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Department of Justice
Executive Office for Immigration Review
A 205-115-978
Enclosed is a copy of the Board's decision and order in the above-referenced case.
Sincerely,
DoYutL ca.AA)
Donna Carr
Chief Clerk
Enclosure
Panel Members:
Adkins-Blanch. Charles K.
Grant, Edward R.
Guendelsberger. John
Userteam: Docket
Nomani, Burhan
Cite as: Laila Shabudin Maknojia, A205 115 978 (BIA March 20, 2015)
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Date:
MAR 2 0 2015
REMOVAL PROCEEDING S
ON BEHALF OF RESPONDENT:
ON BEHALF OF DH S:
Hana Sato
Assistant Chief Counsel
APPLICATION: Reopening
The respondent, a native and citizen of India, has appealed from the Immigration Judge's
May 16, 2014, decision denying her motion to reopen proceedings after she was ordered
removed in absentia. After considering the totality of the circumstances presented, we conclude
that the respondent demonstrated that the reopening of proceedings is warranted.
See
sections
240(b)(S)(C)(i), (e)(l) of the Immigration and Nationality Act ("the Act"), 8 U. S.C.
1229a(b)(S)(C)(i), (e)(l). We will therefore sustain the respondent's appeal and remand the
record for further proceedings.
ORDER: The respondent's appeal is sustained and the record is remanded to the
Immigration Judge for further proceedings and for the entry: of a new decision.
2kJRi
FOR THE
Cite as: Laila Shabudin Maknojia, A205 115 978 (BIA March 20, 2015)
APPEAL
'--c'
Nornani,
98104
P.C.
Burhan
TX
77036
SHABUDIN-MAKNOJIA,
DATE:
FILE A 205-115-978
IN THE MATTER OF
May 19,
2014
LAILA
THIS DECISION
ATTACHED DOCUMENTS,
Leesburg Pike,
FALLS CHURCH,
VA
Suite 2000
20530
U.S.C.
TO REOPEN,
8 U.S.C.
OTHER:
WA
SUITE 2500
98104
MIGRATION COURT
CC:
HANA SATO,
FF
SUITE 2500
WA
File Number:
A205-115-978
Laila SHABUDIN-MAKNOJIA,
Respondent.
IN REMOVAL PROCEEDINGS
CHARGE:
APPLICATION:
Motion to Reopen
ON BEHALF OF RESPONDENT
ON BEHALF OF ICE
Burhan Nomani
Burhan Nomani & Associates, P.C.
6161 Savoy Drive, Suite 1000
Houston, Texas 77036
An in absentia order of removal may be rescinded where an alien files a motion to reopen
within 180 days of the date of the order of removal and establishes that the failure to appear was
because of "exceptional circumstances" or at any time where the alien establishes that she did
not receive notice. C.F.R. 1003.23(b)(4)(ii). The decision to grant or deny a motion to reopen
ultimately lies within the discretion of the immigration judge. Id. As Respondent's motion was
timely filed, the issues are whether she received proper notice of her hearing and whether she has
shown exceptional circumstances sufficient to warrant reopening.
A. Notice
Respondent claims that she did not receive effective notice of her hearing. An alien is
placed on notice of proceedings if she receives the NTA. Matter of G-Y-R-, 23 I&N Dec. 181,
188-89 (BIA 2001). A presumption of effective service applies to certified mail and regular mail.
Sembiring v. Gonzales, 499 F .3d 981, 987 (9th Cir. 2007). The presumption for delivery by
regular mail, however, is weaker than the presumption applied to delivery by certified mail. Id.
Therefore, the presumption of service of notice delivered by regular mail may be overcome. Id.
The Ninth Circuit has also held that the standard for determining whether an alien has overcome
the presumption of service is "practical and commonsensical rather than rigidly formulaic." Id. at
988; Matter of M-R-A-, 24 I&N Dec. 665, 674 (BIA 2008) (stating that "the Immigration Judge
must conduct a practical evaluation of all the evidence, both circumstantial and corroborating
evidence").
Respondent asserts in her motion that she did not receive "the Notice." Resp. 's Motion at 1.
The record indicates that Respondent was properly served in person with the Notice to Appear at
the time it was issued by DHS. See Exh. 1. Accordingly, Respondent was placed on notice of the
proceedings. See also Matter ofG-Y-R-, supra at 188-89. Further, although Respondent's hearing
A205-1 l 5-978
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On March 24, 2014, Respondent timely filed a motion to reopen removal proceedings,
asserting that she did not receive notice of her hearing and that exceptional circumstances
beyond her control prevented her from traveling to Washington and appearing. Specifically,
Respondent argues that because she did not have identification documents, she was unable to
travel by air or bus to attend her hearing. She further asserts that she was unable to make any safe
arrangements to travel by car from Texas to Seattle. See Respondent's Motion to Reopen (filed
Mar. 24, 2014). On April 4, 2014, the Department filed its opposition to Respondent's motion.
For the following reasons, the Court denies Respondent's motion to reopen these proceedings.
B. Exceptional Circumstances
Exceptional circumstances are circumstances beyond the control of the alien, "such as
battery or extreme cruelty to the alien or any child or parent of the alien, serious illness of the
alien, or serious illness or death of the spouse, child, or parent of the alien, but not including less
compelling circumstances." INA 240(e)(l). Courts have held that a motion to reopen must state
new facts that compel a finding of exceptional circumstance. Celis-Castellano v. Ashcroft, 298
F.d 888, 892 (9th Cir. 2002) ((emphasis added) (citing lN.S. v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478,
483-84 (1992)).
Respondent raises a number of arguments in order to establish that exceptional
circumstances prevented her from the attending her hearing. First, Respondent explains that she
"remained under the impression that her case would move to Houston, Texas ...after [her]
release from Tacoma." Resp.' s Motion at 1. She further asserts that she was unable_ to make
travel arrangements due to the "less than 48 hours" notice of her hearing. Id at 2. Respondent
then asserts that she attempted to make travel arrangements to appear at her hearing but that she
could not travel by air or bus without identification, which she does not possess. Id. at 1. She
further states that she was "told that if she tried to travel by car, ICE . .. could detain her." Id.
Respondent's several arguments are unavailing. As an iniial matter, the Court has
already determined that Respondent has actual knowledge of her hearing notice at least three
weeks prior to the hearing date. Thus, her argument that she was provided less than 48 hours'
notice of her hearing is without merit. Additionally, although Respondent might reasonably
expect her hearing to take place near her residence in Texas, she was properly served with the
NTA that indicated her hearing would take place in Seattle, Washington.Respondent does not
claim to have received any notice from an immigration court in Texas, indicating that her hearing
location had changed. She also does not assert anywhere in her motion that she made attempts to
contact any of the immigration courts in Texas to ascertain the date, time, and location of her
hearing. Indeed, more than one year elapsed between the date of service of the NTA and
Respondent's initial master calendar hearing during which Respondent could have inquired
A205-115-978
notice was sent to her last-known address, Respondent contends that she only "found out a few
days prior to the Hearing date that her [December 26, 2012] hearing Notice_ was returned back to
the Court." Resp.'s Motion at 1.However, Respondent's motion to change venue, which is dated
February 6, 2014, and which notes the date of her master calendar hearing, plainly indicates
Respodent had actual knowledge of her hearing date at least three weeks prior to her hearing
date. See Resp.'s Motion to Change Venue (filed Fb. 11, 2014). Having conducted a "practical
evaluation of all evidence," the Court finds that Respondent has failed to establish that she did
not receive notice of her hearing.
ORDER
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED
Date
f bAf> ti. CL :Z
Paul A. DeFonzo
Immigration Judge
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A205-1 l 5-978
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Finally, while the Court accepts as true Respondent's statement that she does not ssess
the necessary documentation for air and bus travel, Respondent has not provided a reasonable
.
explanation as to why she was unable to travel from Texas to Washington by car when she had
previously driven from Washington to Texas without being detained or even stopped. Ultimately,
Respondent has failed to establish that these obstacles constitute exceptional circumstances as
contemplated by section 240(e)(I) or that they result from compelling circumstances beyond
Respondent's control. INA 240(e)(l). The Court finds that Respondent has failed to meet the
standard for a motion to reopen and will therefore deny Respondent's motion.