CASE TITLE: David P. Llorente v.

The Sandiganbayan
DATE PROMULGATED: October 3, 1991
TOPIC: Rule in Case of Judgment of Acquittal (holding the accused civilly liable in
spite of an acquittal)
FACTS:
Atty. Llorente was employed in the PCA, a public corporation. When he was
the Deputy Administrator for Administrative Services, Finance Services and Legal
Affairs Departments, Mr. Curio, Mrs. Perez, Mr. Azucena and Mrs. Javier applied for
PCA clearances in support of their gratuity benefits as they had resigned as a result
of massive organization. Atty. Llorente was among the approving officers with
respect to clearances of rank-and-file employees and as such he signed the above
mentioned employees despite the pending accountabilities except Mr. Curio who
was similarly circumstanced with the three afore-named employees. The reason
given by Atty. Llorente was that when the clearance was presented to him, he was
already aware of the affidavit dated Nov. 26, 1981, in which Mr. Curio assumed to
pay any residual liability for the disallowed cash advances, which at time,
Dec.8,1981,stood at 92,000. Moreover, Mr. Curio had other pending obligations
noted on his clearance. Mr. Curio appealed the non-issuance of his clearance to
higher officials who advised him to wait for the resolution of the Tanodbayan with
which he had filed a case initially against Atty. Llorente. When Mr.Curio was able to
secure a clearance in 1986, he had been deprived of gainful employment between
Dec.1981 and Dec. 1986 because he could present his PCA clearance. Thus, on Dec.
10, 1986, an information for violation of Section 3 (c) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act was filed against the petitioner. The Sandiganbayan acquitted the
petitioner in the absence of any evidence that he acted in bad faith, however, it
took the petitioner to task civilly, and ordered him to pay compensatory damages
in the sum of P90, 000. According to the Sandiganbayan, the petitioner was liable
for damages suffered by the aggrieved party under Art. 27. The petitioner claims
that the Sandiganbayans Decision is erroneous even if the Sandiganbayan
acquitted him therein, because he was never in bad faith as indeed found by the
Sandiganbayan.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner may be held civilly liable in spite of his
acquittal.
HELD:
Yes. Under the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure amending Rules 110
through 127 of the Rules of Court, the judgment of the court shall include, in case of
acquittal, and unless there is a clear showing that the act from which the civil
liability might arise did not exist, a finding on the civil liability of the accused in

favor of the offended party. The rule is based on the provisions of the substantive
law, that if acquittal proceeds from reasonable doubt, a civil action lies nonetheless.

SUBMITTED BY: Lovely Lasay

CASE TITLE: People v. Lodriggo Bayya

DATE PROMULGATED: March 10, 2000
TOPIC: Information (right to be informed of the nature and the cause of accusation)
FACTS:
Lodriggo Bayya was charged and convicted with the crime of incestuous rape
as defined and penalized under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended
by Republic Act 7659.
On Appeal, the respondent challenged the penalty of death against him on
the ground that the information charging him of the offence did not make any
mention of Republic Act 7659 and he was only charged using Art. 335, hence, the
penalty should be that which is provided for in the Revised Penal Code and not as
provided for in RA 7659. As such, by convicting him under RA 7659, there is a
transgression of his right to be informed of the nature and the cause of accusation
against him.
ISSUE: Whether or not there is a transgression of his right to be informed of the
nature and the cause of accusation against him.
HELD:
Yes. The respondent may only be convicted of the charges under the
information indicting him. In the case at bar, the information does not allege the
minority of the victim, Rossie Bayya, although the same was proven during the trial
as borne by the records. The omission is not merely formal in nature since
doctrinally, an accused cannot be held liable for more than what he is indicted for. It
matters not how conclusive and convincing the evidence of guilt may be, but an
accused cannot be convicted an offense, not charged
in the complaint or
information on which he is tried or therein necessarily included. He has a right to be
informed of the nature of the offense with which he is charged before he is put on
trial. To convict an accused of an offense higher than that charged in the complaint
or information would constitute unauthorized denial of that right.

SUBMITTED BY: Lovely Lasay