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MARCUS
Metaphor
VIRGIL ALDRICH
has suggestedl
and
the rele-
B.
HESTER
Aspect
Seeing
skill, the lack of which is called "aspectblindness." 8 Such blindness is "akin to the
lack of a 'musical ear.' " 9 The first factor
206
MARCUS
B.
HESTER
However, the statement of my thesis already shows that "seeing as" as I understand it is quite different from the "seeing
as" analyzed by Wittgenstein. Certainly
seeing as with regard to metaphor is very
different from seeing as with regard to a
visual Gestalt figure, such as Jastrow's
duck-rabbit. Metaphorical seeing as is not,
in its most essential mode, a seeing as related to a perceivable form. The only perceivable qualities that language has are
the visual shapes of printed or written
language and the sound of spoken language. The actual, visible shapes of the
words on the page in the metaphorical
subject are similar to the actual written
words in the metaphorical predicate only
in the most trivial way. The auditory form
of the poem is at least more promising
since poetry is an art form of language,
and a most important feature of language
as it is exploited by the poet is the sound
of language. Perhaps then the relevant
type of seeing as has to do with sound.
Sound similarities are clearly exploited in
many metaphors. For example, Spenser
says:
And more to lulle him in his slumber soft,
A trickling streame from high rock tumbling
downe,
And ever-drizling rain upon the loft,
Mixt with a murmuring winde, much like the
sowne
Of swarming Bees, did cast him in a swowne.
The Faerie Queene I. xli. 136-140
207
cally through the metaphor, can the abstract subject be given concreteness. Further, there are cases, though rare, in which
the metaphorical predicate is abstract, or at
least less concrete and imagistic than the
subject of the comparison. For example,
Eliot in his metaphor writes:
Streets that follow like a tedious argument
Of insidious intent,
To lead you to an overwhelming question....
"Love Song of J. Alfred Prufrock," 11.8-10.
208
MARCUS
B.
HESTER
209
Third, and here differences with Wittgenstein's analysis are left behind, seeing as
with regard to metaphor involves the same
inherent duality that Wittgenstein noted of
visual seeing as. He stated that visual seeing as was like seeing and again not like it.
Seeing as is like normal seeing in that the
aspect seen is related to a publicly accessible
object; it is unlike seeing in requiring ability to execute an imaginative technique.
Wittgenstein expressed this duality by saying: "It is as if an image came into contact,
and for a time remained in contact, with
the visual impression." 27 Metaphor has a
similar duality. Ability to understand the
metaphor's meaning does require imaginative skill. However, this imaginative technique, like the technique required in visual seeing as, has an objective basis. In
this case the basis is the meaning of the language of the metaphor. The relevant sense
of the metaphor, the aspect the poet is trying to get us to see between the metaphorical subject and predicate, is in an important sense in the metaphor, and thus it is
there to be noticed by all normal readers.
Just as it made sense to speak of aspectblindness with regard to the duck-rabbit
figure because the aspect is in an important
sense there to be noticed by normal observers, so here it makes sense to speak of
aspect-blindness because the aspect intended by the metaphor is there to be noticed by a normal reader. The abnormal
reader, or the aspect-blind reader, would
be one who knew the meanings of the
words in the metaphor and could even perhaps "see" Shakespeare's beggar and still not
210
MARCUS
B.
HESTER
211
212
MARCUS
"arguments" but none defining time seen as a beggar and streets seen as arguments.
24I. A. Richards, Principles of Literary Criticism
(A Harvest Book), p. 123; first published in 1925.
2 William Empson, Seven Types of Ambiguity
(London, 1956), p. 91.
26Douglas Charles Berggren, "An Analysis of
Metaphorical Meaning and Truth" (Unpublished
B.
HESTER