1

DOJ Investigations Committee: Comparative Analysis of 10

United States DOJ Findings Letters

May 2nd, 2015

Dr. David Correia
AMST 310: UNM
Group 4

Table of Contents
Abstract......3
Comparative Analysis Chart......4
Alamance County Sheriffs Office5
Albuquerque Police Department...7
Cleveland Police Department......11
East Haven Police Departments..15
Miami Police Department....24
New Orleans Police Department.27
Portland Police Department.....31
Puerto Rico Police Department...35
Seattle Police Department...40
Washington Metropolitan Police Department43
Works Cited48

Abstract
The following is the first-ever compilation of summarized and cross-referenced Department of
Justice Police Investigations throughout the United States. We have analyzed ten major police
departments, whose misconduct and questionable practices led to external investigations at the
federal level. The problems listed in this document do not fully encompass the issues
investigated by the Department of Justice, but they have been analyzed in a way that brings forth
the most immediate issues regarding violations of citizens constitutional rights, and the various
police departments abuse of their authority. This cross analysis hopes to expose some of the
larger, systemic issues that are being experienced in countless police departments throughout the
United States, as well as U.S. provinces. Furthermore, it will be a comprehensive resource for
anyone wishing to gain a broad perspective of the issues, and how they have been examined and
documented throughout the DOJ investigations. The following summaries are condensed
representations of the problems the DOJ chose to focus their investigations on.

Comparative Analysis Chart

Alamance County Sheriffs Office

The US Department of Justice (DOJ) began investigating the Alamance Country Sheriffs
Office (ACSO) in June of 2010. The DOJ focused their investigation on the pattern or practice of
discriminatory policing and unconstitutional searches and seizures by ACSO. The DOJ found
evidence that ACSO engages in a pattern or practice of unconstitutional policing, specifically,
that ACSO unlawfully targets, stops, detains and arrests Latinos, which violate a citizens Fourth
and Fourteenth Amendment rights. The DOJ published its Findings Letter in September 18,
2012.
1. Discriminatory Practice
A. First, ACSO targets Latinos for traffic stops. Statistical analysis showed that,
depending on the road analyzed, ACSO deputies are anywhere between four to ten
times more likely to stop Latino drivers than non-Latino drivers. Interviews with
deputies and community members provided additional evidence of discriminatory
traffic stops, which involved drivers cited only for driving without a license, an
offense that is not observable from the road. In one reported incident, an ACSO
deputy said he stopped a Latino man because "most of them drive without licenses."
(4)
B. ACSO targets Latinos with vehicle checkpoints. Sheriff Johnson selects, and
encourages his officers to select, predominantly Latino neighborhoods to set up
vehicle checkpoints. Documented checkpoints and interviews confirmed that ACSO
checkpoints cluster at or near the entrances of predominately Latino neighborhoods.
(4).
C. ACSO checkpoint practices discriminate against Latinos. Deputies single out Latino
drivers for arrest at checkpoints, even for minor traffic violations. ACSO treats
drivers depending on the driver's ethnicity. When stopped for minor traffic offenses,
ACSO deputies arrest Latinos rather than citing them. Sheriff Johnson directed his
supervisory officers to tell their subordinates, "If you stop a Mexican, don't write a
citation, arrest him." In one example a Latino man and a white woman were stopped
by the same deputy, on the same day, for the same offense but the deputy arrested the
Latino man and only gave the white woman a written citation. (5)

D. ACSO discriminates against Latinos in its jail booking and detention procedures.
Correctional officers verified the immigration status of all detainees who "appeal'"
Latino, regardless of their response to citizenship questions. Officers decide which
detainees to interview based on assumptions about nationality and ethnicity. Those
who appear "American" are not interviewed, even if they cannot produce
identification. (5)
E. Sheriff directs his deputies to target predominantly Latino neighborhoods for
increased enforcement based on the Sheriff's often-stated belief that Latinos are
responsible for Alamance County's drug trade. For example, at a staff meeting Sheriff
Johnson stated, "We've had a big drop in the Hispanic population, but we still got a
lot dealing dope and we still got a lot of citizens in this country dealing dope with
them." (5)
F. ACSO's discriminatory practices prevents it from serving and protecting the
Alamance Countys Latino residents. Effective policing is largely built on a
relationship of trust with all segments of the community. ACSO has done almost
nothing to build such a relationship with the County's Latino residents, and much to
destroy it. Interviews with ACSO officers and community members revealed that the
absence of this trust has substantially compromised policing by limiting the
willingness of witnesses and victims to report crimes and speak to ACSO deputies
about criminal activity or complaints of misconduct by ACSO officers. Latinos are
afraid to call the police to report crimes and provide information pertinent to solving
crimes. (5).
2. Discriminatory Bias
A. Sheriff Johnson and the highest levels of command staff support and foster a culture
of bias within ACSO. Sheriff Johnson has made numerous statements supporting the
culture of bias against Latinos. For example, in one widely publicized statement,
Sheriff Johnson suggested that anyone of Mexican national origin was inherently
suspicious, saying: "Their values are a lot different - their morals - than what we have
here. In Mexico, there's nothing wrong with having sex with a 12-, 13- year old girl....
They do a lot of drinking down in Mexico." Sheriff Johnson has also referred to

Latinos as "taco eaters. Sheriff Johnson explicitly directs his deputies to target
Latinos and to arrest them instead of issuing citations for minor infractions. (6).
3. Departures from Policing Standards and Procedures
A. ACSO has evidently departed from state law and policing standards in multiple ways
that directly affect Latinos and violate their constitutional and federal rights. One
example is that ACSO does not comply with state law, standard policing practices or
with its own policies regarding documentation of checkpoints and traffic stops.
Another example is that ACSOs Special Operations Unit does not comply with
record keeping or standard policing practices. They dont comply with standard
policing practices by targeting predominately Latino neighborhoods with road blocks
and vehicle raids. When performing these activities they fail to document
enforcement actions. (6-7).
Synopsis
The US Department of Justices investigation of the Alamance County Sherriffs Office
revealed that ASCO engages in a pattern or practice of discriminatory policing, specifically
against the Latino community. This bias against Latinos is supported by and even promoted by
Sherriff Johnson, resulting in the discriminatory policing demonstrated in DOJs Findings Letter.

Albuquerque Police Department

The US Department of Justice (DOJ) began investigating the Albuquerque Police
Department (APD) in November of 2012. The DOJ focused their investigation on
unconstitutional use of force issues. The DOJ report found evidence that APD engages in a
pattern of excessive use of force, including deadly force, which violates citizens Fourth
Amendment rights. The DOJ published its Findings Letter in April of 2014.
1. Pattern or practice of unconstitutional use of deadly force
A. In October 2009, an APD officer shot and killed Dominic Smith. Smith was fleeing the
scene of a robbery on foot and unarmed. Smith had robbed a pharmacy using a menacing
note, and no witnesses at the pharmacy reported to have seen Smith with a weapon. An

officer apprehended Smith, who appeared to be heavily intoxicated, just minutes after the
robbery. Smith refused to comply with the officers orders, so the officer retrieved an
assault rifle from his car. The officer claimed Smith motioned near his waist, which led to
the officer shooting and killing him. No weapon was found on his body (11).
B. In May 2011, an APD officer shot and killed Alan Gomez. Gomez was unarmed and
posed no immediate threat to the officers. Gomez would not allow his brother and
girlfriend to leave their house, resulting in a standoff with APD officers. After nearly an
hour, Gomez exited the house. This is when one officer, who gave inconsistent
statements on the incident, fired a single, lethal shot. This same officer shot and killed an
unarmed man while working for the New Mexico State Police and wounded another
unarmed man in 2010 (11-12).
2. Unreasonable use of deadly force on individuals who only pose a threat to themselves
A. In January 2010, an APD officer shot and killed a 25-year old veteran named Ken Ellis
III, whom they pulled over for suspected theft. Ellis was holding a gun to his head, and
never indicated he intended to use the weapon on anyone but himself. Ellis held the gun
to his head as he made several phone calls, and after a few minutes an officer shot Ellis
in the neck. Ellis was suffering from post-traumatic stress disorder (13).
3. Officers own recklessness sometimes led to their use of deadly force
A. In March 2012, an officer shot and killed Daniel Tillison after responding to a call about
an individual selling stereo equipment in a parking lot. Without waiting for backup, an
officer approached Tillison with his gun drawn. Tillison attempted to exit his vehicle, but
the officer shut the door. Tillison then backed into the officers car, so the officer shot at
the tires of Tillisons vehicle. The officer claimed he saw something resembling a weapon,
and that Tillison gave him a warrior stare, so he shot and killed Tillison. No weapon
was found in the vehicle. Tillison never posed an immediate threat to the officer, and it
was the officers escalation of the situation that led to the use of deadly force (13-14).
4. Officers use excessive non-lethal force against individuals who were passively resisting

A. In March 2009, APD officers used excessive non-lethal force on Albert, a 60-year-old
man. Albert was intoxicated and arguing with a friend who reported that Albert had
threatened him with a knife and pellet gun. Forty-seven officers responded to the scene.
After Albert complied with their commands and dropped the knife, he was struck by
beanbags from a shotgun, wooden batons, disoriented by a flash-bang grenade, bitten by a
canine, and shocked with Tasers. District Judge Bruce Black found that no reasonable
person could believe that an inhibited, slow-moving, 60-year-old individual, who made no
physical or verbal threats, and wielded no weapons, could constitute a threat to the safety
of any of the forty- seven armed and shielded police officers who stood over twenty feet
away (17-18).
5. Officers use excessive force against individuals with A) mental illness B) impaired
faculties and C) those in need of medical attention.
A. In September 2012, officers were dispatched to the home of a schizophrenic man called
Jeremy to check on his welfare. The officers found Jeremy locked in the bathroom and
refusing to come out. They kicked the door in and proceeded to beat, choke, and use their
Tasers on Jeremy. The officers had been called to check on the welfare of a mentally ill
man who had committed no crime, and ended up using excessive force on him (21-22).
B. In March 2012, two officers fired Tasers at, and beat, a 25-year-old man with a
developmental disability referred to as Greg. Greg was unable to speak or understand
the officers commands, resulting in the officers excessive use of force. The officers later
found out that Greg had the mental capacity of a five-year-old (20-21).
C. In June 2010, officers responding to a car crash used their Tasers on Larry as he
convulsed in the wrecked vehicle because he was not complying with their commands.
They used their Tasers several times causing Larry to drift in and out of consciousness
(22).
6. Structural and systemic deficiencies contributing to the pattern of excessive use of force
including A) inadequate internal accountability B) documentation deficiencies like failure
to properly report use of force and C) lack of supervisory concern

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A. Inadequate documentation and investigation of use of force incidents cause a sever lack
of accountability in APD (23). Superficial use of force reviews show the chain of
commands disinterest in detecting patterns of excessive force as well as the departments
failure in holding officers accountable for policy violations (25).
B. APDs use of force policy states that, Upon firing the [Taser], the officer shall energize
the subject the least number of times and no longer than necessary to accomplish the
legitimate operational objective. Officers routinely ignored this policy and then failed to
report the number of five-second cycles they used on individuals (26). Officers also failed
to take statements from people subjected to force, provide photographic evidence of the
inflicted injuries, and investigate discrepancies (27).
C. When improper force was used, the problems were not addressed by the chain of
command. In 2011 and 2012, APD investigators found that only two use of force
incidents breached departmental policy. APD policy does not require supervisors to
conduct an objective review of officers use of force. Supervisors failed to address policy
violations by instituting corrective measures and recruiting Internal Affairs to further
investigate the policy violation (24-25).
7. Deficiencies in training contributing to the pattern of excessive use of force include A)
overemphasis on use of force B) and insufficient emphasis on de-escalation.
A. APD training overemphasizes use of force as the primary way to resolve stressful
situations. This type of training leads officers to believe that violent outcomes are
normal and desirable (30).
B. APD officers tended to escalate the situation during scenario-based training meant to
replicate stressful interactions with civilians, even though this type of training is designed
to train officers in peacefully resolving these encounters (30). Officers fail to analyze a
situation and account for an individuals physical, mental, and emotional state when
making use of force decisions (20).

11

Synopsis
The US Department of Justices investigation of the Albuquerque Police Department
revealed that APD engages in a pattern or practice of unconstitutional use of force, including
deadly force. APD consistently uses force on individuals in emotional crisis and the mentally ill.
Structural deficiencies in internal accountability, policies, procedures, and training contribute to
the use of force issues that plague APD.

Cleveland Police Department

The US Department of Justice (DOJ) first started investigating the Cleveland Police
Department (CPD) in 2000, coming to the first amicable agreement in 2004. Not more than ten
years later in March 2013, the DOJ announced they were reinvestigating CPD for the use of
excessive force such as unauthorized deadly force that violates a citizens Fourth Amendment
rights. The DOJ published their Finding Letter in December of 2014.
1. Pattern or practice of unconstitutional use of deadly force
A. An incident from 2013 entailed a sergeant shooting at a victim who had escaped from two
armed assailants. Anthony had been held captive by armed men in a house. After CPD
arrived on scene and surrounded the house, Anthony escaped the assailants wearing nothing
but boxer shorts. One sergeant proceeded to fire two shots at him, luckily missing. (14)
B. A report from a 2012 incident involved an officer shooting a lawfully armed man who
seemed to be cooperating with the officers. Brian was asked to stop by a couple of
officers. At first it appeared as though he wasnt cooperating with the police as he walked to

12

nearby porch. Brian set down his beer and accordingly, turned towards the officers zone
car in a manner that indicated he was going to speak with them. (15) The first officer
reportedly saw Brians weapon and yelled gun as he pointed at it. The second officer
reported that in response, Brian raised his hand and indicated he had a legally concealed fire
weapon. The second officer proceeded to handcuff him. Brains hands were reportedly a
bit below ear level when the first officer fired a shot into his abdomen. (15).
2. Unreasonable use of deadly force on individuals who only pose a threat to themselves
A. One case involved an officer that made the decision to reach into a mans vehicle while
he had his gun drawn and in the process accidently shoots the man in the chest. Nathan
had tried to make a right turn from center lane, cutting off and almost colliding with
another car proceeding through the intersection. It was 2:30 AM and the area was
crowded with people pouring out of local bars and restaurants. Nathan was unable to
complete his right turn and was stuck in the middle of the intersection blocked off by
pedestrians on the crossing the street. At this point an officer approached the car with his
weapon drawn. The incident report provides no written basis to explain why he drew his
gun. (25) With the gun pointed at Nathan, the officer commanded him to turn off the
ignition and to show his hands. When Nathan did not comply the officer reached in the
car to attempt to turn off the ignition himself. While doing this the officer had his gun
pointed at Nathan with his finger on the trigger. The officer claims he felt force on his
hand, stating Nathan was trying to grab my weapon. The gun discharged striking
Nathan in the chest, someone who was stopped for an unlawful left turn. (25)
3. Officers use excessive non-lethal force against individuals who were passively resisting
A. CPD officers use less lethal force- including Tasers, OC Spray, and strikes to a
suspects body- against individuals who pose little, if any, threat, or who offer
minimal resistance, including those who are handcuffed, already on the ground, or
otherwise subdued. (19).
4. Officers use excessive force against individuals with A) mental illness B) impaired
facilities C) those in need of medical attention.

13

A. One incident, an officer tased a suicidal, deaf man who committed no crime, posed
minimal risk to officers and may not have understood the officers commands. Larrys
mother had requested CPDs assistance because her son with bipolar disorder and who
communicates through sign language, was holding a piece of glass to his neck threating
suicide. (23) When the officers arrived Larry retreated to a half filled tub as the officers
followed. The officers without confirming that he could communicate through notes
proceeded to write him a note saying he needed to go to the hospital. Larry waved his
hands aggressively which was taken as refusal from the officers. One officer grabbed
Larrys arm and Larry pulled back. At this point, the other officer yelled Taser and
pointed at his Taser. Larry continued to struggle and the officer eventually fired his Taser
into Larrys chest. (23)
B. Perhaps one of the most egregious incidents, a CPD officer tased a man who was
suffering from a medical emergency and was strapped onto a gurney in the back of an
ambulance, because he was verbally threating officers. Two officers were flagged down
over to a man who was having seizures and was now laying on the sidewalk. The victim
Mark told the officers he suffers from grand mal seizures and that he had been
drinking. The officers called EMS and, while waiting Mark had at least four more
seizures. (24) Once the EMS arrived they strapped Mark into a gurney. He then became
angry and threatened to punch one of the officers. One of them unholstered their Taser
and told mark to calm down. He them proceed to try and stand up, stating hed rather
walk home. The officer continued to warn Mark three more times to calm down, finally
drive stunning Mark on his top left shoulder. (24)
5. Structural and systemic deficiencies contributing to the pattern of excessive use of force
including A) inadequate internal accountability B) documentation deficiencies like failure
to properly report use of force and C) lack of supervisory concern
A. CPD officers are involved in many incidents that seem irreproachably unjust, and yet
still are considered justified in their course of action. For instance, there was an
incident were an off-duty officer with no way to identify himself approached a group of
suspects without back up and struck a civilian in the head with his service weapon during
a struggle. The officers use of force was excessive and he demonstrated poor tactical

14

decisions that placed him and others in danger. Still, Internal Affairs determined that the
officers actions were justified and that no further action should be taken. (36)
B. Officers often use canned or boilerplate language that does not describe with
sufficient particularity the type of force they used. (29) Officers also fail to adequately
describe the level of the threat, if any, posed by those against whom force was used.
They justify use of force with non-specific language. Officers frequently justify force
by expressing a fear that subject had weapon without articulating any basis for that fear.
(29)
C. Supervisors often deliver superficial analyses of incidents that are designed to justify
their subordinates use of unreasonable force. An incident in which an officer punched a
13 year old in the face three to four times while they were handcuffed highlights this
problem. Despite the officer weighing twice the size of the victim, along with having
another officer to help detain the suspect, the supervisor still deemed the excessive and
punitive use of force on the handcuffed 13 year old as arguably the best response. (32)
He justifies the face punches because the boy had kicked the officer trying to escape the
zone car. This failed to even consider the retaliatory nature of the officers punches on the
young man for trying to flee the car. This abdication of supervisory responsibility allows
for unreasonable use of force to continue unchecked. (32)
6. Deficiencies in training contributing to the pattern of excessive use of force include A)
insufficient emphasis on de-escalation.
A. CPS officers, especially the majority who are not specially trained on this issue, do not
use appropriate techniques to de-escalate encounters with individuals with mental illness
or impaired faculties to prevent the use of force and, when force is used, officers do not
adjust the application of force to account for the persons mental illness. (23)
Synopsis
US Department of Justices second investigation of Cleveland Police Department
reinstates that CPD continues to engage in a pattern or practice of unconstitutional use of force,
in violation of the Fourth Amendment. The Findings Letter determines that structural

15

deficiencies-including inadequate accountability, policy, and engagement with the communitycontribute to CPDs unconstitutional use of force upon its citizens.

East Haven Police Department

The US Department of Justice (DOJ) began investigating the East Haven Police
Department (EHPD) in September of 2009. The DOJ focused their investigation on
unconstitutional engagements of patterns discriminatory policing, and discriminatory practices
against Latinos. The DOJ report found evidence that EHPD engages in a patterns of excessive
discrimination against Latinos, which violates citizens Fourth Amendment rights and violates
Title VI and the Safe Streets Act. The DOJ published its Findings Letter in December of 2011.
Intentionally Targets Latinos for Disparate Traffic Enforcement and Treatment
Our statistical analysis of EHPDs traffic stop data shows that Latinos experience vastly
disparate treatment on East Haven roads compared to non-Latino motorists. The size of this
disproportion illustrates the degree to which EHPD suffers from significant institutional
deficiencies. A law enforcement agency with adequate systems of oversight and accountability
would have discovered this problem and rapidly corrected it, rather than permitting it to continue
unabated for years. (6).
1. Focus their traffic enforcement activity on areas where Latinos congregate
A. During their investigation, they received numerous reports that EHPD officers target
Latino places of business by focusing their traffic enforcement activity on customers
leaving those businesses. Consistent with these reports, they found that EHPD
officers also target specific areas of Frontage and Foxon Roads for their traffic
enforcement activity: areas where Latinos are known to congregate. Based on the
EHPD incident reports, they found that EHPD officers deliberately choose these
locations to wait in their patrol cars for Latino drivers to pass so that they can initiate
traffic stops on these vehicles, a tactic known in law enforcement as sandbagging."
(8).
2. Use non-standard, and some cases, unacceptable methods to generate reasons for
stopping Latino drivers that are not employed for non-Latino drivers

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A. That certain EHPD officers are specifically targeting Latino drivers is demonstrated
by the extreme tactics they employ to justify these traffic stops. Once these EHPD
officers target a Latino driver for a traffic stop, they employ a variety of methods to
find cause to initiate the traffic stop, methods they typically do not employ on nonLatino drivers. With Latino drivers, the incident reports show that EHPD officers will
first attempt to identify a facial defect on the license plate of the car. If there is no
obvious defect, and the car has an out-of-state license plate, the officers will stop the
car based on claims that, in their experience, such out-of-state plates are often forged.
On other occasions, the officers will follow the Latino driver and wait for a traffic
violation to occur that they can cite, a tactic rarely used against non-Latino drivers. In
other instances, the officers cite speeding as the justification for a stop, but, contrary
to standard police practice, given no indication of how they know a car is speeding,
failing to state that they paced the vehicle or used a radar gun. In at least one case, the
officer took the highly unusual step of looking up the insurance information for a
moving vehicle in order to find cause for the stop, demonstrating the degree to which
legitimate traffic enforcement is a secondary consideration to targeting Latino drivers.
(8).
3. Treat Latino drivers more punitively than non-Latino drivers after traffic stop.
A. The incident reports further reveal a pattern of discriminatory treatment following the
stop. After a traffic stop is initiated, they found that some EHPD officers subject
Latino drivers to much harsher treatment than non-Latino drivers. In particular, these
EHPD officers will typically arrest Latino drivers and have their vehicles towed.
Consequently, Latinos stopped by these officers not only lose the use of their
vehicles, but they are required to post a surety bond in order to be released. In
contrast, the same EHPD officers typically treat non-Latino drivers in a less punitive
fashion, often releasing them from the scene after giving them a written notice to
appear in court. These drivers generally do not have their vehicles towed. EHPD's
towing policy is ambiguous, and appears to permit officers to make discretionary
decisions regarding towing that have been used to discriminate against Latinos.

17

Moreover, the supervisors responsible for reviewing these reports have failed to
question or correct this behavior. (9).
EHPD's use of tactics that are directed almost entirely at Latinos demonstrates the degree to
which Latinos are disparately impacted by EHPD practices. Indeed, the use of these
discriminatory tactics is so pervasive as to independently show that they were taken with the
intent to target Latinos in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.
EHPD Retaliates against Individuals who Criticize or Complain of Disparate Treatment of
Latinos
1. EHPD perpetuates a culture of fear and intimidation in East Haven by retaliating
against individuals who criticize or complain of EHPD's disparate treatment of
Latinos. A pattern of hostility towards a discrete community, such as that found
here, serves as important evidence of discriminatory conduct. They interviewed
community members who recounted first hand incidents of abusive and retaliatory
behavior. The following incident is one of many that illustrate retaliatory conduct
by police officers:
A. A local priest began documenting EHPD activity directed at Latinos. As a result, the
priest became the target of intimidation and harassment by EHPD. For instance, in
March 2009, EHPD officers entered a Latino-owned business and accused the owner
of attempting to sell license plates, an allegation apparently based solely on the
approximately 80 license plates the business owner had decorating a store wall. The
owner denied that the plates were other than decorative, but two EHPD officers then
initiated a criminal investigation of this activity, which, at most, would culminate in a
minor infraction of State registration laws if it comprised a violation at all. The priest
began videotaping the officers' activities in the store. Upon seeing that they were
being videotaped, the officers demanded that the priest stop recording. When the
priest refused, the EHPD officers used force against him and ultimately arrested him.
The arresting officer falsely reported that he did not know that the priest was holding
a video recorder, and falsely reported that he thought the priest was instead holding a
weapon, necessitating the use of force and subsequent arrest. In a videotape of the

18

incident that we reviewed, the officers can clearly' be heard acknowledging that the
priest was carrying a video recorder. Based on their investigation, EHPD command
staff conducted no meaningful investigation of the incident in question, and meted out
no discipline, despite agreeing that the incident took place as the videotape showed.
(10-11).
EHPD Has Failed to Remedy a History of Discrimination
1. Their investigation found that East Haven has an extensive history of past
discrimination that it has failed to meaningfully address or remedy. This historical
background serves as evidence of discriminatory purpose, especially if it reveals a
series of official actions taken for invidious purposes.
A. East Haven and EHPD has been the subject of litigation for a decade in which EHPD
officers were accused of discriminatory conduct towards African Americans. This
litigation ended with a jury verdict against East Haven. The federal court concluded
in 2007 that sufficient evidence was presented at trial for a jury to find that "there
existed within the EHPD a custom or practice of deliberate indifference to the
constitutional rights of African-Americans, [and] that the Chief of Police was aware
of the custom or practice and deliberately indifferent to it. In the Jones v. Town of
East Haven case. The investigation uncovered no evidence that EHPD instituted any
meaningful changes in any of its policies following the Jones verdict. Indeed, officers
directly involved in the incidents giving rise to the Jones verdict remain with EHPD
and have been, in some cases, promoted to supervisory roles. They found no evidence
that they were subject to meaningful discipline or retraining as a consequence of their
roles in the Jones incidents. Retention of persons in places of authority and with no
apparent disciplinary or responsive policy modifications is strongly probative of
discriminatory intent on the part of EHPD. (11-12).
EHPD's Targeting of Latinos Arises from a Willful Failure to Prevent Discrimination in its
Institutional Practices
1. EHPD does not comply with state laws designed to prevent racial profiling.

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A. Law enforcement agencies in Connecticut are required by State law to document all
traffic stops, including demographic information, and report this information to a
State body. This statute, one of the first of its kind in the nation, is specifically
designed to prevent racial profiling by Connecticut law enforcement agencies. The
press made public EHPD's failure to have ever fully complied with this statute. They
confirmed with EHPD command staff that this failure had not been remedied.
Although EHPD possesses sophisticated data terminals capable of recording the
required information, EHPD has never meaningfully reviewed the data it collects, nor
has it turned it over to the State as required by the statute. EHPD's failure to audit the
data also places it out of compliance with the State statute. Their own review of the
data showed that a large number of entries reflecting traffic stops were devoid of
ethnicity data or appeared to misreport ethnicity data. Because EHPD failed to audit
its own data, it could not comply with the statute's requirement to accurately report
such data. EHPD's failure to comply with a state statute designed to prevent biased
policing is evidence that EHPD command staff sought to obscure the unlawful
activities of EHPD officers. (12).
2. EHPD does not maintain policies preventing biased policing
A. EHPD has put in place no policies to help its officers communicate with Spanishspeaking members of the community, thereby preventing EHPD officers from
building relationships that can enhance officer safety and depriving a significant
portion of the Latino community of policing services. Nor does EHPD have formal
policies addressing enforcement of immigration law, or the appropriate tactics that
may be used in conducting a traffic stop, such as requiring the means that an officer
used to develop probable cause for the stop to be recorded. (13).
3. EHPD does not train officers to avoid biased policing
A. EHPD officers receive no training in the topics that are necessary supplements to
avoiding biased policing, including diversity training or cultural sensitivity training.
These failures are particularly egregious in light of recent discrimination-related

20

civilian complaints, media reports, and litigation, as well as the finding of

discrimination by EHPD officers in Jones. (13).
4. EHPD does not hold officers accountable for biased policing
1. EHPD hinders the ability of Latinos to file complaints
A. During the time period of their investigation, they witnessed that the required form
was available only in English. Had a Latino person with limited English proficiency
come to the station house, the only available complaint form was useless. The failure
to provide accessible complaint forms to Latinos was even more egregious in light of
the tensions that have existed between EHPD and the Latino community, and EHPD's
awareness of those tensions. (14).
1.

EHPD limits the initiation, scope, and resulting discipline of internal investigation.
A. AEHPD was made aware of a number of complaints against individual officers and
the department as a whole involving unlawful stops. EHPD Chief undertook the
investigation himself and informally determined that the complaints of individual
misconduct were unsubstantiated. They found that this incident was part of a larger
pattern of informal resolution of serious complaints without independent review done
through routine internal investigation procedures. (15).

The broken system for handling officer misconduct within EHPD permits officers to target
Latinos with little fear of consequences. Investigations that are completed are superficial,
permitting arbitrary decisions giving rise to an inference that officers may engage in misconduct
so long as it is supported by the relevant EHPD command staff. Indeed, EHPD officers we spoke
to reported precisely this kind of favoritism.
2. EHPD exercises minimal oversight of its officers
A. EHPD has no system to track and analyze complaints, incidents in which an officer
has used force, or any other policing activity that would allow its command staff to
determine whether an officer has engaged in discriminatory policing. Notably, the
absence of such a system is damaging to the officer as well as to EHPD and the
broader community: such systems are used regularly by policing agencies as a means

21

to intervene in response to officer misconduct or potential misconduct before the

officer has put him or herself or members of the community at risk of harm. (15).
3. EHPD has refused to provide meaningful language access to Latinos
A. EHPD, as a recipient of federal funds, is obliged under Title VI to provide language
services to persons with limited English proficiency and has been on notice of that
obligation since well before the initiation of this investigation, despite EHPD's
awareness of this obligation, their investigation found that EHPD has made scant
effort to provide Spanish language assistance to persons with whom EHPD officers
come into contact. EHPD has failed to utilize a language line for communication with
persons that are not proficient in English and has no formal policies guiding EHPD
officers in the field for their encounters with such persons. (16).
4. EHPD has disregarded the consular rights of Latinos
A. EHPD Failed to abide by treaties entered into by the United States obligating law
enforcement agencies nationwide to notify arrested foreign nationals of their right to
contact their respective consulates. Their investigation found that EHPD regularly
comes into contact with Latinos who are nationals of other countries. In these
circumstances, depending on the nationality of the person involved, EHPD must
either contact the appropriate consulate and notify the consulate of the arrest, or
notify the arrestee that the arrestee has the right to make such contact. But they found
that EHPD has entirely failed to understand or protect these clearly-defined rights.
Despite EHPD command staffs awareness of the numerous Latinos of foreign
nationality that live in and travel through its jurisdiction, EHPD has adopted no
training or policies assuring that their consular notification rights will be respected.
(16).
5. EHPD has refused to meaningfully engage with the Latino community, despite the
Latino community's growth

22

A. EHPD has made almost no attempt to conduct meaningful outreach to the Latino
community. They encountered Latinos who described being reluctant to seek police
assistance out of distrust and fear of EHPD officers. (17).
6. An audit commissioned by the Town of East Haven also found that EHPD suffers
from significant institutional deficiencies
A. The PERF Report found that EHPD policies "fell well short of best professional
practices," including policies regarding use of force, less lethal weapons, civilian
complaints and internal investigations, and an early intervention system. The PERF
report emphasized that "many of the current policy directives are outdated" and
encouraged EHPD to take action to update them. During the course of the audit,
PERF learned that some EHPD officers ignored the policies that existed. This
problem of officers disregarding policies was further complicated by EHPD's "uneven
enforcement of policy infractions and inconsistent application of discipline." (17).
EHPD Violates Title VI and the Safe Streets Act by Engaging in Discriminatory Practices
against Latinos
1. Title VI prohibits intentional discrimination. The Safe Streets Act prohibits
discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion, national origin, or sex by police
departments receiving certain federal funds. The United States is authorized to bring a civil
action in an appropriate United States district court to address a pattern or practice of
discrimination by 'any state or local criminal justice agency receiving such federal funds.
The Safe Streets Act has been interpreted by both case law and regulation to prohibit
government activity having a discriminatory impact.
The actions and willful inactions discussed above constitute a violation of Title VI and the Safe
Streets Act. However, the United States is deferring formal determinations of noncompliance
with Title VI and the Safe Streets Act at this time to provide you an opportunity to voluntarily
cooperate in resolving this matter so that your federal funding from the Department of Justice is
no longer at risk.
A. The pattern or practice of bias described above, including EHPD's targeting of Latinos,
particularly in traffic enforcement, the pattern of hostility towards the Latino community,

23

and numerous institutional practices enabling discrimination, supports finding

independent violations of Title VI and the Safe Streets Act. (19).
Additional Areas of Serious Concern
1. They revealed serious deficiencies in the accountability and supervision of officers that
creates an unreasonable risk of other constitutional violations. In particular, they found
serious institutional deficiencies in EHPD's management and accountability systems that
fail to protect individuals from unlawful searches and seizures and use of excessive force.
We are also concerned with reports that Chief Gallo and other EHPD officers created a hostile
and intimidating environment for persons who wished to cooperate with our investigation at
EHPD. During our tours, we observed notes that were publicly displayed outside individual
offices referencing our investigation in a disparaging manner and messages on a police union
bulletin board that referred to "rats" at EHPD. We also learned that Chief Gallo had warned staff
that DOJ had agreed to provide him with the names of individuals who cooperated with the
investigation, contradicting our discussions with Chief Gallo. Indeed, prior to this incident we
notified Chief Gallo that we would keep the names of officers or staff who spoke to us during
our investigation confidential in order to protect individuals from potential retaliation. The
hostility we observed was also directed at civilian members of the Police Commission.
A. During one of their tours, officers referred to EHPD headquarters as a "poisoned pond"
when a Police Commissioner entered the building for a scheduled interview with us. The
Police Commissioner became visibly upset and agitated at the officers' comments and
canceled the interview. (19).
B. DOJ staff members were also the object of similar questionable conduct by several
officers and union representatives who met with us prior to our first on-site tour of
EHPD. At a late evening meeting, officers warned DOJ staff and a police practices
consultant that that they could not guarantee their safety during ride-alongs with officers,
a highly unusual statement given the nature of our ride-alongs and the relatively low
violent crime rate in East Haven. We continued to receive subsequent reports of hostility
and intimidation by EHPD officers and police union representatives. These recent reports
caused us to advise the Mayor in early December 2011 of his obligation to prevent
retaliation. (19).

24

Synopsis
EHPD engages in a pattern or practice of biased policing against Latinos in violation of
the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and federal law. Specifically, we
have reasonable cause to believe that EHPD officers intentionally target Latinos for disparate
traffic enforcement and treatment because of their race, color, or national origin.

Miami Police Department

This is the second time in ten years that the Department of Justice has had investigate the
Miami police department. The first investigation in 2002 started because of excessive use of
force allegations. The DOJ did not find a practice or pattern of excessive use of force during the
first investigation but did find serious deficiencies in the Miami Police Departments investigative
practices. After the first investigation Miami did show a willingness to work with the DOJ to
address the concerns. Here is what they found during the second investigation.
1. The city of Miami Police Department has engaged in a pattern or practice of excessive
force in officer- involved Shootings at persons.
MPD's own finding of a 13% unjustified shooting rate (3 of the 24 completed
investigations) is one factor underlying our determination of a pattern or practice of
unconstitutionally excessive deadly force. Throughout the DOJs review of the Miami Police
department from 2008 to 2011 they identified other shootings that appeared to be unjustified.
A. MPD terminated the officer after he killed an unarmed motorist and wounded an
unarmed passenger in 2011. MPD rejected the shooting officer's statement that he
saw a dark object in the driver's hand that appeared to be a weapon. MPD also
appeared to credit a witness's account that the passenger complied with the
officer's demands to show his hands. Notably, the shooting officer was also
involved in a non-shooting role in a 2008 shooting that is still under investigation.
Had MPD fully investigated the 2008 shooting, perhaps retraining or other
corrective action may have been taken which could have influenced whether the
2011 shooting had to occur (6).

25

B. MPD disciplined an officer after the officer shot at a motorist who reached into
his back pocket to retrieve his wallet after the officer requested identification. The
Firearms Review Board voted 4-1 that the shooting was justified. The dissenting
Firearms Review Board member noted that (1) the officer should have anticipated
that the driver would reach into his rear pocket to get identification; and (2) it was
questionable that the officer gave several commands as he claimed. Chief Orosa
overruled the Firearms Review Board to find the shooting unjustified (6).
C. MPD disciplined an officer after the officer shot several times at a subject in a
fleeing vehicle. The officer had witnessed the subject repeatedly shoot another
man in front of a building before the subject turned the gun towards the officer
and then entered a vehicle and fled. The Firearms Review Board found that the
officer was unjustified in delivering the last of several shots since the car was
fleeing and there was no longer an imminent threat to the officer. It is extremely
dangerous to shoot at a moving vehicle and the practice is prohibited by policy in
many departments. Should the driver become incapacitated; he or she could lose
control of the vehicle creating a serious risk of harm to bystanders (6).
2. MPD Officers Routinely Employ Poor Tactics
MPD's own review of some of these incidents recognized deficiencies such as poor
marksmanship, shooting from too great a distance, failure to follow perimeter protocol, and
firing at a moving vehicle. In other incidents, though, as described below, we found other serious
deficiencies that MPD did not find. In addition to increasing the likelihood that officers will use
deadly force unnecessarily, tactical deficiencies can endanger the lives of officers and
bystanders.
A. An officer apparently entered a dark building alone in search of an unknown and
unarmed subject, who was ultimately shot by the officer. The circumstances of the search
did not present an immediate risk to the public that necessitated entry without backup.
The officer had no information about whether or not the subject was armed prior to
entering the building and placed himself at significant risk of harm by proceeding without
assistance (7).

26

B. In one case, an officer chasing a subject fired numerous shots into a dark alley that was
surrounded by homes (7).
C. In one case, a man known by MPD to have mental illness was shot after he lunged at
officers with a broken bottle. Numerous officers unnecessarily surrounded the man,
escalating the situation, while a member of the Crisis Intervention Team (CIT) was
attempting to speak with him (7 8).
3. Improper Actions by Specialized Units
A. In one case, for example, a team of officers in a specialized unit improperly deviated
from the requirements of a tactical plan. Using unmarked vehicles, the officers diverted
from a plan in which they were only to provide particularized assistance when requested
and, instead, followed a young man walking on the street. The officers ultimately shot the
man, who had been carrying a gun (8).
No marked police vehicles involved in the initial felony stops, and officers who
participated in the related shootings and arrests were not immediately recognizable as
officers.
MPD's Investigations of Officer-Involved Shootings Are Inadequate
To date, to our knowledge, MPD has completed only 24 internal investigations for the 33 officerinvolved shootings that are the subject of our investigation. Thus, for almost a third of the
shootings, MPD has not reached a conclusion internally as to whether or not the officer's firearm
discharge was within policy. In some cases, the investigations have remained open for more than
three years.
4. Outcomes of Shooting Investigations Are Unreasonably Delayed
A. 2009 shooting in which the only living witnesses are the shooting officers. More than
three years after the incident, the involved officers still have not provided statements
about what transpired during the shooting (9).

27

5. Shooting Investigations Fail to Adequately Analyze and Explore Facts to Determine

Whether a Shooting is Justified.
A. In one investigation, for example, multiple civilian witnesses alleged that officers
involved in a fatal shooting exhibited questionable behavior prior to the shooting.
Despite physical evidence at the scene that partly collaborated the civilians' allegations,
investigators did not mention the physical evidence in written reports or ask any of the
involved officers about the allegations or physical evidence in their sworn statements,
ignoring a relevant part of the investigation (9) .
6. DOJ found that MPD does not adequately or timely capture the shooting officer's
version of events.
A. In some of the earlier cases reviewed, they found that MPD would complete an
administrative investigation with the single exception of taking the shooting officer's
statement, which would be taken as soon as the SAO declined to prosecute the officer
(10).
Synopsis
Unlike the first investigation of the Miami Police depart were use of force was not an
issue the second investigation by the US Department of Justices revealed that the MPD engages
in a pattern or practice of unconstitutional use of force. Poor training and inadequate
investigations contribute to the Use of force issues at the Miami Police Department.

New Orleans Police Department

The US Department of Justice (DOJ) began investigating the New Orleans Police
Department (NOPD) in May of 2010. The DOJ focused their investigation on unconstitutional
use of force, unconstitutional stops, searches, and arrests, and discriminatory policing. The DOJ
found evidence that NOPD engages in a pattern or practice of the issues listed above. The DOJ
published its Finding Letter in March of 2011.
1. Pattern or practice of unconstitutional use of A) lethal force and B) non-lethal force

28

A. NOPD officers routinely violate policy by firing their weapons at moving vehicles. In one
case, an officer stood in front of a moving vehicle and was thrown over the vehicles
hood. This led to other officers to shooting and killing the vehicles driver. Sergeants in
the NOPD perpetrated many of the problematic uses of lethal force. One sergeant, who
was involved in six shooting in four years, fired multiple rounds at a fleeing suspect in a
residential area, contrary to NOPD policy (9).
B. NOPD officers use non-lethal force in situations where it is unnecessary. In one incident,
a handcuffed arrestee spit on the back of an officer head so the officer retaliated by
punching the arrestee in the jaw with a closed fist (4). NOPD officers deploy their
electronic control devices (ECD) in situations contrary to official policy. For example,
officers deployed their ECDs on an individual for fleeing on his bicycle. It is against
official policy to deploy ECDs on individuals riding bicycles because the loss of motor
control can cause serious injury. NOPD also has poor control of their canines. NOPD
canines bite subjects approximately six out of ten times they are deployed, twice what
you would expect from a properly managed canine unit (6-7).
2. Pattern or practice of unconstitutional A) stops, searches and B) arrests
A. NOPD officers stop and search individuals without probable cause. In one instance, an
officer pulled over and searched an individuals vehicle after receiving a call about a
suspicious person. Although the officer found stolen property in the vehicle, reports of
a suspicious person do not provide reasonable cause to stop and search an individual or
their vehicle. In another case, officers opened the backpack of a juvenile suspect without
consent and took an iPod they believed to stolen (31).
B. NOPD officers often arrest individuals without probable cause. In one incident, officers
arrested a juvenile for a curfew violation but the arrest report on the incident did not
provide any valid narrative as to why the officers believed a curfew violation had taken
place (31).
3. Pattern or practice of discriminatory policing on the basis of A) race, ethnicity and B)
LGBT status

29

A. African-American residents of New Orleans reported negative encounter with NOPD,

resulting in distrust between their community and the police. These negative encounters
include harassment, illegal stops, violent arrests, and excessive use of force. Many
Latinos in New Orleans, especially young males, reported being stopped by NOPD for
unknown reasons and minor reasons that do not merit police involvement. Latinos also
reported being pulled over at high rates, and they believe this is because they are being
profiled as undocumented immigrants (36).
B. Members of New Orleans LGBT community reported that they are unjustifiably targeted
by NOPD for prostitution arrests. Transgender people reported being charged with
Louisianas criminal statute of soliciting crimes against nature instead of being
charged with under the generic solicitation statute. Until August 2010, being charged
under the crimes against nature resulted registration as a felony sex offender (36).
Many members of the LGBT community also reported both sexual and physical abuse by
NOPD officers, and that NOPD does not take their complaints seriously (37).
4. Structural and systemic deficiencies contributing to the pattern of unconstitutional
conduct including A) use of force policy B) unconstitutional stops, searches, and arrests
and C) discriminatory policing
A. The DOJ found that officers, supervisors, and commander have a poor understanding of
their own use of force policies. This poor understanding stems primarily from the
deficiencies in NOPD force-related policies. These policies are outdated and many are
contradictory. Key terms throughout the policies are not clearly defined. Two of these
ambiguous terms are non-lethal and physical force (9-10). NOPD policy claims to
require force reporting, investigation, and reporting but there is no established framework
to do so. Because of this, NOPD tolerates widespread underreporting. Underreporting of
force is a symptom of poor understanding of official policy and the systemic failure to
hold officers accountable for their actions. One sergeant who leads a taskforce with an
above average number of arrests reported there was not a single incident that required a
force report in a three-month period (13-14).
B. The DOJ found that NOPD policy regarding warrantless searches and seizures. There
was consensus in NOPD that officers have a poor understanding on how to lawfully carry

30

out stops, searches, and arrests due to the lack of detail in the official policies. In a fourpage policy regarding stop and frisks, or Terry stops, only two paragraphs explain the
appropriate legal standards an officer must follow. The policy regarding so-called Terry
stops is emblematic of the lack of clear and comprehensive guidance in NOPD official
policies (27-28).
C. The inadequate policies regarding the performing of legal stops, searches, and arrests
leads to officers to use inappropriate stereotypes and personal bias when making
decisions. NOPD does not acknowledge the reality that stereotypes and personal bias
influence police work on both the individual and structural level. Because of this, NOPD
lacks a comprehensive policy regarding discriminatory policing. There is no framework
in place to collect and analyze complaints of racial profiling. Many members of the
community blame the discriminatory policing on NOPDs focus on maximizing arrests
(34-35).
5. Deficiencies in training contributing to the pattern of unconstitutional conduct including
A) use of force training B) illegal stops, searches, and arrests and C) discriminatory
policing
A. The deficiencies in NOPD use of force policies are exacerbated by the lack of proper use
of force training. NOPD does not provide adequate training on how to effectively use
force or how to avoid using force all together to new recruits or in-service training to
their existing officers. The in-service training consists primarily of annual recertification
in firearm and ECD use. The recertification course is scheduled for two hours, but due to
a variety of issues the actual instruction lasts only thirty minutes. There is no training on
use of force policy, when to use deadly force, or the practical application of force.
Because there is no training, there is no test to determine whether an officer is capable of
using force within the limits of the law and NOPD policy. This failure to properly train
officers leads to them being ill equipped to deal with dangerous situations. This systemic
failure leads to a higher likelihood of officers losing control of the situation and resorting
to force in order to regain control (31).
B. NOPD training on proper stops and seizures is deficient in content and frequency.
Officers reported they had not received search and seizure training since they left the

31

academy. The DOJ found no evidence of any efforts to reinforce the limited training
officers receive as recruits. This poses the risk of institutionalizing illegal search and
seizure practices. For example, many officers believe they can pat down any individual
they detain to look for weapons. Legally, they can only pat down an individual if they
have reasonable cause to believe an individual is armed (28-29).
C. NOPD requires the Education and Training Division to provide in-service training on
bias-based profiling, yet most NOPD personnel had not received this training since
Hurricane Katrina.

Synopsis
The Department of Justices investigation of the New Orleans Police Department
revealed that NOPD engages in a pattern or practice of violating the constitutional rights of
citizens through the use of force, unlawful stops, searches, and arrests, and discriminatory
policing practices. Structural and systemic deficiencies in policy, training, and internal
accountability contribute to the unconstitutional conduct that NOPD engages in.

Portland Police Department

The Department of Justice entered Portland, Oregon on June 8th, 2011. They were
specifically investigating the Portland Police Department in regards to excessive force used
against people with mental illness. In other circumstances, the Department was upheld to
constitutional standards relating to the standards of the DOJ investigation. However, unlike many
of the other departments investigated, mental health was the primary focus of the DOJ when
investigating Portland. This issue is backed by larger gaps regarding healthcare and mental
health treatment in the state of Oregon.
1. The Portland Police Department, through most of the findings were deemed
constitutional, except when it comes to encounters with people with mental illness.
The following were the most identifiable issues with PPD, as written by the DOJ:

32

A. Pattern of Excessive force with a focus on the use of force against people with
mental illness or in health crises, either perceived mental illness or actual health
conditions.
B. PPD officers repeatedly used Electronic Control Weapons (tasers) against people
with mental illness, including excessive and repeated uses of shock against single
victims.
C. Lack of adequate crisis response to help stabilize people in crisis
D. Officers do not consider a persons mental state before engaging in use of force,
or use of deadly force
E. Lack of specialty training for officers
F. In May 2011, a desperate mother called the PPD because he had allegedly
assaulted his mother and was in possession of a sword. The subject had a history
of mental illness, and when the officers arrived they demanded that he come
downstairs. When he refused to put his hands on his head, the officers shot him
with a beanbag shotgun round to his leg, while another officer deployed ECWs
rounds on his back. The subjects hands were visible throughout the situation, and
a sword was never observed. (12).
G. In May 2011, an officer was called to check on an unarmed man who had been
standing in the rain for over an hour. The officer could not speak to the subject
because of a language barrier and went back to his car to ask for assistance from a
Spanish speaking officer. When the officer stepped out of his car, the subject
approached the officer and kicked at the officer, but did not make contact. The
officer caught the subject by the leg and threw the subject to the ground. The
subject rolled onto his back and the officer proceeded to punch him 7-10 times in
the face, while the subject grabbed at the officers hands to try and stop the blows.
(17).
2. Inadequate Supervision and Review of Officers Use of Force
A. Certain elements of police accountability is not under PPDs
control
B. Failure to implement timely corrective action or accountability after officer
misconduct

33

C. Self-Defeating Accountability System because of close relationship with

administrative review committee and officers
D. Ineffective Police Review Board
3. Inefficient process, complaining citizens not allowed to attend, significant delay in
the timeliness of accountability AND CRC (Citizen Review Committee) is also
inefficient
A. Only allowed to look at certain recommendations of findings, and reports back to
the police department. It consists of nine volunteer citizens that meets once a
month, adding additional delays. At the appeal, CRC considers only the
recommended finding on the officer accountability incident. CRC does not
consider and does not receive information on the recommended disciplinary
action, if any. CRC has limited authority to reach findings. CRC representatives
have informed us that they have been counseled that they may only send a
complaint back to PPD for further information or to determine whether a prior
finding is irrational.
4. Lack of clarity and timeliness when it comes to PPDs Early Intervention
System
A. The EIS was recently computerized, but the process took six years to get up and
working functionally. The goal was to create a system that would indicate certain
behavioral trends by certain officers, and using repeated offenses as a way to
command discipline up the chain of command.
B. PPDs stated goal for its EIS is to keep officers productive by offering officers
interventions when PPD identifies behavior, medical issues, or psychological
problems that adversely affect PPDs goals. (35). The EIS serves as a database to
understand different types of officers behavior. EIS would ideally recognize
triggers in officers behavior that could be potentially harmful, when officers
are recognized by the system, the person in that officers chain of command
would intervene.
C. Nothing has been done to address the efficacy of the system. Officers are only
looked at individually, but the DOJ recommends the system looks at entire units
for triggers that indicate higher uses of force.

34

Synopsis
While the publishings put forth by the DOJ, accurately define a problem of mental
health policing, and the many structural and training errors, which provide mentally ill Portlandcivilians with deficient protection, this analysis is specifically limited to the larger role of
mentally ill people and their treatment and societal perception throughout Oregon, extending to
insufficient facilities and care. The Report alluded to structural and supervisory issues, yet to not
relate these to how it may be affecting the way the PPB treats people of color, homeless, or
minorities. There is a section for comprehensive solutions, which includes community policing
and improved access to medical care. The review of Portland was unique in the specific focus of

35

unconstitutional policing against people with mental illness, which was not a primary focus of
the other departments analyzed in this compilation. However, it was also a very limited
investigation, in its own acknowledgement of not looking into any patterns of bias-based
policing.

Puerto Rico Police Department

The US Department of Justice first opened their investigation of the Puerto Rico Police
Department (PR PD) in 2008, focusing on a four year period from 2004-2008. The DOJ focused
their investigations on patterns or practices of conduct by PR PD that deprives persons of rights,
privileges, or immunities secured or protected by both the Constitution and federal law,
including excessive and deadly force. The DOJ published its Findings Letter in September of
2011.

1. Puerto Rico Police Department has engaged in excessive force patterns and practices
which are in violation of the Fourth Amendment.
A. Force is frequently used when it is unnecessary and gratuitous, and is often the first and
last option considered by PRPD officers. The use of excessive force carried out by PR
PD includes punching or taking subjects to the ground, as well as striking and jabbing
with batons, deploying chemical agents, using choke holds and other neck restraints, and
discharging firearms, with subjects of excessive force, many were, at the time of the
incident carrying out ordinary activities or committing minor infractions. Officers also
use excessive physical force in response to perceived verbal slights or after an individual
stops resisting (20).
B. On August 11, 2007, Cceres Cruz was directing traffic as part of a motorcade that had
gathered for a birthday celebration. Three PR PD officers drove by Cceres Cruz and
stopped after they heard him say something they believed was an insult. One officer
exited the vehicle, approached Cruz, and engaged in a verbal exchange. The officers then
told Cruz he was under arrest. The officer grabbed Cceres Cruz and wrestled him to the
ground, as they struggled; the officer discharged his firearm and shot himself in the leg.
The officer then unholstered his firearm and shot Cruz multiple times at close range in

36

the head and body. The two other officers left Cruz lying on the sidewalk as they drove
the injured officer to the hospital without notifying central command that anyone else
had been shot. The officers initial report indicated that Officer Pagn Cruz acted in selfdefense because Cruz resisted arrest and tried to gain control of the officers firearm, but
a video recording taken by a civilian showed the officer standing over Cceres Cruz and
shooting him several times. Murder charges were filed on August 14, 2007 (20).
Table 1: Subjects Shot and Killed by PR PD, As Reported by SIB, 2005-2010

(DOJ Report, 40)

2. Unreasonable force and other misconduct designed to suppress the exercise of
protected First Amendment rights.
A. PRPD indiscriminately using chemical agents, batons, and physical force against
demonstrators and other individuals on University Avenue in August 2009, at the
Sheraton Hotel in May 2010, and at the Capitol in June 2010 (26-32).
B. PRPD officers also using choke holds and pressure techniques against protestors who
were passively resisting or otherwise not posing any significant threat as recently as
December 2010 and January 2011 (31-32).
3. Reliance on heavily armed tactical units and strategies.
A. Units relying almost exclusively on extreme displays of force and actual force, rather
than on problem-solving approaches, are neither trained nor intended to perform such
patrol functions (6, 42-43)
B. Units relying on intimidation, fear, and extreme use of force to manage crowds and
are often deployed to low-income and minority communities on routine patrols (42).

37

4. Unlawful searches and seizures in violation of the Fourth Amendment.

A. 1,302 civilian complaints against PR PD officers for unreasonable or illegal searches
and seizures from 2004 to 2008 according to PRD (48).
B. PR PD involved in patterns and practices of conducting searches of civilians homes
without a warrant or consent and in the absence of any circumstance or exception that
would render such a search constitutional (45).
C. PR PD officers frequently planting evidence during searches, relying on excessive
force and intimidation as search aids or tools, and proceeding with searches even
when knowing that the address, identity of the individual, or other pertinent
information is incorrect (45).
D. On June 21, 2007, Robert Gonzlez Ramrez was standing in front of a business with
a neighbor when four officers detained Ramrez and seized his car. The officers hit
Ramrez with their service weapons and repeatedly threatened him as they asked him
about drugs. The officers then took Ramrez to his home, where they conducted a
search but found nothing. Gonzlez Ramrezs arrest and the search and seizure of his
property were not based on any mentioned probable cause (48).
5. Insufficient training on use of force
A. January 1 - November 30, 2010, only a small fraction of active PR PD officers
received any training on use of force (42).
B. 415 officers received training on the use of batons during this period, or fewer than
3% of active PRPD officers (42).
C. PR PD also does not consistently train officers adequately, as well as fail to train
supervisors to independently review officers use of force (42).
6. Systems of accountability flawed
A. PRPDs systems of accountability do not ensure the lawful and effective use of force
(44).

38

B. PRPD continues to demonstrate a deliberate indifference to the publics safety and the
civil rights of individuals by failing to control the violence and fear exerted by TOUs
(44-45).
C. PR PD failing to report its uses of force. (44-45).
7. Inadequate policies and practices which fail to address A) - D) Police crime and
corruption within PR PD and E) - F) Instances of domestic violence committed by
PR PD officers.
A. The degree of police corruption and criminal misconduct in Puerto Rico alarmingly
high, contributing to public safety (14.)
B. More PR PD officers involved in criminal activity than any other major law
enforcement agency in the country, with officers arrested for criminal activity ranging
from simple assault to theft to domestic violence, drug trafficking, and murder (14).
C. January 2005 November 2010: more than 1,709 arrests of PR PD officers (14).
D. In December 2010, Officers Raquel Delgado Marrero and ngel Rivera Claudio were
convicted of three counts each for drug and firearm-related charges for participation
in a July 2009 drug transaction in which they provided armed protection to a drug
dealer during the sale of seven kilograms of cocaine (15).
E. 2005 to 2010, PRPD received 1,459 civilian complaints alleging domestic violence
by officers. Of the complaints resolved during this period, administrative
investigators recommended disciplinary or corrective action in 1,018 cases in the
form of orientation, admonishment, suspension, separation or expulsion (16-17).

(DOJ Report, 17)

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F. On January 13, 2008, Officer Ramos Santiago killed his wife, Deborah Berrocal
Lugo, in front of their then-four-year-old daughter. A jury found him guilty of firstdegree murder and a weapons charge (17).
8. Discriminatory Police Practices by PR PD
A. PR PD engages in discriminatory policing practices that target individuals of
Dominican descent in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment and the Safe Streets
Act, including the routine employment of excessive force, unlawful searches and
seizures, and intimidation. (55-56).
B. On December 28, 2006, Flix Escolstico Rodrguez was parking his vehicle at his
home when a group of PRPD officers approached him. The officers seized Rodrguez
and, without a legitimate law enforcement purpose, hit him in the head, chest, arms,
and legs as they yelled derogatory and xenophobic slurs at him related to his
Dominican origin. On March 27, 2010, the district court dismissed Escolstico
Rodrguezs civil rights case after the parties entered into a confidential settlement
agreement (56).
9. PR PD frequently failing to police sex crimes and incidents of domestic violence.
A. Serious concerns of PR PD failings to adequately address sexual assault, with serious
underreporting, and to prevent and address domestic violence committed by PRPD
officers (57).
B. PR PD repeatedly failing to appropriately discipline officers accused of domestic
violence. PR PD allowing officers accused of serious crimes to continue on active
duty as a result of inefficient and faulty systems of accountability (58).
10. Further Deficiencies Causing Constitutional Violations
Inadequate Policies and Procedures, Insufficient and Inadequate Training (incl. Pre-Training),
Supervision, and Discipline, Deficient and Discouraging Civilian Complaint Processes, Lack of
Oversight and Accountability, and Limited Risk Management (59-84).
11. Outlined Recommended Remedial Measures

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Independence and Professionalism, PR PD Staffing Evaluations, Specialized Tactical Units

Reforms, Evaluations of Use of Force Policies, Internal Controls, Accountability, and Reporting
and Review, Training, Supervision, and Discipline Evaluations, and Oversight and Community
Engagements.
Synopsis
The US Department of Justices investigation of the Puerto Rico Police Department
revealed the heavy reliance on force by PR PD coupled with inadequate training which results in
excessive and deadly force occurring regularly. Structural deficiencies in internal accountability
and oversight fail to address instances of domestic violence committed by officers and police
corruption within PR PD which perpetuate the use of force issues which are heavily embedded in
this police department.

Seattle Police Department

The US Department of Justice (DOJ) began investigating the Seattle Police Department
(SPD) in March of 2011. The DOJ focused their investigation on whether SPD engaged in a
pattern or practice of unconstitutional policing through the use of excessive force and
discriminatory policing. The DOJ report found that the SPD engages in a practice of
unnecessary or excessive force, which violates citizens Fourth Amendment rights. The DOJ
report did not make a finding of discriminatory policing, but their investigation raised some
serious concerns on this issue. The DOJ published its findings on SPD in December of 2011.
1. SPD officers use excessive force in response to minor offenses
A. In one incident, an officer viewed a man exhibiting irrational behavior. The man was
standing in the road yelling at a traffic light. He was sweating, his eyes bulging, and
he was talking incoherently. The officer ordered the man to get out of the road.
When the man didnt respond to the officer, the officer proceeded to spray the man
with pepper spray. The man reportedly balled up his fist so the officer then
delivered between 14 to 18 punches, 5 to 7 elbow strikes, and 3 baton strikes, while
an additional officer struck the man with a baton. In the end the man was arrested for
pedestrian interference and obstruction (10).

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2. SPD officers use excessive force when they apply force in tandem against a single
individual
A. One incident illustrates this problem. Four officers were called to a house to
investigate a stabbing at a party. When the officers searched the house a man was
lying face down on a bed with his arms under a pillow. The man had fallen asleep
after having too much to drink. The man was 49 years old and did not speak English
as his first language. After the man did not follow the orders of the officers they
decided to arrest him. As the officers made contact with the man, he began to kick
his legs. The officers saw this resistance as reasonable cause to use force. Officer
one delivered 5 to 7 punches to the mans face. Officer two struck the man 3 to 4
times in the head. Officer 3 struck the man in the side of his body 3 to 4 times with
his knee. Officer 4 delivered multiple strikes with his flashlight to the mans
midsection. The mans incoherent state is further illustrated by the fact that when
officers took the man to the precinct for booking, he said that someone had beaten
him up and thanked the SPD officer for saving him. In this case the officers involved
used excessive force when trying to gain compliance from the suspect (12).
3. SPD officers too quickly and unreasonably resort to the use of impact weapons
A. In the course of one arrest, an officer made contact with a man whom he suspected
had put a bag of crack cocaine into his mouth. The officer used his baton to pry the
mans mouth open so that a second officer could take out the drugs. This is an
inappropriate use of a baton. Yet, despite the fact that the officers supervisor
identified the inappropriate use of the baton, neither the supervisor nor anyone in the
chain of command identified this incident as an unreasonable use of force (13).
B. See chart on page 42.

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This graph shows that officers used their batons in an excessive manner 57% of the time (9).
4. SPD officers use excessive force against individuals who are already under physical
control
A. In one incident, a handcuffed man was being seated in a patrol car when he began to
struggle. One officer than then struck the man 5 times in the chest, rather than
finding alternate way to gain full compliance from this already restrained subject
(14).
5. SPD officers use excessive force against individuals who talk-back
A. In one incident, two officers arrested a young man for his refusal to comply with an
officers orders to go down to his knees. After the man was put in handcuffs and laid
face down on the ground, he then said, Go ahead, do what you got to do. The
officer then punched the man in the chest and struck him with his knee. Because the
man was prone and in handcuffs there was no need to use force (14).
6. Unlawful Pedestrian encounters

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A. SPD officers continually make unlawful pedestrian stops. Many of the incidents
reported individuals were stopped without reasonable suspicion or cause, detained,
and told they were not free to leave. Many of these incidents involve officers
stopping youths of color. The DOJ is concerned that these practices may particularly
affect racial and ethnic minorities, which would constitute a violation of the
fourteenth Amendments Equal Protection Clause (27).
7. Incidents of overt discrimination contribute to the problem
A. A number of individuals reported incidents in which racial epithets were used or
minorities were singled out for harsh treatment. In one incident, a Black male
bystander at an accident asked the SPD officer on site if he could help because he
worked at a hospital. The officer replied, what are you the janitor? (27).
8. Additional indicators of potential biased policing
A. Of the cases that the DOJ investigated that involved excessive or unreasonable uses
of force, more than half involved non-white subjects. In a review of use of force
complaints from 2003 to 2005 revealed a high proportion of complaints about force
were made by citizens of color. (28).
Synopsis
The DOJ Investigation into the Seattle police department revealed that SPD engages in in
a practice of unnecessary or excessive force. The DOJ also raised some serious questions
regarding discriminatory policing. SPD often uses excessive force with impact weapons, in
tandem with other officers, and often for small offences. SPD also exhibits discriminatory
policing when dealing with racial and ethnic minorities. Failure to report use of force incidents,
inadequate policies, inadequate supervision, and lack of training, seem to contribute to these
problems listed above.

Washington Metropolitan Police Department

The US Department of Justice (DOJ) Civil Rights Division sent District of Columbia
Mayor Anthony Williams and Metropolitan Police Department Chief of Police Charles H.

44

Ramsey the Findings Letter re Use of Force by the Washington Metropolitan Police Department.
The Civil Rights Division conducted an investigation at the request of the department.
Following the investigation it was revealed there was a pattern or practice of excessive force by
MPD.
The DOJ does compliment MPDs pledge to reduce the liability of excessive use of force,
executed by the MPD in requesting the DOJ conduct an investigation in assisting the MPD to
recognize and establish methods to correct the imperfections. The DOJ recognizes the effort
MPD has initiated to begin making critical reforms into the way the department records,
investigates, supervise, and manages use of force issues. DOJ acknowledges the commitment
MPD has on executing these reforms in order to ensure effective and respectful policing.
Investigative Findings
1. Use of Excessive Force
A. The DOJ conducted an in-depth investigation of layered selection of samples of use of
force incidents it showed almost 15 percent of cases involved use of excessive force by
MPD officers. This is based on experts of police use of force, in organization that follow
strict policies and procedures it is expected excessive use of force would occur 1-2
percent of all incidents. In conjunction with the number of cases they found the amount
of force used, lawful, could have been prevented had the officer used less aggressive
techniques.
B. 14 percent of incidents involved off-duty police officers and a quarter of those
incidents could have involved alcohol (off-duty police patronizing a bar or nightclub).
Approximately one-third of those incidents the subject charged with assault on a police
officer. Noted, the United States Attorney Generals office refused to prosecute the
subject because it lacked merit.
C. Twenty-two percent of the firearm incidents involved accusations by MPD officers to
justify their deadly force, indicating the subject reached into their waistband or had a
firearm. Every case investigated following firearm incident found the subject did not
have a firearm in possession. Twenty-two percent of cases found MPD officers fired
their service weapon at moving vehicles.

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2. Use of Force Reporting

A. The DOJ found that MPD did not have proper protocol when it came officers use of
force reporting. During the investigation period the review required police officers report
firearm, electronic stun devices, pepper spray, batons, carotid artery holds, and forcible
frisks. Following answers from MPD personnel and supervisors the DOJ had concerns
whether there was any use of force, except firearms, was reported. The MPD personnel
had different opinions and definitions of the type of force that needed to be reported.
B. The DOJ recommended the MPD define and examine the meaning of use of force
officers are supposed to report. The DOJ recommends the MPD adopt the following:
(1) Define use of force to include all physical (pain compliance, kicks, punches, etc.)
and instrumental (flashlight, radio, baton, ASP, firearm, etc.) acts that impose any degree
of force on a civilian; (2) require officers to report every use of force; (3) create a use of
force reporting form that adequately captures the type of force used, in circumstances of
the use, injuries to officers and civilians, and all other relevant information; (4) train
officers on these new policies; and (5) monitor compliance with the new policies.
3. Use of Force Investigations
A. The DOJ found serious issues in the manner MPD use of force investigation were
conducted.
Example: found discrepancies into the way investigation were conducted, investigators
did not question the victims, suspects, or MPD or civilian witnesses. MPD investigation
personnel did not record crime scene area by locating shell casings and important
physical evidence; failed to conduct ballistics comparison tests; failed to photograph
crime scene area.
The DOJ recommended that MPD provide all of its use of force investigators proper training of
interrogation skills; report writing; basic criminal law; basic court procedures; basic rules of
evidence; and MPDs disciplinary and administrative procedures.

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4. Use of Force Training

A. The MPD did have a training program in place that included, academy, in-service
(included roll-call and the firing range) and field, although the DOJ found other areas of
deficiencies.
B. Deficiencies were training was conducted in a noncompliance manner there was no
oversight by MPD administrators or legal personnel. This indicated training had major
flaws that did not include lawful protocol of policies and procedures.
C. DOJ recommended major changes to training procedures by developing a mandatory
40-hour in-service training program, set up systems to guarantee officers achieve timely
firearms recertification, and develop more instructor development courses. In addition,
MPD has implemented its own practice of training task force with members of various
department officials they conduct use of force assessment applications.
D. DOJ conducted investigation into use of training of Glock firearm; they found that
MPD did have training and recertification procedures in place. The DOJ did find that
MPD had unsafe use of the Glock. The MPD failed to follow safe gun practices, officers
continually failed to keep their fingers off the trigger unless appropriate and ready to
shoot, and imperative warning since the Glock does not have an external safety
mechanism.
5. Disciplinary System
A. The DOJ found that MPD did not have a valid disciplinary protocol in place to
respond to use of excessive force officer incidents. MPDs records system for
disciplinary reports did not view to be consistent to incidents.
B. Documentation received indicated, 350 use of force incidents referred to the United
States Attorneys Office for possible criminal prosecution, MPD recommended discipline
for only 16 officers. Records indicated MPD did not enforce on any type of disciplinary
action against its officers. Documents received by DOJ, 31 uses of force held by MPD
to be unjustified, discipline were recommended in less than 50 percent of the cases.
Similarly, of 11 sustained citizen complaints of excessive force, discipline was
recommended in only 7 cases.

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C. The DOJ recommended that MPD revise its reporting and discipline policies and
procedures in conjunction to the collective bargaining obligations. The DOJ
recommended MPD restructure its document and records keep system related to
disciplinary and corrective action.

Synopsis
The DOJ recommends the MPD design an up-to-date model to develop and implement
use of force protocols are in place, to ensure the fact-findings are rectified for their department of
move forward. The DOJ acknowledges MPDs preexisting policies and procedures in place
prior to investigation practices. MPDs will continue to refine its use of force protocol; continue
to revise and review unethical behavioral complaints; improve its corrective plan of officers and
personnel; strengthen its use of force training procedures.

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Works Cited
Department of Justice. (2010). DOJ Findings Letter: Alamance County Sheriffs Office.
Washington D.C:, U.S. Department of Justice.
Department of Justice. (2014). DOJ Findings Letter: Albuquerque Police Department.
Washington D.C:, U.S. Department of Justice.
Department of Justice. (2014). DOJ Findings Letter: Cleveland Police Department. Washington
D.C:, U.S. Department of Justice.
Department of Justice. (2011). DOJ Findings Letter: East Haven Police Department.
Washington D.C:, U.S. Department of Justice.
Department of Justice. (2011). DOJ Findings Letter: New Orleans Police Department.
Washington D.C:, U.S. Department of Justice.
Department of Justice. (2010). DOJ Findings Letter: Miami Police Department. Washington
D.C:, U.S. Department of Justice.
Department of Justice. (2012). DOJ Findings Letter: Portland Police Department. Washington
D.C:, U.S. Department of Justice.
Department of Justice. (2011). DOJ Findings Letter: Puerto Rico Police Department.
Washington D.C:, U.S. Department of Justice.
Department of Justice. (2011). DOJ Findings Letter: Seattle Police Department. Washington
D.C:, U.S. Department of Justice.
Department of Justice. (2011). DOJ Findings Letter: Washington Metropolitan Police
Department. Washington D.C:, U.S. Department of Justice.