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AMonarchyofDisseminatedCourts:

Theviceregalsystem.
ManuelRiveroRodriguez
(InstitutoUniversitarioLaCorteenEuropaUniversidadAutnomadeMadrid)

PaperthatwillbereadbytheauthoratPanel
ThePoliticalOrganizationoftheSpanishCourt:Courts,Court,Courtiers~
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contents
Foreword

KingsCourtandViceregalCourts

DevelopmentofViceroyalCourts

Councils,kingdomsandviceroys

AMonarchyofCourtsor...disseminatedCourt?

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Foreword

This paper forms part of the research project funded by the Spanish
Ministry of Education and Science LA RECONFIGURACION DE LA MONARQUIA
CATOLICA (16401700): LA REORDENACION DEL SISTEMA VIRREINAL HAR.
HAR201237308C0503.DevelopedatIULCE[InstitutoUniversitarioLaCorteen
Europa,UniversidadAutnomadeMadrid]www.iulce.es

The viceroys had a capital relevance at the political and administrative


system of the Spanish Monarchy. Its institution was celebrated as an ingenious
legal biction that solved the question that the sovereign of such a great variety of
territorieshadthechancetogovernallofthem,beingimpossibletobephysically
ineachofthematthesametime.DuringSixteenthandSeventeenthcenturies,the
viceregalinstitutiondidnothaveapreciseandspecibicreglamentation,becauseit
did not exist a normative apparatus that bixed its commitments (It was made in
1680,whenanewsistemofgovernmentwascreated).Duetothis,theauthorityof
theviceroyshadvaguelimits.But,theextraordinaryfactthatthedifferentviceroys
were the incarnation of the king and its alter ego, situate us in front of the
problem of the nature and limitation of their power. They were not liable to any
laworrule,sotheycouldactaccordingwiththeirwillswiththeformulaofexcuse,
seobedeceperonosecumple(Iobey,butIwillnot).

KingsCourtandViceregalCourts
Shortly after Philip II had taken possession of his Spanish kingdoms, he
decided to break with the prevailing diversibied centre by concentrating
prerogatives in a single place, Madrid. This involved a radical reorganization of
power, which had a marked effect on the very concept of a viceroy and his
functions.Whatdoesmeanveryconceptofviceroy?Itmeansanentiresubstitute
ofthekinginthekingdomduringhisabsence.Phillipsfather,theEmperorCharles
V, employed pure viceroys, with long mandates, undebined in nature and not
limited in time. The reason was that he never stayed in one place for very long
time; the viceroy was an exceptional bigure who ruled during the kings absence,
occupying a position that he automatically abandoned when the sovereign
returned. The king was supposed to live among his subjects and it was
inconceivable that he should not do so. However, Phillips decision creating a
permanentplaceforhisCourtwasneitherasradicalasitmightappear.Thereisno
regulationmakingMadridthecapitalofSpain.Thecitydoesnotseemtohavebeen
viewedasthecourtoftheMonarchyratherthanasthecourtofalltheterritories,
norwasitperceivedassuchbyhiscontemporaries.Thechangesweregradualand
silent,andwentalmostunnoticed,asisclearfromthefactthatitisimpossibleto
identifytheprecisemoment,theexactdatewhenMadridwasdeclaredtheCourt
oftheMonarchy.Itneverhappened.

At the same time, there are some decisions restraining the authority of
viceroys. The resolutions issued on March 10, 1555 by the emperor in Brussels,
whichlimitedthemandateoftheviceroysoftheIndiestothreeyears,anticipated
anideaworkedonlaterbyhisson,whenhelimitedthemandatesofthoseofItaly

andthecrownofAragon.Limitingthemandatewasregardedasaproblemtodo
withthepermanentabsenceoftheking,sinceitimpliedthatthealteregoswere
notconceivedofastemporarysubstitutesfortheroyalpersonbutashisdelegates
with limited attributes, or, as Juan de Vega feared, governors more akin to
corregidores1thantokings.

There were some complementary regal commands reorganizing the


CouncilsoftheIndiesandAragonandcreatingtheCouncilofItaly,partofageneral
intentiontoconcentratethecapacityforinterventiononthenewcourt,tomakeit
the only source of authority. Madrid will be a place where all the networks of
patronage and clienteles would converge and through which the effective
governmentoftheMonarchywouldbeexercised.Fixingtheresidenceofthecourt
of the king, who did not travel except on rare occasions (and never outside the
Iberian peninsula). At the same time, Philip II introduced the innovation of
appointingviceroysforonlythreeyears,theproposaltolimitviceregalautonomy
was precisely in order to give some content to a superior court. In 1558, the
wordingoftheregulationdoesnotstatethisexplicitly,butitwasclaribiedlater,in
1574,whentheviceroysofItalyexperienceddifbicultiesinreconcilingtheirown
courtswiththekings.InalettertothegovernorofMilan,thenatureofthealter
egowasconbirmed:theywerevicarsofthekingintheexerciseofroyalauthority,
hisdoubles,orotherself,althoughthisdidnotpreventPhilipIIfromwantingto
be informed about everything they did or to approve the decisions they took. As
time went by, some political essayists saw this decision to supervise and keep a
close eye on matters as a distinctive mark of restricted otherness in viceregal
authority. Pietro Corseto pointed it out by underlining the fact that the king
authorized the person of the viceroy in public affairs by conferring potestad
ordinaria [ordinary authority] on him, but without transferring potestad absoluta
[absoluteauthority]tohim,sincethiswasinalienabletothepersonoftheking.A
clear difference was established, in this way, between the sovereign and his
double.Thekingrecognizednopersonsuperiortohiminthetemporalworldand
was also above the law, whereas the viceroy had to account for his actions and
faculties, abiding by the legal system in force at the time. As a consequence, the
viceroy became an instrument of royal authority, not a parallel one (as had been
thecaseinthetimeoftheemperor).Agenericmandatecouldbeestablishedbut
not exhaustive supervision nor, as Juan de Vega had already remarked, was it
possibletotransformthemintocorregidores.
ThedebatesurroundingtheforeignviceroyinAragonmaybeillustrativeof
thelimitsofthesubordinationoftheviceroy,sinceinthatkingdomthelocallaw
(fueros)didnotallowthekingsofbicerstobeforeigners.Everypost,fromthemost
exaltedtothehumblest,fromthegovernortothepalacegatekeeper,wasreserved
fornativesofAragon.Havingaviceroyfulbiltheroleofheadofgovernmentwasan
innovationthathadnotreallybeenacceptedand,toavoidfrictionwiththenative
population, Charles V had done his best to appoint viceroys from the territory in
question.Inakingdomdominatedbysmallgroupsandfactions,thenotionthatthe
absence of the king was transient meant that the viceroy was limited by the
provisional nature of his mandate, whilst the sovereigns frequent visits to the
territoryrestrictedthepossibilityofhisviceroygoverningsolelyforthebenebitof
membersofhisfamilyandcircleoffriends.In1554,theappointmentofDonDiego

1UntranslatableintoEnglish,isakindofroyalmayors

HurtadodeMendozatooccupytheposition,demonstratedthesovereignsconcern
tointroducechangesintheviceregalregime.Hisintentionwasnottosubjectthe
kingdomtoaforeignpower.Themonarchsideawasthatitwasmoreeffectiveto
putsomeoneneutralinplace,giventhathisabsencewaslikelytobepermanent.
Hisintentionwasnottoalterthedelicatechecksandbalanceswhichkept
thekingdomsinequilibrium;thenewviceroyofAragonhadtocomefromoutside
the place he was going to govern and be free of ties of any kind binding him to
thoseheadministered.ThispurposeispatentlyclearinPrincePhilipsinstruction
toHurtadodeMendoza;thefactionalconblictsaredescribedinthetextasbeingat
the heart of the kingdoms problems, and it is tacitly understood that only
somebody from outside and impartial will be able to resolve them. In Aragon,
however,abigureofthiskindhadneverbeencalleduponbeforeand,sinceHurtado
deMendozawasnotapersonofroyalblood,theAragonesesooninterpretedthis
as meaning that without family connections and with limited reason, the viceroy
oughttobeanativeofthekingdom,notaforeigner.Therewereinterpretersofcivil
law,suchasAntonioLabataorthepublicprosecutor,PrezdeNueros,whostrove
toprovethattheviceroywasnotanofbicer,because,amongotherthings,hewas
not subject to any ordinance, but a royal person, as the king could appoint him
withoutreferencetowhatwasstatedinthefuerosonthesubjectofofbicesinthe
administrationandgovernment.
Atlast,thekinghadapragmaticsolution;HurtadodeMendozawentonto
presideovertheCouncilofItalyandwasreplacedbyabettercandidateinAragon.
Between 1566 and 1575, an Aragonese viceroy of royal blood, Hernando de
Aragn, archbishop of Saragossa, combined in his person both the wishes of the
king and the regulations enshrined in the fueros. Nevertheless, the question
remained latent, resurfacing in 1590 when viceroy Artal of Aragon, the count of
Sstago,triedtopreventhissuccessor,themarquisofAlmenara,fromtakingofbice
on the grounds that it infringed the local law. Sstago was unable to delay the
moment when he had to step down from ofbice and, in May, Almenara took
possession. Shortly after, the disturbances known as the Revolt of Aragon began
and the issue of his appointment was regarded as one of the prime causes
triggeringtheconblict.
Almenaraspowersmadehimsubordinatetothekingscourt,yet,paradoxically,he
alsoowedhisauthoritytothestrengtheningofthebigureoftheviceroy,detached
fromthelocalpowers,whichqualibiedhimtosetupabona2ideviceregalcourtin
SaragossathatwasnotincompatiblewiththekingscourtinMadrid.Infact,after
annexing Portugal in 1580, Philip II had given the binal impetus to a model of
territorial government whose two fundamental pillars were to be the councils of
theCourtofMadridandtheviceroys.Subsequently,underPhilipIIIandPhilipIV,
thismodelwasexpressedinapparentlycontradictorytermsintheinstructionsto
viceroys:
The power to exercise this position and ofbice is very wideranging and free
because,inpublic,itiswellthat,sinceyouhavetobethereinmyplace,youshould
have all the authority that is necessary for it. But notwithstanding that power, I
herebydeclaretoyouthatmyintentionisthatyoukeeptoandcomplywithallthe
abovementionedthingscompletely.

DevelopmentofViceroyalCourts
There is no doubt that in the binal decades of the sixteenth century the
courtsoftheviceroysgrewinsplendourandpomp.Theirpresencegrewnotonly
at a symbolic level but also as centres of power, as evidenced by the growth in
personneltoservetheviceroys.Thedevelopmentofthebigureoftheviceroyasthe
political hub of a large number of states within the Monarchy is only
understandableifwelookattheroleofhighnobilityingovernment,mostlyfrom
Castile. Quite obviously, harmonious integration had ever existed because the
nobilityhaditsrootsinroyalty,asitwastheCrownthatbestowedtherank.Atthe
end of the sixteenth century and the beginning of the seventeenth, the Castilian
nobles occupied, as of right, the captaincies general, embassies and viceroyalties,
becauseonlytheyrepresentedtheking,whetherasexecutorsofhismonopoliesor
as negotiators in his name with other princes or parliaments, that is, with the
kingdoms.Thischaracteristicwasreinforcedbecausetheverypositionofviceroy
implied a way of belonging to royalty, of entering the sovereigns family,
expressed in the formula our cousin, viceroy and captain general; this is one
reasonwhyvisitorsinItalywereneverallowedtotouchthepersonoftheviceroy
orhishousehold.20Weobservethiscontiguitybetweenkingandviceroyintheir
households,whichwereassociatedbothsymbolicallyandphysically.
Thissymbioticrelationshipwassuchthatitpermittedallthewealthofthe
high nobility to be placed at the disposal of the Crown so that their monopoly of
themostimportantpostsconstituted,infact,asafeguard;intheabsenceofawell
organized bureaucracy, they provided the structure for government, supplied
throughtheirclientnetwork,theirstockofprestige,theirhonourandtheirgoods.
Inotherwords,theirpersonalcreditconstitutedareservefortheroyalserviceto
drawon.Onthisspecibicpoint,forexample,theinstructionsoftheIndiesviceroys
included some directives relating to the organization of the viceroys household
which,inthemselves,demonstratethewayinwhichthehouseholdofthealterego
dovetailed with the sovereigns, fulbilling the functions of an alter domus: The
viceroys should endeavour to use and have in their households the sons and
grandsons of discoverers, peacemakers and settlers and other distinguished
people,thattheymightlearnurbanityandhaveagoodeducation.
FromJuandeVegasletter,writtenin1558,toOlivaresmemorandaof1590,
theviceroysalwaysrespondedontheassumptionthattheybelongedtoadomestic
order,oneoffamiliaritywiththeking,andwere,therefore,immunetohavingtheir
function controlled externally by the law courts and royal ofbicers. They never
admitted to being subject to higher administrative powers. The honour, the
underlying philosophy of viceregal government made it impossible to invest the
bigureoftheviceroywithabureaucraticconceptionofhisofbice;theviceroywas
inspired by a chivalric ethic and understood his function as deriving from the
personalbondthattiedhimtotheking.

Councils,kingdomsandviceroys
Linkedtotheproblemofredebiningtheofbiceofviceroywastheissueofthe
inexorable rise of the lawyers and the development of the machinery of royal
councils in Madrid. Philip IIs plans for reform came together in the creation of a
blueprint that would be reproduced in similar terms throughout his possessions,
and whose most rebined form was the viceroyalty in the Indies. The viceroys of
Peru and New Spain embodied all the sovereigns functions at the highest levels:
military ones as captains general, judicial ones as presidents of the assize court,
and ecclesiastical ones as vicepatrons of the church in the Indies. The governor
presidents of the assize courts who exercised similar functions in Chile, New
Granada, Guatemala, Terra Firma, and so on were in their turn their viceroys.
Lalindeemphasizedthefactthatfromthekingandhiscouncilsrightdowntothe
last viceroy with his assize court, the entire government of the Monarchy was
organizedalongbinarylines;hetermedthisaviceregalsenatorialregime,andits
specialfeatureineachofthekingdomswastoactasacheckandkeepacarefuleye
ontheviceroys.HecitedthecaseofCatalonia,whoseassizejudgeswereappointed
directly by the king with the aim of counteracting the power of the viceroy and
limitinghisautonomy.Thisinterpretationappearstobeconbirmedbytheserious
conblicts that arose in 1599 and 1626 between the viceroys and their ofbicers on
theonehandandthejudgesoftheassizecourtontheother.Atthesametime,this
schema was imposed in the rest of the Crown of Aragons domains, so that it is
reasonable to conclude that correcting the law courts was the prerogative of the
king:theyweredirectlyaccountabletohim.Ashasbeenobserved,thismodelwas
validoutsideCataloniaandAragon,andwasapplieduniversallyfromwhatcanbe
deduced from the texts of Italian jurists, such as Carlo Tapia, or experts in
institutionsintheIndies,likeSolrzano.
Itisverycommontoconfusethevoiceandstanceoftheassizecourtswith
central government; the fact remains, though, that they only ever showed one
very limited aspect of royal authority. In the sixteenth century, the concept of
tyranny shifted away from the ruler who merely followed his own whim while
holding the common good in contempt towards the king who ignored the laws
andruledwithoutcounsel.Theactofprovidingadvicehadbeentransformedintoa
legalrulingandentailedcompliancewiththelaw.Theeffectofthelegalarguments
supporting judicial reviews was to underline what was forbidden to the idiots,
those untutored in the law who would fall into despotism if they took decisions
withoutknowledgeofthelaw.Aroundtheyear1600,lawyersacquiredavisibility
inpublicpreviouslyenjoyedonlywhencarryingouttheirfunctionsinthecourts;
this can be deduced from many testimonies, such as the letter written by the
CouncilofItalytotheviceroyofSicily,thedukeofMaqueda,remindinghimthat,
accordingtothepragmaticsanctionofjudgesgownsof1599,theyshouldwear
their ofbicial dress to all public ceremonies and not only when going to court.
Wherevertheyhappenedtobe,theywerealwaysjudges,thelivingembodimentof
theLaw.
Furthermore, the magistrates, together with the Castilian nobility and the
military, constituted an inherently itinerant social group, birstly, because their
careers ordinarily took them to all the courts the length and breadth of the

kingdom, and, secondly, because the Court of Madrid was the pinnacle of their
professional lives. There was a constant stream of judges passing through the
councils,courtsandassizes,onvisitsbothprivateandgeneral,makingenquiries,
compilingreports,carryingoutinvestigationsandsoforth.Weknowthatlawyers
trained in Bologna, who completed their cursus honorum in the Milanese
magistracy,endedtheirdaysaspresidentsoftheassizecourtinCharcas,inPeru.
The various local judiciaries, apart from being subject to constant vigilance, also
enjoyedahighdegreeofintercommunication,enablingthetransferofprocedures
andatendencytowardsstandardizationofpractices,illustratedbytheattemptto
create a Sicilian Consiglio Collaterale in 1612, or the reform of the Sardinian
assizesin1606whichseparatedcivilfromcriminalaction.
The result of all this was that the lawyers, formed a social group able to
visualize the Spanish Monarchy as a political and jurisdictional unit, not as a
compositeoffreestandingstateswithnoconnectionsbetweenthem.Thepractice
ofjudgesbeingcooptedontothecouncilsofMadrid(whichbegantobecommon
from 1595 onwards, and general from 1600) demonstrates this fact. The
attendanceofcooptedjudgesandcouncillorsatcouncilmeetingsarosefromthe
practiceofcallinginmembersofacouncilworkinginanotherareatoaskfortheir
opinion as legal experts. Jurisprudence and legal practice made it possible to
discussmattersoflaworgovernmentwhichwentbeyondthescopeofthelawsof
each individual kingdom, with the Italian, Castilian, Portuguese and Aragonese
magistrates exchanging knowledge and experience or binding common ground in
law.
The unitary vision that the lawyers displayed implied a perception of the
kings council that was not tied to a single place; when the judges of the Mexico
assizes introduced themselves in public, they stated after their name that they
were from the Council of His Majesty in New Spain, a similar afbirmation to the
one made by the judges of the Consiglio Collaterale in Naples or those of the
Audiencia in Catalonia. They situated themselves in an intermediate position
between the king and the kingdom: before the king, they were the voice of the
kingdom; before the kingdom, the voice of the king and before everyone, they
representedtheLaw.

AMonarchyofCourtsor...disseminatedCourt?
In the second half of the twentieth century, historians of institutions
sustained an interpretation that paid privileged attention to the bureaucracy and
origins of the modern state. In line with this type of analysis, it was taken for
grantedthatthepoweroftheviceroyswanedtothebenebitofthecourtinMadrid.
From1561,centralpowerwasstrengthenedasaresultofbixingapermanentseat
ofgovernment,andthepowerrelationswithinthevastCatholicMonarchybecame
interplayofopposingforces,ofthecentreversustheperiphery,astateoftension
between centrifugal and centripetal impulses. This reading of the situation saw
administrative renewal at the level of the state cancelling out particularisms,
developingantinobleandanticonstitutionalpolicies(inotherwords,contraryto

therepresentativeassembliesoftheEstatesandthelawsemanatingfromthem),in
favourofabsolutism.AwellknownseriesofstudiesonthekingdomofNapleshas
pointed out that the buildup of power at the centre converted the potestas
viceregiaintosomethingresidual,theresultantstrippingawayofauthoritybeing
linkedtotheexpulsionoftheNeapolitanaristocracyfromhighofbice.Thejudicial
institutions,thatis,theNeapolitanhighcourts,theCollaterale,theSommaria,the
Vicara, and the provincial assizes wielded power because they were state
institutions.
In the other side, most recently, some Historians focused their studies on
power microphysics. In line on Foucault philosophy, they paid attention on a
differentscheme,debiningtheSpanishMonarchyasaPolycentricone.Theyignore
theCourtdisseminationandtheroleofcouncilsandlawyers.Whenthesocialand
political processes are scrutinized more closely, these analytical schemas do not
work. Earlier we described how, at the end of the sixteenth century, the concept
andpracticeofgovernmentwasconsolidatedasadualitybetweengubernaculum
and jurisdictio, making the paired viceroyjudiciary model universal and that this
relationship was more complex than the one expressed as a system of mutual
surveillance.Inunireddatur,maxim57oftheEmpresasmoralesypolticaspara
unprncipeCristiano[MoralandPoliticalMaximsforaChristianPrince],Saavedra
FajardoemphasizedthatthegovernmentoftheMonarchyofSpain[is]foundedon
such sound judgement that the kingdoms and provinces that Nature separated
havebeenbroughttogetherbyprudence.EveryonehastheirrespectiveCouncilin
Madrid:oneeachforCastile,Aragon,Portugal,Italy,theIndiesandFlanders.But
healsoadvised,ThekingofSpaindoesnotruleinItalyasaforeignprince,butas
anItalianprince.Thepointhewasmakingwasthatthankstotheviceroys,Italy
wasgovernedinItalyandfromItaly.
In the seventeenth century, the power of the viceroys was anything but
residual.Inprotocol,thestyleofaddressforaviceroywasequivalenttothatfora
Prince,becauseaviceroywithplenipotentiarystatuswasthekinginthekingdom.
Duality between Senatus and viceregal government is explained in a text called
NoticiageneraldeelEstadodeMiln,sugobiernoyformaao1645,itsays:only
two bodies represent the king in this State, the governor in the natural form and
the Senate in the mystic. The quotation in itself is quite enlightening. In
Covarrubiassdictionary,naturalisdebinedasEverythingthatisaccordingtothe
natureofeachonewherenatureisacondition,whereasmysticmeansmuchthe
sameasbigurative:thatwhichgivesshapetomatter.(IntheVocabulariodelasdos
lenguas,toscanaycastellanabyCristbaldelasCasas,mstico[mystic]istranslated
intoItalianby2igurativo[bigurative]).Mysticrepresentationisnoneotherthanthat
manifested by the regepatria identity, embodying the defence of the Law and its
observance;anaturalrepresentationwhich,comingdirectlyfromGod,subjectsthe
populationtotheobedienceofhisperson.
Both these representations of the sovereign, the natural and the mystic, neither
transmitadistantcentralpowernoraretheyextensionsofit.Webindourselves,in
fact, in a Monarchy with a diversibied court, where the king is absent, but at the
sametime,presentonaccountofthedualityofhisnature.
In this way, the kingdoms across the councils were permanently in the
presence of the king and he could attend to them in person, for the magistrates
keptthepatriaaliveintheroyalretinue.Conversely,theviceroyswiththeircourts
kept the presence of the natural lord alive among his subjects. The relationship

betweenthecourtinMadridandthecourtsoftheviceroyswasbasedonthisdual
interplay.Thisrelationship,however,graduallybecameunbalancedbecauseofthe
changeswroughtduringPhilipIVsreign.ThecountdukeofOlivaressetinmotion
changesthatdelegatedgreaterexecutivepowertotheviceroysatthesametimeas
heremovedCouncilsauthoritycreatingalotofjuntas(informalcommissions).It
is a working hypothesis that we are exploring in current research, probably the
revolts of 1640 were not the result of a reaction against centralization, but quite
the reverse; they were a reaction to an imbalance in which the courts of the
viceroysweregraduallycuttingtheirtieswiththecourtoftheking.Inthestrictest
sense,theywererevoltsofloyalty.Thepopularcry:longlivetheking,deathtobad
governmentcalled,precisely,fortherestorationofthebigureofthekingasfather
and protector, one that had become increasingly remote and mediated by nobles
andlocalelites.Theycryagainsttheabsenceofatruekinginthekingdom.

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