G.R. No.

198780

October 16, 2013

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,

vs.
LIBERTY D. ALBIOS, Respondent.
MENDOZA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules t of Court assailing the September 29, 2011
Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA), in CA-G.R. CV No. 95414, which affirmed the April 25, 2008Decision 2 of the
Regional Trial Court, Imus, Cavite (RTC). declaring the marriage of Daniel Lee Fringer (Fringer) and respondent Liberty
Albios (A/bios) as void from the beginning.
The facts
On October 22, 2004, Fringer, an American citizen, and Albios were married before Judge Ofelia I. Calo of the
Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch59, Mandaluyong City (MeTC), as evidenced by a Certificate of Marriage with Register
No. 2004-1588.3
On December 6, 2006, Albios filed with the RTC a petition for declaration of nullity 4 of her marriage with Fringer. She
alleged that immediately after their marriage, they separated and never lived as husband and wife because they never
really had any intention of entering into a married state or complying with any of their essential marital obligations. She
described their marriage as one made in jest and, therefore, null and void ab initio .
Summons was served on Fringer but he did not file his answer. On September 13, 2007, Albios filed a motion to set case
for pre-trial and to admit her pre-trial brief. The RTC ordered the Assistant Provincial Prosecutor to conduct an
investigation and determine the existence of a collusion. On October 2, 2007, the Assistant Prosecutor complied and
reported that she could not make a determination for failure of both parties to appear at the scheduled investigation.
At the pre-trial, only Albios, her counsel and the prosecutor appeared. Fringer did not attend the hearing despite being
duly notified of the schedule. After the pre-trial, hearing on the merits ensued.
Ruling of the RTC
In its April 25, 2008 Decision,5 the RTC declared the marriage void ab initio, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered declaring the marriage of Liberty Albios and Daniel
Lee Fringer as void from the very beginning. As a necessary consequence of this pronouncement, petitioner shall cease
using the surname of respondent as she never acquired any right over it and so as to avoid a misimpression that she
remains the wife of respondent.
xxxx
SO ORDERED.6
The RTC was of the view that the parties married each other for convenience only. Giving credence to the testimony of
Albios, it stated that she contracted Fringer to enter into a marriage to enable her to acquire American citizenship; that in
consideration thereof, she agreed to pay him the sum of $2,000.00; that after the ceremony, the parties went their
separate ways; that Fringer returned to the United States and never again communicated with her; and that, in turn, she
did not pay him the $2,000.00 because he never processed her petition for citizenship. The RTC, thus, ruled that when
marriage was entered into for a purpose other than the establishment of a conjugal and family life, such was a farce and
should not be recognized from its inception.
Petitioner Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), filed a motion for
reconsideration. The RTC issued the Order, 7 dated February 5, 2009, denying the motion for want of merit. It explained
that the marriage was declared void because the parties failed to freely give their consent to the marriage as they had no
intention to be legally bound by it and used it only as a means to acquire American citizenship in consideration of
$2,000.00.
Not in conformity, the OSG filed an appeal before the CA.
Ruling of the CA

In its assailed decision, dated September 29, 2011, the CA affirmed the RTC ruling which found that the essential requisite
of consent was lacking. The CA stated that the parties clearly did not understand the nature and consequence of getting
married and that their case was similar to a marriage in jest. It further explained that the parties never intended to enter
into the marriage contract and never intended to live as husband and wife or build a family. It concluded that their purpose
was primarily for personal gain, that is, for Albios to obtain foreign citizenship, and for Fringer, the consideration of
$2,000.00.
Hence, this petition.
Assignment of Error
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED ON A QUESTION OF LAWWHEN IT HELD THAT A MARRIAGE CONTRACTED
FOR THEPURPOSE OF OBTAINING FOREIGN CITIZENSHIP WAS DONEIN JEST, HENCE, LACKING IN THE
ESSENTIAL ELEMENT OFCONSENT.8
The OSG argues that albeit the intention was for Albios to acquire American citizenship and for Fringer to be paid
$2,000.00, both parties freely gave their consent to the marriage, as they knowingly and willingly entered into that
marriage and knew the benefits and consequences of being bound by it. According to the OSG, consent should be
distinguished from motive, the latter being inconsequential to the validity of marriage.
The OSG also argues that the present case does not fall within the concept of a marriage in jest. The parties here
intentionally consented to enter into a real and valid marriage, for if it were otherwise, the purpose of Albios to acquire
American citizenship would be rendered futile.
On October 29, 2012, Albios filed her Comment 9 to the petition, reiterating her stand that her marriage was similar to a
marriage by way of jest and, therefore, void from the beginning.
On March 22, 2013, the OSG filed its Reply10 reiterating its arguments in its petition for review on certiorari.
Ruling of the Court
The resolution of this case hinges on this sole question of law: Is a marriage, contracted for the sole purpose of acquiring
American citizenship in consideration of $2,000.00, void ab initio on the ground of lack of consent?
The Court resolves in the negative.
Before the Court delves into its ruling, It shall first examine the phenomenon of marriage fraud for the purposes of
immigration.
Marriage Fraud in Immigration
The institution of marriage carries with it concomitant benefits. This has led to the development of marriage fraud for the
sole purpose of availing of particular benefits. In the United States, marriages where a couple marries only to achieve a
particular purpose or acquire specific benefits, have been referred to as "limited purpose" marriages. 11 A common limited
purpose marriage is one entered into solely for the legitimization of a child. 12Another, which is the subject of the present
case, is for immigration purposes. Immigration law is usually concerned with the intention of the couple at the time of their
marriage,13 and it attempts to filter out those who use marriage solely to achieve immigration status. 14
In 1975, the seminal case of Bark v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, 15 established the principal test for
determining the presence of marriage fraud in immigration cases. It ruled that a "marriage is a sham if the bride and
groom did not intend to establish a life together at the time they were married. "This standard was modified with the
passage of the Immigration Marriage Fraud Amendment of 1986 (IMFA), which now requires the couple to instead
demonstrate that the marriage was not "entered into for the purpose of evading the immigration laws of the United States."
The focus, thus, shifted from determining the intention to establish a life together, to determining the intention of evading
immigration laws.16 It must be noted, however, that this standard is used purely for immigration purposes and, therefore,
does not purport to rule on the legal validity or existence of a marriage.
The question that then arises is whether a marriage declared as a sham or fraudulent for the limited purpose of
immigration is also legally void and in existent. The early cases on limited purpose marriages in the United States made
no definitive ruling. In 1946, the notable case of
United States v. Rubenstein17 was promulgated, wherein in order to allow an alien to stay in the country, the parties had
agreed to marry but not to live together and to obtain a divorce within six months. The Court, through Judge Learned

Hand, ruled that a marriage to convert temporary into permanent permission to stay in the country was not a marriage,
there being no consent, to wit:
x x x But, that aside, Spitz and Sandler were never married at all. Mutual consent is necessary to every contract; and no
matter what forms or ceremonies the parties may go through indicating the contrary, they do not contract if they do not in
fact assent, which may always be proved. x x x Marriage is no exception to this rule: a marriage in jest is not a marriage at
all. x x x It is quite true that a marriage without subsequent consummation will be valid; but if the spouses agree to a
marriage only for the sake of representing it as such to the outside world and with the understanding that they will put an
end to it as soon as it has served its purpose to deceive, they have never really agreed to be married at all. They must
assent to enter into the relation as it is ordinarily understood, and it is not ordinarily understood as merely a pretence, or
cover, to deceive others.18
(Italics supplied)
On the other end of the spectrum is the 1969 case of Mpiliris v. Hellenic Lines, 19 which declared as valid a marriage
entered into solely for the husband to gain entry to the United States, stating that a valid marriage could not be avoided
"merely because the marriage was entered into for a limited purpose." 20 The 1980 immigration case of Matter of
McKee,21 further recognized that a fraudulent or sham marriage was intrinsically different from a non subsisting one.
Nullifying these limited purpose marriages for lack of consent has, therefore, been recognized as problematic. The
problem being that in order to obtain an immigration benefit, a legal marriage is first necessary. 22 At present, United States
courts have generally denied annulments involving" limited purpose" marriages where a couple married only to achieve a
particular purpose, and have upheld such marriages as valid. 23
The Court now turns to the case at hand.
Respondents marriage not void
In declaring the respondents marriage void, the RTC ruled that when a marriage was entered into for a purpose other
than the establishment of a conjugal and family life, such was a farce and should not be recognized from its inception. In
its resolution denying the OSGs motion for reconsideration, the RTC went on to explain that the marriage was declared
void because the parties failed to freely give their consent to the marriage as they had no intention to be legally bound by
it and used it only as a means for the respondent to acquire American citizenship. Agreeing with the RTC, the CA ruled
that the essential requisite of consent was lacking. It held that the parties clearly did not understand the nature and
consequence of getting married. As in the Rubenstein case, the CA found the marriage to be similar to a marriage in jest
considering that the parties only entered into the marriage for the acquisition of American citizenship in exchange of
$2,000.00. They never intended to enter into a marriage contract and never intended to live as husband and wife or build
a family.
The CAs assailed decision was, therefore, grounded on the parties supposed lack of consent. Under Article 2 of the
Family Code, consent is an essential requisite of marriage. Article 4 of the same Code provides that the absence of any
essential requisite shall render a marriage void ab initio.
Under said Article 2, for consent to be valid, it must be (1) freely given and (2) made in the presence of a solemnizing
officer. A "freely given" consent requires that the contracting parties willingly and deliberately enter into the marriage.
Consent must be real in the sense that it is not vitiated nor rendered defective by any of the vices of consent under
Articles45 and 46 of the Family Code, such as fraud, force, intimidation, and undue influence. 24 Consent must also be
conscious or intelligent, in that the parties must be capable of intelligently understanding the nature of, and both the
beneficial or unfavorable consequences of their act. 25 Their understanding should not be affected by insanity, intoxication,
drugs, or hypnotism.26
Based on the above, consent was not lacking between Albios and Fringer. In fact, there was real consent because it was
not vitiated nor rendered defective by any vice of consent. Their consent was also conscious and intelligent as they
understood the nature and the beneficial and inconvenient consequences of their marriage, as nothing impaired their
ability to do so. That their consent was freely given is best evidenced by their conscious purpose of acquiring American
citizenship through marriage. Such plainly demonstrates that they willingly and deliberately contracted the marriage. There
was a clear intention to enter into a real and valid marriage so as to fully comply with the requirements of an application
for citizenship. There was a full and complete understanding of the legal tie that would be created between them, since it
was that precise legal tie which was necessary to accomplish their goal.
In ruling that Albios marriage was void for lack of consent, the CA characterized such as akin to a marriage by way of jest.
A marriage in jest is a pretended marriage, legal in form but entered into as a joke, with no real intention of entering into
the actual marriage status, and with a clear understanding that the parties would not be bound. The ceremony is not
followed by any conduct indicating a purpose to enter into such a relation. 27 It is a pretended marriage not intended to be

real and with no intention to create any legal ties whatsoever, hence, the absence of any genuine consent. Marriages in
jest are void ab initio, not for vitiated, defective, or unintelligent consent, but for a complete absence of consent. There is
no genuine consent because the parties have absolutely no intention of being bound in any way or for any purpose.
The respondents marriage is not at all analogous to a marriage in jest.1wphi1 Albios and Fringer had an undeniable
intention to be bound in order to create the very bond necessary to allow the respondent to acquire American citizenship.
Only a genuine consent to be married would allow them to further their objective, considering that only a valid marriage
can properly support an application for citizenship. There was, thus, an apparent intention to enter into the actual marriage
status and to create a legal tie, albeit for a limited purpose. Genuine consent was, therefore, clearly present.
The avowed purpose of marriage under Article 1 of the Family Code is for the couple to establish a conjugal and family
life. The possibility that the parties in a marriage might have no real intention to establish a life together is, however,
insufficient to nullify a marriage freely entered into in accordance with law. The same Article 1 provides that the nature,
consequences, and incidents of marriage are governed by law and not subject to stipulation. A marriage may, thus, only
be declared void or voidable under the grounds provided by law. There is no law that declares a marriage void if it is
entered into for purposes other than what the Constitution or law declares, such as the acquisition of foreign citizenship.
Therefore, so long as all the essential and formal requisites prescribed by law are present, and it is not void or voidable
under the grounds provided by law, it shall be declared valid. 28
Motives for entering into a marriage are varied and complex. The State does not and cannot dictate on the kind of life that
a couple chooses to lead. Any attempt to regulate their lifestyle would go into the realm of their right to privacy and would
raise serious constitutional questions. 29 The right to marital privacy allows married couples to structure their marriages in
almost any way they see fit, to live together or live apart, to have children or no children, to love one another or not, and
so on.30 Thus, marriages entered into for other purposes, limited or otherwise, such as convenience, companionship,
money, status, and title, provided that they comply with all the legal requisites, 31 are equally valid. Love, though the ideal
consideration in a marriage contract, is not the only valid cause for marriage. Other considerations, not precluded by law,
may validly support a marriage.
Although the Court views with disdain the respondents attempt to utilize marriage for dishonest purposes, It cannot
declare the marriage void. Hence, though the respondents marriage may be considered a sham or fraudulent for the
purposes of immigration, it is not void ab initio and continues to be valid and subsisting.
Neither can their marriage be considered voidable on the ground of fraud under Article 45 (3) of the Family Code. Only the
circumstances listed under Article 46 of the same Code may constitute fraud, namely, (1) non- disclosure of a previous
conv1ctwn involving moral turpitude; (2) concealment by the wife of a pregnancy by another man; (3) concealment of a
sexually transmitted disease; and (4) concealment of drug addiction, alcoholism, or homosexuality. No other
misrepresentation or deceit shall constitute fraud as a ground for an action to annul a marriage. Entering into a marriage
for the sole purpose of evading immigration laws does not qualify under any of the listed circumstances. Furthermore,
under Article 47 (3), the ground of fraud may only be brought by the injured or innocent party. In the present case, there is
no injured party because Albios and Fringer both conspired to enter into the sham marriage.
Albios has indeed made a mockery of the sacred institution of marriage. Allowing her marriage with Fringer to be declared
void would only further trivialize this inviolable institution. The Court cannot declare such a marriage void in the event the
parties fail to qualify for immigration benefits, after they have availed of its benefits, or simply have no further use for it.
These unscrupulous individuals cannot be allowed to use the courts as instruments in their fraudulent schemes. Albios
already misused a judicial institution to enter into a marriage of convenience; she should not be allowed to again abuse it
to get herself out of an inconvenient situation.
No less than our Constitution declares that marriage, as an in violable social institution, is the foundation of the family and
shall be protected by the State. 32 It must, therefore, be safeguarded from the whims and caprices of the contracting
parties. This Court cannot leave the impression that marriage may easily be entered into when it suits the needs of the
parties, and just as easily nullified when no longer needed.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The September 29, 2011 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
95414 is ANNULLED, and Civil Case No. 1134-06 is DISMISSED for utter lack of merit.

G.R. No. 201061

July 3, 2013

SALLY GO-BANGAYAN, Petitioner,

vs.
BENJAMIN BANGAYAN, JR., Respondent.
DECISION

CARPIO, J.:
The Case
Before the Court is a petition for review1 assailing the 17 August 2011 Decision2 and the 14 March 2012
Resolution3 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 94226.
The Antecedent Facts
On 15 March 2004, Benjamin Bangayan, Jr. (Benjamin) filed a petition for declaration of a non-existent
marriage and/or declaration of nullity of marriage before the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 43
(trial court). The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 04109401. Benjamin alleged that on 10 September
1973, he married Azucena Alegre (Azucena) in Caloocan City. They had three children, namely, Rizalyn,
Emmamylin, and Benjamin III.
In 1979, Benjamin developed a romantic relationship with Sally GoBangayan (Sally) who was a customer
in the auto parts and supplies business owned by Benjamins family. In December 1981, Azucena left for
the United States of America. In February 1982, Benjamin and Sally lived together as husband and wife.
Sallys father was against the relationship. On 7 March 1982, in order to appease her father, Sally brought
Benjamin to an office in Santolan, Pasig City where they signed a purported marriage contract. Sally,
knowing Benjamins marital status, assured him that the marriage contract would not be registered.
Benjamin and Sallys cohabitation produced two children, Bernice and Bentley. During the period of their
cohabitation, they acquired the following real properties:
(1) property under Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 61722 registered in the names of
Benjamin and Sally as spouses;
(2) properties under TCT Nos. 61720 and 190860 registered in the name of Benjamin, married to
Sally;
(3) properties under Condominium Certificate of Title (CCT) Nos. 8782 and 8783 registered in the
name of Sally, married to Benjamin; and
(4) properties under TCT Nos. N-193656 and 253681 registered in the name of Sally as a single
individual.
The relationship of Benjamin and Sally ended in 1994 when Sally left for Canada, bringing Bernice and
Bentley with her. She then filed criminal actions for bigamy and falsification of public documents against
Benjamin, using their simulated marriage contract as evidence. Benjamin, in turn, filed a petition for
declaration of a non-existent marriage and/or declaration of nullity of marriage before the trial court on the
ground that his marriage to Sally was bigamous and that it lacked the formal requisites to a valid marriage.
Benjamin also asked the trial court for the partition of the properties he acquired with Sally in accordance
with Article 148 of the Family Code, for his appointment as administrator of the properties during the
pendency of the case, and for the declaration of Bernice and Bentley as illegitimate children. A total of 44
registered properties became the subject of the partition before the trial court. Aside from the seven
properties enumerated by Benjamin in his petition, Sally named 37 properties in her answer.
After Benjamin presented his evidence, Sally filed a demurrer to evidence which the trial court denied.
Sally filed a motion for reconsideration which the trial court also denied. Sally filed a petition for certiorari
before the Court of Appeals and asked for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or injunction
which the Court of Appeals never issued. Sally then refused to present any evidence before the trial court
citing the pendency of her petition before the Court of Appeals. The trial court gave Sally several
opportunities to present her evidence on 28 February 2008, 10 July 2008, 4 September 2008, 11
September 2008, 2 October 2008, 23 October 2008, and 28 November 2008. Despite repeated warnings
from the trial court, Sally still refused to present her evidence, prompting the trial court to consider the
case submitted for decision.

The Decision of the Trial Court

In a Decision4 dated 26 March 2009, the trial court ruled in favor ofBenjamin. The trial court gave weight to
the certification dated 21 July 2004 from the Pasig Local Civil Registrar, which was confirmed during trial,
that only Marriage License Series Nos. 6648100 to 6648150 were issued for the month of February 1982
and the purported Marriage License No. N-07568 was not issued to Benjamin and Sally. 5 The trial court
ruled that the marriage was not recorded with the local civil registrar and the National Statistics Office
because it could not be registered due to Benjamins subsisting marriage with Azucena.
The trial court ruled that the marriage between Benjamin and Sally was not bigamous. The trial court ruled
that the second marriage was void not because of the existence of the first marriage but because of other
causes, particularly, the lack of a marriage license. Hence, bigamy was not committed in this case. The
trial court did not rule on the issue of the legitimacy status of Bernice and Bentley because they were not
parties to the case. The trial court denied Sallys claim for spousal support because she was not married
to Benjamin. The trial court likewise denied support for Bernice and Bentley who were both of legal age
and did not ask for support.
On the issue of partition, the trial court ruled that Sally could not claim the 37 properties she named in her
answer as part of her conjugal properties with Benjamin. The trial court ruled that Sally was not legally
married to Benjamin. Further, the 37 properties that Sally was claiming were owned by Benjamins parents
who gave the properties to their children, including Benjamin, as advance inheritance. The 37 titles were
in the names of Benjamin and his brothers and the phrase "married to Sally Go" was merely descriptive of
Benjamins civil status in the title. As regards the two lots under TCT Nos. 61720 and 190860, the trial
court found that they were bought by Benjamin using his own money and that Sally failed to prove any
actual contribution of money, property or industry in their purchase. The trial court found that Sally was a
registered co-owner of the lots covered by TCT Nos. 61722, N-193656, and 253681 as well as the two
condominium units under CCT Nos. 8782 and 8783. However, the trial court ruled that the lot under TCT
No. 61722 and the two condominium units were purchased from the earnings of Benjamin alone. The trial
court ruled that the properties under TCT Nos. 61722, 61720, and 190860 and CCT Nos. 8782 and 8783
were part of the conjugal partnership of Benjamin and Azucena, without prejudice to Benjamins right to
dispute his conjugal state with Azucena in a separate proceeding.
The trial court further ruled that Sally acted in bad faith because she knew that Benjamin was married to
Azucena. Applying Article 148 of the Family Code, the trial court forfeited Sallys share in the properties
covered under TCT Nos. N-193656 and 253681 in favor of Bernice and Bentley while Benjamins share
reverted to his conjugal ownership with Azucena.
The dispositive portion of the trial courts decision reads:
ACCORDINGLY, the marriage of BENJAMIN BANGAYAN, JR. and SALLY S. GO on March 7, 1982 at
Santolan, Pasig, Metro Manila is hereby declared NULL and VOID AB INITIO. It is further declared
NONEXISTENT.
Respondents claim as co-owner or conjugal owner of the thirtyseven (37) properties under TCT Nos.
17722, 17723, 17724, 17725, 126397, RT-73480, and RT-86821; in Manila, TCT Nos. 188949, 188950,
188951, 193035, 194620, 194621, 194622, 194623, 194624, 194625, 194626, 194627, 194628, 194629,
194630, 194631, 194632, 194633, 194634, 194635, 194636, 194637, 194638, 194639, 198651, 206209,
206210, 206211, 206213 and 206215 is DISMISSED for lack of merit. The registered owners, namely:
Benjamin B. Bangayan, Jr., Roberto E. Bangayan, Ricardo B. Bangayan and Rodrigo B. Bangayan are
the owners to the exclusion of "Sally Go" Consequently, the Registry of Deeds for Quezon City and Manila
are directed to delete the words "married to Sally Go" from these thirty-seven (37) titles.
Properties under TCT Nos. 61722, 61720 and 190860, CCT Nos. 8782 and 8783 are properties acquired
from petitioners money without contribution from respondent, hence, these are properties of the petitioner
and his lawful wife. Consequently, petitioner is appointed the administrator of these five (5) properties.
Respondent is ordered to submit an accounting of her collections of income from these five (5) properties
within thirty (30) days from notice hereof. Except for lot under TCT No. 61722, respondent is further

directed within thirty (30) days from notice hereof to turn over and surrender control and possession of
these properties including the documents of title to the petitioner.
On the properties under TCT Nos. N-193656 and N-253681, these properties are under co-ownership of
the parties shared by them equally. However, the share of respondent is declared FORFEITED in favor of
Bernice Go Bangayan and Bentley Go Bangayan. The share of the petitioner shall belong to his conjugal
ownership with Azucena Alegre. The liquidation, partition and distribution of these two (2) properties shall
be further processed pursuant to Section 21 of A.M. No. 02-11-10 of March 15, 2003.
Other properties shall be adjudicated in a later proceeding pursuant to Section 21 of A.M. No. 02-11-10.
Respondents claim of spousal support, children support and counterclaims are DISMISSED for lack of
merit. Further, no declaration of the status of the parties children.
No other relief granted.
Furnish copy of this decision to the parties, their counsels, the Trial Prosecutor, the Solicitor General and
the Registry of Deeds in Manila, Quezon City and Caloocan.
SO ORDERED.6
Sally filed a Verified and Vigorous Motion for Inhibition with Motion for Reconsideration. In its Order dated
27 August 2009,7 the trial court denied the motion. Sally appealed the trial courts decision before the
Court of Appeals.
The Decision of the Court of Appeals
In its 17 August 2011 Decision, the Court of Appeals partly granted the appeal. The Court of Appeals ruled
that the trial court did not err in submitting the case for decision. The Court of Appeals noted that there
were six resettings of the case, all made at the instance of Sally, for the initial reception of evidence, and
Sally was duly warned to present her evidence on the next hearing or the case would be deemed
submitted for decision. However, despite the warning, Sally still failed to present her evidence. She
insisted on presenting Benjamin who was not around and was not subpoenaed despite the presence of
her other witnesses.
The Court of Appeals rejected Sallys allegation that Benjamin failed to prove his action for declaration of
nullity of marriage. The Court of Appeals ruled that Benjamins action was based on his prior marriage to
Azucena and there was no evidence that the marriage was annulled or dissolved before Benjamin
contracted the second marriage with Sally. The Court of Appeals ruled that the trial court committed no
error in declaring Benjamins marriage to Sally null and void.
The Court of Appeals ruled that the property relations of Benjamin and Sally was governed by Article 148
of the Family Code. The Court of Appeals ruled that only the properties acquired by the parties through
their actual joint contribution of money, property or industry shall be owned by them in common in
proportion to their respective contribution. The Court of Appeals ruled that the 37 properties being claimed
by Sally rightfully belong to Benjamin and his siblings.
As regards the seven properties claimed by both parties, the Court of Appeals ruled that only the
properties under TCT Nos. 61720 and 190860 registered in the name of Benjamin belong to him
exclusively because he was able to establish that they were acquired by him solely. The Court of
Appeals found that the properties under TCT Nos. N-193656 and 253681 and under CCT Nos. 8782 and
8783 were exclusive properties of Sally in the absence of proof of Benjamins actual contribution in their
purchase. The Court of Appeals ruled that the property under TCT No. 61722 registered in the names of
Benjamin and Sally shall be owned by them in common, to be shared equally. However, the share of
Benjamin shall accrue to the conjugal partnership under his existing marriage with Azucena while Sallys
share shall accrue to her in the absence of a clear and convincing proof of bad faith.

Finally, the Court of Appeals ruled that Sally failed to present clear and convincing evidence that would
show bias and prejudice on the part of the trial judge that would justify his inhibition from the case.
The dispositive portion of the Court of Appeals decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant appeal is PARTLY GRANTED. The assailed Decision
and Order dated March 26, 2009 and August 27, 2009, respectively, of the Regional Trial Court of Manila,
Branch 43, in Civil Case No. 04-109401 are hereby AFFIRMED with modification declaring TCT Nos.
61720 and 190860 to be exclusively owned by the petitioner-appellee while the properties under TCT
Nos. N-193656 and 253681 as well as CCT Nos. 8782 and 8783 shall be solely owned by the respondentappellant. On the other hand, TCT No. 61722 shall be owned by them and common and to be shared
equally but the share of the petitioner-appellee shall accrue to the conjugal partnership under his first
marriage while the share of respondent-appellant shall accrue to her. The rest of the decision stands.
SO ORDERED.8
Sally moved for the reconsideration of the Court of Appeals decision. In its 14 March 2012 Resolution, the
Court of Appeals denied her motion.
Hence, the petition before this Court.
The Issues
Sally raised the following issues before this Court:
(1) Whether the Court of Appeals committed a reversible error in affirming the trial courts ruling
that Sally had waived her right to present evidence;
(2) Whether the Court of Appeals committed a reversible error in affirming the trial courts decision
declaring the marriage between Benjamin and Sally null and void ab initio and non-existent; and
(3) Whether the Court of Appeals committed a reversible error in affirming with modification the trial
courts decision regarding the property relations of Benjamin and Sally.
The Ruling of this Court
The petition has no merit.
Waiver of Right to Present Evidence
Sally alleges that the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the trial courts ruling that she waived her right to
present her evidence. Sally alleges that in not allowing her to present evidence that she and Benjamin
were married, the trial court abandoned its duty to protect marriage as an inviolable institution.
It is well-settled that a grant of a motion for continuance or postponement is not a matter of right but is
addressed to the discretion of the trial court. 9 In this case, Sallys presentation of evidence was scheduled
on28 February 2008. Thereafter, there were six resettings of the case: on 10 July 2008, 4 and 11
September 2008, 2 and 28 October 2008, and 28 November 2008. They were all made at Sallys
instance. Before the scheduled hearing of 28 November 2008, the trial court warned Sally that in case she
still failed to present her evidence, the case would be submitted for decision. On the date of the scheduled
hearing, despite the presence of other available witnesses, Sally insisted on presenting Benjamin who
was not even subpoenaed on that day. Sallys counsel insisted that the trial court could not dictate on the
priority of witnesses to be presented, disregarding the trial courts prior warning due to the numerous
resettings of the case. Sally could not complain that she had been deprived of her right to present her
evidence because all the postponements were at her instance and she was warned by the trial court that it
would submit the case for decision should she still fail to present her evidence on 28 November 2008.

We agree with the trial court that by her continued refusal to present her evidence, she was deemed to
have waived her right to present them. As pointed out by the Court of Appeals, Sallys continued failure to
present her evidence despite the opportunities given by the trial court showed her lack of interest to
proceed with the case. Further, it was clear that Sally was delaying the case because she was waiting for
the decision of the Court of Appeals on her petition questioning the trial courts denial of her demurrer to
evidence, despite the fact that the Court of Appeals did not issue any temporary restraining order as Sally
prayed for. Sally could not accuse the trial court of failing to protect marriage as an inviolable institution
because the trial court also has the duty to ensure that trial proceeds despite the deliberate delay and
refusal to proceed by one of the parties. 10
Validity of the Marriage between Benjamin and Sally
Sally alleges that both the trial court and the Court of Appeals recognized her marriage to Benjamin
because a marriage could not be nonexistent and, at the same time, null and void ab initio. Sally further
alleges that if she were allowed to present her evidence, she would have proven her marriage to
Benjamin. To prove her marriage to Benjamin, Sally asked this Court to consider that in acquiring real
properties, Benjamin listed her as his wife by declaring he was "married to" her; that Benjamin was the
informant in their childrens birth certificates where he stated that he was their father; and that Benjamin
introduced her to his family and friends as his wife. In contrast, Sally claims that there was no real
property registered in the names of Benjamin and Azucena. Sally further alleges that Benjamin was not
the informant in the birth certificates of his children with Azucena.
First, Benjamins marriage to Azucena on 10 September 1973 was duly established before the trial court,
evidenced by a certified true copy of their marriage contract. At the time Benjamin and Sally entered into a
purported marriage on 7 March 1982, the marriage between Benjamin and Azucena was valid and
subsisting.
On the purported marriage of Benjamin and Sally, Teresita Oliveros (Oliveros), Registration Officer II of the
Local Civil Registrar of Pasig City, testified that there was no valid marriage license issued to Benjamin
and Sally. Oliveros confirmed that only Marriage Licence Nos. 6648100 to 6648150 were issued for the
month of February 1982. Marriage License No. N-07568 did not match the series issued for the month.
Oliveros further testified that the local civil registrar of Pasig City did not issue Marriage License No. N07568 to Benjamin and Sally. The certification from the local civil registrar is adequate to prove the nonissuance of a marriage license and absent any suspicious circumstance, the certification enjoys probative
value, being issued by the officer charged under the law to keep a record of all data relative to the
issuance of a marriage license. 11 Clearly, if indeed Benjamin and Sally entered into a marriage contract,
the marriage was void from the beginning for lack of a marriage license. 12
It was also established before the trial court that the purported marriage between Benjamin and Sally was
not recorded with the local civil registrar and the National Statistics Office. The lack of record was certified
by Julieta B. Javier, Registration Officer IV of the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of the Municipality of
Pasig;13 Teresita R. Ignacio, Chief of the Archives Division of the Records Management and Archives
Office, National Commission for Culture and the Arts; 14 and Lourdes J. Hufana, Director III, Civil
Registration Department of the National Statistics Office. 15 The documentary and testimonial evidence
proved that there was no marriage between Benjamin and Sally. As pointed out by the trial court, the
marriage between Benjamin and Sally "was made only in jest" 16 and "a simulated marriage, at the instance
of Sally, intended to cover her up from expected social humiliation coming from relatives, friends and the
society especially from her parents seen as Chinese conservatives." 17 In short, it was a fictitious marriage.
The fact that Benjamin was the informant in the birth certificates of Bernice and Bentley was not a proof of
the marriage between Benjamin and Sally. This Court notes that Benjamin was the informant in Bernices
birth certificate which stated that Benjamin and Sally were married on 8 March 1982 18 while Sally was the
informant in Bentleys birth certificate which also stated that Benjamin and Sally were married on 8 March
1982.19 Benjamin and Sally were supposedly married on 7 March 1982 which did not match the dates
reflected on the birth certificates.

We see no inconsistency in finding the marriage between Benjamin and Sally null and void ab initio and,
at the same time, non-existent. Under Article 35 of the Family Code, a marriage solemnized without a
license, except those covered by Article 34 where no license is necessary, "shall be void from the
beginning." In this case, the marriage between Benjamin and Sally was solemnized without a license. It
was duly established that no marriage license was issued to them and that Marriage License No. N-07568
did not match the marriage license numbers issued by the local civil registrar of Pasig City for the month
of February 1982. The case clearly falls under Section 3 of Article 35 20 which made their marriage void ab
initio. The marriage between Benjamin and Sally was also non-existent. Applying the general rules on void
or inexistent contracts under Article 1409 of the Civil Code, contracts which are absolutely simulated or
fictitious are "inexistent and void from the beginning." 21 Thus, the Court of Appeals did not err in sustaining
the trial courts ruling that the marriage between Benjamin and Sally was null and void ab initio and nonexistent.
Except for the modification in the distribution of properties, the Court of Appeals affirmed in all aspects the
trial courts decision and ruled that "the rest of the decision stands." 22 While the Court of Appeals did
notdiscuss bigamous marriages, it can be gleaned from the dispositive portion of the decision declaring
that "the rest of the decision stands" that the Court of Appeals adopted the trial courts discussion that the
marriage between Benjamin and Sally is not bigamous. The trial court stated:
1wphi1

On whether or not the parties marriage is bigamous under the concept of Article 349 of the Revised Penal
Code, the marriage is not bigamous. It is required that the first or former marriage shall not be null and
void. The marriage of the petitioner to Azucena shall be assumed as the one that is valid, there being no
evidence to the contrary and there is no trace of invalidity or irregularity on the face of their marriage
contract. However, if the second marriage was void not because of the existence of the first marriage but
for other causes such as lack of license, the crime of bigamy was not committed. In People v. De Lara
[CA, 51 O.G., 4079], it was held that what was committed was contracting marriage against the provisions
of laws not under Article 349 but Article 350 of the Revised Penal Code. Concluding, the marriage of the
parties is therefore not bigamous because there was no marriage license. The daring and repeated stand
of respondent that she is legally married to petitioner cannot, in any instance, be sustained. Assuming that
her marriage to petitioner has the marriage license, yet the same would be bigamous, civilly or criminally
as it would be invalidated by a prior existing valid marriage of petitioner and Azucena. 23
For bigamy to exist, the second or subsequent marriage must have all the essential requisites for validity
except for the existence of a prior marriage. 24 In this case, there was really no subsequent marriage.
Benjamin and Sally just signed a purported marriage contract without a marriage license. The supposed
marriage was not recorded with the local civil registrar and the National Statistics Office. In short, the
marriage between Benjamin and Sally did not exist. They lived together and represented themselves as
husband and wife without the benefit of marriage.
Property Relations Between Benjamin and Sally
The Court of Appeals correctly ruled that the property relations of Benjamin and Sally is governed by
Article 148 of the Family Code which states:
Art. 148. In cases of cohabitation not falling under the preceding Article, only the properties acquired by
both of the parties through their actual joint contribution of money, property, or industry shall be owned by
them in common in proportion to their respective contributions. In the absence of proof to the contrary,
their contributions and corresponding shares are presumed to be equal. The same rule and presumption
shall apply to joint deposits of money and evidences of credit.
If one of the parties is validly married to another, his or her share in the co-ownership shall accrue to the
absolute community of conjugal partnership existing in such valid marriage. If the party who acted in bad
faith is not validly married to another, his or her share shall be forfeited in the manner provided in the last
paragraph of the preceding Article.
The foregoing rules on forfeiture shall likewise apply even if both parties are in bad faith.

Benjamin and Sally cohabitated without the benefit of marriage. Thus, only the properties acquired by
them through their actual joint contribution of money, property, or industry shall be owned by them in
common in proportion to their respective contributions. Thus, both the trial court and the Court of Appeals
correctly excluded the 37 properties being claimed by Sally which were given by Benjamins father to his
children as advance inheritance. Sallys Answer to the petition before the trial court even admitted that
"Benjamins late father himself conveyed a number of properties to his children and their respective
spouses which included Sally x x x." 25
As regards the seven remaining properties, we rule that the decision of the Court of Appeals is more in
accord with the evidence on record. Only the property covered by TCT No. 61722 was registered in the
names of Benjamin and Sally as spouses. 26 The properties under TCT Nos. 61720 and 190860 were in
the name of Benjamin27 with the descriptive title "married to Sally." The property covered by CCT Nos.
8782 and 8783 were registered in the name of Sally 28 with the descriptive title "married to Benjamin" while
the properties under TCT Nos. N-193656 and 253681 were registered in the name of Sally as a single
individual. We have ruled that the words "married to" preceding the name of a spouse are merely
descriptive of the civil status of the registered owner. 29 Such words do not prove co-ownership. Without
proof of actual contribution from either or both spouses, there can be no co-ownership under Article 148 of
the Family Code.30
Inhibition of the Trial Judge
Sally questions the refusal of Judge Roy G. Gironella (Judge Gironella) to inhibit himself from hearing the
case. She cited the failure of Judge Gironella to accommodate her in presenting her evidence. She further
alleged that Judge Gironella practically labeled her as an opportunist in his decision, showing his partiality
against her and in favor of Benjamin.
We have ruled that the issue of voluntary inhibition is primarily a matter of conscience and sound
discretion on the part of the judge.31 To justify the call for inhibition, there must be extrinsic evidence to
establish bias, bad faith, malice, or corrupt purpose, in addition to palpable error which may be inferred
from the decision or order itself. 32In this case, we have sufficiently explained that Judge Gironella did not
err in submitting the case for decision because of Sallys continued refusal to present her evidence.
We reviewed the decision of the trial court and while Judge Gironella may have used uncomplimentary
words in writing the decision, they are not enough to prove his prejudice against Sally or show that he
acted in bad faith in deciding the case that would justify the call for his voluntary inhibition.
WHEREFORE, we AFFIRM the 17 August 2011 Decision and the 14 March 2012 Resolution of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 94226.
SO ORDERED.

Van Dorn v. Romillo Digest

Van Dorn vs Romillo
G.R. No. L-68470 October 8, 1985
Ponente: Melencio-Herrera, J.:
Facts:
After a divorce was granted by a United States court between petitioner Alice Reyes Van Dorn, a Filipina
and her American husband, the latter filed a civil case in a trial court here in the Philippines alleging that
the her business was conjugal property and praying that she be ordered to render an accounting and that
the plaintiff be granted the right to manage the business.
Issue: Whether or not the divorce is valid
YES.
There can be no question as to the validity of the Nevada divorce in any of the States of the US. The
decree is binding on private respondent as an American citizen. Owing to the nationality principle

embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code, only Philippine nationals are covered by the policy against
absolute divorces the same being considered contrary to our concept of public policy and morality.
However, aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines, provided they
are valid according to their national law. The divorce is likewise valid as to the petitioner.
As such, pursuant to his national law, he is no longer the husband of the petitioner. He has no standing to
sue as husband of the petitioner over their conjugal assets. He is estopped by his own representation
before his own country's court from asserting that right to exercise control over their conjugal assets.

PILAPIL vs. IBAY SOMERA

FACTS:
On September 7, 1979, Imelda Manalaysay Pilapil, a Filipina and Erich Geiling were married at
Friedenweiler in the Federal Republic of Germany. After about three and a half years of marriage,
Geiling initiated a divorce proceeding against Pilapil in Germany in January 1983.
Pilapil, petitioner, on the other hand, filed an action for legal separation, support and separation of
property before RTC of Manila on January 23, 1983 where it is still pending as a civil case. On
January 15, 1986, the local Court of Germany promulgated a divorce decree on the ground of failure
of marriage of the spouses. The custody of the child was granted to petitioner.
On June 27, 1986, private respondent filed two complaints for adultery alleging that, while still married
to respondent, petitioner had an affair with a certain William Chua as early as 1982 and with yet
another man named Jesus Chua sometime in 1983. The respondent city fiscal approved a resolution
directing the filing of two complaints for adultery against petitioner. Thereafter, petitioner filed a motion
in both criminal cases to defer her arraignment and to suspend further proceedings thereon.
Respondent judge merely reset the date of the arraignment but before such scheduled date,
petitioner moved for the suspension of proceedings. On September 8, 1987, respondent judge denied
the motion to quash and also directed the arraignment of both accused. Petitioner refused to be
arraigned
and
thus
charged
with
direct
contempt
and
fined.
ISSUE:
Whether

or

not

the

case

for

adultery

should

prosper.

RULING:
The petition entered dismissing the complaint in criminal case was upheld for lack of jurisdiction. The
temporary restraining order issued in this case was made permanent. The law provides that in
prosecutions for adultery and concubinage the person who can legally file the complaint should be
the offended spouse. The fact that private respondent obtained a valid divorce in his country, is
admitted. Private respondent, being no longer married to petitioner has no legal standing to
commence the adultery case under the posture that he was the offended spouse at the time he filed
suit.
Llorente vs CA
GR 124371 November 23, 2000

FACTS:
Alicia( 2nd wife) Lorenzo N. Llorente --- Paula (1ST wife) --- Ceferino Llorente (brother)
Crisologo Llorente(son)
Lorenzo N. Llorente was an enlisted serviceman of the United States Navy from March 10, 1927 to

September 30, 1957

February 22, 1937: Lorenzo and Paula Llorente were married before a parish priest,

RomanCatholic Church, in Nabua, Camarines Sur

Before the outbreak of the Pacific War, Lorenzo departed for the United States and Paula stayed in
the conjugal home

November 30, 1943: Lorenzo was admitted to United States citizenship and Certificate of

Naturalization
1945: When Lorenzo was granted an accrued leave to visit his wife and he visited the Philippines,
He discovered that his wife Paula was pregnant and was living in and having an adulterous

relationship with his brother, Ceferino Llorente

December 4, 1945: Paula gave birth to a boy registered in the Office of the Registrar of Nabua as
Crisologo Llorente with the certificate stating that the child was not legitimate and the line for the

fathers name was left blank

Lorenzo refused to forgive Paula and live with her

February 2, 1946: the couple drew and signed a written agreement which was witnessed by
Paulas father and stepmother to the effect that

1. all the family allowances allotted by the United States Navy as part of Lorenzos salary and all other
obligations for Paulas daily maintenance and support would be suspended
2. they would dissolve their marital union in accordance with judicial proceedings
3. they would make a separate agreement regarding their conjugal property acquired during their marital life;
and
4. Lorenzo would not prosecute Paula for her adulterous act since she voluntarily admitted her fault and
agreed to separate from Lorenzo peacefully.
November 16, 1951: Lorenzo returned and filed for divorce with the Superior Court of the State of

California in and for the County of San Diego

December 4, 1952: the divorce decree became final

January 16, 1958: Lorenzo married Alicia F. Llorente in Manila and lived together as husband and

wife and bore 3 children: Raul, Luz and Beverly, all surnamed Llorente
March 13, 1981: Lorenzo executed a Last Will and Testament where he bequeathed all his

property to Alicia and their three children

December 14, 1983: Lorenzo filed with the RTC, Iriga, Camarines Sur, a petition for the probate
and allowance of his last will and testament wherein Lorenzo moved that Alicia be appointed

Special Administratrix of his estate

January 18, 1984: RTC denied the motion for the reason that the Lorenzo was still alive

January 24, 1984: RTC admitted finding that the will was duly executedthe will to probate

June 11, 1985: before the proceedings could be terminated, Lorenzo died

RTC on the petition for letters of administration filed by Paula over Lorenzos estate contending
that she was the surviving spouse and WITHOUT terminating the testate proceedings filed by

Alicia, gave due course to Paulas petition

divorce decree granted to the late Lorenzo Llorente is void and inapplicable in the

Philippines, therefore the marriage he contracted with Alicia Fortunato at Manila is void
Paula T. Llorente: 1/3 estate and conjugal estate

illegitimate children, Raul, Luz and Beverly: 1/3 estate

RTC denied Alicias motion for reconsideration but modified that Raul and Luz Llorente are not
children legitimate or otherwise of Lorenzo since they were not legally adopted by him thus,
Beverly Llorente as the only illegitimate child of Lorenzo, entitles her to 1/3 of the estate and one-

third (1/3) of the free portion of the estate

CA: Affirmed with modification

ISSUE: W/N the divorce is valid and proven

HELD:
YES. Petition is GRANTED. REVERSES the decision of the Regional Trial Court and RECOGNIZES as
VALID the decree of divorce granted in favor of the deceased Lorenzo N. Llorente by the Superior Court
of the State of California in and for the County of San Diego, made final on December 4, 1952. REMANDS
the cases to the court of origin for determination of the intrinsic validity of Lorenzo N. Llorentes will and
determination of the parties successional rights allowing proof of foreign law with instructions that the trial
court shall proceed with all deliberate dispatch to settle the estate of the deceased within the framework of
the Rules of Court.

Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr.:

o nationality principle in Article 15 of the Civil Code, only Philippine nationals are covered by the policy
against absolute divorces, the same being considered contrary to our concept of public policy and morality
o Court ruled that aliens may obtain divorces abroad, provided they are valid according to their national law

Quita v. Court of Appeals:

o once proven that NO longer a Filipino citizen when he obtained the divorce, the ruling in Van Dorn would
become applicable
Divorce of Lorenzo H. Llorente from his first wife Paula was valid and recognized in this jurisdiction
as a matter of comity. Now, the effects of this divorce (as to the succession to the estate of

thedecedent) are matters best left to the determination of the trial court.
The clear intent of Lorenzo to bequeath his property to his second wife and children by her is
glaringly shown in the will he executed. We do not wish to frustrate his wishes, since he was a

foreigner, not covered by our laws on family rights and duties, status, condition and legal capacity.
Whether the will is intrinsically valid and who shall inherit from Lorenzo are issues best proved by

foreign law which must be pleaded and proved.

Whether the will was executed in accordance with the formalities required is answered by referring
to Philippine law. In fact, the will was duly probated.

Ninal vs Bayadog
Ninal vs. Bayadog
328 SCRA 122
FACTS:
Pepito Ninal was married with Teodulfa Bellones on September 26, 1974. They had 3
children namely Babyline, Ingrid and Archie, petitioners. Due to the shot inflicted by
Pepito to Teodulfa, the latter died on April 24, 1985 leaving the children under the
guardianship of Engrace Ninal. 1 year and 8 months later, Pepito and Norma
Badayog got married without any marriage license. They instituted an affidavit
stating that they had lived together for at least 5 years exempting from securing the
marriage license. Pepito died in a car accident on February 19, 1977. After his
death, petitioners filed a petition for declaration of nullity of the marriage of Pepito
and Norma alleging that said marriage was void for lack of marriage license.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the second marriage of Pepito was void?
2. Whether or not the heirs of the deceased may file for the declaration of the nullity
of Pepitos marriage after his death?

HELD:
The marriage of Pepito and Norma is void for absence of the marriage license. They
cannot be exempted even though they instituted an affidavit and claimed that they
cohabit for at least 5 years because from the time of Pepitos first marriage was
dissolved to the time of his marriage with Norma, only about 20 months had elapsed.
Albeit, Pepito and his first wife had separated in fact, and thereafter both Pepito and
Norma had started living with each other that has already lasted for five years, the
fact remains that their five-year period cohabitation was not the cohabitation
contemplated by law. Hence, his marriage to Norma is still void.
Void marriages are deemed to have not taken place and cannot be the source of
rights. It can be questioned even after the death of one of the parties and any proper
interested party may attack a void marriage.

G.R. No. 11263

November 2, 1916

ELOISA GOITIA DE LA CAMARA, plaintiff-appellant,

vs.
JOSE CAMPOS RUEDA, defendant-appellee.
TRENT, J.:
This is an action by the wife against her husband for support outside of the conjugal domicile. From a
judgment sustaining the defendant's demurrer upon the ground that the facts alleged in the complaint do
not state a cause of action, followed by an order dismissing the case after the plaintiff declined to amend,
the latter appealed.
It was urged in the first instance, and the court so held, that the defendant cannot be compelled to support
the plaintiff, except in his own house, unless it be by virtue of a judicial decree granting her a divorce or
separation from the defendant.
The parties were legally married in the city of Manila on January 7, 1915, and immediately thereafter
established their residence at 115 Calle San Marcelino, where they lived together for about a month, when
the plaintiff returned to the home of her parents. The pertinent allegations of the complaint are as follows:
That the defendant, one month after he had contracted marriage with the plaintiff, demanded of her
that she perform unchaste and lascivious acts on his genital organs; that the plaintiff spurned the
obscene demands of the defendant and refused to perform any act other than legal and valid
cohabitation; that the defendant, since that date had continually on other successive dates, made
similar lewd and indecorous demands on his wife, the plaintiff, who always spurned them, which
just refusals of the plaintiff exasperated the defendant and induce him to maltreat her by word and
deed and inflict injuries upon her lips, her face and different parts of her body; and that, as the
plaintiff was unable by any means to induce the defendant to desist from his repugnant desires and
cease from maltreating her, she was obliged to leave the conjugal abode and take refuge in the
home of her parents.
Marriage in this jurisdiction is a contract entered into in the manner and with the solemnities established
by General Orders No. 68, in so far as its civil effects are concerned requiring the consent of the parties.
(Garcia vs. Montague, 12 Phil. Rep., 480, citing article 1261 of Civil Code.) Upon the termination of the
marriage ceremony, a conjugal partnership is formed between the parties. (Sy Joc Lieng vs. Encarnacion,
16 Phil. Rep., 137.) To this extent a marriage partakes of the nature of an ordinary contract. But it is
something more than a mere contract. It is a new relation, the rights, duties, and obligations of which rest
not upon the agreement of the parties but upon the general law which defines and prescribes those rights,
duties, and obligations .Marriage is an institution, in the maintenance of which in its purity the public is
deeply interested. It is a relation for life and the parties cannot terminate it at any shorter period by virtue
of any contract they may make .The reciprocal rights arising from this relation, so long as it continues, are
such as the law determines from time to time, and none other. When the legal existence of the parties is

merged into one by marriage, the new relation is regulated and controlled by the state or government
upon principles of public policy for the benefit of society as well as the parties. And when the object of a
marriage is defeated by rendering its continuance intolerable to one of the parties and productive of no
possible good to the community, relief in some way should be obtainable. With these principles to guide
us, we will inquire into the status of the law touching and governing the question under consideration.
Articles 42 to 107 of the Civil Code are not in force in the Philippine Islands (Benedicto vs. De la Rama, 3
Phil .Rep., 34). Articles 44 to 78 of the Law of Civil Marriage of 1870, in force in the Peninsula, were
extended to the Philippine Islands by royal decree on April 13, 1883 (Ebreo vs. Sichon, 4 Phil. Rep., 705).
Articles 44, 45, and 48 of this law read:
ART. 44. The spouses are obliged to be faithful to each other and to mutually assist each other.
ART. 45. The husband must live with and protect his wife. (The second paragraph deals with the
management of the wife's property.)
ART. 48. The wife must obey her husband, live with him, and follow him when he charges his
domicile or residence.
Notwithstanding the provisions of the foregoing paragraph, the court may for just cause relieve her
from this duty when the husband removes his residence to a foreign country.
And articles 143 and 149 of the Civil Code are as follows:
ART. 143. The following are obliged to support each other reciprocally to the whole extent specified
in the preceding article.
1. The consorts.
xxx

xxx

xxx

ART. (149) 49. The person obliged to give support may, at his option, satisfy it, either by paying the
pension that may be fixed or by receiving and maintaining in his own home the person having the
right to the same.
Article 152 of the Civil Code gives the instances when the obligation to give support shall cease. The
failure of the wife to live with her husband is not one of them.
The above quoted provisions of the Law of Civil Marriage and the Civil Code fix the duties and obligations
of the spouses. The spouses must be faithful to, assist, and support each other. The husband must live
with and protect his wife. The wife must obey and live with her husband and follow him when he changes
his domicile or residence, except when he removes to a foreign country. But the husband who is obliged
to support his wife may, at his option, do so by paying her a fixed pension or by receiving and maintaining
her in his own home. May the husband, on account of his conduct toward his wife, lose this option and be
compelled to pay the pension? Is the rule established by article 149 of the Civil Code absolute? The
supreme court of Spain in its decision of December 5, 1903, held:.
That in accordance with the ruling of the supreme court of Spain in its decisions dated May 11,
1897, November 25, 1899, and July 5, 1901, the option which article 149 grants the person,
obliged to furnish subsistence, between paying the pension fixed or receiving and keeping in his
own house the party who is entitled to the same, is not so absolute as to prevent cases being
considered wherein, either because this right would be opposed to the exercise of a preferential
right or because of the existence of some justifiable cause morally opposed to the removal of the
party enjoying the maintenance, the right of selection must be understood as being thereby
restricted.
Whereas the only question discussed in the case which gave rise to this appeal was whether there
was any reason to prevent the exercise of the option granted by article 149 of the Civil Code to the

person obliged to furnish subsistence, to receive and maintain in his own house the one who is
entitled to receive it; and inasmuch as nothing has been alleged or discussed with regard to the
parental authority of Pedro Alcantara Calvo, which he ha not exercised, and it having been set forth
that the natural father simply claims his child for the purpose of thus better attending to her
maintenance, no action having been taken by him toward providing the support until, owing to such
negligence, the mother was obliged to demand it; it is seen that these circumstances, together with
the fact of the marriage of Pedro Alcantara, and that it would be difficult for the mother to maintain
relations with her daughter, all constitute an impediment of such a nature as to prevent the
exercise of the option in the present case, without prejudice to such decision as may be deemed
proper with regard to the other questions previously cited in respect to which no opinion should be
expressed at this time.
The above was quoted with approval in United States and De Jesus vs. Alvir (9 Phil. Rep., 576), wherein
the court held that the rule laid down in article 149 of the Civil Code "is not absolute." but it is insisted that
there existed a preexisting or preferential right in each of these cases which was opposed to the removal
of the one entitled to support. It is true that in the first the person claiming the option was the natural father
of the child and had married a woman other than the child's mother, and in the second the right to support
had already been established by a final judgment in a criminal case. Notwithstanding these facts the two
cases clearly established the proposition that the option given by article 149 of the Civil Code may not be
exercised in any and all cases.
Counsel for the defendant cite, in support of their contention, the decision of the supreme court of Spain,
dated November 3, 1905. In this case Don Berno Comas, as a result of certain business reverses and in
order no to prejudice his wife, conferred upon her powers to administer and dispose of her property. When
she left him he gave her all the muniments of title, mortgage credits, notes, P10,000 in accounts
receivable, and the key to the safe in which he kept a large amount of jewels, thus depriving himself of all
his possessions and being reduced in consequence to want. Subsequently he instituted this civil action
against his wife, who was then living in opulence, for support and the revocation of the powers heretofore
granted in reference to the administration and disposal of her property. In her answer the wife claimed that
the plaintiff (her husband) was not legally in a situation to claim support and that the powers voluntarily
conferred and accepted by her were bilateral and could not be canceled by the plaintiff. From a judgment
in favor of the plaintiff the defendant wife appealed to the Audencia Territorialwherein, after due trial,
judgment was rendered in her favor dismissing the action upon the merits. The plaintiff appealed to the
supreme court and that high tribunal, in affirming the judgment of the Audencia Territorial, said:
Considering that article 143, No. 1, of the Civil Code, providing that the spouses are mutually
obliged to provide each other with support, cannot but be subordinate to the other provisions of
said Code which regulates the family organization and the duties of spouses not legally separated,
among which duties are those of their living together and mutually helping each other, as provided
in article 56 of the aforementioned code; and taking this for granted, the obligation of the spouse
who has property to furnish support to the one who has no property and is in need of it for
subsistence, is to be understood as limited to the case where, in accordance with law, their
separation has been decreed, either temporarily or finally and this case, with respect to the
husband, cannot occur until a judgment of divorce is rendered, since, until then, if he is culpable,
he is not deprived of the management of his wife's property and of the product of the other property
belonging to the conjugal partnership; and
Considering that, should the doctrine maintained in the appeal prevail, it would allow married
persons to disregard the marriage bond and separate from each other of their own free will, thus
establishing, contrary to the legal provision contained in said article 56 of the Civil Code, a legal
status entirely incompatible with the nature and effects of marriage in disregard of the duties
inherent therein and disturbing the unity of the family, in opposition to what the law, in conformity
with good morals, has established; and.
Considering that, as the spouses D. Ramon Benso and Doa Adela Galindo are not legally
separated, it is their duty to live together and afford each other help and support; and for this
reason, it cannot be held that the former has need of support from his wife so that he may live

apart from her without the conjugal abode where it is his place to be, nor of her conferring power
upon him to dispose even of the fruits of her property in order therewith to pay the matrimonial
expenses and, consequently, those of his own support without need of going to his wife; wherefore
the judgment appealed from, denying the petition of D. Ramon Benso for support, has not violated
the articles of the Civil Code and the doctrine invoked in the assignments of error 1 and 5 of the
appeal.
From a careful reading of the case just cited and quoted from it appears quite clearly that the spouses
separated voluntarily in accordance with an agreement previously made. At least there are strong
indications to this effect, for the court says, "should the doctrine maintained in the appeal prevail, it would
allow married persons to disregard the marriage bond and separate from each other of their own free will."
If this be the true basis upon which the supreme court of Spain rested its decision, then the doctrine
therein enunciated would not be controlling in cases where one of the spouses was compelled to leave
the conjugal abode by the other or where the husband voluntarily abandons such abode and the wife
seeks to force him to furnish support. That this is true appears from the decision of the same high tribunal,
dated October 16, 1903. In this case the wife brought an action for support against her husband who had
willfully and voluntarily abandoned the conjugal abode without any cause whatever. The supreme court,
reversing the judgment absolving the defendant upon the ground that no action for divorce, etc., had been
instituted, said:
In the case at bar, it has been proven that it was Don Teodoro Exposito who left the conjugal
abode, although he claims, without however proving his contention, that the person responsible for
this situation was his wife, as she turned him out of the house. From this state of affairs it results
that it is the wife who is party abandoned, the husband not having prosecuted any action to keep
her in his company and he therefore finds himself, as long as he consents to the situation, under
the ineluctable obligation to support his wife in fulfillment of the natural duty sanctioned in article 56
of the Code in relation with paragraph 1 of article 143. In not so holding, the trial court, on the
mistaken ground that for the fulfillment of this duty the situation or relation of the spouses should
be regulated in the manner it indicates, has made the errors of law assigned in the first three
grounds alleged, because the nature of the duty of affording mutual support is compatible and
enforcible in all situations, so long as the needy spouse does not create any illicit situation of the
court above described.
lawphil.net

If we are in error as to the doctrine enunciated by the supreme court of Spain in its decision of November
3, 1905, and if the court did hold, as contended by counsel for the defendant in the case under
consideration, that neither spouse can be compelled to support the other outside of the conjugal abode,
unless it be by virtue of a final judgment granting the injured one a divorce or separation from the other,
still such doctrine or holding would not necessarily control in this jurisdiction for the reason that the
substantive law is not in every particular the same here as it is in Spain. As we have already stated,
articles 42 to 107 of the Civil Code in force in the Peninsula are not in force in the Philippine Islands. The
law governing the duties and obligations of husband and wife in this country are articles 44 to 78 of the
Law of Civil Marriage of 1870 .In Spain the complaining spouse has, under article 105 of the Civil Code,
various causes for divorce, such as adultery on the part of the wife in every case and on the part of the
husband when public scandal or disgrace of the wife results therefrom; personal violence actually inflicted
or grave insults: violence exercised by the husband toward the wife in order to force her to change her
religion; the proposal of the husband to prostitute his wife; the attempts of the husband or wife to corrupt
their sons or to prostitute their daughters; the connivance in their corruption or prostitution; and the
condemnation of a spouse to perpetual chains or hard labor, while in this jurisdiction the only ground for a
divorce is adultery. (Benedicto vs. De la Rama, 3 Phil .Rep., 34, 45.) This positive and absolute doctrine
was announced by this court in the case just cited after an exhaustive examination of the entire subject.
Although the case was appealed to the Supreme Court of the United States and the judgment rendered by
this court was there reversed, the reversal did not affect in any way or weaken the doctrine in reference to
adultery being the only ground for a divorce. And since the decision was promulgated by this court in that
case in December, 1903, no change or modification of the rule has been announced. It is, therefore, the
well settled and accepted doctrine in this jurisdiction.

But it is argued that to grant support in an independent suit is equivalent to granting divorce or separation,
as it necessitates a determination of the question whether the wife has a good and sufficient cause for
living separate from her husband; and, consequently, if a court lacks power to decree a divorce, as in the
instant case, power to grant a separate maintenance must also be lacking. The weakness of this
argument lies in the assumption that the power to grant support in a separate action is dependent upon a
power to grant a divorce. That the one is not dependent upon the other is apparent from the very nature of
the marital obligations of the spouses. The mere act of marriage creates an obligation on the part of the
husband to support his wife. This obligation is founded not so much on the express or implied terms of the
contract of marriage as on the natural and legal duty of the husband; an obligation, the enforcement of
which is of such vital concern to the state itself that the laws will not permit him to terminate it by his own
wrongful acts in driving his wife to seek protection in the parental home. A judgment for separate
maintenance is not due and payable either as damages or as a penalty; nor is it a debt in the strict legal
sense of the term, but rather a judgment calling for the performance of a duty made specific by the
mandate of the sovereign. This is done from necessity and with a view to preserve the public peace and
the purity of the wife; as where the husband makes so base demands upon his wife and indulges in the
habit of assaulting her. The pro tanto separation resulting from a decree for separate support is not an
impeachment of that public policy by which marriage is regarded as so sacred and inviolable in its nature;
it is merely a stronger policy overruling a weaker one; and except in so far only as such separation is
tolerated as a means of preserving the public peace and morals may be considered, it does not in any
respect whatever impair the marriage contract or for any purpose place the wife in the situation of a feme
sole.
The foregoing are the grounds upon which our short opinion and order for judgment, heretofore filed in
this case, rest.
Torres, Johnson and Carson, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. 164584

June 22, 2009

PHILIP MATTHEWS, Petitioner,

vs.
BENJAMIN A. TAYLOR and JOSELYN C. TAYLOR, Respondents.
NACHURA, J.:
Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari are the Court of Appeals (CA) December 19, 2003
Decision1 and July 14, 2004 Resolution2 in CA-G.R. CV No. 59573. The assailed decision affirmed and
upheld the June 30, 1997 Decision3 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 8, Kalibo, Aklan in Civil
Case No. 4632 for Declaration of Nullity of Agreement of Lease with Damages.
On June 30, 1988, respondent Benjamin A. Taylor (Benjamin), a British subject, married Joselyn C. Taylor
(Joselyn), a 17-year old Filipina. 4 On June 9, 1989, while their marriage was subsisting, Joselyn bought
from Diosa M. Martin a 1,294 square-meter lot (Boracay property) situated at Manoc-Manoc, Boracay
Island, Malay, Aklan, for and in consideration of P129,000.00.5 The sale was allegedly financed by

Benjamin.6 Joselyn and Benjamin, also using the latters funds, constructed improvements thereon and
eventually converted the property to a vacation and tourist resort known as the Admiral Ben Bow Inn. 7 All
required permits and licenses for the operation of the resort were obtained in the name of Ginna
Celestino, Joselyns sister.8
However, Benjamin and Joselyn had a falling out, and Joselyn ran away with Kim Philippsen. On June 8,
1992, Joselyn executed a Special Power of Attorney (SPA) in favor of Benjamin, authorizing the latter to
maintain, sell, lease, and sub-lease and otherwise enter into contract with third parties with respect to their
Boracay property.9
On July 20, 1992, Joselyn as lessor and petitioner Philip Matthews as lessee, entered into an Agreement
of Lease10 (Agreement) involving the Boracay property for a period of 25 years, with an annual rental
ofP12,000.00. The agreement was signed by the parties and executed before a Notary Public. Petitioner
thereafter took possession of the property and renamed the resort as Music Garden Resort.
1avvphi1

Claiming that the Agreement was null and void since it was entered into by Joselyn without his
(Benjamins) consent, Benjamin instituted an action for Declaration of Nullity of Agreement of Lease with
Damages11 against Joselyn and the petitioner. Benjamin claimed that his funds were used in the
acquisition and improvement of the Boracay property, and coupled with the fact that he was Joselyns
husband, any transaction involving said property required his consent.
No Answer was filed, hence, the RTC declared Joselyn and the petitioner in defeault. On March 14, 1994,
the RTC rendered judgment by default declaring the Agreement null and void. 12 The decision was,
however, set aside by the CA in CA-G.R. SP No. 34054. 13 The CA also ordered the RTC to allow the
petitioner to file his Answer, and to conduct further proceedings.
In his Answer,14 petitioner claimed good faith in transacting with Joselyn. Since Joselyn appeared to be the
owner of the Boracay property, he found it unnecessary to obtain the consent of Benjamin. Moreover, as
appearing in the Agreement, Benjamin signed as a witness to the contract, indicating his knowledge of the
transaction and, impliedly, his conformity to the agreement entered into by his wife. Benjamin was,
therefore, estopped from questioning the validity of the Agreement.
There being no amicable settlement during the pre-trial, trial on the merits ensued.
On June 30, 1997, the RTC disposed of the case in this manner:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff and against the
defendants as follows:
1. The Agreement of Lease dated July 20, 1992 consisting of eight (8) pages (Exhibits "T", "T-1",
"T-2", "T-3", "T-4", "T-5", "T-6" and "T-7") entered into by and between Joselyn C. Taylor and Philip
Matthews before Notary Public Lenito T. Serrano under Doc. No. 390, Page 79, Book I, Series of
1992 is hereby declared NULL and VOID;
2. Defendants are hereby ordered, jointly and severally, to pay plaintiff the sum of SIXTEEN
THOUSAND (P16,000.00) PESOS as damages representing unrealized income for the residential
building and cottages computed monthly from July 1992 up to the time the property in question is
restored to plaintiff; and
3. Defendants are hereby ordered, jointly and severally, to pay plaintiff the sum of TWENTY
THOUSAND (P20,000.00) PESOS, Philippine Currency, for attorneys fees and other incidental
expenses.
SO ORDERED.15
The RTC considered the Boracay property as community property of Benjamin and Joselyn; thus, the
consent of the spouses was necessary to validate any contract involving the property. Benjamins right
over the Boracay property was bolstered by the courts findings that the property was purchased and

improved through funds provided by Benjamin. Although the Agreement was evidenced by a public
document, the trial court refused to consider the alleged participation of Benjamin in the questioned
transaction primarily because his signature appeared only on the last page of the document and not on
every page thereof.
On appeal to the CA, petitioner still failed to obtain a favorable decision. In its December 19, 2003
Decision,16 the CA affirmed the conclusions made by the RTC. The appellate court was of the view that if,
indeed, Benjamin was a willing participant in the questioned transaction, the parties to the Agreement
should have used the phrase "with my consent" instead of "signed in the presence of." The CA noted that
Joselyn already prepared an SPA in favor of Benjamin involving the Boracay property; it was therefore
unnecessary for Joselyn to participate in the execution of the Agreement. Taken together, these
circumstances yielded the inevitable conclusion that the contract was null and void having been entered
into by Joselyn without the consent of Benjamin.
Aggrieved, petitioner now comes before this Court in this petition for review on certiorari based on the
following grounds:
4.1. THE MARITAL CONSENT OF RESPONDENT BENJAMIN TAYLOR IS NOT REQUIRED IN
THE AGREEMENT OF LEASE DATED 20 JULY 1992. GRANTING ARGUENDO THAT HIS
CONSENT IS REQUIRED, BENJAMIN TAYLOR IS DEEMED TO HAVE GIVEN HIS CONSENT
WHEN HE AFFIXED HIS SIGNATURE IN THE AGREEMENT OF LEASE AS WITNESS IN THE
LIGHT OF THE RULING OF THE SUPREME COURT IN THE CASE OF SPOUSES PELAYO VS.
MELKI PEREZ, G.R. NO. 141323, JUNE 8, 2005.
4.2. THE PARCEL OF LAND SUBJECT OF THE AGREEMENT OF LEASE IS THE EXCLUSIVE
PROPERTY OF JOCELYN C. TAYLOR, A FILIPINO CITIZEN, IN THE LIGHT OF CHEESMAN VS.
IAC, G.R. NO. 74833, JANUARY 21, 1991.
4.3. THE COURTS A QUO ERRONEOUSLY APPLIED ARTICLE 96 OF THE FAMILY CODE OF
THE PHILIPPINES WHICH IS A PROVISION REFERRING TO THE ABSOLUTE COMMUNITY OF
PROPERTY. THE PROPERTY REGIME GOVERNING THE PROPERTY RELATIONS OF
BENJAMIN TAYLOR AND JOSELYN TAYLOR IS THE CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP OF GAINS
BECAUSE THEY WERE MARRIED ON 30 JUNE 1988 WHICH IS PRIOR TO THE EFFECTIVITY
OF THE FAMILY CODE. ARTICLE 96 OF THE FAMILY CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES FINDS NO
APPLICATION IN THIS CASE.
4.4. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS IGNORED THE
REGULARITY IN THE EXECUTION OF NOTARIAL DOCUMENTS.

PRESUMPTION

OF

4.5. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS FAILED TO PASS UPON THE COUNTERCLAIM
OF PETITIONER DESPITE THE FACT THAT IT WAS NOT CONTESTED AND DESPITE THE
PRESENTATION OF EVIDENCE ESTABLISHING SAID CLAIM.17
The petition is impressed with merit.
In fine, we are called upon to determine the validity of an Agreement of Lease of a parcel of land entered
into by a Filipino wife without the consent of her British husband. In addressing the matter before us, we
are confronted not only with civil law or conflicts of law issues, but more importantly, with a constitutional
question.
It is undisputed that Joselyn acquired the Boracay property in 1989. Said acquisition was evidenced by a
Deed of Sale with Joselyn as the vendee. The property was also declared for taxation purposes under her
name. When Joselyn leased the property to petitioner, Benjamin sought the nullification of the contract on
two grounds: first, that he was the actual owner of the property since he provided the funds used in
purchasing the same; and second, that Joselyn could not enter into a valid contract involving the subject
property without his consent.

The trial and appellate courts both focused on the property relations of petitioner and respondent in light of
the Civil Code and Family Code provisions. They, however, failed to observe the applicable constitutional
principles, which, in fact, are the more decisive.
Section 7, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution states: 18
Section 7. Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private lands shall be transferred or conveyed
except to individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain.
1avvphi1

Aliens, whether individuals or corporations, have been disqualified from acquiring lands of the public
domain. Hence, by virtue of the aforecited constitutional provision, they are also disqualified from
acquiring private lands.19 The primary purpose of this constitutional provision is the conservation of the
national patrimony.20 Our fundamental law cannot be any clearer. The right to acquire lands of the public
domain is reserved only to Filipino citizens or corporations at least sixty percent of the capital of which is
owned by Filipinos.21
In Krivenko v. Register of Deeds,22 cited in Muller v. Muller,23 we had the occasion to explain the
constitutional prohibition:
Under Section 1 of Article XIII of the Constitution, "natural resources, with the exception of public
agricultural land, shall not be alienated," and with respect to public agricultural lands, their alienation is
limited to Filipino citizens. But this constitutional purpose conserving agricultural resources in the hands of
Filipino citizens may easily be defeated by the Filipino citizens themselves who may alienate their
agricultural lands in favor of aliens. It is partly to prevent this result that Section 5 is included in Article XIII,
and it reads as follows:
"Section 5. Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private agricultural land will be transferred or
assigned except to individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public
domain in the Philippines."
This constitutional provision closes the only remaining avenue through which agricultural resources may
leak into aliens hands. It would certainly be futile to prohibit the alienation of public agricultural lands to
aliens if, after all, they may be freely so alienated upon their becoming private agricultural lands in the
hands of Filipino citizens. x x x
xxxx
If the term "private agricultural lands" is to be construed as not including residential lots or lands not
strictly agricultural, the result would be that "aliens may freely acquire and possess not only residential lots
and houses for themselves but entire subdivisions, and whole towns and cities," and that "they may validly
buy and hold in their names lands of any area for building homes, factories, industrial plants, fisheries,
hatcheries, schools, health and vacation resorts, markets, golf courses, playgrounds, airfields, and a host
of other uses and purposes that are not, in appellants words, strictly agricultural." (Solicitor Generals
Brief, p. 6) That this is obnoxious to the conservative spirit of the Constitution is beyond question. 24
The rule is clear and inflexible: aliens are absolutely not allowed to acquire public or private lands in the
Philippines, save only in constitutionally recognized exceptions. 25 There is no rule more settled than this
constitutional prohibition, as more and more aliens attempt to circumvent the provision by trying to own
lands through another. In a long line of cases, we have settled issues that directly or indirectly involve the
above constitutional provision. We had cases where aliens wanted that a particular property be declared
as part of their fathers estate; 26 that they be reimbursed the funds used in purchasing a property titled in
the name of another;27that an implied trust be declared in their (aliens) favor; 28 and that a contract of sale
be nullified for their lack of consent.29
In Ting Ho, Jr. v. Teng Gui, 30 Felix Ting Ho, a Chinese citizen, acquired a parcel of land, together with the
improvements thereon. Upon his death, his heirs (the petitioners therein) claimed the properties as part of
the estate of their deceased father, and sought the partition of said properties among themselves. We,

however, excluded the land and improvements thereon from the estate of Felix Ting Ho, precisely
because he never became the owner thereof in light of the above-mentioned constitutional prohibition.
In Muller v. Muller,31 petitioner Elena Buenaventura Muller and respondent Helmut Muller were married in
Germany. During the subsistence of their marriage, respondent purchased a parcel of land in Antipolo City
and constructed a house thereon. The Antipolo property was registered in the name of the petitioner. They
eventually separated, prompting the respondent to file a petition for separation of property. Specifically,
respondent prayed for reimbursement of the funds he paid for the acquisition of said property. In deciding
the case in favor of the petitioner, the Court held that respondent was aware that as an alien, he was
prohibited from owning a parcel of land situated in the Philippines. He had, in fact, declared that when the
spouses acquired the Antipolo property, he had it titled in the name of the petitioner because of said
prohibition. Hence, we denied his attempt at subsequently asserting a right to the said property in the form
of a claim for reimbursement. Neither did the Court declare that an implied trust was created by operation
of law in view of petitioners marriage to respondent. We said that to rule otherwise would permit
circumvention of the constitutional prohibition.
In Frenzel v. Catito,32 petitioner, an Australian citizen, was married to Teresita Santos; while respondent, a
Filipina, was married to Klaus Muller. Petitioner and respondent met and later cohabited in a common-law
relationship, during which petitioner acquired real properties; and since he was disqualified from owning
lands in the Philippines, respondents name appeared as the vendee in the deeds of sale. When their
relationship turned sour, petitioner filed an action for the recovery of the real properties registered in the
name of respondent, claiming that he was the real owner. Again, as in the other cases, the Court refused
to declare petitioner as the owner mainly because of the constitutional prohibition. The Court added that
being a party to an illegal contract, he could not come to court and ask to have his illegal objective carried
out. One who loses his money or property by knowingly engaging in an illegal contract may not maintain
an action for his losses.
Finally, in Cheesman v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 33 petitioner (an American citizen) and Criselda
Cheesman acquired a parcel of land that was later registered in the latters name. Criselda subsequently
sold the land to a third person without the knowledge of the petitioner. The petitioner then sought the
nullification of the sale as he did not give his consent thereto. The Court held that assuming that it was his
(petitioners) intention that the lot in question be purchased by him and his wife, he acquired no right
whatever over the property by virtue of that purchase; and in attempting to acquire a right or interest in
land, vicariously and clandestinely, he knowingly violated the Constitution; thus, the sale as to him was
null and void.
In light of the foregoing jurisprudence, we find and so hold that Benjamin has no right to nullify the
Agreement of Lease between Joselyn and petitioner. Benjamin, being an alien, is absolutely prohibited
from acquiring private and public lands in the Philippines. Considering that Joselyn appeared to be the
designated "vendee" in the Deed of Sale of said property, she acquired sole ownership thereto. This is
true even if we sustain Benjamins claim that he provided the funds for such acquisition. By entering into
such contract knowing that it was illegal, no implied trust was created in his favor; no reimbursement for
his expenses can be allowed; and no declaration can be made that the subject property was part of the
conjugal/community property of the spouses. In any event, he had and has no capacity or personality to
question the subsequent lease of the Boracay property by his wife on the theory that in so doing, he was
merely exercising the prerogative of a husband in respect of conjugal property. To sustain such a theory
would countenance indirect controversion of the constitutional prohibition. If the property were to be
declared conjugal, this would accord the alien husband a substantial interest and right over the land, as he
would then have a decisive vote as to its transfer or disposition. This is a right that the Constitution does
not permit him to have.34
In fine, the Agreement of Lease entered into between Joselyn and petitioner cannot be nullified on the
grounds advanced by Benjamin. Thus, we uphold its validity.
With the foregoing disquisition, we find it unnecessary to address the other issues raised by the petitioner.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the December 19, 2003 Decision and July 14, 2004 Resolution of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 59573, are REVERSED and SET ASIDE and a new one is
entered DISMISSING the complaint against petitioner Philip Matthews.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 74833 January 21, 1991

THOMAS C. CHEESMAN, petitioner,
vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and ESTELITA PADILLA, respondents.
NARVASA, J.:p
This appeal concerns the attempt by an American citizen (petitioner Thomas Cheesman) to annul for
lack of consent on his part the sale by his Filipino wife (Criselda) of a residential lot and building to
Estelita Padilla, also a Filipino.
Thomas Cheesman and Criselda P. Cheesman were married on December 4, 1970 but have been
separated since February 15,1981. 1
On June 4, 1974, a "Deed of Sale and Transfer of Possessory Rights" was executed by Armando Altares
conveying a parcel of unregistered land and the house thereon (at No. 7 Neptune Street, Gordon Heights,
Olongapo City) in favor of "Criselda P. Cheesman, of legal age, Filipino citizen, married to Thomas
Cheesman, and residing at Lot No. 1, Blk. 8, Filtration Road, Sta. Rita, Olongapo City . . ." 2 Thomas
Cheesman, although aware of the deed, did not object to the transfer being made only to his wife. 3

Thereafterand again with the knowledge of Thomas Cheesman and also without any protest by him
tax declarations for the property purchased were issued in the name only of Criselda Cheesman and
Criselda assumed exclusive management and administration of said property, leasing it to tenants. 4 On
July 1, 1981, Criselda Cheesman sold the property to Estelita M. Padilla, without the knowledge or consent of Thomas
Cheesman. 5 The deed described Criselda as being" . . . of legal age, married to an American citizen,. . ." 6

Thirty days later, or on July 31, 1981, Thomas Cheesman brought suit in the Court of First Instance at
Olongapo City against his wife, Criselda, and Estelita Padilla, praying for the annulment of the sale on the
ground that the transaction had been executed without his knowledge and consent. 7 An answer was filed in
the names of both defendants, alleging that (1) the property sold was paraphernal, having been purchased by Criselda
with funds exclusively belonging to her ("her own separate money"); (2) Thomas Cheesman, being an American, was
disqualified to have any interest or right of ownership in the land; and (3) Estelita Padilla was a buyer in good faith. 8

During the pre-trial conference, the parties agreed upon certain facts which were subsequently set out in a
pre-trial Order dated October 22, 1981, 9 as follows:
1. Both parties recognize the existence of the Deed of Sale over the residential house
located at No. 7 Granada St., Gordon Heights, Olongapo City, which was acquired from
Armando Altares on June 4, 1974 and sold by defendant Criselda Cheesman to Estelita
Padilla on July 12, 1981; and
2. That the transaction regarding the transfer of their property took place during the
existence of their marriage as the couple were married on December 4, 1970 and the
questioned property was acquired sometime on June 4,1974.

The action resulted in a judgment dated June 24, 1982,

10

declaring void ab initio the sale executed by Criselda

Cheesman in favor of Estelita M. Padilla, and ordering the delivery of the property to Thomas Cheesman as administrator
of the conjugal partnership property, and the payment to him of P5,000.00 as attorney's fees and expenses of litigation. 11

The judgment was however set aside as regards Estelita Padilla on a petition for relief filed by the latter,
grounded on "fraud, mistake and/or excusable negligence" which had seriously impaired her right to
present her case adequately. 12 "After the petition for relief from judgment was given due course," according to
petitioner, "a new judge presided over the case."

13

Estelita Padilla filed a supplemental pleading on December 20, 1982 as her own answer to the complaint,
and a motion for summary judgment on May 17, 1983. Although there was initial opposition by Thomas
Cheesman to the motion, the parties ultimately agreed on the rendition by the court of a summary
judgment after entering into a stipulation of facts, at the hearing of the motion on June 21, 1983, the
stipulation being of the following tenor: 14
(1) that the property in question was bought during the existence of the marriage between
the plaintiff and the defendant Criselda P. Cheesman;
(2) that the property bought during the marriage was registered in the name of Criselda
Cheesman and that the Deed of Sale and Transfer of Possessory Rights executed by the
former owner-vendor Armando Altares in favor of Criselda Cheesman made no mention of
the plaintiff;
(3) that the property, subject of the proceedings, was sold by defendant Criselda Cheesman
in favor of the other defendant Estelita M. Padilla, without the written consent of the plaintiff.
Obviously upon the theory that no genuine issue existed any longer and there was hence no need of a
trial, the parties having in fact submitted, as also stipulated, their respective memoranda each praying for
a favorable verdict, the Trial Court 15 rendered a "Summary Judgment" dated August 3, 1982 declaring "the sale
executed by . . . Criselda Cheesman in favor of . . . Estelita Padilla to be valid," dismissing Thomas Cheesman's complaint
and ordering him "to immediately turn over the possession of the house and lot subject of . . . (the) case to . . . Estelita
Padilla . . ." 16

The Trial Court found that

1) the evidence on record satisfactorily overcame the disputable presumption in Article 160
of the Civil Codethat all property of the marriage belongs to the conjugal partnership
"unless it be proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband or to the wife"and that the
immovable in question was in truth Criselda's paraphernal property;
2) that moreover, said legal presumption in Article 160 could not apply "inasmuch as the
husband-plaintiff is an American citizen and therefore disqualified under the Constitution to
acquire and own real properties; and
3) that the exercise by Criselda of exclusive acts of dominion with the knowledge of her
husband "had led . . . Estelita Padilla to believe that the properties were the exclusive
properties of Criselda Cheesman and on the faith of such a belief she bought the properties
from her and for value," and therefore, Thomas Cheesman was, under Article 1473 of the
Civil Code, estopped to impugn the transfer to Estelita Padilla.
Thomas Cheesman appealed to the Intermediate Appellate Court. There he assailed the Trial Court acts
(1) of granting Estelita Padilla's petition for relief, and its resolution of matters not subject of said petition;
(2) of declaring valid the sale to Estelita Padilla despite the lack of consent thereto by him, and the
presumption of the conjugal character of the property in question pursuant to Article 160 of the Civil Code;
(3) of disregarding the judgment of June 24, 1982 which, not having been set aside as against Criselda
Cheesman, continued to be binding on her; and (4) of making findings of fact not supported by evidence.
All of these contentions were found to be without merit by the Appellate Tribunal which, on January 7,

1986, promulgated a decision (erroneously denominated, "Report") 17 affirming the "Summary Judgment
complained of," "having found no reversible error" therein.

Once more, Thomas Cheesman availed of the remedy of appeal, this time to this Court. Here, he argues
that it was reversible error for the Intermediate Appellate Court
1) to find that the presumption that the property in question is conjugal in accordance with Article 160 had
been satisfactorily overcome by Estelita Padilla; 18
2) to rule that Estelita Padilla was a purchaser of said property in good faith, it appearing:
a) that the deed by which the property was conveyed to Criselda Cheesman described her
as "married to Thomas C. Cheesman," as well as the deed by which the property was later
conveyed to Estelita Padilla by Criselda Cheesman also described her as "married to an
American citizen," and both said descriptions had thus "placed Estelita on knowledge of the
conjugal nature of the property;" and
b) that furthermore, Estelita had admitted to stating in the deed by which she acquired the
property a price much lower than that actually paid "in order to avoid payment of more
obligation to the government;" 19
3) to decline to declare that the evidence did not warrant the grant of Estelita Padilla's petition for relief on
the ground of "fraud, mistake and/or excusable negligence;" 20
4) to hold that Thomas Cheesman had waived his objection to Estelita's petition for relief by failing to
appeal from the order granting the same;
5) to accord to Estelita Padilla a relief other than that she had specifically prayed for in her petition for
relief, ie., "the restoration of the purchase price which Estelita allegedly paid to Criselda;" 21 and
6) to fail to declare that Thomas Cheesman's citizenship is not a bar to his action to recover the lot and
house for the conjugal partnership. 22
Such conclusions as that (1) fraud, mistake or excusable negligence existed in the premises justifying
relief to Estelita Padilla under Rule 38 of the Rules of Court, or (2) that Criselda Cheesman had used
money she had brought into her marriage to Thomas Cheesman to purchase the lot and house in
question, or (3) that Estelita Padilla believed in good faith that Criselda Cheesman was the exclusive
owner of the property that she (Estelita) intended to and did in fact buyderived from the evidence
adduced by the parties, the facts set out in the pleadings or otherwise appearing on recordare
conclusions or findings of fact. As distinguished from a question of lawwhich exists "when the doubt or
difference arises as to what the law is on a certain state of facts" "there is a question of fact when the
doubt or difference arises as to the truth or the falsehood of alleged facts;" 23or when the "query necessarily
invites calibration of the whole evidence considering mainly the credibility of witnesses, existence and relevancy of
specific surrounding circumstances, their relation; to each other and to the whole and the probabilities of the situation." 24

Now, it is axiomatic that only questions of law, distinctly set forth, may be raised in a petition for the review
oncertiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals presented to this Court. 25 As everyone knows or ought to
know, the appellate jurisdiction of this Court is limited to reviewing errors of law, accepting as conclusive the factual
findings of the lower court upon its own assessment of the evidence. 26 The creation of the Court of Appeals was precisely
intended to take away from the Supreme Court the work of examining the evidence, and confine its task to the
determination of questions which do not call for the reading and study of transcripts containing the testimony of
witnesses. 27 The rule of conclusiveness of the factual findings or conclusions of the Court of Appeals is, to be sure,
subject to certain exceptions,28 none of which however obtains in the case at bar.

It is noteworthy that both the Trial Court and the Intermediate Appellate Court reached the same
conclusions on the three (3) factual matters above set forth, after assessment of the evidence and
determination of the probative value thereof. Both Courts found that the facts on record adequately proved
fraud, mistake or excusable negligence by which Estelita Padilla's rights had been substantially impaired;
that the funds used by Criselda Cheesman was money she had earned and saved prior to her marriage to

Thomas Cheesman, and that Estelita Padilla did believe in good faith that Criselda Cheesman was the
sole owner of the property in question. Consequently, these determinations of fact will not be here
disturbed, this Court having been cited to no reason for doing so.
These considerations dispose of the first three (3) points that petitioner Cheesman seeks to make in his
appeal. They also make unnecessary an extended discussion of the other issues raised by him. As to
them, it should suffice to restate certain fundamental propositions.
An order of a Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) granting a petition for relief under Rule 38
is interlocutory and is not appealable. Hence, the failure of the party who opposed the petition to appeal
from said order, or his participation in the proceedings subsequently had, cannot be construed as a waiver
of his objection to the petition for relief so as to preclude his raising the same question on appeal from the
judgment on the merits of the main case. Such a party need not repeat his objections to the petition for
relief, or perform any act thereafter (e.g., take formal exception) in order to preserve his right to question
the same eventually, on appeal, it being sufficient for this purpose that he has made of record "the action
which he desires the court to take or his objection to the action of the court and his grounds therefor." 29
Again, the prayer in a petition for relief from judgment under Rule 38 is not necessarily the same prayer in
the petitioner's complaint, answer or other basic pleading. This should be obvious. Equally obvious is that
once a petition for relief is granted and the judgment subject thereof set aside, and further proceedings
are thereafter had, the Court in its judgment on the merits may properly grant the relief sought in the
petitioner's basic pleadings, although different from that stated in his petition for relief.
Finally, the fundamental law prohibits the sale to aliens of residential land. Section 14, Article XIV of the
1973 Constitution ordains that, "Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private land shall be
transferred or conveyed except to individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or hold
lands of the public domain." 30 Petitioner Thomas Cheesman was, of course, charged with knowledge of this
prohibition. Thus, assuming that it was his intention that the lot in question be purchased by him and his wife, he acquired
no right whatever over the property by virtue of that purchase; and in attempting to acquire a right or interest in land,
vicariously and clandestinely, he knowingly violated the Constitution; the sale as to him was null and void. 31 In any event,
he had and has no capacity or personality to question the subsequent sale of the same property by his wife on the theory
that in so doing he is merely exercising the prerogative of a husband in respect of conjugal property. To sustain such a
theory would permit indirect controversion of the constitutional prohibition. If the property were to be declared conjugal,
this would accord to the alien husband a not insubstantial interest and right over land, as he would then have a decisive
vote as to its transfer or disposition. This is a right that the Constitution does not permit him to have.

As already observed, the finding that his wife had used her own money to purchase the property cannot,
and will not, at this stage of the proceedings be reviewed and overturned. But even if it were a fact that
said wife had used conjugal funds to make the acquisition, the considerations just set out militate, on high
constitutional grounds, against his recovering and holding the property so acquired or any part thereof.
And whether in such an event, he may recover from his wife any share of the money used for the
purchase or charge her with unauthorized disposition or expenditure of conjugal funds is not now inquired
into; that would be, in the premises, a purely academic exercise. An equally decisive consideration is that
Estelita Padilla is a purchaser in good faith, both the Trial Court and the Appellate Court having found that
Cheesman's own conduct had led her to believe the property to be exclusive property of the latter's wife,
freely disposable by her without his consent or intervention. An innocent buyer for value, she is entitled to
the protection of the law in her purchase, particularly as against Cheesman, who would assert rights to the
property denied him by both letter and spirit of the Constitution itself.
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is AFFIRMED, with costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 149615 August 29, 2006
IN RE: PETITION FOR SEPARATION OF PROPERTY ELENA BUENAVENTURA MULLER, Petitioner,
vs.
HELMUT MULLER, Respondent.

DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
This petition for review on certiorari 1 assails the February 26, 2001 Decision 2 of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CV No. 59321 affirming with modification the August 12, 1996 Decision 3 of the Regional Trial
Court of Quezon City, Branch 86 in Civil Case No. Q-94-21862, which terminated the regime of absolute
community of property between petitioner and respondent, as well as the Resolution 4 dated August 13,
2001 denying the motion for reconsideration.
The facts are as follows:
Petitioner Elena Buenaventura Muller and respondent Helmut Muller were married in Hamburg, Germany
on September 22, 1989. The couple resided in Germany at a house owned by respondents parents but
decided to move and reside permanently in the Philippines in 1992. By this time, respondent had inherited
the house in Germany from his parents which he sold and used the proceeds for the purchase of a parcel
of land in Antipolo, Rizal at the cost of P528,000.00 and the construction of a house amounting to
P2,300,000.00. The Antipolo property was registered in the name of petitioner under Transfer Certificate
of Title No. 219438 5 of the Register of Deeds of Marikina, Metro Manila.
Due to incompatibilities and respondents alleged womanizing, drinking, and maltreatment, the spouses
eventually separated. On September 26, 1994, respondent filed a petition 6 for separation of properties
before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City.
On August 12, 1996, the trial court rendered a decision which terminated the regime of absolute
community of property between the petitioner and respondent. It also decreed the separation of properties
between them and ordered the equal partition of personal properties located within the country, excluding
those acquired by gratuitous title during the marriage. With regard to the Antipolo property, the court held
that it was acquired using paraphernal funds of the respondent. However, it ruled that respondent cannot
recover his funds because the property was purchased in violation of Section 7, Article XII of the
Constitution. Thus
However, pursuant to Article 92 of the Family Code, properties acquired by gratuitous title by either
spouse during the marriage shall be excluded from the community property. The real property, therefore,
inherited by petitioner in Germany is excluded from the absolute community of property of the herein
spouses. Necessarily, the proceeds of the sale of said real property as well as the personal properties
purchased thereby, belong exclusively to the petitioner. However, the part of that inheritance used by the
petitioner for acquiring the house and lot in this country cannot be recovered by the petitioner, its
acquisition being a violation of Section 7, Article XII of the Constitution which provides that "save in cases
of hereditary succession, no private lands shall be transferred or conveyed except to individuals,
corporations or associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain." The law will leave the
parties in the situation where they are in without prejudice to a voluntary partition by the parties of the said
real property. x x x
xxxx
As regards the property covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 219438 of the Registry of Deeds of
Marikina, Metro Manila, situated in Antipolo, Rizal and the improvements thereon, the Court shall not
make any pronouncement on constitutional grounds. 7
Respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals which rendered the assailed decision modifying the trial
courts Decision. It held that respondent merely prayed for reimbursement for the purchase of the Antipolo
property, and not acquisition or transfer of ownership to him. It also considered petitioners ownership over
the property in trust for the respondent. As regards the house, the Court of Appeals ruled that there is
nothing in the Constitution which prohibits respondent from acquiring the same. The dispositive portion of
the assailed decision reads:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Decision of the lower court dated August 12, 1996 is hereby
MODIFIED. Respondent Elena Buenaventura Muller is hereby ordered to REIMBURSE the petitioner the
amount of P528,000.00 for the acquisition of the land and the amount of P2,300,000.00 for the
construction of the house situated in Atnipolo, Rizal, deducting therefrom the amount respondent spent for
the preservation, maintenance and development of the aforesaid real property including the depreciation
cost of the house or in the alternative to SELL the house and lot in the event respondent does not have
the means to reimburse the petitioner out of her own money and from the proceeds thereof, reimburse the
petitioner of the cost of the land and the house deducting the expenses for its maintenance and
preservation spent by the respondent. Should there be profit, the same shall be divided in proportion to
the equity each has over the property. The case is REMANDED to the lower court for reception of
evidence as to the amount claimed by the respondents for the preservation and maintenance of the
property.
SO ORDERED. 8
Hence, the instant petition for review raising the following issues:
I
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE RESPONDENT
HEREIN IS ENTITLED TO REIMBURSEMENT OF THE AMOUNT USED TO PURCHASE THE LAND AS
WELL AS THE COSTS FOR THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE HOUSE, FOR IN SO RULING, IT
INDIRECTLY ALLOWED AN ACT DONE WHICH OTHERWISE COULD NOT BE DIRECTLY x x x DONE,
WITHOUT DOING VIOLENCE TO THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROSCRIPTION THAT AN ALIEN IS
PROHIBITED FROM ACQUIRING OWNERSHIP OF REAL PROPERTIES LOCATED IN THE
PHILIPPINES.
II
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN SUSTAINING RESPONDENTS CAUSE OF ACTION
WHICH IS ACTUALLY A DESPERATE ATTEMPT TO OBTAIN OWNERSHIP OVER THE LOT IN
QUESTION, CLOTHED UNDER THE GUISE OF CLAIMING REIMBURSEMENT.
Petitioner contends that respondent, being an alien, is disqualified to own private lands in the Philippines;
that respondent was aware of the constitutional prohibition but circumvented the same; and that
respondents purpose for filing an action for separation of property is to obtain exclusive possession,
control and disposition of the Antipolo property.
Respondent claims that he is not praying for transfer of ownership of the Antipolo property but merely
reimbursement; that the funds paid by him for the said property were in consideration of his marriage to
petitioner; that the funds were given to petitioner in trust; and that equity demands that respondent should
be reimbursed of his personal funds.
The issue for resolution is whether respondent is entitled to reimbursement of the funds used for the
acquisition of the Antipolo property.
The petition has merit.
Section 7, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution states:
Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private lands shall be transferred or conveyed except to
individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain.
Aliens, whether individuals or corporations, are disqualified from acquiring lands of the public domain.
Hence, they are also disqualified from acquiring private lands. 9 The primary purpose of the constitutional
provision is the conservation of the national patrimony. In the case of Krivenko v. Register of Deeds, 10 the
Court held:

Under section 1 of Article XIII of the Constitution, "natural resources, with the exception of public
agricultural land, shall not be alienated," and with respect to public agricultural lands, their alienation is
limited to Filipino citizens. But this constitutional purpose conserving agricultural resources in the hands of
Filipino citizens may easily be defeated by the Filipino citizens themselves who may alienate their
agricultural lands in favor of aliens. It is partly to prevent this result that section 5 is included in Article XIII,
and it reads as follows:
"Sec. 5. Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private agricultural land will be transferred or assigned
except to individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain
in the Philippines."
This constitutional provision closes the only remaining avenue through which agricultural resources may
leak into aliens hands. It would certainly be futile to prohibit the alienation of public agricultural lands to
aliens if, after all, they may be freely so alienated upon their becoming private agricultural lands in the
hands of Filipino citizens. x x x
xxxx
If the term "private agricultural lands" is to be construed as not including residential lots or lands not
strictly agricultural, the result would be that "aliens may freely acquire and possess not only residential lots
and houses for themselves but entire subdivisions, and whole towns and cities," and that "they may validly
buy and hold in their names lands of any area for building homes, factories, industrial plants, fisheries,
hatcheries, schools, health and vacation resorts, markets, golf courses, playgrounds, airfields, and a host
of other uses and purposes that are not, in appellants words, strictly agricultural." (Solicitor Generals
Brief, p. 6.) That this is obnoxious to the conservative spirit of the Constitution is beyond question.
Respondent was aware of the constitutional prohibition and expressly admitted his knowledge thereof to
this Court. 11 He declared that he had the Antipolo property titled in the name of petitioner because of the
said prohibition. 12 His attempt at subsequently asserting or claiming a right on the said property cannot be
sustained.
The Court of Appeals erred in holding that an implied trust was created and resulted by operation of law in
view of petitioners marriage to respondent. Save for the exception provided in cases of hereditary
succession, respondents disqualification from owning lands in the Philippines is absolute. Not even an
ownership in trust is allowed. Besides, where the purchase is made in violation of an existing statute and
in evasion of its express provision, no trust can result in favor of the party who is guilty of the fraud. 13 To
hold otherwise would allow circumvention of the constitutional prohibition.
Invoking the principle that a court is not only a court of law but also a court of equity, is likewise misplaced.
It has been held that equity as a rule will follow the law and will not permit that to be done indirectly which,
because of public policy, cannot be done directly. 14 He who seeks equity must do equity, and he who
comes into equity must come with clean hands. The latter is a frequently stated maxim which is also
expressed in the principle that he who has done inequity shall not have equity. It signifies that a litigant
may be denied relief by a court of equity on the ground that his conduct has been inequitable, unfair and
dishonest, or fraudulent, or deceitful as to the controversy in issue. 15
Thus, in the instant case, respondent cannot seek reimbursement on the ground of equity where it is clear
that he willingly and knowingly bought the property despite the constitutional prohibition.
Further, the distinction made between transfer of ownership as opposed to recovery of funds is a futile
exercise on respondents part. To allow reimbursement would in effect permit respondent to enjoy the
fruits of a property which he is not allowed to own. Thus, it is likewise proscribed by law. As expressly held
in Cheesman v. Intermediate Appellate Court: 16
Finally, the fundamental law prohibits the sale to aliens of residential land. Section 14, Article XIV of the
1973 Constitution ordains that, "Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private land shall be
transferred or conveyed except to individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or hold

lands of the public domain." Petitioner Thomas Cheesman was, of course, charged with knowledge of this
prohibition. Thus, assuming that it was his intention that the lot in question be purchased by him and his
wife, he acquired no right whatever over the property by virtue of that purchase; and in attempting to
acquire a right or interest in land, vicariously and clandestinely, he knowingly violated the Constitution; the
sale as to him was null and void. In any event, he had and has no capacity or personality to question the
subsequent sale of the same property by his wife on the theory that in so doing he is merely exercising the
prerogative of a husband in respect of conjugal property. To sustain such a theory would permit indirect
controversion of the constitutional prohibition. If the property were to be declared conjugal, this would
accord to the alien husband a not insubstantial interest and right over land, as he would then have a
decisive vote as to its transfer or disposition. This is a right that the Constitution does not permit him to
have.
As already observed, the finding that his wife had used her own money to purchase the property cannot,
and will not, at this stage of the proceedings be reviewed and overturned. But even if it were a fact that
said wife had used conjugal funds to make the acquisition, the considerations just set out to militate, on
high constitutional grounds, against his recovering and holding the property so acquired, or any part
thereof. And whether in such an event, he may recover from his wife any share of the money used for the
purchase or charge her with unauthorized disposition or expenditure of conjugal funds is not now inquired
into; that would be, in the premises, a purely academic exercise. (Emphasis added)
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated February
26, 2001 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 59321 ordering petitioner Elena Buenaventura Muller
to reimburse respondent Helmut Muller the amount of P528,000 for the acquisition of the land and the
amount of P2,300,000 for the construction of the house in Antipolo City, and the Resolution dated August
13, 2001 denying reconsideration thereof, are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The August 12, 1996
Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 86 in Civil Case No. Q-94-21862 terminating
the regime of absolute community between the petitioner and respondent, decreeing a separation of
property between them and ordering the partition of the personal properties located in the Philippines
equally, is REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.