The Identity of Indiscernibles

I.

The Principle

The Identity of Indiscernibles is also known as PII, or the Dissimilarity of the Diverse. It
is the following:
PII: (x y (F (Fx Fy) x=y))
Necessarily, for any object x, and any object y, if x and y have all and only the same
features, x just is y.
II.

Interpretations of the Principle

Interpretations of PII come in two varieties, the haecceitic and the non-haecceitic.
Haecceitic PII: among the things that count as features we include properties that have
particularity built into them, like the property of being identical to Carl Sagan, or the
property of being identical to iron sphere #35.
Taken this way, PII is indisputably true, though it requires countenancing properties like
being identical to Carl Sagan. Such properties, called haecceities or individual essences,
are controversial.
Non-Haecceitic PII: among the things that count as features we exclude any properties
that have the identity of a particular built into them. This version of PII states that it is
impossible for two particulars to have exactly the same general features. It is both more
substantive than the haecceitic version, and also more controversial.
III.

Why Accept PII?

1) Metaphysicians get forced into accepting PII by being committed to both realism
about immanent universals and the bundle theory of particulars. Together, these two
views logically entail PII:
a) If immanent universals exist, then exactly resembling bundles of properties are
numerically identical.
b) If the bundle theory is true, then every particular is numerically identical to a
bundle of properties.
c) So if the bundle theory is true, and if immanent universals exist, then exactly
resembling particulars are numerically identical.

2) A philosopher might have theoretical reasons for defining numeric identity instead of
taking it as primitive. Ed Zalta, for instance, accepts PII in order to take something
else as primitive, namely the difference between encoding and instantiating a
property.
3) Michael Della-Rocca argues that rejecting PII leads to an absurdity:
a) If PII is false, then two things can differ in their numeric identity without differing
in their qualitative identity.
b) If two things can differ in their numeric identity without differing in qualitative
identity, then we can have two, or ten, or a million spheres in exactly the same
place at oncethey can be primitively distinct.
c) But such a situation is absurd.
d) So PII is true
A problem with Della-Roccas reductio is that it assumes that spatial criteria of
individuatione.g. criteria according to which spatial separation is necessary for
numerically distinct particularsreduce to qualitative criteria of individuatione.g.
criteria according to which a qualitative difference is necessary for numerically distinct
particulars. The latter is equivalent to PII. But spatial criteria of individuation need not
be qualitative criteriawe could, of course, analyze location in terms of the properties,
but we need not. (But if locations arent properties, then what are they? See # 4)
IV.

Why Reject PII?

1) Max Blacks Counterexample (a.k.a. Blacks Balls)

Consider a symmetrical universe with just two spheres in it, each made of pure iron and
exactly one mile in diameter. Such spheres would have all and only the same features.
Yet there would be two of them, not one. The spheres show that, possibly, for some x and
for some y, x and y have all and only the same features, though x is not y. So PII is false.
Responses to Blacks Balls:
i) Realism about space-time points.
The two spheres do not have exactly the same features, since one of them has the feature
of being at point p, and the other has the feature of being at point q. This is a real
difference, and not just stipulation, because p and q are real. Spatial points exist, and the
spheres differ by relation to them. Since the spheres differ, they are no counterexample to
the claim that things with exactly the same features are numerically identical.

Problem: the absolute theory of space might be empirically false.

Problem: this view requires there to be a primitive difference between spatial
points, which requires primitive, non-qualitative distinctness. But as long as you
admit that, you may as well allow such distinctness to obtain between the spheres
themselves and leave the spatial points out of it.
Problem: if an objects location is part of the bundle to which it is identical, then
that object cannot move. If it did, it would be a different bundle, which means a
different object. (This is just an instance of a more general problem for bundle
theorists, namely the possibility of change.)
ii) There are not two spheres, but one.

A defender of PII might respond to Blacks Balls by re-describing the case so that it does
not violate PII. There are several ways to do this.
Ian Hackings Version of (ii):
There is just one sphere in the example. It has properties like being ten feet from an iron
sphere, of course, but this is only because in the imagined case space is curved.
Consequently, the sphere is ten feet from itself.

Problem: one should be able to stipulate that space is not curved without
begging the question.

Hawthorne and Zimmermans Version of (ii):

There is just one sphere in the example. Its just located at two distinct places at the
same time. Like the immanent universals that constitute them, property bundles can be
multiply located. If the bundle theory says that objects are identical to property bundles,
then so be it: one and the same object can be multiply located.
e) Problem: consider what would happen if red paint were to suddenly appear and
fall on the sphere at one of its locations. The sphere becomes red. But then it
would have to become red at both of its locations, since it is one and the same
sphere, and this is an absurd kind of action at a distance.
1) Other Objections to PII
Adams Argument from Near-Indiscernibles:
a. Suppose that two near-indiscernible spheres exist: one has a slight bump
and the other does not.
b. It is possible for the bump to be removed without destroying either of the
spheres.

c. If it is possible for the bump to be removed without destroying either of

the spheres then it is possible for there to be non-identical indiscernibles.
d. So it is possible for there to be non-identical indiscernibles. PII is false.
Wiggins Reductio of PII
e. Suppose that PII is true.
f. Suppose that A is a homogenous sphere and B is a homogenous sphere,
and that A and B resemble one another exactly.
g. Then A = B. We have one sphere, not two.
h. Since A is homogenous, then As right half resembles As left half exactly.
i. Then As right half = As left half. We have half a sphere, not one.
j. Since A is homogenous, As right quarter resembles As left quarter
exactly.
k. Then As right quarter = As left quarter. We have a quarter-sphere, not a
half.
l. Etc. So neither homogenous spheres, nor homogenous half-spheres, nor
homogenous symmetrical bodies of any kind, are possible.
m. But such things are possible.
n. So PII is false.

Jason Bowers
The University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill