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  • Libyas Constitutional Crisis - Atlantic Council

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    Naeem Gheriany
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    The Supreme Court of Libya struck down the constitutional amendment that formed the basis for elections in 2014, throwing the country into a constitutional crisis. This has been interpreted as dissolving the House of Representatives. Four scenarios are possible: 1) reinstating the previous legislature, which is unlikely, 2) ignoring the court, undermining the judiciary, 3) having the constitution drafting body form a unity government, but this could delay the constitution, 4) proroguing the House until a settlement is reached, necessitating UN involvement to navigate this risky period of legislative vacuum and polarization. Dialogue mediated by the UN is the best option to reach a ceasefire and form an interim unity government, but requires international support and an end to

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    Libyas Constitutional Crisis - Atlantic Council Naeem Al-Gheriany 2 Dec 2014

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    The Supreme Court of Libya struck down the constitutional amendment that formed the basis for elections in 2014, throwing the country into a constitutional crisis. This has been interpreted as dissolving the House of Representatives. Four scenarios are possible: 1) reinstating the previous legislature, which is unlikely, 2) ignoring the court, undermining the judiciary, 3) having the constitution drafting body form a unity government, but this could delay the constitution, 4) proroguing the House until a settlement is reached, necessitating UN involvement to navigate this risky period of legislative vacuum and polarization. Dialogue mediated by the UN is the best option to reach a ceasefire and form an interim unity government, but requires international support and an end to

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    50 просмотров4 страницы

    Libyas Constitutional Crisis - Atlantic Council

    Загружено:

    Naeem Gheriany
    The Supreme Court of Libya struck down the constitutional amendment that formed the basis for elections in 2014, throwing the country into a constitutional crisis. This has been interpreted as dissolving the House of Representatives. Four scenarios are possible: 1) reinstating the previous legislature, which is unlikely, 2) ignoring the court, undermining the judiciary, 3) having the constitution drafting body form a unity government, but this could delay the constitution, 4) proroguing the House until a settlement is reached, necessitating UN involvement to navigate this risky period of legislative vacuum and polarization. Dialogue mediated by the UN is the best option to reach a ceasefire and form an interim unity government, but requires international support and an end to

    Авторское право:

    © All Rights Reserved
    Скачайте в формате PDF, TXT или читайте онлайн в Scribd
    Отметить как неприемлемый контент
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    DECEMBER2,2014

    Libya'sConstitutionalCrisis
    BYNAEEMALGHERIANY

    OmaralHassi,primeministeroftheLibyanrivalgovernment,speaksduringaninterviewwithReutersatthe
    headquartersofhisofficeinTripoliNovember27,2014.Hassihaswarnedthatattemptsbyarivalgovernmentin
    theeasttoassertcontrolovertheoilindustrycouldescalatethepoliticalconflictdividingtheOPECmember
    stateandforceittobreakintwo.PicturetakenNovember27,2014.REUTERS/IsmailZitouny

    OnNovember6,2014,inanunexpecteddecision,andagainstabackdropofcontinuingpoliticaland
    militarypolarization,theConstitutionalChamberofLibya'sSupremeCourtstruckdownthe7th
    AmendmenttotheConstitutionalDeclaration,thecurrentsupremelawofLibya.Thisamendment,
    passedbyLibyastransitionallegislativebody,theGeneralNationalCongress(GNC),inMarch2014,
    hadprovidedthebasisfortheelectionofaHouseofRepresentativesinJune2014.TheSupreme
    Court'srulinghasbeeninterpretedbymany,includingtherumpGNCanditsSalvationGovernmentin
    Tripoli,assignalingthedissolutionoftheHouseofRepresentatives.Thisinterpretation,alongwiththe

    rumpHouse'srejectionofit,hasthrownthecountryintoadangerousconstitutionalcrisis,onewhich
    threatenstofurtherintensifytheseeminglyintractablepoliticalandmilitaryconflictthathasplaguedLibya
    overthepastthreeyears.
    Inthewakeofthecourt'sruling,anumberofLibyanlawyersandlegalscholarshaveexpressed
    dissentingopinionsaboutthedecision,withsomearguingthatitdoesnotnecessarilyentaildissolutionof
    theHouse.Theseopinionswillremainpurelyacademic,however,unlessthecourtprovidesclarification
    astotheimplicationsofitsruling.Shouldthecourtdoso,itwouldenabletheresumptionofthe
    GhadamesdialoguethatwasfirstlaunchedinSeptember2014,attheinvitationoftheUnitedNations
    SupportMissioninLibya(UNSMIL),andwhichsoughttobringtogetheropposingfactionsfromthe
    dividedHouseofRepresentativeswithaviewtowardendingthecurrentpoliticalstalemate.However,
    shortofaclearstatementfromthecourtthatitsdecisiondoesnotimplydissolutionoftheHouse,a
    viablepoliticalsolutiontothecrisisremainselusive.
    FourscenariosarepossibleifthecourtsdecisionisinterpretedtosignaldissolutionoftheHouseof
    Representatives.First,competingsidescouldacceptthecourt'sdecisionandrecognizetherumpGNC
    asthesolelegitimatelegislativebodyuntilthenextelectionseitherearlyelectionsorelectionsfollowing
    theratificationoftheconstitution.Thisoptionisunlikelytobechosengiventhatmanymembersofthe
    House,andsomemembersoftheGNC,wouldrejecttheGNCsreturn.
    Asecondoptionwouldbetoignorethecourt'sdecisionandcontinuetorecognizetheHouseof
    RepresentativesasthesolelegitimatelegislativebodyinLibya.Thisoptionisunsatisfactoryinsofarasit
    posessimilarriskstothefirst,withtheaddednegativeramificationsofunderminingthecourtandthe
    independenceofthejudiciaryinastatethatcanillaffordtoerodeoneofitsfewfunctioninginstitutions.
    AthirdscenariowouldbetocallontheConstitutionDraftingAssembly(CDA),thespecialbodyelected
    inFebruary2014todraftanewconstitutionforLibya,tofillthelegislativevoid,limitingitsroleto
    appointingaunitygovernmentandpreparingfornewelections.However,distractingtheCDAcould
    delaycompletionofitsprincipaltask.Inaddition,thisoptioncouldalsofacestrongoppositionfrommany
    parties(includingtheHouseandtheGNC),withnoguaranteethattheconstitutionalityoftheactionwill
    notbechallengedinthecourts.
    SincethereinstatementoftheGNCwouldbeviewedasunacceptabletotherumpHouseof

    Representatives,aswellastomostoftheforcesineasternLibya,thefirstscenarioisnotaviable
    option.However,itwouldbeimpossiblefortheHousetocontinuewithbusinessasusualinthewakeof
    theSupremeCourt'sdecision.ThisnecessitatestheprorogationoftheHouseuntilapoliticalsettlement
    canbereachedoruntilanewlegislativebodyiselected.TheprorogationoftheHousewould,however,
    resultinariskyperiodoflegislativevacuuminthecountry.WhileLibyanswouldassumeprimary
    responsibilityfornavigatingthisdifficultperiod,thisoptionnecessitatesdirectinvolvementandclear
    leadershipfromtheUnitedNations,giventheincreasinglyintractablepoliticalpolarizationinthecountry.
    Dialoguemediatedbyaneutralthirdpartyistheonlyoptionthatstandsanychanceofsuccess,given
    thatnoneoftheotherthreescenariosisconstitutionallyrobustandeachwouldfacestrongopposition
    fromthedisadvantagedparty.Thisoptionwouldentailaresumptionofthedialogueprocess,firstinitiated
    bytheUnitedNations,butwithanexpandedscope,i.e.,Ghadames2.Thedialogueshouldbe
    inclusive,transparent,andinaccordancewiththeprinciplesofnationalownership.Theeffortshould
    beginbydesignatingmembersofthedialogueteamanddevelopingaclearactionplan.Thedialogue
    teamshouldincluderepresentativesfromtheGNC,theHouse,citycouncils,leadersofthearmed
    groups,politicalparties,religiousleaders,andrepresentativesofcivilsociety.TheUnitedNationsshould
    ensurethattheinterlocutorsreachanagreementonacomprehensiveandverifiableceasefireandthe
    formationofaninterimunitygovernment.Thenewinterimgovernmentshouldonlymanagedaytoday
    affairsandshouldnotundertakeanymajorpolicyinitiatives.Otherissuestobenegotiatedincludethe
    withdrawalofarmedgroupsfrommajorcities,controlofairportsbygovernmentauthorities,handoverof
    statebuildingsandfacilitiestothegovernment,andinterimsecurityarrangements.
    TheroleoftheUnitedNationsinmediatingapoliticalsolutionisindispensablehowever,its
    effectivenessiscontingentonthestrongsupportoftheUnitedStatesandtheEuropeanUnion,andon
    puttinganendtodisruptiveoutsideinterference.Thisrequiresholdingallcountriestocommitments
    madeduringtheSeptember2014NewYorkmeetingonLibya,convenedbyUSSecretaryofStateJohn
    Kerryandattendedbyadozenforeignministers,andtheOctober2014Parismeeting,whichbrought
    togetherSpecialEnvoysoftheAfricanUnion,ArabLeague,EuropeanUnionandanumberofwestern
    governments,withtheSpecialRepresentativeoftheUNSecretaryGeneral,BernardinoLeon.Italso
    requirestakingdeterrentmeasures,asstipulatedbyUNSecurityCouncilResolution2174(2014),
    againstindividualsandentitiesthatthreatenLibyasstability,security,orobstructorundermineits
    peacefulpoliticaltransitionincludingtherenegadeGeneralKhalifaHaftar,amongothers.

    AsacountrythatstandsatthegeopoliticalcrossroadbetweenAfrica,Europe,andtheMiddleEast,
    Libyaistooimportanttofail.Theriskofitfallingintoafullblownandprolongedcivilwar,ifabandonedat
    thiscriticalmoment,isreal,butthereisstilltimetoputthecountrybackontrack.Ifthepoliticalprocess
    fails,thepresentwindowofopportunitymayclosepermanentlyandthebreakupofthecountrycould
    becomethedefactoscenario.
    Dr.NaeemAlGherianyisaProfessorofNuclearEngineeringattheUniversityofTripoliandamember
    oftheLibyanHouseofRepresentatives.HepreviouslyservedastheMinisterofHigherEducationand
    ScientificResearchinthefirstTransitionalGovernmentinpostQaddafiLibya.

    Libya

    Original

    2015AtlanticCouncil.
    AllRightsReserved.

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