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Constitutional Analysis
Four Factors:
Text of the Constitution
Structure of Government
Intent/History of the provision
Policy reasons
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Mootness
Defunis
White man claimed he was victim of
discrimination by school, but was about to
graduate. Court declined to hear the case
b/c individual no longer had an interest.
Roe v. Wade
Mootness is a prudential rule, not a
constitutional rule. EXCEPTION: If a case is
capable of repetition, yet evading
review it may be appropriate to decide.
Every case like this one will always be
moot, so must decide the case anyway.
Baker v. Carr
The court may not answer political
questions. If a case has one of these
qualities, it cannot be decided by a Court.
Six Factors of Political Questions:
(1) Constitutionally demonstrable textual
commitment to another branch
(2) Lack of judicially manageable standards
(no law the court can apply to the
question = discretionary question)
(3) Inextricably entwined with non-judicial
policy questions (inappropriate policy
issues)
(4) Would show lack of respect for another
branch of government
(5) Unusual need for continued adherence
to decision made (Need quick resolution)
(6) Need for government to speak with a
unified voice
Powell v. McCormack
Only Qualifications of members of
Congress explicitly in Const. are age,
residency. This case did not address listed
items, so it was not textually committed to
another branch, NOT political question.
Nixon v. United States
Federal judge convicted of perjury by
Senate argued it was improperly done.
SCOTUS: it would show lack of respect for
Senates authority to impeach, no
judicially manageable standard, WAS
political question.
Goldwater v. Carter
Dispute whether to recognize Taiwan.
SCOTUS: we must speak with unified voice
on treaties, foreign policy committed to
executive, to recognize Taiwan is nonjudicial policy, WAS political question.
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McCulloch v. Maryland
The federal government is limited to
pursuing the goals/purposes it is assigned
in the Constitution. However, it may use
any means to achieve those goals.
Necessary & Proper Clause:
(1) If the end (purpose) is a legitimate one
for the federal government;
(2) The means being used are plainly
adapted to achieving that end;
(3) The means are not prohibited by the
Constitution;
Then the federal action is constitutional.
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Standing
Ripeness
Political Questions
Prudential Requirements
(4) No 3rd-Party Claims
Craig v. Boren
Party bringing a claim must have real
motivation; a dispute to be adjudicated.
This seller of alcohol had interchangeable
economic interest with underage drinkers
even if she was not a target of statute.
(5) No Generalized Injuries
United States v. Richardson
Taxpayers do not have general standing to
attack laws for secret spending. Should be
addressed electorally, not judicially.
BUT: FEC v. Akins
Congress can authorize citizens to sue on a
generalized injury because it is only a
prudential limit. There must still be an
injury, but then there would be standing.
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Missouri v. Holland
A statute to carry out enforcement of a
VALID treaty is a necessary and proper
means of executing a legitimate end,
regardless of whether Congress had the
power otherwise, IF the treaty was valid.
(1) A treaty must be properly entered into.
President must make the treaty, Senate
must confirm.
(2) A treaty must govern proper subject
matter for an international agreement.
The subject matter can be protected only
by national action in concert with that of
another power.
(3) A treaty may not violate express
provisions of the Constitution.
Reid v. Covert
Power to make treaties was expressly
given to the federal government.
Therefore, statutes to implement treaties
can never violate the 10th Amendment
even in areas of normal state powers.
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Wyeth v. Levine
Congresss purpose in creating a minimum
warning requirement was simply to set the
minimum standard. A stricter standard set
by a state does not frustrate the purpose
of a minimum standard.
Exclusive Federal Power
Cooley v. Board of Wardens
If federal power is always exclusive in an
area, the State law is unconstitutional.
Federal power will be exclusive over
activities which are inherently national.
If the activity is inherently local, States
might be able to regulate it if the dormant
commerce clause or preemption does not
prevent it.
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D.C.C. - Discrimination
Facially Discriminatory
Philadelphia v. New Jersey
Pure facial discrimination; the law said it
was favoring one state over the other. The
law plainly discriminated about garbage
solely because of where it came from.
West Lynn Creamery v. Healy
States ARE permitted to give
discriminatory subsidies to their citizens.
However, in this case the subsidy was
combined with a tax in such a way that it
amounted to a tax on only out-of-state
actors, and discriminatory taxes are not
allowed.
Dean Milk v. Madison
Just because an ordinance is
discriminatory against some in-state
citizens as well as out-of-state citizens
does not make it less discriminatory.
Carbone v. Clarkstown
Town hired a private contractor to build a
waste treatment plant and operate it for 5
years. An ordinance which directed
garbage to that facility was struck down
because it deprived out-of-state
businesses access to a local market. Just
because other in-state facilities were
harmed did not make it less discriminatory
against out-of-state actors.
ARGUMENT AGAINST DISCRIMINATION:
This was a law favoring one entity, and
thus discriminating against the rest of the
world, not discriminating based on state
location.
Oneida v. United Haulers
This was NOT discriminatory because in
Carbone, because rather than
discriminating in favor of one privatelyowned facility, it was discriminating in
favor of one publicly-owned facility. This is
very similar to the dissent in Carbone, in
that it calls the discrimination in favor of a
facility instead of against other states.
Discrimination in Intent
Bacchus Imports v. Dias
The history of the statute reflected that it
was passed when local producers asked
the Hawaii legislature to exempt them
from the state liquor tax. That evidence of
intent to discriminate in favor of in-state
producers was enough to make the
statute unconstitutional.
Justifying Discrimination
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Maine v. Taylor
A discriminatory State regulation may be
constitutional if (1) the end it serves is a
legitimate state purpose, AND (2) the
means used to accomplish the end are
necessary to accomplish the purpose; in
other words, there must be no other way
the purpose could be accomplished.
In this case, banning the importation of
out-of-state baitfish had a legitimate
environmental purpose, and the law was
found to be the only way to accomplish
that purpose.
Horizontal Allocation of
Power
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Undue Burden
Discrimination in Effect
Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig
It can be discriminatory to treat states
differently even when they are the same;
it is also discriminatory to treat states the
same when they are clearly different.
Taking away Vermont milk producers
competitive advantage in the market
discriminated in effect against Vermont
milk producers and in favor of New York
milk producers, which is not allowed.
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Youngstown v. Sawyer
President Truman seized steel mills, the
question was if President was allowed to
take this action on his own power.
Two lines of analysis come out of this case
separationist, and checks & balances.
Separationist
Justice Black: The branches must remain
separate, and only act within their own
sphere of authority. The President must be
authorized by Congress before he can take
action; he cannot make law on his own.
Because he classified this as a law-making
action, it was not an action the President
could take without prior authorization
from Congress.
The President, as Commander-In-Chief, is
authorized to carry out the logistics of a
war effort in the theater of war, and only
goes beyond the theater of war to a
limited extent.
Checks & Balances
Justice Jackson: The Constitution gives
certain powers solely to each branch,
things they can do all by themselves. But
there are also things which each branch
needs the other for, in particular making
and enforcing law. Because there is some
overlap in the branches, the legitimacy of
an act by one branch should be judged in
the frame of how the powers of each
branch should interact with each other.
Therefore, the Presidents power to act
depends upon his interaction with
Congress, with three different levels:
(1) President acts, and Congress supports.
The whole government has acted
together, so the whole power of the
federal government is behind the action.
(2) President acts, and Congress is silent.
The President can do all the things
explicitly granted to him in the
Constitution, and those things which he
would otherwise need authorization of
Congress to do.
(3) President acts, and Congress opposes.
The President can ONLY do those things
which are granted explicitly to him in the
Constitution, minus those things Congress
has power over. If Congress tells the
President to do something and he refuses,
he is limited to those things he is
authorized to do in the Constitution.
In this case, the Court found that Congress
was silent on the issue, and that was
interpreted as disapproval of the action.
Dames & Moore v. Regan
Utilizing a checks & balances approach,
the Court found that Congress had been
silent on the issue. However, unlike in
Youngstown, silence was interpreted as
approval of the action.
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Separationist Analysis
The core of this analysis: What kind of
function, are the function and the branch
doing it compatible?
1. CLASSIFY the action: is this action
legislative, executive, or judicial in nature?
2. ASSIGN the action to the appropriate
branch: where does the Constitution place
this action?
Ex Parte Milligan (1866)
Suspending the writ of habeas corpus
seems to be committed to Congress by
implication in Article I, Section 9, Clause 2:
the writ of habeas corpus shall not be
suspended EXCEPT when in cases of
rebellion or invasion the public safety
requires it.
The converse is when in cases of rebellion
or invasion the public safety requires it,
the writ of habeas corpus MAY be
suspended.
Since these things are in Article I, they are
committed to Congress and the President
could not replace the civil court system
with military tribunals merely because it
was a time of war.
Ex Parte Quirin (1942)
Because Congress had set up and
authorized a military tribunal, they had
exercised their Constitutional power.
1) Presentation Clause
INS v. Chadha
SCOTUS (Justice Burger): Concluded the
legislative veto is unconstitutional.
(1) Classify the action: What Congress
does with the legislative veto is
essentially legislative. However, using the
legislative veto to overturn the previous
act of lawmaking did not follow the
normal process of lawmaking.
(2) Assign the action to a branch: The
original act was properly passed into law
by Congress, but the legislative veto
which was also a legislative act was not
properly done. The Constitution explicitly
says how lawmaking must occur, and by
allowing the House of Representatives to
do lawmaking activity on its own, the law
was unconstitutionally changed.
Justice Powell: Also takes separationist
approach, but classifies the action as
essentially judicial because this was
deciding the case of a single person, it was
more judicial.
Professor Devlin: This could also be seen
as an executive function, because it is
choosing when to enforce the law.
2) Abdication of Power
Clinton v. New York
The line-item veto was similar to the
legislative veto in Chadha it allowed the
President to create law without following
the constitutionally-prescribed method.
(1) By choosing which legislation to pass
and which to reject, which effectively
modified the contents of a law, the
President was doing something legislative
in nature.
(2) As a legislative action, this should be
done by Congress, not the President, and
Congress cannot give away power
distributed in the Constitution.
3) Appointment of Officers
Buckley v. Valeo
(1) The only appointment power for
officers of the United States in the
Constitution is granted to the President.
Therefore, exercising appointment power
is an executive action.
(2) As an exclusively executive action, this
is not an appropriate action for Congress
to take.
4) Firing of Officers
Bowsher v. Synar
(1) The action being taken by the
Comptroller General was essentially
executive, by interpreting and carrying out
legislation.
(2) Therefore, this action belongs with the
executive branch. The Comptroller
General, however, is a legislative official.
He is traditionally one person from a list
presented to the President by Congress,
and may be fired by a joint resolution of
Congress, so he is a legislative official. But
removing officers by impeachment was
only granted to Congress over executive
officers, so Congress can NOT fire the
Comptroller General.
Myers v. US
The President wanted to fire postmaster,
so Congress passed a law to prevent it.
(1) Firing officers of the US is a purely
executive function, over which POTUS
has unlimited power.
(2) As executive function, Congress has no
sway here and the law is unconstitutional.
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Miscellaneous/Judicial Review
Marbury v. Madison
First held that judicial review is a SCOTUS
power. It is emphatically the province of
the judiciary to say what the law is.
Cooper v. Aaron
SCOTUS interpretation of Constitution is
the ultimate, final word on a constitutional
issue. The Constitution is what we say it is.
Martin v. Hunters Lessee
SCOTUS can overturn decisions of State
supreme court decisions involving federal
law.
Dickerson v. U.S.
Congress cannot overrule via statute a
SCOTUS interpretation of the constitution.