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1. In order to know something, its not enough just to believe it you have to have a good reason
to believe it.
In other words:
For any proposition p, if S knows that p,
then S has a good reason to believe that p (S is justified in believing that p).
2. A good reason to believe p cant be p itself (that would be circular reasoning!).
3. Rather, a good reason to believe p must be something else you know that supports p.
In other words:
For any p, if S has a good reason to believe that p, then S knows some q such that q
supports p and q p.
4. But q is not known unless it is supported by knowledge r, where r is not identical to any other
member of the chain (in order to avoid circular reasoning).
And so on
5. Therefore, no belief is known unless it is supported by an infinitely long chain of other beliefs.
6. But thats an impossible condition for a person to meet!
Being finite creatures, we cant have infinitely many different beliefs.
Even if we did, we would never be able to satisfactorily give a justification for any of them,
since that would require infinite time.
7. Therefore, we dont know anything.
Response 1: Foundationalism
Foundationalism denies premises 2 and 3 of the Regress Argument.
For a Foundationalist (e.g. Descartes), beliefs are divided into 2 categories:
Nonbasic beliefs these are justified by other beliefs
- most of our beliefs fall into this category
Basic beliefs these are sometimes said to be self-justifying; it is perhaps more accurate
to say that they are justified by something other than beliefs (experiences and rational
insights)
every nonbasic justified belief is justified by other nonbasic beliefs, which in turn are
justified by other nonbasic beliefsuntil we get to the basic beliefs
basic beliefs are not justified by other beliefs
Descartes Strategy
Physical things exist.
God exists and is no deceiver
Even if there are, they do not play a special role in justificationa belief can be fully justified even if
it is not supported by basic beliefs at all. If foundationalism conceives of justification like a building,
then the coherentist conceives of justification as something like the surface of a ball. Each point on
the surface is connected to (supported by) other points (some close, some distant), and no amount
of traveling along the surface will bring you to point where the connection comes to an end.
Eventually, you will have traveled all the way around and will end up where you started. Thus,
coherentists ultimately do believe in circular reasoning as long as the circles are big enough.
Response 3: Externalism
denies premise 1 of the Regress Argument
Professor Mattey, from fall 2004 lecture notes:
Internalism and Externalism
One of the main disagreements in contemporary epistemology is between the "internalists"
and the "externalists." A simple way of distinguishing the two positions is to say that
externalism makes at least some attributions of knowledge on the basis of purely external
considerations. For example, S was caused to believe that P in a way that involves the truth
of P itself. Or S's belief that P was formed in a reliable way. For the internalist, some
additional, "internal" factor is always required before knowledge can be attributed to a
subject. Generally, this factor involves some "reason" S has to believe that p is true.
It is pretty easy to separate internalists from externalists using a simple test. Are they willing
to attribute knowledge to animals and small children, which are both supposed to be lacking
with respect to rationality? If they are willing to attribute knowledge to animals and small
children (not to mention computers), they are most likely externalists, and if they are not,
they are most likely internalists.
Externalists agree with internalists that having a true belief isnt enough for having knowledge a
third ingredient is needed. But for externalists, the third ingredient is not a reason. A reason is
something that can be found internallya belief or an experience that the subject can be aware of.
According to externalists, the third ingredient is an external condition that the knower may not be
aware of. There are different externalist accounts of what this condition is. One of these is
Reliabilism*: S knows that p if and only if
(i)
S believes that p,
(ii)
it is true that p, and
(iii)
Ss belief that p is caused by a process that reliably causes true beliefs.
*this is a simple version of reliabilism that has since been improved in several ways. The simple version will suffice for our
illustrative purposes.
Note that according to reliabilism, it does not matter whether I have any other beliefs that can justify
the one in question; as long as my belief is true and was formed by a reliable process (e.g. a
properly functioning visual system in a normal environment) then my belief is knowledge.
Pros and Cons of Externalism
Pros: (i) Provides a plausible account of certain types of knowledge (e.g. visual
knowledge). (ii) The externalist condition, when met, rules out the possibility of BVH, or a
Cartesian demon, etc.
Cons: (i) Seems to go too far in making attributions of knowledge. (ii) We cant be certain
that the externalist condition is met, so there is a sense in which the Skeptic remains
undefeated.
The KK thesis:
In order to know that p, it is necessary to know that one knows that p
OR
If S knows that p, then S knows that S knows that p
Foundationalists and Coherentists accept the KK thesis.
Reliabilists deny the KK thesis
8. Moreover, the belief that our BSI are reliable coheres with our other beliefs.
9. If believing something helps us to achieve our basic epistemic goal and it coheres with our other
beliefs, then we are justified in believing it.
10. Therefore, we are justified in believing that our BSI are reliable.