Академический Документы
Профессиональный Документы
Культура Документы
[client name deleted]
I'm working on a report on the 80th anniversary of the Communist Party of Vietnam
(CPV) next week, and I would like to ask you a few questions on this. Here they are:
Q1‐What does the CPV represent now for the Vietnamese people? What is its role in
the society? What is its legitimacy among the people? What are the main challenges
it faces now? What is its margin of maneuver towards the Chinese Communist Party?
ANSWER: To the ordinary person the Communist Party of Vietnam (CPV) is
indistinguishable from authority whether it be the national government, local
government, the police or security forces. The party‐state is viewed as one entity by
the average Vietnamese.
The role of the CPV is to provide leadership in all aspects – politics, economics and
society. Party leaders in every branch of government, the military, mass
organizations etc. are to form a nucleus to lead that organization in applying party
policy.
The legitimacy of the one‐party state rests on multiple sources including
performance legitimacy, that is delivering the economic goods; traditional
legitimacy, the legacy of nationalism and leading the country to victory against
foreign aggression; charismatic legitimacy based on the legacy of Ho Chi Minh; and
rational‐legal legitimacy, through the enactment of laws since doi moi was adopted.
The main challenges facing the CPV are to adjust the theory of one‐party rule and
the leadership role of the CPV to the realities of a society in economic transition.
Ordinary Vietnamese approach powerful individuals in the party and party members
in the government to seek approval for their activities or redress of grievances. They
do so because the normal channels of communication between citizen and
government operate ineffectively. A major concern of ordinary Vietnamese people is
pervasive petty corruption and arbitrary decision‐making by government officials,
especially local officials.
In everyday practice the party’s theoretical leadership role is evaded by ordinary
citizens. The growth of private enterprise has proven incompatible with the policy of
2
having party cells in each business. New organizations form all the time and are led
by local people not the party.
The CPV faces different challenges among the party and non‐party elite. The
legitimacy of Marxist‐Leninist ideology has been under challenge for many years. In
previous national party congresses, for example, party delegates called for dropping
the term “dictatorship of the proletariat” and no less a figure than former prime
minister Vo Van Kiet once suggested dropping communist from the name of the
party. The party has responded by promoting Ho Chi Minh Thought but it is clear
that individualism and materialism has taken hold among the youth generation.
The CPV faces a sustained critique by a minority yet growing number of party
members who want to alter the ideological strictures presently incorporated in party
policy documents. The party faces challenges from within and without to ease up on
political controls and to liberalize slightly.
Relations with China are always governed by the “tyranny of geography.” Vietnam
shares a border with its giant neighbor and even as the thirteenth most populous
country in the world it ranks only as a middle sized Chinese province. This
relationship is highly asymmetrical. Vietnam maintains a massive trade deficit with
China. Militarily, Vietnam may be able to defend itself, but it is out gunned for the
moment in the South China Sea.
Vietnam’s leaders are divided about relations with China. There is a group that
would lean to China in the hope of benefitting from China’s rise and Chinese
beneficence. There is another group that sees Vietnam’s future linked to global
integration and therefore seeks good relations with China and improved relations
with the United States.
The CPV has little scope for confronting China. It must manage the relationship by
showing deference to Chinese power while at the same time eliciting Chinese
recognition for Vietnam’s independence. Vietnam pursues this strategy through a
never‐ending stream of high‐level leadership visits to China. Vietnam constantly
seeks to reassure China of its support and constantly seeks Chinese reassurance that
Vietnamese interests are taken into account.
Vietnam does not have the real possibility of balancing China by turning to the
United States. Vietnam must pursue a complex foreign policy of multiple balancing
through strategic partnerships with the great powers. At the same time, Vietnam can
also operate through multilateral institutions like ASEAN. In the end, the best
Vietnam can hope for is to cushion the negative impact of Chinese policies on
Vietnam.
As for party‐to‐party relations between the CPV and the CCP (Chinese Communist
Party), the CCP is the elder brother in the relationship. Vietnam owes an historic
debt to the CCP for assistance in its struggle against French colonialism and during
the anti‐American war. China’s economic success represents a model for Vietnam to
emulate and adopt to its own circumstances. Arguably, there are only five
communist parties in power in the world today (Cuba, Laos and North Korea).
Vietnam’s shows deference to China through the exchange of party‐to‐party
delegation and a series of joint theoretical seminars (five so far). Vietnam’s objective
3
is to demonstrate common ground in order to please China, but follow its own line
when circumstances dictate. In the past Vietnam has unashamedly borrowed and
translated Chinese books on peaceful evolution and made them required reading for
party members. Vietnamese foreign policy also stresses a refrain used by China,
“peace, cooperation and development.” By praising Chinese ideological innovations
and “learning from experience” Vietnam seeks to flatter China. Most recently this
was illustrated by Lt. Gen. Le Van Dung, head of the General Political Department of
the Vietnam People’s Army, after a visit to Beijing in late 2009. In a newspaper
interview he stated, that “[t]hus, the situation will be stabilized gradually and we will
keep strengthening our relations with China in order to fight the plots of the
common enemy”. In other words, once the situation in the South China Sea was
stabilized, Hanoi and Beijing could make common cause against the common enemy,
none other than U.S. imperialism and its plots of peaceful evolution.
But Vietnam has little or no room for maneuver on sensitive matters. The recently
released Defence White Paper, for example, makes no mention of the 1979 border
war or conflict in Cambodia. At that time Vietnamese propagandists called China’s
actions those of “great Han chauvinism” and that China was not a socialist country.
In internal party documents China was referred to as “the dangerous and most direct
enemy of the Vietnamese people.” Even today Vietnam keeps a lid on critical media
commentary about Chinese actions in the East Sea.
Q2‐For three years, we have seen many arrests of democracy activists, free unions
activists, land activists, and many trials. Last week, one was given a jail sentence of
an unprecedented length over the past years. Do you think the CPV really think it can
be challenged, that the one‐party rule is seriously threatened? Do you think they
have specific targets, a specific strategy in the arrests and trials? Or is it more that by
principle they refuse any kind of dissent, whatever it is, wherever it comes from?
ANSWER: It is more likely that political change will come from within the CPV than
from pressure without. The CPV consists of a kernel of hard‐line ideologues who fear
that the challenges mounted by pro‐democracy, land and labour activists will result
in the demise of the one‐party state. Their fears are captured in the expressions
“colour revolution” and “peaceful evolution.” Generally these people are autocrats
who do not want to give up power. Their main fear is not the seriousness of the
challenge mounted today but what it might become if it is left unchecked. The role
of external political movements like the Viet Tan, which advocated non‐violent
change, is seen as particularly threatening.
Those inside the CPV view the mechanism of “democratic centralism” as the means
to promote change. That is at executive meetings party members are free to speak
their minds (democracy) but then must adhere to the party line once a decision is
reached (centralism).
I do not think the vast majority of party members feel that the party can be
successful challenged or overthrown. Rather the debate within the party is how to
accommodate to changes in the economic and changing values in society. The
question is how to open up gradually and expand the circle of people involved in
decision‐making beyond the 3 percent of society who are party members.
4
It is the conservative group within the CPV, comprising members of the security
apparatus and the party’s internal organs, that determine the pace and scope of
repression. The key red line is when a local dissident makes contact overseas
through the internet and publishes critical views abroad and imports so‐called
subversive literature into the country.
Progressives or moderates in the CPV, advocate gradual change through the rule of
law and have championed the role of the National Assembly. But their attempt to
increase the number of non‐party and other independent candidates has not proven
successful. Vietnam’s growth and development has led to an ever‐widening circle of
non‐party elites were are adept at commerce and law many of whom were educated
overseas. Party moderates would like to co‐opt leaders from the new elite into the
National Assembly.
Q3‐What would you say about the pro‐democracy community in Vietnam now? Has
it been shaken, destroyed, deprived of its main leaders over the past years? In
particular, what about the bloc 8406, what has become of their ambitions and their
capacity to deliver messages?
ANSWER: The challenges to the CPV’s political legitimacy has grown over the last
two decades but remains very weak and limited to several thousand supporters of a
few hard core activists. The regime can easily deal with individual protests and
networks that advocate democracy, free speech, and multiparty elections. Article 88
of the Penal Code is repeatedly invoked. Bloc 8406 was the largest network of
activists with 118 signatures on its petition. It was geographically dispersed. Its key
leadership was “decapitated” through arrest and imprisonment.
Because protest has been sustained over such a long time period Vietnam is now
experiencing the birth of a recidivist generation – pro‐democracy activists who
return to political activism after their release from prison. Here I would mention the
late Hoang Minh Chinh and Father Nguyen Van Ly.
Since Bloc 8406 was a network it means that it was decentralized loose organizations
of individuals and fledgling “political parties.” The emergence of Bloc 8406 revealed
that the era of individual and small group protest had been by‐passes by a network
that had national reach. Developments since then indicate a cross‐fertilization of
ideas where issues like bauxite mining, relations with China, corruption and religious
freedom are being combined into a pro‐reform agenda. Leaders of the Unified
Buddhist Church of Vietnam (UBCV) and Bloc 8406 have supported land protests by
peasants from the Mekong Delta. UBCV leaders and Catholic priests and officials
have supported the anti‐bauxite mining protests. Pro‐democracy political activists
have added to their agenda such issues as bauxite mining, corruption, relations with
China (Olympic torch and South China Sea).
Bloc 8406 is no more but it has created a legacy that other pro‐democracy groups
and fledgling political parties will build on – networking, expanded political agenda,
and mutual support. The arrests and trial of activists under Article 79 of the Penal
Code indicates the importance of overseas contacts in providing moral support,
political guidance and funds. It is also important to note that the new wave of pro‐
democracy activists originate in the stratum of the non‐party elite. They have
5
travelled and been educated abroad and hold degrees from prestigious foreign
universities.
Among the democracy activists arrested and jailed over the past years, which ones
did the CPV fear the most? Who would you say is still considered as a prominent
democracy activist within or without Vietnam now (out of jail)?
Q4. ANSWER: I would make a distinction between dissident and democracy activist.
The CPV fears dissidence by members of the party and decorated war heroes. In my
opinion, Politburo member Tran Xuan Bach, retired Colonel Bui Tin, retired General
Tran Do, retired General Nguyen Nam Khanh and theoretician Hoang Minh Chinh
presented the major challenges to the party. General Do had impeccable credentials
and had to be treated with kid gloves. Chinh, arrested earlier in the anti‐party affair
of the late 1960s, represented a challenge because he was a leader of the Vietnam
Democratic Party, one of three political parties allowed to operate in North Vietnam
(1945‐75) and later reunified Vietnam (until it was disbanded). The other two
parties were the Vietnam Socialist Party and the CPV itself. Chinh’s attempt to revive
the Vietnam Democratic Party in 2006 represented a challenge to the single‐party
regime because multi‐parties had been approved by Ho Chi Minh. With the
exceptions of Bui Tin, in exile in France, and General Khanh, all are deceased.
Among the pro‐democracy activists I would single out two distinct groups which the
CPV viewed as a threat. The first comprised members of the establishment who
were either party members or state cadres. Their dissent resonated among their
intellectual peers.
The second group of activists come from outside the party and state and represent
two strands, one for religious freedom and the other pro‐democracy. Thich Huyen
Quang (now deceased) and Thich Quang Do of the Unified Buddhist Church of
Vietnam and Catholic priest Father Nguyen Van Ly represent the first strand. The
regime has engaged in “soft repression” of the UBCV for fear of inflaming its large
support base. The regime has imprisoned Father Ly twice. Although he does not
represent the official Catholic Church he is representative of activist Catholic priests
who see their mission as involving social causes such as environmental protection
(bauxite mining).
The second strand of activists comes from the privileged non‐party elite who have
received a tertiary education and professional qualifications, some from abroad.
These elite are articulate and well connected at home and abroad. Mention must be
made of mathematician Dr. Phan Dinh Dieu who was active in the 1990s. More
recently, I would put lawyers Nguyen Van Dai and Le Cong Dinh in the forefront.
They and their supporters were able to mount challenges to the regime’s claim to
rational‐legal legitimacy. They have used Vietnamese law and scholarly research to
buttress their case. They also represent a direct intellectual challenge to party
ideological hacks.
Q5‐Would you say that the CPV started a systematic crackdown on dissent after
entering WTO early 2007? Why?
ANSWER: The security apparatus began the current wave of crackdown in November
2006 when it charged labour activists. But the real crackdown on dissent began after
6
the APEC Summit ended so world reaction would not spoil the latest in Vietnam’s
crowning moments in hosting important international gatherings. There are two
explanations. First, the pro‐democracy activists sought to politicize the APEC summit
and generate publicity for their cause. They were muffled prior to and during APEC
(house arrest, phones cut off, foreigners forbidden from visiting etc.). They were
arrested and punished for their audacity in breaking Article 88 of the Penal Code
(conducting propaganda against the socialist state).
Getting into the WTO was a major strategic objective of the Vietnamese leadership.
All members of the WTO had to approve Vietnam’s membership and the United
States was the last holdout. Events towards obtaining US approval had to follow a
sequence: Congress had to approve PNTR (permanent normal trade relations) status
first before the President could act. To forestall a negative vote, the President had to
remove Vietnam from the list of Countries of Particular Concern, which he did. The
action by Congress was an eleventh hour affair and the President had to wait until
after APEC to give his consent. Throughout this period Vietnam had to be on its best
behavior and not provoke the US Congress.
The second reason for the post 2006 crackdown is that some elements of the pro‐
democracy movement sought to disrupt the National Assembly elections scheduled
for May 2007. Some were calling for a boycott, which would sully Vietnam’s “festival
of democracy”. Others sought to gain selection and use the election process to
campaign for democracy. This was an unprecedented challenge to the integrity of
Vietnam electoral process and from the view of security officials and party officials
had to be repressed.