in predicting the potential damage that would flow
from Judge Sach's order allowing Stubblefield to compose a final judgment'on merits.
Exhibit 2 shows Stubblefield l l l y intended to capitalize on the unfair advantage Judge
Sachs donated in authorizing him to compose the final judgment instead of Shipley.
Judge Sachs' blatant violations of the Code of Judicial Ethics should not be condoned.
Judge Sachs intentionally gave Stubblefield a new tool to filch even more mobile homes
fiom elderly, sick, and disabled residents who will be rendered homeless after evictions.
..
Stubblefield will add several more free mobilehomes to his monthly rental portfolio,
expanding wealth exponentially on the backs of poor, elderly and disabled residents.
For the above reasons, Shipley respectfully asks the Panel to augment the appellate
record with Exhibits 1and 2, which are numbered consecutively and attached herein.
September 8,2014
CERTIFICATION OF COUNSEL UNDER OATH
I, Nancy Duffy McCarron, declare the factual statements made in the

Opening Brief and Motion to Aument the Record are true to the best of the
undersigned's knowledge. Counsel confmed with an appellate court clerk
that she
Shipley's Objections to Judgment which theS-33derk would not
accept for filing on 3/2&14 [Exhibit A] L~he'undersi~ned

declares that
Exhibit B was delivered to Space 333 which tlireatens to evict

- park residents
4
for purportea violations Gf road rules under Civil 798.56[d]--the same code
Judge Sachs gratuitously revised by proclamation in the judgment, proving
Stubblefield fully intended to capitalize on Judge Sachs' gratuitous gift.
This certification was executed in Santa Barbara on September 8,2014.
September 8,2014
EXHIBIT 1
I
Nancy Duffy McCarron, CBN 164780
Law Office of Nancy Duffy McCarron
950 Roble Lane
805-450-0450 fax 805-965-3492
I
I
I
I
Attorney for Defendant Bonnie Shipley

SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
COUNTY OF SAN BERNARDINO
STLJBBLEFIELD PROPERTIES, a
California General Partnership, dba Mountain
Shadows Mobile Home Community
Plaintiff,
v.
BONNIE SHIPLEY,
Defendant
action filed: 8-27-12
Case No. UDDS1204130
OBJECTIONS TO SECOND
ORDER
REWRITING A PRIOR JUDGE'S ORDER WITHOUT
JURISDICTION AND REWRITING AN APPELLATE
ORDER IN CONTEMPT OF THAT COURT'S ORDER
NOTICE OF INTENT TO APPEAL ILLEGAL ORDER
AND HOLD MICHAEL SACHS IN CONTEMPT OF
AN APPELLATE DIVISION'S WRIT OF MANDATE
TO SACHS ACTING AS ADVOCATE
OR PLAINTIFF Sr REQUEST FOR RECUSAL
Judge Michael Sachs Department S-33
cting as Advocate in Violation of Judicial Ethics
Defendant objects to this court's acting as an advocate for plaintiff and demands that Michael
Sachs voluntarily recuse himself for violations of Code of .ludicial Ethics as set forth below:
CODE OF JUDICIAL ETHICS PREAMBLE
Our legal system is based on the principle that an independent, fair, and competent judiciary will
interpret and apply the laws that govern us. The rolc of the judiciary is central to American concepts of
justice and the mle of law. Intrinsic to this code are the precepts that judges, individually and collective1
must respect and honor the judicial office as a public trust and strive to enhance and maintain confident
in our leeal system. The judge is an arbiter of facts and law for the resolution of disputes and a highly
visible member of government under the rule of law.
A. Promoting Public Confidence
A judge shall respect and comply with the law* and shall act at all times in a manner that promotes
public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judicia~y.
- 1 -
..............................................................
Objections to Second[Proposedl Order Vacating Denial of Sumnlary Judgment and Judgment for Defendant
The test for the appearance of impropriety is whether a person aware of the facts might reasonably
ntertain a doubt that the judge would be able to act with integrity, impartiality, and competence.
Canon 2. A judge shall avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all of the judge's
ctivities. "Impropriety" includes conduct that violates the law. court rules. or provisions of this code,
nd conduct that undermines a judge's independence, inteaitv. or impartialitv.
ADVISORY COMMITTEE COMMENTARY
Public confidence in the judiciary is eroded by irresponsible or improper conduct by judges.
PECIFIC ACTS IN VIOLATION OF THE LAW, COURT RULES, AND IMPROPER CONDUCT:
.)On 5/6/13 the Appellate Division entered its order directing Judge Alvarez in S-32 to vacate his deni,
of defendant's summary judgment motion, and enter a new order granting it and enter a final judgme
on the merits for Shipley with costs. On 10121113 Judge Alvarez entered the order vacating his denia
of summary judgment and entered a new order granting it to Shipley, but never entered a judgment o
the merits for Shipley with costs as proposed by Shipley. Judge Alvarez wanted to enter the orders
separately but never entered the judgment although submitted to him. At-r
.)Shipley filed her motion for statutory attomey fees on 5129113 set for 7/2/13, which he continued to
7122113, then to 10121113, then to 1/7/14, then to 2110114; because the case was transferred to Michae
Sachs in S-33 after Judge Alvarez recused himself upon Shipley's request.
.)At the first hearing on 2110114 for defendant's motion for statutory attomey fees, counsel for Shipley
McCarron bought the judgment to be entered for Shipley exactly as written by the appellate division,
verbatim, the last two sentences of their order. McCarron asked Judge Sachs to enter the judgment or
the merits so her attorney fee motion could be concluded. Judge Sachs had both McCarron's order ar
Stubblefield's order which McCarron objected to because it paraphrased both the trial court and the
appellate court's findings and completely changed the import of the order to benefit Stubblefield. [%:
.) Judge Sachs then invited Stubbelfield's counsel to propose a new order. McCarron objected a:
the usual practice is for the prevailing party to compose the order---not the losing party---for exactly
reason she stated-the
loser will rewrite the order to benefit himself.
.) Judge Sachs also announced sua sponte that he would re-write Judge Alvarez' 10-21-13 order
There was absolutely no jurisdiction to rewrite another court's order entered 4 months ago.
There was not even a motion to vacate that order pending o r ever filed or served by plaintiff.
- 2 ...--~-~.-----.~---~..--~...--~....~...~~...-
Objections to SecondIProposedl Order Vacating Denial of Summary Judgment and Judgment for Defendant
I.) McCarron objected to such unorthodox procedures; i.e. letting the loser make up an order re-writing
another Judge's prior order which changed the entire findings and import of the order, as well as
parphrasing the appellate court's order. See Objections attached here as Exhibit B.
'. Despite McCarron's objections Michael Sachs scheduled another hearing letting plaintiff propose ne
hybrid" order as he called it. See his minute orders attached as Exh. A3-A6 Michael Sachs then
ontinued it for another hearing on 3/17/13.
I. On 3/17/14 Judge Sachs authohzed all the paraphrasing to completely change the import of both the
rial court's order and the appellate divisions order. Judge Sachs then dismissed the hearing stating he
vould give counsel a copy of his notes for the "final order."
I.
McCarron was shocked that he actually acted as an advocate for Stubblefield by interjecting the wori
or resident" after homeowner on page 2---basically authorizing Stubblefield to "proceed against the
m,
Shipley under Civil Code section 798.56(d) which is an action which can only be taken agains
lomeowner---not a resident! This is not what the appellate division wrote in its order.
l,?
0. This language was never discussed at the hearing or McCarron would have vehemently objected.
nstead it was gratuitously given as a gift by sneaking the words into his "notes" given to us.
If course, Stubblefield jumped right on it and inserted them into what will be the ORDER.
rhis gratuitous gift was beyond the pale. Judge Sachs has stepped into the role of advocate for
Stubblefield and must disqualify himself as his bias is clearly demonstrated.
tespecthlly submitted: 312 1114
AFFIDAVIT OF SERVICE BY COUNSEL

Objections to Plaintiff's
Proposed ORDER and defendant's alternate Proposed Order were served via
Tail to attorney Robert Williamson at: Hart King, 4 Hutton Center Dr., Suite 900, Santa Ana, CA 92705
declare the above to be true under penalty of perjury. Executed in Santa Barbara, CA on 3/21/14.
courtesy copy will also be delivered to the appellate division.
Objections to Second[Proposedl Order Vacating Denial of Summary Judgment and Judgment for Defendant
EXHIBIT A
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Case UDDSI204130 - STUBBLEFIELD-V-SHIPLEY
HEARING RE: CASE MGMT CONFI OSC RE STATUS OF APPEAL

1012112013 -8:30 AM DEPT. 532
DONALD ALVAREZ. JUDGE
CLERK: STEPHANIE CHANDLER
COURT ATENDANT ERIC ASHE
NOT REPORTED
APPEARANCES
AJTORNEY ROBERT WILLIAMSON JR PRESENT FOR PLAlNTlFFlPETITlONER
ATTORNEY NANCY DUFFY MCCARRON PRESENT FOR DEFENDANTIRESPONDENT
PROCEEDINGS
HEARING ON. CASE MGMT CONF 1 OSC RE STATUS OF APPEAL HELD
PREDISPOSITION HEARING HELD
BASED ON THE RULING ISSUED BY THE APPELLATE DIVISION ON THE WRIT OF MANDAMUS AND THE
CALIFORNIA SUPREME COURT HAVING DENIED PLAINTIFFS PETITION FOR REVIEW AND APPLICATION
FOR STAY. THE COURT HEREBY RULES AS FOLLOWS
COURT FINDS:
THE COURTS RULING ON DEFENDANTS MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT HEARD ON FEBRUARY
14,2013 IS
HEREBY REVERSED AND RULES AS FOLLOWS:
BONNIE SHIPLEY'S MOTlON FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT IS GRANTED AS TO ITS ENTIRETY.
DEFENDANTIMOVING PARTY TO PREPARE JUDGMENT.
HEARINGS:
HEARING DATE OF 01107114 CONFIRMED
(RE DEFENDANTS MOTION FOR A T K ) R N ~ YFEES)
NOTICE GWEN BY JUDICIAL ASSISTANT
CORRESPONDENCE COVERSHEET GENERATED TO MAIL MINUTE ORDER DATED 10121113 TO COUNSEL
A,
OF RECORD.
ACTION - COMPL TE
=== MINUE O R ~ E REND ===
COMPIAIM DIS~OSITIONED BY JUDGMENT.
ACTION DISPO: JUDGMENT
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Case U D D S I ~ ~ ~ ISTUBBLEFIELD-VSHIPLEY
~O
Action:
MOTION RE: ~VTORNEY FEES FILED BY DEFENDANT BONNIE SHIPLEY
02/1012014 -8:aO AM DEPT. S33
MICHAEL A SACHS, JUDGE
CLERK. WIMALA BLANCHARD
COURT REPOR&R KATHY SELLERS 4420
COURT A ~ E N D A ~MARY
T
KILGORE
APPEARANCES.
ATTORNEY ROBERT WILLIAMSON JR PRESENT FOR PLAINTIFFIPETITIONER.
ATTORNEY NANCY DUFFY MCCARRON PRESENT FOR DEFENDANTIRESPONDENT.
PROCEEDINGS:
PREDISPOSITIONHEARINGHELD
MOTION
I
ACTlON CAME ON FOR MOTION RE AlTORNEY FEES FILED BY BONNIE SHIPLEY.
COURTHAS REVIEWED THE MOTION, OPPOSITION, REPLY, EXPERT DECLARATIONS, AND OTHER
ADDITIONAL
DECLARATIONS ~ H I C HHAVE BEEN FILED
COURT DOES N q GO FORWARD WITH MOTlON FOR ATIDRNEY FEES AND SETS MATIER FOR HEARING
REGARDING JUD~MENTCOURT HAS RECEIVED PROPOSED JUDGMENTS FROM ATTORNEY MCCARRON
AND INSTRUCTS
COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFF TO SUBMITT PROPOSED JUDGMENT TO M E COURT HEARING REGARDING
JUDGMENT WILL B E HELD ON 2/19/14 AND THEREAFTER A HEARING FOR THE MOTION FOR A ~ R N E Y
FEES WILL
BE SET.
HEARINGS:
HEARING RE: PRPPOSED JUDGMENT SET FOR 02/19/14 AT 08 30 IN DEPARTMENT S33A.
ACTION -COMPLETE
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O
HEARING RE::PROPOSED JUDGMENT

02/19/2014 - 8130 AM DEPT. S33A
MICHAEL A S A C ~ S JUDGE
,
CLERK: WIMAIABLANCHARD
COURT R E P O R ~ ~JULIE
R QUINTANILL4 11309
COURT ATTEND~NTMARY KILGORE
APPEARANCES:I
ATTORNEY ROBERT WILLIAMSON PRESENT FOR PLAlNTIFFlPETITlONER.
ATTORNEY
DUFFY PRESENTFOR DEFENDANTIRESPONDENT.
NAN^
PROCEEDINGS
PREDISPOSITIOId HEARING HELD
COURT HAS RE~IEWEDTHE PROPOSED JUDGMENTS SUBMITTED BY COUNSEL HYBRID PROPOSAL
I
WORKED
OUT BY THE
LANGUAGE IS STATED ON THE RECORD.
COLRT.
COUNSEL FOR +LAINTIFF TO PREPARE JUDGMENTAS PROPOSEDBY COURT. APPELLATE DOCS FROM
I
DEFENSE
MAY BE A n A c A E D PROPOSED JuoGMENT DUE T o DEFENSE COUNSEL N o LATER THAN 3/05/14,
OBJECTION SH L L BE DUE NO L A k R THAN 3/12/14. IF NO OBJECTION IS FILED COURT WILL ENTER
JUDGMENT. HEARING REGARDING MOTION FOR ATJORNEY FEES IS SET AS FOLLOWS:
HEARINGS:
LAW 8 MOTION RE: ArrORNEY FEES SETFOR 03/17/14 AT 08:30 IN DEPT. 533.
ACTION COMPLETE
=== MINUTE O R ~ E REND ===
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Case ~ ~ ~ ~ 1 2 b -STUBBLEFIELD-V-SHIPLEY
4 1 3 0
MOTION RE: ATTORNEY FEES

0311712014 8:90 AM DEPT. S33
MICHAEL A S A C ~ SJUDGE
,
CLERK: ANCHAL E M PRICE
KATHY SELLERS 4420
COURT R E P O R ~ R
COURT A ~ N D ~ MARY
N T KILGORE
APPEARANCES.'
ATTORNEY N A N ~ YDUFFY MCCARRON PRESENT FOR PLAlNllFFlPEllTIONER.
ATTORNEY R O B ~ R WILLIAMSON
T
JR PRESENT FOR DEFENDANTIRESPONDENT
MOTION
P O S T - D I S P O S ~ ~HEARING
N
HELD
M E COURT IS Id RECEIPTOF DEFENDANTS OBJECTIONS AND PLAINTIFFS RESPONSE TO THE
OBJECTIONS W E
COURT HAS R E ~ S E D
ME PROPOSED JUDGMENT AND A COPY OF ME PROPOSED JUDGMENTWW WE
COURTS
I
NOTES ARE PROVIDED TO COUNSEL
PLAIN~FFSCOL~NSEC
TO PREPARE JUDGMENT AS DISCUSSED ON THE RECORD
bURSUANTT0 {IIPULAllON OF COUNSEL:

BONNIE SHIPLE)('S MOllON RE:AlTORNEY FEES IS HEARD.
THE COURT RE~ITESITS TENTA~VERULING ON ME REOCRD.
ARGUED BY CO~NSELAND S U B M I ~ D .
COURT FINDS:
BONNIE SHIPLE)"S MOllON RE:ATTORNEY FEES IS DENIED.
wrniolrr PREJ~IDICE
THE COURT F I N ~ SM A T DEFENSE COUNSEL IS ENlllLED TO HER ATTORNEY FEES PURSUANTTO CCP
i
798.
HOWEVER DEF NSE COUNSEL WAS NOT SPECIFIC AS TO HER BILLlNG.DEFENSE COUNSEL MAY SUBMIT
ANOTHER
MOTION DETAIL1 G HER FEES FOR THE COURTS REVIEW.
ACTION - COMPLIETE
=== MINUTE O R ~ E REND ===
*st
Legal Support (951)779-0100 00/00&

COUNTY OF SAN BERNARDINO - C M L DIVISION
10
STUB~LEFIELDPROPERTIES, a
~ a l i f o k ageneral partnerslip dba

MO~TAINSHADOWS
I z M O B I ~ H O M ECOMMUNITY,
l1
Plaintiff,
14
IS
v.
B O d I E SHIPLEY; and DOES I through
Case No. UDDS 1204130

Assigned for all purposes to:
Judge; Hon. Michael A. Sachs

Dept.: S-33
(PROPOSED] ORDER VACATING

DENIAL OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT
AM, JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF
DEFENDANT
16 10, ina~usive,
17
1
i
I8
~i
19
I
i On February 14.2013. the Cowt, after having considered the evidence and points and
'o(
21
Defendants.
I+utbotitiea submitted by all parties, and oral argumeut of counsel deied Dekndaot Bonnie
Ship)/;yls motion for summary judgment on the grounds that California Civil Code section
23
24
798.i5, subdivision (c) is noi Lhnited h its application only in the escrow, sale, or transfer of
I
a rnobilcliome, but that it applied when an occupant ofa mobilehomc, such as Defendant, \>as
25 )no dbht of tenancy under the Mobiiehame Residency Law (Civ. Code secfioo 798 e1 srg.)
26/and
27
Law.
not M e m i s e enltled to oicupy the tn&ilehome under the Mobilehome Residency
On February 17, 2013, Defendant filed a Petition for Writ of Mandate with the
Appellate Division of the San Bemardino Superior Court ("Appellate Division") requesting
an order that denial of her summaryjudgment motion be vacated and that sumrriaryjudgment
4'
be granted in her favor.

On May 6, 2013, the Appellate Division, having considered Defendant Bonnie
6 Shipley's Petition for Writ of Mandate, issued its unpublished Opinion granting tbe Writ
7 fmding that Civil Code section 798.75 applied only to a purchaser or transferee of a
vil Code section 798.56, subdivision (d)

r "failure to comply wit11 a reasonable rule or regulation of the park that is part of the rental
ent or any amendment the;eto." A copy of the Opinion filed May 6,2013is attached
narkced Exhibit "1" and incorporated herein by this reference.
On July 22, 2013, the Appellate Division issued a Writ of Mandate directing that the
urt vacate its February 14, 20 1 3 order -denying Defendant's summary judgment
and to enter a new order granting summary judgment in favor of Defendant and to
judgment in 'favor 6f'~eiendant.A -copy .df the writ'of
..
anda ate issued July 22,
attached hereto marlced Exhibit "2" and incorporated herein by this reference.
, ,-
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT:

1. The Court's order entered February 14, 2013, denying Defendant's motion for
25
zsi
27
28
1
]I
summary judgment is vacated;

2. Summary judgment is grantcd in favor of D d o d a n t on the grounds
Udf Civil
Code section 798.75 does not apply to Defendant because Defendant was not a
purchaser of a mobilehome in Plaintiffs mobilehome park, rendering the 5-Day
fPROPOJED1 ORDER AND JUDGhITWT
e r s t Legal Support (951)779-0100 00100m

3
Notice to Surrender pursuant to subdivision (c) of 798.75 inapplicabie;
3. Sumnary judgment is granted in favor of Defendant.

4. Judgment is entered in favor of Defendant B o d e Shipley and against Plaintiff
StubblefieId Properties, a California general partnership dba Mountain Shadows
Mobile Home Community. Piaintiff to takenothing by way of its complaint.
5. Defendant is awarded costs.
6. h y award of attorney's fees is to be determioed by way of separate motion.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
91
Dated:
_I
7014
Hon. Michael A. Sacbs, Judge, Superior
Court
EXHIBIT B
Iq
SUPERfClR COIJRT O f 'WE STATE OF CALIFOwIA

CO-?Y
OF SAN REkVARfllNO
S'lXXlBtEFlUD PROPERTIM,a
CascNo, UBDSll;bl.f30
Gali%mia Ceaerat P~tnersbip,d h Motmain DEFENDANT'S OBJECTXONS TO PLAIKT1I;P1S
Slradornh.lobile Norno Community
[PROPOSED] ORDER VACATlNG DENIAI,
Plaintifi:
OF SUMMARY JUDGMLbiT At-$$
1
V.
J L ~ C E M E ~ TFORDBENDtbw
BONNIE3 SHIPLEY,
Wsno~bleMicl~eolSacbs Dcpnrtrnont S-35
303 Ur.3"? St, San Bcrnnrdino CRC 3,1312
I/
Refindtint objects top~uifltiflspraphrasf~rg

of the uinI lrnd appellare coun's orders to create rrpstex
tbr mum made findings agninsLprevdingp;lrtySinterest whic!~clcnrly w r o not rccitcd in either o&r
PIainriBhmded tu lcad the cow down a prinuosc pzk dcrror ~iniplyto gain n stmtegicadvmr;lgc,
lf ptainli$canobtaincrry judicin! oEkerlr sigmuw on wry finditr~against a mobile hmne resident su&
adec will he thro\\x in the hcc afany elderly resident who dart%lo challeng~park o m r ' s aurhofily.
Exccrptu/bel~~v
show how plaintiff tried to get this courf to munr$asrvre new findingsagainst flhipley,
In tllc first paragraph or its proposed order shown bclbw plaintiff inserted "'suchas d~*ncluni" in the
nrc not contained mywhere in tl~scow's
n~iddieatlhccoun's findings. The w r l s
order or transcript, Plaintiff tries m makc ir appwr J u d p Alvac~JbunrlShipley had no right of tenancy.
11
SO
such k i n g was ma&. Judgc Alvarclzsct the case hr jury S z l indicating he would la ajury dacid,
ndge ~lvarhzaevosuttered the ~vordr"
"in his Xi4113 ruling wanseriberf belo%
1ic court must stpikc tho NO& "miras dirhdmt" which clearly were mt contained in tbe order.
'he apflellilacdivision found tBe "unluwfl~IoccupatrPunder 5798.751~1did nor apply ta ShTpley.
Plaintifftrird rn xwenk the appellate divisi~dsfindi~gson Shiplcy's lease with M c C m n , as follo~~rc
she aroupicd whiel~i ~ o by~ ~ d

er oitomcy k h c y DufTy M&mn andsihwrcd bnspacc 33 that McCarton tea& h m Plnintiff:
zm m y t;, 'rarx -h~ w a mDIMW ~ s h hmiw ikr*
a d e
Li~ley'rl'eilrdn for OrWdl5r~Mimhn.h w d 11sunplblirhCd OginTm @anllm6* Wd1

Win;prknt flvil Code y:dan 7@*7J mpTW only D a pnrdusu
a mrmfat of i
mpb(!&mr unlt tha ~ m p i *&

u W1 gwa rsilhour T i aoelrt;lop r M e n kPFe
$he aecqid whrh rr out~rdby hu ~uancyM s e y Puffy McEand

s b n f d on space 333lh51 AlcCwcn lead ffm PlalnWY In PlrinllWa nnhilchomc prr4
md Um w d a the Matrilchrmc Rrsawy laws Pklndff may trin a .W11cmc by
&a
&mly~lialrretbh.&-\you
undm civil Cob mim?98,46, mbtiWn 14)
rw %YIP ~aromply~ ~ ( L t a r w m b t c a l srcpUtrliondlthcpk
oy
dt% b piylof llR rssd
hucrb m&ed
iZ%hibihibitY""and tncwpm4 hcrdnby Mihirrrhw.
4 Proposed Order, p2
'Inintiffs misleading pornphrasing did not rcmotcliy res~mblethe appcllatc division finding be lo^
- 2 -
---"------------------------------..----"--------"*--"-------*-+-------*--------*-*-.--%Xe&aaV*Y Sn:ecCfdD'~ totlr4P39C5I S~de: Bacarlr.9 24n;nl d Sua-rry >Jdpcn? sxd J s e p a t Ibf mioMan!
f + ~ ~ siOtiMl
* 1
lor strmmmy judpcni a n l a w thBt MI JUY 27.
s W E M ~~ m ra~h
o t ~ u m m m rNzmq
201z. CmEUc
tlMer
~d
n &&dnaRa ' h W m 9
~ u @
t~ shrm McCem's m W e h a s at space
E. Piedman1 D M H & I ? M . CA 82348. 10 s

u
m d Ula mtion.
333.4
gnasan& iha d e U a r a of MSam. wha Oddam that an JaMlacy Sa

PUtchWd lhe rn&Wme
* I-333 b suao&&M tnUbHeMms
4 w , , Odcr 5/6/13
Ie4 the p a w tease. h4ccwm a m s V\at an Jaw 27,2OlP.
P d r signed a srrm~ntkfezse to tham M hema as a ce-rwkhnt nflar k r
cantimd to i%c?pt m n W y mnl ficm her. St@a

pre in tpr name and Bhb p a p (Ol them
rhsl aU al Ural u r 1 6 h
?ha.Pwitlaner'sM8em &@bhkct
fharrhait )h M d , a sii%iawm of s u h a n t d McCemn end that W m m b
honner of %a u r m e l
park&uant
W & sjmes 333 d Subb$CMs m b i m
b a Wsaagreemanlbehrreen McCerranend 6iuIs@lr0ld.
4 iVd%Oder 516! I3
fhc appellate division nevcr found Shipicy u-asr publcssecof* ~nnbifehnn?*-b~~ U I WFound @a1
dsfendnfil Shipley
aa
v
uF.dctq~rc$
tindim5 chat Shipby is ihe rublesee uf L:
caing a nrodflelrome without firk.8 eqresscdd t l c n approval

! Shipl~yis the co-mcidcnl, subbsn: of a mobilchomc mvncr.
fheappellotk Diviion Dund fhat as 'a ,nblcswe of a mobilchomeo\w!cr. Petitioner dots not fall
dvithin l e deff n3tion of an " t 1 9 ~ l o occrpant;'
1~~1
~lmnanq, 'Yhus, ihrs ' u n W ceapnl" p a , pvrrhaxw nmool
sgraa&l)
ts an
bodupwt
tMt 'L no1
o!h&M
enlW b m
b#Sn
y the
mdwmpwuant lo I% bsphnplCr' k n subeew DIo mcM#hwneoxmt.

P~&@mbam#nct1.a &thin bcledetmBbauf on %@uvlvl
mamV
lS11ipley is not unlawrul occupant
L;:
39
Wrially, plaintiff miaeptcm~sahm thcspp~?llntcdivision Lund on Stuhblcticld'ssdcquateremedy.

I
7-
*__~*_~l?~*f-*--i~__~___-_~Il-_~--~-~~--h-~-----~--_I_____"___________r-_--_-& % i e d ? y " a :blar;rma
%aL?rap?.rsalorasr
.Ie=arz~q Dclr.:si
cr s~rrszg3 ~ s ~ o r *
. :c,=IJ M ~ a z tf G r i;eicc0err;
in t e follorving cxccrpt plaintiff crated a false paieorrhm the appellate division be16 piafntiffmay
evict , hiplq"by ~virtingthe homeowner, McCarron..
~kinkff'sgeraghmsed words arc intcnriodly mislwdin~and misstntcWhatthe appelbtcdivisionbun

I
The ~Wotedivisiondid not say Stubblblcficld may svicr me. Ir merely noted thm Stubbrlefieldhad an
Idqdate remedy by invoking civil Code 798.56.
10 c\"ict rhc sub

&.%dingk n v n tbc lints, via gmtuirous'foomotc, it suggzsts t h t if Stubblefield
less& by evicting thc hamcowncr,they coulci dsfand the action by srguing Iherutes are unnlmnable.
For ihe &eve ra%ms8ipicy objcc~totho pmposed order, If thc court wants to mclude findings in ic
h.vhjidjudgmenlthere is oalyjurisdiction to hcludc fmdkw aac~uallymade. verbatim by the trio1 caun

and ,Ure appellate cotirt. There is no jurisdiction ro adopt newly manu~acturedfindings plnitttiff fabricate
utd(suwtcb
in a propsea aidcr. This clcvct mnnmver is os transpareat as a piccc of clcm glsss,
Detkndant submirshm alternotepropod orderwt*ltic!iinctudea findings oc~uallymade-not fabricated.
AFFlDAVlT OF E M L SERVICE RY COUNSEL
P1RjlltiEservedhis proposal otder via mail only, Likovvisc dcfcndant m

c
sher order by cniail.
A copy ePObjec~ionsto Plaintiffs Praposcd ORDER and defendant's alfemare Praposcd Order wcrc
an314/148:00 am.
d ~ viadcglail to: ~jllimsoa@iltlkingl~~~.c~m:
I ddarci rhcaixrve to be true undcr penally nfprjury. Executed in Flighlmd CA on 31Jll4.
June 9,2014
INSTRUCTIONS
We are enclosing in this mailing two (2) letters, one from Park Management and
one from your HOA Board's new Traffic Safety Committee with an
Acknowledgement page and this instruction sheet.
Please retain both letters for your records, sign and return the Acknowledgment
page t o the Park Office. BE CERTAIN THAT EVERYONE IN YOUR HOUSEHOLD
WHO ISON THE LEASE HAS SIGNED THE ACKNOWLEDGMENT.
In order t o achieve the goals of your Traffic Safety Committee it is necessary to
read, understand, agree and return your signed copy of the enclosed
Acknodledgment page of the Traffic Safety Committee letter dated June 9, 2014
to the Park Office by: June 13,2014.
Remember, with your complete and total cooperation, your Traffic Safety
Committee, your resident's Homeowners Association and Park Management will
be able t o move forward!
Thank you in advance for your cooperation.
May 9,2014
!
Dear Resident:
We may now be in a position to better focus on the issues of speedinnand coming to a full stop at stop s i ~ n s
within our commbnitv.
A potential progrem may be within our grasp and if so it is entirely due to the efforts of your HOA Board of
Directors and an hnselfish group of 9 community minded residents. This group has come together under the
name of the "TRAFFICSAFETY COMMITTEE". In order to implement the program it will require the
cooperation of every resident within the community as well as a commitment from your Park Management.
I
We, the Park Mahagement, are committed to the following:
1. ~ o d i f tde
y speed bumps where needed.
2. Agree t o Pestripe all streets and walkways not less than every two years and not more than three
years.
3. Continue t o enforce all traffic rules within our community equally and fairly, BUT MORE
VIGOROUSLY.
4. tontinud t o treat all offenders impartially, promptly and equally.
Management has committed to the above provided the residents are willing to accept their responsibility for
good safe drlving habits within the community. That consists of the resident and guest commitment to the
following:
1. Not t o ekceed the 15 MPH maximum speed limit

2. Full andcomplete stop at all stop signs and intersections whether marked or not.
3. ~ ot ot pass the vehicle i n front of you unless it comes t o a full stop.
4. To diligently comply with a l l aspects o f the traffic guidelines within our community.
In order t o accdmplish this goal it will be necessarv t o have 100% cooperation from each resident and,the
attached ~ckndwledgementp
~
O
R
n
e
d
c by Junee13,2014.
If we can all wqrk together on this program we commit t o you to modify the speed bumps where needed, and
continue t o enforce the traffic rules within our community, which we have all previously agreed to in writing.
This will go a ldng way in heipingto continue maintaining a very happy and safe community with an extra eye
out for our more senior residents that enjoy walking and bike riding.
~ of
l ithe above is very achievable, and will require an effort on the part of gacJ
sign and return the Acknowledgement page.
YoursTruxJ,
Eva S. Hazard
Community Manager
resident t o read. understand,
May 9,2014
I
Dear ~esident:
I
We can d l agree that Mountain Shadows is a great place to live. Even when living
in lovely places there can be initating issues. One of those issues that has
challeng d RESIDENTS and MAhTAGEMENTfor a long time is the matter of
enforcedent of our traffic regulations.
In an effort to solve the problem, additional speed bumps were installed in many
places d t h i n the park. Unfortunately, most of us have found that this "solution"
has not been as effective as we hoped, and may have caused d i s ~ p t i o nand even
hardship to some of our residents. In response to our pleas for relief, management
has asked the home owners to come up with a plan to address the problem, while
still achieving the main goal, "Traffic Safety". Our committee has been meeting,
and is r&ommending the following plan.
This letter is the first part of our plan. We know that the majority of our residents
are anxious to make our park a very safe place to live, and this includes residents
stopping at all stop signs and driving within the speed limit. We commend them for
this cooperation. However, there is an entrenched minority that for whatever
reasons, habitually ignore these safety requirements. There is also a small group of
delivery people, sub-contractors, outside guests and even children of some of our
residents. This letter is a special appeal to those people to live within the
restrictions that make our park such a nice place to live. If this earnest appeal goes
unheeyd, we must find other ways to reach the offenders with methods that will
meet our goals.
In support of this objective, we would encourage all residents who witness obvious
violatibns, to report them to the park office. Emphasis should be on license
numb&, type and color of vehicle and the date, time and location the violation
occun'ed.
We assume that some of the offenses are inadvertent and we may not be aware we
are speeding. Our first action would be a documented verbal warning. The ncxt
step would be to send the first written notice, then a second, followed by a final
notice. he final notice states that continuance of non-compliance may result in a

review o residency status in Mountain Shadows.
~alifomiaCivil Code provides for this remedy. It states in Article 6, Section

798.56 ...1'A tenancy shall be terminated by the management for one or more of the
followink reasons... (d)Failure of the homeowner or resident to comply with a
reasonable lule or regulation of the park that is part of the rental agreement or any
amendmknt thereto." Further, the Memorandum of Understanding dated March 1,
2010, ~ektion7(A) (1) describes the consequences of Non-compliance with
commudity Guidelines.
Management has agreed to enforce Section 11B of the Community Guidelines
dated Mhrch 1,2010. The Guidelines clearly state that residents and resident's
guests must obey all posted traffic control signs. This includes coming to a full
and complete stop at all stop signs. This is for the good of our community as a
whole. Management has assured us that if we are successful in obtaining
compliance with the traffic regulations they will adjust or lower the most offensive
speed bumps. Please work with us to achieve this goal.
Your Ttaffic Safety Committee
Barbara Smith, Chairman
Committee Members:
Jim Chenoski
John Robert
Jim Cline
Ray Regis
Arlind Hackett
Charles Romer
Diane Murphy
Steve Sutherland
Acknowledgment
o f thd HOA Board's Traffic Safety CommitteelManagement letters dated

I
June 9,2014
In order \o move forward with this proposal, acknowledgement of receipt and

willingn ss to comply is required. ALL SIGNATORIES TO THE LEASE
ARE ASKED TO PLEASE SIGN AND DATE BELOW.
D E ~ L I N ETO RETURN TO THE PARK OFFICE IS:

JUNE 13,2014
I
Space Number:
Name (Signature)
Date
Name (Signature)
Date
Date
Name (Signature)
Date
Name (Signature)
PROOF OF SERVICE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA,
COUNTY OF SAN BERNARDWO
Stubblefield v. Shioley Court Case: UDDS 1204130
APPEAL Case: ACIAS1400026
The undersigned is counsel for Bonnie Shipley, who is appellant in this appeal,
(Appellate Division) and defendant in UDDS1204130 in limited jurisdiction below.
950 Roble Lane, Santa Barbara, California, 93 103 nancyduffvsb(iT),yahoo.com
cell phone: 805-450-0450 fax and phone: 805-965-3492
On the date recited below the undersigned served the below document as indicated:
Appellant's Opening Brief, Certificate of Interested parties, Motion to Augment Record
[x] PERSONAL DELIVERY to the Justice Center on 9/8/14

Presiding Panel, Appellate Division
San Bernardino Justice Center
247 West Third Street
San Bernardino, CA 92415-0063
tel 909-521-3574 fax 909-521-3563
Hon. Michael A Sachs S-28
San Bematdino Justice Center
San Bemardino, CA 92415-0063
909-708-8699 fax 909-708-8586
Robert Williamson, Esq. Atty for Real Party

HartKing
4 Hutton Drive, Suite 900
S & a Ana, CA92707
te1714-432-8700 fax 714-546-7457
I am familiar with mail collection in Santa Barbara. I deposited the envelopes in the
mail at Santa Barbara, CA. I am aware on a motion of the party served, service is
presumed invalid if postal cancellation date is more than one day after-deposit date
on affidavit. Copies were sent by 2-day mail to track and ensure speedy delivery.
[ ] (By Electronic) to email addresses below; copy to nancydufljsb@yahoo.com
Y
,
rwilliamson@hartkinglaw.com
-
[x] (STATE) I declare under penalty of perjury and laws of California that the
above statements are true. Executed in Santa Barbara CA on the date recited below.
September 8,2014
- GLQ~~I
P.
arron, Attorney for ~
&
SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNILF L E D

COUNTY OF
COURT
MN OF
BERNARDINO
CALIFORNIA
COUNTY OF SAN BERNARDlNO SUPERIOR
SAN BERNARDINO DISTRICT
APPELLATE DIVISION
247 West Third Street, San Bernardino, CA 92415-0063
SEP 2 6 2014
DATE: September 26,2014
CASE NO. ACIAS1400026 1 UDDSI 204130 (San Bernardino)

S-I-UBBLEFIELD PROPERTIES,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
ORDER
BONNIE SHPLEY,
Defendant and Appellant.
NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS: Appellant's Motion to Augment Record on Appeal
-
-----
-----
--- - .-
.---
In a motion filed with this court on September 8, 2014, appellant seeks to augment the record on
appeal with Wo documents.
AtI
any
] time, on motion of a
California Rules of Court, rule 8.841 provides, in pertinent part: "[
party or its own motion, the appellate division may order the record augmented to include: [TI (A) Any
document filed or lodged in the case in the trial court; . .."
The record may only be augmented by matters that were before the superior court. The
augmentation procedure cannot be used to bring up matters outside the trial court record. (Vons
Companies, Inc. v. Seabest Foods, Inc. (1996) 14 Cal.4th 434, 444, fn. 3.)
The documents with which appellant seeks to augment the record were not before the trial court
and are therefore matters outside the trial court record.
The motion is DENIED.
cc: San Bernardino Courthouse
I certify that copies of the above Order were mailed to counsel of record as indicated on
SEP 2 6 2014
e-
Swbpnl;,
Court Clerk
CAROLYN SQLBERG
MAILING LIST FOR ACIAS 1400026:
LAW OFFICE OF NANCY DUFFY MCCARRON

950 ROBLE LANE
SAIVTA BARBARA, CA 93 103
-- ---
HART KING
4
sYwE90
SANTA ANA, CA 92707
--
SAN BERNARDINO JUSTICE CENTER

247 WEST THIRD STREET
SAN BERNARDINO, CA 924 15
--
FILED
SUPERlOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA

SAN BERNARMNO DlSlRlCT
DEC 2 % 2014

APPELLATE DlVlSlON
Plaintiff and Respondent,
Case No: ACIAS 1400026

(Trial Court: UDDSI204130)
P E R -----CURIAM
---
v.
-O- -P- -I-N- I O N
BONNIE SHIPLEY,
Appeal from summary judgment, San Bernardino superior Court,
San Bernardino District, Michael A. Sachs, Judge. Affirmed as modified.

Nancy D. McCarron for defendant and appellant.
Hart King, John H. Pentecost, Robert G. Williamson, Jr. and Rhonda
H. Mehlman, for plaintiff and respondent.
'THE COURT:
On August II, 2012, plaintiff and respondent Stubblefield

-'
'
Properties, a California General Partnership, dba Mountain Shadows

Mobilehome Community (hereinafter "Stubblefield") sewed appellant
Bonnie Shipley with a 5-Day Notice to surrender Possession. The notice
1
The following facts are taken from the clerk's' Transcript, including the Opinion issued by the
Appellate Division on May 6, 2013, granting appellant's petition for writ of mandate, which can be
found at pages 177-187.
was based upon Civil Code section 798.75, subdivision (c), "for failure to
move into the mobilehome without being approved as a sublessee or any
other capacity." The notice also stated that "this is a violation of the Rules
and Regulations of the mobilehome park."
On August 27, 2012, Stubblefield filed a complaint for forcible
detainer (Code Civ. Proc., 1160) naming appellant as the sole defendant.
The complaint alleges that Stubblefield is the owner of the premises
commonly known as 4040 E. Piedmont Drive, Space 333, ~ i g h l a n d , ' ~ ~
92346. The complaint also alleges that prior to service of the Notice to
Surrender, appellant had, without Stubblefield's consent or approval,
without signing a rental agreement, and without beconling the registered
owner of the mobilehome situated at the premises, entered into
possession of the premises. The complaint further alleges that appellant
has continued to hold and keep possession of the premises by force and in
violation of Civil Code sectian 798.75 by failing to surrender the premises

to Stubblefield. The complaint prays for possession of the premises, for
damages at $30.01 per day (reasonable rental value of space 3331, and for
,
attorney's fees.
On January 23, 2013, appellant filed a motion for summary
judgment. On February 14, 2013, the trial c o ~ ~denied
rt
appellant's motion
for summary judgment. The court also denied Stubblefield's motion for
summary judgment, which was heard on the same day.
On February 27, 2013, appellant filed a petition for writ of mandate

requesting that the Appellate Division issue an order directing the trial
court to set aside its order denying appellant's motion for summary
judgment and to enter a new order granting the motion.
On May 6, 2013, a former panel of this Appellate Division granted
appellant's petition and issued a writ of mandate directing the trial court to
vacate its order denying appellant's motion for summary judgment, and to
enter a new and different order granting the summary judgment motion.
Subsequently, Stubblefield filed a petition for writ of mandate in the
Court of Appeal, District Four, Division Two. On July 19, 2013, the Court
of Appeal summarily denied the petition.'
On July 22, 2013, appellant filed a document entitled, "Request for
Immediate Recusal of Judge Alvarez Before Ruling on any Pending
Motions in this case Due to Presumed Bias Upon Reversal of his Ruling
Denying Shipley's MSJ which was reversed on appeal."3
On or about August 5, 2013, Stubblefield filed a Retition for review in
the California Supreme
On August 14, 2013, the Supreme Court
summarily denied re vie^.^

-
---
CT 88
CT 90-1. Appellant's request for immediate recusal is based upon Code of Civil Procedure
section 170.1, subdivision (c), which states: "At the request of a party or on its own motion an
appellate courf shall consider whether in the interests of justice it should direct that further
proceedings be heard before a trial judge other than the judge whose judgment or order was
reviewed by the appellate court." (Italics provided ) Thus, appellant's request for recusal appears
to have been based upon an inapplicable statute, as it was presented directly to the trial court.
4~~
91
On October 21, 2013, the trial court vacated its prior order denying
appellant's motion for summary judgment, and entered a new and different
order granting the summary judgment motion of appellant. The court also
ordered appellant to prepare and submit a proposed order and judgment.
The court set a hearing date of January 7, 2014, to hear appellant's motion
for attorney's fees, and requested that appellant submit the proposed order
and judgment by that date.6
I
On January 7, 2014, upod learning appellant had filed a peremptory

I
challenge on July 22, 2013, t h e ( ~ o nDonald

.
Alvarez recused himself and
the case was reassigned to DPpartment 33, the Hon. Michael A. Sachs
presiding.'
At a hearing on February10, 2014, the court noted that both plaintiff
and defense counsel had subm~ttedproposed judgments. The court set a
hearing on February 19, 2014, tb rule on the proposed judgments.'

On February 19, 2014, tHe court and counsel discussed revisions to
I
the proposed judgment. Thd court ordered Stubblqfield's counsel to
prepare a new proposed judghent
I
incorpqrating the changes suggested
,
by the court and to attach a copy af the Appellate Division's opinion as an

I
exhibit. The court set a further hearing for the proposed judgment on
March 17,2014.'
On March 17, 2014, the court and counsel discussed the proposed
language to be incorporated in the final judgment.
The court noted it
reviewed the objections submitted by appellant.1 The court reviewed the

changes to the language in the proposed judgment based upon the court's
notes.
The court ordered Stubblefield to prepare the proposed final
judgment and provided counsel with copies of the court's notes."

On March 20, 2014, Stubblefield filed a "[Proposed] Final Order
Vacating Denial of Summery Judgment and Judgment in Favor of
Defendant." The judgment was signed by the court on the'same date it

was filed.I2 On April 2, 2014, Stubblefield filed a notice of entry of the
j~dgment.'~
This appeal follows.
DISCUSSION
Preliminarily, we note appellant's brief contains several references to
facts and documents that do not appear in the record on appeal in this
forcible detainer matter. We therefore must disregard them in evaluating
this appeal.
(Kohler v. Interstate Btands Corp. (2002) 103 Cal.App.4th
1096, 1102.)'~
This appeal concerns the final judgment and the trial court
proceedings leading up to the preparation, signing, filing and entry of the
judgment, after the issuance of a writ of mandate by a former panel of this
Appellate Division.
Appellate Division's May 6,2013 Writ of Mandate Opinion
In its May 6, 2013 opinion, a former panel of this Appellate Division

determined that Stubblefield's attempt to evict appellant, who is a
subtenant of the owner of the mobilehome in question, was not authorized
by Civil Code section 798.75.15 The Appellate Division found that "As a
l4 Included in appel!anils opening brief is a motion to augment the record. We previously denied
appellant's motion to augment the record on the ground the documents sought to be included
were not filed with the court and/or are not part of the trial court's file.
l5 Civil Code section 798.75, entitled "Sale or Transfer of Mobilehome Located in Park--Rental
Agreement, Purchaser's Rights of Tenancy; Unlawful Occupant," states:
(a) An escrow, sale, or transfer agreement involving a mobilehome located in a park at the
time of the sale, where the mobilehome is to remain in the park, shall contam a copy of either a
fully executed rental agreement or a statement signed by the park's management and the
prospective homeowner that the parties have agreed to the terms and conditions of a rental
agreement.
(b) In the event the purchaser fails lo execute the rental agreement, the purchaser shall not
have any rights of tenancy.
'
(c) In the event that an occupant of a mobilehome has'no rights of tenancy and is not
othenvise entitled to occupy the mobibhorne pursuant to this chapter, the occupant is considered
an unlawful occupant if, after a demand is made for the surrender of fhe mobilehome park site, for
a period of five days, the occupant refuses to surrender the site to the mobilehome park
management. In the event the unlawful occupant fails to comply with the demand, the unlawful
occupant shall be subject to the proceedings set forth in Chapter 4 (commencing with Section
1159) of Title 3 of Part 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
(d) The occupant of the mobilehome shall not be considered an unlawful occupant and shall
not be subject to the provisrons of subdivision (c) if ail of the following conditions are present:
(1) The occupant is the registered owner of the mobile home.
sublessee of a mobilehome owner, (appellant] does not fall within.the definition of

an 'unlawful occupant."' The court further found that "Although Civil Code section
798.75 does not authorize Stubblefield to evict Petitioner, Stubblefield is not
without a remedy under the Mobilehome Residency Law," and that Stubblef~ld's
remedy under the Mobilehome Residency Law is to proceed against the
homeowner in accordance with Civil Code section 798.56, subdivision (d) for
'failure of the homeowner or resident to comply with a reasonable rule or
l
or any amendment
regulation of ihe park that is part of the r e ~ t aagreement
thereto.'" The Appellate Division concluded,that "The trial court misinterpreted
Civil Code section 798.75. This statute applies only to a purchaser or transferee
of a mobilehome unit that occupies the park's space without first executing a
written lease agreement with the park. Petitioner is not a purchaser or transferee
of the subject mobilehome. Therefore, the 5-Day Notice to Surrender is invalid
because it is based upon an inapplicable statute.
As such, the eviction of
Petitioner by Stubblefield under Civil Code section 798.75 is not authorized."16

The Appellate Division granted appellant's petition and issued a writ of mandate
directing the trial court to vacate its order denying appellanfs motion for
summary judgment and to enter a new order granting appellant's motion for
summary judgment."
I
(2) The management has determined that the occupant has the financial ability to pay the rent
and charges of the park; wilt comply with the rules and regulations of the park, based on the
occupant's prior tenancies; and will comply with this article.
(3) The management failed or refused to offer the occupant a rental agreement.
Issues on Appeal
In her
opening
brief, appellant
lists
numerous procedural
irregularities and claimed errors in the case under review, making it difficult
to ascertain the precise issues she is raising in her appeal. We discern
three issues from our review of appellant's opening brief. First, appellant
contends the trial court erred by allowing Stubblefield, the non-prevailing
party, to prepare the proposed judgment. Second, appellant contends the
trial court erred by signing the proposed judgment prepared by Stubblefield
without affording appellant the opportunity to file objections to the
judgment. Third, appellant contends the trial court erred by permitting the
words "or resident" to be inserted into its final judgment, effectively revising
a statute "by judicial proclamation" and "transmuting prevailing party's
judgment into a victory for the non-prevailing party."'8
Preparation of Proposed Judgment by Respondent
Appellant asserts the trial court violated rule 3.1312 of the California
Rules of Court by permitting Stubblefield, the non-prevailing party, to
prepare the judgment.
I
California' Rules of Court, rule 3.1312 provides, in pertinent part:

"Unless the parties waive notice or the court orders otherwise, the party
prevailing on any motion must, within five days of the ruling, serve by any
means authorized by law and reasonably calculated to ensure delivery to
the other party or parties no later than the close of the next business day a
proposed order for approval as conforming to the court's order. Within five
days after service, the other party or parties must notify the prevailing party
as to whether or not the proposed order is so approved. The opposing
party or parties must state any reason for disapproval. Failure to notify the
preva'iling party within the time required shall be deemed an approval. ...
[m
The prevailing party must, upon expiration of the five-day period
provided for approval, promptly transmit the proposed order to the court
together with a summary of any responses of the other parties or a
statement that no responses were received." (Cal. Rules of Court, rille
3.1312(a), (b).)
We agree with appellant that Rule 3.1312 provides for the
preparation and submission of the proposed judgment by the prevailing
party, and that the court should have permitted appellant to prepare and
submit the proposed judgment.
Nevertheless, we find any error was
harmless, did not result in prejudice, and of no effect on the judgment.

Local Rule 591.3 and Insertion of "or resident" in Judgment
Appellant asserts the trial court erred by failing to wait 10 days prior
to signing the proposed judgment submitted by Stubblefield.
San Bernardino Superior Court Local Rule 591.3 states: "Counsel
must prepare, serve, and present to the Court forms for all orders and
judgments, which require the Court's signature.
If no objection is
forthcoming within ten days, the order or judgment may be signed as

presented. ..."
At the hearing on March 17,2014, the court reviewed the changes to
the proposed judgment from the court's notes.
Specifically, the court
stated, "So again, the court's requesting that Defendant was not a
purchaser or transferee of the subject mobile home period, and then we
are going to line out lines 10, 11, and midway through line 12. And so the
next sentence starts, and this is where the next change is, is Plaintiff may
proceed directly against the homeowner or resident under Civil Code
Section798.56." Defense counsel responded: "Okay. What about the first
three sentences where they paraphrased it and they added the word such
as ~efendant?"'~
On appeal, appellant contends the court improperly included the
phrase "or resident" at page 2, line 10 of the judgment. Appellant argues
that "By inserting the words 'or resident' Judge Sachs paved the way for
park owners to evict residents directly on 5 days' notice, instead of
proceeding against homeowners, who can invoke statutory protections
I
against arbitrary evictions under Civil ~ 7 9 8 . 5 5 . " ~ ~

We agree with appellant that the inclusion of the words "or resident"
is a misstatement of Civil Code section 798.56 and changes the meaning
and effect of the statute. Section 798.56 provides the permissible reasons
for the terrr~inationof a "tenancy" at a mobilehome park, including "failure
of a homeowner or resident to comply with a reasonable rule or regulation
of the park that is part of the rental agreement or any amendment thereto."
(Civ. Code, 798.56, subd. (d).) Section 798.56 does not state that a park
owner may evict a resident directly.
Rather, it provides that a
homeowner's tenancy2' may be terminated if the homeowner or resident

fails to comply with park rules.
Here, the trial court signed the proposed final judgment on March
20, 2014, the very same day the judgment was submitted by Stubblefield.
Appellant was not afforded the opportunity to submit any objections to the
proposed judgment. We find the court erred by failing to wait the requisite
10 days, to permit appellant to file any objections, before signing the
proposed judgment. Nevertheless, we find the error to be harmless.
Because the insertion of the words "or resident" in the final judgment
was erroneous, we will modify the judgment to delete those words from the
final judgment.
Respondent's Request for Dismissal
Stubblefield urges this reviewing court to dismiss the appeal for

appellant's failure to comply with appellate rules-namely,
*'
appellant's
Civil Code section 798.12 provides: "Tenancy" is the right of a homeowner to the use of a site
within a mobilehome park on which to locate, maintain, and occupy a mobilehome, site
improvements, and accessory structures for human habitation, including the use of the services
and facilities of the park.
failure to cite matters in the appellate record to support her arguments,

appellant's repeated and unwarranted personal attacks on the court,
Stubblefield and its counsel, and failure to comply with formatting rr-~lesset
forth in the California Rules of Court.
We will disregard any noncompliance and decline to dismiss the
appeal.
However, we admonish appellant and appellant's counsel to
refrain from making personal attacks on the trial court. "Disparaging the
trial judge is a tactic that is not taken lightly by a reviewing court. Counsel
better make sure he or she has the facts right before venturing into such
dangerous territory because it is contemptuous for an attorney to make 'the
unsupported assertion that the judge was 'act[ing] out of bias toward a
party."' (In re S.C. (2006) 138 Cal.App.4th 396, 422; citing in re White
(2004) 121 Cal.App.4th 1453, 1478.)
The case is remanded to the trial court with directions to modify the
judgment by deleting the words "or resident" from page 2, linelo, o f the
judgment. In in all other respects, the judgment is affirmed. The parties to
bear their own costs on appeal.
DAVID COHN, wesiding

Judge of the Appellate Division
~~ICHAE
A.LKNISH
n
n
7
El-IA V. PlROZZl
guyertor Court State of California

Countp ot B a n j'Bernarbino
Appellate Division
DECLARATION OF SERVICE BY MAIL
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
1
1
vs.
Case # AClAS 1400026

Trial Court# UDDS1204130
The undersigned hereby declares: I am a citizen of the United States of America, over the age of
eighteen years, a resident of the above-named State, and not a party to nor interested in the
proceedings named in the title of the annexed document. I am a Deputy Appellate Clerk of said
County. I am readily familiar with the business practice for collection and processing of
correspondence for mailing-withthe United States Postal Service. Correspo~dencewould be - deposited with the United States Postal Service that same day in the ordinary course of business.
On the date of mailing shown below, 1 placed for collection and mailing following ordinary business
practices, at the request and under the direction of the Superior Court in and for the State of
California and County above-named, whose office is at the Courthouse, San Bernardino, California, a
sealed envelope which contained a true copy of each annexed document, and which envelope was
addressed to the addressee, as follows:
LAW OFFICE OF
NANCY DUFFY MCCARRON
950 ROBLE LANE
SANTA BARBARA, CA 93103
HART KING
4 HUITON CENTER DR., SUITE 900
SANTA ANA, CA 92707
cc: Honorable Judge MICHAEL A. SACHS, San Bernardino Justice Center Courthouse
Trial Court: San Bernardino Justice Center Courthouse
Date and Place of Mailing: December 22, 2014, San Bernardino, California.
Document Mailed: PER CURIAM OPINION
<. .
I declare under penalty of perjury that the fo?egoin$is, M e and correct.

Executed on December 22, 2014, at San Bemardino, California.
Clerk
DEC 2 2 2014
[d-rnq R V t 'I
&& of vie superi~

Cou~tof Ihe %ts
Calitomia. in and lbr ehe CarPlyof
of
hs
EXHIBIT 1.3
CLAIM AQAINST THE CITY OF SAN BERNARDINO

(For damages to persons or personal property)
(Complete Both Pages)
9. ciaim aaainst
&sum WUr claim Is
---. -.the
.~
.Ciw
.., of
- San Bernardino must be filed with the Ciw Clerk within 8 months after the incident or event occun~d.
~
against the City of Sen Bwnsrdmo and not anomer publ~centity Completed claims mum be mailed or del~veredto:Cily Clerk. C(gof Sen Bernsrdino,
300 Nonh D Strent. Ssn Bernardino. Cslif0m.a 92418. If add tional space is needed to answer one of tho questions. please a w h en additional shest.
Warnlng:
AI
It b a Crlmlnel Offense t o Fils a Falm Claim1
(Penal Code Sec. 72; insurance Code See. 556.11

h l a e Clalm egslnat a PWCe OfflCerl
61 It 11 a Crimlnsl Offanr t a FBe

(Penal Code 148.61
Dele Stamp
Claimant Information
Address to whlch cla~mantdeslras n o t m s t o 8~sent

Name
--
Address
*-
/"PS-~~;~RY
D r e r ' s L~canseNO
Date of claim incident
'on: Whirr Caoav& Rot C O ~Ooldenrod.

;
clsimam
D I C I A R,-
,I
Damages Claimed
- Less Than B'IAQWI

Propem Dsmagm
Bodily Injury
Amount claimed as of thls date.

Ertimatsd amount of future costs.
Subtotal
Total Costs of Claim
Damages Claimed
- More Than $10.000
You must indkate court jurisdiction:
~unicipl
~uperior
Claim Investigation
names of any employee(s)who have bean involved.
/71,
&&do,
y-0 wd(
Wes this incident reported t o e law enforcement agenw?
Who reported it?
~ e s BNO
.-
If yes, which agency?
When wes it reported?
List the following:

Hospitels or Doctors:
I*""
h""
Ynr
..em.
..em.
Indicate eddiiional information whlch you believe might be helpful in considering this claim.
Warning:
A)
It 11. a Crlminal M f a n u to File a Faloo CIaBml

(Penel Code Sec. 72: Insurancecode Sec. 556.1)
B)
It im a Crlrnlnal Offenan to File a Fa1.s Claim ag0in.t a Peac. Onlcerl

IPenel Code 148.6)
Ihave read the matters and statements made i n the ebove cleim and Iknow the same to be true of m y own knowledge, except as to those meners
stated upon information or belief and as to such matters Ibelievs the same to be true. Icertify under penalty ofperjury that the foregoing is 7RUE
and CORREC7:
Signed this
23 4%. .
dayof
Hm
-
RM-15
M b u r i o n : White. Canan&Pink- City; Goldenrod. Claimant
C W M AGAINST COUN
(CLAIM FORM MUST BE FILLED OUT PROPERL Y OR CLAIM M'T;tL BE RETURNED WITHOUT
Claim is hereby made against the treasury of the County of San Bernardino, State of California, as follows:
Less than $10,000 State the total amount claimed $

More than $10,000 Check one of the boxes:
MunicipalCourt Jurisdiction ($10,000 $25,000)
Superior Cc:urt Jurisdiction ($25,001 and up)
Claimant makes the following statements in support of the claim:

1.
Duffy
Name of Claimant: Nancy

Fist
2.
R?.;Carron
Middk
Address of Claimant: 950 R o b l e Lane
Last
805-965-3492
(Area Code and Phone No.)
Santa B a r b a r a C A
93103
Zip Code
3.
Notices concerning claim should be sent to:

Address
4.
Zip Code
Circumstances giving rise t o claim are as follows: attached Notice of Racketeerinn Action
6.
Public property and/or public officers or employees causing injury, damage or loss: Kyle Brodie
(will add other cons~irinsracketeers on discoverv of sup~ortinaevidence)
7.
8.
Basis of computation of claimed amount is as follows:
-----Medical expenses to date

Loss wages
Estimatedfuture medical expenses
Genercl damages
Other expenses
PropeCy damage $80,000 value mobile home
Other damages: Judge Brodie is enabling abusive, harassing, ',legal litigation tactics by refusing to
,apply the law, Codes of Procedure, C~sortRules; refusing to rezlassify case to higher jurisdiction to
enable cross claims for elder abuse ar:d intentional infliction of emotional distress, Judge Brodie is a
participant in a racketeering enterprise in which he refuses to rul: against Stubblefield, has granted an
order to authorizing Stubblefield's gocn squad to invade our hcme to "videotape, photograph & test"
?he inside of our private home; "tests & ssmples" on exterior (bye believe agents intend to plant drugs)
and he intends to sign an order compe!ling my husband to tesli:;/ at a deposition, breaking his spousal
Office: (909)386-8631
Fax:
(909)382-3212 ,,
C W M AGAINST COLIN
(CLAIM FORM MUST BE FIL LED OUT PROPERL Y OR CLAIM WILL BE RETURNED WITHOUT
Less than $10,000 State the total amount claimed $

More than $10,000 -Check one of the boxes:
MunicipalCourt Jurisdiction ($10,000- $25,000)
1.
2.
Shi:;ley
Name of Claimant: Bonnie
Address of Claimant:4040 E. Piedmont Drive, Highland, CA
.s%et
3.
92346
Notices concerning claim should be sent to: Nancy McCarron, 950 Roble Ln. Santa Barbara CA
Name
5.
call McCarron 805-965-3492
/.r.st
Address
Zip Code
Date, Time and Place (city, street, cross-street) damage occurred and nature thereof: see attached
See d t q
6. Public property andlor public officers or employees causing injury, damage or loss: FireIArson
investigators Steve Tracey, Brian M. Carvalho, Battalion Chief Brian Crowell, and Judge Kyle Brodie
7.
8.
Medical expenses to date

Loss wages
EstimatedMure medical expenses
General damages,
Other expenses
Property damage Fire Damage to Space 333
Other damages: Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress, kist wages-not able to work due to having
to print, deliver and file pleadings to defend 2 sham unlawful evictions, which Kyle Brodie should have
dismissed or classified in unlimited jurisdiction so that I would be able to file cross-claims for damages;
destroying my credit rating, physical and mental anguish from harassment and violations of my privacy,
falsifying arson investigation reports to imply that I caused a fire at space #333 in Stubblefield's mobile
RETURN COMPLETED FORM TO:

Office: (909) 386-8631
(909) 382-3212
Fax:
San Bernardino. CA 92415-0016
Less than $10,000 -State the total amount claimed $
More than $10,000 -Check one of the boxes:
U Municipal Court Jurisdiction ($10.000 - $25,000)
Supelior Court Jurisdiction ($25,001 and up)

~.

1. Name of Claimant: Stephen
C.
Fist
Allen
Middle
Last
805-965-3492 (attorney)
2.
Address of Claimant: PO Box
Highland, CA
3.
Notices concerning claim should be sent to:Nancy McCarron, 950 Roble Ln, Santa Barbara, CA
Zip Code
Address
6. Public property and/or public officers or employees causing injury, damage or loss: Steve Tracey,
M. Cawalho, Brian Crowell (knowingly falsified fire reports t o imply I caused fire damage t o #333)
i n conspiracy with Arnold Stubblefield, Tom Parrish, and Robert Williamson; participants i n
racketeering enterprise b y accepting bribes or political favors for falsifying arson & fire reports
7.
Name, address and telephone number of witnesses: see attached
8.

Loss wages
General damages
Propert.) damage
Other expenses
Other damages: to my reputation, slander, loss of wages, intentional infliction of emotional distress,
violation of my privacy; trying to get judge to compel videotaping my face--violating my native American
ights under CA Const. Artl.$l
religious beliefs (violation-Is. Amendment (US Const) and inali
Estimated future medical expenses
RETURN COMPLETED FORM TO:

Risk Management Division - County of San Bernardino, State of California
222 W. Hospitality Lane. 3d Floor
San Bemardino. CA 92415-0016
Cih 04-L l3Px- n
k b -
d m , GJ-~
u , ~ L NNO.o
)31
C
(jXirnanilWRepresentatrve
(S~gnature)
Office: (909) 386-8631

Fax:
(909) 382-3212
07.8387-286
9Zf/8
TO: Clerk, City of San Bernardino (fax 909-384-5158) and County of San Bernardino (fax 909-382-3212)
NOTICE: Intent to Name Steve Tracy, M. Carvalho, Brian Crowell, Judge Kyle Brodie in Racketeering Action,
together with Arnold Stubblefield and participants in his racketeering enterprise to defraud mobilehome owners.
TRUE Narrative/exhibits prove Steve Tracy, M. Carvalho, Brian Crowell falsified evidence in arson reports:
The truth about what happened by Wendy Durr, the only witness who saw where the fire started, and put it out:
8/28/14 -10:30 am Thursday--2 days before 8/30/14 Saturday fire-Wendy experienced large surge & loud boom;
Saturday (8/30/14-12 noon) she had similar surge, but no bang; her air conditioning unit popped off, then on.
20 minutes later she exited home to go out to patio and heard a crackling noise, looked out window and saw fire
at McCarron/Shipleys home, in the electrical pedestal and plastic fence, and vegetation in front of the pedestal.
Durr called 911 to report fire at 1:14 pm. Durr took her fire extinguisher over to the fire area and joined Jerome
Poland who had run across the street when he saw fire. Durr gave Poland the hose; she extinguished the fire at
the electric pedestal with fire extinguisher. Poland extinguished the fire at base of palm trees with a water hose.
Durr said it took 22 minutes for a fire engine to arrive (from less than 1 mile away); fire was already out by then
Durr said the fire department staff interviewed her about what happened. Durr said So. Cal Edison rep returned
to the fire site the next day to examine the pedestal and restore her electric service. SoCal rep said he saw
damage a bus-bar within the electric pedestal and he had documented same in his report. Durr said he also found
a ball of metal down in the hole, underneath the pedestal, where the electrical wires come up from the ground.
After the fire department departed Wendy Durr called Nancy McCarron to notify her of the fire & above events.
IT WAS INDISPUTABLE EVIDENCE THE FIRE STARTED ON INSIDE OF ELECTRIC PEDESTAL.
Pages
1-5
8/30/14 NFIRS-Basic Internal Fire Report on space #333 at 4040 E. Piedmont Dr. Highland, CA
shows 911 call: 1314 (1:14 pm); page 2 shows Brian Crowell left section K1, K2 blank (witnesses)
[in a later 10/7/14 report (pg. 35) Brian Crowell admits there were 2 witnesses at scene when he arrived]
Crowell whitewashed: resident not home called in by next door neighbor extinguished by bystander
possibly damaged inside wiring..unknown cause of fire..possibly electrical in nature..electrical box taped off
Crowell taped off the box with hundreds of feet of electrical tape wrapped around several times so that no one
could look inside the box which revealed exactly how the fire started. Crowell did not know Wendy had taken
a picture of the inside of the box before he arrived---evidence of the real origin of the fire (see pic @ page 20)
Crowell intentionally failed to document 2 witnesses (Wendy Durr & Jerome Poland) to suppress real evidence.
9/02/14 McCarron called Steve Tracy to ask for investigation. Because she had already heard Stubblefield
owned local fire department bosses and bribes them to alter reports and bury complaints about fire hazards,
and because she did not trust Steve Tracy, she asked him to tape record her report so he could not lie about her.
Tracy said to call back on an alternate number so her interview would be tape-recorded. City now refuses to
give McCarron a copy of her recorded report. During their recorded interview she told Tracy everything Wendy
had told her on 8/30/14. Tracy knew on 9/2/14 the fire started in the pedestal and spread to the palm trees
after starting in pedestal. McCarron told Tracy pedestals were 50 years old and that she suspected sabotage by
Stubblefield as the park controls pedestals and resident/tenants have no access to the pedestals which are locked.
McCarron told Tracy that Stubblefield tried to evict her co-resident in a vitriolic litigation lasting for two years,
and because he had lost the 2-year battle he had a motive to burn her out of the park after losing his appeal.
Secondly, maintenance staff told McCarron manager Tom Parrish ordered them not to replace a pedestal at 333.
Parrish told staff to stay out of it and let McCarron replace the pedestal and gas meter to restore her utilities.
McCarron called Hanna Noreiga (assistant park manager) on 9/2/14 to request immediate restoration of utilities.
Noreiga told McCarron it was not the parks job to replace the pedestal and gas meter and told McCarron she
had to contact her homeowners insurance carrier to get them to replace utilities. Clearly Stubblefield and his
racketeers intended to drive Shipley and McCarron out of the park as it was impossible to live without utilities.
Despite knowing the origin of the fire, and history of vitriolic 2-year litigation relayed during a taped interview
which Tracy promised to keep confidential, Tracy betrayed a victim by meeting with Stubblefields manager,
Tom Parrish & his lawyer to conspire how they would falsify reports to create a pretext Shipley caused the fire.
The evidence below shows exactly how these corrupt fire investigators participated in a racketeering enterprise.
1
Pages
6-10 9/2/14 After McCarrons recorded interview with Steve Tracy, in which she told him all of the details
Wendy Durr had told her on 8/30/14 (the day of the fire), including the origin of the fire in the pedestal, and in
which she gave Tracy Wendy Durrs space no. 332 & cell phone no. 909-347-1940 (which she always answers)
and Jerome Polands space no. 316 & cell no. 909-362-9988 corrupt investigator M. Carvalo falsified a report:
M. Carvalo never contacted two witnesses with personal knowledge of the origin of the fire (Durr and Poland).
Carvalo utters a BOLDFACED LIE reciting, Investigator Tracy (l684) and I (l688) took photographs and
interviewed witnesses. The general area of origin was determined to be the planter on the southeast (left side)
of the structure. The cause of fire was found to be undetermined. HE NEVER INTERVIEWED WITNESSES.
WE BELIEVE THAT EITHER HE OR TRACY PLANTED CIGARETTE BUTTS NEAR THE PALM TREES.
Carvalo then recites We began an investigation into the cause and origin.. On 9/2/14 they already knew the
cause and origin of the fire because Wendy Durr identified the cause and origin to McCarron on 8/30/14 which
McCarron repeated to Steve Tracey IN A RECORDED STATEMENT ON 9/2/14 exactly what Wendy told her.
After planting cigarette butts by the palm trees Carvalo then recites, Evidence of smoking materials was found
all along the planter surrounding the structure. Witness statements from Durr & Poland are conspicuous by
their absence, as well as any statements by the victim, Nancy McCarron. Only what could work to Stubblefields
advantage was written in the report; i.e. inferences that smoking by the residents was the cause of the fire!
In No. 7 of his report (page 8) M. Carvalo lists the property value at $100,000. This supports evidence that Judge
Kyle Brodie is part of Stubblefields racketeering enterprise as he refuses to classify UDFS1406978 to unlimited
jurisdiction despite McCarron providing evidence the damages Stubblefield seeks (over $25,000 in back rent)
and the property he seeks to seize both exceed Judge Brodies jurisdiction (limited to $25,000 or less). [see the
attached Writ Petition to Appellate Division after Judge Brodie denied reclassification to unlimited jurisdiction)
In No. 10 M. Carvalo recites, Evidence of smoking materials was found near the general area of origin.
Therefore smoking can NOT be ruled out. M. Carvalo knew his statements were false when made because
he had my recorded interview telling Tracy that Wendy Durr saw the fire started in the electric pedestal,
and had taken a picture of the burned out lug hole which was the origin of the fire by an arching event.
M. Carvalos final conclusion (No. 12 pg. 9) conveniently recites the cause of this fire was undetermined.
Carvalo prints out Investigation Report Detail which includes the following fraudulent evidence.
Evidence
Item Number
1
Type
Photographs
Description: Stored in SIB-Scene Photos
Class
Fire Cause Determination
Disposition
We believe Tracy and/or Carvalo planted cigarette butts in the palm trees to imply that Shipley started the fire.
* Steve Tracy & M. Carvalho intentionally did not interview Durr or Poland so they could falsify the 9/2/14
report for Stubblefields immediate benefit as will be shown by the remainder of chronological evidence below!
pp 11-12 9/4/14 Housing & Community Development (HCD) Investigator Bryan Winn (760-702-1436) arrives
after McCarrons 9/3/14 complaint-park refused to replace electric pedestal & gas meter to restore utilities to 333
Page 12 top shows second round of evidence proving a conspiracy with fire department to falsify arson reports.
Manager Hanna Noreiga stated the fire investigator had completed the investigation and was able to determine
a starting location of the fire which was by some palm trees by the street in the area close to the lot utilities,
not from the electric pedestal, but was unable to determine the cause of the fire. This was a BOLDFACED LIE!
Wendy Durr stopped by the office to report the fire and told Noreiga and Tom Parrish it started in the pedestal.
This also demonstrates the conspiracy between Tracy, Carvalho, Tom Parrish and Noreiga to falsify evidence.
After my initial call to Tracy on 9/2/14 he avoided me like the plague for two days (9/2/14 and 9/3/14). He would
not take my calls; rather he left his phone on voicemail continuously and refused to return my calls. I even called
other fire department clerical staff, who answered the main line to contact him to call, as I had new information.
Tracy finally took a call from me at the end of the work day on 9/4/14 which was our last conversation.
2
Tracy told me he was finished with his investigation and that he would tell me the same thing he had just
told Tom Parrish and his lawyer at a meeting they just finished; i.e. that the cause and origin of the fire was
undetermined but that he could not rule out (and believed) the fire was started by smoldering cigarette butts
in the palm trees. I asked if he had interviewed the only 2 witnesses with personal knowledge (Durr & Poland).
He said no. It was not necessary to interview them because HE had already determined the cause and origin
of the fire and had taken pictures of the cigarette butts all along the planter areas. Shipley never smoked in
that remote area. Shipley smokes only in her garage and places her butts into closed containers in the garage.
We knew then that Tracy and/or Carvahlo had planted cigarette butts in palm tree area near the fire to imply that
Shipley had caused the fire, and to protect Stubblefield from any liability for gross negligence or intentional acts
of arson to drive us out. This also explains why both Carvalho and Stacy intentionally failed to even acknowledge
the existence of witnesses Durr & Poland in any of their reports---let alone interview them before arriving at
their fraudulent conclusions about the origin and cause of the fire at 333. This also explains why Battalion
Chief Brian Crowell intentionally left the witness blocks blank in his initial 8/30/14 report at the time of the fire,
and why Crowell intentionally delayed arrival for 22 minutes when his fire engine was less than a mile away.
Crowell had arranged with Tom Parrish to delay arrival---hoping my house would be burned down by then.
THIS IS EXACTLY WHAT HAPPENED IN THE COLONIES CORRUPTION CASE WHEN THE WITNESS
AGAINST THE CONSPIRATORS HOUSE MYSTERIOUSLY BURNED DOWN- THE SAN BERNARDINO
FIRE DEPARTMENT TOOK 45 MINUTES TO ARRIVE AT THE SCENE TO FIND ONLY RUBBLE LEFT!
ATTORNEY GENERAL MUST INVESTIGATE THIS SEWER OF CORRUPTION IN SAN BERNARDINO!
Pg. 13 9/5/14 Stubblefields corrupt lawyer (Robert Williamson) sent a letter to McCarron with boldfaced lies:
According to the Fire Department Battalion Chief and the arson investigator,
with whom I have already spoken with, it is very clear the origin of the fire
occurred at the base of two palm trees at the Southeast corner of Space 333,
moved toward the electric pedestal, destroying the pedestal, and then continued
toward and damaged the gas meter and line which for obvious safety reasons
was shut off. In fact, based on my discussions with the arson investigator,
the fire was accelerated and burned intensely as a result of two conditions on
Space 333:(i) overgrown shrubbery containing some type of oil-based liquid;
and (ii) the palm trees on the Space.
The Fire Departments initial report indicates and confirms the location of
the fires origin, a copy of which will be forwarded to you upon receipt.
I am informed the arson investigators report, which will confirm the same
information, will not be available for another 10-15 days, at which time a copy
will be provided to you. Whether to request initiation of a criminal investigation
is under consideration pending issuance of the arson investigators report.
While the cause of the fire is still under investigation, the Fire Batallion Chief
and arson investigator both conclude that the cause of the fire was in no way
related to nor triggered by the electric pedestal.
Amazingly, neither Tracy nor Carvalho, nor Chief Brian Crowell talked to Wendy Durr or Jerome Poland.
Instead, the only persons they wanted to meet with and talk to were Stubblefield, Parrish and their lawyer!
How dare they be so dishonest and unethical. They all should be fired forthwith for blatant corruption!
Pg 15-27 9/8/14 Irate after receiving AttorneyWilliamsons email, McCarron faxed City Clerk at 4:00 a.m.
Outlining the details of the fire, and the blatant in-your-face corruption of Steve Tracy and Battalion Chief.
I also filled out a government claim asking for an investigation of this corruption in the fire department, and
asked the City Clerk, Ms. Hanna to investigate corruption. Ms. Hanna said she would forward my fax and my
claim to the City Attorneys office for review and action. The City later denied the claim on October 22, 2014.
3
Pg 28-29 9/8/14 Stubblefields Attorney Robert Williamson filed a declaration under oath, in Judge Sachs
court testifying to Judge Sachs that (in No. 4) On Thursday, September 4, 2014 I spoke with the arson investor
regarding origin of the fire at Space 333. The arson investigator confirmed that the fire originated at the base of
the palm trees on Space 333.
Pg 30 9/8/14 Because of the fax transmitted at 4:00 a.m. which Ms. Hanna read upon her arrival at 8:00 am.,
and which she immediately forwarded to the City Attorney, we believe the City Attorney immediately called the
Fire Department to find out what had happened and how the investigators could complete their report on 9/4/14
and conclude the fire started in the palm trees, without ever having interviewed either of the two witnesses
who had personal knowledge of where the fire started. (Wendy Durr and Jerome Poland).
In a kneejerk reaction to that contact by the City Attorney Steve Tracy FINALLY decided it would be
prudent to FINALLY INTERVIEW WENDY DURR AND JEROME POLAND which he did THAT DAY!
Page 30 is Tracys summary of his 9/8/14 interview of Wendy Durr---10 days after the fire and 4 days after
he met with perpetrators Stubblefield, Tom Parrish, and their corrupt attorney Mr.Williamson on speaker phone.
Continuing blatant corruption, Tracy tried to trick Wendy Durr by starting the recorded interview by stating their
interview was being taped on September 2, 2014 --- Wendy had to correct the record by saying, NO, TODAY
IS SEPTEMBER 8, 2014! Tracy tried to falsify again by creating a pretext that he interviewed her on 9/2/14.
In this interview Wendy Durr recited the identical history of events she had told me on 8/30/14 after the fire.
DURR SAW THE FIRE START IN THE PEDESTAL AND THEN MOVE OVER TO PALM TREES.
Durr also explained how the Edison employee saw the damage to one of the bus-bars (lug nuts-live wires)
within the electrical pedestal. She also stated he found a ball of metal down in the hole underneath the
pedestal where the electrical wires come up FROM THE GROUND.
Edison employee excavated the dirt for hours digging very deeply to see if the fire originated in the main line.
He explained to Wendy Durr that he believed an arching event occurred inside the pedestal causing the fire.
Tracy conveniently left this part of her testimony out of his summary of interview. How convenient?
Pg 31- 9/8/14 Tracys interview with Jerome Poland. Jerome told McCarron that Tracy tried to trip him up.
Tracy kept repeatedly asking Poland, Are you sure the fire didnt start in the palm trees at least three times.
POLAND stated, I felt like the fire had moved from the area in front of the pedestal towards the palm trees
and then continued to start the trees; those trees would have been a bigger blaze if it was the other way around.
THIS IS NOT WHAT TRACY WANTED TO HEAR BECAUSE IT DID NOT MATCH HIS CONTRIVED
CONCLUSION; HE WAS SO EAGER TO GIVE STUBBLEFIELD ON 9/4/14 TO USE IN COURT 9/8/14.
PG 32 - 9/9/14 Ex Parte Hearing on Shipleys Application for Order to Repair or Replace Electric Pedestal
Judge Sachs denied Bonnie Shipleys righteous application for an Order to Compel Repair or Replacement of
the Electric Pedestal and Gas Meter so that utilities could be restored. We were without electric power, gas,
telephone and DSL and had been for nearly 2 weeks by then, in the middle of a heat wave over 105 degrees.
I wrote a letter and called Mr. Williamson to ask if Bonnie Shipley could relieve herself from the extreme heat
by going into the air conditioned clubhouse and swimming pool. He said, no, she is an unapproved resident.
This was despite the stress she was under, as the sole caregiver for a brother dying of Stage 4 cancer (she takes
him to chemo, radiation, and proton therapy nearly every day, and has to hand-feed him 3 meals per day, as well
as the stress for caring for her 80-year old mother with congestive heart failure. These people are pure evil!
Judge Sachs had no sympathy whatsoever for Bonnie Shipleys plight denying her order to restore utilities.
Williamson smirked at me as he walked out, knowing he defeated us with corrupt reports by bribed fire officials.
Because Judge Sachs refused to compel utilities restoration, I had to spend over $3,000 to restore utilities myself.
Pg 35 -10/7/14 Tracys belated interview with Battalion Chief Brian Crowell, in an attempt to whitewash fraud!
Amazingly, Crowell back peddles and ADMITS there were two neighbors at the location when they arrived on
scene that had extinguished the body of the fire with garden hose prior to his arrival. Crowell stated one of
these neighbors was the RP who had called 911 to report the fire. It is also amazing that Crowell never
included summaries of his interviews with these two percipient witnesses who extinguished the fire.
NOTE that on Brian Crowells initial report entered 8/30/14 (pages 1-5 above) he never listed these 2 witnesses
on his report or a summary of his interview with both of them immediately upon his arrival at the fire scene.
Even in this belated report Crowell still does not identify Wendy Durr & Jerome Poland as witnesses therein.
Tracy then narrates, Crowell did state the cause of the fire may have been possibly electrical in nature but
was not able to make this determination based on his training and experience. How convenient?
Crowell did not need to make a determination based on his training and experience. He had a live witness on the
scene who TOLD HIM what caused the fire it started inside the electric pedestal shown by Ms. Durrs picture.
(see picture - page 20). But that is not the evidence Stubblefield wanted included on the corrupt reports!
Accordingly, Crowell filled out his initial report as if there were no witnesses, reciting he could not determine
the cause Crowell conspired to send corrupt racketeers (Tracy and Carvalho) to plant evidence Stubblefield
wanted to appear in the pictures at the scene; i.e. cigarette butts in the palm trees. How convenient?
These corrupt participants in Stubblefields racketeering enterprise executed the plan to falsify reports.
Pg 3310/13/14 Belated Final Narrative Issued by Steve Tracy (5 weeks after the fire-on city attorney advice)
Tracys narrative is replete with BOLDFACED LIES in a belated attempt to whitewash prior corrupt reports.
First LIE: Offensive fire attack was initiated and the fire was extinguished. Brian Crowell intentionally
delayed arriving with the fire truck for 22 minutes despite the fact the station was less than a mile away.
Wendy Durr marked the time she called (1:14 pm) and said the fire truck did not arrive until 1:36 p.m.
Wendy Durr & Jerome Poland had already extinguished the fire. Brian Crowell delayed arrival as requested
by racketeer Stubblefield --- in hopes my entire home would be burned down before the fire truck arrived.
What they did not count on is that two courageous neighbors would extinguish the fire with their bare hands!
CONCLUSION: CORRUPT FIRE INVESTIGATORS AND CHIEF FALSIFIED ARSON REPORTS
PLEASE BE ADVISED WE INTEND TO FILE A RACKETEERING ENTERPRISE CASE IN FEDERAL
COURT IN EARLY APRIL 2015. The time of discovery of this blatant fraud by falsifying fire investigation
reports was 10/28/14 ---- the day Nancy McCarron picked up Fire Department Final Narrative Report.
This claim is timely as it is filed within 6 months from discovery of this blatant fraud (falsified reports).
The racketeering case will be filed in federal court after waiting 30 days from denial of the claims.
We intend to name Steve Tracy, M. Carvalho, Brian Crowell and Judge Kyle Brodie as racketeer participants.
The following pages outline how Judge Kyle Brodie continues to enable Stubblefield to prosecute his
SECOND SHAM eviction complaint against McCarron and Shipley in the WRONG JURISDICTION.
WE DEMAND THAT STEVE TRACY, M. CARVAHLO, AND BRIAN CROWELL BE FIRED FOR
BLATANT CORRUPTION AND FALSIFYING FIRE ARSON REPORTS FOR PERSONAL GAIN
(EITHER MONEY BRIBES BY STUBBLEFIELD OR PROMISED FUTURE POLITICAL FAVORS)
WE EXPECT A WRITTEN RESPONSE, NOT JUST DENYING OUR CLAIMS, BUT EXPLAINING WHY.
CLAIM AGAINST KYLE BRODIE WHO HAS GONE OVER THE LINE IN APPEASING STUBBLEFIELD
Summary of Why Judge Kyle Brodie will be named as a participant in Stubblefields Racketeering Enterprise
Stubblefields Racketeering Enterprise is designed and operates to filch mobile homes from their legal owners
to add to Stubblefields portfolio of rental units inside his Mountain Shadows Mobile Home Community.
Stubblefield prosecuted a SHAM eviction proceeding against my co-resident Bonnie Shipley. Stubblefield
and his attorney, Robert Williamson, knew it was a sham complaint before filing and serving it upon Shipley.
The Notice to Vacate Stubblefield served on Shipley was unlawful because the statute authorized eviction of
purchasers and transferees who move in to a mobile home without a new park lease [Civil Code 798.75(c)].
This statute did not apply to Shipley because she is not a purchaser or transferee of McCarrons mobile home.
Shipley was/is a lawful co-resident sharing the home with McCarron. It was also a sham because there is no
privity of contract between Stubblefield and Shipley -- a prerequisite to eviction proceedings. McCarron is
Stubblefelds contract tenant---not Shipley who is McCarrons co-resident sharing her mobile home.
McCarron recited these arguments in a demurrer which Judge Wilfred Schneider should have granted 9/28/12.
Instead, he disregarded Stare Decisis, Codes of Procedure, Rules of Court and common sense as a UD Judge.
This was because Judge Schneider either feared billionaire Stubblefield would run a candidate against him
during his next 6-year reelection, or he wanted to curry favor with Stubblefield for campaign contributions.
Stubblefield engaged in scorched earth litigation tactics---fighting us as if ten million dollars were at stake.
We had 53 court hearings, with over 400 items on the docket, 15 volume case file wheeled around on a cart,
and a case summary sheet which is 43 pages long. It is one of the most complex UD cases ever litigated.
Schneider would not rule against Stubblefield no matter how obnoxious his motions were to harass Shipley.
However, Judge Schneider knew where to draw the line and did not cross over it. He denied Stubblefields
vile motion to converge upon our home with a goon squad to videotape, photograph, test and take samples.
After awarding unwarranted and illegal sanctions against us for $9,000 upon which we complained to the
Presiding Judge Marcia Slough, Judge Schneider voluntarily revoked his sanctions order and recused himself.
The case was then assigned to Judge Donald Alvarez, who was also afraid to rule against Stubblefield and
failed to apply the law to the facts on most of the motions. Judge Alvarez also knew where to draw the line and
denied Stubblefields renewed obnoxious motion for an order authorizing a goon squad of videographers,
testers, photographers, and unidentified agents to converge upon our home for testing and extracting.
Judge Alvarez denied Stubblefields motion to restrain myself and my husband from talking to any witness.
Judge Alvarez denied Shipleys summary judgment motion and set the case for trial. Shipley filed a timely
Writ petition in the Appellate Division. Judges Ochoa and Briscoe, who were the first judges we encountered
who were not afraid to rule against billionaire Stubblefield, and who actually applied the law to undisputed facts.
The Panel granted the petition reciting the same arguments I presented on demurrer and in a pre-litigation letter.
The Panel held the Notice to Vacate was invalid as it did not apply to Shipley because she was not a purchaser or
transferee, and Stubblefield could not evict her directly because he was not in privity of contract with Shipley.
The Panel ordered Judge Alvarez to enter summary judgment for Shipley and final judgment on the merits.
Judges Ochoa & Briscoe were removed from the Appellate Division Panel after issuing the Writ of Mandate.
Although Judge Alvarez entered summary judgment he never entered final judgment on the merits for Shipley,
despite that I had presented 3 alternate proposed final judgments for his signature in court. Judge Alvarez
recused himself. The case was reassigned to Judge Michael Sachs who was afraid to rule against Stubblefield.
In fact, despite my vehement objections he allowed Stubblefields attorney to compose Shipleys final judgment.
This violated CRC 3.1312 which calls for the prevailing party to compose final judgment. As one would expect,
Stubblefield paraphrased the Panels holdings, which recited that Stubblefields remedy was to proceed against
the homeowner under Civil Code 798.56(d) if he believed any resident had violated any reasonable park rule.
However, Stubblefield composed the text in final judgment to recite Stubblefield could proceed directly against
the homeowner ---or resident---under Civil Code 798.56(d) -- thus authorizing him to evict Shipley directly.
6
This directly conflicted with the Writ of Mandate issued by the Appellate Division Panel which expressly
recited that Stubblefield could not evict Shipley directly because he was not in privity of contract with her.
In violation of CRC 3.1312 requiring Stubblefield to serve Shipley with the proposed judgment and wait five
days for objections, and Local Rule 591.3 requiring a Judge to hold a final judgment 10 days for objections,
Stubblefield delivered the judgment to Sachs chambers and he signed it on the spot entering it that same day.
Shipleys attorney was forced to spend hundreds of hours prosecuting an appeal of her own victory to protect
Shipley from yet another unlawful eviction based on a statute which did not apply to her; i.e. Civil 798.56(d).
Shipley prevailed as a new Appellate Panel ordered Judge Sachs to strike or resident from the judgment.
Although Shipley cited Judge Sachs nine serial violations of statutes, court rules, codes of procedure, and his
judicial oath, the Panel labeled them as harmless errors and denied Shipley her costs for daring to allege bias,
and even chastised her for alleging judicial bias and recited a veiled threat that it bordered on contempt.
It was hardly harmless when it caused McCarron to have to labor hundreds of hours on research, writing
appellate briefs, paying $173 for transcripts, and hundreds of dollars on copy costs for filing brief and reply.
After Stubblefield lost all three appeals, and McCarron filed a motion for significant attorney fees for 2400
hours of labor over 3 years defending scorched earth litigation tactics (53 hearings, over 400 docket entries,
43-page case history, 15 volumes of case files -- wheeled around on a cart) it remains to be seen what Judge
Sachs will do with this motion. Will he award McCarron appropriate attorney fees? Will he have the courage
to actually apply THE LAW (attorney fees are mandatory to prevailing parties on MRL cases) or will he be so
afraid to rule against Stubblefield he will find a way to significantly slash fees or stall the award indefinitely.
Furious that he lost 3 appeals Stubblefield resorted to trying to burn us out of our home by sabotaging the
electric pedestal to start a fire (there has been no other reported fire in a park pedestal in over 50 years) and
arranging for conspiring racketeer Brian Crowell to delay arrival at 333 for 22 minutes hoping our home would
burn before they arrived. The station is less than a mile from the park. What could take a fire truck 22 minutes
to go one mile? The racketeers did not count on heroic neighbors saving McCarrons home! When this evil
failed to drive McCarron out Tom Parrish became even more determined to evict McCarrron and Shipley.
Stubblefield summoned his pit bull lawyer Williamson to prosecute a new SHAM eviction against both of us.
Judge Brodie was assigned to the case. While all the other Judges ignored the law and ruled for Stubblefield
on most motions, they were astute enough to know where to draw the line; they denied the most repugnant of
motions; such as, unjustified restraining orders on free speech against my husband and I, and denied orders to
authorize goon squads to invade our home to videotape, photograph, extract samples, and perform tests.
This violation of our privacy, with no compelling need, was denied by every Judge before cavalier Judge Brodie.
Judge Brodie does not know where to draw the line. He has taken under submission a motion to compel
my husband to appear for deposition to testify against his own spouseresearching the law himself for weeks
to try to locate a case which could support denying my husbands privilege not to testify against his spouse,
conveyed by statutory privileges under Evidence Code 970 and 971. We cited the Duggan case which is
exactly on point, holding an adversary cannot compel a spouse to testify against the other spouse. Judge Brodie
should have sustained our demurrer as there is no legal basis to evict McCarron or Shipley under stare decisis.
(see Summary of Merits). Judge Brodie clearly erred by refusing to transfer this case to unlimited jurisdiction.
See attached Writ Petition in Appellate Division (attached in email version of this Notice of Intent to Name.)
McCarron provided admissible, authenticated evidence that Stubblefield prayed for open-ended damages already
exceeding $25,000 [McCarrons Monthly Resident Account Statement reciting over $25,000 Rent Due 1/1/15]
and County Tax Assessor records showing the home is valued at $27,800 for tax purposes. Incredibly, despite
this undisputed evidence, Brodie DENIED our motion to transfer and insists on keeping it in his court which is a
limited jurisdiction UD court where past due rent damages do not exceed $25,000.
UD court imposes undue burdens on McCarron as motions and depositions are set on only 5-days notice.
Because McCarron has to drive over from Santa Barbara these short deadlines impose exhausting hardships.
Trial is set on only 21-days notice depriving McCarron of adequate time for discovery and trial preparation.
UD court has no provisions for telephonic appearances forcing McCarron to drive over for every hearing.
7
There are no court reporters. The record is audio-taped. McCarron must pay to have verified each time.
Transcribers discovered mysterious clicks on the tape in the middle of McCarrons sentences. There are no
clicks in the middle of Williamson or Judge Brodies sentences unless he interrupts. Parts of McCarrons
objections were deleted from the audio, as she remembers making specific points, and has written notes on them.
When McCarron listens to audio recordings she does not hear words she remembers uttering during the hearing.
Instead there is a click in the middle of her sentence---then Williamson or Judge Brodie is heard talking.
Besides these mysterious deletions Judge Brodie is so anxious to please Stubblefield that he consistently
interrupts McCarron during hearings to prevent her from recording important arguments on the tape for appeal;
yet Judge Brodie never interrupts Mr. Williamson. Most of the transcript is a colloquy between Judge Brodie
and Williamson---like two lawyers trying to figure out how they can tweak the law to support Stubblefields
request for relief. If McCarron dares to try to get a word in edgewise Judge Brodie chastises her---threatening
to eject her from the courtroom. Yet Williamson is allowed to interrupt McCarron and Judge Brodie at his whim
and Judge Brodie never chastises Mr. Williamson for interrupting. There is a double standard at all times.
We have been arguing before every judge at nearly every hearing for 3 years now that Stubblefield is
prosecuting sham evictions, and there is no legal basis to evict Shipley or McCarron as shown below.
Williamson argues there is a triable issue for a jury to decide if McCarron regularly occupies the mobile home;
if not then Stubblefield can evict her for violating a 2010 park rule requiring every owner to occupy the mobile
home at all times in order to have a co-resident in the second bedroom. Williamsons argument is illogical.
If a defendant is ticketed for exceeding 65 miles per hour he cannot invoke a jury to decide if 65 is a reasonable
maximum speed limit. A jury cannot overrule a legislative enactment which sets 65 as a maximum speed limit.
The same logic applies here. Stubblefield cannot invoke a jury to decide if his rule prohibiting subleasing is a
reasonable new rule. The appellate court in Rancho Santa Paula Homes v Evans already decided this issue,
holding a new rule prohibiting subleases, as applied to an existing tenant is unreasonable as a matter of law.
Stare Decisis must be applied to the undisputed facts. A jury is not authorized to overrule an appellate court!
Both sham complaints should have been dismissed with prejudice at the first demurrer hearing based on:
Otanez v. Blue Skies Mobile Home Park (1991) 1 CA 4th.1521 (first sentence) holding:
We hold that the tenant need not live in the premises full-time in order to be a resident
City of Santa Barbara v. Adamson (1980) 27 Cal.3d 123, holding the following:
people have an inalienable right to life...liberty happinessprivacy.
Rancho Santa Paula Mobile Homes v. Evans (1994) 26 CA4th.1129, 1147-1148 holding:
Because of the high cost of moving mobile homes, they are anything but mobile..However, as explained above,
a rule prohibiting subleasing affects the very nature of the holding and may well cause the eviction of both
the tenant and the mobile home owner. We hold that such a rule, when applied retroactively--that is, against
a homeowner whose lease contains no such restriction and who has not agreed to the restriction--is contrary
to the stated purpose of the MRL and is therefore unreasonable.
II Respondent claims that the regulation he seeks to enforce does not prohibit subleasing, but only requires the
owner to be one of the residents of the mobilehome. However, the restriction would permit subleasing only if the
home remained unoccupied or if the homeowner were one of the occupants. The restriction is broader than a nosublease clause in that it also prohibits a noncommercial arrangement in which persons other than the homeowner are
the sole occupants of the home. Nevertheless, it is essentially a prohibition of subleasing.
III Respondent contends that the restriction did not operate retroactively because it was incorporated by law into
the original lease. He argues that, since Civil Code, section 798.25 permits the making of new rules without the
homeowner's consent, the homeowner in commencing the tenancy agrees to subsequently enacted rules.
However, the argument begs the question. To be valid and enforceable, the rule must be reasonable.
A homeowner could not be expected to foresee a rule change effecting such a radical change in such an important
condition of his tenancy. Insofar as it attempts to operate retroactively, such a rule is not reasonable.
Attorney General Opinion No. 11-703 (July 23, 2013) on sublease prohibition concluding:
with the possible exception of rentals to park employees under appropriate circumstances that satisfy the
requirements of Civil Code section 798.23(b), if the management of a mobile home park has enacted rules
and regulations generally prohibiting mobile home owners from renting their mobile homes, then park
management is also bound by these same rules and regulations. Civil Code 798.23(a)
HUD WEBSITE:
HOPA.95 pdf page 10
Questions and Answers

Concerning the Final Rule Implementing the Housing for Older Persons Act of 1995 (HOPA)
Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968 (the Federal Fair Housing Act), as amended by the Fair Housing
Amendments Act of 1988 (the Fair Housing Act), prohibits discrimination in housing and real estate-related
transactions based on race, color, religion, sex, national origin, handicap and familial status (in general, the
presence of children under the age of 18 in the household). The prohibition against discrimination based on
familial status became effective March 12, 1989. The Act contained a provision exempting "senior" housing
from the prohibition against familial status discrimination. The Housing for Older Persons Act (HOPA),
signed into law by President Clinton on December 28, 1995, amended the housing for older persons exemption
against familial status discrimination. The HOPA modified the statutory definition of housing for older persons
as housing intended and operated for occupancy by at least one person 55 years of age or older per unit.
It eliminated the requirement that housing for older persons have significant services and facilities specifically
designed for its elderly residents. It required that facilities or communities claiming the exemption establish
age verification procedures. It established a good faith reliance defense or exemption against monetary
damages for persons who illegally act in good faith to exclude children based on a legitimate belief that the
housing facility or community was entitled to the exemption
Question 22
Are there circumstances under which a 55 or older owner/tenant might be temporarily absent
from a dwelling without affecting the exemption status of the community/dwelling?
Answer
Yes. For example, the 55 or older occupant may be on vacation, hospitalized, or absent for a season without
affecting the exempt status of the community. The resident may, if he/she wishes, allow a younger relative or
a house sitter under 55 years of age to live in the unit during this absence. In either event, the unit would
be included in the calculation of the 80 percent occupancy requirement as long as the dwelling is not
rented out, the owner/tenant returns on a periodic basis, and maintains legal and financial responsibility
for the upkeep of the dwelling.
Civil Code 798.19. Waiver of homeowner rights void
(Mobile Home Residency Law)
No rental agreement for a mobile home shall contain a provision by which the homeowner waives his or her
rights under the provisions of Articles 1 to 8, inclusive, of this chapter. Any such waiver shall be deemed
contrary to public policy and void.
Civil Code 798.34 (b)
(Mobile Home Residency Law)
A homeowner who is living alone and who wishes to share his or her mobilehome with one person may do so,
and a fee shall not be imposed by management for that person.
Clause 10 in 1-05-2005 Duffy lease which plaintiff admits was never modified. [Exh. B,
No persons other than those listed on the signature page of this Lease, and one guest (where resident would
otherwise be living alone) may reside at the Space without Parks prior written consent.
Stubblefield wants Brodie to maintain UDFS1406978 in limitedjurisdiction court for the following reasons:
1.) Stubblefield knows Judge Brodie will disregard stare decisis and rule in his favor on every motion.
2.) Stubblefield knows Judge Brodie will interrupt McCmon when she tries to get a key point on record.
3.) Stubblefield knows Judge Brodie will deny Tim McCmon his privilege under Evid. Code $970 & $971
and compel him to testify against his own wife in violation of the law just to vex and harass McCmon.
No unbiased judge would ever make such an oppressive and unfair order.
4.) Stubblefield knows Brodie will order a goon squad to invade the inside of Shipley/McCmon's home to
violate their right to privacy in their residence without any compelling state need. Judge Brodie adopts
the invalid argument that Stubblefield needs to videotape the inside of the home to "show it to the jury"
to argue the "firniture layout" somehow proves McCmon does not "regularly occupy" the mobile home.
Stubblefield does not need to videotape the inside of McCmon's home. All he has to do is present the
guard shack logs to the jury, as each guard is required to write down every time McCanon enters or exits.
That is a reasonable alternative to ordering the invasion of a person's private home by a goon squad.
No unbiased judge would ever violate the sanctity of a person's home as violating the 4thAmendment.
Criminal defendants are afforded more rights than McCmon and Shipley who have done nothing wrong.
This is the most outrageous miscarriage of justice. It shocks the conscience of a civilized society.
Brodie crossed the line in ordering videota~e/~hototzra~~~~e
of the inside of McCarron & Shiplev's home.
5.) Stubblefield knows Judge Brodie will alter the record by deleting words from the audio tape if necessary.
G-
6.) Stubblefield knows Judge Brodie will do whateverfie needs to do to ensure5tubblefield prevails,
even if he has to grant a motion notwithstanding the verdict if McCmon prevails at a jury trial.
7.) Transcripts and rulings in this case clearly show Judge Brodie rules against the law on every issue.
Judge Brodie has never ruled for McCmon or Shipley even though Stare Decisis required him to do so.
Judge Brodie rules against Stare Decisis to rule in favor of Stubblefield-to guarantee his financial and
political support for the remainder of his tenure on the bench.
8.) Judge Brodie continues to violate the law by not filing Form 700 since the 2012 year, disclosing his
assets and investments. We believe it is because he does not want to disclose significant monetary
contributions by Stubblefield or straw entitles Stubblefield uses to launder money to political allies.
We demand the elected officials who govern the City of San Bernardino and the County of San Bemardino
investigate this Big Developer corruption permeating the Fire Department and the courts. We ask presiding
County Officials to order the Presiding Judge of San Bemardino Superior court to transfer our case to unlimited
jurisdiction where it must be litigated under mandatory classifications set forth in CCP $85, 86 and 88 as recited
in CCP $32, and appoint a Judge who is not afraid to rule against Stubblefield when Stare Decisis requires him
or her to do so. We await a response at your earliest convenience. We will not submit to Judge Brodie's illegal
jurisdiction any longer because every unjust order he enters is void ab initio because it exceeds his jurisdiction.
e ~~ o k Shiiley
e
and Steve Allen
and as ~ t t o m for
LocationType
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lntersectlon
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home. Called in by nextdoor neighbor.
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Page 5 of 5
onth
Day
Year
Hou
CR2
FIRE DEPARTMENT CA0365300

S A N BERNARDINO, CALIFORNIA
PAGE 1
1
SBFD#
SBPD#
ADDRESS:
DATE:
TIME:
CAUSE:
1.
REPORTTYPE
14-21471
N/A
4040 PIEDMONT DR. # 333 SAN BERNARDINO, CA 92346
09/02/2014
1510
UNDETERMINED
SYNOPSIS
On 08/30/14, at 1314 hours, the San Bernardino City Fire Department responded to 4040
Piedmont Dr. in the City of San Bernardino for a report of a planter on fire. Medic Engine 228
(ME228) was the first to arrive and the officer in charge, Captain Brian Crowell found a planter,
along with vegetation and other debris smoldering. On primary and secondary survey no
occupants were found inside or outside of the structure. Offensive fire attack was initiated and the
fire was extinguished. According to Captain Brian Crowell, 911 operators were called by a next
door neighbor, Investigators were requested to the Location via a request by the home owner. On
09/02/2014 at 1510 hours the request was approved by Battalion Chief G. Hubbell. lnvestigator
Tracy (1684) and 1 (1688) took photographs and interviewed witnesses. The general area of origin
was determined to be the planter on the southeast (left side) of the structure. The cause of fire was
found to be undetermined. No injuries to firefighters or civilians were reported.
2.
ARRIVAL B ASSIGNMENT
On 09/02/2014 1 was assigned as the Firefighterlparamedic and Fire lnvestigator along with
Investigator Tracy (1684) at Fire Station 232. At 1510, Fire investigators were dispatched to the
above address, at the request of the home owner and approved by the on duty Battalion Chief.
There was no resident's home at the time to make contact with. We began an investigation into the
cause and origin, even though the scenes integrity had been disrupted and compromised pilor to
our arrival.
3.
SUSPECT IWITNESS INFORMATION

See lnvestigator Tracy's report.
REPORTING INVESTIGATOR (S)
TDENTlFICI\TTON NUMBER (SJ
CARVALHO, M.
RPPVTFWEDBY:
12470
Dr\lE
FURTHER ACTION:
ll.\'l'l+;:
RECORDS BNICODlNG ONLY
09/02/2014
KIiCOKDS PROCESSING BY

SAN BERNARDINO, CALIFORNIA
4.
CRZ
CASE NUMBER
PAGE 2
14-21471
UTILITY SERVICES
Electrical
Southern California Edison provides electrical service to the property. The electrical pedestal is
owned by the mobile home park. The pedestal was found on the south (left) facing exterior wall of
the structure and damage by the fire.
Natural Gas
The natural gas service is provided by Southern California Gas and the meter was found on the
south (left) facing exterior wall of the structure and damage by the fire.
5.
PROPERTY DESCRIPTION
The involved property is located in the northeast area of San Bernardino City at 4040 Piedmont Dr.
# 333. The single family manufactured residence was built in 1984 and is approximate 1,300 sq. ft.
The property contains two bedrooms, two baths, a kitchen, a living room, a dining area and
detached garage. The exterior walls are wooden construction with wood panels. The roof is pitch
construction with composition shingles.
6.
EXTENT OF DAMAGE
A search of the surrounding area and a perimeter search were conducted. No ignitable liquid
containers or open flame devices were found. Evidence of smoking materials was found all along
the planter surrounding the structure. There was also notable destruction of fire patterns and burn
indicators to the area due to the removal of burnt vegetation with in the general area of origin prior
to the arrival of investigators. Exterior examination of building was initiated from least damage to
most damage in a counter clockwise rotation.
Exterior examination revealed minor to moderate melting and charring damage to the garden hose
reel on the southeast corner of the driveway. The palm tree standing left of the garden hose reel
also received minor to moderate charring damage, more towards the planter involved with fire.
There was a second palm tree standing towards the east (front) of the planter involved, which
received moderated to severe charring damage. The west (back) of the palm tree sustained the
most damage, along with the brush surrounding the area of the tree. This area appeared to be
mostly consumed and damage by the fire. There also appeared to be a fence in this area, which
was removed prior to our arrival. Continuing towards the west (back) of the planter, the gas meter
and electrical panel sustained minor to moderate oxidation and melting to the exterior. The
electrical panel also received moderate melting to its underground components.
The building and roof appeared to be structurally intact, with no burned through areas.
( REPORTING INVESIIGATOR (Sj
1
CARVALHO, M.
REVIEWED BY
IDENTIFICATION NUMBER (Sj
DATE:
12470
I
FUK'lHbR ACTION.
l>,VYl!,;
09/02/2014
RECORDS PROCESSI'VG BY.
R E C O W S BARCODING ONLY

7.
CASE NUMBER
PAGE 3
14-21471
VALUE OF BUILDING 8 CONTENTS

Property Value
Content Value
8.
CR2
Loss
Loss
$100,000
$10,000
TBD
$0
FIRE ORIGIN AND CAUSE

The determination of the origin of the fire involved the coordination of the data derived from the
following sources:
1) The physical marks (fire patterns) lefl by the fire.
2 ) Statements of first arriving firefighters.
3) Interview of witnesses.
There were significant fire and burn patterns on the southeast (left) planter of the structure,
indicating where the fire would have originated.
Due to the absence of other supportive evidence, the scene being disrupted prior to our
investigation and the fact other causes cannot be eliminated, the cause of this fire has been found
to be undetermined.
9.
WEATHER
Time (PDT) Temp.

11:48 AM 89.6"F
1232 PM 95.0 "F
1:48 PM
98.6 ' F
2 5 1 PM
98.6'F
10.
Wind Dir
Dew Point Humidity Pressure Visibility
41.0 "F
33.8 "F
37.4 ' F
35.6 "F
18%
12%
12%
11%
29.84 in
29.92 in
29.80 in
29.78 in
10.0 mi
10.0 mi
10.0mi
10.0 mi
West
NW
NW
WSW
Windspeed Gust Speed

4.6 mph
4.6 mph
9.2 mph
9.2 mph
Precip Events Conditions

NIA
Clear
NIA
Clear
NIA
Clear
NIA
Clear
ELIMINATION OF OTHER CAUSES

SMOKING
Evidence of smoking materials was found near the general area of origin. Therefore smoking can
NOT be ruled out.
INCENDIARY
An incendiary fire is a fire that has been deliberately ignited under circumstances in which the
person knows the fire should not be ignited. The existence of a single indicator or combination of
indicators is not conclusive proof that a fire is of incendiary cause. Therefore incendiary can NOT
be ruled out.
ELECTRICAL
The electrical panel was found damaged externally and internally and is within the general area of
origin. Therefore electrical can NOT be ruled out.
REPORTING INVESTIGATOR (9
IDENTIPILAI'ION NUMBER (S)
CARVALHO, M.
REVEWED BY
12470
DA1E:
FURTMER ACTION:
D .\77':
--
RECORDS BARCODING ONLY
09/02/2014
wCORDS PROCESSING BY:

CR2
CASE NUMBER
PAGE 4
14-21471
OTHER
No evidence of items capable of self-heating, spontaneous ignition or combustion was found in the
area. Therefore these elements capable of ignition CAN be ruled out as the source of this fire.
11.
EVIDENCE
Evidence collected consisted of digital still images taken by Investigator Carvalho.
12.
OPINION AND CONCLUSION

Through the facts obtained in the course of this investigation, it is my opinion that the cause of this
fire was found to be undetermined and therefore is consistent with the first arriving Company
Officers conclusion noted in his fire report.
13.
ATTACHMENTS
Witnesses Interview
SBFD Captain Brian Crowell Interview
SBFD Dispatch Log
SBPD Incident Log
Photographic Log (digital)
lnvestigation Report
Detail
Print DatelTime:
Login ID:
Investigation Number:
Investigation Status:
IgnitionlDelay Device:
From Date:
T o Date:
Incident Number:
Entry Method:
Fuel:
09/02/2014 16:49
11241
2014-00021471
All
All
FDlD Number:
Container:
AssignedTo Officer:
All
All
All
Investigation Started
Investigation Number
lnvestlgation Type
Location
lncident Number
9/2/2014
2014-00021471
Residential
4040 E PIEDMONT DR 332 SAN EERNARDINO. C A

92346
2014-00021471
Alarm Datemime:
Disposition:
Field Diagrams:
Photographs:
0813012014 13.14
Undetermined
NO
FD-Yes
Method of Entry:
~ x t e nof
t Fire Involvement:
Container:
Unknown
Smoke Only shm.ng
No container
lnvestigation Start Date:

Disposition Date:
Scene Altered:
Exam Conditions:
9/2/2014
9/2/2014
Undetermined
Not Limited
Availability of Material First Ignited:

Available at scene
Property Ownership:
Private
IgnitiodDelay Device:
No device
ActuallAttempted:
Exterior Type:
Scene Examined By:
Structure Occupied:
Fuel:
Investigation for FDlO
No device
&&rs
Motivation Factors
Apparent Group Involvement

Unknown
Unknown
Other Investigative Info
Subjects
Evidence
Item Number
1
Type
Photographs
Description: Stored in SiBScene Photos
Class
Fire Cause Determination
Disposition
Role
Arson investigator
Origin and Cause Investigator
Assigned By
10589-Hubbell
10589-Hubbell
Asslanments
Assigned Personnel
11241-Tracy
12470-Cawalho
Total Number of investiiatlons:
Assignment DateRime
09/02/2014 1510
0910212014 15:lO
1
San Bernardino Fire Dept

36195
All
All
Initial Observations
Actual
Other
12470 Calvaiho
inhabited - Occupied
,w.n,,
6,
,"".r-#..
T &sIgmnanlff. MP'14.0988
C. I D t 38:WD.MP
Date: September 4, 2014
Date: September 4, 2014
Repolthy: Blyall WinW!?E_-
.AREA OFFICES:
. .
Address: L U o p l e d m o n l D r P 3 3 3 ~ l M d ~. ~ 9 2 3 4 6.
'
'
# FLDORS:
HOMEILINIT:' . .
SouthernAres
1731 ~ e i n s i r a e ~
Sull~
I00
RlnmlEc, CA91501
EI M
Address:
1 MH
PURPOSE OF REPORT (Checked ;Was aporapriale)

INSPECTION
RECORD ONLY
-.
INFORMATION ONLY
NOTICE OF VIOLATION AND R E U T E D INFORMATlONl
Tnlr rooort pr~vbe. narlse of vlolatlor$ 01 inlormatlon relalea.lo !ha Catllornie Health end Sakty code
orvrrron 13 or me Cadlomia Code of Rsgulallonr, Title 25, Dlvlslnn 1. Chapla~Z.Senlons IndlcYed,
Copies d the i ~ w an0
s fe~ulalanernny be oblaned from Barciays b w PubliBnerL. P.O. Box 3066.
Sovlh San Francisco, CA 94083.3066, or onrme a1,ar almost Ilbrarles.
n
-,
M H L O ~x
Manufacturer:
HUD LebelorHCD Insign$ ND:
Inactive
MAX CAP:
SFO:
INSPECTION UNIT INDEN~IFICAT~DN:
I? 0
.,
DORM
115.
. , .
papi
;
MflI3V:
occ:
0:
R r oec~r
&erev~ile:
--
RVLO~
1 En INSPECTION DATA:
(0 i n
Iryou believe this reporl has been issued in error oris legally drfenus~iyincorrecl, you have a
informal review andlor hearing. P l e a s conlnn the Area 3upewisar at !he Area Wee indicsled abavs.
SoxSlze:
Ni
MP INSPECTION DATA:
A permi! shall be oblained rrom !he Area Office iilenlilel above for work l o colr0Cl l l m s ( s i U I
Type of Unit:
,.,
THIRD-PARTY MONITORING:
VidaBmS indlatej shall ha conedea and a writlsn request for fudher hspedon ftkd with the Area
ALTERATION mP4: ,, .,.,

ACC O R O O F U F P
1 U Ac
OR& indicted adave &hi" 7 days oras ~tberwlsenoled. The request lor lnlpectlon shall Be
accompanisd by a rnlnlmum fee of $
P 1 GI0
rear:
.
Serial No. or V.1 N.:
R ~ ~ F O R M A T ~ O W :
r t n investigation was conducted at the above listed m o b i l e h o m e park in response to a complaint receivedby t h e
ii~:pci;tioi~.was c o n d t r c t c d u n d e r :lie a l t t l i o r i t y af-Hcnlth a s d - S a f e t y - & d c

T i t l e 25, California Code c f Rcgulaticns (T25CCR), Chapter 2, Section 1004.5.
' D e p a r t ~ ~ i c r t 'Illis
r-
(1-ISC), Secrjpn-l-$dO[L
Complaic~antalleges: An electrifal pedcstal caught on fire at space #333 on Saturday 8/30/14. R e s i d e n t s at dlis
w i t h o u t e l e c t r i c i t y and gas since the fire. Park m a n a g e m e n t refuses to make repairs.
location are
Tlte park m a n a z c m e n t and park owner Tom Parfish were cont~etedon September 4,2014 with regards to the
c o m p l a i n t filed o n Se~~lcrnbcr
3, 2014. T o m P a r r i s h srotad that the damaged eleatrical p e d e s t a l 11od not bmn rcpIac.
due to an ongoing investigation by The City o f Sen B e m a r d i n 0 Fire D e p a r t m e n t fire investigator, to d e t e r m i n e the
cause oftlte fire. He also statcd tI1z.t
On=
REVIEWED BY.
HCO 61 (.70v.8110)
__
Recnlved By:
Title:
O E P ~ T M E H TUSE ONLY:
Close Flle o Rel?sPecIlan R & U I ~ ~o Progress lnspeclnn ~
Enforcement Actlon N e w : 0 FCO D NO1 0 .Other.
COPIES SENTTO
D AppUcanl U MHlRV O m e r O Pan Opcratar/Owner

DATE
SA4
0 ~d D Other
COPIES SENT BI'
,DATE:-
Paoe 1
Momaln Shadaw MH
HmnaNoriega the assistant manager was interviewed late afternoon nt the Mountain 'shadows MH Community
oEce on September 4,2014. She stated the fire investigator had completed the inves!igation a d was able to
determine astartin= location of the fire which was by some palm trees by rhe sweet id thc area close to the lot utilitieq
investiggtor hnd cleared the
not from the electri<d pedestal, but was unable to determine the cause of the fite.
with
repairs.
Also
during
the
investigation
the
fire
investigator
notic&
a gas leak at the gas meter
park to
adjncent the fire damaged electrical pedestal md called the locnl gas utility company kor gas disconnection.
1. Inspection revealed a fire damage electrical pedestal including electric wires, (anda fire damaged gas meter at
Lor #333. The park shall replace the electrical pedestal and gas meter as needed. The power supply wires &om
the mabilehome to the lot electrical pedestal w e n damaged and shall be repldced by thehome owner at lot
#333. California Code of Regulations. Title25, Chapter 2, Section I l~a(a)(bj
The
shall
. -.pa&
. .
- obtain
. -. building
. -.- permits from
. the Department
-.for the pedestd replncchent.
.
,
- --.
----__
The park shall correct the violations ASAP and no later than September 1 1,2014 p&uant I+Iealthond Safety Code,
Section 18402 and Title 25, California Code ofRegulations, Chapter 2, Section 1 1 d and 1610.
Failure to comply with this order will be considered willful violation of the ~ o b i l e h b k Pmks
e
Act, hywi(lfi,l
violation is a misdemeanor under Health nnd Safbty Code, Section 18700.
HCD 63 (Rev. 8114)
~>PF;;"'!w
H A R T ! K I N G
A T T O R N E Y S A T L A W
Robd G. Willlamson, Jr.

~llfllamson@harlklnglau~uNn
September 5, 2014
OUI
me Numher: 3 ~ 6 8 . ~ ~ 1 4 a m - ~ 4 2 - D 9 9 0 v . l
VIA E-MAIL 8 OVERNIGHT MAIL

Nancyduffysb@yahoo.com
Nancy Duffy McCarron. Esq.
Law Offices Of Nancy Duffy McCarron
950 Roble Lane
Santa Barbara, California 93103
Re:
StubblefieldProperties v. Bonnie Shi~lev.Case No. U!3D$1204130--Ex Parte

Ao~licationre: Space 333
Dear Ms. McCarron:

Please be advised that my client Stubblefield Properties dba Mountain Shadows Mobile Home
Community is in receipt of your written correspondence dated September 3, 2014 regarding a
fire that took place on Space 333 on or about August 30. 2014. Your unfounded accusations of
my client attempting to "burn you out" are despicable, false and malicious, how dare you.
First and foremost, your correspondence is replete with false, conclusory and defamatory
statements punctuated with wild speculation entirely untethered to any factual basis. Your
claims that a "corroded pedestal . blew out," and that "[tlhe fire spread from the pedestal to
the white fence, burned a palm tree, and the left outside wall facing the street behind the palm
tree" are utterly reckless, irresponsible and fiat wrong.
. .
According to the Fire Department Battalion Chief and the arson investigator, with whom 1 have
already spoken with, it is very clear the origin of the fire occurred at the base of two palm trees
at the Southeast corner of S ~ a c e333, moved towards and up the electric pedestal, destroying
the pedestal, and then continued toward and damaged the gas meter and line which for obvious
safety reasons was shut off. In fact, based on my d~scussionswith the arson investigator, the
fire was accelerated and burned intensely as a result of two conditions on Space 333: (i)
overgrown shrubbery containing some type of oil-based liquid; and (ii) the palm trees on the
Space.
The Fire Department's initial report indicates and conflrms the W i n of the fire's origin, a copy
of which will be fotwarded to you upon receipt. I am informed the arson investigator's report,
which wili confirm the same information, wili not be available fcr another 10-15 days, at which
time a copy will be provided to you. Whethei to request initiation of a criminal investigation is
under consideration pending issuance of the arson investigator's report.
While the cause of the fire is still under investigation, the Fire Batallion Chief and arson
investigator both conclude that the cause of the fire was in no way related to nor triggered by
the electrlc pedestal. Notwithstanding that you and Ms. Shipiey, your illegal subtenant, failed to
call the fire investigator for two davs after the fire, neither the Fire Department nor the anon
investigator found any evidence within the pedestal that it in any way caused the fire. Again,
your claims about the origin of the fire are baseless and flat wrong.
A Professional Corporation
4 Hutton Centre Drive, Suite 900, Santa Ana, Call!arnia 92707
Ph 714.432.8700 ( www.hartklnglaw.com ( Fx 714.566.7457
~~
." ..
H A R T 1 K I N G
.I...
" . . l l . , . l
Nancy McCarron,
September 5, 2014
Page 2
Upon learning of the incident at Space 333, and in accordance with standard procedure, my
client immediately shut off the electricity and gas lines on the Space to prevent any further
damage or safety threat to persons or property.
The remaining claims in your correspondence of intentional, willful, and/or malicious acts on
behalf of my client in response to the fire are frivolous, reprehensible and based on nothing
more than your venomous ill will toward Park Management and Mr. Parrish in particular. How
dare you utter these deliberately abusive accusations knowing they were false when you made
them.
For obvious safety reasons, my client is also unable to comply with your unreasonable demands
that the electric pedestal be replaced immediately, but please be advised that the Park will be
replacing the pedestal as soon as practicable. As you know, the Park is required to obtain a
permit for replacement and have the new pedestal inspected and approved. Moreover, the gas
meter and raiser must be inspected and approved by the gas company before sewice is
restored. My client is taking immediate steps to do so, though I anticipate it may take at least
10-15 days.
My ciiem is also in receipt of your notice of intent to move for ex parte relief before the
Honorable Michael Sachs on Monday, September 8. 2014 and the related ex parte application.
Simply put, you are wrong on the facts and wrong on the law. As you well know, the current
matter Is pending on appeal. Your 'request" regarding the electric pedestal is entirely unrelated
to Me prior matter which, but for the pending appeal, is concluded. Thus, the Court lacks
jurisdiction to entertain your frivolous request. Your reliance on Civil Code 5 789.3 is also
entirely rnlspiaced and inapplicable. Furthermore, your application, that neither includes the
requlred declaration nor makes the required factual showing. violates California Rules of Court
3.1201 and 3.7202. I am confidentthat your attempt to sidestep the Civil Code and 'bootstrap"
improper requests under the guise of a prior matter will be readily apparent to the Court.
i have confirmed with the court clerk for Deparfment S-28 that no ex parte is on calendar for
Monday. September 8, 2014. Should you attempt to notice an ex parte hearing, we intend to
appear and oppose your improper request and seek sanctions for the appearance since the
Court lacks jurisdiction and your claims are frivolous.
Very t ~ l yours,
y
HART KING
Enclosures
NANCY D M W
MCCARRON
~
950 Roble Lane
Santa Barbara, CA 93 103
nancvduffvsbiiT).vahoo.co~n
landfax 805-965-3492 cell 805-450-0450
by fax to: 909-384-5158

~ e ~ t e r n b 8,2014
er
Georgeann Hanna, City Clerk
300 NO. "D" st, zndfloor
San Bernardino, CA 924 18
RE: Fire in an Electric Pedestal at 4040 E. Piedmont Drive, Space #333 Highland, CA, 92346
Mountain Shadows Mobile Home Park - owned by Developer Arnold Stubblefield
COMPLAINT-Request t o Investigate Cormution at S t a t i o m ( Steve Tracey, Investigator)
Dear Ms. Hanna:
I sent this fax to you because you claim to be assio ion ate about open and ethical government."
There is corruption at Station 222 involving arsonlinvestigator engineer Steve Tracy, a Battalion Chief
and developer Arnold Stubblefield, who has been bribing city officials for over 40 years. Exhibit A
As you know, Stubblefield laundered a $5,000 bribe to Neil Derry through Tax Assessor Bill Postmus.
The DA prosecuted felony counts against Neil Derry and Bill Postmus but never indicted Stubblefield.
I have owned a mobilehome at space #333 in Stubblefield's p ~ r ksince 2005. Because I commute
often between Santa Barbara and San Bernardino I have always had a co-resident who shared the home
to keep up the gardening and maintain the property while 1am away. On 8/1/12 Bonnie Shipley moved
in as co-resident. I dropped off her application for residency at the park office the next day on 8/2/12.
After I departed the park manager drove up to #333 and tried to intimidate Shipley into moving out.
The manager said the owner was "no longer going to allow co-residents to move into #333." He said if
Shipley wanted to remain in the park she had to "find a sugar-daddy over 55 and move in with him."
When Shipley did not move out Stubblefield sent a process server to nail a "5-day Notice to
Surrender Premises." On day 6 Stubblefield served her with a shall: complaint for "forcible detainer."
This was while simultaneously collecting the full monthly rent $1,053 from me, Stubblefield's tenant.
Because I am an attomey and real estatc broker I defended Shipley h m a sham, unlawful eviction.
Stubblefield has engaged in scorched earth litigation tactics for two years. We prevailed, despite 2
years of acrimonious litigation. Stubblefield appealed all the way to the California Supreme Court,
with no avail, and will now have to pay my attorney fees because Shipiey is tke prevailing party.
The appellate court found Stubblefield could not evict Shipley as he was not in privity of contract
with her and that his attempt to evict her directly was unlawful. A motioll for statutory attorney fees
is pending and Stubblefield has done everything he can to make life nliserable for Bonnie Shipley.
Shipley is not welcome at the clubhouse and is banned from using the swimming pool or facilities.
On Saturday, August 30,2014 while Bonnie Shipley was awz:? for the day, a fire erupted at the
electric pedestal which supplies electric to the home at space #333. Wendy Durr, who lives next door,
and the neighbor across the street ran over to put out the fire which had spread to a palm tree next to it,
and also burned the gas meter adjacent to the electric pedestal. Bonnie has been without gas and electric
since Saturday. The park manager, Tom Panish, told both maintenance men (Jim & Rick) to "stay out
of it" and not repair or replace the electric or gas meter.
15'
1 suspected sabotage as I have never heard of anyone's electric pedestal catching fire at the park
before in ten years that I have owned a home there. I thought that because they have not been able to
evict Shipley, despite two years of acrimonious litigation that Toni Parrish resorted to sabotage.
I called Steve Tracey and asked him to investlgate as to what caused the fire in the pedestal.
For the entire 10 years 1 have owned the home residents have talked about how Tom Parrish and
Stubblefield have bribed city officials to "look the other way" when residents complain about fue
hazards or other unsafe conditions in the park. I asked Mr. Tracey to record my telephone request.
You can listen to our recorded telephone conversations. Mr. Tracey took the report and said he would
call me back. I told him he needed to interview Wendy Durr and Jerome Poland, the 2 neighbors who
saw the fire and put it out as they were the only witnesses. I gave him both of their phone numbers.
Mr. Tracey never interviewed either witness. A short time later 11e called to tell me that he visited the
site and took pictures. He never looked in the pedestal because it had been "taped up." He said he saw
cigarette butts in the garden area so he "could not rule out" a cigarette butt causing the fire. I told him
that was ridiculous because Bonnie and her friend Steve had left in the morning and were gone all day.
The following is what happened. On Friday Wendy Durr (ncxt door) hear a loud "pop" and lost
electric, which then went back on. Wendy thought it was a power surge due to air conditionhg use.
On Saturday morning, while in the back yard her air conditioner compressor popped on and then off.
She went inside and returned outside shortly thereafter. While at the unit, she heard a third louder
"op" and a crackling sound from her front yard. She walked up znd discovered my pedestal was
burning. Jerome ran across to help when he saw the fire. Wendy went inside to fetch a fire
extinguisher in her kitchen as water pressure is very low in the park. When she returned the fire had
spread from the box to the palm tree. Jerome sprayed the tree whi!e Wendy sprayed the pedestal.
They put the fire out. The next day a man from Southern California Edison arrived to investigate.
He was excavating the area. Wendy asked him what caused the fire. He pointed to a "hole" on the
left side where a double lug used to be. (see Exhibit B). He said :here was arching on that line, and
when that happened it got "hotter than the sun" and melted the double lug into a molten ball which he
found at the bottom of the pedestal when he opened it. He threw the molten ball into the dirt.
Wendy took the pieture at Exhibit B. Exhibit C is a replacement pedestal. You can see three double
lugs, and also replacement of three lugs. Wendy said the fire started in the pedestal and moved toward
the tree as that was the way the wind was blowing that day. Yet, Mr. Tracey never called Wendy.
I explained all this to Mr. Tracey but he still never called Wendy or Jerome---the witnesses to the fire.
He also never called the manufacturer or an electrician. Mr. Tracey told me he "did not know anything
about electric as he was not an electrieian." He said he "talked t~ someone" from the electn'c company
who denied liability because they are afraid of being held liable for damages.
I wrote a letter to the park's attorney. Exhibit D. I was shocked to at his response. Exhibit E.
Apparently, Mr. Tracey and the "battalion chief' met with Tom Pai~ishand talked to the park's
s
and was not invited to attend.
attorney during that meeting. I was not notified about & ~"meeting"
1 cannot believe the "battalion ehief' and Mr. Tracey would violate the confidence of my report, while
your website assures residents that reports are .'confidential." Why did they talk to the ark's lawver?
I ask for a full investigation. How could the "battalion chief' and Tracey come to a
"conclusion" the electric pedestal was not the cause of the fire and we are now blamed for it?
This conflicts with all of the evidence; i.e. what the witnesses saw and the man from the
electric company told Wendy the next day. He said the archine in the box caused the fire.
He showed Wendy the melted ball thrown in the dirt, which has now "disappeared."
See attached "arching" explanations from Wikipedia. Exhibit F
Why would your so-called investigator, Steve Tracey, tell me he "knows nothing about
electricity." If not, then he should not have been hued into the position of a r ~ o ~ ~ v e s t i g a t o r !
Secondly, why would he not interview the ONLY WITNESSES who had personal knowledge
of what happened (Wendy and Jerome)? Why would he not contact the manufacturer to ask?
Why would he not contact an independent electrician? Instexd the only people he
interviewed were Tom Parrish and his attorney. This is outrageous and reeks of corruption.
"Something in rotten in Denmark."
Bonnie Shipley's 80-year old mother has congestive heart failure; prognosis is not good
and her bother (who lives with her mother) is dying of Stage 4 cancer. Bonnie is going through
the most challenging time in her life and has no energy to fight this evil. She has been without
electric and gas for 8 days no@ Please call me to discuss this matter in more detail.
I demand a full investigation of this apparent corruption. I await your response.
-. .. ..L,.,.-umu
GUUNW Judge denies Derry probation changes I Breaking News IPE.com Press...
THE PRESS-ENTERPRISE
S A N BERNARDINO
COUNTY: Judge denies

Derry probation changes
BY lMRAN GHORI
STAFF WRITER
Published: 13August 2012 06:22
PM
,,
San Bemardino
g~
County SupeFJisor ...
. .
..
..
Neil Deny sought to modify his probation
conditions from his guilty plea last year in a
campaign finance violation case, but a judge
rejected the request, according to court
records.
Attorney Rajan Maline appeared on behalf of
Deny before Superior Court Judge Richard
Peel to seekthe changes on Aug. 3.
Court records state Maline and Stephanie
Chow, a state deputy attorney general,
conferred with the judge off a e record.
When they went back on the record, Peel
ruled that Denywould continue probation on
the same terms and conditions.
Derty, when reached by phone Monday, Aug.
13, declined to comment on his request
except to say itwas 'personal."
A spokesperson for the attorney general's
office said they were looking into the case
but did not have details as of Monday
evening.
State prosecutors accused Deny of

attempting to launder a campaign contribution
...R 0 1 2 0 8 1 3 - s a n - b e m a r t l i n o - c o u n t y - j u d g e - d e n i v . e c e
3. mdocal-news1
*AN
and charged him with two felonies and a

misdemeanor in April 2011.
Deny agreed to a plea deal in July 2011,
where he admitted to a single misdemeanor
charge of failing to report a campaign
contribution.
He was sentenced to three years probation,
under which he is required to obey all laws or
face a 30-day jail sentence that was
suspended.
Derry also was fined about $10,000.
'
The charges stemmed from a $5,000

campaign contribution in May 2007 from San
Bernardino developer Arnold Stubblefield.
Prosecutors say Stubblefield approached
Derry about contributing to his campaign but
him to a political action committee that then
made a contribution to Derry, according to
the indictment.
The conviction has become an issue in

Derry's re-electioncampaign. In campaign
mailers, challenger James Ramos, former
chairman of h e San Manuel tribe, has
accused_-Derryof being part of a culture of
corruption at the county.
I
Deny has sald the charges against hlm were
polltically motivated and said he tookthe plea
deal to avoid a drawn-out trial.
In June. Ramos took47 percent and Deny
got 33 percent of the vote. A third candidate
won 20 percent. A majority is required to win,
prompting the need for the November runoff
election.
Comments
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B!=RNARDINO COUNW. Judge denla Derry probation changes ( Breaking News 1 PE.com Press...
NANCY DMffY MCCARRON
950 Roble Lane

nancvduffvsb~yahoo.com
landlfax 805-965-3492 cell 805-450-0450
VIA EMAIL to: rwilliarnson@,hartkin~law.com

and
FAX to: 714-546-7457
w b e r t c(. W i l l i a w o v ~
Ha.rtJKing
4 Hutton Centre Drive, Suite 900
Santa h a , California 92707
September 3,2014
re: Stubblefield v. Shipley UDDS1204130
VIOLATION OF CIVIL CODE s 7 8 9 . S Shut off of Gas & Electric to #333 -Notice of Ex Parte Monday
Dear Mr. Williamson:
Electricity is supplied by an underground line to Space #332 (Wendy Dm), #333(McCarron/Shipley),
#334(Lelane) and #335 (?). Each of the 4 spaces has what So. Cal. Edison refers to as a "pedestal" which is
the main supply of electricity to the entire lot. This is separate and distinct from each panellbreaker box which
is mounted on the side of each home. On #333 it is on the right side iiear the back end of the mobilehome.
There is a main gas supply line also located directly next to the main electrical supply (the "pedestal").
On Thursday [8/28/14] Wendy D m heard a loud "pop" and there was a strong surge of electric in her home.
On Saturday 8/30/14, after she arose and had breakfast, Bonnie Shipley went out to do errands and shopping.
Shipley did not retun home until the late afternoon. According to Wendy, about 1: 13 p.m. she saw a fire at the
"pedestal" on space #333 which faces her front porch. I believe she was outside when it happened. Jerome
Poland (who lives across the street from #333) also saw this fire. Wendy aimed the water from her hose at it.
When Jerome ran across he took the water hose so Wendy could run inside to get her fire extinguisher.
Wendy returned and helped put out the fire with it and my garden hose, while Jerome continued with her hose.
They called the fire department. The fire spread from the pedestal to the white fence, burned a palm tree and
the left outside wall facing the street behind the palm tree. The fire was out when the firemen arrived at #333.
Jim (regular park maintenance man) was off for the weekend. Rick (back up maintenance) was summoned.
The electric pedestal was completely burned out. (see attached picture) Both electric & gas .#ere shut off.
Shipley returned home late that afternoon. She called me about dinner time tc report the fire and events.
So. Cal. Edison staff at 1-800-655-4555 [Edgar 3257, Supervisor Yolanda 1514, Eddie, and Supervisor
Maxime 33221 told me they only supply electric to the pedestal, the pedestal is the park's equipment, and
is always maintained by the park. The pedestal was installed probably 40-50 years ago [original installation].
As shown from the picture it is totally corroded and should have been replaced years ago. It is burned and
unusable. So. Cal. Edison will not reinstall service until the pedestal is replaced and a City Inspector has
verified that the pedestal and installation complies with Mobile Home Park and electrical code requirements.
Page 2
9/3/2014 9:30 a.m.
The gas meter was also turned off and has bum damage on the top front. Both utilities remain off.
Accordingly, Bonnie Shipley has had no gas or electric in the mobilehome since Saturday, August 30,2014.
I talked to Rick [909-936-6791] who said he could not repair or replace the unit as he was sick with a cold and
had already reported events to Hanna in the office. I called the office at 6 pm Saturday but no one answered.
I called Rick (the park's back-up maintenance man) and asked him to contact Hanna to ask her to call me.
I never heard from Hanna. We waited patiently through Sunday, Monday (labor day holiday) with no gas or
electric to the home. Shipley slept elsewhere on Saturday night as it was about 105 degrees that day so it was
impossible to sleep without air conditioning or a fan. The home also smelled of smoke as windows were open.
We fully expected on Tuesday that Jim or Rick (or both) would replace the pedestal and call the city
inspector to check it for reinstallation of electric service. No park staff showed up to replace the pedestal.
About 4:30 p.m. I called the office to inquire. Hanna answered. I asked Hanna why no staff had arrived to
deal with this emergency. She replied, "have vou notified vour fire insurance carrier to am for the ~edestal
and repairs?" I responded, "I do not own the pedestal; it is not my responsibility, nor did we cause the damage.
As you know, under Health & Safety Codes & MRL, the park must supply gas, water & electric to each home.
The park has always maintained the electric pedestals and gas meters, and has always replaced them as needed.
THEY ARE NOT MY PROPERTY AND ARE NOT MY RESPONSIBILITY. I called Rick back last night.
Rick said Tom Parrish told him and Jim to "stav out of i f ' and "do not replace or reaair the pedestal at #333."
We believe Tom Parrish is intentionally withholding electric and gas service to #333 to evict Shipley.
These willful acts violate Civil Code 5789.3. Failure to maintain services is a nuisance under Civil s798.87.
We cannot live without utilities and it is a health and safety hazard. The penalties for violations under Civil
Code 5789.3 are $100/day and were found constitutional. see Kinney v. Vaccari (1980) 27 C3d 348,351-353.
see also Otanez v. Blue Skies Mobile Home Park (1991) 1 CA.4th 1521 and Spinks v. Equity Residential
BriarwoodApartments (2009)171 CA.4th 1004; Kinney v. Vaccari ( 1 980) 27 Cal.3d 348. You must realize
that Tom Parrish, who is in his So's, shows signs of dementia and lacks the cerebral capacity to act rationally.
His conduct is not only inhumane, but illegal and malicious, warranting punitive damages. Although we may
have our differences in representing our mutual clients, I do not believe this is conduct that you would approve.
I trust vou will advise your clients to immediately replace the pedestal and call the inspector to approve it todav
so electric and gas can be reinstated. Shipley has been without gas and electric for 5 days now since Saturday.
Please be advised that if I do not receive notice fmm your office or the park staff that the pedestal has
been replaced by 5 pm tomorrow (Thursday) and the city inspector called to approve it on Fridey, an ex parte
hearing will be held in S-28 on Monday, for an emergency order to direct the owner to replace the pedestal and
to assess penalties of $100 for every day Bonnie Shipley has no utilities resulting from Tom Pamsh's malicious
conduct, and a loss in services caused bv his failure to replace a 40-50 vear old pedestal destroved bv corrosion.
I await your immediate response to this basic human rights violation.
H A R T 1 K I N G
A T T O R N E Y S A T L A W
Roberl G. Wlllamsnn. Jr.

nuiliiamson@hadkinglawawC[lm
September 5. 2014
Our Flle Numbsr: 36568.053148464842-499Ov.l
VIA E-MAIL & OVERNIGHT MAIL

Nancyduffysb@yahoo.com
Nancy Duffy McCarron, Esq.
950 Robie Lane
Santa Barbara, California 93103
Re:
Stubblefield Properties v. Bonnie Shiplev, Case No. UDDS1204130-Ex

Application re: Space 333
Parie
Dear Ms. McCarron:

Please be advised that my client Stubblefield Properties dba Mountain Shadows Mobile Home
Community is in receipt of your written correspondence dated September 3, 2014 regarding a
fire that took place on Space 333 on or about Ausust 30. 2014. Your unfounded accusations of
my client attempting to "burn you out" are despicable, false and malicious, how dare you.
First and foremost, your correspondence is replete with false, conclusory and defamatory
statements punctuated with wild speculation entirely untethered to any factual basis. Your
claims that a "corroded pedestal . blew out," and that "[tlhe fire spread from the pedestai to
the white fence, burned a paim tree, and the left outside wail facing the street behind the palm
tree" are utterly reckless, irresponsible and flat wrong.
. .
&cording to the Fire Department Battalion Chief and the arson investigator, with whom I have
already spoken with, it is very clear the origin of the fire occurred at the base of two paim trees
at the Southeast corner of Space 333, moved towards and up the electric pedestal, destroying
the pedestal, and then continued toward and damaged the gas meter and line which for obvious
safety reasons was shut off. In fact, based on my discussions with the arson investigator, the
fire was accelerated and burned intensely as a result of two conditions on Space 333: (i)
overgrown shrubbery containing some type of oil-based liquid; and (ii) the palm trees on the
Space.
The Fire Department's initial report indicates and confirms the location of the fire's origin, a copy
of which will be forwarded to you upon receipt. I am informed the arson investigator's report,
which will confirm the same information, will not be available for another 10-15 days, at which
time a copy will be provided to you. Whether to request initiation of a criminal investigation is
under consideration pending issuance of the arson investigator's report.
While the cause of the fire is still under investigation, the Fire Batallion Chief and arson
investigator both conclude that the cause of the fire was in no way related to nor triggered by
the electric pedestal. Notwithstanding that you and Ms. Shipiey, your illegal subtenant, failed to
call the fire investigator for two davs after the fire, neither the Fire Department ncr the arson
investigator found any evidence within the pedestal that it in any way caused the fire. Again,
your claims about the origin of the fire are baseless and fiat wrong.
A Professional Corporation
Hutton Centre Drive. Suite 000, Santa Ana. California 92707
Ph 714.432.8700 ( w~.hartkinglaw.comI Fx 714.546.7457
Nancy McCarron,
September 5.2014
Page 2
Upon learning of the incident at Space 333, and in accordance with standard procedure, my
client immediately shut off the electricity and gas lines on the Space to prevent any further
damage or safety threat to persons or property.
The remaining claims in your correspondence of intentional, willful, andlor malicious acts on
behalf of my client in response to the fire are frivolous, reprehensible and based on nothing
more than your venomous ill will toward Park Management and Mr. Parrish in particular. How
dare you utter these deliberately abusive accusations knowing they were false when you made
them.
For obvlous safety reasons, my client is also unable to comply with your unreasonable demands
that the electric pedestal be replaced immediately, but please be advised that the Park will be
replacing the pedestal as soon as practicable. As you know, the Park is required to obtain a
permit for replacement and have the new pedestal inspected and approved. Moreover, the gas
meter and raiser must be inspected and approved by the gas company before service is
restored. My client is taking immediate steps to do so, though I anticipate it may take at least
10-15 days.
My client is also in receipt of your notice of intent to move for ex parte relief before the
Honorable Michael Sachs on Monday, September 8, 2014 and the related ex parte application.
Simply put, you are wrong on the facts and wrong on the law. As you well know, the current
matter is pending on appeal. Your "request" regarding the electiic pedestal is entirely unrelated
to the prior matter which, but for the pending appeal, is concluded. Thus, the Court lacks
jurisdiction to entertain your frivolous request. Your reliance on Civil Code 9 789.3 is also
entirely misplaced and inapplicable. Furthermore, your application, that neither includes the
required declaration nor makes the required factual showing, violates California Rules of Court
3.1201 and 3.1202. 1 am confident that your attempt to sidestep the Civil Code and "bootstrap"
improper requests under the guise of a prior matterwill be readily apparent to the Court.
I have confirmed with the court clerk for Department S-28 that no ex parte is on calendar for
Monday, September 8, 2014. Should you a t t e m ~to
t notice an
anrte
hearinn W P ....-..
in+-nrl tn
~ . ex
. r
- , . - ........=,
appear and oppose your improper request and s'eek sanctions for the appearance since the
Court lacks jurisdiction and your claims are frivolous.
~
Very truly yours,
HART KING
/"
._
RGWlrje
Enclosures
- .-
Definition
--.
A controlled arc-flash, produced in a flashtube. Even though the energy level used is fairly low
(85 joules), the low-impedance, low-inductance circuit produces a flash of 24,000,000 watts.
With an arc temperature of 17,000 K (30,100 OF), the radiation output is centered at 170
nanometers, in the far UV. The intense burst of radiation easily penetrates the shade #10 welding
filter which shields the camera.
An arc flash is the light and heat produced from an electric arc supplied with suscient electrical
energy to cause substantial damage, harm, fire, or injury. Electrical arcs experience negative
resistance, which causes the electrical resistance to decrease as the arc temperature increases.
Therefore, as the arc develops and gets hotter the resistance drops, drawing more and more
current (runaway) until some part of the system melts, trips, or evaporates, providing enough
distance to break the circuit and extinguish the arc.['] Electrical arcs, when well controlled and
fed by limited energy, produce very bright light, and are used in arc lamps (enclosed, or with
open electrodes), for welding, plasma cutting. and other industrial applications. Welding arcs can
easily turn steel into a liquid with an average of only 24 DC volts. When an uncontrolled arc
forms at high voltages, arc flashes can produce deafening noises, supersonic concussiveforces, super-heated shrapnel, tem~eraturesfar ~ r e a t e rthan the Sun's surface,
and intense. high-energy radiation capable of vaporizing nearby materials.
Arc flash temperatures can reach or exceed 35.000
O F
(1 9.400 "C) at the arc termina~s.'~'
The massive energy released in the fault rapidly vaporizes the metal conductors involved,
blasting molten metal and expanding alasma outward with extraordinarv force.[21
A typical arc flash incident can be inconsequential but could conceivably easily produce a more
severe explosion (see calculation below). The result of the violent event can cause destruction of
e c l u i p i n v o l v e d . L y to an electrical worker but also to bystanders.
During the arc flash, electrical energy vaporizes the metal, which changes from solid state to
gas vapor, expanding it with explosive force. For example, when copper vaporizes it suddenly
expands by a factor of 67,000 times in volume.P1
In addition to the explosive blast, called the arc blast of such a fault, destruction also arises fiom
the intense radiant heat produced by the arc. The metal plasma arc prodyces tremendous amounts
of light energy from far infrared to ultraviolet. Surfaces of nearby objects, including people,
absorb this energy and are instantly heated to vaporizing temperatures. The effects of this can be
seen on adjacent walls and equipment - they are often ablated and eroded from the radiant
effects.
Arcing, sometimes called an arc flash, occur,^ when electricity flows o r discharges along an
unintended path. Electricity jumps during anarc to a nearby grounded object. Arc faults,
caused by low, erratic elcctrical flows, commonlv occur due to fraved or exoosed wires.
They can occur anywhere in a building. \Vhilc half of arc flashes occur in appliances,
computers and other ~telnsthat run via clcctricity, 36 percent of arcs occur in electrical panels.
Overload
Arcing in an electrical panel occurs when circuits that make up the panel become overloaded.
Overheating can occur where a circuit breaker connects to an electrical panel bus. It can damage
the bus as well as the connection, making equipment unreliable and prone to hilure. Damaged
circuit breakers may not perform properly when excessive currents occur. Instead of t~ipping
whcii excessive or dangcrous current occ~us,damaged circuits may continue to let electricity
flow, leading to overheating and possible arcing.
Contributing Conditions
Conditions in or around an elcctrical panel can contribute to possible arcing as well as to the
arcing's severity, should it occur. Electrical panel wiring should never be exposed outside the
box. Combustible materials, including gasoline, paint thinner and similar liquids, should be kept
away from the vicinity of the electricity panel. Over-fusing, or using too many fuses inside an
electrical box, can cause too much electricity to flow through the circuitry, leading to
overheating and arcing. Fuses that blow, or circuits that trip frequently, can indicate a possiblc
arcing hazard. Other indicators of potential arcing include bum marks or a burning slnell near the
panel, as well as buzzing or cracking sounds.
Read more :
http:l/electricd.about.com/od~electri~alsafety/darcfaultsafety.h~
What is an Arc-fault?
An arc-fault occurs when loose or corroded connections make intermittent contact and
causes svarkinv or arcing between the connections. This translates into heat. which will
break down the insulation of the wire and can be the trigger for an electrical fire.
Unlike a short circuit, that is a hot wire coming into contact with a ground or neutral wire, arcing
may not trip the circuit brcakcr. If vou've ever heard a switch buzzing. hissing. or povving,
you'll know what I'm talking about.
In order to protect your home, an arc-fault circuit interrupter can be used to detect just such a
problem. Read more: http://electrical.about.com/od/elec~cdsafety/darcfdu1tsafety.htm
DECLARATION OF ROBERT G. WILLIAMSON. JR.
2 I, ROBERT G. WILLIAMSON, declare:
1.
I am an attorney duly licensed to practice law before all courts of the State of
California, and am a partner with the law f m of Hart ( King, attorney of record for Plaintiff
STUBBLEFIELD PROPERTIES, a general ~artnership dba MOUNTAIN SHADOWS
MOBILEHOME COMMUNITY ("Plaintiff?.
The fz.,fs set forth herein are true of my own
personal knowledge, except those facts stated on inf~rmationand believe and as to those
facts I believe them to be true, and if called as a witless, I could and would competently
testify thereto.
2.
This declaration is made in support of Plaintiffs Opposition to Defendant
Bonnie Shipley's Ex Parte Application for Order to Repair or Replace Electric Pedestal at
Space 333, and to Reinstate Electric & Gas Service.
3.
On Wednesday, September 3, 2014, I reliewed the letter correspondence from
Defendant's counsel, Ms. McCarron attached as Exhibit A to Defendant's Ex Parte

Application.
4.
On Thursday, September 4, 2014, I spoke with the arson investor regarding the
origin of the fire at Space 333. The arson investigator confirmed that the fire originated at
/the base of the palm trees on Space 333. On Septe~claer5, 2014, I drafted and sent Ms.
19 ~ c ~ a r r ao response
n
letter outlining these facts and demanded that Ms. McCvmn take the
rr
20 ex parte off calendar. A true and correct copy of said correspondence is attached hereto as
2 1 Exhibit "A" and made a part hereof by this reference.
I am informed that on Thursday, Septembcr 4, the arson investigator informed

5.
22
23 the Park that the Park could proceed with installing a new electric pedestal and new gas
24 meter on Space 333.

6.
25
1 am informed that a new electrica! pedestal and a new gas meter were installed
26 on Space 333 on Friday, September 5,2014.
7.
However, power from the serving utilities cannot be restored until an inspector
27
28 from California's Department of Housing and Community Development ("HCD") inspects
1
36568.05314844-1046-5054v.1
D E C L A R A T I O N O F R O B E R T G. W I L L l A M S O N . J R .
2%
1 and authorizes restoration of the power.

2
3
4
declaration, I am informed and believe that my client has

1 been in contactAswithof theHCDdatetoofhavethisinspectors
inspect the installations and authorize power to
A be restored.
R1
8.
9.
However, my client received conflicting information from HCD as to which
6 inspector for the HCD district in which the Park is located will actually conduct the
7 inspection. I am informed that HCD has apparently resolved the conflict and will proceed
8 with the inspection.

9
10.
As of today, as noted above, a new electric pedestal and gas meter have already
10 been installed.
My client is currently awaiting an inspection from HCD inspectors to
1 1 authorize that service may be restored.

12
I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the
13 foregoing is true and correct.

14
Executed this 8th day of September, 2014, at Santa Ana, California.
L
36568.053/4844-1046-5054~.1
DECLARATION O F ROBERT G . W I L L I A M S O N , J R .

CRZ
CASE NUMBER
14-21471
W
I
l
N
E
S
S
REPORT TYPE
PAGE 1
WENDY DURR
STATEMENT
VICTIhl'S NAhE/FII(IMS NAME (LAST, ARSI; MIUDm]
DUFFY, NANCY MC CARRON
RESIDENTIIU ADDRESS
CITY
SB,
4040 PIEDMONT SPACE 333
ST,4TF
CA
TELEPIlONE NUMBER
805-450-0450
On 09/08/2014, at approximately 13:45 hours, I conducted a phone interview with WENDY DURR a
witness to a fire that occurred on August 301h, 2014 at Mt. Shadows Mobile Home Park located at
4040 Piedmont space 333 in the City of San Bernardino. The following is a summary of DURR'S
statement:
DURR stated two days prior to the fire her home experienced a large serge accompanied by a loud
boom, she stated this occurred at approximately 1030 in the morning. DURR said her lights flickered
a little bit but did not go off completely. DURR stated she did look outside but did not see anything.
DURR stated on Saturday August 30, at approximately 12 noon she had a similar serge, but stated
there was no bang associated with this serge. DURR did state that her air conditioning system did
shut down during this second serge. Approximately 20 minutes later DURR went outside to see if the
breaker had gone off on her air conditioner. DURR stated she check the breaker later after the fire
occurred and the breaker did not trip. DURR stated as she was exiting her home out to her patio she
could hear crackling. DURR said she wasn't sure what the crackling was or where it was coming
from. DURR stated she looked out the window towards her driveway and saw fire on the side of her
neighbor's house next to the electrical pedestal and plastic fence. DURR stated the vegetation in
front of the electrical pedestal as well as the white fence was on fire and moving towards the two
palm trees.
DURR stated she went outside to grab her fire extinguisher and met her neighbor from across the
street who also noticed the fire. DURR stated she gave her neighbor the hose and she and he
attempted to extinguish the fire with a hose and fire extinguisher. DURR stated the first thing she saw
on fire was the plastic fence on the south side of her neighbor's house in the planter area and in front
of the electrical pedestal. DURR said the fire was traveling towards the palm trees in an easterly
direction. DURR stated she used her extinguisher on the plastic fence towards the electrical pedestal
and that was able to knock most of the fire down in that area. DURR said her neighbor put the fire
out around the base of the palm trees with the water hose.
DURR stated that Southern California Edison came to repair the electrical pedestal and wiring on
Sunday the 31st. DURR said the Edison employee had stated he saw some damage to one of the
bus-bars within the electrical pedestal. DURR indicated in her statement that the Edison employee
stated he would document his findings in his report. DURR also stated the Edison employees found
a ball of metal down in the hole underneath the pedestal were the electrical wires come up from the
ground.
DURR had nothing more to add to this interview. I concluded this interview at 13:59 hours.
REPORTING INVESnGATOR [Sj
IDEUTIFICr~TlONVUMBER [S)
S. TRACY
REVIE\VEDOY.
D A ~ :
l>,'O'lJ.:
R E C O R ~ BARCOUING
S
ONLY
1011312014
1-684
FUR~IER
AC~ON:
RECORDS PROCESSING BY:
NO
7
.0
2
'

CRZ
11-5386
PAGE 1
I RPPORTTYPF
...
.. ,.... - ..-
WITNESS
RESlDENnlL ADDRESS
4040 PIEDMONT SPACE

333
---
SB,
--
CA
805450-0450
On 09/08/2014,at approximately 1054 hours, I conducted a phone interview with JEROME POLAND
a witness to a fire that occurred on August 3oth,
2014 at Mt. Shadows Mobile Home Park located at
4040 Piedmont space 333 in the City of San Bernardino. The following is a summary of Mr.
POLAND'S statement:
POLAND stated he was walking out to his car located in his driveway when he noticed two palm trees
on fire on the side of his neighbor's house. POLAND said he went to his neighbor's house and
knocked on the door to see if they were home, but stated they were not at home. POLAND then
stated he went to his neighbor's to the north and knocked on his door to alert him that there was a
fire. POLAND then ran down the street to his other neighbor's to the south of the house that was
burning, but stated she was already outside and was moving towards him. POLAND stated she
handed him the water hose and he started to put the fire out on the plastic fence and around the palm
trees. POLAND stated it was very hot that day and he did not have enough water pressure in the
water hose to reach the fire fully so he had to stand back 3 to 5 feet. POLAND stated his neighbor
helped him with a fire extinguisher to extinguish the fire as well. POLAND stated they were able to
extinguish the fire and his neighbor called 91 1 to have the fire department respond.
POLAND said the first thing he saw on fire was the palm trees. However, POLAND went on to state
he did see the electrical around the pedestal was melted. POLAND stated he's pretty sure it was
some kind of electrical fire but he stated he did not see anything in front of the Pedestal burning.
POLAND stated the plants in front of the pedestal had already burnt up. POLAND stated "I felt like
the fire ad moved from the area in front of the pedestal towards the palm trees and then continued to
start thd! trees; those trees would have been a bigger blaze if it was the other way around."
POLA D stated when the fire department arrived the blaze was already put out. POLAND stated the
fire de artment continued to water down the area that was burning and then checked the roof and the
surrou ding area around the mobile home for any hotspots.
POLA(D had nothing further to add to this interview, I ended the interview at 11:10hours.
l>.VI'l?
S. TRACY
REVIEWED BS
1-684
DATE:
1011312014
F U Z ~ I ACTION:
I
RECORDS PROCESSING BY: -
YES
3I
UDDS1204130 Minute Orders 1San Bernardina Main
10/18R014
Home
ComplaintslParties
Actions
Minutes
Pending
Hearings
Case
Report
Images
I
A
_
Case Type:
Case Number:
Case UDDS1204130 STUBBLEFIELD-V-SHIPLEY

-Action: wse)
EX-PARTE MOTION RE: DEF EXPARTE APP FOR ORDER TO REPAIR OR R E P L A ~ EELE
09/09/2014 9:30 AM DEPT. S28X

CLERK: WIMALA BLANCHARD
COURT REPORTER LINDA BALDWIN 12453
COURT ATTENDANT MARY KILGORE
APPEARANCES:
ATTORNEY ROBERT WILLIAMSON PRESENT FOR STUBBLEFIELD PROPERTIES.
ATTORNEY NANCY DUFFY MCCARRON PRESENT FOR BONNIE SHIPLEY.
PROCEEDINGS:
NO FILE.
EX-PARTE HEARING IS HELD.
EX PARTE APPLICATION ARGUED.
COURT HAS READ AND CONSIDERED THE MOVING PAPERS AND OPPOSITION FILED 9/8/14
COURT FINDS:
EX PARTE ORDERS DENIED.
FINDINGS ARE STATED ON THE RECORD.
ACTION - COMPLETE
=== MINUTE ORDER END ===

14-21471
PAGE 1
--
Form of mvesagahon
CASE NUMBER
CR2
REPORT TYPE
NARATIVE
ORIGIN AND CAUSE

VICTIM'SNAME/FIRMS NAME M S T , FIRST, MIDD1.E)
RESIDENT1AL ADDRESS
4040 PIEDMONT SPACE 333
Cl lY
STATE
SB,
CA
--
TBLZPHONE NUMBER
805-450-0450
On 08/30/14, at 1314 hours, the San Bernardino City Fire Department responded to 4040 Piedmont
Dr. in the City of San Bernardino for a report of a planter on fire. Medic Engine 228 (ME228) was the
first to arrive and the officer in charge, Captain Brian Crowell found a planter, along with vegetation
and other debris smoldering. On primary and secondary survey no occupants were found inside or
outside of the structure. Offensive fire attack was initiated and the fire was extinguished. According to
Captain Brian Crowell, 91 1 operators were called by a next door neighbor.
The fire itself was small approximately 10 by 10 on the south side of a mobile home at space 333. As
indicated in the fire report the fire was put out by locals prior to ME228's arrival. Refer to the attached
fire report for further. On September 1, 2014 1 received a call from the owner of the mobile home
(Nancy McCarron) involved in this fire requesting an origin and cause report. l informed Ms.
McCarron who to contact to request the information she was seeking. As I was attempting to explain
the process to Ms. McCarron she frequently would interrupt me by informing me of her long civil
litigation issues with the mobile home park. Ms. McCarron went on to state she felt this fire was
intentionally started as retaliation to her winning her court case against the mobile home park. I
informed Ms. McCarron I would look up who the investigator was who was called out to the fire and
attempt to put her in touch with the investigator for additional follow-up.
As I looked into this incident further I revealed an investigator was never requested to the fire scene.
In fact, when I read the fire report the Captain noted in his narrative the cause of the fire was
undetermined. I informed the home owner there was no investigator requested due to the fact the
Company Officer conducted a preliminary origin and cause and based on his training and experience
he listed the cause of the fire as undetermined. This explanation to the home owner was not
acceptable has she persisted this fire was intentionally set or at least that's what she suspected.
On September 1, 2014 1 contacted Chief Hubbell and informed him of the circumstances surrounding
this incident. Both Chief Hubbell and I agreed it would be in the departments best interest to start a
formal investigation due to the fact this home owner is an attorney and with her current litigation with
the park we needed to absolutely rule out any foul play. I informed the home owner the fire
department would look into the cause of the fire further. However, I did explain to the home owner
the scene had been released the day of the fire and the fire scene and any possible evidence may
have been spoiled and or tampered with. With this in mind, I further explained we would do are best
in coming to a reasonable hypothesis as to the cause. The home owner seemed to be satisfied with
our decision but questioned my explanation of possible scene tampering.
In the days following our examination Ms. McCarron became more belligerent as to our methods and
limitations of the investigation. I did call her back and explain to her the scene had been
compromised by Edison and or park maintenance people. The general area of origin had been dug
up and remarkably disturbed. I explained to Ms. McCarron we had no choice but to concur with the
(S)
S. TRACY
l>;\'l'I<,
IDENTIFICK~IONNUMBER (5)
1-684
DATE:
NK~-IF.RACTTON.
10/13/2014
RECOlmS PROCESSING BY:
NU
CRZ

14-21471
PAGE 2
original cause listed in the fire report as Undetermined. She was not happy to say the least and went
on to explain it was the parks responsibility to ensure her renters~electricityand gas be repaired so
they could return to the home. I explained to her this problem was a civil matter between her and the
park and the fire department had no jurisdiction regarding those matters.
On September 4th, I went back out to the scene and conducted a very thorough examination of the
electrical pedestal. In addition to my examination I also requested Edison and the Gas Company
back out to the scene to ensure the pedestal and the gas meter were safe. I did discover a small gas
leak from the meter and had the Gas Company render it safe. The Pedestal was cleared by Edison
as being DE energized and safe to work around. I conferred with the linemen from Edison on some
Hypothesis related to the Pedestal and the cause of the fire and then released him. The Gas
Company remained on scene to document their actions and post a safety report for the home owner.
In the late afternoon on September 4th, I received another phone call from Ms. McCarron on the SIB
line. I did inform Ms. McCarron I conducted the examination of the pedestal as she requested and
informed her, the determination of the cause was going to remain Undetermined at this time. I
explained I did still need to do some follow-up with some witnesses. I informed Ms. McCarron she
may request a copy of the entire detailed report and it should be ready for her in four to six weeks.
She was still not pleased with this additional work on this investigation. In Fact, she and her husband
started to cross examine me over the phone on the methods of our investigation. It was at this time I
informed Ms. McCarron if she had any further questions or complaints she could contact Captain
Lentine or Chief Harker.
End of Narrative
I
i - A - S. TRACY
REVIEWED BY:
I>illC
IDENTIPIC.2TION NUhIBEll (S)
REPORTING INVESTIGATOR (Sj
1-684
DATE:
FURTIIER ACTION.
YES
RBCORDS BARCODING ONLY
101~/2014
RECORDS PROCESSING BY

CRZ
CASE NUMBER
PAGE I
14-21471
REPORT TYPE
WINEBS
STATEMENT
CAPTAIN B. CROWELL
V I C T I ~ SNW/FIRMS
~
NAME
(~As'I:PIRST, MIDDLE)
RESIDENTIAL 4DDRESS
4040
- PIEDMONT SPACE 333
SB,
STATE
CA
TELEPHONE NUMBER
805-450-0450
On 1010712014, at approximately 11:30 hours, I conducted an interview with CAPTAIN BRIAN

CROWELL the Company Officer in charge of ME 228 who was dispatched to a fire that occurred on
August 3oth, 2014 at Mt. Shadows Mobile Home Park located at 4040 Piedmont space 333 in the City
of San Bernardino. The following is a summary of CAPTAIN CROWELL'S statement:
CROWELL stated ME228 arrived at the top of the mobile home park and found burnt and smoldering
palm trees to the front of the mobile home space number 333. CROWELL said members of his crew
checked the residents to see if the residents were home. CROWELL said his crew reported no one
was home. CROWELL stated there were two neighbors at the location when they arrived on scene
that had extinguished the body of the fire with garden hose prior to his arrival. CROWELL stated one
of these neighbors was the RP who had called 911 to report the fire. CROWELL stated the fire
burned a small portion of plastic fence, some light vegetation and melted the electric meter and
possibly damaged the inside wiring. CROWELL said the gas meter was also damaged. CROWELL
said the fire burned an area approximately a 10sqlft section of the planter on the South side of the
home.
CROWELL stated after he and his crew conducted additional cooling measures on the affected area
and determined the fire was completely suppressed he conducted a preliminary origin and cause
investigation. CROWELL stated based on his training and experience he did not observe anything
that would indicate a crime had occurred. CROWELL stated he listed the fire as "unknown" as to the
cause of fire. CROWELL did state the cause of the fire may have been possibly electrical in nature
but was not able to make this determination based on his training and experience. CROWELL said
he took additional protective measures to make the structure and environment safe by shutting off the
gas, taping off the area around the electrical box and checking the area for embers and smoldering
debris. CROWELL stated the onsite property management arrived and he informed them of what
occurred on scene. CROWELL requested Edison to secure the power and render it safe. CROWELL
stated after he and his crew were satisfied the property was safe and secure he turned the scene
over to property management.
I concluded this interview at approximately 11:40 hours. See Captain Crowell's fire report for further.
RCPORTING INVESTIGATOR (S)
S. TRACY
KEVIEWD BY.
IUENTIPIC~\I'IONNUMRER
1-684
DATE
FURTHER ACTION:
l).V~'l<
1011312014
RECORDS PROCESSING BY:
BARCODING ONI>Y
John H. Pentecost, Esq., Bar No. 99527

Robert G. Williamson, Jr., Es ., Bar No.
Ryan J. E an, Esq., Bar No. 2 1836
HART #INc
A PRO ESSIONAL CORPORATION
4 Hutton Centre Drive, Suitc 900

Santa Ana, California 92707
Telepbone: (714) 432-8700
Facs~mile: (714) 546-7457
6 Attorrteys for Plaintiff STUBBLEFIE1.D PROPERTIES, a California eneral
partnership dba MOUNTAIN SHADOWS MOBILEHOME COMMU ITY

COUNTY OF SAN BERNARDINO, FONTANA DISTRICT
STUBBLEFIELD PROPERTIES, a
Case No. UDFS 1406978
California general partnership dba

MOUNTAIN SHADOWS

Judge: Hon. Kyle S. Brodie
MOBILEHOME COMMUNITY,
PLAINTIFF'S RESPONSES TO FIRST

SET OF FORM INTERROGATORIES
PROPOUNDED BY DEFENDANT
BONNIE SHIPLEY
Plaintiff
v.
NANCY B. DUFFY aka NANCY DUFFY

aka NANCY MCCARRON aka NANCY
DLW-MCCARKON aka NANCY B.
DUFFY MCCARRON; BONNIE
SHIPLEY; and DOES 1 through 10,
inclusive.
Defendants.
- -
IRESPONDING PARTY:
I
24 PROPOUNDING PARTY:
26
1
1
21
22
Defendant B O W SHLPLEY
Plaintiff STUBBLEFIP*DPROPERTIES, a California
general pmtncrship dba MOUNTAIN SHADOWS
MOBILEHOME COMMLNITY
One
3h5h8.02214819-20934080~.1
1
RESPONSES TO FIRST S E T OF FORM ~ N T E R R O O A T O R ~ E S
to the Sixty (60) Day Notice to Terminate Possession served on Defendant McCarron,
Responding Party responds as follows:
Responding Party owns Mountain Shadows Mobilehome Community (hereinafter
"Park"), a mobilehome park located at 4040 E. Piedmont in Highland, California 92346.
Responding Party does not own the mobilehome unit situated upon space 333.
The
mobilehome unit is currently situated on Plaintiffs property, at space 333 inside the Park.
?a such, Responding Party does not maintain the rnobilehome unit, but does maintain the
areas of the Park. Responding Party is aware of inspections by representatives of

Fire Department and California Department of Housing and Community
ordered the Edison Company and Southern California Gas Company to
t:rminate services to spacc 333 due to a fire that destroyed the utility pedestal at space 333
cn or about August 28, 2014 as Responding Party understands those terns to mean,
rzgarding the common areas of the Park.
5- 'E.
.,.
I tie
..... ,...
. ..
During the period beginning 36 months before the NOTICE TO QUIT was served to
present, did PLAINTIFF or LANDLORD receive a notice or other communication
r:garding the condition of the RENTAL UNIT or PROPERTY (including other rents
units) from a governmental agency? If so, for each notice or communication state:
II
I
b
I
i
1
(a)
the date received;
(b)
the identity of all parties;
(c)
the substance of the notice or communication;
(d)
the identity of each DOCUMENT evidencing the notice or communication
a d the name, ADDRESS, and telephone number of each PERSON who has it,
Objection: This interrogatory seeks information that is irrelevant to Ulis action and the
terrogatory is not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.
p i s interrogatory is oppressive and burdensome because it is vague, ambiguous, and

ulintelligible so as to make a response impossible without speculation as to the meaning of
1293093-008Ov.l
30
RESPONSES TO FIRST S E T O F FORM INTERROGATORIES
3?
lthe question and the term "condition."
This interrogatory is oppressive and burdenrome
2 because it is vague, ambiguous, and unintelligible so as to make a response impossible
UNIT."
3 without speculation as to the meaning of the question and the term "RENTAL
4 "[TJhe premises PLAINTIFF seeks to recover" in the c ntext of divided ownership of the
5 land containing a mobilehome park are "pads" or space;;

6 on the "pads" or spaces."
opposed to mobilehomes situated
503 U.S. 519, 523 (1 92) [ A
See Yee v. City of
I1
7 mobilehome owner typically rents a plot of land, cs!led a "pad," from h e

g mobilehome park.] This interrogatory seeks informati05 that is irrelevant to
9 the interrogatory is not reasonably calculated to lead to
r discovery of admissible e idence.
This interrogatory is oppressive and burdensome

overbroad. This interrogatory is propounded with
burden Responding Party.
Without waiving any objections,
.
...,Responding
Party owns...
"Park"), a mobilehome park
Responding. Party does not

mobilehome unit is currently
AS
such. Responding Party does not maintain h e mobdchome unit, but does mai tain h e
I
19((commonareas of the Park. Responding Party rece$ed an Activity Report 4om the
lg
20 California Department of Housing and C

21 2014 and a written and verbal fire repo
Bemardino
~
&
Department
e
as
Respo
22
___1_1__1
(1
23 regarding the condition of the common areas of the ~ask.1
Responding Party reserves the right to add
this -response
information obtained during discovery as well as om
26 FORM INTERROGATORY NO. 75.6

27
1
1
I,I '
was there any corrective action t d e n in rcsp&selllto h e inspection or dice or
28 communication identified in sections 75.4 and 75.51 ifrd, f+ d c h :

, ,, ,
31
365611.02'1J4S29-2093O0800 1
RESPONSES TO FIRST SET OF FORM :1
VERIFICATION
2 I have read the foregoing
PLAINTIFF'S RESPONSES TO FRST SET OF FORM
INTERROGATORIES PROPOUNDED BY DEFENDANT BONNIE SHIPLBY and h o w
4 its contents.
I am the party to this action. The m a w stated in the foregoing document are hue to
my own knowledge, except as to those matters which are stated on information and
belief, and to those matters I believe them to be true.
10
IX/
I am
an officer
a partner
a Managing Agent of Stubblefield Properties, a
party to this action, and am authorized to make this verification for and on its behalf,
and I make this verification for that reason.
I am informed and believe and on that ground allege that the matters stated in the
foregoing document are true.
The matters stated in the foregoing document are hue of my own howledge, except
as to those matters which.are stated on information and belief, and as to those mafters,
I believe them to be hue.
I am one of the attorneys for a pariy to this action. Such party is absent from the
county of aforesaid where such attorney have their offices, and I mdx this
verification
for and on behalf of that p a q for that reason. ]-aminformed and believe
and on that ground d e g e that the matters stated in the foregoing document are true.
Executed on November
2014. 1 declare u=der penalty of perjuj. pursuant to the
laws of the State of California that the foregoing is true and correct
23
24
25
26
p
Stubblefield Properties
PROOF OF SERVICE
Srubblefreld hoperties v. DUB,et al.
Court C u e No. UDFS1406978
3 STATE OF CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF ORANGE
I am employed in the County of Orange, State of California. I am over the age of 18 years and am not a party
4 to the within action. My business address is 4 Hutton Centre, Suite 900, Santa Ana, California 92707-0507.
On November 26,2014.1 caused the foregorng document(s) described as PLAPITIFF'S RESPONSES TO

O F FORM INTERROGATORTES PROPOUNDED BY DEFENDANT BONNIE
I1SHIPLEY be served on the interested parlies in this action as follows:
5 FIRST SET
6
the original
a hue copy thereof enclosed in sealed envelopes addressed as stated below
$placlng
b sDnding a copy as stated and a d d w e d below:
SEE ATTACHED SERVICE LIST
BY MAIL: 1 am k a d i l y familiar" with the firm's practice of collection and processing

correspondence for mailing. Under that practice it would be deposited with the U.S. Postal Seryice on that
same day with postage thereon l l l y prepaid Santa Ana. California in the ordinary course of business. I am
aware that on motion of the party served, service is presumed invalid if the postal cancellation date or pastage
meter date is more than one day after date of deposit for mailing in the affidavit.
[XJ
BY OVERNIGHT DELIVERY: 1 enclosed the documents in an envelope or package provided by

an overnight delivcry carrier and addressed to the persons identified herein. I placed the envelope or package
for collection and overnight delivery at an office or a regularly utilized drop box of the overnight delivery
BY ELECTRONIC SERVICE. B a r d m a murt ordm-or an agreement of thd pvlies to r r e p l
mission, I caused the documents to be sent to the persons at the electronic
isted herein on this date at --[time]. I did not receive, within a reasonable
the transmission, any electronic message or other indication that the transmission was unsuccessful.
Y FACSIMILE: Based
an an agreement of the parties to accept service by fax transmission, I

documents from a fax machine, at Santa Ana, California, with the telephone number. (714) 246parties andlor attorney for the parties at the facsimile transmission number(s) shown herein. The
smission was reported as complete without error by a transmission report, issued by the
facsimile transmission machine upon which the transmission was madc. a copy of which is attached hereto.
SSENGER SERVICE: 1 sewed the documents by placing them in an envelope or package

ons at the addresses listed herein and providing them to r professional messenger service
ion by the messenger will be filed separately.
eclare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the Stab of Califomiathat the foregoing
22 Executed on November 26,2014, at Santa Ana, California

23
24
i
PROOF OF SERVICE
CARL \%IhRRENiFc COMPz4NY

Claims Management and Solutions
October 22,2014
C E R T m D MAILIRETURN RECEIPT REQUESTED

REGULAR U.S. MAIL
Nancy Duffy McCarron
950 Roble Ln
Our Principal: City of San Bernardino

Claimant:
Date of Loss: August 30,2014 to present
File No.:
1893390-JM
NOTICE OF REJECTION
Dear Ms. McCarron:
The Claim that you presented to the City of San Bernardino, on or about September 8,
2014 was rejected on October 22,2014, by Carl Warren & Company, on behalf of the
City of San Bernardino.
WARNING
Subject to certain exceptions,
you havcgnly six (6) months from the d a g of tfii_s_no&ce
W@i%%%aflydelivered or deposited in the mail to file a court actidiin a superior court
of the State of California on this claim. See Government Code section 945.6.
,..*
This time limitation applies only to causes of action arising under California law for
' which a claim is mandated by the California Government Tort Claims Act, Government
Code sections 900 et seq. Other causes of action, including those arising under federal
law, may have a shorter time limitation for filing.
You may seek the advice of an attorney of your choice in connection with this matter. If
you desire to consult an attorney, you should do so immediately.
AN EMPLOYEE-OWNED COMPANY
P. 0 Box 1820
www.carhvarren.com
San Bernardino. CA 92402
Tel: 909-884-8669
800-762-3216
CA License No.2607296
Fax: 866-204-9268
Very Truly Yours,
'
John McCormack
Carl Warren & Company
jmccormack@c~lwarren.com
6"
cc:
City of San Bernardino
Carl Warren & Co.
222 W. Hospitality Lane, 3rdFloor, San Bernardino, CA 92415
Phone: 909.386.8655 Fax: 909.382.3212
- ---------
NARDINO
UNTY
-- *- - --
Department of
Risk Management
Kenneth L. Hernandez
Director
March 23,2015
Nancy McCarron
950 Roble Lane
-=
a
- -
RE: - ClaimarL .-.

,
.-Nancy_Mr;Car r o ~ o n n
Date of Loss.. ..........October 28, 2014
Amount of Claim...... Undetermined
Our File.. ................ I 19658
Notice is hereby given that the claim which you presented to the County of San
Bernardino on February 23, 2015 was rejected on March 23,2015.
WARNING
Subject to certain exceptions, you have only six (6) months from the date this notice
was personally delivered or deposited in the mail to file a court action on this claim.
See Government Code Section 945.6.
You may seek the advice of an attorney of your choice in connection with this matter. If
you desire to consult an attorney, you should do so immediately.
Liability Claims Rep II

DEPARTMENT OF RISK MANAGEMENT
(9b9)386-8637
BSWARa
- __
---
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
)
)
COUNTY OF SAN BERNARDINO )
I, the undersigned, declare:

I am employed in the County of San Bernardino, State of California; I am over the
age of 18 years and not a party to this action; my business address is 222 West
~
t
~
~
E
I5-LifsMia
s,
s
c 9BH-MlQIU--m---~
with this office's practice for collection and processing of documents for mailing with the
United States Postal Service. The documents are deposited with the United States
Postal Service on the same day in the ordinary course of business. On the date written
below, I served the document named below on the parties indicated by placing a true
copy thereof enclosed in a sealed envelope for collection and mailing from 222 West
Hospitality Lane, Third Floor, San Bernardino, Ca. following ordinary business practice,
addressed as follows, and declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State
of California that the foregoing is true and correct and that this declaration is executed
on March 23, 2015 at San Bemardino, California.
DOCUMENT: BSWARa
PARTIES SERVED:
Law Office of Nancy DufFy

950 Roble Lane
Santa Barbara, CA. 93103
proofsvc
-- - -
- --
222 W. Hospitality Lane, 3rdFloor, San Bernardino, CA 92415
Department of
Risk Management
Phone: 909.386.8655 Fax: 909.382.3214
Director
Law Office of Nancy McCarron

950 Roble Lane
Santa Barbara, CA. 93103
RE:
Claimants:
Date of Loss:
Our Claim #:
Nancy McCarron, Bonr~ieJ. Shipley & Stephen Allen

October 28,2014
119658
Dear Nancy McCarron

Please be advised that we have completed our inquiry in response to the claim against
the County that you filed.
At this time, we are denying liability for the following reason: The alleged employee are
not employeed with the County of San Bernardino. It appears your claim may be
against the City of San Bernardino, where the County has no jurisdiction. Also the
County of San Bernardino Courts and its employees, including judges are under the
jurisd-iciton of the State of California and not the County of San Bernardino.
-- -
The purpose of this letter is to advise your office of ol.lr findings and is not intended to
waive or eictend the statutory perioy-as cfe3riedmTh-e rejection notice d'afed March 23,
2015.
Sincerely,
Richard Castanon
EXHIBIT
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'1
950 Roble Lane

Santa Barbara. CA 93103
ATTORNEY FOR (Name):
1 Nancy Duffy McCarron. 164780
805-450-0450
Bonnie Shipley
-&
COURTOF
1 -SUPERIOR
- _ _ -- CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF
--
I
1
FOR COURT USE ONLY
Telephone Number
ATTORNEY OR PARTY WITHOUT ATTORNEY (Name and Address)
S,4N B32RNPLRD1BJO
SBSC?Fontana District
17780 Arrow Blvd
Fontana, CA 92335
PLAlNTlFFlPETlTlONER Stubblefied Properties, et al

DEFENDANTIRESPONDENT Nancy B. Duffy, et a1
CERTIFICATE RE:
DISQUALIFICATION OF JUDGE
(CCP 170.6)
I am the attorney for the Bonnie shipley

in the within action.
W~lfredSchneider
, the Judge before whom the trial of said
action is pending is prejudiced against the interest of the Bonnie Shipley

I
so that I believe a fair and impartial trial of said action cannot be had before said Judge
I certify under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct.
Executed on 10-10-14
Optional Form
.";?I
5 (Rev. 07/03)
at Fontana
CERTIFICATE RE:
DISQUALIFICATION OF JUDGE
fCCP 170.6)
, California
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Case UDFS1406978 STUBBLEFIELD -VS- DUFFY

Action: I (Choose)
HEARING RE: 170.6

10/14/2014 - 4:00 PM DEPT. F2
KYLE S BRODIE, JUDGE
CLERK: SHOSHONE NEAL
APPEARANCES:
PARTIES NOT PRESENT: STLIBBLEFIELD PROPERTIES, A CAI-IFORNIA, NANCY B DUFFY, BONNIE
SHIPLEY
PROCEEDIIVGS:
CCP170.6 FILED AS TO JUDGE WILFRED J SCHNEIDER JR., CASE REASSIGNED TO JUDGE KYLE S
BRODIE FOR ALL PURPOSES.
HEARINGS:
LAW & MOTION RE: DEMURRERIMOTION TO STRIKE COMPLAINTIQUASH SUMMONS SET FOR 11110114
AT 08:00 IN DEPT. F2.
CASE ASSIGNED FOR ALL PURPOSES TO DEPARTMENT F2
CLERK'S OFFICE TO NOTIFY ALL PARTIES

ACTION COMPLETE
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CaseUDFS1406978STUBBLEFIELDVSDUFFY
Action: (Choose)
MOTIONRE:DEMURRER/MOTIONTOSTRIKECOMPLAINT/QUASHSUMMONS
11/10/20148:00AMDEPT.F7
KYLESBRODIE,JUDGE
CLERK:SHOSHONENEAL
APPEARANCES:
ATTORNEYROBERTWILLIAMSONPRESENTFORPLAINTIFF/PETITIONER.
DEFENDANTNANCYBDUFFYPRESENT
ATTORNEYNANCYDUFFYPRESENTFORDEFENDANT/RESPONDENT.
PROCEEDINGS:
MATTERELECTRONICALLYRECORDED
09:09
NANCYBDUFFY'SMOTIONDEMURRER/MOTIONTOSTRIKEISHEARD.
ORALARGUMENTPRESENTEDBYDEFENDANT.
ORALARGUMENTPRESENTEDBYCOUNSELFORPLAINTIFF.
MATTERPUTON2NDCALLFORCOURTTOREVIEWDEFENDANTSJUDICIALNOTICEREQUEST.
09:11
10:54
ORALARGUMENTPRESENTEDBYDEFENDANT.
AFTERTESTIMONYANDDUECONSIDERATIONBYTHECOURT:
DEMURRERISOVERRULEDASTONANCYBDUFFY
NANCYBDUFFY,BONNIESHIPLEY'SMOTIONTOSTRIKECOMPLAINT/QUASHSUMMONSISDENIED.
5DAYSTOANSWER.
COUNSELFORPLAINTIFFTOGIVENOTICE.
11:28
CERTIFICATEOFELECTRONICRECORDINGMONITORPRINTED.
ACTIONCOMPLETE
===MINUTEORDEREND===
http://openaccess.sbcourt.org/OpenAccess/civil/civilminutes.asp?courtcode=X&casenumber=FS1406978&casetype=UD&dsn=&actionseq=4&actiondate=201
1/2
Case No.___________________

APPELLATE DIVISION
BONNIE SHIPLEY,
Petitioner,
v.

Respondent;
__________________________________________________
a CA General Partnership,
dba Mountain Shadows Mobile Home Community
Real Party in Interest.
WRIT PETITION - STAY REQUESTED

[abatement required: other action pending(ACIAS140026)-same issue, same parties]
see CCP 597 see Browne v. Superior Court (1940) 16 Cal. 2d 593, 597
Following Hearing: DEMURRER OVERRULED
Case No. UDFS1406978 [limited jurisdiction]
Hon. Kyle Brodie, Judge [F-2] (909) 320-5134
PETITION FOR PEREMPTORY WRIT OF MANDATE AND PROHIBITION IN THE
FIRST INSTANCE, OR ALTERNATIVE WRIT, OR OTHER APPROPRIATE RELIEF;
MEMORANDUM OF POINTS & AUTHORITIES; EXHIBITS [SEPARATE COVER]
TRANSCRIPT WILL FOLLOW ASAP
_________________________________
950 Roble Lane
805-450-0450 fax 805-965-3492
Attorney for Petitioner
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Table of Authorities .....................................................................................................1, 2
Certificate of Interested Parties (on file)
Writ Issues Presented (4) .................................................................................................3
Statewide Urgency ...........................................................................................................4
Petition, Authenticity of Exhibits, Beneficial Interest, Capacities, Urgency .................5
IMMEDIATE STAY REQUESTED ............................................................................5
Chronology of Pertinent Events .......................................................................................6
No Adequate Remedy at Law, Prayer for Relief .............................................................7
Memorandum of Points & Authorities, Standard of Review ...........................................8
ARGUMENTS .................................................................................................................8
1. Court May Not Deprive Defendant of Oral Arguments at Demurrer Hearing .........8
2. Pendency of Prior Action Abates Second Action Against the Same Party .............9
3. Court Erred by Compelling Party to Litigate Complex Issues in UD Court .........11
4. Procedural & Substantive Defects Are Fatal to the Complaint .............................14
a. invalid notice and/or invalid service of notice (defective proof of service)
b. a general partnership complaint not verified by a general partner
c. breach of covenant despite waiver by accepting rent after notice of breach
d. sublease breach despite waiver by accepting rent after notice of subtenant
e. delay for over a year in suing for unpaid rent or uncured covenant breach
f: retaliatory eviction barred by Civil 1942.5 proven by RJN + exhibits
Admissions in Ps Opposition to Demurrer Negate Ability to State Claim .............18
Conclusion .....................................................................................................................19
Judge Brodie Should Not Sit As Judge in Violation of Govt Code 87203 ................20
Certificate of Word Count, Verification of Counsel & Petitioner .................................21
Request for Judicial Notice of Monthly Statement $23,538.09 rent due
Proof of Service .............................................................................................................22
Cases
Asuncion v. Superior Court, supra, 108 CA.3d 141 .......................................................... 11

Auto Equity Sales v. Superior Court (1962) 57 Cal.2d 450 ................................................. 9
Bedford Investment Co. v. Folb (1947) 79 CA.2d 363, 366 .............................................. 17
Berry v. Society of St. Pius X (1999) 69 CA.4th 354 ........................................................ 11
Browne v. Superior Court (1940) 16 Cal. 2d 593, 597 ........................................................ 9
Cal-American Income Property Fund IV v. Ho (1984) 161 CA3d 583, 585............... 14, 17
Casterson v. Superior Court (2002) 101 C.A.4th 177,182 .................................................. 7
Chong Pong v. Harris (1918) 38 CA 214, 217 .................................................................. 15
Deal v. Municipal Court
157 CA.3d 996........................................................... 11
EDC Associates, Ltd. v. Gutierrez (1984) 153 CA.3d 167 ................................................ 16

Halvorsen v. Aramark Uniform Services, Inc. (1998) 65 CA.4th 1383, 1391 ............ 17, 19
Horsemens Benev. & Prot. Assn. v. Valley Racing Assn. (1992) 4 CA.4th 153, 155 ......... 8
Howard Jarvis Taxpayers Assn. v. City of Riverside (1999) 73 C.A.4th 679, 685 ............. 7
Kern Sunset Oil Co. v. Good Roads Oil Co., 214 Cal.435, 440 ....................................... 17
Kern Sunset Oil Co. v. Good Roads Oil Co. (1931) 214 Cal.435, 440 ............................. 16
Kresteller v. Superior Court
(1967) 248 C.A. 2d 545, 549 .............................................. 9
Lee v. Bank of America (1990) 218 C.A. 3d 914, 919 ......................................................... 7

Lindsey v. Normet, supra, 405 U.S. at pp. 64-66 ............................................................... 11
Ludgate Ins. Co. v. Lockheed Martin (2000) 82 C.A.4th 592, 602-603 .............................. 7
Lynch & Freytag v. Cooper, supra, 218 CA.3d at p. 609 ................................................ 12
Martin-Bragg v. Moore (2013) 219 CA.4th 367 .............................................................. 11
Mayflower Ins. v. Pelligrino (1989) 212 CA. 3d 1326, 1332 .............................................. 7
McCutchen v. City of Montclair (1999) 73 CA.4th 1138 .................................................... 7
Medix Ambulance Service, Inc. v. Superior Court (2002) 97 C.A 4th 109, 112 ........... 8, 19
Mehr v. Superior Court, supra, 139 C.A.3d 1044 ............................................................. 11
Miller v. Reidy,
85 CA.757, 762 ............................................................................. 17
Palmer v. Agee (1978) 87 CA.3d 377, 385 ..................................................................11, 19

1
Rader Co. v. Stone, 178 CA.3d @ 20 .................................................................................. 7

Requa v. Regents of University of Cal. (2012) 213 CA. 4th 213, 223 ............................... 18
Rich v. Schwab (1998) 63 CA.4th 803 ........................................................................ 11, 19
Rodas v. Spiegel (2001) 87 C.A. 4th 513, 517..................................................................... 7
San Mateo Union HS Dist. v. County of San Mateo (2013) 213 CA.4th 418, 436 ............. 8
Simmons v. Superior Court (1950) 96 C.A. 2d 119, 122-123 ............................................. 8
Smiley v. Citibank (1995) 11 Cal.4th 138, 146 .................................................................... 7
STATUTES
CCP 904.1 .......................................................................................................................... 6

CCP 1102-1105 .................................................................................................................. 9
CCP 430.10 .............................................................................................................. 2, 6, 19
CCP 597 ............................................................................................................................. 8
Civil 1942.5 ............................................................................................................ 3, 17, 19
Civil 798.56[d] .............................................................................................2, 4, 5, 6, 9, 10
Civil 798.88 ........................................................................................................................ 4
Civil Code 1717 ................................................................................................................. 7
RULES OF COURT
CRC 3.1312 ...................................................................................................................... 2, 6
OTHER AUTHORITIES
Legislative intent Civil Code 798.88 injunctive relief instead of eviction ....................... 4
(4) WRIT ISSUES PRESENTED

1.
Can a judge deprive a defendant of due process by: 1) failing to read a demurrer,
[calling a 15-minute break for a cursory review]; 2) resume the hearing by vigorously
cross-examining defense counsel [effectively advocating for plaintiff] and abruptly
walking off the bench after counsel asked for an opportunity to argue the issues?
Did the court err by denying oral argument at a crucial demurrer hearing?
2.
On May 6, 2013 a former appellate panel found Stubblefield could not evict
Shipley directly as he had no privity and directed final judgment in her favor.
Violating CRC 3.1312 the court ordered Stubblefield to write the final judgment
authorizing him to evict Shipley directly. Stubblefield delivered it to chambers ex
parte without a proof of service. Judge Sachs entered it. Shipley was forced to appeal
her own final judgment to reverse the debauchery. Despite a pending appeal on the
issue of whether Stubblefield could evict Shipley directly under Civil 798.56(d)
[as recited in the final judgment] he filed to evict Shipley under Civil 798.56(d).
Shipley demurred under CCP 430.10 [c] to abate the second action while the first
action [1204130] is pending between the same parties & appeal issue [ASIAS140026].
Did the court err in not abating the second action between the same parties?
3. Did the court err by compelling defendants to litigate complex issues in a UD court?
4.
Can a court compel an answer to a complaint with fatal procedural & substantive defects?

f: retaliatory eviction barred by Civil 1942.5 proven by RJN + complaint exhibits
Admissions in Plaintiffs Opposition to Demurrer Negate its ability to State a Claim
3
STATEWIDE URGENCY
Our legal system is based on the principle that an independent, fair
and competent judiciary will interpret and apply the laws that govern us.
The role of the judiciary is central to Americanjustice and the rule of law.
Intrinsicareprecepts that judges, individually and collectively, must
respect and honor the judicial office as a public trust and strive to enhance
and maintain confidence in our legal system. Judicial Ethics, Preamble
This petition addresses prevailing defendants having to defend a new case filed in
a different court while the first case is pending on appeal. It also addresses defendants
having to litigate complex real property issues in UD summary proceedings designed for
simple tenant issues. Answers must be filed in 5 days, cross claims are barred, pre-trial
motions and depositions are set on 5-day notice and trial is set on only a 21-day notice.
This deprives defendants of adequate discovery and truncates trial preparation time.
Granting the petition would enable the Appellate Panel to curtail judicial abuse by
reversing structural errors depriving litigants of due process rights to a fair hearing.
Overruling Shipleys demurrer to a new UD complaint authorized Stubblefield to evict
her directly under Civil 798.56[d]. Whether he can evict her directly under that code is
the issue on appeal in ASIAS 140026. Oral arguments are set for December 2014.
Legislators expressed their stated goal of encouraging park owners to seek injunctions
under Civil 798.88 rather than evicting residents by Civil 798.56[c] for violations. 1
Notwithstanding the courts clear error in denying Shipley oral argument on demurrer,
she must defend a complaint replete with fatal procedural and substantive deficiencies.
Legislative intent: This three-year sunset will arguably provide the Legislature with
the opportunity to re-evaluate this bill to ensure that the stated goal of encouraging a
park owner to pursue a lesser remedy against a resident of a mobilehome park instead
of eviction is actually reached without negative unintended consequences.) (Amended
by Stats. 2012, Chap. 99 (AB 2272, Wagner), eff. 1/1/2013)
4
PETITION
AUTHENTICITY OF EXHIBITS
1.
All exhibits accompanying this petition are true and correct copies of original
documents on file with the respondent court. There was no court reporter on duty
during defendants demurrer hearing on November 10, 2014.
Counsel will submit an
electronic CD of proceedings when it is produced after her request at Fontana court.

BENEFICIAL INTEREST OF PETITIONER;
CAPACITIES OF PARTIES
2.
Petitioner is defendant in an action pending in the Respondent Court entitled,

Stubblefield Properties, a California General Partnership v. Nancy Duffy, et al
UDFS1406978, a summary eviction proceeding. Plaintiff is Real Party in Interest.
URGENCY TO PETITIONER
3.
Absent intervention by this panel petitioner will be compelled to defend

summary eviction proceedings Stubblefield is currently prosecuting directly
against her, which were expressly prohibited by a Writ of Mandate issued by
this court on May 6, 2013. Stubblefield cited Civil 798.56[d] as the basis
for prosecuting the new case, while the exact issue of whether he can evict her
directly under 798.56[d] is on appeal. Briefing is complete. Oral arguments
are to be set on the December calendar.
IMMEDIATE STAY REQUESTED

Shipley asks this court to issue an IMMEDIATE STAY of all proceedings below
until this petition is resolved, or at the very least, until this court issues a decision in
the pending appeal between the same parties on the same issue, ACIAS 1400026.
Absent a stay Shipley will endure yet another unlawful eviction based on a statute
which does not apply [Civil 798.56[d] because Shipley is not a homeowner.
5
CHRONOLOGY OF PERTINENT EVENTS

4.
On 8/1/12 Shipley moved in as co-resident of a mobile home owner at Space 333

in real partys park. The owner had a series of co-residents sharing the home since
she bought it on 1/05/05. The owner registered Shipley as resident at the park office.
The manager drove up to 333 on 8/2/12 and tried to orally evict Shipley by stating if
she wanted to live there she had to move in with a sugar daddy over 55 in the park.
The manager confiscated a parking sticker the owner had attached to Shipleys car.
The manager told Shipley the owner had gotten away with having co-residents in the
past but would no longer get away with it under the 2010 park rules now in effect.
5.
On August 11, 2012 plaintiff nailed a 5-day Notice to Surrender Possession.

Shipley was unable to surrender as she did not own it. On August 27, 2012 Shipley
was served with a UD summons and Forcible Detainer complaint. The trial courts
denial of Shipleys motion for summary judgment was reversed by an appellate

panel, who found Stubblefield could not evict Shipley directly because there
was no privity of contract. The Panel ordered judgment for Shipley on merits.
Violating CRC 3.1312 the court ordered Stubblefield to write a final judgment.
6.
Stubblefield wrote a judgment authorizing direct eviction and delivered it to

chambers ex parte without proof of service. Judge Sachs entered it. Shipley was
forced to appeal her final judgment to reverse the debauched judgment. Despite
a pending appeal on whether Stubblefield could evict Shipley directly under Civil
798.56(d) [as recited in the final judgment] he moved to evict Shipley under Civil
798.56(d). She demurred under CCP 430.10 [c] barring the filing of a new action
while another action is pending between the same parties on the same legal issues.
On November 10, 2014 Judge Kyle Brodie overruled Shipleys demurrer, Motion to
Quash Service, Motion to Strike, and Motion to Transfer case to higher jurisdiction.
Judge Brodie ordered defendants to answer Stubblefields UD complaint in 5 days.
NO ADEQUATE REMEDY AT LAW

7.
Respondent Court's denial of Shipleys demurrer is not appealable. CCP 904.1.

Appeal after final judgment is inadequate as Shipley will have to defend eviction
under 798.56[d] while the issue of whether Stubblefield can evict under that code
is the subject of a pending appeal [ACIAS 140026]. Writ relief is essential to avoid
wasting significant party resources and court staff labor. California courts will have
to conduct jury trials in unmeritorious actions. Petitioner faces summary eviction.
If relief is not granted owner will lose her mobile home without due process of law
and petitioner will be deprived of shelter in the home she has occupied for 2.5 years.
Petitioner has no other adequate remedy at law for the relief sought in this petition.
PRAYER FOR RELIEF
WHEREFORE, Petitioner prays the Appellate Panel:
1. Issue an immediate STAY of proceedings pending outcome of this writ proceeding.

2. Either (a) issue a peremptory writ of mandate directing Respondent Court to set
aside and vacate its November 10, 2014 order overruling Shipleys demurrer, motions
to strike, quash service and transfer the case to a higher jurisdiction, and directing
respondent court to enter an order sustaining her demurrer and issuing a 180 day bar
on filing a complaint, or sustain demurrer without leave to amend due to plaintiffs
waiver of alleged covenant breaches, and alleged sublease; (b) issue an alternative
writ directing Respondent Court to show cause why it should not so be directed, and
upon return to the alternative writ, issue the peremptory writ set forth in subparagraph
(a) next above; or (c) to direct any other appropriate relief.
3. Award Shipley costs incurred in this proceeding and attorney fees under MRL,
Civil Code 1717, and any other basis in law for which she is entitled to attorney fees.
Respectfully submitted,
_______________________________________
Nancy D McCarron, Attorney for Petitioner
7
MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES

STANDARD OF REVIEW [DE NOVO]
An appellate panel independently reviews an order overruling a demurrer de novo. 2
There is no transcript in UD courts. Counsel will order a CD of the recorded hearing.
A transcript is not necessary as the panel does not review the validity of a trial court's
reasoning but only propriety of the ruling itself. 3 Panel is not bound by a trial court's
construction of a complaint, but makes its own independent complaint interpretation 4
A minute order recites motions denied; defendants must answer in 5 days. [Exh. K]
1.)
Court May Not Deprive Defendants of a Right to Oral Argument on Demurrer?

The court may not deprive defendants of oral argument at a demurrer hearing. Medix 5
We publish our opinion primarily in an attempt to delineate
circumstances which require the court to hear oral argument.
Medix @112
We doubt we have to persuade either the court or the litigants herein of

the critical nature of the demurrer stage of the proceeding. If, as we will
conclude in our discussion below, the demurrer should have been sustained,
its being overruled results in defendants having to engage and participate in
discovery and the expense of an eventual motion for summary judgment
Clearly a ruling on a demurrer involves a "critical pretrial matter,"
and the dispute between the parties on the issues raised are undoubtedly
"real and genuinewe conclude that the court erred in denying the
parties an opportunity to argue the matter in open court. Medix @115
Smiley v. Citibank (1995) 11 Cal.4th 138, 146; McCutchen v. City of Montclair

(1999) 73 CA.4th 1138, 1144; Howard Jarvis Taxpayers Assn. v. City of Riverside
(1999) 73 C.A.4th 679, 685; Ludgate Ins. Co. v. Lockheed Martin (2000) 82 C.A.4th
592, 602-603 Casterson v. Superior Court (2002) 101 C.A.4th 177,182
3
Lee v. Bank of America (1990) 218 C.A. 3d 914, 919; Mayflower Ins. v. Pelligrino
(1989) 212 CA. 3d 1326, 1332
4
5
Rader Co. v. Stone, 178 CA.3d @ 20; Rodas v. Spiegel (2001) 87 C.A. 4th 513, 517
Medix Ambulance Service, Inc. v. Superior Court (2002) 97 C.A 4th 109, 112
8
Medix found that CRC 324 governing demurrers supported its legal conclusion.
Review of the recording will show Judge Brodie thwarted counsels efforts to argue,
including walking away. Every litigant has a duty to submit to the courts rulings.
After a litigant has done so, he or she may demonstrate the legal errors on appeal. 6
Notwithstanding multiple errors, stare decisis mandates reversal on this error alone. 7
2. Pendency of Prior Action On Same Claim & Parties Abates the Second Action
Pendency of a prior action predicated on the same claim between the same parties
abates the second action. CCP 597
If the court in a second action overrules demurrer
its proceedings in the second action may be restrained by prohibition. CCP 1102-1105. 9
The court clearly erred in overruling demurrer in order to proceed with the second action
while the first action on same issue is pending in Appellate Division. ACIAS 1400026.
The pending issue on appeal is whether Stubblefield can evict Shipley directly under
Civil 798.56[d]. A process server served Shipley by personal delivery Oct 6, 2014 with
two sets of papers. He told Shipley 1 set was for her (after she identified herself at door)
and the other set was for Nancy Duffy. Exh A2 as occupant and Exh.A4 as defendant:
Exh A2
Exh.A4
The Duffy packet had a folded envelope on the bottom showing $2.24 postage. Exh. A6
Hart|King firm scanned the envelope via its postal meter (no post office cancellation).
It recited Duffys Santa Barbara address but was given to Shipley on 10/6/14 at #333.
First Legal mailed a third one, addressed to Duffy at Space #333 arriving 2 days later.
6
7
8
9
San Mateo Union HS Dist. v. County of San Mateo (2013) 213 CA.4th 418, 436
Horsemens Benev. & Prot. Assn. v. Valley Racing Assn. (1992) 4 CA.4th 153, 155
Auto Equity Sales v. Superior Court (1962) 57 Cal.2d 450, [must apply stare decisis]
Simmons v. Superior Court (1950) 96 C.A. 2d 119, 122-123
Browne v. Superior Court (1940) 16 Cal. 2d 593, 597; Kresteller v. Superior Court
(1967) 248 C.A. 2d 545, 549
9
Exh A7
Exh
A9
No package was ever served or mailed to Duffys Santa Barbara address, despite that
defendants had to answer in 5 days (with an intervening 3-day Columbus day weekend).
Shipleys packet had an empty Prejudgment Claim of Right to Possession JC form,
notifying Shipley in BOLD of her impending eviction if she did not answer. Exh. A10 .
Allegations show Shipley & Duffys sham evictions are based on Civil Code 798.56[d].
B14
B15
B15
B15
B15
The 8/10/12 7-Day Notice cited 798.56[d] ; correction was to remove Shipley.
B-93
10
B103
The 12/21/12 60-day Notice to Terminate Possession cited 798.56[d] to evict. B119
Complaint exhibits show Civil 798.56[d] as the purported basis for eviction. Judge
Brodie must be prohibited from proceeding with second action until appeal is complete.
3. The court erred by compelling defendant to litigate complex issues in UD court?

Palmer 10 court held mobile home tenancies cannot be terminated in summary
proceedings:
...The summary proceedings for obtaining possession of
real property outlined in the Code of Civil Procedure are not
applicable for termination of mobile home tenancies. Palmer 385
Palmers prohibition on summary eviction was later affirmed in Rich v. Schwab 11:
Our conclusion is also consistent with the holding in (Palmer). In
Palmer the court held the eviction requirements set forth in the MRL
control over the less stringent requirements of the unlawful detainer law.
(87 CA.3d at pp. 383-384.)
Schwab @ 803
Although a court has discretion to preserve the benefits of summary proceedings,
it may not disregard a legitimate need for, and a right to, time to prepare and obtain
reasonable discovery in advance of a trial of complex issues on conflicting claims,
or require them to be tried within summary procedures designed for simple UD claims. 12
10 Palmer v. Agee (1978) 87 CA.3d 377, 385
11 Rich v. Schwab (1998) 63 CA.4th 803
12 Martin-Bragg v. Moore (2013) 219 CA.4th 367, 389; Deal v. Municipal Court
157 CA.3d 996; see Lindsey v. Normet, supra, 405 U.S. at pp. 64-66 [summary UD
procedures are constitutionally acceptable only in straightforward issues of possession
and incidental damages.] Id Asuncion v. Superior Court, supra, 108 CA.3d 141,
Mehr v. Superior Court, supra, 139 C.A.3d 1044; Berry v. Society of St. Pius X (1999)
69 CA.4th 354; "the summary remedy of an unlawful detainer action was not the
proper vehicle to litigate the complex issues of title in that matter. (Id, 364.)
11
when complex issues of title are involved, the parties' constitutional rights
to due process in the litigation of those issues cannot be subordinated to the
summary procedures of unlawful detainer. proceeding to try the complex
issue of the parties' rights to title of the property. within the confines of the
summary procedures that apply only to straightforward determination rights
to possession, the court abused its discretion.
Moore @ 391-392
The cases cited above are consistent in holding that adjudication
of complex issues of title to property should not be forced to adhere
to the strictures that apply to summary proceedings for unlawful detainer. 13
Error in trial proceedings is prejudicial when there is a "reasonable
probability" that the error affected the outcome of the trial {cites}
Under the applicable test, the error was prejudicial. Moore @ 395
Faced with these circumstances, the trial court's trial and implicit
determination of the ownership issue within the summary unlawful
detainer proceeding, and refusal to permit trial of the issue of title
outside of those summary procedures, was an abuse of discretion
requiring the judgment's reversal
Moore @396
Under stare decisis the court clearly erred when it refused to transfer the case
to a higher jurisdiction upon indisputable evidence the home is assessed at a
value exceeding $25,000. [Exh.C-174]. Duffys home is not a mobile home.
Homes manufactured after 1976 are manufactured homes---not mobile homes.
Health and Safety Code 18007. Manufactured home
(a) Manufactured home, for the purposes of this part, means a
structure that was constructed on or after June 15, 1976 is built on
a permanent chassis and designed to be used as a single-family dwelling.
[see also HUD Code ] 14
Duffys home was built and installed after 1974 [in 1984] as shown below
13
Lynch & Freytag v. Cooper, supra, 218 CA.3d at p. 609
14
http://portal.hud.gov/hudportal/HUD?src=/program_offices/housing/ramh/mhs/faq
12
Moore @ 393
Plaintiffs complaint admits Duffys manufactured home was installed on a

permanent foundation under HUD code (not moveable) with HUD decals in1984:
Exh. B12
P admits [Opp.-Dem.Exh.G-186, ln 24 & complaint 37] filing in wrong jurisdiction:
Exh.G-186
Exh B-16
Damages: $31.75/day from 1/1/13 to 1/31/14 (365+31=396 days x $31.75= $12,593
$32.90/day from 2/1/14 to 2/1/14 (365 days) x $32.80=$12,008.50 which is for
rent only damages are $24,601.50---not included accrued monthly guard fees
which appear on monthly statements mailed since plaintiff refused to take rent 1/1/13.
[see Request for Judicial Notice of real partys monthly statement mailed to Duffy,
attached to this writ petition and incorporated by reference:
13
The December 1, 2014 monthly statement will add $1,012 in rent damages.
The January 1, 2015 monthly statement will add $1,012 in rent damages. Thus,
within 6 weeks damages will exceed $25,000, before the Appellate Division even
writes a decision on the pending appeal ACIAS 140026 between the same parties.
Secondly, plaintiffs Civil Case Cover Sheet [Exh. A-1] shows plaintiff prays for
monetary damages by checking that box on its Civil Cover Sheet filed on 10/3/14.
A-1
Third, plaintiff prays for attorney fees [Compl, 38 + prayer Exh. B-16, B-17]
causing monetary damages to exceed $25,000. Finally, because plaintiff waited
more than a year to sue for unpaid rent, plaintiff is limited to collecting rent in regular
civil action, without restitution of premises.15
4. Procedural and Substantive Defects Are Fatal to the Complaint?

A defendant should not be compelled to answer a complaint with fatal procedural and
substantive defects appearing in the complaint, exhibits or in documents judicially noticed.

Eviction is based on a 12/26/14 60-day Notice to Terminate Possession
B-152
B-152
The notice at B-152 is fatally defective, failing to list name, address and phone number.
15
Cal-American Income Property Fund IV v. Ho (1984) 161 CA3d 583, 585

14
The Proof of Service has a robo-signed stamped signature pasted on the document.
The form was generated at Hart|King. The unidentified process server is not registered
pursuant to B&P 22355 as the form does not list a license number. An eviction cannot
be based on such flimsy evidence of personal service, where validity cannot be verified.

Where plaintiff is a general partnership only a general partner can verify a complaint. 16
The affidavit is signed: "Fook Hing Lung Co. by Gee Chong Pong,
Member & Clerk of said Co." A test of the sufficiency of an affidavit is
whether it is so clear and certain that an indictment for perjury may be
sustained on it if false. (2 C. J. 348.) It has been held that an affidavit
cannot be made by a partnership firm in the firm name, since it would be
impossible to convict the individual partners of perjury upon the
evidence of such affidavit. (2 C. J. 325.) "An affidavit on behalf of a
partnership, therefore, should be sworn to by one of the partners,..
The affidavit states that the partnership was sworn, and it nowhere
appears that the affidavit was sworn to by one of the partners. Id
Plaintiff Stubblefield Properties is a general partnership. Thus, only a general
partner could verify the complaint. The verification at the end of the complaint
[B-153] is signed by Katherine Faulise, an account clerk in Stubblefields office.
B-153
16
Chong Pong v. Harris (1918) 38 CA 214, 217

15
A plaintiff must verify a UD complaint to ensure the allegations are truthful.

Where the plaintiff is a partnership, a general partner must verify the complaint.
There can be no negative consequences if a mere agent of the partnership verifies.
A general partner cannot be prosecuted for perjury committed by a straw man.
There is no incentive for a partner to refrain from making false allegations where
there can be no negative consequences for such misdeeds. The agents verification
is worthless fodder. Katherine Faulise testified the matters stated in the foregoing
document are true of my own knowledge. For example, 17 [Exh. B-13] recites,
Defendant McCarron neither intended to, nor did she regularly occupy the
mobilehome. Katherine Faulise could have no personal knowledge of Defendant
McCarrons intent nor could she have any personal knowledge of whether McCarron
regularly occupies the mobilehome. Ms. Faulise does not live or work in the park.
Faulise works at Stubblefields office located several blocks away from the park.
Faulise rarely even visits the park so she could not possibly have any personal
knowledge of who regularly occupies his or her mobile home in the park at any time.
Plaintiffs complaint is replete with innuendo, speculation, conclusions and lies.
The demurrer must be sustained because the straw verification is fatally defective.
c. breach of a covenant despite waiver by accepting rent after notice of breach
Under CCP 1161.5 a landlords declaration of forfeiture for breach of a covenant
shall be nullified if the landlord waives the breach by accepting rent from the tenant. 17
the acceptance by a landlord of the rents, with full knowledge of a breach in the
conditions of the lease, and of all of the circumstances, is an affirmation by him that the
contract of lease is still in force, and he is thereby estopped from setting up a breach in
any of the conditions of the lease, and demanding a forfeiture thereof." Kern @ 441
Exh.B of ShipleyRJN shows plaintiff waived alleged breach by taking rent. Exh. F-171
17
Kern Sunset Oil Co. v. Good Roads Oil Co. (1931) 214 Cal.435, 440;
EDC Associates, Ltd. v. Gutierrez (1984) 153 CA.3d 167
16

The right of lessor to declare lease forfeiture by the making of a sublease without
the lessor's consent in violation of the lease is waived when the lessor, after
knowledge of the sublease, accepts the rents specified in the lease. 18
e. delay in suing for unpaid rent or uncured covenant breach for more than a year
CCP 1161[2] limits damages for rent to actions served "within one year after the
rent became due." If a landlord waits over one year to sue for unpaid rent he is relegated
to an ordinary breach of contract action, which results only in a money judgment without
restitution of the demised property. 19 The compliant shows on its face that plaintiff is
attempting to collect damages for rent as far back as January 1, 2013. [Exh. B-16, 37]

A complaint fails to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action if it shows on
its face or it appears from judicially noticed matter the action is barred by an affirmative
defense. 20 Shipleys Request for Judicial Notice [Exh. F 168] shows defendants made a
complaint to HCD to compel Stubblefield to replace a burned out electric pedestal and
gas meter supplying utilities to Space 333. Defendants were deprived of gas, electric,
DSL or telephone for several weeks after a mysterious fire erupted in the electric pedestal
in front of defendants mobile home, which was under the exclusive control of the park.
An inspector issued a safety violation to the park manager, and ordered the manager to
replace the gas and electric meters to restore utilities to the home. He moved to evict.
Civil Code 1942.5 bars eviction for 6 months after a complaint it validated by HCD.
18
Kern Sunset Oil Co. v. Good Roads Oil Co., 214 Cal.435, 440; Miller v. Reidy,
85 CA.757, 762; Bedford Investment Co. v. Folb (1947) 79 CA.2d 363, 366
19
Cal-American Income Property Fund IV v. Ho (1984) 161 CA3d 583, 585
20
Halvorsen v. Aramark Uniform Services, Inc. (1998) 65 CA.4th 1383, 1391

17
Request for Judicial Notice [Exh. F 168] shows the complaint was validated.
Thus, the park was required to wait 180 days before prosecuting an eviction case.
The affirmative defense appears on the face of the complaint coupled with Exh. F-168.
While the courts focus is on the pleadings, relevant matters that are properly the
subject of judicial notice may be treated as having been pled.21
The demurrer should
be sustained because plaintiff was required to wait 180 days before moving for eviction.
Admissions in Plaintiffs Opposition to Demurrer Negate ability to State a Claim
Admissions contained in plaintiffs opposition to a demurrer can be used to negate
plaintiffs ability to state a cause of action. Casterson v. Superior Court (2002) 101 CA.
4th 177, 181 (face of the complaint showed the claim was barred by a statutory
affirmative defense); Rodas v. Spiegel (2001) 87 CA.4th 513, 517 (taking judicial notice
of admissions in plaintiffs opposition to demurrer); Setliff v. E.I. Du Pont De Nemours
& Co. (1995) 32 CA.4th 1525, 1534. Plaintiff made various admissions in its opposition.
The most glaring admission appears at page 6 [Exh. G-186].reciting a UD action is
a limited civil case only when the amount of rent and damages claims is $25,000 or less.
G-186
Since the mobile home is not moveable as it was installed into a permanent foundation
and enclosed rock walls it is impossible to relocate it. Secondly, the park does not
allow any homes to be moved in the park. Third, all surrounding cities and counties have
ordinances precluding installation of any mobilehomes more than 15 years old onto lots.
These ordinances are to prevent blight of very old homes moved into neighborhoods.
If Stubblefield acquires possession Duffy will lose $80,000 invested in the home.
Even a tax assessor assigned a value of $27,800 exceeding $25,000 limited jurisdiction.
21
Requa v. Regents of University of Cal. (2012) 213 CA. 4th 213, 223
18
CONCLUSION
Depriving defendants of oral arguments at a demurrer hearing was reversible error.22
The court clearly erred in not abating the second action while the first action between
the same parties on the same issue [whether Stubblefield can evict Shipley directly
under Civil Code 798.56(d)] is pending on appeal in ACIAS 140026 to be set for oral
argument in December 2014, pursuant to CCP 430.10(c) [demurrer, Exh. E-160 ln12]
The court erred in compelling defendants to litigate complex real estate issues of title and
right to possession, and application of complex MRL statutes in a truncated UD court.23
The court erred in overruling demurrer where affirmative defense [retaliatory eviction]
appeared on in judicially noticeable documents under Evidence Code 453. 24 Exh.F-168
The court erred in compelling defendants to answer in 5 days a complaint which is
replete with fatal procedural and substantive defects, most of which cannot be cured.
Admissions in Plaintiffs Opposition to Demurrer Negate its ability to State a Claim.
Plaintiff admits that under CCP 85(a) and 86(a)(4) that where amount in controversy
exceeds $25,000 the case must be filed in a higher jurisdiction. RJN proved home is
assessed at $27,800 [Exh. F-174] and complaint 37 [Exh. B-16] shows rent damages
from January 1, 2013 at $32 day is over $25,000 by Jan 1, 2015. No jurisdiction in UD.
The Panel must reverse the clearly erroneous overruling of demurrer and sustain it.
22
Medix Ambulance Service, Inc. v. Superior Court (2002) 97 C.A 4th 109, 112
Palmer v. Agee (1978) 87 CA.3d 377, 385; Rich v. Schwab (1998) 63 CA.4th 803
24
Halvorsen v. Aramark Uniform Services, Inc. (1998) 65 CA.4th 1383, 1391
19
23
JUDGE BRODIE SHOULD NOT SIT AS JUDGE UNTIL HE COMPLIES WITH LAW
As a final note, the Panel must find that Judge Brodie lacked any jurisdiction to rule on
this case, or any case, until he complies with judicial mandates of Govt Code 87203
Every person who holds an office specified in Section 87200 shall, each
year at a time specified by commission regulations, file a statement
disclosing his investments, his interests in real property and his income
during the period since the previous statement filed under this section or
Section 87202. The statement shall include any investments and interest in
real property held at any time during the period covered by the statement,
whether or not they are still held at the time of filing.
Gov Code 87200 expressly enumerates judges as subject to the mandatory reporting.
Complying with mandatory judicial duties is a condition of holding a judicial position.
Judge Bodie is not excused from complying with the law. Defendants object to his sitting
on a judicial bench despite his intentionally, inexcusable failure to comply with the law.
Judge Brodie failed to file a Form 700 with the FPPC in March of 2014 to report his
financial assets (for conflict analysis) for the prior year 2013. The last form he filed was
March 2013 for the prior 2012 year, and that form woefully failed to comply with duty.
Judges are subject to discipline by the Commission on Judicial Performance for failure
to comply with Govt Code 87200 to protect the PEOPLE of CA who pay their salaries.
Code of Civil Procedure 340, theres a one-year statute of limitation he can
be subjected to discipline by the Commission on Judicial Performance. Art. VI,
18(d)(2) makes a judge fair game for scrutiny of conduct occurring during the
six-year period prior to the commence of his or her current term. Yaffes current
term commenced in January. Yaffes failure to abide by his statutory oblgation
to report gifts and debt forgiveness, without more, would be disciplinable. Canon
2A of the Code of Judicial Ethics provides: A judge shall respect and comply
with the law. The law in particular, Government Code 87203 requires
that financial disclosures be made in the annual statement of economic interests.
It says: Every person who holds an office specified in Section 87200 [which
includes judges] shall, each year at a time specified by commission
regulations, file a statement disclosing his investments, his interests in real
property and his income during the period since the previous statement filed
under this section or Section 87202. California Judicial Commission v. Jaffe
20
CERTIFICATE OF WORDCOUNT
The petition contains 5,789 words (excluding tables) in roman typeface 14 font.
I relied on a word count generated by MS Word 2010 showing in the status bar.
11/14/14
VERIFICATION OF PETITIONERs ATTORNEY
I, NANCY D MCCARRON, declare:
I am the Petitioners attorney in this proceeding. I have read the foregoing Petition
for Writ of Mandate, and know the contents; the same is true of my own personal
knowledge, except as to those matters which are stated upon my information or belief,
and as to those matters I believe them to be true. I declare under penalty of perjury,
under the laws of the State of California that the foregoing is true and correct and this
Verification was executed on November 14, 2014 at Highland, California.
_______________________________________________
NANCY D MCCARRON, Attorney for Petitioner
VERIFICATION OF PETITIONER
I, BONNIE SHIPLEY, declare:
I am the Petitioner in this writ proceeding. I have read the foregoing Petition for
Writ of Mandate, and know the contents thereof; the same is true of my own personal
under the laws of the State of California that the foregoing is true and correct and this
Verification was executed on November 14, 2014 at Highland, California.
_____________________________________________
BONNIE J. SHIPLEY, Petitioner
21
PROOF OF SERVICE
Stubblefield Properties v. Nancy Duffy, et al UDFS1406978 ____________________________

The undersigned is counsel for petitioner/defendant at: 950 Roble Lane, Santa Barbara, CA 93103
805-450-0450 fax 805-965-3492
On the date recited below the undersigned served the below document in the manner indicated:
WRIT PETITION+EXHIBITS re: Overruled Demurrer & Motions in F-9 on Nov 10, 2014
[x] (By Personal Delivery) on 11/14/14 to the parties below as follows:
APPELLATE DIVISION:: Original+4 copies + Exhibits (Volume 1 of 1) 220 pages
247 W. Third St., San Bernardino, CA 92415-0063
RESPONDENT COURT: Hon. Kyle Brodie in Fontana Division [F2 or F9]
17780 Arrow Blvd, Fontana, CA 92335 (brief only)
[ ] (By Fax) Fax machine used complied with Rule 2003(3) and no error was reported by the
machine. Pursuant to Rule CRC, 2008 [c](4). I caused the machine to maintain a record of same.
[x] (By Electronic) email address below (by agreement) & with copy to
to: rwilliamson@hartkinglaw.com and regan@hartkinglaw.com
[x] (By Mail) 1013a, 2015.5 CCP. I deposited the documents in a pre-paid stamped envelope to:
Robert Williamson, Hart|King
4 Hutton Center Drive, Suite 900
Santa Ana, CA 92707 714-432-8700 fax 714-546-7457

I am familiar with mail collection in San Bernardino. I deposited the envelope in the mail at
San Bernardino, CA. I am aware on a motion of the party served, service is presumed invalid if
postal cancellation date is more than one day after deposit date on affidavit.
[x] (STATE) I declare under penalty of perjury and laws of California that the above is true.
Executed in San Bernardino CA on November 14, 2014
22
%
.
FCOURT
ILE
D
OF CALlFORNlA
SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIF

APPELLATE DIVISION
247 W. Third St., San Bernardino, CA 92415-0063
(909) 521-3574
CASE NO. ClVDS 1417078 1UDFS 1406978 (Fontana)
OF SAN BERNARDINO
BAN BERNAROINO DISTRICT
DEC 1 0 21114
~
CAROLYN OLBERG.
y
DATE: December 10,2014
BONNIE SHIPLEY,
Petitioner,
SUPERIOR COURT FOR THE COUNTY OF

SAN BERNARDINO,
-- - - NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS:
ORDER
--
---
--
--
-- - -
PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDATE
The petition for a writ of mandate and for a stay of the action is denied.
The Hon. Michael A. Knish and the Hon. Elia V. Pirozzi concur.
I certify that copies of the above Order were mailed to counsel of record as indicated on
Court Clerk
Superior Court State of California

Countp of B a n Bernarbino
Appellate Division
1
1
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
Writ # CIVDS1417078
Trial Court# UDFS1406978
The undersigned hereby declares: I am a citizen of the United States of America, over the
age of eighteen years, a resident of the above-named State, and not a party to nor interested
in the proceedings named in the title of the annexed document. I am a Deputy Appellate
C l e I k ~ u n & l a m t e a ~ r ~ l r t b g B b l s K 1 E ?&
s s g for&W&
processing of correspondence for mailing with the United States Postal Service.
Correspondence would be deposited with the United States Postal Service that same day in
the ordinary course of business. On the date of mailing shown below, I placed'for collection
and mailing following ordinary business practices, at the request and under the direction of
the Superior Court in and for the State of California and County above-named, whose office
is at the Courthouse, San Bernardino, California, a sealed envelope which contained a true
copy of each annexed document, and which envelope was addressed to the addressee, as
follows:
HART KING & COLDREN

4 HUTTON CENTRE DRIVE, STE 900
SANTA ANA, CA 92707
NANCY DUFFY MCCARRON

950 ROBLE LANE
FONTANA COURTHOUSE
Date and Place of Mailing: December 11, 2014: San Bernardino, California.
-
Document_Mailed: ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDATE
I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct.
Executed on December 11, 2014, at San Bernardino, California:
c-
>,
I
SM%,
CAROLYN SOLEERG
Deputy Clerk
COURT OF APPEAL -- STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOURTH DISTRICT
DIVISION'TWO
ORDER
BONNIE SHIPLEY,
Petitioner.
E062546
(Super.Ct.No. CIVDS1417078)
The County of San Bernardino
THE SUPERIOR COURT OF SAN

BERNARDINO COUNTY,
Respondeht;
THE COURT
The petition for writ of mandate and request for immediate stay are DENIED.
HBLENHORSB
Acting P. J.
cc:
See attached list
COPY
~ ~ ~ S ~ i i . - C 7 i S ~ O 6 2 5 4 0 ' Bonnie Shipley v. The Superior Court; Stubblefield Properties
Superior Court Clerk

San Bemardino County
San Bernardino, CA 92415
J Nancy Duffy McCarron

950 Roble Lane
Santa Barbara. CA 93 103
--
Robert G. Williamson
HartKing
Santa Ana, CA 92707
Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Two - No. E062546
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA
SUPREME COURT
FILED
En Banc
JAN 2 8 2015
BONNIE SHIPLEY, Petitioner,

-
' r a n k A. McOi~ireClerk
v.
SUPERIOR COURT OF SAN BERNARDINO COUNTY, Respondent;

STUBBLEFIELD PROPERTIES, Real Party in Interest.
The petition for review and application for stay are denied.
Chief Justice
EXHIBIT 15
3/15/2015
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MOTIONRE:FORANORDERTOCOMPELNANCYDUFFYMCCARRONANDBONNIE
SHIPLEYTOAPPEAR,TESTIFYFILEDBYPLAINTIFFSTUBBLEFIELDPROPERTIES,A
CALIFORNIA
12/19/20148:00AMDEPT.F7
KYLESBRODIE,JUDGE
CLERK:SHOSHONENEAL
APPEARANCES:
ATTORNEYROBERTWILLIAMSONJRPRESENTFORPLAINTIFF/PETITIONER.
ATTORNEYNANCYSHIPLEYPRESENTFORDEFENDANT/RESPONDENT.
PROCEEDINGS:
10:36
THECOURTHASREVIEWEDTHEMOTIONTOCOMPELANDOPPOSITIONTOMOTIONTOCOMPEL.
PLAINTIFFREQUESTINGANORDERFORDEFENDANTSTOAPPEARFORADEPOSITION.
ORALARGUMENTPRESENTEDBYCOUNSELFORDEFENDANT.
STUBBLEFIELDPROPERTIES,ACALIFORNIA'SMOTIONTOCOMPELISGRANTED.
ASTOBOTHDEFENDANTS.
THISCOURTWILLNOTGRANTANYSANCTIONS.
DEPOSITIONDATESAREASFOLLOWS:
BONNIESHIPLEYSETFOR01/05/15AT9:30AMINORANGECOUNTY.
NANCYDUFFYSETFOR01/06/15AT9:30AMINSANTABARBARACOUNTY.
11:15
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MOTIONRE:SETASIDEDEFAULTIMPROPERLYTAKENBYWITHOUTCOMPLYING
FILEDBYDEFENDANTNANCYBDUFFY,BONNIESHIPLEY
12/31/20148:00AMDEPT.F7A
VICTORROYSTULL,JUDGE
CLERK:SHOSHONENEAL
APPEARANCES:
PROCEEDINGS:
09:07
THECOURTHASREADTHEMOTIONTOSETASIDEDEFAULTANDOPPOSITIONTOMOTIONTOSET
ASIDE
DEFAULT.
NANCYBDUFFY,BONNIESHIPLEY'SMOTIONTOSETASIDEDEFAULTISDENIED.
09:29
ACTIONCOMPLETE
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MOTIONRE:TOTRANSFERJURISDICTIONFILEDBYDEFENDANTNANCYBDUFFY,
BONNIESHIPLEY
12/31/20148:00AMDEPT.F7A
MATTERHEARDANDRECORDEDINDEPTF3
CLERK:SHOSHONENEAL
APPEARANCES:
PROCEEDINGS:
09:07
THISCOURTHASREADMOTIONSTOTRANSFERJURISDICTIONANDOPPOSITIONTOMOTION.
NANCYBDUFFY,BONNIESHIPLEY'SMOTIONTOTRANSFERJURISDICTIONISDENIED.
09:29
09:34
COURTRECALLSMATTERTOINQUIRYABOUTMOTIONTOTRANSFERJURISDICTION.
THECOURTSTATESFORTHERECORDTHATTHISMOTIONHASALREADYBEENHEARD,RULED
UPONANDDENIED.
THATISONEOFTHEREASONSFORTODAYSRULINGBYTHECOURT.
09:38
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MOTIONRE:TOCOMPELFURTHERRESPONSEWITHSEPARATESTATEMENTFILED
BYDEFENDANTNANCYBDUFFY,BONNIESHIPLEY
12/31/20148:30AMDEPT.F7A
CLERK:SHOSHONENEAL
APPEARANCES:
PROCEEDINGS:
09:07
THECOURTHASREADTHEMOTIONTOCOMPELANDOPPOSITIONTOMOTIONTOCOMPEL.
COURTTENTATIVEISTOGRANT70.12
NANCYBDUFFY,BONNIESHIPLEY'SMOTIONTOCOMPELASTO70.12ISGRANTED.
PLAINTIFFTORESPONDWITHIN5DAYS
NANCYBDUFFY,BONNIESHIPLEY'SMOTIONTOCOMPELASTO12.2,12.3,12.4,12.6ISDENIED.
ARGUMENTASTO71.5&71.5:
NANCYBDUFFY,BONNIESHIPLEY'SMOTIONTOCOMPELASTO71.4&71.5ISDENIED.
09:29
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MOTIONRE:FORANORDERTOCOMPELINSPECTIONREQUESTFORMONETARY
SANCTIONSFILEDBYPLAINTIFFSTUBBLEFIELDPROPERTIES,ACALIFORNIA
01/29/20158:00AMDEPT.F7
KYLESBRODIE,JUDGE
CLERK:SHOSHONENEAL
BAILIFF:A.VELA
APPEARANCES:
ATTORNEYNANCYDUFFYMCCARRONPRESENTFORDEFENDANT/RESPONDENT.
PROCEEDINGS:
10:37
THECOURTHASREADTHENOTICEOFMOTIONANDMOTIONFORANORDERTOCOMPEL
INSPECTIONAND
REQUESTFORMONETARYSANCTIONSANDOPPOSITIONTOPLAINTIFFSMOTION.
STUBBLEFIELDPROPERTIES,ACALIFORNIA'SMOTIONFORINSPECTIONSISGRANTED.
THISCOURTWILLALLOWINSPECTIONOFINSIDEOFMOBILEHOME.THECOURTWILLNOTALLOW
ANY
OPENINGOFANYCLOSEDCONTAINERS(DOORS,CABINETS,DRAWERS,ETC..)INSPECTIONLIMITED
TO
FURNISHINGSANDLAYOUT,INSPECTIONISLIMITEDTONOMORETHAN15MINUTES.
BALANCEOFREQUESTISDENIEDWITHOUTPREJUDICE.
STUBBLEFIELDPROPERTIES,ACALIFORNIA'SMOTIONFORSANCTIONSISDENIED.
PARTIESTOPREPAREORDERANDSUBMITTOCOURTFORSIGNATURE.
NANCYBDUFFY,BONNIESHIPLEY'SMOTIONFORSTAYTOFILEWRITISDENIED.
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MOTIONRE:TODISMISSFORLACKOFSUBJECTMATTERJURISDICTIONFILEDBY
DEFENDANTBONNIESHIPLEY
01/29/20158:00AMDEPT.F7
KYLESBRODIE,JUDGE
CLERK:SHOSHONENEAL
BAILIFF:A.VELA
APPEARANCES:
PROCEEDINGS:
10:21
THECOURTHASREADTHEREPLYMOTIONTODISMISSACTIONFORLACKOFJURISDICTIONOR
TRANSFER.
NANCYBDUFFY,BONNIESHIPLEY'SMOTIONTOTRANSFERISDENIED.
10:37
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MOTIONRE:FORANORDERTOCOMPELTIMOTHYMCCARRONTOAPPEAR,TESTIFY
ATDEPOFILEDBYPLAINTIFFSTUBBLEFIELDPROPERTIES,ACALIFORNIA
01/29/20158:00AMDEPT.F7
KYLESBRODIE,JUDGE
CLERK:SHOSHONENEAL
BAILIFF:A.VELA
APPEARANCES:
PROCEEDINGS:
11:16
THECOURTHASREADTHENOTICEOFMOTIONANDMOTIONFORANORDERTOCOMPELTIMOTHY
MCCARRON
TOAPPEAR,TESTIFYATDEPOSITIONANDOPPOSITIONTOMOTIONTOCOMPEL.
MATTERTAKENUNDERSUBMISSION.
COUNSELFORDEFENDANTINFORMSCOURTTHATTHEREARE3MOTIONSSETFOR02/03/15.
COURTINFORMS
PARTIESTHATHEWILLREVIEWTHEMOTIONSASAP.THECOURTMAYNEEDTORESCHEDULETHE
MOTIONSTO
ANOTHERDAY.
PARTIESWILLBEINFORMEDIFTHEDATEFORTHEMOTIONWILLBERESCHEDULED.
COUNSELFORDEFENDANTREQUESTINGTELEPHONICAPPEARANCE.
DISCUSSIONHELDONTHERECORDREGARDINGTELEPHONICAPPEARANCE.
1/2
3/15/2015
NANCYBDUFFY,BONNIESHIPLEY'SMOTIONFORTELEPHONICAPPEARANCEISDENIED.
DENIALBASEDONTHISCOURTROOMNOTBEINGPROPERLYSETUPFORTELEPHONIC
APPEARANCESANDABILITYTO
HAVEAGOODRECORD.
11:43
ACTIONCOMPLETE
2/2
1
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6

950 Roble Lane
805-450-0450 fax 805-965-3492
and Defendant Nancy McCarron, In Pro Per
and for Non-Party Timothy McCarron (special appearance only)
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)
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)
action filed:10-3-14; UDDS1204130 filed 8/2/12 )
)
appeals ACIAS1200111(2012) & 140026 (2014) )
CIVDS 1208367, 1210511, 1302013, 1403933
)
(related cases)
)
California general partnership, dba Mountain
Shadows Mobilehome Community
Plaintiff,
v.
Nancy B. Duffy, aka Nancy McCarron aka
Nancy Duffy-McCarron, aka Nancy B. Duffy
McCarron, Bonnie Shipley, and Does 1
through 10, inclusive,
Defendants
Case No. UDFS1406978
OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFFS MOTION TO

COMPEL TIM MCCARRON TO APPEAR AND
TESTIFY AND FOR $3,150 IN SANCTIONS
with Supporting Declarations of Nancy McCarron,
Sharon McDaniel (owner, McDaniel Court Reporting)
& Dianna Peirson, Manager, Office Suites Building at
206 E. Victoria St, Santa Barbara (where depo was set)
DATE: January 29, 2015
(Limited Civil Case)
TIME: 8:00 a.m. DEPT: F7 Judge Kyle Brodie
PLACE: 17780 Arrow Blvd, Fontana CA 92335
19
I. DEPOSITION NOTICES SERVED ON MCCARRONS WERE FRAUDULENT
20
Defendants object to unethical fraud on the court, fraud on the court reporter, fraud on the building
21
22
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manager at 206 E. Victoria Ave., Santa Barbara, fraud on a process server, and fraud on McCarrons.
The court must sanction Ryan Egan, Robert Williamson, and John Pentecost [the HART/KING firm]
for the most blatant abuse of process this attorney has ever encountered in 20 years of practicing law.
The firm never called McDaniel Court Reporters to schedule two McCarron depos for 12/11/14.
24
25
[Exh 1-McDaniel declaration, 1:26]. Two Notices ordered McCarrons to appear at 206 E. Victoria Ave.,
Santa Barbara on 12/11/14 (Nancy-9:30 am) and (Tim-1:30 pm) despite the fact that McDaniel Court
26
Reporters have not occupied space since October. [Exh 1-McDaniel decl, 2:1]+[Exh. 2- Dianna Peirson
27
decl., 1:26]. The depo notices were a total fraud. They were served by hand to harass McCarrons at
28
their home and only to generate this motion for sanctions to harass. [Exh.3-Nancy McCarron Decl.,A,B]
1
Opposition to Motion to Compel Tim McCarron to Appear and Testify at Deposition and for Sanctions
1
2
Suspecting fraud from the onset, Nancy McCarron called Sharon McDaniel on December 10, 2014 to
inquire about the scheduling. McDaniel told McCarron they had not occupied their office space at 206
E. Victoria since October and had relocated to 21 E. Carrillo St. downtown. McDaniel told McCarron
3
4
that no one from the HART|KING firm called to schedule any depositions. [Exh. 1, McDaniel decl.1:26]
McCarrons appeared for the depositions on 12/11/14. No attorney from HART|KING was present & no
attorney from HART\KING notified McCarrons depositions were never actually scheduled. This was
because the attorneys knew they had never actually scheduled any depositions. The building manager
directed McCarrons to drive over to 21 E. Carrillo St. downtown, and verified appearance by signing the
top of a copy of the front page of Nancy McCarrons deposition notice. [Exh. 2 -PEIRSON decl., 2:1]
Evidence proves malicious intent to harass & abuse McCarrons by serving two fraudulent depo notices.
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The court has a duty to report this unethical conduct to the California State Bar. McCarron has
complained to the court on several occasions about this firms continued violation of CCP 128.7(a)
by using a cut and pasted signature block on the bottom of every pleading with three attorney names
[Williamson, Egan, and Pentecost] and then having someone insert squirrely circles on a signature line,
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rendering it impossible to discern which attorney is liable for signing if the pleading is held to be fraud.
The following appeared on the last page of the fraudulent deposition notices served on the McCarrons.
15
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who is liable for intentional fraud?
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When McCarron appears she must petition the court to ask Mr. Williamson who signed the pleading.
21
These three attorneys conspire to insulate the firm from sanctions for fraudulent and frivolous pleadings.
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The three attorneys violate CCP 128.7 which requires the composing attorney to sign his name only.
To discourage continued violations the court must sanction all attorneys who appear on the notice.
Sanctioning all three attorneys for these blatant and continuous violations of CCP 128.7 by using the
deceptive signature box may result in discontinuance of at least this facet of blatant deceptive conduct.
A deposition is a proceeding commanded under the power of a court. Attorneys are officers of the court.
26
Lay persons are not authorized to issue subpoenas to preclude abuse the court expects from lay persons.
27
Judicial Council assumes attorneys will not abuse powers delegated to issue subpoenas & depo notices.
28
These continued violations are an unethical breach of the powers delegated to them by Judicial Council.
2
1
2
Secondly, the firm continues to violate CRC, Rule 1.21 by failing to provide a signed Proof of Service.
The following excerpt demonstrates a violation. Anyone can cut & paste a stamp which fails to comply.
3
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violation 1.21[c]
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Proof of service of notice must be made by affidavit. Harris v Minnesota Invest. Co. (1928) 89 CA 396
Court must deny relief until plaintiff complies with same Rules enforced vigorously against defendants!
EQUITY DEMANDS SAME RULES MUST BE EQUALLY ENFORCED TO BOTH PARTIES.

On 12/31/14 Judge Victor Stull adopted plaintiffs argument that plaintiff was not required to file a
substantive opposition to Shipleys motion finding insufficient time was given Under CRC 3.1300.
12
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12/31/14 transc. P.10
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Judge Stull denied relief to defendants instructing them to re-file their motion complying with Rules.
COURT MUST NOW ENFORCE THE SAME RULES OF COURT AGAINST PLAINTIFF!
It is patently unfair, inequitable, and shows clear bias if a court vigorously enforces Rules of court
against one party while looking the other way and continuing to excuse the favored partys violations.
THIS IS A COURT OF LAW AND EQUITY. RULES MUST BE APPLIED EQUALLY TO ALL.
P&A below provides indisputable evidence of fraud on the court, fatal procedural deficiencies,
violations of Rule of Court & Codes of Procedure. Motion clearly misled the court on spousal privilege.
27
Stare Decisis requires denial, notwithstanding fatal procedural deficiencies and court rule violations.
28
Auto Equity v. Superior Court (1963) 57 Cal.2d 450, 455-456. (court must apply Stare Decisis)
3
1
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II.
The Motion Is Invalid as It Failed to State Statutory Grounds In the Notice of Motion
Notwithstanding all the substantive deficiencies the court must deny plaintiffs motion for failure
to comply with CCP 1010 governing Notices of Motion, which must state when, and the grounds
upon which it will be made, and the papers, if any, upon which it is to be based. It is not optional;
it uses the word must---not may. Plaintiff was required to state the statutory basis for reliefnot jargon.
This court lacks jurisdiction to grant a motion not filed in conformity with mandatory statutes, especially
where sanctions are sought. This violates minimum due process which must be afforded all litigants.
HART|KING advertises representing clients for 30 years, and is fully aware of CCP 1010 mandates.
The purpose of CCP 1010 is to enable party served with notice to prepare defense to proposed motion.
Alvak Enterprises v Phillips (1959) 167 CA2d 69. Court may consider only grounds stated in the notice
Hernandez v National Dairy Products (1954) 126 CA2d 490. A notice of motion which fails to state the
grounds thereof is defective. Keown v Trudo (1925) 71 CA 155; Bonfield v Bonfield (1925) 71 CA 705;
Hecq v Conner (1928) 203 C 504. No statute is cited in the Notice which authorizes this court to
compel Tim McCarrons appearance and testimony, or to award sanctions against him and his attorney.
This is because there is no statutory basis for the court to grant such relief in the body of the motion.
III. Plaintiff Failed To Cite Statutory Authority to Bring the Motion against a Non-Party
17
As argued above plaintiff failed to recite any statute authorizing the relief sought in his CAPTION,
18
violating CCP 1010 (must recite authorizing code in caption & notice). Plaintiff failed to cure the fatal
19
deficiency by even citing a statute inside the body of the motion authorizing sanctions against non-party.
20
Page 3 of motion (top) is the only reference to any statute applying to a non-party reciting as follows:
21
If a non-party disobeys a deposition subpoena, the subpoenaing party may seek a court
order compelling the nonparty to comply with the subpoena. (Code of Civ. Proc.1987.1.
22
CCP 1987.1 authorizes a party, witness, consumer or employee to move for a protective order, reciting:
23
CCP 1987.1 Order to quash, modify or limit subpoena
24
(a) If a subpoena requires the attendance of a witness or the production of books, documents,
electronically stored information, or other things before a court, or at the trial of an issue therein,
or at the taking of a deposition, the court, upon motion reasonably made by any person described in
subdivision (b), or upon the court's own motion after giving counsel notice and an opportunity to be
heard, may make an order quashing the subpoena entirely, modifying it, or directing compliance with
it upon those terms or conditions as the court shall declare, including protective orders. In addition,
the court may make any other order as may be appropriate to protect the person from unreasonable
or oppressive demands, including unreasonable violations of the right of privacy of the person.
25
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4
1
2
Where a non-party does not appear for deposition after subpoena under CCP 1987, the remedy
immediately follows the statute authorizing the non-party subpoena; i.e. CCP 1991 reciting:
CCP 1991. Punishment of disobedient witness for contempt
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Disobedience to a subpoena, or a refusal to be sworn, or to answer as a witness, or to

subscribe an affidavit or deposition when required, may be punished as a contempt by the
court issuing the subpoena.
When the subpoena, in any such case, requires the attendance of the witness before an officer
or commissioner out of court, it is the duty of the officer or commissioner to report any
disobedience or refusal to be sworn or to answer a question or to subscribe an affidavit or
deposition when required, to the court issuing the subpoena. The witness shall not be
punished for any refusal to be sworn or to answer a question or to subscribe an
affidavit or deposition, unless, after a hearing upon notice, the court orders the witness
to be sworn, or to so answer or subscribe and then only for disobedience to the order.
As shown by the attached declarations of Sharon McDaniel, Dianna Peirson, and Nancy McCarron
11
Tim McCarron appeared at the time and place recited on the subpoena and depo notice served on him;
12
no attorney or agent of plaintiff appeared at the scheduled time and place; no one ever notified the
13
McCarrons that plaintiff never actually scheduled any deposition at the recited time and place to appear.
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This fraud proves the purported setting of a deposition was a pretext; plaintiff never intended to appear.
It was served only to harass, vex and annoy the McCarrons and to cause them hardship and annoyance.
Plaintiff must be sanctioned for his fraud on the court, court reporter, process server and the McCarrons.
16
Under CCP 2025.430 the court must sanction plaintiff for failure to appear at the noticed deposition:
17
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If the party giving notice of a deposition fails to attend or proceed with it, the court shall
impose a monetary sanction under Chapter 7 (commencing with Section 2023.010) against
that party, or the attorney for that party, or both, and in favor of any party attending in
person or by attorney, unless it finds that the one subject to the sanction acted with
substantial justification or that other circumstances make the imposition of the sanction unjust.
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Tactics violate CCP 2023.010 (a)-(c) and are a discovery abuse warranting sanctions. CCP 2023.030.
This firm has engaged in abusive, scorched-earth litigation tactics against the McCarrons since 2010.
23
At some point, this court must finally get it and realize plantation owner Stubblefield uses the courts
24
as a whip against any serf residing on the Mountain Shadows plantation who challenges his authority.
25
Once a serf challenges the dictator he proceeds to filch his/her mobilehome & personal property through
26
sham evictions in UD court. Once filched the home is added to Stubblefields portfolio of rental units
27
advertised on billboards strategically placed right outside of the Mountain Shadows serfdom, advertising
28
homes at $845/month--a tenant bargain---and a windfall to Stubblefield who acquired the unit for free.
5
IV.
Failure to Comply with CRC 3.1346 (service-non-party deponent) is Fatal to Motion
Plaintiff was required to serve Motion to Compel & Sanctions on a non-party by personal delivery.
The Proof of Service on this motion recites it was served by overnight delivery on attorney McCarron
3
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who represents defendant Shipley and herself in pro per. The papers were not delivered by personal
delivery to Tim McCarron as required by CRC 3.1346. This failure is fatal to plaintiffs motion.
5
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V.
Objections to the Deposition Were Warranted Under Stare Decisis and Statutes
Plaintiffs argument objections were without merit is a blatant misrepresentation of the facts and law.
First, although plaintiff notes a proof of service indicates Tim McCarron was personally served 12/6/14,
that event occurred only after plaintiff tried to first serve notice by overnight mail, dumping it into the
10
11
same envelope used to serve Notice of Deposition of Nancy McCarron on Thursday, December 3, 2014.
below is excerpt from Exh. 4, p. 1 of this motion.
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served subpoena by mail
21
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McCarron served objections to plaintiffs failure to personally serve Tim McCarron. In a knee-jerk
24
reaction, plaintiff sent a process server up to our home to deliver the subpoena by hand to Mr. McCarron
25
This proves plaintiff knew the service by mail to a non-party failed to comply with CCP 1987 service.
26
Accordingly, McCarrons objection was appropriate and warranted as the service was clearly defective.
27
Although this deficiency was cured by the personal delivery on 12/6/14, plaintiff failed to cure its
28
defective service of this Motion for Sanctions under CRC 3.1346. This court is without jurisdiction here.
6
VI.
Evidence Code 970 Precludes Compelling Tim McCarron to Testify Against Party Spouse
Plaintiff has engaged in a history of misrepresenting the law and facts to 4 judges in this court.
Wilfred Schneider, Donald Alvarez, Michael Sachs, Appellate Judges, and now this court in Dept. 7.
These misrepresentations of fact and law resulted in their rulings being reversed on appeals or writs.
McCarron cautions this court not to be led down the same primrose path of reversible error by trickery.
Plaintiff misrepresented the law on the spousal privilege not to testify as a witness against a spouse.
EC 970 bars testimony against a spouse and EC 971 bars calling as a witness against a spouse/party.
8
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Evidence Code 970. Privilege not to testify against spouse

Except as otherwise provided by statute, a married person has a privilege not to testify against his
spouse in any proceeding.
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Evidence Code 971. Privilege not to be called as a witness against spouse

Except as otherwise provided by statute, a married person whose spouse is a party to a
proceeding has a privilege not to be called as a witness by an adverse party to that proceeding
without the prior express consent of the spouse having the privilege under this section unless the
party calling the spouse does so in good faith without knowledge of the marital relationship.
There are a few statutory exceptions enumerated at EC 972 none of which apply in this proceeding.
There are only 2 instances where the privilege can be waived, expressly enumerated at EC 973:
Evidence Code 973. Waiver of privilege
(a) Unless erroneously compelled to do so, a married person who testifies in a proceeding to which
his spouse is a party, or who testifies against his spouse in any proceeding, does not have a privilege
under this article in the proceeding in which such testimony is given.
(b) There is no privilege under this article in a civil proceeding brought or defended by
a married person for the immediate benefit of his spouse or of himself and his spouse.
Plaintiff knows that waiver does not apply on these facts as explained in cases annotated in EC973.
Plaintiff misrepresents the facts and knows waiver cases hold exactly the opposite of its arguments.
22
Lets get the facts straight. The mobilehome is separate property as acquired 1/5/05---6.5 years before
23
marriage on 9/28/11. (McCarron will bring her marriage certificate for in camera review to prove this)
24
Family Code 770. Separate property of married person

(a) Separate property of a married person includes all of the following:
(1) All property owned by the person before marriage.
(2) All property acquired by the person after marriage by gift, bequest, devise, or descent.
(3) The rents, issues, and profits of the property described in this section.
(b) A married person may, without the consent of the person's spouse, convey the person's separate
property.
25
26
27
28
7
1
2
3
4
As part of Stubblefields racketeering enterprise, to facilitate filching mobile homes from elderly and
disabled owners, who cannot afford a lawyer to save their home, racketeer Robert Williamson created a
52-page set of onerous, park-busting Community Rules to impose upon the unsuspecting victims to
facilitate filching their homes via sham evictions for purported rule violations. This caused market
values of mobile homes in the Mountain Shadows plantation serfdom to drop from $100,000 to ZERO.
Any rent formerly collected from Bonnie Shipley for her shared use of the mobile home went
directly to Stubblefield by way of Nancy McCarrons monthly rent paid to Stubblefield each month.
Shipleys portion of rent did not even come close to creating a positive cash flow on the property.
McCarron would have to collect $80,000 in rent from Shipley, and pay nothing to Stubblefield to even
recover her initial $80,000 investment. Either counsel Egan, Williamson or Pentecost (whichever
10
11
12
fraudster composed this bogus motion), blatantly defrauded this court by reciting Duffy-McCarron also
alleges to share the mobile home with her husband Timothy. Any cites to where McCarron alleges
this are conspicuous by their absence! All 3 HART/KING racketeers continue to defraud this court by
peppering their arguments with purported facts which are always boldfaced lies by the attorneys.
13
14
[BAJI 1.02 Statements of Counsel are not Evidence]
15
Plaintiff argues that Diepenbrock v. Brown (2012) 208 CA. 4th 743 recites there are opposing views
16
on whether waiver is triggered. Not true. Diepenbrock affirmed the trial courts application of privilege.
17
The only issued appealed was sanctions awarded against deposing partys counsel, which were reversed.
18
19
20
Plaintiff artfully omitted Duggan v. Supr Court (1981) 127 CA3d. 267 which McCarron cited in M&C.
Duggan is on all fours with this case. Duggan prosecuted an action to dissolve a partnership and force
accounting of partnership assets. Defendant partners noticed Duggans wifes deposition. A trial court
ordered her to testify, finding a community property interest in any recovery her husband might obtain.
21
Duggan filed a Writ Petition. The court reversed the trial courts order compelling her deposition:
22
The question presented is whether the action is prosecuted for the "immediate
benefit" of petitioner's spouse In granting the motion, respondent court accepted the
argument of real parties that the exception contained in section 973, subdivision (b),
applied"There is no privilege under this article in a civil proceeding brought or
defended by a married person for the immediate benefit of his spouse or of himself and
his spouse." In light of the foregoing, we respond to the question whether a spouse who
is not named as a party to the action, nor as a signatory to the partnership agreement at
issue, nor as record holder of any of the real property at issue, is a person for whose
immediate benefit the action was brought, solely by virtue of a potential community
property interest in any recovery which petitioner might obtain. Duggan @ 269-270
23
24
25
26
27
28
8
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
Duggan cited several cases, including two from the Supreme Court, defining immediate benefit:
These cases appear to limit the application of "immediate benefit" to persons who
are represented by a nominal plaintiff or defendant (as where a corporation serves
as the alter ego of its sole shareholder) or who themselves have the right to act or
defend against the adverse party on the issues involved. Otherwise, the right to a
portion of the recovery is not immediate and direct
(3) The Legislature is presumed to have knowledge of existing judicial decisions
construing words in analogous statutes and to have enacted a new statute in
light thereof. {cites} In this case, petitioner was a partner in a real estate venture.
We conclude that, under the authority heretofore set forth, petitioner's spouse
has no present, immediate, or direct interest in the property constituting the
partnership assets. Any claim to a community property interest in the partnership
would be against petitioner rather than real parties, and under the showing made
here, the action is not being prosecuted for the immediate benefit of the person
whose deposition is sought.
Let a peremptory writ of prohibition issue to prevent respondent superior court from
enforcing its order compelling the deposition of petitioner's spouse. Duggan @ 272
Plaintiff omitted Duggan because the court must apply Duggan under Stare Decisis. Auto Equity Sales,
supra @455. Diepenbrock affirmed marital privilege. Legislative comments to EC 970 explain why:
The rationale of the privilege provided by Section 970 not to testify against one's spouse
is that such testimony would seriously disturb or disrupt the marital relationship.
Society stands to lose more from such disruption than it stands to gain from the
testimony which would be available if the privilege did not exist. The privilege is
based in part on a previous recommendation and study of the California Law Revision
Commission. See 1 Cal. Law Revision Comm'n, Rep., Rec. & Studies, Recommendation
and Study Relating to the Marital "For and Against" Testimonial Privilege at F-1 (1957).
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
Plaintiff argued Diepenbrock noted conflicting authorities as to immediate benefitciting only half of
a sentence from the Rutter Guide while artfully omitting the other half. Diepenbrock noted conflicts in
immediate benefit but only where community property is at stake, such as in a personal injury action.
Personal injury damages recoveries are generally community property if the cause of
action arose during marriage (Fam.C. 780); thus, in a married person's suit to recover
damages for personal injuries sustained during marriage, the noninjured spouse has a
direct interest in the outcome and the privilege is waived.'' (Guide, 8:2344, p. 8E-109)
There is only a conflict where a potential community property interest in a monetary award is at stake.
Here, there is no community property interest. Plaintiff admits the home is a separate property asset.
Any rent Shipley pays is her prorated portion of rent owed to Stubblefield to rent the space at #333.
9
1
2
Even if Shipleys rent were income it is separate property. FC 770 (a). Plaintiffs argument Duffy
commingles funds deposited to her separate bank account is preposterous. Plaintiff knows Duffy
testified that she does not commingle funds with her husband.
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
rough draft of Duffy deposition 1-6-15

Asserting Duffy defends eviction for Tim McCarrons immediate benefit to use a pool is preposterous.
Tim McCarron went in the pool once in 2012 (3 years ago) while Duffy was napping. Stubblefields
agent harassed him there so he never returned. There is no immediate benefit to being harassed.
17
18
19
20
21
VIII. Sanctions Against McCarrons are Unwarranted/Unuthorized; Court Must Sanction Plaintiff
As explained above, under CRC 3.145 plaintiff was required to serve any motion to sanction Tim
McCarron, or compel his appearance at a deposition, by personal service. Mailing a copy to Shipleys
attorney fails to comply with CRC 3.145. An attorney and client may not be sanctioned for invoking a
statutory privilege. In Doe v. U.S. Swimming, Inc. (2011) 200 CA.4th 1424, 1434 the court held that
22
substantial justification means a justification well grounded in both law and fact. (See Union Mut.
23
Life Ins. Co. v. Superior Court (1978) 80 Cal.App.3d 1, 15. A party seeking discovery sanctions must
24
demonstrate that the opposing party's objections were insubstantial, were interposed for purposes of
25
delay or harassment, or were otherwise unreasonable. Weil & Brown, Cal. Practice Guide: Civil Proc.
26
Before Trial, supra, 8:846, p. 8E-152 (rev. #1, 2012). McCarrons were substantially justified to object
27
to a deposition prohibited by Evid. Code 970 & 971, and where waiver under 973(b) does not apply
28
as there is no community property interest in defending a sham eviction on a separate property asset.
10
CONCLUSION
The court should sanction plaintiffs attorney for serving a fraudulent "Notice of Deposition" set at
a non-existent location---where the attorney never scheduled depositions with the court reporter, and fo
filing a sham motion. This is clearly an abuse of discovery under CCP 52023.030. Secondly, plaintiff
failed to comply with CRC 3.145 and failed to file a motion under the proper Code of Civil Procedure.
(see declarations of Court Reporter Sharon McDaniel, Owner Dianna Peirson, and Nancy McCarron.)
The court should not tolerate this kind of unethical lawyer conduct, regardless of the merits involved.
Attorney McCarron spent 10 hours researching, obtaining witness declarations in defense of the
sham sanction motion, composing opposition & anticipates another 10 hours traveling to San Bernardir
(round trip) to appear at a hearing on this sham motion. McCarron's rate is $350/hour---the same rate
HARTKING charges Stubblefield for Mr. Williamson's attorney hours. Total sanction request is for
$7,000.00 to defend this fiivolous motion brought without substantial justification.
The court should sanction the firm for using a fraudulent signature stamv with swirled circles to
avoid complying with CCP 5128.7, and for serving a fraudulent Subpoena and Notice of Deposition,
under the authority of court, and for misrepresenting the true facts in presenting this motion to the coun
DECLARATION OF NANCY DUFFY MCCARRON

I, NANCY DUFFY MCCARRON declare:
1. I am attorney for Bonnie Shipley, Nancy McCarron, in pro per, specially appearing for Tim McCarrc
2. I make these statements based on personal knowledge and will testify to them if called as a witness.
3. All of factual statements made in above arguments' are based on my personal knowledge and are trut
4. I spent I0 hours researching, obtaining witness declarations in defense of the sham sanction motion,
composing opposition & anticipates another 10 hours traveling to San Bemardino (round trip) to app
at a hearing on this sham motion. McCarron's rate is $350/hour---the same rate HARnKING charg
Stubblefield for Mr. Williamson's attorney hours. Total sanction request is for $7,000.00 to defend
this fiivolous motion brought without substantial justification only to harass, vex & annoy McCarro~
5. The above excerpt from my deposition taken on 1/6/15 represents my testimony recited on that day.
I declare statements are true under penalty of perjury & California law. Executed in Santa Barbara, CA
DATED: 1/28/2015
and as Attorney for Tim McCarron (special appearance
II
EXHIBIT LIST
Declaration of Sharon McDaniel 12/15/14 + Exh A [Notice of McCarron Deposition - page 11
Declaration of Dianna Peirson 12/15/14 + Exh. A [Notes on P.l of McCarron deposition Notice]
Declaration of Nancy McCarron 12/16/14
Exh. A [Nancy McCarron depo notice] Exh. B [ T i McCarron subpoena and depo notice)
Exh. C [US Postal Confirmation of Personal Deliver of Objections on 12/8/14 at 8:3 1 pm]
Exh. D [fax confirmation showing objections were FAXED to 714-546-7457 on 12/5/14

950 Roble Lane
805-450-0450 fax 805-965-3492

1
case NO. UDFS1406978
California general partnership, dba Mountain )
Shadows Mobilehome Communitv
DECLARATION OF SHARON MCDANIEL
J
plaidtiff,
) CO-OWNER-MCDANIEL COURT REPORTING
..
N~~~ B. ~ ~ f faka
y ,N~~~ M
~ aka c j Filed~ with Opposition
~
~ to Motion for Order To Compel
Nancy Duffy-McCmon, aka Nancy B. Duffy ) Nancy Duffy McCarron to appear for Deposition and
Monetary Sanctions for $1,960.00
M c C m n . Bonnie Shivlev. and Does 1
through 10, inclusive, '
) DATE: December 19,2014
Defendants
- -- -.. .action likd:lO-3-11;UDDSl204130 filed 8/2/12 TIME: 8:00 a.m. DEPT: r 7 Judge Kyle Bmdie
appeals ACIAS120011 l(2012) & 140026 (2014) )
CIVDS 1208367,1210511,1302013,1403933
1
5
1
,
I, SHARON MCDANIEL, declare the following:

1. I am over 18, not a party, do not know any party, and base my statements on personal knowledge.
2. I am co-owner of McDaniel Court Reporting, together with my husband Kenneth McDaniel.
3. I have never scheduled a deposition, or been involyed in one, with Nancy or Timothy McCarron.
4. On December 10; 2014 I received a call from Nancy Duffy McCarron asking if we had scheduled a
court reporter to appear at 206 E. Victoria Avenue, in Santa Barbara on December 1l,20 14 for the
noticed deposition of Nancy McCarron at 9:30 am and then Timothy McCarron at 1:30 pm that day
I told her we hadn't received any job request from the HARTKING Firm for December 11,2014.
I told Mrs. McCarron the last request we received with that name was from "Hart, King, Coldren"
and it was a long time ago. Mrs. McCarron said the firm split up last year and the name on her
Deposition Notice was "HARTKING," as shown on Notice of Deposition attached as Exhibit A.
5. Nancy Warron told me thoir notices included the 206 E.Victoria Street, Santa Barbara address
which we have not occupied since October. I told her w e moved our Santa B a r h a satellite office
to 21 W. Camllo St., but no reporter was scheduledto appear at either address December 11,2014.
I declare the above staternedts to bc true under penalty ofperjlrry and the laws of California
Executed in San Luis Obispo, Californiaon the date entered below to thc icfi of my signature.
,*TED:
12-IS-/+
Y
-CO-OWNER OF M C D m COURT REPOR'IWG
DECLARATION OF SHARON MCDANIEL, CO-OWNER OF MCDANl@LCOtlRTREPORTTNG
6 Attorneys for Pldotiff STUBBLEFZELD PROPERTIES, a California
eneral
partnership dba MOUNTAIN SHADOWS MOBILa,HOME cOMM&ITY
SUPERIOR COURT OF TIIE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
c o u N n OF SAN BERNARDINO,
FONTANADISTRIC~
STUBBLEFIELD PROPERTIES,a
California eneral atnaship dba
MOUNT& SH&OWS
MOBILEKOME COMMUNITY,
Plaintiff
Case No.
UDFS 1406978
Assigned far all purposes to:

Judge: Hon.Kyle S. Brodie
vs
ANCY 8.DUFFY akaNANCY DUFFY

NANCY MCCARRON ~ k NANCY
a
DUFPY-MCCARRON &I NANCY:B.
DWFY MCCARRON,BONNIE
SHIPLEY, and DOES I thrwgb 10,
inclusive,
DATE: December 11.201 4

TUIE: 9:30 a.m.
Defendants.
.
--
2 1 TO ALL PARTIES AND TEEIR ATTORNEYS OF W O R D :

,
PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that pursuant to Code af Civil Procedure 85 2020.010, et.
23
seq., 2025.010, et seq., Plaintiff STUBBLEFIELD PROPERTIES, a California
24 partnership dba MOUNTAM SHADOWS MOBUEHOLMECOMML'MTY, will take the

25 deposition upon oral examination
26
27
of Defendant NANCY DUFQY MCCARRON aka
ANCY B. DUFFl aka NANCY DUFFY

. . .
WFY-MCCARRONaka NANCY B.DUFFY MCCARRON, on December 11, 20l4, at
28 9:30 am,at 1McDanieI Court Reporters, 206

1&61.O;W~-18074816~.l
E. Victoria Street, Santa Barbara, CA 93101
NOTICE OF DEPOSITf3N

950 Roble Lane
805-450-0450 fax 805-965-3492

STLJBBLEFIELD PROPERTIES, a
),
California general partnership, dba Mountain )
) DECLARATION OF DIANNA PEIRSON
Shadows Mobilehome Community
)
Building Manager for 206 E. Victoria St, Santa Barbarz
Plaintiff,
v.
j
N~~~ B. ~ ~ f f aka
y , N~~~ M
~ aka c ) Filed~ with Opposition
~
N~~~ ~ ~ f f yaka-N~~~
~ B.
~ ~ ~ f )~f Nancy
y ~ Duffy
~ , McCarron to appear for Deposition and
)
>
Monetary
Sanctions for $1,960.00
McCarron, Bonnie Shipley, and Does 1
j
through 10, inclusive,
~
~
f
~) DATE:
~
dDecember
~
t 19,2014
~
action fded:10-3-14; UDDS1204130 filed 8/2/12 ) TIME: 8:00 a.m. DEPT: F7 Judge Kyle Brodie
appeals ACIAS120011 l(2012) & 140026 (2014) ))
CNDS 1208367,1210511,1302013, 1403933
I, DIANNA PEIRSON, declare the following:

1. I am over 18, not a party, do not know any party, and base my statements on personal knowledge.
2. I am building manager at 206 E. Victoria, Santa Barbara, Califo-mia where I work regularly.
3. I have never known or been involved with either Nancy Duffy McCarron or Timothy McCarron.
4. On December 11; 2014 at 9:20 a.m. a person walked in the front door. I went to greet her there.
She identified herself as Nancy Duffy McCarron and the man with her as her husband, Timothy.
She showed me a deposition notice commanding herappearance at "McDaniel Court Reporters,
206 E. Victoria St. Santa Barbara" on December 11,2014 at 9:30 a.m. I explained that a deposition
could not have been scheduled as McDaniel Court Reporting had moved their offices last October.
I showed her the room McDaniel Court Reporters had used for depositions, which is now empty.
I told her their office had relocated to 21 E. Carrillo St, located a few blocks away down the street.
1
DECLARATION OF DIANNA PEIRSON, BUILDING MANAGER FOR 206 E. Victoria St., Santa Barbara, CA
5. I wrote and signed the notations appearing on the top of Mrs. McCarron's deposition notice, whicl
is attached as Exhibit A. I gave Mrs. McCanon my business card with contact information on it.
6. Mrs. McCarron emailed a copy of the notes I had written nn the top of her notice (Exhibit A) with
a declaration for me to sign and return m her concerning what happened on 12111/14at 9:20 am.
I declare the above statements to be true under penalty of pejury and the laws of California
Executed in Santa Barbara, California on the date entered below to the left of my signahlre.
L
DATED:
,cL@+-a
I?&
DIANNA PEIRSON,Office Manager

206 E. Victoria Street, Santa ~arb&a,CA
DECLARATION OF DJANNA PEIRSON,BUlLDING MANAGER FOR 206 E. Victoria St.. Sanla Barbara CA
6 Attorneys for PlAihtiff STUBBLEFIELD PROPERTIES,a California genera

ilprtnership dba MOUNTAIK SHADOWS MOBILEHOME COMMUNITY
A@-"
STUBRLEFIELD PROPERTIES,a
California eneral partnership dba
MOUNT.& SHADOW'S
M O B I L E H O ~COMMUNTY:
,

Plaintiff
NOTICE OF TAKING OF
DEPOSITION OF DEFENDANT
NANCY DUFFY MCCARRON AND
FOR PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS
AT DEPOSITION
NANCY B. DIJFFY aka NANCY DLWFY

DUFFY-MCCARRON aka NANCY B.
DUFFY MCCARRON, BONNIE
SHIPLEY, and DOES 1 through 10,
inclusive,
DATE: December I I, 2014

TIME: 9:30 a.m.
/I
21 TO ALL PARTIES AND THEIR ATTORNEYS OF RECORD:
(1
PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure $5 2020.010, e~

22
23 seq., 2025.010, et seq., Plaintiff STUBBLEFIELD PROPERTIES, a California general
24 parmership dba MOUNTAlN SHADOWS MOBILEHOME COMMUNITY, will take the
25 ]/deposition upon oral examination of Defendant NANCY DUFFY MCCARRON aka
I(
26 NANCY B. DUFFY aka NANCY DUFFY aka N W C Y MCCARRON aka NANCY
27 1DljFFY-MCCARRON aka NANCY B. D m F Y MCCAIIRON, on December 11,2014, at

28
9:30-a.m. at McDaniel Court Reporters, 206 E. Victoria Street, Santa Barbara, CA 93101
rrt,n
aq*.rc-<
?on? .no?c..
rl
i r J
iancy Duffy McCarron, CBN 164780

50 Roble Lane
lanta Barbara, CA 93 103
05-450-0450 fax 805-965-3492
ancyduffysb@yahoo.com
~ttorneyfor Defendant Bonnie Shipley
nd Defendant Nancy McCarron, In Pro Per
nd for Non-Party Timothy McCarron (special appearance only)

TUBBLEFIELD PROPERTIES, a
)
:alifornia general partnership, dba Mountain )
) DECLARATION OF NANCY MCCARRON
hadows Mobilehome Community
1
Plaintiff,
)
v.
1
rmcy B. ~ ~ fakaf N~~~
~ , M
~ aka c ) Filed~ with Opposition
~
rmcy D ~ ~ ~ - aka
M N~~~
~ cB, ~~ ~ ~)~ Nancy
,f Duffy
i
McCarron to appear for Deposition and
) Monetary Sanctions for $1,960.00
IcCarron, Bonnie Shipley,
- - and Does 1
uough 10, inclusive,
~
~
f
~) DATE:
~
dDecember
~
~19,2014
t
~ (Limited Civil Case)
C ~ ~ Ofikded:lO-3-14;
D
UDDS1204130 filed 8Ril2 TIME: 8:OO a.m. DEPT: F7 Judge Kyle Brodie
ppeals ACIAS120011 l(2012) & 140026 (2014) )
!WDS 1208367, 1210511, 1302013,1403933
I, NANCY DUFFY MCCARRON, declare the following:

I. I am a defendant and attorney for co-defendant Bonnie Shipley, and for non-party Tim McCarron;
I base the following statements on personal knowledge.
On December 11, 2014 at 9:20 a.m. I waked into a building at 206 E. Victoria Street in Santa
Barbara with my husband, Tim McCarron because I had received a deposition notice command'ing
me to appear at "McDaniel Court Reporters, 206 E. Victoria St. Santa Barbara" Decl 1,2014-9:30.
A woman who identified herself as Dianna Peirson greeted me upon my arrival at the front desk.
I asked for McDaniel Court Reporters. Mrs. Peirson told me McDaniel Court Reporters had not
occupied office space there since October and had relocated to 21 E. Carrillo Street---downtown.
Before we left she made notations on the first page on my Notice to confum I had timely appeared.
Ms. Peirson later signed a declaration supporting opposition to this motion to confum these facts.
1
3. I also called Sharon McDaniel, co-owner of McDaniel Court Reporters to verify their relocation.
Mrs. McDaniel told me during a telecom that no one fiom HARTIKING law firm had called to engage
a court reporter to appear for any deposition at any time on December 11,2014. She told me the only
similar law firm she had in their attorneyflaw firm database was Hart, King, Coldren in Orange County
I told her the old firm broke up last year and Mr. Coldren is not affiliated with the firm on my notice;
i.e. "HARTIIUNG." Mrs. McDaniel also signed a declaration in support of our opposition to this motic
4. My husband's deposition was also scheduled the same day. (December 1I, 2014 at 1:30 p.m.)
My husband told me he drove over to 21 E. Carrillo (the new location for McDaniel Court Reporters) a
the time listed in a Subpoena for Deposition he received fiom a process server last week at our home.
My husband told me he left a post-it note on the door at 21 E. Camllo Street to let the staff know that h
had showed up at 1:30 pm (as commanded in his deposition) and found no one inside the locked office.
The front door and office were all glass. If aperson were inside they could be seen through the glass.
5.
My deposition notice was not served personally. The notice was delivered by a Fed Ex employee
who regularly leaves packages at my front door on Thursday, Dec 4,2014. I did not see it until eveninl
The fm scheduled it to amve Thursday, to thwart my ability to research complex issues for three
deponents, including a non-party deponent (my husband). Since the depos were only 5 days later, and
the code requires objections to be served 3 "business days" before the appearance objections would ha\
to be served Friday (by personal delivery to the firm) when I did not even see them until Thursday nigh
6. It was nearly physically impossible to research legal issues and prepare objections for 3 deponents.
I was forced to do the best I could and FAXED them to the law office on Friday, Dec 5,2014 and also
delivered them to the post office at 6 p.m. in 2-day mail, which was to deliver them by hand Monday,
December 8,2014 which was 3 business days before the depositions, in addition to being faxed 12/5/12
Attached herein to my declaration is my confirmation that objections were faxed on 12/5/14 and that
hard copies of deposition objections were hand delivered to HartlKing on Monday, 12/8/14 at 8:31 a m ,
which was 3 davs before commencement of depos. Deliverv bv mail carrier counts as oersonal service
USC v. Weiss (1962) 208 CA2d. 759,769. see also Colyear v. Tobriner (1936) 7 Cal.2d. 735.
[McCarron decl.Exh. C-UPS confirmation shows objections were delivered by camer 12/5/12 8:31 am
see also Exhibit D herein-a
fax confmation showing objections were faxed to the firm on 1215114--
I notified Mr. Egan a mammography was scheduled for me in Santa Barbara on 12/10/14 - making it
impossible for me to attend Shipley's deposition even if it were authorized under discovery statutes.
Evidence shows the deposition notices were used as a fraudulent tool to seek monetary sanctions.
2
. F i y , the depositions of Shipley and McCanon include notice to bring certain documents as well
h e list of documents is the SAME documents plaintiff demanded at previous depos already delivered.
'he fact that the new requests were nearly identical to the first request for documents in 2012 shows
here are no additional issues not addressed in the fust round of extended depositions in 2012.
I spent 16 hours working on opposition to this motion. Eight hours were used to benefit myself.
Cight hours were used to benefit my client Bonnie Shipley. My rate is $350 per hour --- the same rate
h.Williamson bills Stubbefield for work on the same case against the identical parties. The total bili
or hours to benefit Shipley is $2,800 (8 hours) which I ask the court to award as sanctions for discover
buse as set forth in Points & Authorities in the opposition to this motion.
I declare the above statements are true under penally of ptrjury. Exccuted in Santa Barbara on
Iecember 16,2014.
3
DECLARATION OF NANCY DUFFY NICCARRON

Robert G. Williamson, Jr., Esq., Bar No. 73176
Ryan J. Egan, Esq., Bar No. 281836
HART KING
A PRO ESSIONAL CORPORATION
Telephone: (714) 432-8700
Facsimile: (714) 546-7457
ti
4
5
Attorneys fur Plaintiff STUBBLEFIELD PROPERTIES, a California eneral

partnership dba MOUNTAIN SKADOWS MOBILEHOME COMMU ITY
I1
MOUNTAIN SHADOWS
/I
19
11
I
1

Plaintiff
NOTTCF,
- - - -.OF
- - TAKTNG
-.
.- O
- -F
DEPOSITION OF DEFENDANT
NANCY DUFFY MCCARRON AND
FOR PRODUCTION O F DOCUMENTS
A T DEPOSITION
..
NANCY B. DUFFY aka NANCY DLTFFYj

aka NANCY MCCARRON aka NANCY )
DUFFY-MCCAKKON aka NANCY B.
DUFFY MCCARRON; BONNIE
inclusive.
)
Defendants,
-~

TIME: 9:30 a.m.
2 I /)TOI L L PARTIES AND THEIR ATTOKYEYS OF RECORD:

22
11
PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure $8 2020.010, et
! I
-"
--
'
req.: 2025.010; et seq., Plaintiff STUBBLEFIELD PROPERTIES, a California general
1- ;armership dba MOUNTAIN SHADOWS MOBILEHOME COMMUNITY, will take the

-- - eposition upon oral examination of Defendant NANCY DUFFY MCCARRON aka
II
I: >.IXCY R. DUFFY aka NANCY DUFFY aka NANCY MCCARRON aka NANCY (
I
-- DLTFY-MCCARRON aka NANCY B. DUFFY MCCARRON, on December 11, 2014, at
--
-.
- - .
1.:: 2 2.m.
at McDaniel Court Reporters, 206 E. Victoria Street, Santa Barbara, CA 93101
.. .~- - ~
.
....~.--.i826--SCii-C816v
1
NOTICE OF DEPOSITION
I
i
1 /and will continue from day to d b . excluding weekends and holidays until completed.
2
3
11
The deposition will be taken before a deposition officer who is authorized to
il
administer an oath. If for any reason the taking of such deposition is not completed on the
II
4 date set out above, the taking of the deposition will be continued froin day-to-day
5 thereafter, Sundays and holidays excepted, at the same place until completed, or will be
continued to such other dates and times as otherwise agreed by counsel. In addition to
1 recording the deposition tesrimony by the stenographic method, the deposition will be
recorded by audio and!or videotape in conformity with Code of Civil Procedure
2025220(a)(5). Plaintiff also reserves the right to record the deposition by way of instant
10 visual display of the testimony pursuant to California Code of Civil Proccdure

11
2025.220(a)(5) along with stenographic recording. This deposition shall be taken under the
12 provisions of Code of Civil Proccdure
4 2020.010: et scq. and 2025.010, et seq.
13
PLEASE TAKE FURTHER KOTICE that pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure
14
section 2020.510 and 2025.220(a)(3), the deponent is required to produce for inspection
15
and copying at the rime of deposition the items set forth in Attachment "A" hereto.
II
17 Dated December 3; 20 14
HART I KING
RobertJ.G.
Williamson, Jr.
/
' '"
Ryan
Enan
~itorneys-forPlaintiff STLBBLEFIELD
PROPERTIES, a California general
artnership dba MOUNTAIN SHADOWS
COM~IUNITY
LOBILEHOME
.-
4~
SUBP-015
rjohn H. Pentecost, Esq., Bar No.(mm.

Barnunbw.
99527, Robed G. Wllllemson, Jr.. Esq., Bar No. 73178
R ~ D R N E YOR PARTI W~~IMITATVJRNEY
SI~I~
FOR cDWTUSEDNLY
andaddm*sJ:
an J. Egan. Esq., Bar No. 281836
HART KING
4 Hdtton Centre Drive, Suite 900, Santa Ana, CA 92707
714.432.8700
TELEPHONENO.:
~ax~o.(~llmslr.714.~46.7457
E-~ILAODRESSio#~~uo:twllllamson@haflkinglaw.cam
AnonrrEr rm warn*:
SUPERIOR
plaintiff
COURT OF CALIFORNIA, COUNTYOF SAN BERNARDINO
17780 Arrow Blvd.
STREETPOORESS:
MNLING AWRESS
CIIYAN~ZIP
coos:
Fontanl, CA 92335
Fontana District
~RANCHNALIE
PLAINTIFF! PETITIONER: STUBBLEFIELD

~arlnershipdba MOUNTAIN SHADOWS MOBlLENOME COMMUNiM
DEFENDANVRESPONDENT:NANCY 8.DUFN, et al.
CABE NUMBEW
DEPOSITION SUBPOENA
FOR PERSONAL APPEARANCE
UDFSl406978
I
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA, TO (name, address, and telephone number of deponent Hknowl:
TIMOTHY MCCARRON
1. YOU ARE ORDERED TO APPEAR IN PERSON TO TESTIFY AS A WITNESS Inthls action at the fOlbllOWItlg date, the, andptace:
Date:
Time:
Address:
12111114
206 E. Vlctorla Street, Santa Barbara, CA 93101
130 P.M.
a.
b.
c.
2.
As a deponent who Is not a natural person, you are ordered lo designate one or more peraons to teslify on your behalf as
lo the matters described in item 2. (Code Civ. Proc., 5 2025.230.)
This depositlon will be recorded slenographicaliy
through the instant visual display of testimony
and by
audiolave
(XI videotape.
This vldealape depositlon Is intended for possible use al trlel under Code of Clvli Procedure sectlon 2025.620(d).
i f the wltness is a representalive of e buslness or other entity, the matters upon whlch the witness Is tc be examined are as
bllows:
3. At the deposition, you wlll be a s k e d queslions under oath. Questions and answers are recordedatenogmphbally at the deposlth;
larar they a m transcribedforposslbte use el 1M. You may read the wn'lten record and change sny tnconect answers before you
sign the deposition, You am entitled in receive witness fees and rnilaape actually traveled both ways. The money must he paid, at
tha oplion of the paIfygiving nolice oflhe deposllion, eitherwith s d c e ofthis subpoena or at tho t h e of the deposltion. Unless the
court orders or you m e otheiwlso, ifyou are behg deposed as an individual, the deposition rnusl take place withln 75 miles of your
residence or within 150 miles 0f)'OUr~sidence dthe depositmn wlll be teken within the county dthe couri where fhe action is
pendlng. 7he iooalion of tha de~O8liioRfor all deponents 1s mvemad by Code ofCIvil Procedure seotion 2025,Z50,
DISOBEDIENCE OF THIS SUBPOENA MAY BE PUNISHED AS CONTEMPT BY THIS COURT. YOU WILL ALSO BE LIABLE
FOR THE SUM OF 8 0 0 AND ALL DAMAGES RESULTING FROM YOUR FAILURE TO OBEY.
Date issued: 1213114
Robert G. W~lliarnsan.Jr., Esq.

ITYPEOR PRlM NAME)
Attorney for Plaintiff

{TITLE)
e
m
o
r of ssrvlee an ;euers%)
br Mmdalow Usl
ludijat CaunJI d cetianrta
SUBPUt5 ( R w . J a n w l.10ODJ
Fwm*dwCd
DEPQSlTlON SUBPOENA
FOR PERSONAL APPEARANCE
Pagold1
Code OfCivllProcrWI~85 ZWo.3ro.

2m5.220.2025,2P,
2025s2W,M25620
5cwarnnaM cad%gBW7.l
mn".rn*.LkOW
..,
SUBP-015
I
sTUBBLEFIELD PROPERTIES,a Californjs general

partnership dba MOUNTAIN SHADOWS MOBILEHOME COMMUNITY
DEFENDAW~ESPONDENT:
NANCY 0. DUFFY, st al.
PLAI~FFIPETITIONER:
CASE NUMBW:
UOFS140697B
--
PROOF OF SERVICE OF DEPOSITION SUBPOENA FOR PERSONAL APPEARANCE

1. I sewed thls DeposlHon Subpoena for PersonalAppeamnce by personally delivering a Copy lo ihe parson sewed as follow^:
a. Person s e ~ s d
(name):
b. Address where sewed:
c. Date of delhrery:
d. Time of delivery:
e. Witness fees and mlleage boih ways (check onel:

(I) wers pald. Amount:
$
(2)
were not pald.
(3)
were tendered to the witness's
publlc entity employer as
required by Government Code
secUon 68097.2. The amount
tendared was (speclfyl:
......$
.
.
............... ....
..........
.
f. Fee for service:
....................
....................S
2. i recelved this subpoena for servlce on (dale):
3, Person serving:
a.
Not a reglstered Callfornia process server
b.
c.
d.
e.
f.
g.
h.
Callfornia shedfor marshal

Registered CalBrnla process server
Employee or Independent contractor of a reglstered Callfomla process server
Exempt from reolstratlon under Business and Pmfessions Code sectlon 22350(b)
Registered professional photocopier
Exempt from reglatratlon under Business and Professions Code sectlon 22451
Name, address, telephone number, and, if applicable, oounly of reglstralton and number!
Ideclare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of

Callfmla lhet the foregoing Is true and correct.
(For Callfomja sheriff or marshal use only)

Icertlfy thatthe foregoing Is true and correct.
Date:
Date:
SUSPUiS IRN January 1.2008]
PROOF OF SERVICE OF
DEPOSITION SUBPOENA FOR PERSONAL APPEARANCE
~awldi
w F 0 f r " CDm
~

Robert G. Williamson, Jr., Es .,Bar NO.
Ryan J. E an,Esq., Bar No, 2 1836
HA~TI&G
A PROFESSIONALC O R P O R A ~ O N
714) 432-8700
714) 546-7457
6
7
I
I
Attorneys for Plaintift'STUBBLEFlELD PROPERTES, a California general

partnership dbn MOUNTAIN SHADOWS MOBLLEHOME COMMUNITY
SUPERIOR COURT OF TKE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

California eneral artnership dba
MOUNTA~NS&OWS
Plaintiff
v.
NOTICE OF TAKING OF
DEPOSITION OF TIMOTHY
MCCARRON

TIME: 1:30 p.m.
Defendants.
20
I TO
I/
ALL PARTIES AND THEIR ATTORNEYS OF RECORD:

PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure $4
21
22 112020.010, et seq., 2025.010, et seq., Plaintiff STUBBLEFIELD PROPERTIES, a California
II
II
23 general partnership dba MOUNTAM SHADOWS MOBILEHOME COMMUNITY, will

24 take the deposition upon oral examination of TIMOTHY MCCARRON, on December 11,
25 112014, at 1:30 a.m. at McDaniel Court Reporters, 206 E. Victoria Street, Santa Barbara, CA
26 93101, and will continue from day to day, excluding weekends- and holidays until
27 completed.
28
/I
The deposition will be taken before a deposition officer who is authorized to
1136568.022148~-43014784~~1
1
NOTTCE OF DEPOSITION
-0
1 administer an oath. If for any reason the taking of such deposition is not completed on the
2
date set out above, the taking of the deposition will be continued from day-to-day
thereafter, Sundays and holidays excepted, at the same place until completed, or will be
continued to such other dates and times as otherwise agreed by counsel. In addition to
recording the deposition testimony by the stenographic method, the deposition will be
recorded by audio and/or videotape in conformity with Code of Civil Procedure 4
7 2025.220(a)(S). Plaintiff also reserves the right to record the deposition by way of instant
8
visual display of the testimony pursuant to California Code of Civil Procedure
9 2025,22O(a)(S) along with stenographic recording. This deposition shall be taken under the
10 provisions of Code of Civil Procedure
2020.010, et seq. and 2025.010, et seq.
11
HART I KING
PROOF OF SERVICE
JOUNTY OF SAN BERNARDINO
Stubblefield v. Nancy B. Duffy, et al
UDFS 1406978
am counsel for defendant Shipley: My address is 950 Roble Lane, Santa Barbara, CA 93 103.
805-450-0450 fax 805-965-3492
In the date recited below I served plaintiff with the following documents:
IPPOSITION to MOTION TO COMPEL TIM MCCARRON TO APPEAR AND FOR SANCTIONS
: ] (By Personal Delivery) as follows: Mail Carrier to personally deliver in 2 days (by 12/18/14)
: ] (By Fax) The fax machine I used complied with Rule 2003(3) and no error was reported by
nachine. Pursuant to Rule CRC, 2008 [c](4) I caused the machine to maintain a record of same.
x] (By Email) to email address below @v ameement) with copy to nancyduffysb@yahoo.com
rwilliamson@hartkinalaw.com reaan@,hartkinalaw.com
] (By Mail) 1013a, $2015.5 CCP. I deposited the documents in a pre-paid stamped envelope to:
Robert G. Williamson, Attorney for Plaintiff

HARTIKING
Santa Ana, CA 92707
I am familiar with mail collection in Santa Barbara. I deposited the envelope in a US mailbox
ocated in Santa Barbara, CA. I am aware on a motion of the party served, service is presumed
nvalid if postal cancellation date is more than one day after deposit date on affidavit.
XI (STATE)
I declare under penalty of perjury and laws of California that d e above is true.
Executed in Santa Barbara, CA on the date indicated below.
~ a h DU@
c ~ McCarron, in Pro Per
and as Attorney for Tim McCarron 1/28/15
13
Less than $10,000 - State the total amount claimed $
More than $10,000 - Check one of the boxes:
Municipal Court Jurisdiction ($10,000 - $25,000)
Superior C ~ : i i Jurisdiction
~t
($25,001 and up)
1. Name of Claimant: Nancy
h?zCarron
805-965-3492
2. Address of Claimant: 9 5 0 Roble Lane

3. Notices concerning claim should be sent to:
Address
4.
Z p Code
Circumstances giving rise to claim are as follows: attached Notice of Racketeerins Action
5.
Date, Time and 1 c (city, street, cro s-street damage o curred a d nature thereof: see attached
6.
Public property and/or public officers or employees causing injury, damage or loss: Kyle Brodie
(will add other cons~irinqracketeers on discovery of s u ~ ~ o r t i evidence)
nq
C [B/3.&zQ,
~
d~ 4 ~ 1 2 -
8. Basis of computation of claimed amount is as follows:

Loss wages
----Estimated future medical expenses
Gener2.l damages
Other expenses
Propetty damage $80,000 value mobile home
Other damages: Judge Brodie is enabling abusive, harassing, illegal litigation tactics by refusing to
a ~ p l ythe law, Codes of Procedure, Cocrt Rules; refusing to re:lassify case to higher jurisdiction to
enable cross claims for elder abuse ai?dintentional infliction of emotional distress, Judge Brodie is a
participant in a racketeering enterprise in which he refuses to rulr against Stubblefield, has granted an
order to authorizing Stubblefield's gocn squad to invade our hcrne l o "videotape, photograph & test"
the inside of our private home; "tests & samples" on exterior (we believe agents intend to plant drugs)
and he intends to sign an order compe!ling my husband to testi;;/ at a deposition, breaking his spousal
Office: (909)386-8631
3/15/2015
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RULINGONSUBMITTEDMATTER
03/02/20154:00PMDEPT.F7
KYLESBRODIE,JUDGE
CLERK:SHOSHONENEAL
COURTRULESASFOLLOWSONSUBMITTEDMATTER:
STUBBLEFIELDPROPERTIES,ACALIFORNIA'SMOTIONFORORDERTOCOMPELTIMOTHY
MCCARRONTOAPPEARISDENIED.
STUBBLEFIELDPROPERTIES,ACALIFORNIA'SMOTIONFORMONETARYSANCTIONSISDENIED.
NOTICEGIVENBYJUDICIALASSISTANT
CORRESPONDENCECOVERSHEETGENERATEDTOMAILRULINGONSUBMITTEDMATTERTO
COUNSELOFRECORD.
ACTIONCOMPLETE
1/1
EXHIBIT 16
3/15/2015
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EXPARTERE:ORDERTOENJOINANDRESTRAINDEFNANCYDUFFYMCCARFILED
BYSTUBBLEFIELDPROPERTIES,ACALIFORNIA
02/18/20151:14PM
Receipt:1502182081$60.00
1502182081MCReferenceNumber270163313708
Code
Text
Operator
*FEE
1502182081MCMMF/60.00Paymt JECAS
*REFNM 1502182081MCReferenceNumber270163313708
JECAS
1/1
SuPERloR L'ubT5FDCAuFoRNIA
COUNTY OF SAN BERNAROINO
FONTANA OIS?RICT

1 Robert G. Williamson, Jr,, Es .,Bar No. 73176
Ryan J. E an, Esq., Bar No. 2 1836
2 HART 1 NG
3 Santa Ana, California 92707
Telephone: (714 432-8700
4 F a s m i e : (7141 546-7457
17 I
FEB 1 8 2015
5 Attorneys for Plaintiff STUBBLEFIELD PROPERTIES, a California eneral

partnership dba MOUNTAIN SHADOWS MOBILEHOME C O M M ~ T Y
6

COUNTY OF SAN BERNARDINO-FONTANA DISTRICT
MOUNTAIN SHADOWS
)
)
)

Assigned for all purposes,
PLAINTIFF'S EX PARTE
APPLICATION FOR ORDER T O
ENJOIN AND RESTRAIN
DEFENDANT
NANCY DUFFYV.
) MCCARRON AND HER EMPLOYEES
AND AGENTS FROM
NANCY B. DUFFY aka NANCY DUFFY
COMMUNICATING DIRECTLY oR
IM)IRECTLY TO PLAINTIFF,S
DUFFY-MCCARRON aka NANCY B.
EMPLOYEES
AND AGENTS;
DECLARATIONS
O F ELISAVETA
POGODAEVA
;RYAN J. EGAN IN
inclusive,
SUPPORT THEREOF
Defendants.
Date: February 19,2015
Time: 8:00 a.m.
Dept: FT$
Plaintiff
Nancy D
m McCarron, CBN 164780
Law Office of Nancy D u f ~

950 Roble Lane
March 3, 2015
Honorable Marsha G. Slough
Presiding Judge
303 W. Third Street, Fourth Floor
sent via fax to: 909-708-8769

sent via email to: msloug;h@sb-court.org
re: DEMAND TO ENFORCE
COURT RULES & CODES
CONFIDENTIAL - PART 1
Dear Ms. Slough:

I realize you just returned today after a leave or vacation since February 23, 2015.
Unfortunatelv. vou must act immediatelv to address the abuses occurring in vour courts.
I am sure that you have already reviewed the complaint I submitted to the county and city
about Stubblefield's continued corruption & intimidation of public officials, including bribing
arson investigators and battalion chiefs to falsify arson reports to cover up criminal conduct.
Stubblefield advertises his love of money by wearing it in pictures posted on facebook. (Exh. A).
Apparently, Stubblefield's intimidation of judicial officers continues to infect your courts.
WE DEMAND AN ANSWER IN WRITING TO THE FOLLOWING QUESTION?
DOES MONEY MAN STUBBLFIELD CONTROL ALL O F YOUR COURTS & STAFF?
It certainly appears so.? &
Every time we file a pleading in Fontana F7 the clerks review our proof of service ~i&o~rously.
They even require my husband to sign the bottom of my proofs of service telliiizme-theyhave
to require a "third party" to sign it because I am a "party defendant" even though the motions
and oppositions are filed for Bonnie Shipley, and I am her attorney of record. On the other
hand, these same clerks are now accepting pleadings from HART I KING law firm without any
proof of service at all, and setting his motions on 24 hour notice where there is no emergency!
A bogus so-called "emergency" exparte motion was filed in F7 for a "restraining order" against
me on 2/18/15 without anv roof of service or notice t o m . I did not even discover there was a
hearing until after the hearing already occurred. Judge Lily Sinfield had enough sense to see
through this fraud on the court and must have realize no bar member would fail to appear or
oppose a motion for a permanent restraining order against her free speech. She DENIED it.
Even after the frivolous motion was denied the firm still r e f ~ ~ s etod serve me with the papers.
I had to send a runner to seek out Supervisor Amanda T a m ~ e r o nto get a copy of the papers,
which the firm never served to date. WE DEMAND THAT YOU STOP THIS ABUSE NOW!
-
Less than a week later, HART I KING filed yet another frivolous so-called "emergenc_V1'
exparte motion in Judge Sachs' court (S-28) on 24-hour notice setting it for 8:30 tomorrow,
without anv proof of service. The firm ignored my 2 emailo dsmanding papers to be served.
They are being trained, like Pavlov's dogs, to continue this abuse because your staff rewards
them by continuing to accept these ex parte motions where there is no "emergency" and with
NO PROOF OF SERVICE. Even if it were an emergency there is no excuse for not serving!
CRC 2.117 requires all papers filed in court to be served
on all parties to the action. (Exh. B)
*
Please consider this a demand that you carry out your duties as presiding judge.
It is YOUR RESPONSIBILITY to control San Bernardino Judges and court staff.
YOU MUST STOP THIS ABUSE NOW!
We demand that you circulate notices to all judges and court staff that they cannot accept
motion papers under anv circumstances without executed proofs of service attached thereon.
(except in cases of domestic violence where it would be too dangerous to give notice).
WE DElMAND TO KNOW WHY YOUR CLERKS AND JUDGES ARE ALLOWING

STUBBLEFIELD'S LAWYERS TO FILE EX PARTE MOTIONS WHERE THERE IS NO
EMERGENCY AND WITHOUT ANY PROOFS OF SERVICE ATTACHED TO THEM?
You know this is a blatant violation of due process. Yet, your staff is training these lawyers
like Pavlov's dogs, that they will continue to reward their illegal and unethical conduct by
continuing to set ex parte motions where no emergency exists and without serving me at all!
Secondly, we demand an answer as to why you continue to allow Judge Brodie to prosecute
this action against me where there is NO JURISDICTION and why you're Appellate Division
Judges are sitting on a writ I filed on February 17, 2015 where no opposition was ever filed.
Has Stubblefield been told that he need not oppose writs as all of them will be denied for him,
regardless of the law? WE DEMAND THEY APPLY THE LAW AND TRANSFER THIS CASE.
I already emailed you about my righteous writ petition which your judges are sitting on! Why?
Why can't they just apply the law even if it means ruling against the almighty billionaire!
The unethical HART I KING firm continues to vex and harass us, enabled by your staff.
I set a renewed motion for attorney fees in Judge Sachs' department on 3/18/15at 8:30 a.m.
Yesterday this unethical firm intentionally, and with malice, scheduled two bogus motions to
compel with sanctions on the SAME DAY in Judge Brodie's court in Fontana 3/18/15a t 8:00.
I cannot be in 2 physical locations a t the same time although they can with 2 different lawyers!
These are two frivolous motions (filed for no other reason than to harass us) against innocent
third parties who have nothing to do with whether Bonnie Shipley can be my co-resident.
(my handyman Steve Allen and his ex-wife). They have nothing to do with this. See Exh. C
This is vet another reason whv vou cannot allow this case to be prosecuted in Fontana.
There is no jurisdiction in Fontana as damages sought exceed $25,000. You must transfer it!
We expect a response in writing as to what you intend to do to carry out your duties.
If you do nothing, we will file a new complaint with Kamala Harris and ask her office to
investigate yet another massive corruption in San Bernardino now infecting the courts!
cc: Supervisors, County, City
URGENT - MUST IMMEDIATELY STOP FRAUD I S-28 8:25 AM

Nancy D u e McCarron, CBN 164780
Law Office of Nancy Duffy
950 Roble Lane
March 4, 2015
I
I
8:25 (before Dept. S-28 starts calendar at 8:25 a.m.

Presiding Judge
sent via fax to: 909-708-8782 909-708-8586

sent via email to: msloueh@sb-c0urt.G.
re: DEMAND TO ENFORCE
CRC 1.21, 2.117, 3.1203, 2.117
Local Rule 73 1.1 Confidential-Part 2
Dear Ms. Slough:
WE DEMAND YOU IMMEDIATELY GO DOWN TO 5-28 AND STOP THIS FRAUD

Attached are Exhibits A-D proving the hearing a t 8:30 in S-28 is a complete fraud!
I t violates CA Rules of Court, and Local Rule 731.1 (as cited above and shown in Exh. D)
A- Shows right before noon (1136 am) I emailed Hart\King demanding a copy of the papers
they filed in your court (cover page shown a t Exh. B)
Exh. A also shows despite notice at noon they intentionally withheld emailing me
The 52-page motion until 3:00 p.m (after court closed to preclude filing opposition)
B- Shows YOUR CLERK accepted a 52-page motion WITHOUT a PROOF of SERVICE
violating CRC 1.21, 2.117 Local Rule 731.1 proves she accepted it before NOON
WITHOUT ANY PROOF O F SERVICE ATTACHED SHOWING SERVICE ON ME
C- This is the LAST page of the 52 page motion showing NO PROOF OF SERVICE
Although it complied with CRC 3.1203 (notice by 10 am) it FAILED TO COMPLY
With CRC 1.21 and 2.117 and combined with Local Rule 731.1
D- Shows all rules of court and local rule VIOLATED
If you do not go down to S-28 and STOP THIS FRAUD ON THE COURT I WILL HOLD
YOU RESPONSIBLE FOR ALLOWING THIS BLATANT FRAUD ON THE COURT
I WILL FILE A COMPLAINT WITH THE GOVERNOR AND W I L L A HARRIS
TO OPEN A NEW INVESTIGATION FOR A SEWER OF CORRUPTION IN COURTS
March 2 20 15
11 52 am
We have not raeivecl any papers served by fed ex or a t h e r h e r . it isnearty noon.

We demand that you IUMEDlATELY SENDALLPAFERS &our mothnand dl attachments) b1Unz1thby ematl
This dnes not q a l i 8s an "merge~y'umlecexpertewles You confinned that you knew about
*fee
d o n an Feb. 1%!
You nlen6an;lltywaitfa unhltha dav before lrour opposlrion vras due to intentionally -&o:age me VI~UI24 hour notlce
You are the most ufimwl anarneF I have encoumered in 20 yem
%u ha..%M,marats no ethfcs. no dimly YGU are scoundrelsand will pay !he pnee
That is a promisst
We +ill
take all legal adlon (c assore your blatantviolatlm at mrt rules are no! STOPPED by ma murt
Nancy Duffy McCat-ron, CRN 164780
I.:<
CGten
Rale 731.1 Civil cx arrte apltlira(Mor

Afl ex. pde applications must be Bled with ihe Caure no later tk
wuri day prwding the: day of the scheduled hearing on &e ex parte appiic
an ex prte order must notify aEI W e s nu later than 10:M A.M. oa the etzaut day before the ex
appearance ss provided by the mi%mia Rules of C o a rule 3.1203. (EfX July E,2tlt 1.)
a '.V4ilran?m3..Rgsn 2. Elan
Ms,PAcCaren,
Attached @east find P i ~ i n t i REx~Paito Ap~licatat!cn
ic:i3r~e:Contmuin; t h H
~o a i r q an Uef~dart'silrnei-weM2t8sn LrxMtcmcy Fesfa Peml: s!ai%tj'!;.o mpxi Erpa? Cedaration c?:bi:&G.
R ? z r J. Fgi:: m Soppo:t?ile!eof rttk :?narc to :hf &?houe-re%rearedmatter
Vdiibarnrm. ;r; C ~ 8 a r d B mof
Sandy Moore I Legal Aaistant

Td. i14-432-6703 x357 1 Fax. ?14-540-I457
5!%3ure@h>ttk%?>claw,~
1 v<v:w bacsi<nt7~2!!.%of:l
17
<.,v:.;.t;. a
'Q?
3s
'
:&ear+:m t br St+mqr a d 4.-
piovir%i r i x%nh
gyc?
ILE
suPER@RF
COURT
OF D
c,q.Ip~np,;~
COuWr OF SAN B E R & I ~ ~ ~ ~ ~
~ERNARDINOn
John H. ~entecost,Esq., Bar

Robert G. 'Williamson, Jr.,
Ryan J. E an, Esq., Bar No. 2 1 3
HART I ~ N G
4 Hutton Centre Drive, Suite 900Sanfa Ana. Callifornia 92707
Tele hone; (714) 432-8700
.Fats mile: (714) 546-7457
fs~~lc~
i'
Attorneys for Plaintiff STUBBLEFIELD PROPERTIES,

a California General Partnershi dba MOUNTAIN SHADOWS
MOBILE HOME COMMUNIT!
COUNTY OF S A N BERNAIM0
10
California Genera1 Partnership, dba
Mountain Shadows Mobile Home
l4
Plaintiff,
BONNIE SHIPLEY,
Defendant.
Case No.:UDDS 1204130
Assigned for all urposes to:

Judge: Hon. ichael A. Sachs
Dept: 328
Id'
PLAINTIFF'S EX PARTE
APPLICATION FOR ORDER
CONTINUING THE HEARING ON
DEFENDANT'S RENEWED MOTION
FOR ATTORNEY FEES TO PERMIT
PLAINTIFF TO DEPOSE
DEFENDANT'S EXPERT;
DECLARATION OF ROBERT G.
WILLIAMSON, JR,;DECLARATION
OF RYAN J. EGAN I N SUPPORT
THEREOF
DATE: March 4,2015
TIME: 8:30rm
DEPT: S28
Complaint Filed: August 27,2012
36568,05314851-2088-6818v.l
PLAlNTlFF'S EX PARTE APPLICATION FOR ORDER
From:
Sent:
To:
Cc:
Subject:
Ryan J. Egan
Tuesday, March 03,2015 9:07 AM
Robert G.Williamson Jr.
36568.053/Mountain Shadows v. Shipley - Ex Parte Notice - Case No.: LlDDS 1204130
Ms. McCarron,
Be advised that tomorrow. March 4,2015 at 8:30 a.m. or as soon thereafter in Department S28 before Judge Michael A.
Sachs, Plaintiff will move ex parte in Case No. UDDS 1204130 for an order continuing the March 18, 2015 hearing date
on Defendant's "renewed motion for attorney fees to permit Plaintiff to depose Defendant's expert Joel Mark. Please
advise if you intend to oppose.
Ryan J. Egan I Associate

Hart ( King
4 Hutton Centre Drive, Suite 900 ( Santa Ana, CA 92707
Tel. 714-432-8700 1 Fax. 7 14-546-7457
Direct No. 657-622-4703
reaan~hartkinulaw.com1 www.hartkinalaw.com
Ll'
CA Rules of Court , Rule 1.2 1. Service

(a) Service on a party or attorney Whenever a document is required to be served on a party, the service must be made on the party's attorney if the
party is represented.(Subd (a) amended effective January 1,2007.)
(b) "Serve and file" As used in these rules, unless a statute or rule provides for a different method for filing or service, a requirement to "serve and
file" a document means that a copy of the document must be served on the attorney for each party separately represented, on each self-represented
party, and on any other person or entity when required by statute, rule, or court order, and that the document and a proof of service of the document
must be filed with the court.(Subd (b) amended effective January 1,2007.)
(c) "Proof of service" As used in these rules, "proof of service" means a declaration stating that service has been made as provided in (a)
and (b). If the proof of service names attorneys for separately represented parties, it must also state which party or parties each of the
attorneys served is representing.(Subd (c) adopted effective January 1,2007.)
!
I
CA Rules of Court ,Rule 2.1 17. Conformed copies of papers

All copies of papers served must conform to the original papers filed, including the numbering of lines, pagination, additions, deletions, and
interlineations except that, with the agreement of the other party, a party may serve that other party with papers printed on both sides of the
page.
CA Rules of Court, Rule 3.1203. Time of notice to other parties
(a) Time of notice A party seeking an ex parte order must notify all parties no later than 10:OO a.m. the court day before the ex parte
appearance, absent a showing of exceptional circumstances that justify a shorter time for notice.(Subd (a) amended effective January 1,
2008.)
LOCAL RULE 731.1

Rde 73f .I Civil en ~ a r t aptrlica4ions
e
All ex pfie appfications must he fded \vith the C o w no later tkm f2:W P.M. on the
court day preceding the day of the scheduled hearins on $heex pparte applieatiun. A pwy seeking
an ex p t e order must noti9 all pir-ties t10 lager W n 10:W A.M. cnr the caw day before Ihc ex
apparance as pruviderl by ehe @i%mia Rules of Courl., ruIe 3.1203. (Eff Jdy f ,261 1.)
.
.
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NAME : N & N I ~ ~ - M C C ~ R F ? ~ ~ ~ ] '
FAX
: 8059653492
TEL
: 805965:3492
SEE. # : 00065,J::;2:3985
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Action: 1 (Choose)
EX-PARTE MOTION RE; ORDER TO ENJOIN AND RESTRAIN DEF NANCY DUFFYMCCAR
0211912015 8:00 AM DEPT. F8A
MATrER ELEC.TRONICALLY RECORDED

08: 57
LILY L SINFIELD, JUDGE

CLERK: SUSAN KING
BAILIFF: ALFRED BENNElT
APPEARANCES:
AlTORNEY ROBERT WILLIAMSON JR. PRESENT FOR PLAlNTlFFlPETlTlONER.
PARTIES NOT PRESENT: NANCY B DUFFY, BONNIE SHIPLEY
PROCEEDINGS:
MOTION
STUBBLEFIELD PROPERTIES, A CALIFORNIA'S MOTION ORDER TO ENJOIN AND RESTRAIN IS HEARD.
ORAL ARGUMENT PRESENTED BY COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFF.
STUBBLEFIELD PROPERTIES, A CALIFORNIA'S MO1-ION ORDER TO ENJOIN AND RESTRAIN IS
DENIED.
DENIEDWITHOUT PREJUDICE
ACTION - COMPLETE
09:Ol
CERTIFICATE OF ELECTRONIC RECORDING MONITOR PRINTED.
EXHIBIT 17

950 Roble Lane
805-450-0450 fax 805-965-3492
5
I Att~riley+'orD e f e i ~ d ~Boilr~ie
:
Shipley


California General Partnership,
Mountain Shadows Mobile
ome Community
Plaintiff,
v.
ONNIE SHIPLEY,
~
~
CI '
-11-
Date:
March lS, 2015
CRC 8.891 & 3.1702(a)
Time:f 8:30 a.m.

~
~
d
Dept. S-28 (Justice Center)
TO: THE COURT AND ATTORNEYS OF filECSm
IIPLEASE NOTE at above time
II
NOTICE OF RENEWED MOTION FOR ATTORNEY

FEES UNDER M,RL [CIVIL $798.851 [CCP 5 1021.51
and Request for Court to delete (cross out) the words
"or resident" from the final iudmnent entered on 3120114
1
-
filed: 8-27-12
--
II
& place, Bonnie Shipley RENEWS a MOTION for ATTORNEY FEES,
formerly set, but put on hold, due to a pending appeal in ACIAS 1400026. The appellate panel entered
II a remittitur 213115 to return jurisdiction to the trial court after an opinion entered on 12/22/14:
DISPOSITION
"The case is remanded to the trial court with directions to r~zodifithe judgment by deleting the words
"or resident "$-ompage 2, line 10, of the judgment. " In all other respects the judgment is a@rnzedY
Defendant asks the court to cross out the words "or resident" in the final judgment entered on 3120114.
SUMMARY OF AMOUNT OF AWARD REQUESTED (see motion + exhibits)
Former Motion for Attorney Fees (before 2ndappeal-"or resident" stricken) $ 840,000 2400 hr x $350
"i
Amount of Attorney Fees with a 1.5 multiplier added
1,260,000 (x 1.5 multiplier)

I
1,680,000 x (2 multiplier)
MINIMAL 'TOTAL AMCUNT OF FEES REQUESTED .....
!E 840,000 actual labor hrs
IIAmount of Attorney Fees with a 2 multiplier added
Shipley asks for a 2 multiplier for crucial benefit she secured for $G75,000 mobile home residents facing
IIarbitrary eviction by getting a decision reversed which would have enabled park owners to evict 4
resident
IIvia summary proceedings without just cause on 2 inapplicable statutes. (CCP 798.75[c)
-1Notice of RENEWED MOTION for Attntncy Fees Under MRL 5798.85 as Prevailing Party
& 798.56(d).
Shipley litigated this case to ensure that residents were afforded the protections legislators conveyed
1
2
in Civil Code $798.55; i.e. protection from eviction without just cause, and only for 7 specijed reasons.
This important reversal protects 675,000 residents in mobile home parks from the loss of their mobile
homes through arbitrary summary eviction, in which most residents cannot afford to hire an attorney to
sunzmary evictions on 5-days' nctice.

litigate to save their homes from being filched through arbitmr~~
Please see Points & Authorities included in the FORMER motion for attorney fees which is being
RENEWED. Counsel called calendar department to schedule RENEWED Motion for Attorney Fees.
Clerk checked with Department S-28 for permission to RENEW the voluminous motion with exhibit tal
and color-coded for ease of review---as opposed to having to COPY it all and file an entirely new set.
The court authorized counsel to RENEW the motion by simply giving NOTICE of RENEWED Motion.
without having to RECOPY the package already submitted which was put on hold pending appeal in
ACIAS 1400026. The Appellate Division issued a remittitur on 2/3/15 and returned jurisdiction to the
trial court after entering an order on 12/22/14 which neither party appealed during the 30 day window.
see Declaration of Nancy Duffy McCarron supporting this RENEWED attorney fee motion.

I am attorney for defendant and make these statements in support of Motion for Attorney Fees.
1. I make these statements based on personal knowledge and can testify to them if called to do so.
2. I downloaded the official court docket in this case, cut and pasted it into an excel spreadsheet,
which I added a few columns on the sides to enter number of hours worked on various tasks in the
case as shown on docket and tasks. It shows prep time (research & writing motions, oppositions,
or replies, or preparing evidence to attach) travel and hearing time, which was usually 4 hours for
each hearing, including traveling ?4hour each way in the morning from Highland, and waiting 2-3
hours in court for the case to be called up, and filing papers, etc.
3. I programmed formulae into certain cells to compute sub-totals, totals, averages, etc.
4. Actually, I spent more time on this cas9 than reflected i:~.the filed spreadsheet on related issues,
and various investigations. I had to decline accepting any other cases to properly litigate this case.
5. The exhibits attached to this motion are true and correct copies which have not been altered,
authenticated by counsel. $350 hour is my regular hourly billing rate, with 20 years of experience.
-2Notice of RENEWED MOTION for Attorney Fees Under MRL 5798.85 as Prevailing Party
6. This is the most litigious and acrimonious lawsuit I have ever been involved with in 20 years
as an attorney, and was more labor intensive than any case I have ever worked on in 20 years.
7. I sent a letter to plaintiffs counsel as soon as he served Shipley with a 5-day Notice to Vacate,
explaining that he could not evict her on a forcible detainer case because Stubblefield was not in
privity of contract with Shipley and he was not a purchaser under Civil Code 5798.75
I spent 80 more hours (60 research-20 writing) on opposing the Writ Petition to the 4th.Circuit
Court of Appeals. Division 2. which was denied on 7119113.
I spent another 90 hours (65 research-25 writinn, printing. collating & binding 20 copies)
opposing the Writ of Review to the Supreme Court. Court Rules required submission of original +
13 copies, and service on all 3 lower courts and parties. The Writ of Review was denied 8/14/13.
8. Counsel & plaintiff were fully aware of potential for significant attorney fees on continued appeal.
9. Because plaintiff defrauded the court, defendant, and her counsel by inserting the words "or
resident" into the final judgment which the court allowed plaintiff to submit (over defendant's
vehement objections) defendant was forced to prosecute yet another appeal to get those words
stricken from the final judgment entered by the court.
10. I received notice of order entered12/22/14 in ACIAS 1400026, and a remittitur issued 2/3/15,
noting the decision is final and returning jurisdiction to the trial court.
11. I called the court calendar department to schedule a RENEWED MOTION for attorney fees.
I talked to court clerk Sulma. She set the motion for March 18,2015 at 8:30 a.m. in S-28.
She said 3118115 was the first date Judge Sachs had an opening to schedule a motion to be heard.
I explained that I had already filed a very lengthy, detailed motion (color-coded for easy review)
with multiple tabs, etc. and requested permission to use the motion already filed as the operating
motion for the March 18,2015 hearing. She checked with the court who approved the request.
Accordingly, the court will review the detailed motion already on file. Opposition will be due per
code. Reply will be due per code. The court will hear the motion on March 18,2015.
12. I declare under penalty of perjury the above statements, and those made in the motion, are true.
Executed in Santa Barbara, CA on the date below.
I
February 17,2015
";ri,w&r/7
Lc w
Nancy D MCC&~, Attorney for Bonnie Shipley
-3Notice of RENEWED MOTION for Attorney Fees Under MRL $798.85 as Prevailing Party
-7
PROOF OF SERVICE
1
II

Properties v. Bonnie Shipley
UDDS1204130
The undersigned is counsel for defendant at:
I1
950 Roble Lane, Santa Barbara, CA 93 103

805-450-0450 fax 805-965-3492
lo
1111 [ ] (By Personal Delivery) to the parties below as follows:
11
[ ] (By Fax) Fax machine used complied with Rule 2003(3) and no error was reported by the machine.
Pursuant to Rule CRC, 2008 [c](4. I caused the machine to maintain a record of same.
12
11
l4
15
6
RENEWED MOTION FOR ATTORNEY FEES AS PREVALING PARTY
[ ] (By Electronic) to address below (by agreement) & with copy to nancyduffysb@yahoo.com
I1
to: rwilliamson@hkclaw.com
[XI(By Mail) 9 10 13a, 920 15.5 CCP. I deposited documents in a pre-paid stamped envelope to:
Robert Williamson, Esq.
Hart, King & Coldren
4 Hutton Centre Drive, Ste. 900
Santa Ana, CA 92707
20
22
23
1 am familiar with mail collection in San Bernardino. I deposited the envelope in the mail at Santa
Barbara, CA. I am aware on a motion of the party served, service is presumed invalid if postal
cancellation date is more than one day after deposit date on affidavit.
[ ] (STATE) I declare under penalty of perjury and laws of California that the above is true.
Executed in San Bernardino CA on
February
Notice of RENEWED MOTION for Attorney Fees Under MRL $798.85 as Prevailing Party
LJRGENT - MUST IMMEDIATELY STOP FRAUD I S-28 8:25 AM

Nancy D u e McCmron, CBN 164780
Law Office of Nancy D u e
950 Roble Lane
March 4,2015
8:25 (before Dept. S-28 starts calendar at 8:25 a.m.

Presiding Judge
sent via fax to: 909-708-8782 909-708-8586

sent via email to: msloueh@sb-court.=re: DEMAND TO ENFORCE
CRC 1.21, 2.117, 3.1203, 2.117
Local Rule 731.1 Cofidential-Part 2
Dear Ms. Slough:
WE DEMAND YOU IMMEDIATELY GO DOWN TO S-28 AND STOP THIS FRAUD

Attached are Exhibits A-D proving the hearing at 8:30 in S-28 is a complete fraud!
I t violates CA Rules of Court, and Local Rule 731.1 (as cited above and shown in Exh. D)
A- Shows right before noon (11:56 am) I emailed Hart\King demanding a copy of the papers
they filed i n your court (cover page shown at Exh. B)
Exh. A also shows despite notice at noon they intentionally withheld emailing me
The 52-page motion until 3:00 p.m (after court closed to preclude filing opposition)
B- Shows YOUR CLERK accepted a 52-page motion WITHOUT a PROOF of SERVICE
violating CRC 1.21, 2.117 Local Rule 73 1.1proves she accepted it before NOON
WITHOUT ANY PROOF O F SERVICE ATTACHED SHOWING SERVICE ON ME
C- This is the LAST page of the 52 page motion showing NO PROOF O F SERVICE
Although it complied with CRC 3.1203 (notice by 10 am) it FAILED TO COMPLY
With CRC 1.21 and 2.1 17 and combined with Local Bule 731.1
D- Shows all rules of court and local rule VIOLATED
If you do not go down to S-28 and STOP THIS FRAUD ON THE COURT I WILL HOLD
YOU RESPONSIBLE FOR ALLOWING THIS BLATANT F W D ON THE COURT
I
I WILL FILE A COMPLAINT WITH THE GOVERNOR AND KALVILLA HARRIS

TO OPEN A NEW INVESTIGATION FOR A SEWER O F CORRUPTION IN COURTS
3/15/2015
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CaseUDDS1204130STUBBLEFIELDVSHIPLEY
Action: (Choose)
EXPARTEMOTIONRE:PLAEXPARTEAPPFORORDERCONTTHEHEARINGONDEF
03/04/20158:31AMDEPT.S28X
MICHAELASACHS,JUDGE
CLERK:WIMALABLANCHARD
COURTREPORTERREGINAVEGA12612
COURTATTENDANTMARYKILGORE
APPEARANCES:
ATTORNEYROBERTWILLIAMSONJRPRESENTFORPLAINTIFF/PETITIONER.
PROCEEDINGS:
NOFILE.
ACTIONCAMEONFORPLAEXPARTEAPPFORORDERTOCONTDEFTHEARING.
COURTADVISESCOUNSELOFORDERPREVIOUSLYSIGNEDON2/27/15REQUIRINGNEWMOTION
WITHNEW
SUPPORTINGDOCUMENTSTOBEFILED.EXPARTEAPPLICATIONDENIEDASMOOT.
COURTVACATESHEARINGCURRENTLYSET3/18/15.MOVINGPARTYTOCONTACTCLERKSOFFICE
AND
OBTAINFIRSTAVAILABLEDATEFORHEARING.
COURTORDERSCSRREGINAVEGATOPREPAREATRANSCRIPTOFTHEPROCEEDINGSDATED
03/04/15.
HEARINGS:
VACATEHRGHEARINGSCHEDULEDFOR03/18/15AT08:30INDEPARTMENTS28.
ACTIONCOMPLETE
http://openaccess.sbcourt.org/OpenAccess/civil/civilminutes.asp?courtcode=X&casenumber=DS1204130&casetype=UD&dsn=&actionseq=2&actiondate=201
1/1
County of San Bernardino
REQUEST FOR FURTHER ACTION

Y
Judge
SACHS
Date
Name
STUBBLEFIELD VS SHIPLEY
Case No. UD DS 1204130
)&v
PlaintifflDefendant Requests:
--
2Y' /,2Q,e.* r L J
=,I'
REQUESTING CLARIFICATION AS TO WHETHER THIS MOTION NEEDS TO BE FILED

"
IN
THE PREVIOUSLY FILED MOTION AS ITS SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS?

-
-A-
--
. --_.
--
--
----
--
u
ANITA JOHNSON. LPA II
COURT ORDER
Granted
Denied
- --
--
Remarks
Date
16-10915-349 REV. 5/89 (ALL)
k.: -
- -
Superior Court of California

Zounty of San Bemardino
3an Bernardino District-Civil Division
%I7 West Third Street
Sari Bernardino, CA 92415-0210
\I
RETURN
SE!?'d!E
$2
25
Q*
M a d er
Q3)3J)2Q15
F1",5r-CL&SS
$00.2
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r----.-----,... 204130 STUBBLEFIELD-V-SHIPLEY
- -.--.-,-----Action: ! (Choose)
....-.-.--.-,*-.-".*.--"-.
1
EX-PARTE MOTION RE: FOR ORDER CONTINUING HEARING

09/17/2014 8:31 AM DEPT. S28X

COURT REPORTER CRAIG ANDERSON 11800
COURT AlTENDANT ROBERT KRETZMEIER
APPEARANCES:
ATTORNEY ROBERT WILLIAMSON JR PRESENT FOR PLAINTIFFlPETIl~lONER.
ATTORNEY NANCY DUFFY MCCARRON PRESENT FOR DEFT-BONNIE SHIPLEY.
PROCEEDINGS:
NO FILE.
COURT ADVISES ATTORNEY MCCARRON THAT SHE MAY APPEAR BY COURTCALL ON FUTURE
EXPARTE HEARINGS.
COURT DOES NOT HAVE JURISDICTION TO MOVE FORWARD WITH TODAYS HEARING. CASE
REMAINS STAYED
PENDING APPELLATE RULING. COURT VACATES THE MOTION REGARDING ATORNEY FEES
CURRENTLY SET
10/02/14.
HEARINGS:
VACATE L&M HEARING SCHEDULED FOR 10/02/14 AT 08:30 IN DEPARTMENT S28.
NOTICE TO BE GIVEN BY ATTORNEY WILLIAMSON.
ACTION - COMPLETE
----- MINUTE ORDER END ===
UDDS1204130 Minute Orders San Bernardino Main
3/15/2015
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Case UDDSI 204130 STUBBLEFIELD-V-SHIPLEY

Action: ease)- --.-----.
r i--a
~-",--
MOTION RE: EXPUNGE LIS PENDENSIAWARD A T N FEES * FILED BY PLAINTIFF

STUBBLEFIELDPROPERTIES A CA GENERAL PARTNER
06/23/2014 8:30 AM DEPT. S28A

COURT REPORTER REGINA VEGA 12612
COURT ATrENDANT MARY KILGORE
APPEARANCES:
AlTORNEY ROBERT WILLIAMSON JR PRESENT FOR PLAINTIFFIPETITIONER.
AlTORNEY NANCY DUFFY MCCARRON PRESENT FOR DEFENDANTIRESPONDENT.
PROCEEDINGS:
AlTORNEY MCCARRON STATES APPEAL IS ONGOING.
MOTION
STUBBLEFIELDPROPERTIES A CA GENERAL PARTNER'S MOTION RE: EXPUNGE LIS
PENDENSIAWARD ATTY FEES IS HEARD.
COURT GIVES TENTATIVE RULING.
ARGUED BY COUNSEL AND SUBMITTED.
COURT FINDS:
COURT HAS REVIEWED AUTHORITIES STATED BY EACH PARTY AS IT RELATES TO LIS PENDENS.
MOTION TO EXPUNGE LIS PENDENS IS GRANTED. .
MOTION TO EXPUNGE LIS PENDENS UNTIMELY,
COURTS FINDINGS ARE STATED ON THE RECORD.
OTHER ORDERS: MOTION REQUESTING ATTORNEY FEES ARE DENIED.
ORDER SIGNED THIS DATE.
ACTION - COMPLETE
MS. DUFFY MC CARRON:
A l l right.
So t % a t l s a dead
issue.
THE COURT:
A l l right.
So we a r e h e r e t o d a y on a
Motion t o Expunge t h e l i s p e n d e n s t h a t was f i l e d on t h i s c a s e .

My t e n t a t i v e w i l l b e t o g r a n t t h e m o t i o n , expunging t h e
l i s pendens.
Couple o f p o i n t s r a i s e d by t h e o p p o s i t i o n I wanted t o
address.
One o f t h o s e p o i n t s was t h a t t h e Motion t o Expunge

CCP S e c t i o n 4 0 5 . 3 0 b a s i c a l l y s t a t e s t h a t t h e
was u n t i m e l y .
.Motion t o Expunge may b e made a t any t i m e a f t e r t h e n o t i c e o f

pendency h a s b e e n r e c o r d e d .
So t h i s w i l l b e t i m e l y .
Hold on one s e c o n d .
Okay.
S e c o n d l y , I d o n ' t b e l i e v e i t was a p p r o p r i a t e
f o r t h e l i s pendens t o b e f i l e d i n t h e f i r s t i n s t a n c e .
A c c o r d i n g t o some a u t h o r i t y a c t u a l l y c i t e d by t h e Defendant i n
t h i s c a s e , t h e l i s p e n d e n s i s a p p r o p r i a t e l y f i l e d by t h e
P l a i n t i f f o r Defendant t h a t s e e k s a f f i r m a t i v e r e l i e f .
w a s n ' t a n y a f f i r m a t i v e r e l i e f s o u g h t by M s .
c a s e , by t h e way, i s Welton v. Cook.
c a s e , 1 8 6 2 , 6 1 Ca1.981.
Shipley.
There
And t h a t
I t ' s an extremely o l d
But t h e law i s s t i l l good.
. Some o t h e r c o n c e r n s I had was t h a t t h e l i s pendens i n

t h i s m a t t e r a p p e a r s t o h a v e b e e n f i l e d r e a l l y f o r t h e one
p u r p o s e o n l y t h a t was c i t e d by t h e Defendant i n h e r b r i e f .
I ' l l j u s t quote,
on e a c h l o t .
And
" T h e r e i s no s e p a r a t e p a r c e l t o r e c o r d a g a i n s t
A s e x p l a i n e d a b o v e , S h i p l e y was l e g a l l y e n t i t l e d
t o r e c o r d t h e l i s pendens and r e t a i n i t , r e s e r v e h e r r i g h t t o
by trying to go around what the law says. And unlawful

detainer is very clear that a defendant is not allowed to file
any cross-complaint or anything.
They're not allowed, which is
one of the reasons why I made a motion to transfer to a higher

jurisdiction.
Because possession was involved.
You have to look at what's the typical case, your

Honor.
Typically, when it's an unlawful detainer it's because
I own the property, that tenant is renting from me, and that
tenant is not paying the rent, and I'm losing money every day
because I have to pay the mortgage and blah, blah, blah, and
they're living there free.
So the court provides what they call a summary
proceeding where I can get them out in 30 days.
I set a
hearing -THE COURT:
Let me interrupt, please.

THE COURT:
Let me interrupt, please.

THE COURT:
Sure.
Sure.
We've gone down this road.-

THE COURT:
But it's not the same --
Okay.
In this circumstance, I understand
there's no cross-complaint.
But the answer that you filed is
not a property claim as contemplated by 405.31.
I'm granting
the motion expunging the lis pendens.

I'm going to ask the moving party to prepare an
order.
And I'm denying the motion for attorneys' fees at this
Lr,
pending.
And under Peery v. Superior Court, 29 Cal.3d 837,

1981, it says that when there is a lis pendens filed on a case,
if there is an appeal that lis pendens must remain on the
property through all levels of the appeal.
And I bring that up only because it wasn't in my
brief the first time because the first time we hadn't filed an
appeal on the final judgment, which we have.
So now, Peery
becomes relevant because of this appeal that was filed last

month.
Also, there's several Supreme Court cases that I
cited.
They're also old.
Just as you said, they're old
Supreme Court cases, but they clearly have validity.
And the
one I'm going to quote from is from 1890, like your case, very
old but has not been overruled, and that's Drinkhouse v. Spring
Valley Water Works.
And it says that "any leasehold is an
estate in land and to hold that a leasehold does not affect the
right to possession is unreasonable as a matter of law."
That case was also cited in an appellate case in 1970
entitled Parker v. Superior Court, 9 Cal.App.3d 397.
again, citing that old case, Parker said that the
And
-- the same
thing, that any leasehold is an estate in land, and it's

appropriate.
It doesn't matter whether the plaintiff or the
defendant filed the action.

If there is any dispute as to a leasehold or the
right to possess land, that the lis pendens is appropriate only
CCP 9405.31. Underlvin~action not containing real property claim

In proceedings under this chapter, the court shall order the notice expunged if the court finds that the pleading on which the
notice is based does not contain a real property claim. The court shall not order an undertaking to be given as a condition of
expunging the notice where the court finds the pleading does not contain a real property claim.
CCP 9405.4. Real propertv claim
Real property claim means the cause or causes of action in a pleading which would, if meritorious, affect (a) title to. or the
right to possession of. specific real property or (b) the use of an easement identified in the plea$ing, other than an easement
obtained pursuant to statute by any regulated public utility.
CCP 9405.1. Claimant
Claimant means a ~ a r t vto an action who asserts a real property claim and records a notice of the pendency of the action.
Civil 947. Privileged publication or broadcast
A privileged publication or broadcast is one made:
(a) In the proper discharge of an official duty.
(b) In any (1) legislative proceeding, (2) judicial proceeding, (3) in any other official proceeding authorized by law,
or (4) in the initiation or course of any other proceeding authorized by law and reviewable pursuant to Chapter 2
(commencing with Section 1084) of Title 1 of Part 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure, except as follows:
(4) A recorded lis pendens is not a privileged publication unless it identifies an action ~reviouslvfiled with a
court of competent jurisdiction which affects the title or r i ~ hof
t possession of real property, as authorized or
required bv law.
Lis pendens recorded as to leasehold for years on real property is proper. Parker v. Supr Court (1970) 9 CA. 36 397,400
privileged, constitutes no basis for slander of title. Woodcourt, 1

1Limited v. McDonald Co. (198 1)
Lis Pendens is absolutely
. .
119 Cal. App. 3d 245,250;. Effect of a lis pendens is anyone acquiring interest in property after the action was filed is
bound by a judgment. Palmer v. Zaklama (2003) 109 CA4th 1367,1375; BGJAssoc. v. Supr Ct (1999) 75 CA4th 952,966
Kirkeby v. Superior Court (2004) 33 C.4th 642,647

'A lis pendens is a recorded document giving constructive notice that an action has been filed affecting title or right to
possession of the real property described in the notice.' [Citation.] A lis pendens may be filed by any party in an action who
asserts a 'real property claim.' (Code Civ. Proc.. 405.20.) Section 405.4 defines a ' "Real property claim" ' as 'the cause or
causes of action in a pleading which would, if meritorious, affect (a) title to, or the right to possession of, specific real
property . ..' "Kirkeby v. Supr Court (2004) 33 C.4th 642,647
"We reject Alpha's interpretation of subdivision (b)(4) of Civil Code section 47. In discerning the Legislature's intent, we
look to the words of the statute, 'assigning them their usual and ordinary meanings, and construing them in context. If the
words themselves are not ambiguous, we presume the Legislature meant what it said, and the statute's plain meaning
governs.' [Citations.] [I The language of subdivision (b)(4) of Civil Code, section 47 is not ambiguous and in any event is
not reasonably susceptible to a construction that would create an additional exception to the absolute litigation privilege
based on the lack of 'evidentiary merit' of a claimant's real property claim in connection withearecorded lis pendens."
(Alpha & Omega, supra, 200 Cal.App.4th at pu. 666667.)
(8) We believe this analysis of the privilege statute is correct. Civil Code, section 47(b)(4) does not contain a lack of"
'evidentiary merit' " exception to the litigation privilege, and it would be improper for us to insert what the
Legislature has plainly omitted. (Alpha & Omega, supra, 200 Cal.A~p.4that DV. 666; see 1858[court's role is to
declare terms of a statute, not to "insert what has been omitted"].) (9)" 'It is a prime rule of construction that the
legislative intent underlying a statute must be ascertained from its language; if the language is clear, there can be no room
for interpretation, and effect must be given to its plain meaning. "An intent that finds no expression in the words of the
statute cannot be found to exist. The courts may not speculate that the legislature meant something other than what it said.
Nor may they rewrite a statute to make it express an intention not expressed therein." ' [Citation.]" Moreover, we believe
that if the Legislature had intended to erect an evidentiary hurdle or create an exception to the privilege based on lack of
evidentiary merit, it would have said so. Since the Legislature did not do so, we are not at liberty to insert what has been
omitted. For these reasons, we reject appellants' proposition that the availability of the litigation privilege to a recorded
lis pendens depends upon whether the claimant is able to make a certain evidentiary showing of merit to support the real
property claim. On this issue, the dicta in Palmer, supra, 109 Cal.App.4th 1367, that is relied upon by appellants was in
error Mutual Life Ins. Co v. City of Los Angeles (1990) 50 Cal.3d 402,412
3/15/2015
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CaseUDDS1204130STUBBLEFIELDVSHIPLEY
Action: (Choose)
EXPARTEMOTIONRE:DEFEXPARTEAPPFORORDERTOREPAIRORREPLACEELE
09/09/20149:30AMDEPT.S28X
MICHAELASACHS,JUDGE
CLERK:WIMALABLANCHARD
COURTREPORTERLINDABALDWIN12453
COURTATTENDANTMARYKILGORE
APPEARANCES:
ATTORNEYROBERTWILLIAMSONPRESENTFORSTUBBLEFIELDPROPERTIES.
ATTORNEYNANCYDUFFYMCCARRONPRESENTFORBONNIESHIPLEY.
PROCEEDINGS:
NOFILE.
EXPARTEHEARINGISHELD.
EXPARTEAPPLICATIONARGUED.
COURTHASREADANDCONSIDEREDTHEMOVINGPAPERSANDOPPOSITIONFILED9/8/14.
COURTFINDS:
EXPARTEORDERSDENIED.
FINDINGSARESTATEDONTHERECORD.
ACTIONCOMPLETE
http://openaccess.sbcourt.org/OpenAccess/civil/civilminutes.asp?courtcode=X&casenumber=DS1204130&casetype=UD&dsn=&actionseq=2&actiondate=201
1/1
EXHIBIT 18
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Case Number:
Case LID~SI204130 STUBBLEFIELD-V-SHIPLEY

--.-.----*-.-.-.-..------..-.....-..
Action: FChoosel
MOTION RE: ATTORNEY FEES FILED BY DEFENDANT BONNIE SHIPLEY

07/02/2013 8:30 AM DEPT. S32
DONALD ALVAREZ, JUDGE

COURT REPORTER FRANCES MACIAS 10918
COURT ATTENDANT ERIC ASHE
APPEARANCES:
ROBERT WILLIAMSON JR APPEARS BY COURTCALL FOR STUBBLEFIELDPROPERTIESA CA GENERAL
PARTNER.
ATTORNEY NANCY D U F N MCCARRON (BY PHONE PRIOR TO CALENDAR) PRESENT FOR
DEFENDANTIRESPONDENT.
MOTION
BONNIE SHIPLEY'S MOTION FOR ATTORNEY FEES IS HEARD.
MATTER ORDERED CONTINUED
REASON: CASE STAYEDIAPPEAL PENDING
HEARINGS:
CURRENT HEARING CONTINUED TO 07122113AT 08:30 IN DEPARTMENT S32.
COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFF TO GIVE NOTICE.
ACTION COMPLETE
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Case UDDSl204130 - STUBBLEFIELD-V-SHIPLEY

Action: I P2hoosel

07/22/2013 8:30 AM DEPT. S32

NOT REPORTED
APPEARANCES:
ROBERT WILLIAMSON JR APPEARS BY COURTCALL FOR STUBBLEFIELDPROPERTIES A CA GENERAL
PARTNER.
ATTORNEY NANCY DLIFFY MCCARRON PRESENT FOR DEFENDANT/RESPONDENT.
MOTlON
MATTER ORDERED CONTINUED
REASON: STILL AWAITING REMITTITUR
MOTION ORDERED TO TRIAL OSC RE STATUS
HEARINGS:
CURRENT HEARING CONTINUED TO 10/21/13AT 08:30 IN DEPARTMENT S32.
NOTICE WAIVED.
ACTION - COMPLETE
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-..-..---.
-.--.-.---.---..--w---..-.
Action: ikChoose)
---_-....
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--- .,.-.
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1012112013 8:30 AM DEPT. S32

COURT REPORTER JILL LANGLEY 7663
APPEARANCES:
ATTORNEY ROBERT WILLIAMSON JR PRESENT FOR PLAINTIFFIPETITIONER.
MOTION
STUBBLEFIELDPROPERTIES A CA GENERAL PARTNER'S MOTION FOR AlTORNEY FEES IS HEARD.
MAlTER ORDERED CONTINUED TO BE HEARD AFTER DEFENDANT HAS PREPARED AND SUBMllTED
A PROPOSED
JUDGMENT AND ORDER.
DEFENDANT TO LIST AlTORNEY FEES TO BE DETERMINED IN THE PROPOSED JUDGMENT.
PURSUANT TO STIPULATION OF COUNSEL:
DEFENDANT SHALL BE ALLOWED TO SERVE A COPY OF THE PROPOSED ORDER AND JUDGMENT TO
PLAINTIFFS
COUNSEL VIAL EMAlL OR BY FAX.
HEARINGS:
CURRENT HEARING CONTINUED TO 01107114 AT 08:30IN DEPARTMENT S32.
ACTION COMPLETE
MINUTE ORDER END ===
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.---* - . . - ~ . . - . - . . - " . . ~ - ~ . Action: ! (Choose)
...------*
- _ - ~ . . , , ~ . . - . . . . . . .
.__"

0110712014 8:30 AM DEPT. S32

APPEARANCES:
AlTORNEY ROBERT G WILLIAMSON PRESENT FOR PLAINTIFF/PETlTIONER.
MOTION
ARGUED BY COUNSEL AND SUBMITTED.
COURT FINDS:
THE COURT IS INFORMED THAT THE DEFENDANT FILED A REQUEST FOR RECUSAL (170.6) ON
7122113.
NOTE: THE COURT NOTES THAT THE 170.6 WAS PREMATURELY FILED BY DEFENDANT 0~7122113,
AS THE COURT WAS STILL AWAITING THE REMITTITUR
(THAT THE COURT HAD NOT YET RECEIVED)
HOWEVER DEFENDANT HAVING MADE AN ORAL REQUEST FOR RECUSAL IN OPEN COCIRT, THE
COURT RLILES AS
FOLLOWS:
JUDGE DONALD ALVAREZ RECUSES SELF FROM THE CASE. CASE ASSIGNED TO JUDGE MICHAEL A
SACHS FOR ALL PURPOSES.
CASE ASSIGNED TO DEPARTMENT S33, BEFORE THE HONORABLE JUDGE SACHS FOR ALL
PURPOSES.
HEARINGS:
CURRENT HEARING CONTINUED TO 02/10/14 AT 08:30 IN DEPARTMENT S33.
NOTICE GIVEN BY JClDlClAL ASSISTANT
CORRESPONDENCE COVERSHEET GENERATED TO MAIL MINUTE ORDER DATED 1/7/14 TO COUNSEL
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m --.-.--.--.-..
ose)
"-.
.---.---.- v
"--"

0211012014 8:30 AM DEPT. S33

COURT REPORTER KATHY SELLERS 4420
APPEARANCES:
AlTORNEY ROBERT WILLIAMSON JR PRESENT FOR PLAlNTlFFlPETlTlONER.
PROCEEDINGS:
PREDISPOSIl-ION HEARING HELD
MOTION
ACTION CAME ON FOR MOTION RE: ATTORNEY FEES FILED BY BONNIE SHIPLEY.
COURT HAS REVIEWED THE MOTION, OPPOSl1-ION, REPLY, EXPERT DECLARATIONS, AND OTHER
ADDITIONAL
DECLARATIONS WHICH HAVE BEEN FILED.
COURT DOES NOT GO FORWARD WITH MOTlON FOR ATTORNEY FEES AND SETS MATTER FOR
HEARING
REGARDING JUDGMENT. COURT HAS RECEIVED PROPOSED JUDGMENTS FROM ATTORNEY
MCCARRON AND INSTRUCTS
COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFF TO SUBMITT PROPOSED JUDGMENT TO THE COURT. HEARING
REGARDING
JUDGMENT WlLL BE HELD ON 2/19/14 AND THEREAFTER A HEARING FOR THE MOTION FOR
AlTORNEY FEES WlLL
BE SET.
HEARINGS:
HEARING RE: PROPOSED JUDGMENT SET FOR 02/19/14 AT 08:30 IN DEPARTMENT S33A.
ACTION COMPLETE
7-p.-.-""--,-
Case Type:
"
----
- --------
".-"/
v-l
Case Number:
Case UDDSI
_--__ 204130 .-_STUBBLEFIELD-V-SHIPLEY
_--._ --.-.-.-----Action: k o o s,l__~--'-,+~ll..,,
e)
.
l-v---.-.....I^X-"
.....
_-_._ ,._.,
"l
MOTION RE: ATTORNEY FEES

03/17/2014 8:30 AM DEPT. S33

CLERK: ANCHALEE M PRICE
COURT REPORTER KATHY SELLERS 4420
APPEARANCES:
AlTORNEY NANCY DLIFFY MCCARRON PRESENT FOR PLAINTIFFIPETITIONER.
AlTORNEY ROBERT WILLIAMSON JR PRESENT FOR DEFENDANTIRESPONDENT.
MOTION
POST-DISPOSITION HEARING HELD
THE COURT IS IN RECEIPT OF DEFENDANTS OBJECTIONS AND PLAINTIFFS RESPONSE TO THE
OBJECTIONS. THE
COURT HAS REVISED THE PROPOSED JUDGMENT AND A COPY OF THE PROPOSED JUDGMENT
WITH THE COURTS
NOTES ARE PROVIDED TO COUNSEL.
PLAINTIFFS COUNSEL TO PREPARE JUDGMENT AS DISCUSSED ON THE RECORD.
PURSUANT TO STIPULATION OF COUNSEL:
BONNIE SHIPLEY'S MOTION RE:ATTORNEY FEES IS HEARD.
THE COURT RECITES ITS TENTATIVE RULING ON THE REOCRD.
ARGUED BY COUNSEL AND SLIBMITTED.
COURT FINDS:
BONNIE SHIPLEY'S MOTION RE:AITORNEY FEES IS DENIED.
WITHOUT PREJUDICE
THE COURT FINDS THAT DEFENSE COUNSEL IS ENTITLED TO HER ATTORNEY FEES PURSUANT TO
CCP 798,
HOWEVER DEFENSE COUNSEL WAS NOT SPECIFIC AS TO HER BILLING.DEFENSE COUNSEL MAY
SUBMIT ANOTHER
MOTION DETAILING HER FEES FOR THE COURTS REVIEW.
\~.
##-
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204130 STLIBBLEFIELD-V-SHIPLEY
__.__._____l.-_
--.-.-....,-..---Action: ' ~ o o--.---.-....----.-"
se)
--.71
-".~-."+~
...-.----__-"
EX-PARTE MOTION RE: FOR ORDER CONTINUING HEARING

0911712014 8 5 1 AM DEPT. S28X
MICHAEL A SACHS, JLIDGE

COURT REPORTER CRAIG ANDERSON 11800
COURT ATTENDANT ROBERT KRETZMEIER
APPEARANCES:
AlTORNEY ROBERT WILLIAMSON JR PRESENT FOR PLAINTIFFIPE-IITIONER.
A'ITORNEY NANCY DUFFY MCCARRON PRESENT FOR DEFT-BONNIE SHIPLEY.
PROCEEDINGS:
NO FILE.
COURT ADVISES A'ITORNEY MCCARRON THAT SHE MAY APPEAR BY COURTCALL ON FUTURE
EXPARTE HEARINGS.
COURT DOES NOT HAVE JURISDICTION TO MOVE FORWARD WITH TODAYS HEARING. CASE
REMAINS STAYED
PENDING APPELLATE RULING. COURT VACATES THE MOTION REGARDING A7TORNEY FEES
CURRENTLY SET
HEARINGS:
VACATE L&M HEARING SCHEDLILED FOR 10/02/14 AT 08:30 IN DEPARTMENT S28.
NOTICE TO BE GIVEN BY ATTORNEY WILLIAMSON.
ACTION COMPLETE
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Case UDDSI
30 STUBBLEFIELD-V-SHIPLEY
r-,--..-.---.2041
-.
-,-------.-.--.--..
a
Action: ,EL!!@).....
.--...--.......
...--.
.......... -- t
EX-PARTE MOTION RE: PLA EXPARTE APP FOR ORDER CONT THE HEARING ON DEF
03/04/2015 8:31 AM DEPT. S28X

APPEARANCES:
AlTORNEY ROBERT WILLIAMSON JR PRESENT FOR PLAINTIFFIPETITIONER.
PROCEEDINGS:
NO FILE.
ACTION CAME ON FOR PLA EXPARTE APP FOR ORDER TO CONT DEFT HEARING.
COURT ADVISES COLINSEL OF ORDER PREVIOUSLY SIGNED ON 2/27/15 REQUIRING NEW MOTION
WITH NEW
SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS TO BE FILED. EXPARTE APPLICATION DENIED AS MOOT.
COURT VACATES HEARING CURRENTLY SET 3/18/15. MOVING PARTY TO CONTACT CLERKS OFFICE
AND
OBTAIN FIRST AVAILABLE DATE FOR HEARING.
COURT ORDERS CSR REGINA VEGA TO PREPARE A TRANSCRIPT OF THE PROCEEDINGS DATED
03/04/ 15.
HEARINGS:
VACATE HRG HEARING SCHEDULED FOR 03/18/15 AT 08:30 IN DEPARTMENT S28.
ACTION COMPLETE
UDFSi406978 Minute Orders San BernardinoMain
31512015
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Case UDFS1406978 STUBBLEFIELD

,-"-,.--."
-.,
"-.---"-VS- DUFFY
Action: rll--"-''--l
(Choose1
----"
HEARING RE: MOTIONS SET FOR 02103115

01/30/2015 9:30 AM DEPT. F7

APPEARANCES:
PARTIES NOT PRESENT: STUBBLEFIELD PROPERTIES, A CALIFORNIA, NANCY B DUFFY, BONNIE
SHIPLEY
PROCEEDINGS:
ON ITS OWN MOTION, THE HEARING ON DEFENDANTS MOTION FOR TERMINATING SANCTIONS AND
TO COMPEL
RESPONSES ARE RESET FOR 02/10/15 AT 8:30AM IN DEPT. F7.
THE CLERK IS ORDERED TO NO1-IFY THE PARTIES BY TELEPHONE.
NOTICE GIVEN BY JLlDlClAL ASSISTANT
BY TELEPHONE & MAILING OF MINUTE ORDER
CORRESPONDENCE COVERSHEET GENERATED TO MAIL MINUTE ORDER DATED 01/30/15 TO
COUNSEL OF RECORD.
ACTION - COMPLETE
UDFS1406978 Minute Orders - San Bernardino Main
3/15/2015
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Action:
MOTION RE: TO COMPLE RESPONSES TO BONNIE SHIPLEYS DOCUMENTINSPECTION
FILED BY DEFENDANT BONNIE SHIPLEY
0211012015 8:30 AM DEPT. F7

BAILIFF: J RODRIGUES
APPEARANCES:
ATTORNEY ROBERT WILLIAMSON PRESENT FOR PLAINTIFFIPETITIONER.
ATTORNEY NANCY DUFFY MCCARRON PRESENT FOR DEFENDANTIRESPONDENT
PROCEEDINGS:
MATTER ELECTRONICALLY RECORDED
10:17
THE COURT HAS REVIEWED DEFENDANTS MOTION FOR DOCUMENT PRODUCTION, TERMINATING
SANCTIONS AND
COMPEL RESPONSES.
ORAL ARGUMENT PRESENTED BY COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT.
ORAL ARGUMENT PRESENTED BY COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFF .
DOCUMENT(S) SUBMITTED FOR REVIEW.
MATTER TAKEN UNDER SUBMISSION.
11:08
ACTION COMPLETE
--- MINUTE ORDER END ===
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Case UDFSl406978 STUBBLEFIELD -VS- DUFFY

Action: Lchoose)
---.----.-.----.
----.-.-" -.-.-------..-- v 1
J
HEARING RE: MOTIONS UNDER SLIBMISSION/NEXT HEARING DATE

03/06/2015 4:30 PM DEPT. F7
KYLE S BRODIE, JLIDGE

PROCEEDINGS:
MOTIONS TAKEN UNDER SUBMISSION ON 02/10/15 IS ORDERED VACATED. MOTIONS TO BE HEARD
AT A DATE
TO BE DETERMINED BY JUDGE SACHS (DEPT. S28).
COURT ORDERS THIS CASE TO SAN BERNARDINO JUSTICE CENTER TO BE HEARD WITH
UDDS1204130.
COURT ORDERS MOTIONS THAT ARE SET TO BE HEARD ON 03/18/15 IN DEPT. F7 TO BE RECALENDARED FOR
03/18/15 IN DEPT. S28 (SAN BERNARDINO) TO EITHER BE HEARD OR CONTINUED TO A DATE TO BE
DETERMINED
BY THAT DEPARTMENT.
THE COLIRT NOW ORDERS THIS CASE ASSIGNED TO DEPARTMENT ( S28) FOR ALL PURPOSES.
CLERK'S OFFICE TO NOTIFY PARTIES
CLERK'S OFFICE TO SEND FILE TO SAN BERNARDINO FOR NEXT HEARING
AC1-ION COMPLETE
EXHIBIT 19
Nancy DL@ McCarron, CBN 164780

Law Office of Nancy Duffy
950 Roble Lane
Richard Castanon,
[so9-3a6-86311
Liability Claims Rep I1
Department of Risk Management
222 W. Hospitality Lane, 3rd. Floor
San Bernardino, CA 92415
sent via fax to: 909-382-3212
sent via email to: msloug.h@sb-court.org

San Bernardino County BOS (5 emails)
Your File: 119658 (McCarron, Shipley & Allen)
Judge Michael A. Sachs (added to claim)
Claim is amended to over $25,000
Dear Mr. Castanon:

I received your March 16, 2015 letter. Please consider this a n amendment to claim 119658.
We are adding Judge Michael A. Sachs to our claim. The judicial abuse and corruption we
have cndured in his kangaroo court since Feb 10, 2012 caused me to seriously consider naming
him with Brodie. Sachs is sneakier and more subtle in his corruption so I didn't name him.
However, Sachs' callous acts this week exceeded the bounds of a civilized society, causing me
to amend to name Sachs. If Sachs is not removed from our case by 3/26/15, and all of his void
orders vacated, wo will seek punitive damages in our racketeering case to be filed this April.
I believe a federal jury would be so outraged they might award millions against Judge Sachs.
On Friday 3/13/15 I called Kay Lewis residing judge Marsha Slough's assistant) and Judge
Sachs' deputy Mary Kilgorc to notify them about the very tragic and untimely death of my
younger brother, whose daughter and wife were murdered a few years ago by her ex-boyfriend.
This was the thirdhorrifying tragedy in our immediate family which has been devastating.
I also told them my diabetic daughter was rushed to the emergency room in a semi-coma state.
With these two tragic events I needcd a few weeks to grieve the death of my brother and help
my daughter's family in a time of crisis. I faxed a 2-page "Notice o f UnavailabiIity o f Counsel'
with a n incorporated Notice ofPreempto~yChallenge to Judge Sachs, under CCP 2170.6 (a)(2).
(see Exhibit A - a t end see mail priority confirmation proving Sachs received papers 3/13/15.)
Judge Alvarez postponed a 12/17/12 trial date to 1/10/13 when Tom Parish's stepson died. Our
case was transferred from Judge Brodie's UD court in Fontana to S28 in the Justice Center last
week to be consolidated with the first case which we won in 2013. The case is still pending
because we had to appeal the judgment Sachs entered against our interest, and because Judge
Sachs has done everything in his power to delay and thwart awarding mandatory attorney fees.
Stubblefield's lawyer (Williamson) had just pummeled me with 3 motions (on 5-days' notice).
In UD court discovery motions are brought on 5 days' notice. CCP 21170.8. Opposing party may
file written opposition a day before hearing or present opposition orally a t the hearing. see
CRC 3.1347. The first motion was 52 pages; the second one 102 pages; the third 129 pages.
With the unexpected death of my brother and my daughter's emergency hospitalization, it was
humanly impossible to research the issues addressed in 183 pages of motions and arguments,
and prepare written opposition. I was so overcome with grief and worry over my daughter,
that I could barely function last week and was in no condition to try to perform the impossible.
Exh. A shows Sachs received my Notice Monday, 3/13/15, I-Ie knew I could not He opposition
the day before the 3/18/15 hearing. Any unbiased judge would have continued everything!
oral argument from a malicious opposing party,

Any unbiased judge would refuse to hear
showing up to take full advantage of counsel's physical and mental impairment in her time
of severe grief over the death of her brother and worry over the near death of her daughter.
Instead, evil Sachs showed his true colors. He is a hcartless monster without a conscience.
Attached as Exhibit B is the rulings he made on 3/18/15 while I was not there to rebut the lies.
Here are excerpts from the callous Judge with the heart of a grcat white shark:
"Court addresses filng of a CCP 170.6 filed by defendant against Judge Sachs is DEMED."
"Court treats Notice of Unavailability o f Counsel submitted by attorney McCarmn as a request
for antinuance. Matter is continued due to attorney McCarron's emergency situation. Court
h u e due dates for fine of ouvasition."
notes no opposition to motion filed. Cto-ur
What kind of a callous monster would make such a ruling, where movant filed 183 pages of
motion papers on 5 days' notice, when he knows she is physically, emotionally, and mentally
unable to cope duc to two immediate family tragedies. Sachs has a malignant, evil heart.
This is not the first time Judge Sachs has acted with a malignant heart and zero compassion.
On May 6, 2013 the AppelIatc Division granted Bonnie Shipley's writ petition and reversed
the biased trial court's denial of summary judgment every judge knew was a sham complaint.
For 2 years Judge Sachs (Stubblefield's chore boy) has thwarted my ability to collect attorney
fees which are mandatory under Mobile Home Residcncy Law to every MRL prevailing party.
First, after the writ of mandate arrived in the trial court Judge Alvarez recused himself a t my
request because bias is presumed when a judge's decision is reversed. (see Exh. A; exh. A)
The case was transferred to Sachs, who was a more vigorous.advocatc for Stubblefield then his
own half-competent lawyers. Sachs proceeded to engage in g n e serial violations of statutes,
scparation of powers, Rules of Court, Stare Decisis, and Codes of Procedures (see Exh. C) even
going so far as to insert the words "or resident" into a statute Stubblefield quoted in the final
judgment Sachs let the loser prepare, instead of prevailing party a s required by CRC 3.1312.
We have encountered only 2 unbiased judges who actually applied the law; i.e. Judge
Ochoa and Judge Brisco, who authored the Appellate Division's 10-page Decision and Writ
of Mandate directing the trial court to cnter judgment in Bonnie Shipley's favor. The court
immediately pulled them off the Appellate Panel, and replaced them with Judge Hosking, the
Judge who "dissented in the ruling. With a chore-boy on t.he Appellate Panel Stubblefield is
home free. They wiLl never assign either of the two honest judgcs to us. They will only assign
judges who will rule against us no matter what the law, rules of court, or codes of procedure.
Sachs not only let the loser compose final judgment, but even went one step furthcr.
Sachs inserted the words "or resident" into tho final judgment to provide a remedy for
Stubblefield to evict Bonnie Shipley directly, contravening what Appellate Panel mandated.
Stubblefield's lawyer then delivered the debaucbedjudgment directly to his chambers.
Sachs entered the judgment before I had an opportunity to evcn sce it, let alone object to it.
When Shipley tried to hand deliver objections the next day Judge Sachs refused to file them,
stating objections were "late" as he had "signed the judgment already." This violated Local
Rule 591.3 requiring all judges to hold a final judgment for 10 days to allow for objections.
Shipley was forced to appeal her own victory to prevent abuse by using the debauched
judgment to steal mobile homes from residents at Mountain Shadows Community.
2
Shipley dropped off her objections which Sachs refused to accept in his Kangaroo Court.
The new Appellate Division Panel (Sachs' lunch buddies) DENIED Shipley's motion to augment
the record with her objections, opening the door for Stubblefield to argue we waived objections.
Sachs lunch buddies on the Appellate Panel had to order Sachs to strike the words "orresident."
They found his nine serial violations to be "harmless"and chastised me for daring to argue
bias---makinga subtle threat that such arguments "bordered on contempt of court." Incredible!
Sachs' nine serial violations were hardly "harmled' to us. We had to pay $175 for a transcript.
Sachs was able to thwart my ability to receive any attorney fee award for another six months.
I had to spend hundreds of hours researching issues, writing Opening and Reply briefs, and
attending oral argument in San Bernardino, including travel costs. Sachs loves revenge.
Perhaps a federal jury will have the last say on Sachs' campaign to punish and degrade me.
It would take hundreds of pages to show all of the blatant violations of judicial ethics, not
to mention gender discrimination (calling me Ma'am while addressing Williamson as "counsel").
The final showing of a malignant heart is how Sachs treated Bonnie Shipley this past summer.
Stubblefield exhausted all appeals a s high as California Supreme Court, and lost them all.
Once the concept of possibly having to pay my attorney fees for 3 years became a reality,
Stubblefield tried to burn us out of the mobile home. The electrical pedestal and gas meter on
the side of our home caught fire. The neighbor who saw the fire start up, and another who ran
over to help save our home extinguished the fire with their bare hands, water and extinguisher.
Both witnesses said it started in the electric pedestal, which was under park manager's control.
We had no gas, electric, telephone or DSL. The park manager refused to replace the meters.
We filed an emergency ex parte hearing to ask Sachs to order utilities restored to the home.
(see Exhibit D) D-1 is priorty mail confirmation Sachs received the papers on Friday 9/5/14.
Yet, when we showed up Monday morning (918114) Judge Sachs played his cute little game of
reciting they "neverrcceivedthepapem." Attorney Williamson was not there. I am sure Sachs
had his deputy call to telI him not to bother driving over as he would continue it to Tuesday.
We had to stay overnight and return Tuesday, at Williamson's whim and total convenience.
Sachs DENIED our motion (Exh. D 1) while temperatures exceeded 105 degrees. I had to pay
$3,000 to restore utilities to our home. I asked if Bonnie could relievc herself from the extreme
heat by sitting in the air-conditioned clubhouse and going in a swimming pool. THE ANSWER
WAS "NO, SHE I S NOT AN APPROVED RESIDENT OF THE PARK SO SHE C N T GO.
Judge Sachs was fully aware that Bonnie was caring for.her bother, who has stage 4 cancer,
undergoing chemotherapy, radiation and proton therapy to try to save his life, and her mother
who suffered congcstive heart failure and could not care for her son or drive him to therapy.
Both Sachs and Williamson arc malignant hearts who have zero compassion for anyone.
Sachs may enjoy all the power he can hoard over us in his black robe and guard with a gun.
Some day Sachs will have to face a higher force on judgmcnt day and try to justify his cruelty.
I could write pages about all the unfair treatment and gender bias abuse from Judge Sachs.
The transfer of the Duffy case to Judge Sachs for "consolidation" is so he can deny my fecs
again, by claiming he needs to wait for the outcome of the "related case." I am not retarded!
This scam is transparent. We wonder many thousands Stubblefield laundered into Sachs'
"judicial campaign fund." We have no chance for a n ounce of justice in his kangaroo court.
CC:
Supervisors, County, Steve Graham
EXHIBIT A
(1<'
w
Fa%
y?~S-fZSz
$0
p- 4 b$ - ggp;L ,
Nancy Duffy McCarron, CRN 164780

950 Roble Lanc
2 Santa Barbara, CA 93103
805-450-0450 fax 805-965-3492
3 nancyduffysb dyahuo.com
1
Real Estate raker Lie. #00853086
Attorney for Defendant Bonnie Shiplcy

Nancy Duffy McCarron, In Pro Per
Special Appearance for Steve Allen and Christine Allen
URGENT!

I1
CONSOLIDATED CASES
7
-
Case No. UDPS1406978 filed 10/3/14

Case No. UDDS1204130 filed 8/13/12
PPREMPTORY CHALLENGE AGAINST JUDGE

SACHS -2 CONSOLIDATED CASES CCP 5170.6
.
NOTICE OF UNAVAILABILITY OF COUNSEL
TRAGIC DEATH OF
BROTHER AND HER DIABETIC DAUGHTER'S
IN A SEMI-COMATOSE STATE
17
19
ba Mountain Shadows Mobile
MTC non-parties Steve & Chistine Allen

5 MTC Bonnie Shipley, defendant
(Motions are Filed & Served by 2-day Mail 3-1-15)
will be filed 1-day before rescheduled date
22
TO: PRESIDING JUDGE MARSIU SLOUGH, .JUDGE SACHS AM) COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFF
23
PLEASE TAKE NV'I'ICE that Nancy Duffy McCarron, as counsel for Bonnie Shipley, and herself in pro per,
& specially appearing, without conceding./urisdiction,for Steve Allen and Christine Allen (non-parties harassed)
24
Counsel will be unavailable until after April 3,2015. 3 Hearings set for March 18 & 19 must be vacated.
25
Nancy Duffy McCarron's 55-yr old brother nnexpectedly died this week from complications of pneumonia and
26
mcst grieve the first death of a sibling. Secondly, his surviving daughter is devastated as she and her father just
27
buried her only sister & mother a few years ago who were murdered by an ex-boyfriend. The family i s devastate0
28
We need time to mounl this horrible third tragedy in this family. Secondly, counsel's daughter was rushcd to the
hospital in a diabctic coma, sunivetl hut is still hospitalized. Counsel needs to help her family in this recovery.
---~T-L---cTT-
-..-
:i-h:i:k.
---
-..--
-I..-&:I
.-
-0.
.
a
-
AI?II<
~ ~ x ~ ~ ~ : - - + - n : - - . . - i : r . .T.A--Q,,A.~
PPD
s17n
McCarron expects the same equal treatment from this court which was extended to Stubblefield when his
lawyer filed "Notice of Unavailability" due to two "compelling circumstances" (death in family & sickness also).
(See Exh. A). Judge Alvarez immediately continued all hearings for an entire month for "family emergencies."
Accordingly, the 2 hearings set for March 18 against Steve &Christine Allen, as well as the hearing set March 19
against Bonnie Shipley must be vacated and no other hearings be set until after April 3,2015 to afford McCarron
her time to grieve the tragically premature dcath of her younger brother & to deal with her daughter's emergency.
6
MOTION BY AFFIDAVIT FOR DISQUALIFICATION OF JUDGE SACHS ON BOTH CASES

NANCY DUFFY MCCARRON, being duly sworn, deposes and says:
She is attorney for the named parties, and both non-parties to the within action (or special proceeding). That Judg
Sachs, who has been assigned to preside over both consolidated cases cited above now pending, is prejudiced
against the party (or his or her attorney) or the interest of the party (or his or her attorney) so that affiant cannot
10
or believes helshe cannot have a fair and impartial trial or hearing before the judge, under CCP 170.6 (a)(2)
11
"A motion under this paragraph may be made following reversal on appeal of a trial court's decision, or
following reversal on appeal of a trial court's final judgment, if the trial judge in the prior proceeding is
assigned to conduct a new trial on the matter. Notwithstanding paragraph (4), the party who filed thc
appeal that resulted in the reversal of a final judgment of a trial court may make a motion under this
section regardless of whether that party or side has previously done so. The motion shall be made
within 60 days after the party or the party's attorney has been notified of the assignment.
12
13
14
Rcmittitur was entered 213115 in UDDSl204 130. Transfer of UDDS 1204130 was enteredlserved 3/9/15
1
Non-parties Steve & Christine Allen join in this Motion to Disqualify as to their imarouer motions.
I Presiding Judge is required to reassign both consolidated cases to a new judge who is not afraid to appl!
the law and rule against the almighty Stubblefield when mandated by Stare Decisis & who is not afraid
to enforce m
v
,Rules of Court, Civil Procedures fairly and equally to both parties in the litigation.
Judicial Estoppel [as amply explained in Jackotr v. v. County ofLos Angeles (1997) 60 CA.4th 1711
precludes Stubblefield from opposing disqualification because he already gained an advantage by havin
his denial of disqualification reversed on a writ by making the identical claim McCanon makes above.
see Stubblefield v. Superior Court of Sun Bernardino County (2000) 81 CA 4'h. 762 (Exhibit B)
Accordingly, wc request the presiding judge to immediately disqualify Judge Sachs, vacate all
motions which may be reset after April 3,2015 on 16 day notice in the court of a newly assigned judgc
Oppositions to 3 motions will be filed after the motions have been reset on Drover notice per CCP $100:
I declare the above to be true under penalty of perjury. Executed in Santa Barbara, CA on 3/13/15.
and specially appearing for non-parties Steve and Christine Allen
- 1Notice of Unavailability of Counsel until after 4/3/15 & Motion to Disqualify Judge Sachs CCP 51 70.6
Robert S. Coldren, Esq.,Bar No. 81710

Robert G. WOliamsan, Jr., Esq. Bar No. 73176
Justus J. Britt, Es Bar No. 269352
BART, r n B~
~OLDREN
A PROFESSIONAL LAW CORPORAT'ION
.,
200 Sandpointe, Fourth Floor

6 Attorneys for Plaintiff Stubblefield Pro ertics, s Csk:i'ornia general partnership
dba Mountnin Shadows Mobile Home ommuniPf
SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE )F CALIFORNIA
COUNTY OF SAN BERN.4RDM3 -CIVIL DNISTON
10
1I
L STUBBI>EFI[ELDPROPERTIES, s
California gneral partnership dba
Case<.r'o.UDDS1204X30
Judge: Hcn. Donald R. Alvarez

Dept.842
13 HOME COMMUNTTY,
14
Plaintiff
Defendants.
B O m SHIPLFY, and DOES 1 through

17 10, inclusive,
18
--
21
22
TO &L PARTIESAND TO THEIR
23
PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that
OF R E C O ~ :
, . s ,,
Properties dba Mountain
24 Shadows Mobile Home Community, wial witnesses set firth below are unavailable to attend
I1
15 nnd testify at trial until after
January 1.2013 due to :%garatecompelling circumstances as
26 set forth in the declaration of Plaintiffs counsel.
I. Thomas Parrish, Senior Executiva Vice ~r.=iii;;;?t,~tubblefieldProperties.

28
-.
,'?'.',?,
2. Marvin Freeman, Manager, Mountain Shadows

m e reasons for each of these witnesses unavilability are Set
of Robert G. Williamson, Ir.
DECLARATION OF ROBERT G. WILLIAMS

I, ROBERT G. WILLIAMSON, JR., declare:
1.
attorney duly licensed to practice law before all cou
~alifomia,and am a partner with the law firm of Hart, King Coldren. att
partnership dba
for Plaintiff STUBBLEFIE3.D PROPERTIES, a
SHADOWS MOBILEHOMECOMMUNITY YPIaintiff 7. The facts set forth herei

of my own personat knowledge, except those facts stated
to those matters I believe them to be true and could and would completely testify thereto.
2.
Mr. Thomas Parrish is Senior Executive Vice President of Plaintiff..:.
Stubbletield Properties. His duties, among others, include supervising . management

and. ..
.
,
operations of Mountain Shadows Mobile Home Corn~nunity.As Plaintiffs representative he
expected to attend trial every day.
3.
Mr. Parrish is also a percipient witness and expected to testify at trial about
Defendant's presence in the community, the Community Guidelines and resideacy age
restriction and his communications with Defendant's munsel Nancy D u e McCarron,.
4.
On December 10, 2012. the initial trial date, the C o w with counsel and
Defendant present in court reset the trial date for December 17, 2012 and Defendant
5.
I learned that morning after leaving ourt that MI. Parrish's son's funeral will
n December 17,2012. It is my understanding that the passing of M ~pan-&$...

.
.
call^ premature and naturally

.
.
his family is dkeply grieving their loss. Under the
stances I do not expect Mr. Parrish to be prepared to be in court for . ~ aand

l to testify
r January 1,2013.
36568.053/4814-7826-5618~.1
2
S m ~ m r n L O)NSTRUCI'ION
D
COOet .I., Petitloner+ v. THE SUPERIOR COURT O F SAN BERNARDINO C O W , RrepondenQ
c m OF SAN BERNARDMO et al., Real ParKw in Interest.
COURTOF ~ppI3.L OF CALIFORNIA, FOUR733 APPELLATE DISTRICT, DlVlSlON TWO
81 cy ~ p 4p6 76UI Cal. App. 4th 76% 97 C d Rptr I I2197 Cal RpU. U 121; 2 m O &I &PIP*IS 4 W D N Cd. App. m 1 S 412; 2 N 0 W 04
Op S&
49012000 Cal. Daily Op. Service 4901; 2000 Daily JournnlDAR651 12080 Daily J O ~ D A 651
R I
No. W26308
June L6,2000, Decided
Editorial Information: Prior HisfDry
Superior Cwrt of San Bmardino County. Super. Ct. No. SCV-232058. Martin A. Hildrnh ~udge.
Retired judge of the former San Bemardino Municipal CouR W a t Valley Divison, @signed by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VL section 6 of the
~ a i k i ~nsrilution.
a
Disposition:
a peremptoy writ of mandate issue as prayed. Petitioners shall rewVCr their Costs.
~eadnntes
CALIFORMA OFFICIAL REPORTS HEADNOTES:
Clsssified to California Digest dOfficial Report3
(I \ rudees 6,. 14-Disqudifietdion-Groundr-Biasor Prejudiob-Party's PerempWry Chalknge--Timelinm-Applieabilify ofFILsr Track Rules-Following
Reversal and ema and.
--AAer rmaod in a civil action in which a mmmary judgment in favor of defendants had been reversed in pan and in whieh the eaCs was assigned to
the same judge who had made the m m s r y judgment mling, the Rial c o w emd in denying as untimely plaintiffi' per-tory
challenge to the judge
p u m to Code Civ. Pme., 5 170.6, subd. (2). First, given the policy reasons for the 1985 amendments to Code Civ. Proe., 5 170.6 rubd (2), i.e., the
potcdial for biason the pert of the trial judge who had b m reversed, plainti@ had the right to disqualify the judge, even though they had previously
mereired such a challenge. Althmgh m a rule a party is limited to a single peremploy challenge in a e m , the stafutc permis an a d d i t i d ehallenge
following reversal of ajudgment if thc same judge is assiped to bear the case on remand. Second. plainti*' motion was timely. Although Gov. Code, $
68616, subd(i)
(fast uack rules), limits a parly's exerehe of a peremptory challenge to the I5 days following the first appearnee, this provirion
only applies when the assignment of an dl-purpose or direct ealendar judge is mnde simultaneously with the aceepcance of the complaint for filink Thm,
Gav. Codc S 68616 has no aodicntion when aiudment has been reversed on appeal and rebJmed tn the trial court for retrial. hscesd,the 60-day
provision d < ~ c d e ~ i vme.,
. y170.6, eontro~~cd.[See 2 Witkin, Cal. Pmeedure (4th ed. 1996) C O W , 8 146 etscq.] Summary
'
.-,~~~--~
ARsr remand in a civil action in which a summary judgment in favor of defendants had been rcwrscd in pa? the casc wasaesigncd to the umejudge
~ h had
o m& the summary judgment d i n g . Plaintif% filed a peremptory challenge to the judgc pursuant to Codc Civ. Proe., 5 170.6, subd (2). and
defendants obicctcd bawl on untimelincss. The trial iudnc
Court of Ssn Bmmdino Counw.No. SCV252058,
. .
- msfaincd defendad obiection. (Sumior
~
d A Hiimh,
n
Judge. *)
Retired judge of the former San Bemardino Municipal Court, West Valley Division, assigned by the C h i e f l ~ i c pe u m t to artiele VI, pertion 6 of the
California Constitution.
The Court of Appeal granted plaintiffs' petition for a writ of mandate. The wurt held that, given the policy r e m n s for the 1985 amendments to Code
Civ. Pmc., 5 170.6, subd. (2). i.e.. the potential for biw an the part ofthe trial judge who had k e n reversed, plaint& had the I+&
to disqualify the
judge, even though they had previously exercised meh a challenge. Tke court also held that plaintiff? motion wss timely. Although Gov. Code, 8 68616,
subd. (i) (fast Uack rules), limits a p W s exereire of a peremptoryehallenge to the 15d a r j following the first appearance. this pmvision only applies
whm the rssignment of an all-plrrpose or direct calendarjudge is made simultaneously with the aeeepmee of the complaint for filing.
Thus, Gov. Code. 9 68616, has no applicaion when a judgment has been reversed on appeal and refilmed to the vial eourt for reaid. Instead, the m d a y
pmvision of Code Civ. Pmc., 5 170.6, contmlled. (Opinion by Gaut, Aeting P. I., with Riehli and Ward,JJ., eoneurring.)
Counsel
Hill, Pamr & Burrill and Dean 8. Dennis for Petitionem
No appearance for Respondent.
Lmis, VAmato, Brisbois & B i s g e Christopher D. Lockwood; lamer F. Penman. City Ammey, and H q Empeno, Depofy City
Anmey, for Real Pm'es in Interest
Judges: Opinion by G a a Aciing P. J., with Richli and Ward, JJ., wneurring
Opinion by:
Gaut
(81 Cd. App. 4th 7631 (97 Cal. Rptr. Zd 123) GAUT, Aeting P. 1.
In thin muter we aq as happens far too ofleu, Eancd upon to reconcile and auempt to harmonize two stnrutes which strenuously resist any effort to make
sen= of them. Ofme two possible results argued by the panics, neither is either mmpelled or compelling. Nevertheless, in our {81 cal. ~ p p4th
. 764)
view the eonelusion we reaeh wmpot'ts best with the intent of the Legislahue as we understand it and does the 1- violence to the English language.
We find that petitioners' attempt to disqualify the trial judge wan t h e w and that the hial court erred in findhg otherwise.
'Ihe facts of the underlying case arc not signilimt Earlier proceedings resulted in a summary judgmmt in favor of real pmiw in infwest the Ciw of San
~ e d i nd
o related dekndan4 (hereinafter City). However, on appeal by pefitioners SNbbletieM ConJtrueiion Co. a al. (hcminaffer Srubblefield),
we reversed the summaryjudgment in pan and remanded for fuitha pmceedings. Our opinion was filed on June 29.1999, and theminihlr was
rcccived by the trial wurt on August 3 1 of that year.
On Sepiember 17. the clwk of the wurt notified the W i e s thnt the ease had been m i m e d to the Honomblc Christopher J. Wmer for all purposes.
Judge W m e r had, in fact,made the ruling which led to the latest appeal and partial revernal. On October 29, Stubblefleld filed a pmmmory ehallenge to
Judge Wamer pmuant to Code Of Civil Pmeedure, seetion 170.6, and the City filed an objection b a d on untimeliness The court susuained the C i y s
objeciion and refused to disqualify iaelf This petition followed and we stayed funher p m d i w pending our resolution of the matter.
DISCUSSION
(1)(1) Stubblrtield relier upon Code Of CivilProeedurenection 170.6,subdivlsion (2). In pertinent part this statuk providm that " [a] motion
under this paragraph may be made fallowing rwersal on appeal o i a trial court's dslslon, o r iollowlng reversal au appeal of a trlal court's final
judgmenb if the trial judge in the prior proceeding is aasigncd to eonducta new trial on the mam. Notwithstanding paragraph (3) of this s e c f i o ~the
party who fded the appeal that resulted in the reversal of a finaljudgmentof a trial wurt m y make a motion under this s e c t h mgardless of whaher that
p a w or side has previously done so. The motion shall be made within 60 days after the party or the p a w s attorney has been notlfied oithe
assignment"
,/Of
,
To this, the City raises two arguments: I) that Stubblefield, having previously filed a ehallcnge under Code ofcivil Proesdurc, section 170.6, is not
entitled to file another, w d 2) that the case is governed by sepaate, and shorter, t h e limits established in the Govemmenl Code. We a d d m these
w m ~ f sop&y.
s
(81 Cal. App. 4th 765) A.
First, the City argues that Stubbleiield may not exereise its right to cballcnge Judge Wamer bemuse it previwsly exercised sueh a challenge. I Although
as a (97 CaI. Rpb: 2d 124) mle a party is limited to a single peremptory ehallenge in a gse,as sd forth above, the statute elearly permits an addillonel
following reversal of ajudgment if the same judge is nssigned to hear the cau; on remand. However, the City argues that because the
proccdings were terminad by summary judgment, rather than by judgment &trial, the remand will not result in anew lrial but in a first Wial. Henez,
the argument runs, the exeeptim to the "one ehallcnge" rule does not apply.
The contention is meritless. It is quite hue, as the City argues, that the exception does not spply to all pmeeedings after remand by the cant o f ~ p p e a l .
In Stcgs Investment. v. Superior Court (1991) 233 Cal. App. 3d 572.576 1284 Cal. Rpv. 4951 (hereinafter S t e p Investmmts), the wmt q w s d the
view that the disqualieation right would not apply if the remand was for a "ministerial" purpose, such as calculating interest However, the cowl painted
out hat the pup.% of the provision, enacted in 1985 at a time when it was common to reasign the trial judge to the remanded cn% was to address the
"concern. . that a judge who bed been mversed might prove to be biased agalnst the party who succurfully a p p l e d the judge', erroneous
ruling a t the original trial." (Id. at pp. 575376.) Accordingly, as the wwr explained. a party may disqualify the former judge w s l g n e d to the
case if the ease involves m actual re(rinl of one or more issues.
Stegs Investments, supra. 233 Cal. App. 3d 572, was followed in Hendershot v. Superior Court (1993) 20 Cal. App. 4th 860 124 CaL Rpk.2d 6451,
whieh, in defining "new trial," relied on the "very broad" application of the phrase in Code of Civil Pmedu* section 656. (See also Carney v.
Simmonds (1957) 49 Cal. 2d84,90-91 13 13 P.2d 3051.) It k also weU reeognid Lhata molion for new trid may properly b c n d d m ~ e dto a summary
judgment rendered under Code of Civil Proeedure, section 437c. (Seoll v. Farm (1983) 139 Cal. App. 3d 462,467 [I88 CaL Rptr. 8231; see alsu
Passavanti v. Williams (1990) 225 Cal. App. 3d 1602, 1606 [275 Cal.RpW. 8871.)
Thus, the proceedingr contemplated by our remand will be a new Uial within the meaning of Cade of Civil Proeedure seecion 170.6. mMivision (81 Cat.
of the matter in this case, a final judgment was entaed. Our parrial reversal requires that the case be
App. 4th 766) (2). Although there was no full
reopened with an netual trial if neeesary; finthenno% our partial revenel refleeted our view that the vial judge cmd in a emeial deeision of law.
Artumiag. as the Legirlabre dld, thot s judge may reaet with n eerbin piqac to the negative treslment of hlr or her dcciaioos by an appellate
rourl, thls situntlon is ohvlonsly one in whlch the potcmiel far bias cxists. 2 Glvcn the policy rentoas for the 1985 amendmeab to Code of Civil
thnt ~tubblefieldhad the right to disqnalify Judge Warner.
procedure, seetion 170.6. It k
We mrn now to the more difficult auestion-whether Stubblefield exercised that rieht in a timely f d i o n . B.
Thi Ciry's responsc to ~mbbkficld'sreliance on the time provisions of &&of ~yvil~ r o c c d u ksection 170.6 is to point to h i a l l y canvary provisions
in Govcmmem Ccds secfion68616, subdivision (i). That sIamtc is pan orthe Tria Court Delay Reduction A d and wplies to all ca% falling under that
act (commonlv known as Mtrack mas). as thisone docs. The l&eume on whieh the Citv relies orovides hat "~o&ithstandin~
Seelion 170.6 ofthe
(97'~al.~pn..ld 125) Code of Civil dm in direct e a l e n d m ~ u ~challengcs
s.
p u r s k t to tiat section shall be exercised shin I5 dayoofthe
p a w s firs impearwee. M&-tercalcnd.w mrls shall be governed solely
. by. Section 170.6 of the Code of Civil Procedure.' (Italics added.) This case
invilves a d<& eakndar assignment.
The d d c effen of an unadorned reading of this provision is immediately apparent. If the direct calendar assignment is rnadc more Lan 15 days after a
p a q s first Bppearaacc in the caw, that patty would ncva have the right to exercise e peremptory ehallenge. It would also n e d y mew that a
peremptory challenge could ncver be exercised after an appeal md remand, because all parties would have long since made a tint appearance.
Nevertheless, his was the conshuetion argued by the real party in interest in Fight for the Rams v. Superior Court (1 996) 41 Cal. App. 4th 953 148 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 8511 @ereinafterFight for the RsmS). In thzd care, the plaintiff filed suit (&us appearing) on February 15, but an all-purpare nssipment (or
dircet calendar assignment) was not made until May 4. The plaintiff then filed a peremptory challenge on May 1 2 The vial wurt denied it as (81 Cal.
App. 4th 767) untimely, and when the plaintiff sought review by extraordinary wit, the defendant argued that due to the timing neither side had MY
right to aperemptory challenge.
The appellete wurt had no d a c u l t y in rejecting this mntention in revming the trial m u t t instead, the wurt held that "Government Code seetion 68616.
subdivision (I) unambiguously requires a pariy to uereisea p m m p m y ehdlenge 'within 15 days of the pert)rs first appearanee' in a dinet ealendnr
mutt" (Fight for the Ratm, supra. 41 Cal. App. 4th al p. 958, italies added.) In the eourt's implicit view, n trid court does not b m m e a d i e calendar
court until a direct eelendat assignment is made, and it is only at that time that a party makes its first appearance in that murt and the h e in which a
peremptory challenge must be made begins to w. 3 A similar mult was reachcd in Cybermedi% suprn, 72 Cal. App. 4th 910, whieh bvohed a case in
which the assigned all-pu~pmejudgewas revlaeed by anotherjudge. Without referring to Fight for the Rams, suma, 41 Cal. App. 4th 953. and
expressing the intent to "harmonize' Code of Civil Procedure, section 170.6 with Govmment Codc section 68616, suMivislon (i), the wurt k p l y
stated that "whsre, as here, apmty has already appeared m the action, il must file its challmge within 15 days of receiving notie of a change in the
individual falexdar judge assigned to the case." 4 (Cybermedin, supra, 72 Cal. &D. 4th at o. 913.)
r ~-~~
The City here does not argue that Stubblefield had no rightto e x s s e aperemptbjchal~en~e
foilowing the remand, but argues by w o g y h m Fight
for the R a m supra, 4 1 Cal. App. 4th 953, that it had only 15 days from the date Judge W m e r was wigned the csse aftn r m m d . The City argues t h a
x the East track rulcs are desigued to (97Cal. Rptr. 2d 126) limit delay, it is '"absurd"to sllppose that the rules would require a petty to make a
peremptory ehallenge at the beginning of the ease within I5 day$ but allow four times as long in whieh to ehallmge ajudge reassigned to the case after
remand
This position h x substantial appeal. The problem is that, on its face, the Govcmmmt Code provision s e e m to apply to all possible situations, b w if (81
Cal. App. 4th 768) so, its use of the pnrty's first appearance as the trigger date is singularly poorly ehoseh Fight for h e Ram& supra, 41 CaL App. 41h
953, and w e m e d i a , supra, 72 Cal. App. 4th 910, rewguize this at kart implicitly. In both eases the eourt war compelled to intapret ~ b d i v i ~ i o(i)nof
Govemment Code. section 63616 5 in order to avoid thepreesumably unintmded result that parties in b t t m k cares would frequently be deprivsd of any
o p p m i t y to exenise a peremptory challenge 6 A fair reading of the fnsttrnek provision leads to the conclusion that it was draREd as if only one
situation would e V K be presented: the immediate assignment ofan all-purpose judge at the time the original mmplaint is filul. Only in thatsituation will
both sides invariably have I5 days in whieh lo ehallenge the svigned judge &er their respedive first appesranew. In d l 0 t h srmation~
latnansignedjudge, a ehange in judges, or retrial after appeal--a literal reading of subdivision (i) would caneel the right 10disqualify the judge b e e a m the
challenge would necerserily eomc too late aRer the firs1 appearance. Thus, the appellate courts have w e n t i a l y rewitten the samae to provide a fair
opmmnity for B e parties to make a peremptory challenge.
LA
$0~. or wb&er to eonelude thntfirst appe-cc

means fimappesranee. f i e term
lojoin in the
us is
",ppesranccn has a well+stablished p o Q d u ~meaning. A plaintiffnppem in an action when the -hint
is fled. (Lyons v- State of Califmia (Isa5)
ride, "[a) defendant appears in an action when ths defendant answers. demurs, files a notice Of motion to
67 Gal, 380! ,s4 [7 p. 7631.) on the
pbintiff
a notie ofmotion to transfer .. movesfor reeIassilication purmant to Code of Civil Procodurn, S~ecfon403.040, gives
mike,
tes do not "appear'
of a p p e m e , or when an aMmey givesnotiecof Bppemancc for Ule defendant." (Code Civ. Pme., 8 1014.) The F'
hn
when an all-purpose judge is awigned or replaced; they are already there. We respect the Legislamre's use of the lerm'fira a p p w c e : '
kbwever, this does no( -that
Smbblefield's only opporiwity m exercise a peremptory ehallenge came when it filed its complaint beck in ihe mists of
pdiEia1time. 7 We ahofledge, as did the eo& in Fight for h e Rams, supra, 41 Cal. App. 4 L 953, and C~bermcdia,~ p r 72
q ~ a lApp
. 4th (81 Cd.
' A ~ 4th
~ .769) 910, that applying Ur statute to Ur siiualion before us would be illogieal and unfair. &uglr
subdivihn (i) of O o v m I I ~ Cod6
t
68616 dm limit a p w - s aereise of aperemplory ehallenge lo the I5 days following the fim appesranee, this only maka smsc if the
Legislanrrc intended it to apply only when the assimment of an all-purpose or d i m eacendar judge is made simuttaneordy with ihe eeccptanee of the
amplaint for filing. We are reluemt to uttribute an illogieal or uni%r inlent to the Legislamre; (97 Cal. Rptr. 2d 127) instezd, we a s m e that it did
intend to make sense. (See People v. Broussnrd (1993) 5 Cal. 4th 1067, 1072 [22 Cal. Rptr. 26278.8% P.2d I 1341, on avoidanee of absurd resulls.)
Thus, Govmment Code seetion 68616, subdivision (i) has no application to the situation whieh arises after remand.
Although it may he anomalous, as the City argnes, to allow 60 days tollowing the assignment ofthe same trial judge a&r reversal, our interpretaim
doe8 not do unaeeeptable violenee to the fa%track whcme as a whole. In La SeigneuricU.S. Holdings, Ine. v. Superior Comt (1994) 29 Cal. App. 4th
1500pS Cd. KpZ Zd 1751, the wurt found it "somewhal punling" thal the fksltrek mles aaually allow ilve more days to exmire a peremptory
ehallmge than does C d e of Civll Procedure, seetion 170.6. 8 It eoneluded that the Legislature might have believed that extra tim wes nnecensary
because of the expedited nature ofthe proaam so thal a defendmf "brought inm an aetion wainst hi will; eould have .aWi oppormnity rn r d e c t and
coosida on the issue of R challmp~to the assigned judge." (La Scigncuri, sup% rit p. 1504.) Assuming lhis to be the legislative intent then Itmiring the
effed of the Government Code pmvision to the situation in which an all purpose judge is arrigned mtemporaneously with the filing of a mrnplaint
makes sense. The extended pcriod for making a perempbrj ehallens is thus remickd to L e defendant faced with numaous deeisirms and ehoices at the
very beginning ofli(igation, while in l e s prcrsvrcd situations thc shorter l0.day period of the Code of Civil Pmedurn wfinws mnmI.
We therefore wnelndethnt Governmeut Code, section 68616 has nonpplication when a ludgmenr has bwn revcraed an sppsl md . h r n r d to
the t h l wuri Tor rebial. The 60-day provlslon of Code of Civll Procedure, reelion 170.6 wntrolp and S t ~ b b l ~ f i e lmotion
d * ~ was timew.
{ S l CAI. Am. 4th 770) DISPOSITION
L e t s pernnptory writ of mandate bane as prayed. Petitioners shall recover their coats.
Richlii I., and Ward, J., wnarrrsd.
Fwblotes
.,,,e*ehoiEe
Retircd judge ofthe former San Bernardino Municipal C o y West Valley Divison, wigned by the Chief Justice pursuam to &cle VI, scction 6 of the
Califomin Canstitution.
Retired judgeof h e former SanBernaPJino Municipal Court, WestVdly Division, svigncd by the ChieiJuvtiee purnuanttomicleVI, seetion 60f the
California Constitution.
The City did no1 raiw this issue below. However, as the issue is one of law and does not involve disputed facts, we may consider it even though the City
neglaed to raise it belaw. Wale v. Morgan (1978)22 Cal. 3d 388.394 [149 Cal. Rptr. 375,584 P.Zd 5121; I n n Maniage ofPnm(1997) 52 Cal. App.
4th 1487, 1490 [61 Cal. Rptr. 2d 4931.) We do note that the City filed M abbreviatsd objection and did request have to prep= fullcr briefing if the m n
felt it ncchow-er, the eourt's d i n g in the City's favor mooted that request.
2
We do not. o f m r s e , suggest that Judge W m e r has so reacted or vmuld so react. We merely accept the Legislature's opinion 41at such a reanion is
possible, and very human.
The result reached by ~ i g hfor

t the Rams, supra, 41 Cal. APp. 4th 953, is cleaciy equitable and we agree with if bW it does involve m e rcanangemenl
of the shltu10ry langnage. The murrs bland stanee that it is merely conshling %nbmbignous" lwguage might be called romcuhat d&genuous. In
Cyb=di% Inc. v. Superior Court (1999) 72 Gal. App. 4th 9 10 [gZ Cd.RPV. Zd 1261 (heninafler Cybermedia), by contrast. thc c m did not rdy on
any fiction that a WIfY did not wpp'ar in a dir& calendar murt until a direct o r l e n d ~ j u d was
~ e a s s i m d but simply m g n i z e d that Govanmart Code
section 68616, subdivision (i)could not be strictly applied= dr&d in all cirsumstanccs.
4
Presumably3under Fight fortheRam% sup- 41 Cat. App. 4th 953, the peremptory ehallenge filed in Cybermedia, supra, 72 cal. ~ p p4th
. 910
have bem untimely, because the Cybenoedia trial coun became a direct calcndar c m whm the first all-purposehdp was &gned.
5
AS we have observed in Fight for the Rams, supra 41 Cal. App. 6ha1 page 9 1 , the coun desnibcdthe l a n g u w whiB we quoted abwe as
"unambiguouslJ" bW then rwote "fust a p p m o e " to mean firat appearance orthe time of the assignment of an all-purposejudge, whichever is later
6
As we hwe naed above, a literal and drict rending of G o v c m m t Codesection 68616, subdivisjor, (i)wmld ocgste k provision in CodcdCivil
Proccdwe, section 170.6 that allows achallenge after appeal.
7
SeptemberZ9, 1989, to be precise.

X
Code of Civil i'mcaiurq secrion 170.6 providcs in p e t thaf "ifdirected to ike MU ofa muse tha hm bem asrignd to a judge B r all purpose%m e
molion shall be made . ..within 10 days afier notice of ihe all purpose assignmen$ or if the party has not yet appeared in the aetion, then witbin 10 days
atter the appmrmce."
2 0 Cal. App. LEXlS 477::Metro. Water Dist. of S. State v. Imperial Irrigation Uie::lune 15,zWO
PROOF OF SERVICE
2
3
4
COUNTY OF SAN BERNARDMO
Stubblefield Properties v. Bonnie Shivley
The undersigned is counsel for defendants & non-parties at: 950 Roble Lane, Santa Barbara, CA 93103
805-450-0450 fax 805-965-3492
6
7
10
11
12
13
14
1S
-16
17
18
UDDS 1204130 and UDFS 1406978
I
1
1
NOTICE OF UNAVAILABILITY OF COUNSEL
[ ] (By Personal Delivery) to the parties below as follows: at the 1-22-13 OSC Hearing (short form)
[x] (By Fax) on 311311 5 Fax machine to numbers below used complied with Rule 2003(3) and no error was
reported by the machine. Pursuant to Rule CRC, 2008 [c](4). I caused the machine to maintain a record of same
HartKing office fax 714-546-7457
I**
to presiding Judge Marsha Slough, to request reassignment of both consolidated cases to a new judge
to: nvilliamson@hkclaw.com (Appcndix included)
1 [XI
(By 2-day Mail) $1013a, 5201 5.5 CCP. I deposited the documents in a pre-paid stamped envelope to:
Robert Williamson, HARTIKMG
Santa Ana, CA 92707
Judge Sachs, San Bemardino Superior Court, S-28

247 W. Third Street, S-28
San Bemardino, CA 924 15-0210
20
1am familiar with mail collection in San Bemardino and the two-day mail service offered by the post office.
I mailed the envelope at San Bernardino, CA. I am aware on a motion of the party served, service is presumed
invalid if postal cancellation date is more than one day after deposit date on affidavit.
21
[ ] (STATE) I declare under penalty of perjury and laws of Californiathat the above is true.
19
22
23
Executed in Santa Barbara CA on 3/13/15

Making copies, faxing, preparing copies & envelopes
24
25
dclivcring to US Post Office & obtaining receipt
26
-2Notice of Unavailability of Counsel until after 4/3/35 & Motion to Disqualify Judge Sachs CCP $170.6
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Case UDFS1406978
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STUBBLEFIELD.....-VS................DUFFY
....
Action: j. (Choose)
.............................
",
'i
HEARING RE: MOTIONS UNDER SUBMlSSlONlNEXT HEARING DATE

03/06/2015 4:30 PM DEPT. F7
KYLE S BRODIE. JUDGE

PROCEEDINGS:
MOTIONS TAKEN UNDER SUBMISSION ON 02/10/15 IS ORDERED VACATED. MOTIONS TO BE HEARD
AT A DATE
TO BE DETERMINED BY JUDGE SACHS (DEPT. S28).
COURT ORDERS THlS CASE TO SAN BERNARDINO JUSTICE CENTER TO BE HEARD WITH
UDDSi204130.
COURT ORDERS MOTIONS THAT ARE SET TO BE HEARD ON 03/18/15 IN DEPT. F7 TO BE RECALENDARED FOR
03/18/15 IN DEPT. S28 (SAN BERNARDINO) TO EITHER BE H E M D OR CONTINUED T O A DATE TO BE
DETERMINED
BY THAT DEPARTMENT.
THE COURT NOW ORDERS THlS CASE ASSIGNED TO DEPARTMENT ( S28) FOR ALL PURPOSES.
CLERK'S OFFICE TO NOTIFY PARTIES
CLERK'S OFFICETO SEND FILE TO SAN BERNARDINO FOR NEXT HEARING
ACTION - COMPLETE
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EXHIBIT
UDFS1406978MinllteOrders San BernardimMain
3/19f7.015
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Case UDFS1406978
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STUBBLEFIELD
_
Action: [(choose)..
_
.
II
MOTION RE: ORDER TO COMPEL STEPHEN C. ALLEN TO APPEAR & TESTlFYlMlSC

FILED BY PLAINTIFF STUBBLEFIELD PROPERTIES, A CALIFORNIA
03/18/2015 8:30 AM DEPT. S28
MICHAELA SACHS, JUDGE

APPEARANCES:
AlTORNEY ROBERT WILLIAMSON JR PRESENT FOR PLAlNTlFFlPETlTlONER.
PARTIES NOT PRESENT: NANCY B DUFFY, BONNIE SHIPLEY
PROCEEDINGS:
COURT TREATS NOTICE OF UNAVAlLABlLlN OF COUNSEL SUBMllTED BY AlTORNEY MCCARRON
AS A REQUEST FOR
CONTINUANCE.
MAlTER IS CONTINUED DUE TO AlTORNEY MCCARRONS EMERGENCY SITUATION.

COURT NOTES NO OPPOSITION TO MOTION FILED.
COURT DOES NOT CONTINUE DUE DATES FOR FILING OF OPPOSITION.
COURT FURTHER STATES CHRONOLOGY OF CASE ON RECORD.
COURT ADDRESSES FILING OF CCP170.6 FILED BY DEFENDANT. PEREMPTORY CHALLENGE AGAINST
JUDGE
SACHS IS DENIED. FOR ADDITIONAL COURT FINDINGS AND RULING SEE AlTACHED REPORTERS
TRANSCRIPT.
COURT ORDERS CSR REGINA VEGA TO PREPAREA TRANSCRIPT OF THE PROCEEDINGS DATED
03118115.
ADDITIONALLY, COURT CONTINUES TODAYS MOTIONS TO 4/10115. MOTION TO COMPEL SET 3119115
AND
STATUS CONFERENCE SET 3/26/15 ARE BOTH CONTINUED TO 4111Yi5
ALL HEARINGS SET 4110115 WILL BE HELD AT 1:30PM.
HEARINGS:
CURRENT HEARING CONTINUED TO 04/10/15AT 01:30 IN DEPARTMENT S28.
VACATE SCUD HEARING SCHEDULED FOR 03/26/15 AT 08:OO IN DEPARTMENT S28.
VACATE LBM HEARING SCHEDULED FOR 03/19/15 AT 08:30 IN DEPARTMENT S28.
LAW & MOTION RE: ORDER COMPELLING B.SHIPLEY-FILED BY PLAINTIFF SET FOR 04/10/15AT 01:30 IN
DEPT. S28.
HEARING RE: STATUS CONFERENCE SET FOR 04/10/15 AT 01:30 IN DEPARTMENT S28.
NOTICE GIVEN BY JUDICIAL ASSISTANT
CORRESPONDENCE COVERSHEET GENERATED TO MAIL COPY OF MINUTE ORDER 3/18/15 TO
COUNSEL OF RECORD.
ACTION -COMPLETE
EXHIBIT C
D.
Chronological Summary of Judge Sachs' serial violations:
1. 2/10/14 Violation of CRC 3.1312 (prevailing party to prepare her judgment)

Judge Sachs refused to sign a judgment prevailing party submitted at the hearing.
Judge Sachs invited non-prevailing party's attorney to prepare the final judgment.
2. 2/19/14 Violation of Civil 6663(b) (power to vacate judgment expired in 60 days)
McCarron objected to revisiting a summary judgment order entered on 10121l13.
McCarron told Judge Sachs jurisdiction to vacate the order expired months ago.
3. 2/19/14 Violation of CRC 3.1 103: 3.1 12: 3.1 113. CCP 81005 (no motion notice
with basis for relief or Points & Authorities was filed as required) CCP 5 1005
4. 2/19/14 Violation of CRC 3.1312 (prevailing party $3 prepare judgments)
Minute Order recited "Counsel for Plaintiff to Prepare Judgment"
5. 3/17/14 Violation of Judicial Oath to avplv the law-violation of due process

Judge Sachs thwarted McCarron from reciting objections on a transcript record,
depriving Shipley of an opportunity to be heard and an opportunity to object.
Disparate treatment-calling counsel "ma'am" instead of by her name or counsel.
6. 3/17/14 Violation of Judicial Oath to Auvlv the law- violation of due process
Judge Sachs actively advocated for Stubblefield by distorting prior findings of
two courts and allowing Stubblefield to paraphrase findings to alter its import.
7. 3/17/14 Violation of Judicial Oath to Avvlv the law- violation of due process
Judge Sachs advocated for Stubblefield by inserting the words "or resident" into
his judge notes, and then giving the notes to Stubblefield's counsel for insertion
into the final judgment (a contrivance even Stubblefield didn't think of doing).
This violated Shipley's right to due process under federal and state constitutions.
The deck is stacked against a party where the Judge is the opponent's advocate.
8. 3/17/14 p
- violation of due process
Judge Sachs made a bizarre journal entry "jilesretained in department" which

enabled him to exercise exclusive control over which documents would be filed
or rejected. Judge Sachs then refused to accept the objections Shipley tried to file
on 3121114--only one day after Stubblefield submitted a debauched judgment
exparte to chambers on 3120114. This deprived Shipley of opportunity to object.

9. 3120114 Violated Local Rule 591.3 (no entry of judgment for 10 days)
Rule 591.3 was amended on 1/1/13 to afford opposing parties a chance to object
Stubblefield hued Legal Support Services to hand deliver a paraphrased final
judgment directly to chambers exparte on 3120114, without fust serving the
proposed judgment to opposing counsel, who represented prevailing party.
Judge Sachs signed the judgment the same day it was delivered [on 3/20/14]
without waiting even one day to afford Shipley an opportunity to object to form.
10. 3/21/14 Violation of Judicial Oath to Applv the law- violation of due process
Judge Sachs prevented Shipley from obtaining the judgment entered 3/20/14.
Shipley appeared 3 consecutive days to try to get it. [3/2 1/14,3/24/14,3125/14]
because his clerk had not scanned it to the online docket. Each time she appeared
in Dept. S-33 for a copy of the judgment she was told to return the following day.
Shipley was never able to obtain a copy of the judgment despite three attempts.
This was not one isolated incident or a few inadvertent mistakes. The 10 incidents
above displays a serial pattern of intentional violations of Codes of Civil Procedure,
Rules of Court, Statutes of Limitations, Local Rules, and the Judicial Code of Ethics.
By inserting the words "or resident" Judge S a c h paved the way for park owners to
evict residents directly on 5 days' notice, instead of proceeding against homeowners,
who can invoke statutory protections against arbitrary evictions under Civil 9798.55.
Former Panel quoted the trial court's finding verbatim on 2/14/13 as recited below:
Words .suchus defendant were not in Panel's verbatim quote from a 2/14/13 transcript:
~t the hearing on PetRioner's mation far
summary iudgment, the
found, am0119 o t b r things, Ulat Civil Code section 798.75 does not apply on[y to
circumstances where cwner&lp is lrangferred. Rather, Me cDwt found Mat
Sedon 798.75, eubd~sion(c) "is not limiled in ih a ~ l i c a t b n ,only in VFe

escrow, sale or transfer of a mobile home. It applies when an occupant of a
mahue home has no rwt of tenancy and is not otherwise en6tled la occupy the
mob@ home pursuant to this chapter.
mats Civil Code 708,75(c). This chapter 4 CT 181:s top
When McCarron objected to Stubblefield's distortion Judge Sachs insisted it is accurate.

Ms. MMRRON: okay. What about the first three
sentences where they paraphrased it and they added the word
such as Defendant?
THE COURT: It is irrelevant.
MS. MMRRON: Why is it irrelevant?

THE COURT: Because that was Judge Aluarez' decision
h i c h was, in fact, overturned by the coun so whatever that
says it is really irrelevant.
MS. McCARRON: But why havesomething in there that

wasn't said? That is not nght.
THE COURT: 1 believe it is accurate.
4 RT 54:21 bottom
Judge Sachs consecrated Stubblefield's distortion by approving his paraphrased

conclusions in the final judgment to create a pretext that both courts found Shipley was
an unlawfil occupant not entitled to reside in Space 333 under park rules. Judge Sachs
mote the words or resident onto his copy of the judgment Stubblefield had submitted,
authorizing Stubblefield to proceed directly against residents under Civil 798.56(d).
McCarron asked why she could not file the order to avoid his paraphrasing. RT 60:25
The court responded " It is his motion, it is his work" &d offered to give us his copy.
The S-33 deputy made copies of the judgment with the Judge's notes on it. RT 61:l
PlAhtifl m y
.&P
Civil Cndc scnion 798.56, mbbdivision (d)
4 RT 63 :
EXHIBIT D
9;5/2014
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EX-PARTE MOTION RE: DEF EXPARTE APP FOR ORDER TO REPAIR OR REPLACE ELE
09/09/2014 9:30 AM DEPT. S28X
MICHAELA SACHS, JUDGE

COURT REPORTER LINDA BALDWIN 12453
APPEARANCES:
ATTORNEY ROBERT WILLIAMSON PRESENT FOR STUBBLEFIELD PROPERTIES.
ATTORNEY NANCY DUFFY MCCARRON PRESENT FOR BONNIE SHIPLEY.
PROCEEDINGS:
NO FILE.
EX PARTE APPLICATION ARGUED.
COURT HAS READ AND CONSIDERED THE MOVING PAPERS AND OPPOSITION FILED 9/8/14.
COURT FINDS:
EX PARTE ORDERS DENIED.
FINDINGS ARE STATED ON THE RECORD.
ACTION -COMPLETE
222 W . Hospitality Lane, 31d Floor, San Bernardino, ~ i 9 2 4 1 5 1 Phone: 909.386.8655 Fax: 909.382.3212
Department of
Risk Management
March 16,2015
Direclor
I1
Nancy McCarron
950 Roble Lane
Santa Barbara, CA 93103-2044
RE:
Cl&mant
. , , .
........ N-ancy McCarron, ~ o n ~ j k ? ~ . S h $&~Ste~he_n_~mn-_
ey
Date of Loss. ...........October 28. 2014
Our File.. ................1 19658
Dear Nancy McCarron:

We are in receipt of your claim against the County of s i n Bemardino and are currently
investigating the circumstances surrounding your claim. A decision regarding the County's
liability will be made upon completion of the investigation or within 45 days of our receipt of
your claim.
If you have any questions, please contact me at (909)386-8637.
Respectfully,
. . ~,
a~&

Receipt of claim leuel
EXHIBIT 20
Case No ________________
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA

Stubblefield Properties,
a California General Partnership,
dba Mountain Shadows Mobile Home Community,
Plaintiff
v.
Nancy Duffy McCarron, Bonnie Shipley, et al,
Defendants
_______________________________________
AFTER SUMMARY DENIAL OF WRIT PETITION TO COURT OF APPEAL,
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT, DIVISION 2 Case E063118
Hon. Carol Codrington, Acting PJ [Exhibit A]
FOLLOWING SUMMARY DENIAL OF WRIT PETITION
TO APPELLATE DIVISION OF SAN BERNARDINO SUPERIOR COURT
Hon. Elia Perozzi Case: CIVDS1502107
Trial Court: Hon. Kyle Brodie Case: CIVDS1417078
REFUSED TO RECLASSIFY CASE TO UNLMITED JURISDICTION

WHERE DAMAGES SOUGHT & HOME TO BE SEIZED EXCEED $25,000
_____________________________________________________________________
DEFENDANT BONNIE SHIPLEYs
PETITION FOR REVIEW

Nancy Duffy McCarron CBN 164780
950 Roble Lane
805-450-0450 fax 805-965-3492
Attorney for Petitioner, Bonnie Shipley
TO BE FILED IN THE COURT OF APPEAL
FOURTH
COURT OF APPEAL,
APPELUTE DISTRICT, DlVlSlON
APP-008
coun ol ~ p p s acare
l
Number
TWO
805-450-0450 FU: NO (OPuMaII: 805-965-3492

E . M ~ I L ~ D D R E S ~ ( O ~ ~nancyduffysb@yahoo.com
O~LI~):
n r r FOR
~ (Name]:
~ ~Petitioner
~
[Writ of Mandate. Prohibition and Review]
APPELWNTIPETITIONER: Bonnie Shipley
TELEPHONENO.:
REspoNYENTmEAL
IN INTEREST: Stubblefield Properties
I
(Check one):
a INITIAL CERTIFICATE
SUPPLEMENTAL CERTIFICATE
-
Notice: Please read rules 8.208 and 8.488 before completing this form. You may use this form for the initial
certificate i n an appeal when y o u file your brief or a prebriefing motion, application, or opposition t o such a
motion or application i n the Court o f Appeal, and when you file a petition for an extraordinary writ. You may
also use this form as a supplemental certificate when you learn o f changed or additional information that must
be disclosed.
1. This form is being submitted on behalf of the following party (name):Petitioner
2. a.
b.
0 There are no interestedentities or persons that must be listed in this certificate under rule 8.208.
a Interested entities or persons required to be listed under rule 8.208are as follows:

Full name of interested
entity or person
Nature of interest
(Explain):
(1)
Stubblefield Properties, Partners
Business BankcorpICA; see more- SEC filing Attachment 2
(2)
Stubblefield Quail Point Company
D. William Bader; Neal Baker; William Cozzo, Alan J Lane
(3)
Eva Stubblefield Hazard, partner
John E. ~uck\;orth;John Riddell; Robert L Nottingham;
(4)
Arnold H Stubblefield, Gen Partner
John L Ridell; James W Andrews; Ruth E Adell
(5)
Thomas Parrish, General Partner
Neil Deny,SB Cty Supr race; Bill Postmus;Dale Stubblefield
aContinued on attachment 2.
The undersigned certifies that t'he above-listed persons or entities (corporations, partnerships, flrms, or any other
association, but not including government entities or their agencies) have either (1) an ownenhlp Interest of 10 percent or
more in the party if it is an entity; or (2) a financial or other interest in the outcome of the proceeding that the justices
should consider i n determinlng whether to disqualify themselves, as deflned in rule 8.208(e)(2).
Date:
12-18-2014
Nancy Duffy McCarron 164780

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TABLE OF CONTENTS
Table of Authorities ........................................................................................................ 2
Writ Issues Presented (2) .................................................................................................3
Statewide Urgency ...........................................................................................................3
Petition, Authenticity of Exhibits, Beneficial Interest, Capacities .................................3
Urgency to Petitioner. ..4
IMMEDIATE STAY REQUESTED ............................................................................4
Statement of Facts and Procedural History ......................................................................4
No Adequate Remedy at Law, Prayer for Relief .............................................................5
Writ Petition Timely Filed .. .....5
Memorandum of Points & Authorities ............................................................................6
Standard of Review (De Novo) on Subject Matter Jurisdiction. ..............6
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS . ....6
ARGUMENT I .................................................................................................................8
Court Should Have Transferred to Unlimited Jurisdiction Because Plaintiff
Prayed for Damages Exceeding $25,000 & Property Value Exceeds $25,000.. ...8
ARGUMENT II
Appellate Panel Has a Duty to Prohibit Trial Court from Exceeding
Jurisdiction by Enabling Unlawful Prosecution in Wrong Jurisdiction .....14
CONCLUSION .. 15
Certificate of Word Count, Verification of Counsel and Petitioner ..............................16
Proof of Service .............................................................................................................17
CASES
Abelleira v. District Court of Appeal (1941) 17 Cal.2d 280, 291 .......................................... 14, 15
Asuncion v. Superior Court, supra, 108 CA.3d 141 ...................................................... 13

Auto Equity Sales v. Superior Court (1962) 57 Cal.2d 450 ..........................................12
Becker v. Superior Court, 151 Cal. 313.........................................................................10
Berry v. Society of St. Pius X (1999) 69 CA.4th 354 ....................................................13
Castellini v Municipal Court (1970) 7 CA3d 174 . 3
Deal v. Municipal Court, 157 CA.3d 996 ....................................................................13
Dial 800 v. Fesbinder (2004) 118 CA.4th 32, 42 ............................................................ 6
Harris v. Seidel, 1 CA. 2d 410 at page 416 ...................................................................10
Horsemens Benev. & Prot. Assn. v. Valley Racing Assn. (1992) 4 CA.4th 153, 155 ...12
Lindsey v. Normet, supra, 405 U.S. at pp. 64-66 ........................................................... 13
Martin-Bragg v. Moore (2013) 219 CA.4th 367 .......................................................... 13
Mehr v. Superior Court, supra, 139 C.A.3d 1044 ......................................................... 13
Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Company, 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950) ........11
Palmer v. Agee (1978) 87 CA.3d 377, 385....................................................................12
Rader Co. v. Stone, 178 CA.3d @ 20 ..............................................................................6
Rich v. Schwab (1998) 63 CA.4th 803 ..........................................................................12
Rodas v. Spiegel (2001) 87 C.A. 4th 513, 517 ................................................................ 6
San Mateo Union HS Dist. v. County of San Mateo (2013) 213 CA.4th 418, 436 .......12
Stern v. Superior Court (2003) 105 C.A. 4th 223, 229231 .........................................10
Walker v. Superior Court (1991) 53 Cal. 3d 257, 262 ..................................................10
Warburton/Buttner v. Supr. Court (2002) 103 CA. 4th 1170, 1180............................... 6
Williams v Rosinsky Motor Co. (1955) 133 CA2d Supp 798, 284 P2d 979. 3
STATUTES
Constitution, Article VI, 10, 11 .............................................................................3, 14
CCP 32 .......................................................................................................................6, 9
CCP 85, 86, 88 .......................................................................................3,6, 8, 9, 10,14
CCP 396a(b) ..........................................................................................3, 5, 6, 9, 11, 15
CCP 403.040(b) .............................................................................................................9
CCP 403.040(e) ..................................................................................3, 6, 7, 11, 14, 15
CCP 403.080 ..............................................................................................................7, 9
Civil Code 1717 .............................................................................................................5
Health and Safety Code 18007 ....................................................................................13
2
WRIT ISSUES PRESENTED

Did Fourth District-Division 2 Panel err by not reversing Appellate Division Panels
denial of writ petition to compel a trial court to transfer a case to unlimited jurisdiction
where evidence showed the home to be seized and damages sought both exceed $25,000?
[trial court disposed the CCP 396a (b) motion to transfer by citing CCP 403.040 (e)
as the dispositive code with no chance to research/brief or present oral argument on it]
Do Appellate Panels have a constitutional duty under Article VI, 10, 11 to prevent
a trial court from exceeding jurisdictional limits circumscribed by CCP 85, 86, 88?
STATEWIDE URGENCY
This petition affects every litigant who is deprived of a statutory right to unlimited
jurisdiction where damages sought and the amount in controversy exceed $25,000.00.
Arbitrary and capricious classification of cases renders CCP 85, 86, 88 illusory.
Legislators never delegated concurrent jurisdiction over actions. CCP 85, 86 & 88. 1
PETITION
1. Exhibits 1-6 are true copies of original documents on file with respondent court.
Exhibit 7 is the verified transcript of proceedings conducted on January 29, 2015.
2. Shipley is defendant in an action pending in the Respondent Court below entitled,
Stubblefield Properties, CA General Partnership v. Nancy Duffy, Bonnie Shipley, et al
UDFS1406978, a summary eviction in which plaintiff seeks possession of the premises
and monetary damages exceeding $25,000 the maximum for limited jurisdiction,
as shown on a Civil Case Cover Sheet plaintiff filed. 2
Plaintiff is Real Party.
Castellini v Municipal Court (1970) 7 CA3d 174; Williams v Rosinsky Motor Co.
(1955) 133 CA2d Supp 798, 284 P2d 979
Exhibit 1, page 0
3
3.
Absent intervention Shipley will have to defend a second sham summary eviction
in limited jurisdiction depriving her of a statutory right to be in unlimited jurisdiction.3

Plaintiff prayed for open-ended damages at a daily rate since February 2013 4 which
exceed $25,000 5 [the maximum amount in limited jurisdiction under CCP 85, 86],
and where the value of the home to be seized in summary eviction exceeds $25,000. 6
Shipley will be homeless if plaintiff evicts her from a home she has lived in 3 years.
4.
Shipley asks this court to issue a STAY of all proceedings until the petition is
resolved. The trial court denied stay below. The court continues to sign void orders
exceeding jurisdiction. Fontana UD Court transferred the case to the Justice Center
(Hon. Michael Sachs) but did not reclassify it to unlimited jurisdiction. Plaintiff still
files motions on truncated UD 5-day notice while court accepts them & sets hearings.
STATEMENT OF FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
5.
On 8/2/12 Stubblefield moved to evict Shipley---who was not his contract tenant,
but rather a co-resident of his contract tenant in UDDS1204130. 7 Stubblefield never

named or joined his contract tenant in that action. Shipley prevailed after an Appellate
Panel reversed the trial courts denial of a summary judgment motion, and directed
the court to enter judgment on the merits for Shipley in civil case CIVDS1302013.8
Panel found the eviction unlawful because the authority Stubblefield cited in his notice
to vacate did not apply to Shipley as she was not a purchaser or transferee; and because
he lacked privity of contract with her since she was not his tenant. Id
3
4
5
6
California Constitution, Article VI, 1, 10, 11, 13; CCP 85, 86, 88.
Exhibit 1, page 00, Prayer, No. 3
Exhibit 2, page 11
Exhibit 2, page 11
http://openaccess.sbcourt.org/OpenAccess/civil/civildetails.asp?courtcode=X&case
number=DS1204130&casetype=UD&mcnmsearch=Y&dsn=
number=DS1302013&casetype=CIV&mcnmsearch=Y&dsn=
4
6.
After losing 3 related appeals plaintiff prosecutes a new case in limited jurisdiction
where damages he prayed for and a property he prays to seize both exceed $25,000.00.
Denial of motion to transfer/reclassify jurisdiction is not appealable. CCP 904.1 9
7.
Writ relief would avoid wasting significant party resources, court labor, and jury time.
Shipley is deprived of adequate discovery and trial preparation in limited jurisdiction.
If relief here is denied the homeowner may lose her mobile home and Shipley may be
evicted from the home she has lawfully occupied as co-resident for 3 years since 2012.
Shipley has no other adequate remedy at law for the relief sought in this petition.
WRIT PETITION WAS TIMELY FILED
8.
Petition was timely filed within 20 days of 1/29/15 order. see CCP 403.080 .
Writs to Appellate Division & 4th District Court of Appeal were timely, as is this
Petition for Review is timely served within 10 days after entry of order. (Exh. A)
PRAYER FOR RELIEF
1. Issue an immediate STAY of proceedings pending outcome of Writ of Review.
aside and vacate the orders below (refusal to transfer case to unlimited jurisdiction);
or (b) issue an alternative writ directing Respondent Court to show cause why it should
not be so directed, and upon return of the alternative writ, issue the peremptory writ
set forth in subparagraph (a) above; or (c) to direct any other appropriate relief.
Issue a writ prohibiting and restraining the limited jurisdiction court from proceeding
with an unlawful detainer action and order transfer to unlimited jurisdiction forthwith.
Civil Code 1717, and any other basis in law for which she is entitled to attorney fees.
Respectfully submitted:
_______________________________________
Nancy D McCarron, Attorney for Petitioner
9
Carlos Garau v. Torrance Unified School District, 137 Cal App 4th 192, 194-195
5

Where evidence is not in dispute, a determination of subject matter jurisdiction is a
legal question subject to de novo review. 10 The Court is not bound by a court below
but makes its own independent interpretation. 11 Minute order entered 1/29/15 recites
transfer was denied without reciting any rationale or any findings of fact. Exhibit 5
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS:
The court exceeded its powers by denying a transfer sought under CCP 396a (b)
and reciting CCP 403.040 (e) as the dispositive code, which no party cited or argued,
and with no opportunity to research or brief it, and without oral argument or objections.
Shipley cited CCP396a (b) in the caption and body of her Notice of Motion to Dismiss
or Transfer to Unlimited Jurisdiction. Exhibit 2, 1:16 It recites in relevant part:
(b) If it appears from the complaint or affidavit, or otherwise, that
the superior court or court location where the action or proceeding
is commenced is not the proper court or court location for the trial,
the court where the action or proceeding is commenced, or a judge
thereof, shall, whenever that fact appears, transfer it to the proper court
or court location, on its own motion, or on motion of the defendant,
unless the defendant consents in writing, or in open court Id 12
The court was required to transfer the action to unlimited jurisdiction upon proof
that the damages demanded or value of property in controversy exceeds $25,000.00.
Discretion is not authorized where legislators use the word shall. Legislators defined
jurisdictional classification at CCP 32 and circumscribed limited jurisdiction to cases
where the amount in controversy is less than $25,000.00. [CCP 85, 86] All other
cases are litigated in unlimited jurisdiction. [CCP 88]. Legislators never authorized
concurrent jurisdiction or the power to arbitrarily classify based on a judges whim.
10
Dial 800 v. Fesbinder (2004) 118 CA.4th 32, 42; Warburton/Buttner v. Supr.
Court (2002) 103 CA. 4th 1170, 1180
11
12
CCP 1235.060. Shall in a statute is mandatory; may is permissive.
6
A fortiori, legislators provided a remedy for arbitrary misclassification by enacting

CCP 403.080 which expressly authorizes a writ proceeding to the Appellate Division
to reverse whimsical misclassification. Discovery and trial preparation are severely
circumscribed by summary proceedings in limited jurisdiction courts where all cross
claims are barred, motions and depositions are set on only 5-days notice, and trial is set
on a mere 21-day notice. Shipley timely invoked CCP 403.080 to correct a manifest
injustice perpetrated by a biased judicial officer who is plaintiffs de facto advocate.
Appellate Courts have a duty to prohibit a trial court from exceeding jurisdiction
and unlawfully prosecuting a case in the wrong jurisdiction. The illegal acts, coupled
with refusal to make findings on the evidence, and sua sponte disposition of a motion
by CCP 403.040(e)--an inapplicable statute never argue-- shows clear judicial bias.
The court stepped out of its role as independent arbiter and into a role of de facto
advocate by searching for a statute to dispose of a motion without making findings,
and without affording Shipley any opportunity to be heard or present oral arguments.
The court sabotaged Shipley by denying her motion on a statute which did not apply.
CCP403.040(e) applies only to the converse fact pattern; i.e. where a party, or court
sua sponte, reclassifies a case from unlimited jurisdiction down to limited jurisdiction.
In fact 403.040(e) recites, Nothing in this section shall be construed to require
the superior court to reclassify an action or proceeding because the judgment to be
rendered, as determined at the trial or hearing, is one that might have been rendered
in a limited civil case. This case is not in San Bernardino Superior Court. It is in
the Unlawful Detainer Court in Fontana, Dept. 7, which is a limited jurisdiction court.
These biased acts violated the judicial officers oath taken when he was sworn in as
a judicial officer of the court; i.e. to uphold the constitution and laws of California.
The Appellate Panel has a duty to prohibit a trial court from exceeding its jurisdiction
by prosecuting a case in a limited jurisdiction court when the trial court was required
to transfer the case to unlimited jurisdiction under CCP$396a(b)a mandatory code.
7
ARGUMENT 1
1. Court Should Have Transferred the Case to Unlimited Jurisdiction Because
Plaintiff Prayed for Open-Ended Damages (rent) already exceeding $25,000
and the Value of the Property (home to be seized) also Exceeds $25,000.00
A. To be treated as a limited civil case, the amount in controversy in an
action or special proceeding cannot exceed $25,000.00 CCP 85(a)
Amount in controversy means the amount of a demand or value of a property,
or the amount of a lien, or personal property, exclusive of attorneys fees, interest &
costs. CCP 85(a); 86(b). On October 3, 2014 Stubblefield filed a Civil Case Cover
Sheet praying for monetary damages and possession of premises. [Exhibit 1, page 0] :
Exh.1, page 0
In his prayer for judgment, at page 7 of the complaint, Stubblefield sought openended damages for all rent past due since February 2013. [Exhibit 1, page 00]:
Exh.1, page 00
In a Motion to Dismiss or Transfer Shipley attached a Resident Account Statement
Stubblefield mailed to his contract tenant---showing past due rent of $25,653.66.
[Exh. 2, pg 11] The statement proved the open-ended damages Stubblefield prayed
for exceed $25,000.00. Shipley attached a certified copy of San Bernardino County
Tax Assessors print-out showing $27,800 as the value of the home. [Exh. 2, pg 12].
This proved the value of the property to be seized exceeds $25,000.00. The court
made no findings on the evidence, and did not allow oral argument on a statute the
court announced disposed of the motion to transfer the case to unlimited jurisdiction.
8
B. Transfer To Unlimited Is Mandatory If Party Shows Good Cause Why

She Did Not Move Until After Answering; Court Must Reclassify if Case is or
was Incorrectly Classified and Good Cause Exists To Transfer. CCP 403.040(b)
Shipley showed good cause. The motion recited she first moved for transfer as part
of her demurrer, which was denied by the court [Exh. 2, 3:18]. Shipley filed a separate
motion to transfer on 5 days notice [Exh. 2, 3:22]. The court found 5 days notice was
insufficient but authorized Shipley to refile a motion on 16 days notice [Exh. 2, 3:24].
Shipley refiled for a hearing on the merits with a review of evidence submitted. [Exh.
2, 3:26]. The hearing on the merits and evidence was held on 1/29/15. Exhibit 5
Shipley cited CCP396a(b) in the caption and body of Notice of Motion to Dismiss
for lack of subject matter jurisdiction or transfer to unlimited jurisdiction. Exh.2, 1:16
(b) If it appears from the complaint or affidavit, or otherwise, that
the superior court or court location where the action or proceeding is
commenced is not the proper court or court location for the trial,
the court where the action or proceeding is commenced, or a judge
thereof, shall, whenever that fact appears, transfer it to the proper court
or court location, on its own motion, or on motion of the defendant,
unless the defendant consents in writing, or in open court Id 13
The court had a mandatory duty to transfer the action to unlimited upon proof
the amount in controversy (damages demanded or value of property to be seized)
exceeded $25,000. Discretion is not authorized when legislators use the word shall.
Legislators defined jurisdictional classification at CCP 32 and circumscribed
limited jurisdiction to cases where the amount in controversy is less than $25,000.00
[CCP 85, 86] and all other cases to unlimited jurisdiction. [CCP 88]. Legislators
never authorized concurrent jurisdiction or delegated powers to arbitrarily classify.
A fortiori, legislators provided a remedy for arbitrary misclassification by enacting
CCP 403.080 which expressly authorizes a writ proceeding to the Appellate Division
or Court of Appeal to reverse whimsical and arbitrary misclassifications.
13
CCP 1235.060. Shall and may Shall is mandatory and may is permissive.
9
C. Amount In Controversy Continues To Provide A Basis For Reclassification 14

The Walker Test 15 continues to provide the method to determine the jurisdictional
amount in controversy for reclassification back down to a limited civil case, i.e.,
that the matter will necessarily result in a verdict below the jurisdictional amount. 16
Finally, under Walker v. Superior Court (1991) 53 Cal.3d 257, 262, we
find that the trial court improperly reclassified this action as a limited civil
case without evidence that the matter will "necessarily" result in a verdict
below the jurisdictional amount required by statute for classification as an
unlimited civil case. Stern v. Superior Court (2003) 105 C.A.4th 223, 227
Walker and all published cases resolving classification present the opposite scenario;
they all involved fact patterns where a trial court reclassified from unlimited to limited
and the impaired party appealed the misclassification through a writ petition or appeal.
Jurisdictional basis was first set in 1934 in Harris v. Seidel, 1 CA. 2d 410 at page 416:
Ordinarily, jurisdiction depends upon the amount claimed in the ad
damnum clause of the complaint{cite} It has been said "that any
other rule would be fraught with uncertainties and mischiefs beyond the
power of anticipation".{cite}. Likewise, it has been held that jurisdiction
does not depend in any way upon the amount which the plaintiff is finally held
to be entitled to recover. In Becker v. Superior Court, 151 Cal. 313, the court
says: "The test of the jurisdiction of a court is ordinarily to be found in
the nature of the case as made by the complaint and the relief sought
It is elementary that the first question which must be determined by the
trial court in every case is that of jurisdiction
In Stern, supra, @ 229-231 the panel held a trial court abused its discretion
by failing to make requisite findings that the matter would necessarily result in
a verdict below $25,000. Stern held that a trial court must look to the prayer for the
amount in controversy; if there is any possibility (not probability) the award might
exceed the maximum for limited jurisdiction the case must be reclassified unlimited.
The prayer [Exh.1:00] and evidence [Exh.2:11-12] prove demand exceeds $25,000.
14
15
16
CCP 85(a), 86(a)(1), 403.010 et seq.

Walker v. Superior Court (1991) 53 Cal. 3d 257, 262
Stern v. Superior Court (2003) 105 C.A. 4th 223, 229231
10
D. Whether Party Moves a Court Or It Raises a Jurisdictional Issue Sua Sponte,

It Must Give Litigants Opportunity to be Heard/Contest Reclassification. Stern 17
Shipley cited CCP396a(b) in the caption & body of a Notice of Motion to Dismiss
for lack of subject matter jurisdiction or transfer to unlimited jurisdiction. Exh.2, 1:16
She cited CCP 85 circumscribing amounts less than $25,000 to limited jurisdiction
and CCP 88 --- unlimited jurisdiction where amount in controversy exceeds $25,000.
Instead of making factual findings on admissible, authenticated evidence presented
with the motion, as required by Walker, supra & recently affirmed by Stern, supra the
court literally pulled a rabbit out of his hat to save his preferred party from transfer
by announcing the dispositive statute was CCP 403.040(e). Exh. 6, 8:19, transc.
Neither party cited or argued 403.040 in their moving and/or opposing papers.
A court may raise the issue of reclassification under CCP 403.040(e) sua sponte;
however, if it does so, the court must afford all parties an opportunity to be heard. 18
Here, the court simply announced a code neither party had cited or argued at all, and
when Shipleys counsel tried to object the court rudely cut her off with a sternNo..
Im ..notExh. 6, 9:1]. The court barreled into the next motion to rule upon; i.e.
the motion to compel home inspection and to compel Timothy McCarrons affidavit.
This violated Shipleys federal & state constitutional rights to due process by depriving
her of any opportunity to research the statute, present oral argument or object to it.
The United States Supreme Court has emphasized, on numerous occasions, that the
right to due process, at a minimum, guarantees citizens the right to be heard that is,
an opportunity to present objections and arguments with regard to governmental
actions that may result in a deprivation of their life, liberty, or property. Mullane
17
19
Stern v. Superior Court (2003) 105 Cal. App. 4th 223, 230231
Stern, supra @ p.229-230 citing Walker v. Supr Court (1991) 53 C.3d 257, 261;
Chahal v. Superior Court (1999) 73 CA.4th 399, 403; Kent v. Superior Court, supra,
2 CA.4th @1394
19
Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Company, 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950)
11
18
The Mullane Court expressed the fundamental right to be heard as follows:

Many controversies have raged about the cryptic and abstract words of the
Due Process Clause but there can be no doubt that at a minimum they require
that deprivation of life, liberty or property by adjudication be preceded by notice
and opportunity for hearing appropriate to the nature of the case. Id @ 313
see also, e.g., Nelson v. Adams USA, Inc., 529 U.S. 460, 466 (2000);
Richards v. Jefferson County, Alabama, 517 U.S. 793, 797 n.4 (1996);
Grannis v. Ordean, 234 U.S. 385, 394 (1914); Brinkerhoff-Faris Trust & Sav.
Co. v. Hill, 281 U.S. 673, 678 (1930)
Transcripts in this case show the court consistently allows plaintiffs counsel to argue
ad nauseam uninterrupted, while consistently and rudely interrupting Shipleys counsel.
If her counsel dares to utter May I speak? (to get a word in edgewise) she is promptly
admonished by the court in a loud voice, No or Dont interrupt. Plaintiffs counsel
is free to interrupt Shipleys counsel and the court at his whim and has never been told,
Dont interrupt or No when HE interrupts. The court is not even subtle in its bias.
A litigant must submit to the courts control of the room, even if he is blatantly biased.
After a litigant has done so, he or she may demonstrate his legal errors on appeal. 20
Stare decisis mandates reversal when a court refuses to follow mandatory authority 21
E. Court Erred by Forcing Shipley to Defend Complex Issues in UD Court
Palmer 22 held mobile home tenancies cannot be terminated in summary proceedings:
...The summary proceedings for obtaining possession of
real property outlined in the Code of Civil Procedure are not
applicable for termination of mobile home tenancies. Palmer 385
Palmers prohibition on summary eviction was later affirmed in Rich v. Schwab 23:
Our conclusion is also consistent with the holding in (Palmer).
In Palmer the court held the eviction requirements set forth in the MRL
control over the less stringent requirements of the unlawful detainer law.
(87 CA.3d at pp. 383-384.)
Schwab @ 803
20
21
22
23
Auto Equity Sales v. Supr Court (1962) 57 Cal.2d 450, [must apply stare decisis]
Palmer v. Agee (1978) 87 CA.3d 377, 385
Rich v. Schwab (1998) 63 CA.4th 803
12
Although a court has discretion to preserve the benefits of summary proceedings,

it may not disregard a legitimate need for, and a right to, time to prepare and obtain
reasonable discovery in advance of a trial of complex issues on conflicting claims,
or require them to be tried within summary procedures designed for simple UD claims. 24
when complex issues of title are involved, the parties' constitutional rights
to due process in the litigation of those issues cannot be subordinated to the
summary procedures of unlawful detainerthe court abused its discretion.
Moore @ 391-392
Error in trial proceedings is prejudicial when there is a "reasonable
probability" that the error affected the outcome of the trial {cites}
Under the applicable test, the error was prejudicial. Moore @ 395
.refusal to permit trial of the issue of title outside of those summary
procedures, was an abuse of discretion requiring the judgment's reversal
Moore @396
Under stare decisis the court exceeded its powers when it refused to transfer the
case to unlimited jurisdiction with indisputable evidence the home is assessed at a
value exceeding $25,000. Exhibit 2, page 12. The home is not a mobile home.
Homes manufactured after 1976 are manufactured homes---not mobile homes.
Health and Safety Code 18007. Manufactured home
(a) Manufactured home, for the purposes of this part, means
a structure that was constructed on or after June 15, 1976
is built on a permanent chassis and designed to be used as a singlefamily dwelling. [see also HUD Code ] 25
24 Martin-Bragg v. Moore (2013) 219 CA.4th 367, 389; Deal v. Municipal Court
157 CA.3d 996; see Lindsey v. Normet, supra, 405 U.S. at pp. 64-66 [summary UD
procedures are constitutionally acceptable only in straightforward issues of possession
and incidental damages.] Id Asuncion v. Superior Court, supra, 108 CA.3d 141,
Mehr v. Superior Court, supra, 139 C.A.3d 1044; Berry v. Society of St. Pius X (1999)
69 CA.4th 354; "the summary remedy of an unlawful detainer action was not the
proper vehicle to litigate the complex issues of title in that matter. (Id, 364.)
25
http://portal.hud.gov/hudportal/HUD?src=/program_offices/housing/ramh/mhs/faq
13
ARGUMENT II
Appellate Panel Has a Duty to Prohibit Trial Court From Exceeding Jurisdiction
By Enabling the Unlawful Prosecution of an Action in the Wrong Jurisdiction.
Acts exceeding jurisdiction, coupled with a courts refusal to make findings on
the evidence presented with the motion, and its sua sponte announcement that is was
disposing the motion under CCP 403.040(e)---never cited nor argued shows bias.
The court is clearly acting as a de facto advocate for billionaire Stubblefield for
political reasons, to assure Stubblefield does not run a candidate against him when he
faces the next 6-year reelection. These acts violate an oath the judge swore to, after
being appointed to the bench, to uphold the constitution and laws of California.
The court stepped out of its role as independent arbiter and into a role of de facto
advocate by searching for a statute to dispose of the motion without making findings,
and without affording Shipley any opportunity to be heard or present oral arguments.
The court sabotaged Shipley by disposing her motion on a statute which did not apply.
CCP403.040(e) applies only to the converse situation; i.e. a party, or court sua sponte,
moves to reclassify a case from unlimited jurisdiction back down to limited jurisdiction.
In fact 403.040(e) recites, Nothing in this section shall be construed to require
rendered, as determined at the trial or hearing, is one that might have been rendered in
a limited civil case. The case is not in superior courtbut rather in Fontana UD court.
This panel has a duty under powers delegated by Article VI, 10, 11 to prohibit
the trial court from exceeding delegated powers circumscribed by CCP 85, 86, 88.
Acts exceeding jurisdiction must be restrained to ensure statewide uniformity.
The writ lies to prevent the exercise of any unauthorized power in a
case or proceeding of which the subordinate tribunal has jurisdiction..
26
Abelleira v. District Court of Appeal (1941) 17 Cal.2d 280, 291

14
26
Speaking generally, any acts which exceed the defined power of a court
in any instance, whether that power be defined by constitutional provision,
express statutory declaration, or rules developed by the courts and followed
under the doctrine of stare decisis, are in excess of jurisdiction. Abelleira @ 291
CONCLUSION
The court exceeded its powers by denying a transfer sought under CCP 396a (b)
and reciting CCP 403.040 (e) as the dispositive code, which no party cited or argued,
and with no opportunity to research or brief it, and without oral argument or objections.
CCP396a(b) imposes a mandatory duty on the court to transfer the case to unlimited
jurisdiction upon proof the amount in controversy [damages demanded or value of
property to be seized] exceeds $25,000. Legislators never authorized concurrent
jurisdiction 27 or delegated powers to arbitrarily classify cases on a judges whim.
CCP 403.080 authorizes a writ petition to reverse such arbitrary misclassification.
The appellate panel has a duty to prohibit a court from enabling unlawful prosecution
in the wrong jurisdiction. These acts exceeding jurisdiction, coupled with the courts
refusal to make findings on evidence presented, and its sua sponte disposition of the
motion on CCP 403.040(e) which was never cited nor argued demonstrates clear bias.
The court acts as a de facto advocate for billionaire Stubblefield to assure his support
during his next 6-year reelection campaign. These biased acts violate the very oath he
swore when appointed to the bench to uphold the constitution and laws of California.
CCP 403.040(e) recites, Nothing in this section shall be construed to require
rendered, as determined at the trial or hearing, is one that might have been rendered
in a limited civil case. The section is inapplicable as it is the reverse of the facts here.
For the above reasons Shipley asks this panel to stay all proceedings and issue a writ
prohibiting the court from prosecuting this case in the wrong jurisdiction and
commanding the court to transfer the case to unlimited jurisdiction forthwith.
27
Castellini v Municipal Court (1970) 7 CA3d 174; Williams v Rosinsky Motor Co.
(1955) 133 CA2d Supp 798, 284 P2d 979
15
CERTIFICATE OF WORD COUNT

The petition has 5.325 words including tables, in roman typeface, font 13.
Nancy ~ G f ~h c ~ & r o Attorney
n,
for Bonnie Shipley
VERIFICATION OF PETITIONER'S ATTORNEY
I am the Petitioner's attorney in this proceeding. I have read the foregoing Petition
for Review, and b o w the contents; the same is true of my own personal knowledge,
except as to those matters which are stated upon my information or belief, and as to
those matters I believe them to be true. I declare under penalty of perjury, under the
laws of the State of California that the foregoing is true and correct and this
verification was executed at Santa Barbara, California.
I am the Petitioner in this writ proceeding. 1-haveread the foregoing Petition for
Writ of Mandate andlor Prohibition or Review and know the contents thereof; the
same is true of my own personal knowledge, except as to those matters which are
statcd upon my information or belief, and as to those matters I believe them to be true.
I declare under penalty of pejury and Califomia law that the foregoing is true and
correct and this Verification was executed on the date below at Highland, California.
COURT OF APPEAL -- STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOURTH DISTIUCT
..
DIVISION TWO
.
,~
..
,-..
~~
ORDER
BONNIE SHIPLEY,
Petitioner,
(Super.Ct.Nos. CIVDS 1502107
& UDFS1406978)
THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
SAN BERNARDMO COUNTY,
Respondent;
The County of San Benardino
THE COURT
The petition for writ of mandateiprohibition and request for immediate stay are
\
DENED.
-TON
Acting P. J.
MAILING LIST FOR CASE: E063 1 18

B6iie S k i p l e ~ 7 T T K e ~ u .ri~~, =
r b b b l E f i e l d Pyopaies
-- ----
~-
Superior Court Clerk

San Bernardino County
San Bernardino, CA 9241 5

950 Roble Lane
..
--.
-Robert.
n-C
Hart I King
Santa Ana, CA 92707
--
-.

APPELLATE DIVISION
247 West Third Street, San Bernardino, CA 92415-0063
(909) 5213574
SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF

CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF SAN
BERNARDINO.
Respondent,
ORDER
The court having read and considered the merits of the Petition for Writ of Mandate filed on
February 17,2015. the petition is DENIED.
The Hon. James J. Hosking and the Hon. Michael A. Knish concur. -.
&dJ. q
*
ELlA V..PIROZZI
Assistant Presiding Judge of the Appellate Division
.
Q
cc: Fontana Courthouse
I certify that co i s o
MA! 8 9
- -
i&
e above Order were mailed to counsel of record as indicated on
Superior Court &ate of California

Countp of B a n Pernarbino
Appellate Division
STATE OF CALIFORNIA

~
.-. \.-
-.
- .
.---
)
-----
Writ # ClVDS 1502107

Trial Court# UDFS
-- 1406978
.
-.
-~--
-.
The undersigned hereby declares: I am a citizen of the United States of America, over the
age of eighteen years, a resident of the above-named State, and not a party to nor interested
in the proceedings named in the title of the annexed document. I am a Deputy Appellate
Clerk of said County. I am readily familiar with the business practice for collection and
processing of correspondence for mailing with the United States Postal Service.
Correspondence would be deposited with the United States Postal Service that same day in
the ordinary course of business. On the date of mailing shown below, I placed for collection
and mailing following ordinary business practices, at the request and under the direction of
the Superior Court in and for the State of California and County above-named, whose office
is at the Courthouse, San Bernardino, California, a sealed envelope which contained a true
copy of each annexed document, and which envelope was addressed to the addressee, as
follows:
JNANCY D. MCCARRON, ESQ.

950 ROBLE LANE
--
HART, KING & COLDRFN

4 H U R O N CENTRE DRIVE, STE 900
SANTA ANA, CA 92707 %
FONTANA COURTHOUSE
- HBPdORAEl=E KYLES.mMf-----------
-.
----
Date and Place of Mailing: March 9, 2015, San-Bernardino, California.

Document Mailed: ORDER
I declare under penaltyof perjury that the foregoing is true and correct.
Executed on March 9, 2015, at San Bernardino, California.
Deputy Clerk
Nancy D u e McCarron, 164780

950 Roble Lane
nancvduffvsb@vahoo.com
March 19, 2015
Clerk of the Court
Fourth District Court of Appeal - Div. 2
3389 12th. Street
Riverside, CA 92501

Stubbleifeld v. Nancv Duffv. et al
Attn: Belinda
Although the above online docket shows the above Fontana case was physically
transferred last week to the Justice Center (Judge Sachs in S28) the case was not
reclassified, and it is still being treated a s a UD "under $10.000 damages" case, which
is in complete violation of law. This case must be reclassified to "unlimited jurisdiction"
as damages sought exceed $25,000 and value of property to be seized exceeds $25,000.
(see brief). I wanted to clarifv this fact so as to avoid any argument this writ petition
is moot because the case is now being heard in S28 Justice Center rather than Fontana.
Plaintiffs Notice of a Discovery Motion shows it was set for March P9,2015, with a
Proof of Service dated March 11,2015 (mailed oniy 8 days before the hearing) [Exh. A]
This pleading was accepted by the court clerk and scheduled on 8 daysinotice pursuant
to CCP 31170.8 (5 days' notice in limited UD jurisdiction) rather than 16 days + 5 for
mailing a s required in unlimited jurisdiction, pursuant to CCP 1005(a). This is yet
another reason why this case must be classified in unlimited jurisdiction to comport
with due process. Three motions were served (52 pages, 102 pages, and 129 pages)
for a total of 273 pages. Not even superman coula mount opposition to it in 5 days.
This abuse has continued for 3 years now since 8/2/12. The case is now 15 volumes,
428 docket entries with a total of over 60 hearings. A case this complex should never
be litigated in UD jurisdiction. The second case starting 1013114 wigbe deja vue, with
23 hearings already and 128 docket items after only 5 months. At some point this court
must put a n end to this abuse. This is the second sham complaint with no legal basis.
cc:
Robert Williamson, Esq.

(real.party's attorney)
via US MAIL
Santa Ana, CA 92707
'John H. Pentecost, Esq., Bar No. 99527

Robert G. Williamson, Jr., Es Bar No.
Ryan J. Egan, Esq., Bar No. 2${836
HART KING
A PRO SSIONAL CORPORATION
Telephone: (714) 432-8700
Facs~mile: (714) 546-7457
6 Attorneys for Plaintiff STUBBLEFIELD PROPERTIES, a California eneral
partnership dba MOUNTAIN SHADOWS MOBILEHOME COMMU%ITY
EZE
5 5- %0
z-y n 3
4 z w i
2s
COUNTY OF SAN BERNARDINO, CENTRAL JUSTICE CENTER
STUBBLEFIELD PROPERTIES. a
l2
MOUNTAIN SHADOWS

Assigned for all u oses,
Judge: Hon. Mic ae A. Sachs
13
14
Plaintiff
15
v.
PLAINTIFF'S NOTICE OF MOTION

AND MOTION FOR ORDER
COMPELLING DEFENDANT BONNIE
SHIPLEY TO PERSONALLY APPEAR
AND TO ANSWER QUESTIONS AND
PRODUCE DOCUMENTS AT
DE~OSITION;
MEMORANDUM OF
POINTS AND AUTHORITIES.
DECLARATION OF ROBER+G
WILLIAMSON,
JR. IN SUPPORT
THEREOF; REQUEST
FOR
MONETARY SANCTIONS IN THE
AMOUNT OF $6,290.00 AGAINST
DEPONENTANDHERATTORNEY
NANCY DUFFY MCCARRON-
m u E
8 3
l6 NANCY B DUFFY aka NANCY DUFFY

s< = 5
* " l7 DUFFY-MCCARRON aka NANCY B.
SHIPLEY, and DOES 1 through lo,
inclusive,
19
20
Defendants.
21
[Code of Civ. Proc.5 2025.010 et seq.,

1170.8; Cal. Rules o C t 3.13471
[Filed concurrently with Separate
Statement and Notice of Lodgment]
I
36568.02214819-1132-9314v.l
DATE: March 19,2015

TIME: 8:30 a.m.
DEPT: ,9287
PLAINTIFF'S NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION FOR ORDER

TO COMPEL TO APPEAR AND PRODUCE DOCUMEMS AT DEPOSITION
OF SERVICE
rties v. DUB,et al.
. UDFS1406978
,COUNTY OF ORANGE
y of Orange, State of Califomia. I am over the age of 18 years and am not a party
ddress is 4 Hutton Centre, Suite 900, Santa h a , California 92707-0507.
ed the foregoing document(s) described as PLAINTIFF'S NOTICE OF
MOTION FOR ORDER COMPELLING DEFENDANT BONNIE SHIPLEY TO
TO ANSWER QUESTIONS AND PRODUCE DOCUMENTS AT
MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES; DECLARATION OF
JR. IN SUPPORT THEREOF; REQUEST FOR MONETARY
T OF $ 6,290.00 AGAINST DEPONENT AND HER ATTORNEY
MCCARRON to be served on the interested parties in this action as follows:
or
lo
11
,8ow g
F
Ct-4
22;
25 g55 2
52
.<Q
2 u5
z cu
- 893
5 .O 5 4
8<x 5
w
by placing
the original
a m e copy thereof enclosed in sealed envelopes addressed as stated below
by sending a copy as stated and addressed below:
SEE ATTACHED SER WCE LIST
BY MAIL: I am "readily familiar" with the firm's practice of collection and processing
correspondence for mailing. Under that practice it would be deposited with the U.S. Postal Service on that
12 same day with postage thereon fully prepaid Santa Ana, California in the ordinary course of business. I am
aware that on motion of the party served, service is presumed invalid if the postal cancellation date or postage
meter date is more than one day after date of deposit for mailing in the affidavit.
~13
BY OVERNIGHT DELIVERY: I enclosed the documents in an envelope or package provided by
iql
14 an
overnight delivery canier and addressed to the persons identified herein. I placed the envelope or package
15 for collection and overnight delivery at an office or a regularly utilized drop box of the overnight delivery
canier.
16
BY EL.ECTRONIC SERVICE. Based on a corn order or an agreement of the parties to accept

service by electronic transmission, I caused the documents to be sent to the persons at the electronic
17 notification addresses listed herein on this date. I did not receive, within a reasonable time after the
transmission, any electronic message or other indication that the transmission was unsuccessful.
18
BY FACSIMILE: Based on an agreement of the parties to accept service by fax transmission, I

faxed the documents from a fax machine, at Santa Ana, Califomia, with the telephone number, (714) 5467457 to the parties andlor attorney for the parties at the facsimile transmission number(s) shown herein. The
facsimile
transmission was reported as complete without error by a transmission report, issued by the
20 facsimile transmission
machine upon which the transmission was made, a copy of which is attached hereto.
21
BY MESSENGER SERVICE: I served the documents by placing them in an envelope or package

addressed to the persons at the addresses listed herein and providing them to a professional messenger service
22 for service. A declaration by the messenger will be filed separately.
23 1
1 [State] I declare under penalty of perjury undm the laws of the State of California that the foregoing
is true and correct.
Executed on March
&,2015, at Santa h a , California.
28 1
568.02214818-5208-8608v.l
I
1
PROOF OF SER VICE
3/15/2015
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HEARINGRE:MOTIONSUNDERSUBMISSION/NEXTHEARINGDATE
03/06/20154:30PMDEPT.F7
KYLESBRODIE,JUDGE
CLERK:SHOSHONENEAL
PROCEEDINGS:
MOTIONSTAKENUNDERSUBMISSIONON02/10/15ISORDEREDVACATED.MOTIONSTOBEHEARD
ATADATE
TOBEDETERMINEDBYJUDGESACHS(DEPT.S28).
COURTORDERSTHISCASETOSANBERNARDINOJUSTICECENTERTOBEHEARDWITH
UDDS1204130.
COURTORDERSMOTIONSTHATARESETTOBEHEARDON03/18/15INDEPT.F7TOBERE
CALENDAREDFOR
03/18/15INDEPT.S28(SANBERNARDINO)TOEITHERBEHEARDORCONTINUEDTOADATETOBE
DETERMINED
BYTHATDEPARTMENT.
THECOURTNOWORDERSTHISCASEASSIGNEDTODEPARTMENT(S28)FORALLPURPOSES.
CLERK'SOFFICETONOTIFYPARTIES
CLERK'SOFFICETOSENDFILETOSANBERNARDINOFORNEXTHEARING
ACTIONCOMPLETE
1/1
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Case UDFS1406978 - STUBBLEFIELD -VS- DUFFY

Action: (Choose)
MOTION RE: TO DISMISS FOR LACK OF SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION FILED BY

DEFENDANT BONNIE SHIPLEY
0112912015 - 8:00 AM DEPT. F7
KYLE s BRODIE, JUDGE
BAILIFF: A. VELA
APPEARANCES:
ATTORNEY ROBERT WILLIAMSON PRESENT FOR PLAINTIFFIPETITIONER.
PROCEEDINGS:
10:21
THE COURT HAS READ THE REPLY MOTION TO DISMISS ACTION FOR LACK OF JURISDICTION OR
TRANSFER.
ORAL ARGUMENT PRESENTED BY COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT
ORAL ARGUMENT PRESENTED BY COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFF.
NANCY B DUFFY, BONNIE SHIPLEY'S MOTION TO TRANSFER IS DENIED.
10:37
ACTION - COMPLETE
PROOF OF SERVICE
Stubblefield Properties v. Nancv Duffv. et a1 UDFS1406978
The undersigned is counsel for petitioneridefendant at: 950 Roble Lane, Santa Barbara, CA 93 103
805-450-0450 fax 805-965-3492
PETITION FOR REVIEW re: Denial of Motion to Re-CLASSIFY Jurisdiction to Unlimited
[ ] (By Personal Delivery)
[ ] (By Fax) Fax machine used complied with Rule 2003(3) and no error was reported by the
[ ] (By Electronic) email address below @v ameement) & with copy to na~~cvduffvsb~vahoo.com
to: rwilliamson@,hartkinnlaw.com and reean@,hartkinglaw.com
[XI (2-dav Express Mail) 8 1013%52015.5 CCP.
I deposited it in a pre-paid stamped envelope to:
CA Supreme C o u r t (original + 8 of petition + (Exh A Court of Appeal order 3/25/15)

350 McAllister Street, Room 1295
1 copy by electronic submission to CA SC
San Francisco, CA 9 4 102
telephone (415) 865-7000
.
4th District Court of AppcaI

Division Two
3389 Twelfth Street
Riverside, CA 9250 1
tel95 1-782-2500 fax: 95 1-248-0235
Appellate Division Presiding Panel

San Bernardino Justice Center
%
247 W. 31d. St.
te1909-52 1-3574 fax 909-521-3563
Hon. Kyle Brodie, Dept. F7

Fontana Division of SBSC
17780 Arrow Blvd.
Fontana, CA 92335
Te1909-320-5 134 fax 909-320-5049
Robert Williamson, Esq. for Real Party

HartKing 4 Hutton Drive, Suite 900
Santa hi,CA92707
te1714-432-8700 fax 714-546-7457
I am familiar with mail collection in Santa Barbara. I deposited the envelope in the mail at San
Barbara, CA. I am aware on a motion of the party served, service is presumed invalid if postal
cancellation date is more than one day after deposit date on affidavit.
[x] (STATE) I declare under penalty of perjury and laws of California that the above is true.
Executed in San Bemardino CA on Aori12.2015
c w &
uyi c
~ a n c Duffy
)
Akarron, Attorney for Bonnie Shipley
EXHIBIT 2 1
APR
Case
3 2015
foc3207
STAY REQUESTED
APPELLATE DIVISION
BONNIE SHIPLEY,
Petitioner,
v.

Respondent;
dba Momtain Shadows Mobile Home Community
Real Party in Interest. -
PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDATE,

AND/OR PHOHIBITION OR REVIEW
.
Exhibits (under separate

-- - cover)
, .
-.
Following Denial of Motion to Disqpalifjr Under CCP 5170.6
UDFS 1406978 and LDDS 1204130 (consolidated)

Michael Sachs, Judge [S-281 (909)708-8699
, '-

950"RobleLane
nancyduffisb@,vahoo.c m
805-450-0450 fax 805-965-3492
J
Case________________
STAY REQUESTED
In the Court of Appeal, State of California
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT, DIVISION TWO
BONNIE SHIPLEY,
Petitioner
v.
APPELLATE DIVISION
SAN BERNARDINO SUPERIOR COURT
Respondent
dba Mountain Shadows Mobile Home Community
Real Party In Interest
PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDATE,

AND/OR PHOHIBITION OR REVIEW
Exhibits (under separate cover)
Following Denial of Motion to Disqualify Under CCP 170.6
Case No. UDFS1406978 [limited jurisdiction]
Michael Sachs, Judge [S-28] (909)708-8699
950 Roble Lane
805-450-0450 fax 805-965-3492
CASES
Abelleira v. District Court of Appeal (1941) 17 Cal.2d 280, 291 .......................................... 14, 15
Asuncion v. Superior Court, supra, 108 CA.3d 141 ...................................................... 13

Auto Equity Sales v. Superior Court (1962) 57 Cal.2d 450 ..........................................12
Becker v. Superior Court, 151 Cal. 313.........................................................................10
Berry v. Society of St. Pius X (1999) 69 CA.4th 354 ....................................................13
Castellini v Municipal Court (1970) 7 CA3d 174 . 3
Deal v. Municipal Court, 157 CA.3d 996 ....................................................................13
Dial 800 v. Fesbinder (2004) 118 CA.4th 32, 42 ............................................................ 6
Harris v. Seidel, 1 CA. 2d 410 at page 416 ...................................................................10
Horsemens Benev. & Prot. Assn. v. Valley Racing Assn. (1992) 4 CA.4th 153, 155 ...12
Lindsey v. Normet, supra, 405 U.S. at pp. 64-66 ........................................................... 13
Martin-Bragg v. Moore (2013) 219 CA.4th 367 .......................................................... 13
Mehr v. Superior Court, supra, 139 C.A.3d 1044 ......................................................... 13
Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Company, 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950) ........11
Palmer v. Agee (1978) 87 CA.3d 377, 385....................................................................12
Rader Co. v. Stone, 178 CA.3d @ 20 ..............................................................................6
Rich v. Schwab (1998) 63 CA.4th 803 ..........................................................................12
Rodas v. Spiegel (2001) 87 C.A. 4th 513, 517 ................................................................ 6
San Mateo Union HS Dist. v. County of San Mateo (2013) 213 CA.4th 418, 436 .......12
Stern v. Superior Court (2003) 105 C.A. 4th 223, 229231 .........................................10
Walker v. Superior Court (1991) 53 Cal. 3d 257, 262 ..................................................10
Warburton/Buttner v. Supr. Court (2002) 103 CA. 4th 1170, 1180............................... 6
Williams v Rosinsky Motor Co. (1955) 133 CA2d Supp 798, 284 P2d 979. 3
STATUTES
Constitution, Article VI, 10, 11 .............................................................................3, 14
CCP 32 .......................................................................................................................6, 9
CCP 85, 86, 88 .......................................................................................3,6, 8, 9, 10,14
CCP 396a(b) ..........................................................................................3, 5, 6, 9, 11, 15
CCP 403.040(b) .............................................................................................................9
CCP 403.040(e) ..................................................................................3, 6, 7, 11, 14, 15
CCP 403.080 ..............................................................................................................7, 9
Civil Code 1717 .............................................................................................................5
Health and Safety Code 18007 ....................................................................................13
2
WRIT ISSUES PRESENTED

Did Judge Sachs deny due process in a hearing denying Shipleys valid motion to
disqualify him under CCP 170.6 (2)--two days after counsel notified him that she was
unavailable due to her brothers unexpected death and her daughters hospitalization?
Was it abuse of discretion not to continue resolution until after counsels emergency?
Did Judge Sachs violate CCP 170.3 (a)(2) when, as Presiding Judge of Civil Cases in
Justice Center, he did not submit disqualification to Marsha Slough, the Presiding Judge?
STATEWIDE URGENCY
Petition affects every litigant who is deprived of a right to counsel at a crucial hearing,
conducted despite notification of her attorneys unavailability due to family emergencies.
Our judicial system is based on the presumption a judicial officer will be fair and impartial.
Although a facially deficient disqualification motion may be stricken a judge should never
be allowed to rule on his own disqualification based on resolution of substantive issues.
The appellate court must intervene when a judge shows callous disregard and cruel bias.
PETITION
1. Exhibits are copies of original documents on file in respondent court & dockets,
and a transcript of a disqualification hearing denying Shipley of a right to counsel.

2. Shipley is defendant in two consolidated cases pending in Respondent Court entitled,
Stubblefield Properties, CA General Partnership v. Nancy Duffy, Bonnie Shipley, et al
UDFS1406978, a summary eviction in which plaintiff seeks possession of premises and
Stubblefield Properties, CA General Partnership v. Bonnie Shipley, UDDS1204130, a
summary eviction seeking possession of premises. Plaintiff below is Real Party in Interest.
3
3.
Absent intervention Shipley will be forced to submit to the jurisdiction of a Judge
in two consolidated cases, who has engaged, and continues to engage in intentional
serial violations of court rules, codes of procedures, and rules against Stare Decisis,
all to advocate for his preferred party Stubblefield; who has thwarted every effort
to obtain statutory attorney fees as prevailing party, and who has shown serial bias
against Shipleys attorney, including denying disqualification, rather than continuing
the hearing until counsel returned from two family emergencies two weeks later, and
refusing to submit the Motion to Marsha Slough, Presiding Judge.
4. Under Stare Decisis bias is presumed when any part of a judges decision is
reversed on appeal. Hendershot v. Supr Court
Shipley had to appeal her own
victory when Judge Sachs let loser Stubblefield write a debauched final judgment.
Judge Sachs entered it immediately after Stubblfields runner delivered it directly to
chambers without giving Shipley any chance to object. Judge Sachs admitted this
in the transcript included under separate cover. [Exh. 6, pg 32:17] It was improper
for Judge Sachs to conduct Shipleys hearing on 3/18/15 without counsel present to
argue and/or rebut misrepresentations Sachs packed into a transcript. A judge is not
authorized to file any opposition on writ petitions. Sachs attempt to nestle a
forbidden opposition into the 3/18/15 transcript is as transparent as a piece of glass.
It Judge Sachs intended to rebut bias, he had to file/serve a verified answer 10 days
after service of the motion. CCP 170.3(c) (5). Judge Sachs was able to present a
distorted version of the true facts while avoiding having to verify them under oath.
Hendershot v. Supr Court (Pac SoWest Invest., Inc.) (1993) 20 C.A.4th 860;
Stegs Investments v. Superior Court (Sprecher) (1991) 233 CA.3d 572; Stubblefield
Construction Co., Petitioner v. San Bernardino County, Respondent; City Of San
Bernardino et al, Real Parties In Interest, 81 CA.4th 762 (2000)
4
5. Shipley notified the Presiding Judge of her intent to ask Attorney General Kamala
Harris to investigate Arnold Stubblefields continuous corruption and intimidation of
government officials, which we believe has infected the court system.
6.
Shipley asks this court to issue an IMMEDIATE STAY of all proceedings until a
petition is resolved. The court continues to issue void orders ignoring CCP 170.4 (a).
Despite Shipleys counsels request for a mere 3 week reprieve to grieve the death of
her brother, and help her daughter recover from a coma, at no hardship to plaintiff,
the callous, pitiless, cold-hearted Judge Sachs emboldened plaintiff to pummel Duffy
with 5 malicious motions (served on truncated notice) refusing to extend counsel any
extra time to oppose [Exh. 6, pg 47]; four frivolous motions against Duffys clients,
who have absolutely nothing to do with whether Duffy & Shipley can share her home.
1) 59-page MTC Chris Allen & $1,931.50 sanctions with perjured return of service.
2) 109-page MTC Steve Allen & $8,511.50 sanctions with perjured return of service.
3) 129-page MTC Bonnie Shipley & $6,290 sanctions sham against Shipley & Duffy.
4) 127-page MTC Nancy Duffy & $5,590 sanctions after answering all depo questions
5) 219-page Motion to Expunge Lis Pendens & $5,600 sanctions against Nancy Duffy
643 pages of Motions with a grand total $27,923.00 in sanctions requested.
Stubblefields so called summary proceeding in UD court in limited jurisdiction.
Stubblefields frivolous motions appear on Exh 1 (177 item docket 5 volume case)
It is Stubblefields use of Superior Court Judges as Weapons of Mass Harassment.
HARASSMENT Round 2 (Exh.1) UDFS1406978; 177 entries-5 volumes-12 hearings
HARASSMENT Round 1 (Exh 2) UDDS1204130; 429 docket entries, 60 court
hearings, 17 volume case file
Absent a STAY it will be physically and emotionally difficult for counsel to present
meaningful opposition on truncated notice to 643 pages---cheered on by Judge Sachs.
5
Shipley prevailed on Round 1 on May 6, 2013. For two years Shipley has been
trying to obtain statutory attorney fees as prevailing party under Mobile Home Law.
Sachs has thwarted every effort Duffy has made to obtain attorney fees since 2013.
Shipley will explain what has happened over three years of abuse in this court in a
written complaint to Attorney General Kamala Harris, with a request to investigate
Stubblefields use of local judges as Weapons of Mass Harassment to pummel any
person who challenges his sewer of corruption. We have endured three years of
relentess harassment --- as shown in Exhibits 1 and 2 in Star Court proceedings.
STATEMENT OF FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

7.
On 8/2/12 Stubblefield moved to evict Shipley---who was not his contract tenant,
but rather a co-resident of his contract tenant in UDDS1204130. 2 Stubblefield never

named or joined his contract tenant in that action. Shipley prevailed after an Appellate
Panel reversed the trial courts denial of a summary judgment motion, and directed
the court to enter judgment on the merits for Shipley in civil case CIVDS1302013.3
Panel found the eviction unlawful because the authority Stubblefield cited in his notice
to vacate did not apply to Shipley as she was not a purchaser or transferee; and because
he lacked privity of contract with her since she was not his tenant. Id
After losing
three related appeals plaintiff fraudulently prosecutes a new case in limited jurisdiction
where the damages prayed for and the property sought to be seized exceed $25,000.00.
number=DS1204130&casetype=UD&mcnmsearch=Y&dsn=
number=DS1302013&casetype=CIV&mcnmsearch=Y&dsn=
6
8.
Denial of motion to disqualify is not appealable. CCP $ 904.1
If relief is denied
Shipley may leave the homeowner may lose'her mobile home and Shipley may be
evicted from the mobile home she has lawfully occupied as co-resident for the past 3
years since 2012. Shipley has no other adequate remedy at law for the relief sought
in this petition.
WRIT PETITION WAS TIMELY FILED

9.
Petition was timely filediserved 15 days after Denial (lO+5 mail) CCP $170.3(d)
PRAYER FOR RELIEF
1. Issue an immediate STAY of proceedings pending outcome of this writ petition.
aside and vacate its March 18,2015 order denying disqualification or (b) issue an
alternative writ directing Respondent Court to show cause why it sho*
not be so
directed, and upon return of the alternative writ, issue the peremptory writ set forth in
;",
subparagraph (a) above; or (c) to direct any other appropriate relief as the court deems
necessary. Issue a writ prohibiting and restraining Judge Sachs from proceeding with
either of the two consolidated case. Include a directive
Civil Code $1717, and any other basis in law forwhich she is entitled to attorney fees.
Respectfully submitted:
~ a n c ;D McCarron, Attorney for Petitioner
Carlos Garau v. Torrance UniJiedSchool District, 137 Cal App 4th 192, 194-195
-?'

Where evidence is not in dispute, a determination of a legal issue is a legal question
subject to de novo review. 5 The Panel is not bound by a trial court but makes its own
independent interpretation. 6
APPEALABILITY & PROCEDURE TO APPEAL
Denial of a motion to disqualify is not an appealable order and may only be
challenged by a writ petition to the appropriate court of appeal. CCP 170.3(d)
Although Stubblefield filed and prosecuted this case in UD limited jurisdiction,
Judge Kyle Brodie just transferred this case to Department S28. There is nothing in
his transfer order indicating if this case has been reclassified to unlimited jurisdiction.
Accordingly, Shipley does not know where she should file a writ; i.e. in the Appellate
Division or Fourth District Court of Appeal. To avoid rejection for untimely filing,
Shipley files this writ petition in both courts, pending further clarification by the court.
Stubblefield is treating this case as if it remains in limited jurisdiction; i.e. his attorney
continues to serve discovery motions on truncated 5-day notice.
ARGUMENTS:
I.
COURT VIOLATED DUE PROCESS BY DENYING ORAL ARGUMENT

The United States Supreme Court has emphasized, on numerous occasions, that the
right to due process, at a minimum, guarantees citizens the right to be heard that is,
an opportunity to present objections and arguments with regard to governmental actions
that may result in a deprivation of their life, liberty, or property. Mullane
Dial 800 v. Fesbinder (2004) 118 CA.4th 32, 42; Warburton/Buttner v. Supr. Court
(2002) 103 CA. 4th 1170, 1180
6
7
Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Company, 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950)
8
The Mullane Court expressed the fundamental right to be heard as follows:

Many controversies have raged about the cryptic and abstract words of the
Due Process Clause but there can be no doubt that at a minimum they require
that deprivation of life, liberty or property by adjudication be preceded by notice
and opportunity for hearing appropriate to the nature of the case. Id @ 313
see also, e.g., Nelson v. Adams USA, Inc., 529 U.S. 460, 466 (2000);
Richards v. Jefferson County, Alabama, 517 U.S. 793, 797 n.4 (1996);
Grannis v. Ordean, 234 U.S. 385, 394 (1914); Brinkerhoff-Faris Trust & Sav.
Co. v. Hill, 281 U.S. 673, 678 (1930)
Once Judge Sachs realized McCarrons brother had just died, and her daughter
was hospitalized in a diabetic coma, he should have continued the CCP 170.6(a)(2)
motion until after April 3, 2015 as she requested. Any compassionate person would
understand the emotional trauma a person experiences at the death of a close sibling,
and should understand the effect of a daughter on the edge of death on her mother.
Instead, Judge Sachs issued a perfunctory continuance of scheduled hearing dates
(from 3/18/15 to 4/10/15) but refused to continue dates for opposition---for the three
motions already set, and even accepted a FOURTH and FIFTH motion to be filed
while McCarron was grieving the death of her brother and tending to her daughter,
for 4/10/15-pummeling Duffy with yet another 127 pages and 219 pages in motions.
Shipley had 3 motions under submission in Department 7 in Fontana when Judge
Kyle Brodie transferred her case to Judge Sachs in S28. Stubblefield had 3motions.
Despite Duffys urgent need for continuance Sachs refused to vacate his motions.
Instead the court reset his 3 hearings to S28 to be heard on the same day as he set.
As to Shipleys 3 pending motions, they were not re-set to S28 like he did for plaintiff.
Instead Shipleys pending motions were vacated to impose a significant burden on
Duffy to re-submit her 3 extensive motions to compel over again. Sachs did the same
thing with Shipleys extensive attorney fee motion. Sachs vacated her motion, then
refused to let McCarron re-notice the hearing based on papers already filed & served.
Sachs goes out of his way to create as many burdens as he can create for McCarron.
9
II. Sachs violated 170.3 (a)(2) when, as Presiding Judge of Civil Cases in Justice
Center, he did not submit disqualification to Marsha Slough, the Presiding Judge?
In Rossco Holdings 8 the appellate court held disqualification occurs when the
facts creating disqualification arise, not when the disqualification is established,
and a disqualified judges orders are void, regardless of whether they happen t
have been legally correct. A partys right to disqualify a judge, commissioner, or
referee for prejudice is automatic in the sense that the partys good-faith belief in
the prejudice is sufficient without proof of any facts showing actual prejudice 9
The court in Bravo 10 held if a CCP170.6 motion is timely filed in proper form,
the court must accept it without further inquiry, the disqualification is effective
immediately, and as a remedial statute the statute is liberally construed in favor of
the allowing the peremptory challenge and a challenge should be denied only if
the statute absolutely forbids it
The Supreme Court has stated courts must be conducted in a manner as will avoid
suspicion of unfairness. Prejudice, being a state of mind, is very difficult to prove
and, when a judge asserts that he or she is unbiased, courts are naturally reluctant to
determine he or she is prejudiced. To ensure confidence in the judiciary and avoid the
suspicion that might arise from the belief of a litigant that the judge is biased, the
Legislature could reasonably conclude a party should have an opportunity to obtain
disqualification of a judge for prejudice, on a sworn statement, without being required
to establish it as a fact to the satisfaction of a judicial body. 11
Rossco Holdings, Inc. v Bank of America (2007) 149 Cal. App. 4th 1353
CCP 170.6(a)(4); McCartney v. Commission on Judicial Qualifications (1974)
12 Cal.3d 512, 531 (judicial removal); Mayr v. Supr Court (1964) 228 CA.2d 60, 61
10
Bravo v. Supr. Court (2007) 149 CA. 4th 1489; Davcon, Inc. v. Roberts & Morgan
(2003) 110 CA.4th 1355, 1360; Stephens v. Supr Court (2002) 96 CA. 4th 54, 6162
11
Johnson v. Superior Court (1958) 50 Cal. 2d 693, 697
9
10
III. SACHS FINDING 170.6 (a)(2) DOES NOT APPLY IS CLEAR ERROR
In the transcript of the 3/18/15 hearing (Exh. 6, pg 36, ln 6) Judge Sachs
admits the Appellate Panel ordered him to strike the words or resident from
the final judgment for Shipley, remarking it was harmless error. It was
hardly harmless to 675,000 mobile home residents, including Shipley,
who would be subject to arbitrary eviction under Civil 798.56(d) with Judge
Sachs insertion of those words into the judgments citation of the code section.
It was hardly harmless error when it caused McCarron another years delay in
obtaining attorney fees (Sachs refused to award them while case was on appeal as
to the words or resident.) Sachs said he had no jurisdiction, as he also held when
he refused to order Stubblefield to restore utilities to the home after our electric pedestal
was mysteriously burned out. Again, Sachs said he had no jurisdiction during appeal.
However, when the shoe was on the other foot (Stubblefield asked for an order
expunging our valid lis pendens while the case was still on appeal) Sachs had no
problem with jurisdiction then. When we argued there was no jurisdiction Sachs held
there was jurisdiction to expunge it.
Sachs also argues the case was not reversed but rather one issue was reversed; i.e.
Judge Sachs was ordered to strike or resident. Sachs misrepresents the ruling.
Appellate panel found several other errors, but Sachs conveniently omitted them in the
transcript. They held he SHOULD NOT HAVE LET STUBBLFIELD WRITE
SHIPLEYs final judgment in violation of court rules. He did that purely to advocate
for Stubblefield; to let HIM write the final judgment to convert him into a winner.
Panel also held he erred when he entered judgment without waiting 10 days for
objections in violation of Local Rules. As explained above, these errors were not
harmless. Duffy had to pursue another appeal, wait another year for fees, pay for
transcripts and spend hundreds of hours on research, writing, and oral arguments.
11
Three courts already found there does not have to be a new trial in order
for a party to disqualify a Judge under CCO 170.6(a)(2). Even if the Judge
only has to decide ONE ISSUE when the case is returned after an appeal, if the
Judge has to rule on ONE substantive issue a party is entitled to disqualify.
12
Stubblefield made this same argument and the appellate court granted relief;
i.e. Stubblefield was entitled to disqualify on remand. See footnote 12.
Citing Stegs, supra the Hendershot v. Supr Court (footnote 12) at page 864 holds:
[1] The issue, then, is whether our remand order upon Hendershot's
section 908 motion for restitution called for a "new trial" within the
meaning of section 170.6, subdivision (2). We conclude that it did. 864
The 1985 amendment to section 170.6 was prompted by concern that "...
a judge who had been reversed might prove to be biased against the party
who successfully appealed the judge's erroneous ruling at the original trial."
(Stegs Investments v. Superior Court, supra, 233 Cal.App.3d at p. 575.)
In Stegs, supra (fn 12) the appellate court held:
"The legislative history of the 1985 amendment suggests that the
applicability of [section 170.6] does not turn on ... whether the issue(s)
to be resolved on remand are limited, but what the court must do to
resolve them. Our remand to the trial court was not for the
purpose of causing it to perform a ministerial act, such as the
execution of a mathematical calculation. It was, instead, for the
purpose of receiving evidence and resolving a factual issue: whether,
in paying the amount of the judgment against him, Hendershot acted
for himself alone or for the Shadowood Corporation.
The former law strictly limited motions for new trial to cases in which
an issue of fact had been adjudicated, and denied its application to other
cases, such as those in which a dismissal was ordered after a demurrer had
been sustained, or where a judgment had been taken by default. (8 Witkin,
Cal. Pro, supra, Attack on Judgment in Trial Court, 22, p. 423.)
12
Hendershot v. Supr Court (Pac SoWest Invest., Inc.) (1993) 20 C.A.4th 860;
Stegs Investments v. Superior Court (Sprecher) (1991) 233 CA.3d 572; Stubblefield
Construction Co., Petitioner v. San Bernardino County, Respondent; City Of San
Bernardino et al, Real Parties In Interest, 81 CA.4th 762 (2000)
12
That rule was repudiated more than three decades ago (see Carney v.
Simmonds (1957) 49 Cal.2d 84 [315 P.2d 305]), and the remedy is now
quite broad. (See 8 Witkin, op. cit. supra, 23, p. 424.)
We see no reason why it should not receive a similar broad
construction in this case, encompassing a post-trial reversal and
remand for trial of a contested issue in which trial court discretion or
fact determination is involved.
Finally, our construction and application of the amendment is consonant
with the established rule that section 170.6, in guaranteeing a litigant the
extraordinary right to disqualify a judge, should be liberally
construed to effect its objects and to promote justice. (See Nissan
Motor Corp. v. Superior Court (1992) 6 Cal.App.4th 150, 154 [7
Cal.Rptr.2d 801] and authority cited.)
This case is on all fours with Hendershot, Stegs & Stubblefield v. Supr. Court.
Where a judge who was reversed, even on only one issue (Sachs was reversed on three
issues which the Panel found were harmless errors. These errors were not harmless
to us and 675,000 other mobile home residents subject to arbitrary eviction based on
the way Sachs wrote or resident into a statutory remedy applying only to owners.
Prejudice on the part of a judge was properly made a ground of disqualification
by CCP 170.6. Johnson v. Superior Court (1958) 50 Cal. 2d 693, 696
The transcript at Exhibit 6 shows the court is not even subtle in its prejudicial bias.
A litigant must submit to the courts control of the room, even if he is blatantly biased.
After a litigant has done so, he or she may demonstrate his legal errors on appeal. 13
Stare decisis mandates reversal when a court refuses to follow mandatory authority 14
13
14
Auto Equity Sales v. Supr Court (1962) 57 Cal.2d 450, [must apply stare decisis]
13
IV Appellate Panel Has a Duty to Prohibit A Court From Exceeding Jurisdiction
Judge Sachs had stepped out of his role as independent arbiter and into a role of de
facto advocate by not forwarding the case to the presiding judge for reassignment and by
denying Shipley any opportunity to present oral arguments on disqualification.
This panel has a duty under powers delegated by our legislators in CCP 170.3 and
170.4. Acts exceeding jurisdiction must be restrained to ensure statewide uniformity. 15
The writ lies to prevent the exercise of any unauthorized power in a
case or proceeding of which the subordinate tribunal has jurisdiction..
Speaking generally, any acts which exceed the defined power of a court
in any instance, whether that power be defined by constitutional provision,
express statutory declaration, or rules developed by the courts and followed
under the doctrine of stare decisis, are in excess of jurisdiction. Abelleira @ 291
CONCLUSION
The court exceeded its powers by denying Shipleys motion to disqualify, by
failing to continue the motion to give her a chance to present oral argument or object,
and by failing to submit the motion to Marsh Slough, Presiding Judge as mandated by
CCP 170.3 (a)(2), where he is Presiding Judge in Civil Cases in the Justice Court.
Judge Sachs intentionally ruled on the motion, despite absence of Shipleys counsel,
as he thought due to her emergencies she would not be able to file a writ in 15 days.
The cruel and insensitive manner in which Judge Sachs handled McCarrons motion is
the best evidence of the extreme bias an animus he holds toward attorney McCarron.
HE MUST BE REMOVED FROM BOTH CASES UNDER STARE DECISIS.
15
Abelleira v. District Court of Appeal (1941) 17 Cal.2d 280, 291

14
The petition has 4,629 word$ excluding tables, in roman typeface, font 13.
-LJ
cCarron, Attorney for Bonnie Shipley
Nancy Duffy

I am the Petitioner's attorney in this proceeding. I have read the foregoing Petition
for Writ of Mandate, and know the contents; the same is true of my own personal
under the laws of the State of Califomia that the foregoing is true and correct and this
verification was executed at Santa Barbara, California.
---N m C Y D MCCARRON, Attorney for Petitioner
I am the Petitioner in this writ proceeding. I have read the foregoing Petition for
Writ of Mandate andlor Prohibition or Review and know the contents thereof; the
same is true of my own personal knowledge, except as to those matters which are
stated upon my information or belief and as to those matters I believe them to be true.
I declare under penalty of perjury and California law that the foregoing is true and
correct and this Verification was executed on the date below at Highland, Califomia.
PROOF OF SERVICE
COUNTY OF SAN BEKNARDINO
StubbIefield Properties v. Nancv Dufi, et a1 UDFS1406978
The undersigned is counsel for petitionertdefendant at: 950 Roble Lane, Santa Barbara, CA 93103
805-450-0450 fax 805-965-3492
Writ Petition and Exhibits
re: Denial of Disqualification under CCP 170.6(2)
[ ] (By Pcrsonal Delivery)
[ ] (&y Fax) Fax machine used complied with Rule 2003(3) and no error was reported by the
[ ] (By Electronic) email address below (by ameement) & with copy to nancyduffysb~vahoo.com
to: rwilliamsonc;i)hartkinalaw.com
and reganliiihartkinclaw[x] (By US Mail) 8 1013a, 42015.5 CCP. I deposited the documents in a pre-paid stamped envelope to:
APPELLATE DIVISION: ORIGINAL + 4 copies + Exhibits (Volume 1 of 1)

RESPONDENT COURT:
Judge Michael Sachs (petition only)
247 W. Third Street
San Bemardino, CA 92415-0063
FOURTH DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL Original+4 copies + Exhibits (Vol 1 of 1)
3389 12th Street
Riverside, CA 9250 1
Robert Williamson, Ryan Egan at IIartJKingLaw Firm
Santa Ana, CA 92707 714-432-8700 fax 714-546-7457
I am familiar with mail collection in Santa Barbara. I deposited the envelope in the mail at
Santa Barbara, CA. I am aware on a motion of the party served, service is presumed invalid if
postal cancellation date is more than one day after deposit date on affidavit.
[x] (STATE) I declare under penalty of pejury and laws of California that the above is truc.
Executed in Santa Barbara. CA on March 3 1,2015
EXHIBIT 22

950 Roble Lane
805-450-0450 fax 805-965-3492
Real Estate Broker Lic. #00853086
filed: 10-3-14
DEFENDANT BONNIE SHIPLEY's NOTICE OF
dba Mountain Shadows Mobile
AND MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Home Community
Plaintiff, Filed with Separate Statement of Undisputed Facts
v.
Declarations: Nancy Duffy McCarron, Bonnie Shipley;
NANCY DUFFY, BONNIE SHIPLEY, et to be consider d with D's Request for Judicial Notice
CCP $3437~;592; 597; 1170.7
2015
Defendant. Date: April
No trial date set:
CRC 3.1350; 3.1351
Time: 8:30 a.m.
S28 [or to be announced] Evidence $5451,452,453
PLEASE NOTE on the above date and time defendant BONNIE SHIPLEY will move the court for
summary judgment based on above statutes and rules, P&A, P's admissions, court files and evidence.
I. Introduction
[General Rules on Summary Judgment]
(5-day notice in UD - CCP 51170.7)
In an action for recovery of real property, money claimed as due under a contract, or damages sought,
"where there are both issues of fact and law, the issue of law must beJirst disposed of." CCP $592.
It is the trial court's duty to determine the issue of law.
fact does not turn on a trial court's discretion.
'
Whether there is a triable issue of material
Under CCP 437c(c), a court must grant summary
judgment if all papers & affidavits submitted, together with all inferences reasonably deducible from the
evidence, and un-contradicted by other inferences or evidence, show there is noiriable issue, movant is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law. There is a triable issue of material fact only if evidence would
allow a reasonable trier of fact to find in favor of a party opposing the motion for summary judgment.
The purpose of summary judgment is to ascertain if the weighing procedures of a trial are necessary. 4
1
2
4
Aloha PaciJic, Inc. v. CA Ins. Guar. Assn. (2000) 79 Cal. App. 4th 297,307; Armato v. Baden (1999)
71 CA. 4th 885, 893; Ludgate Ins. Co. v. Lockheed Martin Corp. (2000) 82 CA. 4th 592,603;
Monteleone v. Allstate Ins. Co. (1996) 5 1 Cal. App. 4th 509, 5 14;
Fretland v. County of Humboldt (1999) 69 Cal. App. 4th 1478, 1490
Aguilar v. Atlantic RichJield Co. (2001) 25 Cal. 4th 826, 850
Chern v. BOA (1976) 15 C.3d 866,873; Convin v. LA Newspaper Svs Bureau (1971) 4 C.3d 842, 851;
Bechtel Corp. (1983) 33 C.3d 868, 874; Stationers Corp. v. Dun & Bradstreet (1965) 62 C.2d 412,417
-0Defendant's Summary Judgment Mot~onfiled w t h D's Separate Statement of Und~sputedFacts,
Declarat~onsof Nancy D McCarron and Bonn~eShlpley to be cons~dered\nth D's Request for J u d ~ c ~Notice
al
When a court decides an issue of law it must apply controlling statutory interpretations, as they are
binding under Stare Decisis.5 The court must consider all evidence set forth in papers, unless objections
are sustained under CCP 437c(c) 6 and all deducible inferences from them. CCP 437c(c) 7 A trial
4
5
6
7
8
9
court may not weigh the evidence like a fact finder to determine whose version is more likely true.
Declarations must contain evidentiary facts on personal knowledge--not ultimate facts or conclusions. 9
An assertion based solely on conjecture or speculation is insufficient to avoid summary judgment. 10
Defendant can satisfy initial burden to show an absence of evidence by plaintiffs admissions. 11
Plaintiff cannot raise new, un-pleaded issues in opposition papers or any issue based on speculation.12
Plaintiff may not rely on verified allegations in a complaint to show that a triable issue of fact exists;
plaintiff must set forth evidentiary facts showing a triable issue of material fact. CCP 437c(p)(1) (2) 13
10
11
12
Plaintiff may not create an issue outside of the pleadings. 14 Since plaintiff has a statutory duty to
respond to discovery, plaintiffs factually devoid answers showed plaintiff has no triable issue of facts.15
If defendants showing establishes facts justifying judgment, summary judgment must be entered. 16
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
Auto Equity Sales v. Inc. v. Superior Court (1962) 57 Cal.2d 450, 455; State Farm Gen. Insurance v.
Wells Fargo Bank, NA (2006) 143 CA. 4th. 1098, 1121
6
Tchorbadjian v. Western Home Ins. Co. (1995) 39 CA. 4th 1211, 1217; see also CCP 537.25[4]
7
Assad v. So Pac Tran. Co (1996) 42 C.A.4th 1609, 1612; Tchorbadjian, @1465; Sanchez v. Swinerton
& Walberg (1996) 47 CA. 4th 1461, 1465; Murillo v. Rite Stuff Foods, Inc. (1998) 65 CA. 4th 833, 841
8
Binder v. Aetna Life Ins. Co. (1999) 75 CA. 4th 832, 840
9
CCP 437c(d);Estate of Nelson (1964) 227 CA2d 42
10
Sanchez v. Swinerton, supra @ 1466; USC v Weiss (1962) 208 CA2d 759 [1 triable issue required]
11
Aguilar v. ARCO (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 855; Chavez v. Glock, Inc. (2012) 207 CA. 4th 1283, 1302
12
Tsemetzin v. Coast Fed. S&L (1997) 57 CA.4th 1334, 1342; Coyne v Krempels (1950) 36 Cal.2d 257
13
Aguilar v. ARCO (2001) supra @ 850; Vesely v Sager (1971) 5 Cal.3d 153,169; Arciniega v. Bank of
San Bernardino (1997) 52 CA.4th 213, 224; Eisenberg v. Alameda News (1999) 74 CA.4th 1359, 1375;
UC v. Supr Court (1996) 41 CA.4th 1040, 1044; Scheiding v. Dinwiddie Const. (1999) 69 CA.4th 64,69;
Sangster v. Paetkau (1998) 68 CA.4th 151, 162; Bacon v. South. Cal. Edison (1997) 53 CA.4th 854, 858
14
Laabs v. City of Victorville (2008) 163 CA. 4th 1242, 1253; Sutherland v. Barclays American Mortg.
Corp. (1997) 53 CA. 4th 299, 317; Nash v. Fifth Amendment (1991) 228 CA. 3d 1106, 1116; see also
GEICO v. Superior Court (2000) 79 CA.4th 95, 98 n.4; Hobson v. Raychem Corp. (1999) 73 CA. 4th
614, 629; Allyson v. Department of Transportation (1997) 53 CA. 4th 1304, 13181321
15
Scheiding v. Dinwiddie Construction Co. (1999) 69 CA. 4th 64, 7180
16
FNB Mortgage Corp. v. Pacific General Group (1999) 76 CA. 4th 1116, 1126; Oliver v. AT&T
Wireless Services (1999) 76 CA. 4th 521, 528; Tibor v. Superior Court (1997) 52 CA. 4th 1359, 1369;
Brantley
v. Pisaro (1996) 42 CA.4th 1591, 1602
_________________________________________________________________________________
-1Defendants Summary Judgment Motion filed with Ds Separate Statement of Undisputed Facts,
Declarations of Nancy D. McCarron and Bonnie Shipley to be considered with Ds Request for Judicial Notice
II. Judgment for Shipley is Required as the Only Issue Was Already Decided As a Matter of Law
An admission is extended a very high credibility value in determining whether a triable issue exists. 17
2
3
Defendant may rely on verified allegations which are conclusive concessions of the truth of a matter. 18
Plaintiff admitted at a 2/10/15 hearing, through counsel, there is only one issue, as recited by his counsel:
MR. WILLIAMSON: The issue in this case, is whether, under the terms of
Ms. McCarrons lease, and the rules and regulations, regularly occupies the
home in order to have a resident, co-resident, sub-lessee, live there who was
under the parks age restriction. In other words, a sub-lessee or co-resident,
under the terms of the lease and the park rules and regulations, cannot reside
there without the homeowner, the age-qualified prime owner staying there on
a regular basis, living there on a regular basis. Thats the subject matter of
this action. 2/10/15 Transcript [F7] Duffy Decl. Exh A, pg 10:20; pg 21:1
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
Express & implied covenants are questions of law decided by a court in summary judgment motions.19
Where the only material issue is a legal question the court must resolve it and grant summary judgment.
13
Morales 20 [if defendant owed a legal duty to plaintiffs to make sure their tenants obtained insurance in
14
the agreed amount].
15
In Uram v. Abex 21 a trial court found, as a matter of law, plaintiffs exposure to asbestos claims were
16
barred by a statute of limitations [CCP 340.2] after reviewing the complaint for when injuries occurred.
Finding there was no duty the court entered summary judgment for defendant.
17
The Supreme Court held a trial court may consider facts judicially noticed.22 CCP 437c authorizes
18
summary judgment based on judicial notice. 23 Summary judgment for defendant was affirmed where a
19
pilots responsibilities were established through federal regulations judicially noticed by a trial court. Id
20
If movants showing negates an element of the claim no other facts preclude summary judgment.24
21
Here, the only material issue presents a pure question of law; i.e. must the age-qualified prime owner
22
23
[McCarron] reside in a mobile home at all times while co-resident [Shipley] shares the mobile home?
24
17
25
26
27
28
DAmico v. Bd of Med. Exam. (1974) 11 C.3d 1, 21-22; Thompson v. Williams (1989) 211 CA.3d 566
Yurick v. Superior Court (1989) 209 Cal. App. 3d 1116, 1120
19
Lundin Weber Co. v Brea Oil Co., Inc. (2004) 2004 Cal App LEXIS 435
20
Morales v. Fansler (1989) 209 Cal. App. 3d 1581, 1584
21
Uram v. Abex Corp. (1990) 217 Cal. App. 3d 1425, 1433
22
Parker v. 20th. Century-Fox Film Corp. (1970) 3 C.3d 176, 181 (breach of employment contract)
23
Stevens v. Cessna Aircraft Co. (1981) 115 Cal. App. 3d 431, 434 (wrongful death airplane crash)
24
Yurick, supra @ 1120
_________________________________________________________________________________
-218
Defendants Summary Judgment Motion filed with Ds Separate Statement of Undisputed Facts,
A. Rancho Santa Paula Mobile Homes v. Evans (1994) 26 CA.4th 1129, 1147 Must be Applied
Plaintiffs sham complaint is purportedly based on Civil Code 798.56[d] authorizing eviction for:
3
4
5
(d) failure of homeowner or resident to comply with a reasonable rule or regulation

of the park that is part of the rental agreement or any amendment thereto.
Nothing in this subdivision shall relieve the management from its obligation
to demonstrate that a rule or regulation has in fact been violated.
Plaintiff has the burden to prove Duffy failed to comply with a reasonable rule. It is a 3-Prong burden.
First, P must prove the rule is reasonable. Second, P must prove the rule is part of the rental agreement
or amendment thereto. Third, P must prove D violated the rule. If D negates Prong 1 there is no need to
ever reach Prong 2 or Prong 3. D negates Prong 1 of the test here as a matter of law as shown below.
10
Counsel glossed over Prong1 and 2 as if the 2010 anti-sublease rule had already been found reasonable,
11
had already been found to be part of the rental agreement or any amendment thereto; and the only issue
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
in this case (to go to a jury) is whether Duffy violated a reasonable rule which is part of her agreement
or amendment thereto. Plaintiff fails on Prong 1 as a matter of law. The court must apply Stare Decisis.
The Appellate court in Rancho Santa Paula Mobile Homes v. Evans (1994) 26 CA4th.1129, 1147-48
already found an anti-sublease rule is unreasonable as a matter of law if it is applied without consent or
without the pre-existing tenant agreeing to modify her lease to incorporate the new anti-sublease rule.
Because of the high cost of moving mobile homes, they are anything but mobile.
However, as explained above, a rule prohibiting subleasing affects the very nature of the
holding and may well cause the eviction of both the tenant and the mobile home owner.
We hold that such a rule, when applied retroactively--that is, against a homeowner whose
lease contains no such restriction and who has not agreed to the restriction--is contrary to
the stated purpose of the MRL and is therefore unreasonable.
Respondent claims that the regulation he seeks to enforce does not prohibit subleasing,
but only requires the owner to be one of the residents of the mobilehome. However,
the restriction would permit subleasing only if the home remained unoccupied or if the
homeowner were one of the occupants it is essentially a prohibition of subleasing.
Respondent contends that the restriction did not operate retroactively because it was
incorporated by law into the original lease. He argues that, since Civil Code, section
798.25 permits the making of new rules without the homeowner's consent, the
homeowner in commencing the tenancy agrees to subsequently enacted rules.
However, the argument begs the question. To be valid and enforceable, the rule must be
reasonable. A homeowner could not be expected to foresee a rule change effecting such a
radical change in such an important condition of his tenancy. Insofar as it attempts to operate
retroactively, such a rule is not reasonable.
Evans @ 1147-1148
_________________________________________________________________________________
This court must apply Evans, supra because it is controlling authority. Evans held an anti-sublease
clause is unreasonable as a matter of law. Summary judgment must be granted when defendant negates
the first element of what a plaintiff must prove at trial. There is no need for trial where Pron1 is negated.
4
5
6
7
If a defendant is charged with speeding at 65 miles per hour, a judge has no power to invoke a jury to
decide if 65 mph is a reasonable speed as legislators already decided 65 is a reasonable maximum speed
The court cannot submit a legal issue to a jury when an appellate court already decided the legal issue.
This court must apply controlling authority of Evans, supra @ 1147-1148. This negates Prong 1 as a
matter of law; accordingly the court must grant summary judgment to defendants.
8
9
10
11
12
CHRONOLOGY OF UNDISPUTED FACTS:

1. It is undisputed Duffy executed a lease 1/5/2005 [Compl., 11,12-Exhibit 1; Duffy Decl. pg 1, 1]
__________________________________________________________________________________
2. It is undisputed Community Guidelines (11/1/2000) applied; Cover Pg, Pg1, pg 15 (signature page)
Compl,13,14-Exh. 2 (age restriction= >40); Duffy Decl. pg 1,2 Exh.1a,1b,1c (cover, p.1, p.15) same
It is undisputed Duffy agreed to 2000 Community Rules when she executed her lease on 1/5/2005:
13
14
15
Complaint, Exh. 2, pg. 15, 13-14

Complaint, Exh. 2 2000 Community Guidelines shows 2nd resident need only be 40 years of age.
16
17
18
19
20
Complaint, Exh. 2, p.2

___________________________________________________________________________________________
3. It is undisputed Duffy did not agree to 2010 Rules in 3/2010 as her signature & date lines are blank.
21
22
23
Compl, Exh. 3, pg 27
24
Plaintiff did not allege Duffy signed 3/10/2010 Community Rules, attached to complaint as Exhibit 3.
___________________________________________________________________________________
25
4. It is undiputed Duffys lease could not be modified absent written agreement or by operation of law
26
27
Compl, Exh.1, p.6, 29

___________________________________________________________________________________
28
_________________________________________________________________________________
5. It is undisputed Bonnie Shipley still resides in Space #333 (Compl, pg.6,36; Shipley decl. p.3, 8
___________________________________________________________________________________
6. It is undisputed plaintiff admitted through its counsel on 2/10/15 at a court hearing (transcript on file)
there is only one issue in this case; i.e. whether Duffy must regulary occupy the mobilehome at all times
in order to share her mobile home with Shipley, who is over age 40 but not yet over age 55
6
7
8
Complaint, Page 3, 16; Duffy Decl. pg.3,13, Exh.7; 2/10 15 transcript on file in court
7. Under Civil 798.25(b) new park rule is enforceable after 6 months, but only if the rule is reasonable
___________________________________________________________________________________
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
PLAINTIFF FAILED TO ALLEGE LEASE WAS MODIFIED BY OPERATION OF LAW

Since Clause 29 of Duffys lease prohibited modification of her lease absent written consent or by
operation of law, and Duffy did not consent to the new 2010 Community Rules, the only way Duffys
lease could be modified is by operation of law. This means that under Civil Code 798.25 (b) the new
park rule implemented in 2010 (anti-subleasing unless owner regularly occupies the home at all times )
must be reasonable. In order to evict a homeowner under an alleged violation of a reasonable rule.
Civil Code 798.56(d) statutorily imposes the burden of proof on plaintiff (park owner/manager) to
prove that a homeowner violated a reasonable rule that is part of the rental agreement or amendment.
17
18
19
20
21
(d) failure of homeowner or resident to comply with a reasonable rule or regulation

of the park that is part of the rental agreement or any amendment thereto.
Nothing in this subdivision shall relieve the management from its obligation
to demonstrate that a rule or regulation has in fact been violated.
Plaintiffs complaint is devoid of any allegation that Duffys 2005 lease was modified by operation
22
of law in 2010 or at any time during her tenancy. The Evans court held that an anti-subleasing rule
23
could not be enforced against a pre-existing tenant if not incorporated in her original lease. Such ex post
24
25
26
27
28
facto application is unconstitutional and unreasonable as a matter of law. Evans @ 1148. This court
must apply Stare Decisis [Evans] and grant motion for summary judgment as a matter of law.
Plaintiff cannot prove Duffy agreed to be a prisoner within the 4 walls of her mobilehome in order to
be entitled to have a coresident share her home. There is no admissible evidence by way of affidavit that
plaintiff can counter with to show otherwise. Plaintiff cannot rely on naked allegations in its complaint.
Plaintiff must counter with admissible facts in affidavits showing a triable issue of material fact.
_________________________________________________________________________________
Declarations must contain evidentiary facts on personal knowledge--not ultimate facts or conclusions. 25
An assertion based solely on conjecture or speculation is insufficient to avoid summary judgment. 26
Defendant can satisfy initial burden to show an absence of evidence by plaintiffs admissions. 27
4
5
6
Plaintiff cannot raise new, un-pleaded issues in opposition papers or any issue based on speculation.28
Plaintiff may not rely on verified allegations in a complaint to show that a triable issue of fact exists;
plaintiff must set forth evidentiary facts showing a triable issue of material fact. CCP 437c(p)(1) (2) 29
NO LEASE CLAUSE CAN DEPRIVE TENANT DUFFY OF HER RIGHTS UNDER MRL
Even if plaintiff could show a lease provision in Duffys lease which precluded the sharing of her
home with a co-resident, unless she occupied the home at all times (be a virtual prisoner within 4 walls)
10
such lease clause would not be enforceable as a matter of law under MRL statutes and case law below:
11
Civil Code 798.19. Waiver of homeowner rights void (Mobile Home Residency Law)
No rental agreement for a mobilehome shall contain a provision by which the homeowner
waives his or her rights under the provisions of Articles 1 to 8, inclusive, of this chapter.
Any such waiver shall be deemed contrary to public policy and void.
12
13
14
Civil Code 798.34 (b) Guests; Provision of livein health or supportive care (MRL)
A homeowner who is living alone and who wishes to share his or her mobilehome with
one person may do so, and a fee shall not be imposed by management for that person.
15
16
Otanez v. Blue Skies Mobile Home Park (1991) 1 CA 4th.1521 (first sentence) holding:
17
We hold that the tenant need not live in the premises full-time in order to be a resident
18
19
20
21
Notwithstanding the courts holdings in Evans, supra that a park rule requiring a homeowner to
occupy the home at all times in order to have a sub-tenant share the home was, in essence, a prohibited
anti-subleasing rule, and that all such anti-subleasing rules were unreasonable as a matter of law, the
court in Otanez, supra held that a tenant need not live in the premises full-time in order to be a resident.
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
25
CCP 437c(d);Estate of Nelson (1964) 227 CA2d 42

Sanchez v. Swinerton, supra @ 1466; USC v Weiss (1962) 208 CA2d 759 [1 triable issue required]
27
Aguilar v. ARCO (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 855; Chavez v. Glock, Inc. (2012) 207 CA. 4th 1283, 1302
28
Tsemetzin v. Coast Fed. S&L (1997) 57 CA.4th 1334, 1342; Coyne v Krempels (1950) 36 Cal.2d 257
29
Aguilar v. ARCO (2001) supra @ 850; Vesely v Sager (1971) 5 Cal.3d 153,169; Arciniega v. Bank of
San Bernardino (1997) 52 CA.4th 213, 224; Eisenberg v. Alameda News (1999) 74 CA.4th 1359, 1375;
UC v. Supr Court (1996) 41 CA.4th 1040, 1044; Scheiding v. Dinwiddie Const. (1999) 69 CA.4th 64,69;
Sangster
v. Paetkau (1998) 68 CA.4th 151, 162; Bacon v. South. Cal. Edison (1997) 53 CA.4th 854, 858
_________________________________________________________________________________
26
Secondly, our Attorney General issued Opinion No. 11-703 on 7/23/13 holding the following:
1
2
with the possible exception of rentals to park employees under appropriate

circumstances that satisfy the requirements of Civil Code section 798.23(b),
if the management of a mobile home park has enacted rules and regulations
generally prohibiting mobile home owners from renting their mobile homes,
then park management is also bound by these same rules and regulations.
see Civil Code 798.23(a)
3
4
5
6
7
SHIPLEY ASKS THE COURT TO TAKE JUDICIAL NOTICE OF HUD WEBSITE
The Supreme Court held a trial court may consider facts judicially noticed.30 CCP 437c authorizes
summary judgment based on judicial notice. 31 Summary judgment for defendant was affirmed where a
10
pilots responsibilities were established through federal regulations judicially noticed by a trial court. Id
11
12
In applying mandatory authority of Evans, supra prohibiting anti-subleasing park rules, Shipley
13
asks the court to take Judicial Notice of HOPA.95 pdf (Housing for Older Citizens) which provides
14
15
16
17
18
exemption for over-55 park owners from complying with Title VIII of Civil Rights Act of 1968
[anti-discrimination codes prohibiting a landlord from refusing to rent to families with children].
HOPA.95 pdf is posted on HUDs website: http://www.hud.gov/offices/fheo/library/hopa95.pdf
The pdf is a 17-page Questions & Answers for park owners and tenants to use to understand how the
exemption works; i.e. 80% of park residents must be over 55 in order to qualify to maintain exemption.
Page 10 contains hypothetical No. 22 which is the idential fact pattern to Shipleys sharing lease:
19
20
Question 22
21
Are there circumstances under which a 55 or older owner/tenant might be temporarily

absent from a dwelling without affecting the exemption status of the community/dwelling?
22
Answer
23
Yes. For example, the 55 or older occupant may be on vacation, hospitalized, or absent for
a season without affecting the exempt status of the community. The resident may, if he/she
wishes, allow a younger relative or a house sitter under 55 years if age to live in the unit
during this absence. In either event, the unit would be included in the calculation of
the 80 percent occupancy requirement as long as the dwelling is not rented out,
the owner/tenant returns on a periodic basis, and maintains legal and financial
responsibility for the upkeep of the dwelling.
24
25
26
27
28
30
31
Parker v. 20th. Century-Fox Film Corp. (1970) 3 C.3d 176, 181 (breach of employment contract)
Stevens v. Cessna Aircraft Co. (1981) 115 Cal. App. 3d 431, 434 (wrongful death airplane crash)
_________________________________________________________________________________
PROOF OF SERVICE
1
2
3
4
5
Stubblefield Properties v. Bonnie Shipley
UDDS1204130
The undersigned is counsel for defendants at:
950 Roble Lane, Santa Barbara, CA 93103

805-450-0450 fax 805-965-3492
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
Defendant Shipleys MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT, Separate Statement of Undisputed Facts,
and Request for Judicial Notice with Declaration of Nancy Duffy, attaching also Declaration of B. Shipley
[ ] (By Personal Delivery) to the parties below as follows:
[ ] (By Fax) on 1-23-13 Fax machine used complied with Rule 2003(3) and no error was reported by the
machine. Pursuant to Rule CRC, 2008 [c](4. I caused the machine to maintain a record of same.
to: rwilliamson@hkclaw.com (Appendix included)
[x] (By US Mail) 1013a, 2015.5 CCP. I deposited the documents in a pre-paid stamped envelope to:
Robert Williamson, Hart|King
Santa Ana, CA 93103
17
18
19
20
I am familiar with mail collection in San Bernardino and the two-day mail service offered by the post office.
I mailed the envelope at San Bernardino, CA. I am aware on a motion of the party served, service is presumed
invalid if postal cancellation date is more than one day after deposit date on affidavit.
[ ] (STATE) I declare under penalty of perjury and laws of California that the above is true.
Executed in Santa Barbara CA on 3/27/15.
21
22
23
24
_______________________________________________
Nancy Duffy McCarron, Attorney for Bonnie Shipley
25
26
27
28
_________________________________________________________________________________
Nancy Dnffy McCarron CBN 164780
Law Office of Nsncy Dujfy McCarron

950 Roble Lane
805-450-0450 fax 805-965-3492
nancyduf@sb@yahoo.com
SUPEWOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

a California General Partnership, dba
Mountain Shadows Mobile
Home.Community
I'laintiff,
v.
SEPARATE STATEMENT OF FACTS SUPPORTING

SHIPLEY's MOTION FOR SOMMARY JUDGMENT
Filed with Se~arateStatement of Undis~utedFacts
Declarations:Naacy DufQ McCarron, Bonnie Shigley
NANCY DUFFY, BONNIE SHJFLEY, et a1

Defendants
DEFENDANT BONNIE SEUPLE
SUPPORTING BONNIE SHIPIXY'S MOTION F'OR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
FACTS
1: Du@ & P's authorized agent signed a lease
on 1/5/05 attached to complaint as Exhibit 1
2: Community Guidelines (1 1/1/2000) applied;

Zover Page, Pagel, page 15 (signature page)
3: DuRy did not signlagree to 2010 Corn. Rules
4: D u w s lease could not be amended absent

written modificationor by operation of law
5: Bonnie Shipley still occupies Space #333

6: P admitted via counsel to only 1 issue in case
whether Durn must occupy at all time to share
with Shipley, who is over 40 but not yet age 55
7: Under Civil 798.25(b) new rule is enforced

after 6 months, but onlv if the
-d
-lSEPARATE STATEMENT OF FACTS Supporting Shipley's Summary Judgment Motion
1
PROOF OF SERVICE
2
3
c o u N n OF SAN BERNARDINO
5
Stubblefield Proverties v. Nancy Duffy. et a1
The undersigned is counsel for defendant at: 950 Roble Lane, Santa Barbara, CA 93 103
805-450-0450 fax 805-965-3492
10
UDFS 1406978
11
SHIF'LEY'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT with Separate Statement of Undisputed Facts,
Declarations of Nancy Duffy McCarron and Bonnie Shipley
11
[x] (By Personal Delivery) to the parties below as follows: at the 1-22-13 OSC Hearing
l2
13
[ ] (By Fax) Fax machine used complied with Rule 2003(3) and no error was reported by the machine.
Pursuant to Rule CRC, 2008 [c](4) I caused the machine to maintain a record of same.
14
15
l6
[ ] (By Electronic) to address below @v ameement) & with copy to nancyduffysb@yahoo.com

to: rwilliamson@hartkiglaw.com regan@hartkinglaw.com
11[XI
(By Mail) 1013a, $2015.5 CCP. I deposited the documents in a pre-paid stamped envelope to: 2-day mail
Robert Williamson, HartlKing
Santa Ana, CA 92707
20
21
22
I am familiar with mail collection in Santa Barbara. I deposited the envelope in the mail at San Bemardino, CA.
I am aware on a motion of the party served, service is presumed invalid if postal cancellation date is more than
one day after deposit date on affidavit.
[XI(STATE) I declare under penalty of perjury and laws of California that the above is true.
Executed in Santa Barbara CA on the date indicated below
"
Nancy ~ u f @ h c ~ & o n ,A'tt&meyfor Bonnie s m e y
-2SEPARATE STATEMENT OF FACTS Supporting Shipley's Summary Judgment Motion
PROOF OF SERVICE
TATE OF CALIFORNIA,
LOUNTY OF SAN BERNARDMO
tubblefield Proverties v. Bonnie Shivlev
UDDS1204130

805-450-0450 fax 805-965-3492
ln the date recited below the undersigned served the below document in the manner indicated:
lefendant Shipley's MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT,Separate Statement of Undisputed Facts,
nd Request for Judicial Notice with Declaration of Nancy Duffy, attaching also Declaration of B. Shipley
] (By Personal Delivery) to the parties below as follows:
s ax
] (By Fax) on 1-23-13

machine used complied with Rule 2003(3) and no error was reported by the
lachine. Pursuant to Rule CRC, 2008 [c](4. I caused the machine to maintain a record of same.
] (By Electronic) to address below (bv agreement) & with copy to nancyduffysb@yahoo.com
U]
(By US Mail) $ 1013%$2015.5 CCP. I deposited the documents in a pre-paid stamped envelope to:
Robert Williamson, HartlKiig
Santa Ana, CA 93 103
am familiar with mail collection in San Bemardino and the two-day mail service offered by the post office.
mailed the envelope at San Bernardiio, CA. I am aware on a motion of the party served, service is presumed
)valid if postal cancellation date is more than one day afterdeposit date on affidavit.
] (STATE) I declare under penalty of perjury and laws of California that the above is true.
Executed in Santa Barbara CA on 3127115.
?-fancy ~ u ~ c ~ " m Attorney

o n , for sonhie Shipley
kfcndant's Summary Judgment Mouon fild unh U's Separec Statrmmt of Unll~sputcdkaca,
Dcclaral~onsof Nancy D McCanon md Bonnlc Sh~plcylo be coni~dcrcd~ 8 t D's
h Kequcsl for Jud~clalVoucc
qancy Duffy M c C m n , CBN 164780
150 Roble Lane

{ants Barbara, CA 93 103
105-450-0450 fax 805-965-3492
rancyduffusb@yahoo.com
ittomey for Stephen C. Allen
SLPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

California General Partnership,
.baMountain Shadows Mobile
Iome CbmmUaity

filed: 10-3-2014
Supporting Motion for Summary Judgment Hed with
Separate Statement of Undisputed Facts
I3
Date: April %-&

2015
Time:&30 p.m.
Dept. S28 or to be announced
1, NANCY DUFFY MCCARRON, declare that I am defendant in pro per, attorney fir Bonnie Shipley,
nd make these statements based on personal knowledge, in support of Motion for Summary Judgment.
On or about 1-05-2005 I bought a mobilehome at space #333 in plaintiffs park and signed a park
lease with plaintiffs authorized agent. Betsy Voss, who met with me to review papers on 1/5/05.
I.
I signed 2000 Community Rules in effect when I bought the home on 1/5/05. (Exh.la, lb, Ic)
Page 1 of the rules, clause 2 recited that one person who signed the lease must be 55 (Iwas 55 then)
and all other residents must be a minimum of 40 years or older. I asked Betsy Voss about residents;
specifically, if I could share the home with another co-resident as I intended to use the home as a
second residence and office while in San Bemardino .asI had clients and business in the area.
Betsy Voss assured me I could have share the home, so long as the other residents were over 40
and I registered them as co-residents at the office. Betsy remarked that she had a live-in-boytliend
and her son living with her in her mobile home in the park. Betsy Voss said it would be no problem
I relied on representations. I saw Betsy with her boyfriend & son at Friday potlucks in the clubhouse
3.
I had to subniit a "net worth" statement to "qualiw for ownershiplresidency, acknow1edging the
"minimum age requirement" was 40 years old. This was underlined on the form. (Exhibit Id).
-
-1Declaration of Nancy DuRy McCarron supporting MSJ, Separate Statement of Undisputed Facts
4.
My life from Jan 2005 to Jan 2010 (5 years) was uneventful. I had a series of co-residents share
my home from 2005-Aug 1,2012 (7 years) [Exh. 2.1 [Last names redacted to protect their privacy].
Only the title and first two sentences are relevant as they show lease agreement was always to share
the home--never as a sub-lease where I had no right of entry. Each co-resident fdled out a co-resident
5
6
applications, turned it into the park and was given a parking sticker for their vehicle from 2005-2012.
l
I got a letter from Community Manager Eva Stubblefield Hazard on co-residents.
5. On ~ p r i 13,2009
As underlined on a net worth statement from Jan 2005, and Betsy Voss confirmed in 2005, Hazard
also confirmed a co-resident need only be over 40, complete a guest application, go to orientation,
receive approval and a parking sticker for their car. No co-resident was denied approval. [Exh. 31
6. On March 18,2015 Wendy Durr applied to be my co-resident after Jim Tate bought a unit. [Exh. 4-a]
10
As shown by date of birth on 3118/10 Wendy was 50 when she moved in under our sharing lease.
11
She was born 5/8/59 so she would have turned 50 on 5/8/2009. She applied on 3118/2010. Wendy
12
was approved by the park, and was my co-resident from March 2010 until the end of July 2012.
13
On June 13,2012 Wendy Durr notified me she had bought the mobile home next door. [Exh. 4-b]
14
Even though Wendy Durr was onlv 52 the owner authorized her to buy the mobile home next door.
I believe this was done intentionally because the park wanted to steal my mobile home by not
15
16
l7
allowing me to share my residence with a co-resident. I could not afford to pay the full rent alone.
I believe this is part of a racketeering enterprise Stubblefield orchestrated to steal homes in the park
and convert them into a cash cow rental portfolio for himself. He wanted to eliminate all competition
7. In March 2010 the park hired a new law firm,
HARTJKING,who represents park owners and helps
l9
them orchestrate these racketeering enterprises whereby they steal mobile homes to convert to rentals.
20
To this end, HARTIKING attorneys replaced our 12-page benign park rules with a 50-page set of
21
onerous rules designed to drive everyone out. I did not sign or agree to new 2010 rules. [Exh. 5a-b-c]
22
This was attached to plaintiffs complaint as Exhibit 3. The fact that my signature does not appear on
23
24
25
26
27
the document is an admission by plaintiff that I never agreed to the new 2010 rules. I spoke out at a
clubhouse meeting in MarchlApril2010 and told Tom Parrish, a park managerbroker, that the rules
were unconstitutional and unenforceable. Parrish told me to sit down and shut up. Within a week he
filed a complaint with the city about my home & has engaged in a witch hunt against me since 2010.
Home values dropped from an average of $100,000 to $5,000 within 2 years, as shown on Wendy
Durr's email. [Enh. 4b].
28
-2Declaration of Nancy Duffy McCarron supportingMSJ, Separate Statement of Undisputed Facts
1.
After Wendy Durr moved out in the end of July 2012 I signed a lease with a new co-resident name
Bonnie Shipley. The details about what happened to Bonnic Shipley are included in her declaration
from 20 13 attached here as [Exh. 6 a-dl Plaintiff filed a sham complaint to cvict Bonnie Shipley or
8/27/12 which plaintiff tenaciously prosecuted for 3 years as if millions were at risk. UDDSl205130
This resulted in 428 docket items, 60 court hearings, 16 volumes, and a 20-pg case summary report, ,
or 5 writ petitions and 4 appeals. The case is still open pending an award of attorney fees to Shipley
as prevailing party. Bonnie Shipley was the s rev ailing party now entitled to mandatory attorney feer
After losing UDDS1205 130, a mysterious fire occurred in which the mobile home nearly burned.
Alert neighbors put the fire out and testified that it started in the electrical pedestal which supplies
electric to my mobile home, which was under the exclusive control of the park management.
0.
Afta we repaired the damage and restored all utilities, and got a fmal signoff on the permit to
restore utilities from the DHC inspector, within 2 weeks plaintiff files this new sham complaint.
1.
Plaintiff has no valid grounds to evict Bonnie Shipley and I, based on a new 2010 anti-subleasing
(anti co-resident) rule implemented in 2010 because I never agreed to the rules, and the rule cannot t
enforced against use because an appellate court has already found an anti-subleasing rule is not
enforceable unless the tenant agreed to it in their original lease. I never agreed to it in my lease.
2.
Bonnie Shipley is nearly 54 years old, and well over 40. Before this case is over, through all the
anticipated appeals, she will be 55 and the entire case will become moot. Nonetheless, plaintiff fight
with malice aforethought to try to evict us with a vengeance. We are equally committed to defend.
3.
I attended a hearing 2/10/15 in which plaintiffs counsel admitted there is only one issue in this
case; i.e. whether I can have a co-resident under 55 under MRL. [Exh. 7a-d; 7b: line 20; 7e line 11
4.
I declare the above is true under penalty of perjury. Executed in Santa Barbara, California.
DATE:
3 /z?,&
-3Declaration of Nancy D u e McCarron supporting MSJ, Separate Statement of Undisputed Facts
EXHIBIT LIST
1
a-b-c-d
Community Guidelines November 1,2000 - D u e signed and Net Worth Statement
Series of Co-residents Who Shared Mobile Home with Duffy (except Addie - didn't)
April 13,2009 Letter from Eva Stubblefield Confirming co-resident need only be 40
Wendy Durr application for co-residency with Duffy at age 51 (under 55)
June 13,2012 30-day notice Wendy bought mobile home next door &would be moving
Date of Birth (Exh. 4a) shows she is 51; 2 years later she is 53 but park lets her buy horns
5
6
a-b-c
Shows 2010 Com. Guidelines (compl. Exh. 3) 5c plaintiff admits Duffy did not sign it
Declaration of Bonnie Shipley4etails of her co-residency and admits sharing agreement
Original on file in court 1/28/2013 (date stamp on top)
a-b-c-d Transcript 2/20/15 Plaintiffs counsel admits there is only one issue in the case
whether Nancy D u e McCarron can has a co-resident over 40 but under 55 share home
-4Declaration of Nancy Duffy McCarron supporting MSJ, Separate Statement of Undisputed Facts
Mountain Shadows klobilehome Community
Mountain Shadows Mobili-hme Community

is designated as "ECoushg far Older Persons" and
has miaimurn age requirements for residency
Equal Housing Opportunity

we do business in accorrlance with
the Federal Pair Eoudng Lnrv
It & illegal to disoimiaale a g n h i any person
becausn of race, color, religion, sex,
Lqndicap, f d a l status, or national origin
Mounlain Shadows Mobilehome Communjh

'4040 Easl Piedmont Drive
Highlnnd, Californin 92346
(909) 362-2400
1.
INTRODUCTION
These Community Guidelines (frequently referred LO as " ~ I e and

s regulations" in the
California sclrutes known as the "Mobilehome Residency Law" m d orher stare laws) have been
designed 10 encourage Residents to cooperate with the C o m u n i q Owner and h l m a g e n e n l for
the purpose o r promoting the enjoyment and convenience of all Residents in the Cammuniry.
Because ours is a rnobilrhomr communiry. i t has unique conditions which must be recognized and
dealt wirh in a fair and reasonable rnanncr, and applied End complied wirh on an irnpmlal basts.
The spiril behind rhese guidelines is in the Clolden Rttlt: "Do unto others as you would have o[hers
do unto you." We rrusl we will have yourcomplete coopcrarion not only to keep Community
standards high and to maintain a happy and friendiy armasphere, but also co assure each resident
a maximum of Convenience and comfon.
The fallowing Comrnuniry Guidelines arc apsrroryour Rental and Lease Agreements.
!
a they consrimte a
Please read these Communiry Guidelines Carefully and keep them o n file .
binding agreement baween you and the management. All Cornrnuniw Guidelines of the
Community will be inrcrprered and applied by management in a reasonable manner.
2.
COMMUNITY STATUS
Maunrain Shadows Mobilehomc Communlry is designated as housing for older persons.

has signed a rental vr lease agreement for Resident's homesitc, must
be Fifty-five (55) years of age, and all other residentsmusr be a rninlmurn o f forty (40) years o f
age or older.
A[ least one occupant, who
3.
USE OF FACILITIES AND DEFlNlTIONS
Residents and Guests have rhc right to use h e Hornesire and c o r n u n i t y facilities only
if they comply with h e x Community Guidclines and [he other provisions of h e Communiry's
reddency documents. Guests. when using the Community facilirier, must at all times be
accompanied by a Resident who has signed a Community Lcasc or Rental Aereement.
Communiry Owner will attempt to promptly. equally and impmially obtain the cooperarion and
compliance of all Residents with the Cornmuniry Guidelines and other conditions of residency.
Resident rccognizeq, however. that Community Owner's abili~ylo obtain compliance is dependenr
upon a number of facton, including the cooperation a f all Residents and rheir guests, the n a m e
and extent of Lhe failure m comply, the expense and pracricabiliry a f enforcement and the laws
then .in effecr. Resident agrees therefore, chat the enforcemen1 of che Communiry Guidelines and
conditions of tenancy are a private matter, between Owner and each Residenr indiv.idually.
Resident agrees that he is not a third parry beneficiary of any other agreement between owner and
any ather Resident i n h i s Community or the Carnmuniry Guidelines or the Communiry:r Rental
or Lense .Igrmmenls. The defin'ifions and orher provisions of the paragraphs in the Cammuhiry's
Rental and Lea% Agreements entitled "Definitions." 'Parries." and "Owners Approval'' apply
ib rhesc Communl(y Guidelines. Borh "Pask" and "Community" mean Mountain Sl-tadows
The headi~rpsm d lilies of the PGagispns within rhcse Cornrnuxiry Guidclincs are
~ncludedf o i purposes o f convenience only, and shaii no; affecl the construc[ion or inrerprera~i~n
of m y provisions o f raid Cammuniv Guidelines.
I have read the Communiy Guidelines dais Narember I , ?DDD, and
with them.
Dated
Dated
l & / / ~d<4 /
Resident
Rrsidcnt
dgrcc ro comply
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is F~,?cLI'sI! , .
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RESIDENTIAL LEASE AGREEMENT
THLS RESIDENTIAL LEASE AGRJ35MENTis effective on 8/15/06by and between Nancy D*

(LANDLORD) and James E
m (Temt).
WHEREAS. hd10rd meito share the p~miseso f 4 ~ E.
0p
i $ 3 h gS t . I, 2006. Tenimt
RESIDENT'IAL LEASE AGREEMENT
m,
THIS RESIDENTJAL LEASE AGREEMENT is e&&ve on * by and between Nancy Dug, W m d ) and 3WHEREAS, Landlord agrees 10-
the residence at 4040 E. Piedmont Drive, #333, Highland W o m i a , starring on August 12,21
9
'
RESIDENTIAL LEASE AGREEMENT

This Residential Lease Agreement is effective Nov. 3,2007 by & bmeen Nancy Dug, (landlord) & Janice Lynn W-enant
at 4040 E. Piedmont Drive ,#333, figbland California, stairing on Nov. 15,2007
- - WHEREAS, Landlord agrees tq-residence
RE$IDENTIAL LEASE AGREEMENT
Tenant.
THIS LEASE AGREEhEN is effective on June23,2008 by and between Nancy D& b ~ d l m d and
) Jose
-C-
to ~
(95 1-5263142)
nDrive. #333.
t
Highland California, startiag on July 1,2008
RESIDFNTIAL LEASE AGREEMENT

THIS LEASE AGREFNENT is effective on by and bemeen Nancy D m W o r d ) and A a e T e n a n t
WIIEREAS, Landlord agrees t q a a residence at 4040 E. Piedmont Drive, #333, Highland W m i a , starring on March 16,20C
RESIDmTIAL LEASE SHARE AGREE=

is effective March 18.2010 bvnnd h---
-..---I--
--
..
4040 E PIEDMONTDRNE. SPACE #4 HIGHLAND, CALIFORNIA 92346 PHONE (909) 862-2400

2256 BRADFORD AVENUE HIGHLAND, CALIFORNIA 92346 PHONE (908) 864-1522
April 13,2009
Dear Resident:
w e a r e frequently asked about the length of time, according to the park rules, a guest may
reside with a home owner. We have decided to answer these inquiries in this letter to all of
oar residents.
The State of California Civil Code Provisions commonly referred to a# the Mobilehome
Resideney Law (MRL) require that residents provide management with information on all
persons staying with a resident over the 20 consecutive day grace period, or the maximum
30 days in a calendar year. This requirement is also in the Mountain Shadows Mobile
Home Community Guidelines. A daily guest fee of $20.00, when applicable, may be
chrrged for a non-registered guest who stays loneer than those legal grace periods. If you
have, or are planning to have guests reside with you longer than those limits, prior to the
commencement of hisher stay, your guest must:
1. Be at least 40 years of age;

2. Complete the guest application package;
3. Have the Community guidelines explained during orientation;
4. Sign Community Guidelines & Guest Addendum, and
5. Receive management's written approval at orientation.
Mountain Shadows Mobilehome Community does provide n special lifestyle. It is the
Resident's obligation to ensure that management has a record of all guests stayingwith yon
beyond the g a e e periods stated in the MRL. After that, the law is clear, and complying
with the rules is quite simple.
Any guest (son, daughter, brother, nister, parent, friend, e t r ) must be registered with the
park Failure to do so is a violation of the long-term lease and Community Guidelines.
Please contact the park oflice at 909-862-2400 with questions or to pick up the required
documents. We hope this answers your questions.
Sincerely,
Eva Stubblefield Hazard
Community Manager
..
IUENTAL
.
.
APPLICATION
..
22
+
Hoar long at this nddre-ss

previous AddRss
p&oap
Fieason for leaving

City
Lsadlords Name
How long at this address
Phone #
Reasrm fa leaving
A u t o Y r a M a k e %yn&Mode~
/P~v 4
LI.AJ~C/
p ~ s m~mp~oyer
t
phone #
?bq 53%
P ~0J How long atjob
N m h r and type of Pets
Name of b
Name o f b d
Name
%%
6 B!Fob
~0.h6CO -
~ t a w ~ i t e nplate
se #
position
0therinoornd~-
JhployersAddresa?\~~
S*.te-@
&
B
~ 6 j you
z over been perry to an i;icri~n? [ I yes [
Bnmch
YIS.m-Rellerionship
L7M.
of A m t
M. of Account
Phone #
I CERTIFY that answers givenherein are but and wmplae to the bcst of my howle&e. I authorh landlord to
Print
Page 1 of 1
Subject:
Re
From:
Wendy (wdurr@aol.com)
To:
nancyduffysb@yahoo.com;
Date:
Wednesday. June 13,20129:01 AM
Sony nancy. Can't chat right now at work. This thing was an all of a sudden idea. And a good idea for me.
Harmon and place is in excellent condition. Needing no repairs. There is another nice home in the park I am
now hearing also In excellent shape. These homes are really being given away. Sad for the sellers. Good for
those buying. I don't think u would want to sell for less than 5000.
Sent from my iPhone
On Jun 13,2012, at 8:11 AM, nancy duffy ~nancyduffysb@yahoo.com~

wrotc:
could you please call me ASAP as I would really like to sell my home and can provide financing as
well.
I really wish you would have let me know that you wanted to buy a unit. I would have worked with
you to buy mine.
Attorney, Real Estate Broker, BBB Arbitrator, C.4 Notaty Public
Cemfied Forenslc Loan Auditof, P r o p e q Manager
950 Roble Lane
nmqduffpsb@yahoo.com
805-965-3492 cell 805-450-0450
,. .., .. ..
To: Nancy Duffy <nancyduffysb@yahoo.com>

Sent: Tuesday, June 12,2012 533 AM
Subject:
Nancy I will be buying Lois Harmons home this month, therefore I am moving there in July. So I
am giving my 30 days notice that I will be out of your place by July 1Gth ish. I have enjoyed living
here and that is why I cannot pass up this great opportunity for me.
Wendy
COMMUNITY GUIDELINES
of
Mountain Shadows Mobile Home Community

March 1,2020
Mountain Shndows Mobile Home Community

is designated as "Housing for Older P e r s ~ n gand
'~
has minimum age requirementr for residency
Equnl Rousing Opportunity

we do business in acegrdance with
the Federat Fair Housing Law
It is illegnl to discriminate against any person
because of race, color, religion, sex,
I~mdicap,familial status, o r national origin
Mountain Shndows Mobile Home Community

4040 East Pierlmont Drivc
Highland, California 92346
(909) 862-2400
COMMUMTY GUIDELINES
I.
INTRODUCTION
These Community Guidelines (frequently referred to as "rules and regulations" in the

Cdifomia statures known as the "Mobilehome Residency Law" and other state laws) have been
designed to encourage Residents to cooperate wit11 the Convnunity Owner and Management for
the purpose of promoting the enjoyment and convenience of all Residents in the Community.
Bcceuse ours is a mobilehome community, it hm unique conditions which must be recognized
and dealt with in a fair and reasonable manner, and applied and complied with on an imnpa~tial
basis. The spiril behind these guide)ines is in the Golden Rule: "Do unto others as you would
have others do unto you." We trust we will have your cornpiete cooperation nat only to keep
Conlmunity standards high and to maintain a happy and friendly abnospl~ere,but also to assure
each resident a maxilnum of convenience and comfort.
The following Community Guidelines are a part of your Rental and Lease Agreements.
read these Cornmunity Guidelines carefully and keep them on file as they constitute a
binding agreement hetwcen you and the management. All Community Guidelines of the
Community will be interpreted and applied by management in a reasonable manner.
please
2.
COMMUNITY STATUS
Mountain Shadows Mobile k10m Community is designmed as housing for older persons.
At least one occupant, who has signed Community Rental or Lease agreement for Resident's
Honlesite, must be fifty-five(55) years of age or older and all other residents must be aminimum
offorty (40) years of age or older.
3.
'
USE OF FACILITIES AND DEFINITIONS
Residents and Guests have the right to use the FIomesite and community facilities only if
they comply 6 t h dlese Cornmunity Guidelines and the other provisions of the Community's
residency documents. Guests, when using the Community facilities, inust at dl times be
accompanied by a Resident who has signed a Community Lease or Rental Agreement
Community Owner will nltempt to promptly, equally and impartially obtain the cooperation and
compli~nceof dl Residents with t l ~ eCommunity Guidelines and other conditions of residency.
Resident recognizes, however, that Community Owner's abiIity to obtain carnpliance is
dependent upon a number of factors, including the cooperation of all Residents and lheir guests,
the nature and extent of the failure to compiy, the expense and practicability of enforcement and
the laws then in effect. Resident agfees therefore, that the enforcement of the Cormnunity
Guidelines and conditions of tenancy are a private matter, between Owner and each Resident
individually. Resident agrees that he is not a third party beneficiary of any other agreement
between owner and any other Resident in this Community br the Community Guidelines or the
Community's Rental or Lease Agreements. Tlie definitions and other provisions of the
paragraphs in the Community's Rental and Lease Agreements entitled "Defioitions," "Parties,"
and "Owners Approval" a ~ l to
y tllese Community Guidelines. Both "Park" and "Community"
mean Mountain Shadowi Mobile I-Iome Community. "Owner" means the Owners of the pal<,
including, hut no1 limited lo, the owners, partners, directors, representatives, officers, mployees
and qents, and the management of the Park (herein referred to as either Community Owner,
A copy of the registration carj or cerlificdtc of titla issued by the Department of

Housing and Community Development or other g o v m e n t agency for the mobilehome
occupying the Homesite;
5.
25.
F.
Proof of Rcsidcnt's insurance policy (orpolicies) on Resident's mobilehome:
G.
Proof of age of Resident and all occupmts of Resident's mobilehome.
PARAGRAPH HEADWGS
The headings and titles of the paragraphs witldn these Community Guidelines are
included for purposes of convenience only, and slioll not affect the construction or interpretation
of any provisions of said Community Guidelines.
I have read the Community Guidelines pages 1 tlmugh 27

agree to comply with them.
Dated
Resident
Dated
Resident
Dated
Resident
Homesite No.
dated
March 1 , 2010, and
Nancy Dufe McCarron CBN 164780

Law Office of Nancy ~ u f McCarron
f ~
950 Roble Lane
805450-0450 fax 805-965-3492
nancydu@sb@yahoo.com

COUNTf OF SAN BERNARDINO .
'

rlbaMountain Shadows Mobile
Home Community
Plaintiff,
v.
BONNIE SHIPLEY.
Defendant
original trial set: 12-10-2012

12-10-2012: court continued to 12-174012
12-13-2012:ct vacated due to death P'B side
No new trial date set
tiled: 8-27-12
DECLARATION OF BONNIE SHIPLEI

SUPPORTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTION
Filedlw Summary .ludgment Motion, Declarations of
1 Maurice Pricst & Nancy McCarron; Request for Judicial
Notice and Separate Statement of Undisputed Facts
1
Date: January 31,2013

Time: 8:30 a m .
Dept. S-32
Honorable Donald Alvarez

1. I make these statements based on personal knowledge Wr the purposes stated directly above.
2. 1 am competent to make the staterhents and could testify to these statements if called as a witness.
3. On July 27,20 12 I executed a lease with Nancy Duffy McCarron (hereinafter "Duffy") to share her
residence at W c e 333,4040 E. Piedmont Drive. Highland, CA 92346. The lease I signed was entitled
,'RESIDENTIAL LEASE TO SHARd OCCUPANCY" in BOLD CAPS. Duffy made it clear that we
would he sharing the home when she was in Highland. I am 5 1 years old. D u e made it clear that it
was not a "sub-lease" or "sub-tenancy" butwas a sharing arrangement. The lease term was 6 months.
DufFy
me P E &Rule
~ No. 2 which recited that at least one person who had signed an agreement
.. showed
,
wiiji the park to lease a space must be -55and all other residents must be at least 40 years old. DuRy
said she bought thehome
. .
at age 55 in 2005 and had maintained a lease with the park owner since 2005.
..
4. Duffy showed me h a lease executed with the park on 1-5-2005. We looked at Clause 10 together.
Clause 1 0 recited that Duffy was authorized to have one co-resident WITHOUT PARK APPROVAL.
Duffy said I would have to register with the park office as her new co-resident to obtain a parking
sticker for my vehicle. DufTy and I both believed there would not he a problem with the park owner as
Wendy Durr lited in Dulfy's home as co-resident for owr 2 years without incident from age 50 to 52.
We md with Wendy Durr before I inoved in, while Ms. Durr was still Living in the home, during the 1%
week of July 2012. Wendy Durr said it was a very nice place to live and she had no ~roblemsthere.
Wendy Durr told me she bought the home next door from friends who had relocated closer to family.
5. On 8/2/12 Duffy told me she was going to drive over to the office to pick up a "w-resident ppacket"
60m Hanna, *om
D u e told me distributes them to new co-~esidents.A few minutes later Duffy
returned with a new co-resident package she said Hanna had given her for me to fill out and submit.
Duffy said it was the same package Wendy Durr had submitted to the owner when she moved in 20 10.
Duffy asked me to fill out the package, sign at the end, and return the package to the park office.
5, Duffyput one of her two parking stickers on my vehicle while I awaited a new sticker from the park.
Duffy departed after.b~ingingme the packet. Later that afternoon (8-2-12) a man knocked on the door.
I answered the door, The man identified himself as Marvin Freeman. the park manager. I invited him
~nsideand introduced myself. He loolied around and asked me my age. I said that I was 50 years old.
Mr. Freeman became hostile and told me I could no longer live there because I was not 55 years old.
Mr. Freeman said I had to move all of my stuff out the next day. I was so upset that I started to c ~ y .
Vlr. Freeman said if I wanted to live in the park I had to "find a sugar daddy over 55 to take care of me.
Mr. Freeman reached inside my open car window and ripped my parking sticker off a rear view minor
1. I applied for a civil harassment restraining order against Mr. Freeman and a hearing was set in 8-31
kt the hearing on the restrainii~gorder. Mr. Freeman admitted making the remark about the sugar dadd!
aking my
sticker off the rear view mirror, and also admitted that DWy was blacltlistd hy the
lark owners. The court denied my application for a restraining order.
I. On August 9,2012 we delivered my completed application for co-residency to the park office.
never received a response From the park office denying or granting my application for residency.
1.
I have no criminal record. While I was awaiting park approval a "5-day Notlce to Vacate" was
~ostedon my door and in the fiont of the mobile home on a wall. I did not undmtand the notice
because it recited language about the park's right to eject a "purchaser" d ~ moved
o
in without first
tbtaining approval for residency. It could not have applied to me because I did not purchase the home
10. I moved in as Duffy's co-resident, under Clause 10 of her lease, which recited that she had a right t
have a co-resident without park approval. Duffj' also showed me a copy of Civil Code 798.34(b)
1
which recited that any residenl had a right to a have a co-resident share her mobile home. Durn also
showed me a copy of the lease she signed with the park, and it showed that she had taken an a s s i g ~ l e n
of a lease from a Dorothy Buchanan who had taken an assignment from the first residents in the home.
These two assignments contained two lines with the words "resident" under them for signatures of mor
'
than one resident. Both sets of assignees showed two different residents, with different surnames.
It was obvious to us that 333 had a history of having co-residents which the park approved as residents
11. Subsequently a summons for "Unlawful Detainer" with a complaint entitled "Forcible Detainer"
was delivered to my home. It contained, as Exhibit A, a copy of the same notice (related to a purchase
which I had observed earlier posted on my door and on a wall in front of the mobile home.
12. Nancy Duffy McCarron is representing me in this case and also represented me in my petition for i
restraining order against Marvin Freeman.
13. I have entered into my sixth month of residing in the mobile home at 333. On the first day I lookec
4
at the inside of the home the last week of July 2012, while Wendy Durr was still living there, Duffy
I showed me the bedroom and bathroom she uses while here in Highland. It had her two twin beds, her
computer table with a computer hooked up to the internet by DSL she maintains in her name only.
The bathroom she uses had her personal items, shower curtain, and towels. Many pieces of hmiture in
the home belong to her. We share them. During my six months hcre Ms. Duffy has regularly occupied
the mobile home. When she is here, Duffy usually stays overnight for two or three days at a time, and i
times stays for an entire week. Several times per month she arrives and lives here for several days.
14. We are good friends and enjoy each other's company. We cook and share many meals together.
Duffy has three computers, three printers and various ofice equipment she uses regularly while here.
All ofthe utilities are in Duffy's name and she pays them herself. Duffy pays the park's monthly rent.
Duffy receives mail here regularly. Duffy stays here overnight on her way to and from Big Bear Lake.
14. I declare the above statements are true under penalty of perjury and California law. Executed in
Highland, CA on January 22,2013,
BONNIE SHIF'LEY
-3 -
Declaration ofBomie Shipley Supporting Summar) Judgment
PROOF OF SERVICE
TATE OF CALIFORNIA,
:OUNTY OF SAN BERNARDINO
tubblefield Proverties v. Bonnie Shiplev
UDDS1204130
The undersigned is counsel for defendant at:

805-450-0450 fax 805-965-3492
)n the date recited below the undersigned served the below document in the manner indicated:
DECLARATION OF BONNlE SHIPLEY supporting summary judgment

u] (By Personal Delivery) to the parties below as follows: at OSC hearing on 1-22-13
] (By Fax) Fax machine used complied with Rule 2003(3) and no error was reported by the machine.
'ursuant to Rule CRC, 2008 [c](4. I caused the machine to maintain a record of same.
] (i3y Electronic) to address below @v ameement) & with copy to nancyduffysb@yahoo.com

] (By Mail) 1013a, 82015.5 CCP. I deposited the documents in a pre-paid stamped envelope to:
Robert Williamson, Hart, King & Coldren
200 Sandpointe, 4". Floor
Santa Ana, CA 92707
am familiar with mail collection in San Bemardino. I deposited the envelope in the mail at San
5emardin0, CA. I am aware on a motion of the party served, service is presumed invalid if postal
:ancellation date is more than one day after deposit date on affidavit.
Executed in San Bemardino CA on January 22,2013
-4Declamtion ofBonnie Shipley Supporrinp Summary Judgment
SAN BERNARDINO SUPERIOR COURT

FONTANA, CA - DEPT F7 - HONORABLE KYLE BRODIE
SHORT TITLE: STUBBLEFIELD PKOPEKTIES VS. NANCY DLJFFY, ET AL
CASE NO. UDFS1406978 HEARTNG:February 10,2015 AM SESSION
APPEARANCES:
E
Plaid&
ROBERT WILLIAMSON, ESQ., NANCY DUFEY MCCARRON, ESQ. m t i n g Defendan&
(TRANSCRET OF AUDIO TAPE)

THE COURT:
Good Morning.. .
WILLIAMSON: Good morning your honor.

THE COURT:
11
OK, that's it. All right. Stubblefield v. ah, Duffy
.... [longpause] ... .
3n calendar today for three motions brought by dcfendant. I have read them. .. 1have read the
oppositions.. .. and
MCCARRON:
... Ms. McCarron, you want to speak to any of them?

Well, your honor, 1 had a preliminary item that I would like to address
before we get started. I have three oppositions and I would like to have the court ask counsel
to identify which lawyer signed the pleadings because we continue to have the violation of um
128.7 CCP code, (a), 127,I mean, I'm sorry, 126.7 (a) that says every lawyer shall sign his or hc
name to the pleading. And every, and every single pleading, whether it's a motion or oppositior
I
II
has three lawyers' names under the line and then there's a squirrelly squiggly q, ah, so you don?
know which of the three actually signed it. So I would like to have an identification of which
lawyer signcd it.
THE COURT:
the typical.. .as far as I'm aware.. . the typical custom
...everything ...
I don't know. ..I'm not saying everyone does it this way.. ..I'm not ..no, I don't know of any rulc
that requires it but.. .the last lawyer in the signature block is the one who signed it..
MCCARRON:
Uh, well.. .
MCCARRON: They don't work.
THE COURT: I'm going to let him finish.

MCCARRON: OK.
WIL1,IAMSON: Counsel didn't address the deficiency of the notice itself. ... It didn't even
require a response. We objected to the notice, without waiving, nnd further responded, without
waiving the objection to the notice. It failed to comply with 203 1.10 with regard to time,
location, and where documents would be produced.
THE COURT:
(sound of finger drumming or mouse rolling)
WILLIAMSON: It's not timely served under CCP 2013 [c], 2016.050. and 203 1.30 [c]2
there's unreasonable time and location for production [inaudible] in Santa Barbara.
THE COURT:
(sigh)
WILLIAMSON: CCP 203 1.30 or 030 [c] 2. Again, with regard to counsel's argument that
it's incumbent upon the responding party to bring a motion for a protective order, instead of
filing objections, there's no authority for that. When the document demand is objected to, the
burden shifts to the propounding party under 3 lo., ...203 1 . 3 10(a) to the propounding party to
show cause why these documents are relevant to the subject matter of the action, how they woul~
tend to prove or support a defense, or disprove a claim by the plaintiff. There is ahsoIutely no
showing in this motion to that effect at all. With regard to the documentation, the interrogatorie!
which were completely deficient, do not comply with the code.. urn, or ancient move-in moveout dates of other residents are irrelevant to this action. The issue in this case. is whether, under
the terms ofMs McCarron's lease. and the rules and regulations, ah, regularly occupy the home
in order to have ah a resident, co-resident, sub-lessee, live there who was under the park's age
restriction.
THE COURT: (several thumps)

HU&yi
o w Z / 1 0 / 1 5 - p $ j O 10
WILLIAMSON: In other words, a sub-lessee or co-resident, under the terms of the lease
and the park rules and regulations, cannot reside there without the homeowner, the age-qualified
prime owner staying there on a regular basis, living there on a regular basis. That's the subject
matter of this action. Furthermore, I don't care how the amendment act, the Housing for Older
Persons is an exemption to a claim for familial discrimination. There's no affirmative defense ir
this action, that there's been a unfair housing practice based upon familial status. Neither Ms.
Shipley nor Ms. McCarron did bring that claim, because neither one of 'em was seeking to be
domiciled with a child under the age ...of 18 years of age. And, familial status is defined under
FHAA.
THE COURT:
(metallic sound)
WILLIAMSON: So, at..it's a red herring to say oh well, we have, they have, we have, we
can prove, that they don't comply with the exemption. That's the same thing as saying, Judge,
you have to decide in the abstract, whether if a claim of familial-status discrimination was
brought, they couldn't prove their exemption. That is tantamount to an advisory opinion. And
it's not based on concrete fact or a claim under Title 8 of familial discrimination which both the
regulations and the case law that have recited it say, it has to bepending before we have an
obligation to prove that ah we comply with the terms of the statutory exemption the Housing for
Older Persons. The purpose, and we pointed this out in both, in Ms. McCarron's emails she had
mailed to us, is the reason she wants the move-in move-out and ages of every resident in the
I
park, and the name of every resident in the park, is so that she can gather this information for a
separate lawsuit that she is preparing that she says is a "R I C 0"action against the property
owner. That's the purpose in gathering this information. It's an ulterior purpose of not for
discovery in this case, just for use in some other case that she is preparing which is a manifest
abuse of discovery in this case. Thank you.
m ay2/U)/15- pug& 11
CEKI'IFICATJON
ro~...,
do hereby c e r t i f y under penalty
1,
o f perjury and t h e laws o f t h e w e a t e o f c a l i f o r f i a , t h a t

the foregoing pages, comprise a f u l l , t r u e , and c b r e c t
t r a n s c r i p t of proceedings held i n t h e above-enti t l e d matter
on February LO, 2OLS.Executed i n Santa Barbara, c a l i f o r n i a
March
6, 2015.
PROOF OF SERVICE
TATE OF CALIFORNIA,
OF SAN BERNARDINO
tubblefield P
UDDS1204130
950 Roble Lane, Santa Barbara, CA 93103
805-450-0450 fa^ 805-965-3492
)n the date recited below the undersigned served the below document in the manner indicated:
Mendant Shipley9sMOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT,separate Statement of Undi~putedFacts,
nd Reauesl for Judicial Notice wit6 Declaretion of Nancy Duffy, attaching also Derlaration of B. Sbipley
] (By Fax) on 1-23-13 Fax machine used complied with Rule 2003(3) and no error was reported by the
lachine. Pursuant to Rule CRC, 2008 [c](4. I caused the m a c h i i to maintain a record of same.
] (By Electronic) to address below Lbv agreement) & with copy to nancyduffysb@yahoo.com
to: nuilliamson@bkclaw.com (Appendix included)

$20 15.5 CCP. I deposited the documents in a pre-paid stamped envelope to:
Santa Ana CA 93 103
am familiar with mail collection in San Bemardino and the two-day mail sewice offered by the post office.
mailed the envelope at San Bemardino, CA. I am aware on a motion of the party served, service is presumed
nvalid ifpostal cancellation date is more than one day after deposit date on affidavit.
] (STATE) I declare under penalty of perjury and laws of California that the above is m e .
Executed in Santa Barbara CA on 3/27/ 15.
#?fl%,dw
~ a n k Duffy
y
M'cCarron, Attorney for Bonnie Shipley
-1R e m ~ nfnludieisl
l
Notice wilh Shipley's Summsry Judgment Motion filed with D'n Separ5 StaWnvlt oFUndLpIlbd Fac4
D e d d o n n ofNancy D McCarmn wdBmnic Shipley
FILED
SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA
SAN E$ERI~JAi?SINO
DISTRICT
Nancy D u e McCarron, CBN 164780

950 Roble Lane
805-450-0450 fax 805-965-3492
nancydqsb yahoo.com
Real Estate roker Lic. #00853086
+y
&
mi-- JESSICA
d & d & d i i 7
JOANIS, DEPU"P%
8!

filed: 10-3-14
~TUBBLEFELD'K o K R ~
CaseI
No. UDF S1406978
REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE FILED WITH
dba Mountain Shadows Mobile
DEFENDANT BONNIE SHIPLEY' s NOTICE OF
Home Community
Plaintiff,
AND MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
and
Separate
Statement of Undisputed Facts
v.
NANCY DUFFY, BONNIE SHIPLEY,et a1 Declarations: ancy Durn McCarron, Bonnie Shipley;
2015
CCP 9437~;592; 597i1170.7
Defendant, Date: April
CRC 3.1350; 3.1351
Time: B:30 a.m.
No trial date set:
1 528 [or to be announcedl Evidence @451,452,453
S u p m e Court held a trial court may judicially notice facts ofi NSJ.' CCP $437~
also authorizes it.
Shipley asks to Notice HOPk95 pdf (Housing for Older Citizens) exemption for over-55 park owners.
HOPA.95 pdf is posted on HUD's website: httpd/www.hud. ~ov/offices/fheo/librarly/hova95.pdf
The pdf is a 17-page "Questions & Answers" for park owners and tenants to use to understand how the
exemption works; i.e. 80% of park residents must be over 55 in order to qualify to maintain exemption.
Page 10 contains hypothetical No. 22 which is the idential fact pattern to Shipley's sharing lease:
"Question 22
Are there circumstances under which a 55 or older owner/tenant might be temporarily
absent from a dwelling without affecting the exemption status pf the coinrnunity/dwelling?
Answer
Yes. For example, the 55 or older occupant may be on vacation, hospitalized, or absent for
a season without affecting the exempt status of h e community. The resident may, if he/she
wishes, allow-ayounger relative or a house sitter under 55 years if age to live in the unit
during this absence. In either event, the unit would be included in the calculation of
the 80 percent occupancy requirement as long as the dwelling is not rented out,
the ownerhenant returns on a ~eriodicbasis, and maintains legal and financial
responsibility for the upkeep of the dwelling."
I
'
' Pmker v. 26fh.Century-Fox Film Corp. (1970) 3 C.3d 176, I8 1 (breach of employment contract)
Stevens v. Cessnn Aircraff Co. ( 1 981) 115 Cal. App. 3d 431,434 (wrongful death airplane crash)
-0Request for Judicial Notice with Shipley's Summary Judgment Motion filed with D's Separate Statementof Undisputed Facts,
Declarations of Nancy D. McCamon and Bonnie Shipley
Questions and Answers

Concerning the Final Rule Implementing
the Housing for Older Persons Act of 1995 (HOPA)
Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968 (the Federal Fair Housing
Act), as amended by the Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988 (the Fair
Housing Act), prohibits discrimination in housing and real estate-related
transactions based on race, color, religion, sex, national origin, handicap and
familial status (in general, the presence of children under the age of 18 in the
household). The prohibition against discrimination based on familial status
became effective March 12, 1989. The Act contained a provision exempting
"senior" housing from the prohibition against familial status discrimination.
The Housing for Older Persons Act (HOPA), signed into law by
President Clinton on December 28, 1995, amended the housing for older
persons exemption against familial status discrimination. The HOPA modified
the statutory definition of housing for older persons as housing intended and
operated for occupancy by at least one person 55 years of age or older per unit.
It eliminated the requirement that housing for older persons have significant
services and facilities specifically designed for its elderly residents. It required
that facilities or communities claiming the exemption establish age verification
procedures. It established a good faith reliance defense or exemption against
monetary damages for persons who illegally act in good faith to exclude
children based on a legitimate belief that the housing facility or community
was entitled to the exemption.
Ouestion 1
For the purpose of HOPA, what is a housing community o r facility?
What are some typical examples of a housing, community o r facility?
Answer
A housing community or facility is any dwelling or group of dwelling units
governed by a common set of rules, regulations or restrictions. A
of a
single building may not be considered a housing facility or community. Typical
examples include: a condominium association; a cooperative; a property
governed by homeowners or resident association; a municipally zoned area; a
leased property under common private ownership; a manufactured housing
community, a mobile home park.
** HUD INTERNET VERSION **
Ouestion 2
May an owner of single family houses that are dispersed throughout a
geographical area, and who is not otherwise exempt under the Fair
Housing Act, qualify as a "housing community or facility" and claim the
exemption?
Answer
No. The common use of the terms "housing community" and "facility" applies
to dwelling units which are in the same location and have some relationship to
each other. The dwelling units in a housing community or facility must share a
common set of rules, policies, and procedures, that is applied to all of thc
dwellings in the community or facility. Further, although there is no required
stated minimum number of dwelling units that must be present for the
exemption to apply, there must be a sufficient number of dwelling units to
constitute a "community" or "facility" in the common meaning of those terms.
One single family dwelling or a duplex would not qualify as a "housing
community or facility."
Ouestion 3
What must a housing community or facility do to qualify for the 55 or
older housing for older persons exemption?
Answrer
In order to qualify for the exemption, the housing community/facility must
satisfy each of the following requirements:
a) at least 80 percent of the occupied units must be occupied by at least
one person 55 years of age or older per unit;
b) the owner or management of the housing facility/community must
publish and adhere to policies and procedures that demonstrate an
intent to provide housing for persons 55 years or older; and
c) the facility/community must comply with rules issued by the
Secretary for verification of occupancy through reliable surveys and
affidavits.
Ouestion 4
What are some examples of the types of policies 5 ,:.d procedures that
would demonstrate an intent to provide housing <.a7..persons 55 years of
age or older?
Answer
Examples include:
a) the written rules, regulations, lease provisl-ns, deed or other
restrictions,
b) the actual practices of the owner/manage::,;:;~t of the housing
facility/community used in the e n f o r c e m ~ & othe
f rules;
c) the kind of advertising used to attract prospective residents to the
housing facility/community as well as the manner in which the
facility/community is described to prospective residents;
d) the housing community's/facility's age verification procedures, and
its ability to produce, in response to a familial status complaint,
verification of required occupancy.
Ouestion 5
May a housing facility or community advertise as "adult" housing and still
demonstrate the intent to be housing for older persons?
Answer
Use of the word "adult" or "adult community" in an advertisement, sign or
other informational material, or when describing the facility or community to
prospective renters or purchasers or members of the public, does not
demonstrate an intent to be housing for older persons as defined by the final
rule. The use of these terms, on the other hand, does not destroy the intent
requirement of HOPA. If a facility or community has clearly shown in other
ways that it intends to operate as housing for older persons, and meets the 80%
requirement, and has in place age verification procedures, the intent
requirement can be met even if the term "adult" is occasionally used to describe
it. The Department will look at the totality of the circumstances in the
investigation of a complaint alleging that the facility or community does not
qualify as housing for older persons.
** HUD INTERNET VERSION *'
Question 6
How many days after the effective date of the final rule implementing
HOPA does a facility/community have to develop routine procedures for
determining the occupancy of each unit, including age verification?
Answer
The housing community/facility has 180 days after the effective date of the
rule, May 3, 1999, to develop the appropriate procedures that should constitute
a part of its normal leasing and purchasing procedures. However, if a housing
facility or community is not now but intends to become eligible for the
exemption, it should not delay development of appropriate procedures.
Question 7
What information should a housing provider include in its survey of
residents in order to calculate whether the community or facility meets the
80% requirement of HOPA?
Answer
The owner or manager should obtain the total number of units in the housing
community or facility. From that number, the following units should be
excluded from the calculation of the 80% requirement:
a) the number of units that have been continuously occupied by the
same household since September 13, 1988, and the household did
not contain and does not currently contain at least one person over
the age of 55;
b) the number of unoccupied units (see question 22);
c) the number of units occupied by employees of the housing facility or
community who are under 55 years of age, and who provide
substantial management and maintenance services to the housing
facility or community
d) the number of units occupied solely by persons who are necessary or
essential to provide medical and/or health and nursing care services
as a reasonable accommodation to residents.
The owner or management then should calculate the percentage of the

remaining number of units that are occupied by at least one person age 55 or
over as of the date of the survey or the alleged date of violation of the Act.
Ouestion 8
What is considered reliable age verification documentation?
Answer
The following documents are considered to be reliable for age verification:
birth certificate, drivers license, passport, immigration card, military
identification, or any other state, local, national or international documentation,
provided it contains current information about the age or birth of the possessor.
Ouestion 9
Is there any other documentation that would be considered reliable for age
verification?
Answer
Yes. A self certification in a lease, application affidavit, or other document
signed by an adult member of the household asserting that at least one occupant
in the unit is 55 years of age or older will satisfy this requirement.
Ouestion 10
What recourse is there for the owner or management of the housing
community or facility if the occupants in the household refuse to
cooperate in providing documentation regarding their age?
Answer
The housing/community facility may, if it has sufficient evidence, consider the
household to be occupied by at least one person who is 55 years or older.
Statements made under penalty of perjury from third party individuals who
have knowledge of the age of the occupants of a household may be used when
the household itself refuses to cooperate by providing age verification. Other
information, such as statements indicating age in prior applications may be
acceptable. In addition, the facility/community may base its decision on
government documents such as census data. The census data referred to is
household censuses that are conducted by many cities and towns.
Ouestion 11
How frequently should a honsing/community provider update its lists of
occupants to be in compliance with the age verification requirements of
HOPA? Are there any consequences if a housing provider fails to update
its list of residents?
Answer
HOPA requires that a housing facility/community re-survey its lists of
residents every two years to ensure that the 80% requirement is met. A housing
community's or facility's failure to survey or re-survey its list of occupants in
accordance with its age verification procedures does not demonstrate intent to
housing for older persons, and could jeopardize the housing community's status
as 55 or older housing.
Ouestion 12
How long should a housing communitylfacility retain its records of survey
information that show it meets the 80 percent requirement?
Answer
The records referred to in Answer 9 above need to be kept as long as the
housing community/facility intends to proffer its exempt status.
Ouestion 13
Are the surveys and affidavits used to gather information about the
facility's/community's residents admissible in an administrative or judicial
proceeding under the Fair Housing Act?
Answer
Yes.
Ouestion 14
What does the ratio or percentage of 80120 portion of housing mean?
Answer
HOPA requires that at least 80 percent of the occupied units must be occupied
by at least one person 55 or older. The remaining 20 percent of the units may
be occupied by persons under 55, and the community/facility may still qualify
for the exemption.
** HUD INTERNET VERSION "
Ouestion 15
Is it lawful to advertise or market the 20 percent portion of the units not
required to be occupied by at least one person 55 years of age or older to
prospective tenants/purchasers under age 55 and to families with
children?
Answer
Yes. However, the marketing must be done in a way that identifies the
facilitylcommunity as housing intended for older persons. Advertising and
marketing must not be inconsistent with the intent. Further, the
facility/community needs to plan with care any attempt to sell or rent the entire
20 percent portion of the remaining units to incoming households under age 55,
because it could risk losing the exemption if some occupants over 55 die, with
surviving spouses or heirs who are under 55 years of age. Such planning
should address notice to incoming households under the age of 55 regarding
how the housing provider will proceed in the event that the 80% requirement is
endangered.
Ouestion 16
May a housing facilitylcommunity impose an age limitation more
restrictive than that required by HOPA and qualify for the 55 or older
exemption?
Answer
Yes. For example, the housing facility/community may require that at least 80
percent of the units be occupied by at least one person 60 years of age or older.
The housing facility/cornmunity may require that 100% of the units are
occupied by at least one person 55 years of age or older, or that 80% of the
units be occupied exclusively by persons aged 55 or older. However, the
facility/community should review other state and local laws, including fair
housing laws that may prohibit discrimination based on age, before establishing
policies and procedures restricting occupancy based on age, or affecting
survivors' rights to property, that are not covered under HOPA.
Ouestion 17
If a housing facility or community meets the requirements of HOPA but
permits up-to 20 percent of the units to be occupied by families with
children, may the facility/community impose different terms and
conditions of residency on those families with children who reside there?
Answer
Yes. If a housing community/facility qualifies under HOPA as housing for
older persons, the community/facility is exempt from the Act's prohibition
against discrimination on the basis of familial status. The housing
community/facility may restrict families with children from benefits of the
community, or otherwise treat family households differently than senior
households, as long as those actions do not violate any other state or local law.
However, the community/facility is not exempt from the provisions of the Act
that prohibit discrimination against any resident or potential resident on the
basis of race, color, religion, national origin, sex, or disability.
Ouestion 18
If a 55 or older occupant dies and leaves hisher property to a surviving
spouse or heir@) under the age of 55, what rights, if any, do the survivors
have to possession?
Answer
The right to possession by a surviving spouse or heir is not governed by the
HOPA or the Fair Housing Act. Whether an underage heir or surviving spouse
can occupy the unit upon the death of the 55 or older occupant is a matter of
state/local law or custom, and generally is governed by private contractual
agreements between senior housing developers and the individuals who
purchased or rented the dwelling. The provision in the Act permitting 20
percent of the units to be occupied by persons under 55 is intended, in part, to
prevent a housing facility/community fiom losing the exemption due to
situations where there are surviving spouses and underage heirs when the 55 or
older occupant dies.
Ouestion 19
I n the event that the sole 55 or older occupant dies, and a surviving spouse
or heir remains in the unit, is the surviving occupant counted in the 80
percent or the 20 percent portion of tbe units needed to meet the criteria
for housing for older persons?
Answer
The surviving occupant must be counted in the 20 percent portion.
Ouestion 20
How should a housing provider count, for the purpose of meeting the 80120
occupancy requirement, attendants or health care providers needed for
the reasonable accommodation of the disability of an occupant (including
family members under the age of 18)?
Answer
The attendant or health care provider or family care provider is excluded from
the calculation in its entirety. This is true whether the live-in person resides in
the same unit with the disabled occupant or in a separate unit. Neither
circumstance adversely affects the exemption of the housing
facility/community.
Ouestion 2 1
How is the calculation for the 80120 percent requirement affected if a 55 or
older individual purchases a dwelling in a senior housing
facilitylcommunity, vacates the unit, and allows an underage adult relative
to move in for an indefinite length of time?
Answer
In calculating whether a communitylfacility meets the 80 percent requirement,
it is the occupants of the dwelling units who are counted, not the owners. In
this example, the current resident, the underage adult relative, would be
counted in the 20 percent portion. Similarly, if a 55 or older ownerloccupant
to an underage
decided to vacate a unit for an indefinite period of time and
individual, the current occupant would be counted in the 20 percent portion.
" HUD INTERNET VERSION **
Ouestion 22
Are there circumstances under which a 55 or older ownerltenant might be
temporarily absent from a dwelling without affecting the exemption status
of the community/dwelling?
Answer
Yes. For example, the 55 or older occupant may be on vacation, hospitalized,
or absent for a season without affecting the exempt status of the community.
The resident may, if helshe wishes, allow a younger relative or a house sitter
under 55 years if age to live in the unit during this absence. In either event, the
unit would be included in the calculation of the 80 percent occupancy
requirement as long as the dwelling is not rented out, the ownerltenant returns
on a periodic basis, and maintains legal and financial responsibility for the
upkeep of the dwelling.
Question 23
Can a housing communitylfacility that does not now meet the 80 percent
occupancy requirement take any action to become eligible?
Answer
Yes. For a period of one year after the rule became effective (May 3, 1999), a
housing provider may reserve all new, vacant and/or unoccupied
unitsldwellings for occupancy until 80 percent of the unitsldwellings are
occupied by at least one person 55 years of age or older. This does not mean
that the dwellingslunits must be held off the market; indeed, marketing the
units as 55 and over units during the transition period may be done as those
units become vacant.
Question 24
During this transition period, may a facility/community refuse to rent or
sell to families with children in its effort to qualify as housing for older
persons?
Answer
Yes. If, during the one year period the facilitylcommunity demonstrates its
intent to be housing for older persons through advertising and revisions to or
development of rules and procedures, and adopts age verification procedures, it
may refuse to rent or sell to applicants based on their familial status. Of course,
the facilitylcommunity may have to meet the requirements of state and
local laws with respect to making the changes required for the transition in its
covenants or other instruments binding on the property.
Ouestion 25
Can the facility/community evict families with children during the
transition period for the purpose of becoming housing for older persons?
Answer
No. However, the housing facility/community can renew or not renew leases
for families with children if doing so does not represent a change in its
practices or does not violate state or local landlord tenant law. Additionally,
while the facility/community may not take any measures deliberately designed
to discourage families with children from continuing to reside in the
community, nothing prevents the offering of positive incentives that might lead
some families to seek housing elsewhere.
Question 26
What if a 55 or older housing provider, at the end of the transition period,
does not succeed in meeting the 80 percent occupancy requirement?
Answer
At the expiration of the one year period, all units/dwellings must be marketed
and made available to the public in general, including families with children.
Additionally, all restrictive operations policies which may impact negatively on
families with children must be rescinded.
Ouestion 27
When does HUD become involved in determining whether a 55 or older
housing community or facility is in compliance with HOPA requirements?
Answer
HUD's involvement begins in one of two ways: 1) when a person allegedly
injured on the basis of familial status files a complaint against a housing
facility/community and the respondent claims the exemption as a defense; or 2)
when HUD commences a Secretary-initiated investigation or files a complaint
based on information it has that indicates the need for an investigation.
* * HUD INTERNET VERSION * *
Ouestion 28
When must a person claiming to be injured by a housing
communitylfacility because of familial status file a complaint with the
Department in order for the complaint to be timely?
Answer
The comulaint must be filed no later than one year after the alleged
discriminatory act occurred or was terminated
Ouestion 29
Can a household which does not fall within the Fair Housing Act's
definition of familial status file a complaint challenging a housing
provider's attempt to provide housing for older persons?
Answer
No. The family cannot file a familial status complaint because it does not meet
the definition of familial status.
Ouestion 30
Can an owner of a dwelling file a complaint based on familial status if the
owner is being impeded in the ability to sell or rent the dwelling because
the housing facility/community is claiming to be 55 and over housing but
does not meet the requirements for the exemption?
Answer
Yes, if the owner has affirmatively undertaken to rent or sell his property and
can establish that the housing communitylfacility illegally (is not qualified
housing for older persons) interfered with the owner's ability to do so, belshe
can file a familial status complaint. Other complainant parties could include the
family with children seeking to rent or buy but was denied the opportunity, as
well as any real estate agent involved in the transaction.
* * HUD INTERNET VERSlON **
Ouestion 3 1
If an individual files a complaint based on familial status and the housing
community/facility claims the exemption as a defense, who has the burden
of proving, that the community/facility is in compliance with HOPA
requirements?
Answer
The community/facility housing provider has the burden of proving that it was
in compliance with HOPA requirements on the date of occurrence of the
alleged act or incident of discrimination.
Ouestion 32
Can a corporate entity avail itself of the good faith reliance against
monetary damages if the housing community/facility is found not to be in
compliance with the HOPA requirements?
Answer
No. The governing board, management company, or corporate entity of the
housing facility/community is liable if the facility/community fails to meet the
requirements, and cannot claim a good faith reliance defense against monetary
damages. The legislative history of HOPA shows that in creating the good faith
reliance defense, Congress intended to protect individual persons, such as
individual members of boards of governing homeowners associations and real
estate agents relying on information provided by the housing providers of
senior housing.
Ouestion 33
Since individuals, including individual members of a homeowners
association or a board of directors, can use the good faith reliance against
monetary damages, under what conditions might that occur?
Answer
An individual is not liable for monetary damages if the person acted with a
good faith belief that the housing facility/community qualified for a housing for
older persons exemption. Such a person must have knowledge, from an
authorized representative, that the facility/community asserted in writing that it
qualified for the older persons exemption before the date on which the alleged
discrimination occurr~d.An authorized representative may be an
individual, committee, management company, listing agent, owner or other

entity.
Question 34
Under what circumstances may an individual not use the good faith
reliance defense?
Answer
An individual is not entitled to the good faith defense if he or she has actual
knowledge that the facility/community does not or will not qualify as housing
for older persons, despite the fact that helshe received written assurances to the
contrary from an authorized representative of the housing provider.
Ouestion 35
Is an individual insulated from a liability claim for disseminating
information to others regarding the facility's/community's exemption
claim?
Answer
An individual who claims the good faith reliance defense based on hisher
actual knowledge and a written assertion from an authorized representative of
the facilitylcommunity may disseminate such information to others. Those
others may include real estate agents, multiple listing services, advertisers and
other print media who may, in turn, rely on the assertions of the individual
from whom they received the information, unless they have actual knowledge
that information is not accurate.
Ouestion 36
Is a publisher (newspaper or other print media) liable for damages under
the Fair Housing Act for accepting for publication an advertisement for 55
and older housing if the community/facility is found not to be in
compliance with HOPA?
Answer
No. Newspaper publishers and other print media that rely on the assertions of
the housing provider are not liable unless they have actual knowledge that the
housing does not qualify for the exemption.
Ouestion 37
Does HUD certify that a housing, facility/community is housing for older
persons?
Answer
No. Neither the Fair Housing Act nor HOPA authorizes the Department to
certify whether a particular housing facility or community meets the
qualifications for housing for older persons.
Ouestion 38
If a developer is building new housing that is intended to be for persons 55
and over, how should the new units be marketed and occupied as the
facility/community is being developed?
Answer
Newly constructed housing for first occupancy after March 12, 1989 (including
a facility or community that has not been occupied in its entirety for at least 90
days prior to re-occupancy due to renovation or rehabilitation), must be
marketed as housing intended for older persons. It does not have to have at
least one occupant in each occupied unit who is age 55 and over until at least
25 percent of the units are occupied.
Question 39
How are state and federal fair housing laws that prohibit age
discrimination affected by HOPA?
Answer
Neither the Fair Housing Act nor HOPA covers age discrimination. Neither of
these federal laws supersede or otherwise affect state or local laws that prohibit
age discrimination. Housing community/facilities always should check all
relevant state, local and federal laws, and any requirements imposed as a term
of governmental financial assistance before implementing policies and
procedures that limit the eligibility of its residents.
* * HUH UDERNET VERSION * *
Question 40
Must state or local governments that have been determined to have
substantially equivalent laws to the Fair Housing Act change the laws
under which they operate in order to be identical to HOPA?
Answer
No. States and local governments with fair housing laws that have been
determined to be substantially equivalent to the federal law may have no
exemption from familial status discrimination for housing for older persons, or
may have more stringent requirements to meet an exemption than does HOPA.
Question 41
Must a housing community/facility file or register a declaration of intent
with the state or local unit of government in order to claim its exemption
as housing for older persons?
Answer
HOPA does not require this. However, the state or local government might
require the housing community/facility to register its intent to be housing f o ~
older persons. The facility/community should consult the appropriate
governmental body for requirements in this regard.
Question 42
Must a resident of a 55 or older housing community/facility join the
homeowner's association?
Answer
The Fair Housing Act does not require this. HOPA does not require this. This is
an example of an issue or aspect of senior housing communities that is
generally governed by independent law, deed restriction, or other legally
enforceable documents.
Question 43
Would HUD apply HOPA retroactively to a familial status claim of
discrimination that occurred prior to December 28,1995, when HOPA was
signed into law?
Answer
No. If the alleged violation occurred prior to December 28, 1995, the
Department's investigation of a pending complaint will determine whether the
community/facility met the requirements for the housing for older persons
exemption, based on the regulations that were in effect at the time of the
alleged violation.
Ouestion 44
How does the Fair Housing Amendments Act senior housing, exemption,
and HOPA, affect eligibility requirements for federally funded housing
programs.
Answer
The Act and HOPA do not affect statutory or regulatory provisions of federally
assisted housing programs. For example, neither HOPA nor the Act change the
definition of "elderly family"' in federally assisted housing programs. HOPA
does not permit a HLJD funded public housing provider to designate a project
as an "elderly project" without HUD review and approval as mandated by
existing regulations. HUD funded housing that is designated as elderly housing
may not, because of HOPA, admit households that are not statutorily eligible
for the housing. No public housing development that is not designated as an
elderly development by statute or program regulation may exclude families
with children even if at least 80% i f t h e units are occupied by at least one
person age 55 or older. Federally assisted housing providers should continue
look to existing program statutory and regulatory requirements to determine
tenancy of those developments.
* * HUD INTERNET VERSION * *
PROOF OF SERVICE
lTATE OF CALIFORNIA,
2OUNTY OF SAN BERNARDINO
itubblefield Proverties v. Bonnie Shivley
UDDS1204130
805-450-0450 fax 805-965-3492
In the date recited below the undersigned served the below document in the manner indicated:
)efendant Shipley's MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT, separate Statement of Undisputed Facts,
md Reauest for Judicial Notice with Declaration of Nancy Duffy, attaching also Declaration of B. Shipley
] (By Fax) on 1-23-13 Fax machine used complied with Rule 2003(3) and no error was reported by the
nachine. Pursuant to Rule CRC, 2008 [c](4. I caused the machine to maintain a record of same.
] (By Electronic) to address below [bv aereement) & with copy to nancyduffysb@yahoo.com
to: nvilliamson@hkclaw.com (Appendix included)
X]
(By US Mail) 51013a, 52015.5 CCP. I deposited the documents in a pre-paid stamped envelope to:
Santa Ana, CA 93 103
am familiar with mail collection in San Bernardino and the two-day mail service offered by the post office.
mailed the envelope at San Bernardino, CA. I am aware on a motion of the party served, service is presumed
nvalid if postal cancellation date is more than one day after deposit date on affidavit.
Executed in Santa Barbara CA on 3/27/15.
$&fJ/,.
-6
~ a n Duffy
L ~ ~ c ~ a r r oAttorney
n,
for Bonnie Shipley
- 1Request for ludieial Notice with Shipley's Summary Iudgment Motion filed with D's Separate Statement of Undisputed Facts,
Declarations of Nancy D. MeCarron and Bonnie Shipley

EXHIBITS To Compl Kamala Harris VOL II Exh12 To Exh22 Mailed 4-10-15.compressed

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Local Rule 591.

Unless confidentiality is required by law, court records are presumed to be open.

CRC, Rule 3.1109. Notice of determination of submitted matters

CRC, Rule 10.603. Authority and duties of presiding judge

(2) Judicial schedules

SAN BERNARDINO COUNTY SUPERIOR COURT

case NO. ACIAS 1400026

Appeal from a Final Judgment in

APPELLANT'S OPENING BRIEF

Nancy D McCarron, CBN 164780

DE NOVO STANDARD OF APPEAL ....

Pertinent Facts and Procedural History ...

A. Former Panel Held, As the Sublessee of a Mobile Home Owner Petitioner

B. Former Panel Never Held Shipley Was An Unlawful Occupant ..

Judge Sachs Stepped Out of His Role as Independent Arbiter

C. Court Had No Power to Grant Declaratory Relief to a Loser in the Judgment

D. Chronological Summary of Judge Sachs Serial Violations

PRAYER FOR RELIEF .

CERTIFICATE OF WORD COUNT .....

MOTION TO AUGMENT RECORD

PROOF OF SERVICE ............

TO BE FILED I N THE COURT OF APPEAL

APPEAL, SanBernardin APPELUTE

Nancy Duf@ M&at-rob

RESPONDENT^ ELL PARTY IN INTEREST:Michael Sachs, Stubblefield Properties

CERTIFICATE OF INTERESTED ENTITIES OR PERSONS

0There ate no Wrested e m e s or pemns that must be ~~sted

Fqll name of Interested

Sfubblefield Pmperties, Partners

Business BankcorplCA; see more- SEC filing Attachment 2

~tubblefieldQuail Point Company

D. William Bader; Neal Baker; William Cozzo, Alan J Lane

(3) Eva Stubt)LefieldHazard, partner

Arnold HStubbletield, Gen Partner

(5) Thomas Panish, General Partner

John E. Duckworth; Joh~iRiddell; Robert L Nottjngham;

CERTIFICATE OF INTERESTED ENTITIES OR PERSONS

Docs: & @&

Statemel of Change hBene6cia1Omemhip of Sscloitlen

UNITED STATES SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSKN

3, Dalr of EndladTmnedon ~onVllOewoal1

SEC Info. Buslness Bsnwrp/CA -4a p 1

'4'~ocumend:Statements of Changes in Beneficial Ownership of Securities - Form 4

CONSTITUTION and STATUTES

DE NOVO STANDARD OF APPEAL 2

by Michael Sachs 9/14/05-Annual Meeting of County Counsels in Los Gatos

Former Panel found Stubblefields remedy was to proceed directly

against the homeowner for an alleged rule violation by a co-resident or homeowner.

Privity of contract is a statutory prerequisite to any lawful eviction.

Article III, Section 3.The powers of state government are legislative,

Vacating a summary judgment on 3/20/14 5 months after its entry on 10/21/13

Whether disciplinary action is appropriate, and the degree of discipline

RELEVANT FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

A. Former Panel Held, As the Sublessee of a Mobile Home Owner Petitioner

B. Former Panel Never Held Shipley Was An Unlawful Occupant

C. The Trial Court Never Held Shipley Was An Unlawful Occupant.

McCarron objected to no jurisdiction to amend a summary judgment

McCarron objected again to no jurisdiction to paraphrase findings not recited in the

2/14/13 RT, p.11 of 24

RT 51:17, 52:1, 52:21,54:2, 62:26

Judge Sachs facilitated Williamsons distortion of Panel findings on the record.

Stubblefield cited Civil 798.56(d) verbatim on the Judges working copy.

(d) Failure of the homeowner or resident to comply with