Programa de Ps-graduao em Comunicao PPGCOM/UFC Fotografia e Arte Contempornea Prof. Silas de Paula ______________________________________________________________________ ________________________ Reading the Surface: The Creative Voice in the Art Criticism of Stuart Morgan James A. Brown, Plymouth College of Art, UK
This paper proposes a shift in the nature of art criticism.
Although my aim here is not to provide a model for criticism, I shall be putting the case forward for a critical practice that allows more latitude - in terms of how interpretation is reached in the face of the unavoidable problem of subjectivity. What I am arguing for here is a reconsideration (or at least a recalibration), in the face of the fragmentation of critical authority, of the nature of interpretation within art critical writing and the way in which it addresses the artwork. The subject of this paper is the late critic, Stuart Morgan, a prolific writer during the 1980s and 1990s, considered by many to be a leading critic of mid- to late-postmodern art. I will argue that, in a cultural condition within which meaning floats between object and subject, the critic finds him/herself in a position in which s/he may consider him/herself as much a creator of meaning as the artist whose work is the subject of their writing. Morgan provides a strong example of where the critic retains authority at the same time as questioning the validity of the objectivist approach. From some time in the mid- to late-1960s and into the 1970s, art critics (not all, but many) in the West had either been lamenting the shifts that had occurred in art and culture which meant that their own models for describing art works to which they are/ were/ had been adamant to stick, would no longer fit or attempting to continue to apply models of interpretation which would appear to have been rendered obsolete by such shifts. The most prominent and dramatic of these falls was Greenbergs, whose later essays find him bemoaning inter-media art (Greenberg, 1981), and its move away from Modernist concerns with form and the aesthetic. However, arguably more interesting in these terms is Peter Fullers later writings, including his essay on Richard Hamilton (Fuller, 1983). He accuses Hamilton of referring to the mega-visual tradition rather than to true artistic expression. Expression, in Fullers terms, being the transformation of materials
by an imaginative human subject, the artist into a new aesthetic
whole in order to create another reality within the existing one providing an alternative vision of experience and the world to that spewed out within the mega-visual tradition of advertising. What Fuller recognises (but is unwilling to countenance) here is the early stages of the shift away from the idea of fixed, manifest meaning (through the expression of the artist-subject) toward meaning that floats on the surface of the text, between images whose relationship to one another is purely contingent. What the critic was facing here was the shift toward an art after Modernism, which speaks, as Craig Owens (1980) put it, of its own contingency, insufficiency, lack of transcendence. And thus the new post - Modern art spoke as a collection of fragments, rather than a collective whole. Where Modernism presented its own inherent logic, post-Modernism faced the critic with its absolute (and purely contingent) illogic, wherein clearly defined but mutually incomprehensible readings are engaged in a blind confrontation in such a way that it is impossible to choose between them. Each clearly defined reading exists in isolation from all others, with the critic (at each approach) setting forth his/her interpretation. The choice between these depends upon the readers own preference as subject. The critic as interpreter, then, must relinquish the Modernist quest for (the mythical) objective interpretation and acknowledge the absolute contingency of meaning in the post-Modern image. Multivalent meaning is the only possible conclusion, and a more subjective (and creative) position a relevant and useful contributor to the meaning of the work. What we are left with is a culture of the depthless image. By depthless, I mean not that these images are lacking in meaning beyond what is seen, but that meaning proliferates endlessly on the surface. No reading between the lines will tell us anything more about what we see. As Baudrillard (1976) put it, everything is right on the surface, absolutely superficial. So in the 1980s and 1990s, the culture within which meaning was exchanged, responded to and celebrated the surface as the site of manifest meanings, and the detachment of signified from signifier meant that the objective interpretation (and evaluation) of images became explicitly problematic. Meaning here becomes contingent, dependent upon the context within which the message is being communicated (and received). So the critic who aims at objective interpretation can only be speaking to one defined community at any one time. There were,
however, those writers who, through the process of writing itself,
questioned and addressed their own previous positions and moved forward into the post-Modern condition accepting (if not embracing) the problematics of contingency. The most striking of these is Michael Fried, whose Art and Objecthood (Fried, 1967) was one of those texts which attacked the movement away from (or rather against) formal idealism and the theatricality of the new Minimalist aesthetic. In his review of Frieds 1990 book on Courbet, however, Stephen Melville (1996) finds in the text a writerly presence that recognises its interpretations as interpretations and is willing to be responsible to and for what may be forced or excessive in them. Here Fried considers himself or at least his writing considers itself to be accountable for his interpretations. What is interesting here is that Melville considers Frieds interpretations recurrently extreme and excessive, almost as if going too far were itself some kind of criterion. He gives an example of this excessive interpretation in Frieds reading of Courbets The Stone Breakers. We are asked to believe he suggests, that the two figures are both the painters hands and his initials, that all sorts of objects either long or thin or in some sense hairy are brushes and that others flat or colourful are pallettes. As Melville puts it, Fried mixes overt speculation and fierce conviction, resulting in something of a theatricality in his writing, which is ironic when one considers that it is against theatricality that Fried was so strongly arguing in Art and Objecthood. This speculation makes explicit the difficulties presented by even the historical image when addressed from the contemporary perspective, and sees the writer releasing his own subjectivity upon the artworks text, transgressing the disciplinary boundary that exists (or, perhaps, existed) between art history and art criticism. Whereas Melvilles characterisation of Frieds writing in this case as excessive implies a criticism, I would offer that, because of Frieds allowing his creative (writerly) voice to flourish, the discourse around the works is enlivened. Perhaps going too far is a perfect criterion for the interpretation of the excessive proliferation of meaning facing the critic of the contemporary. Where this may become problematic for those who retain fealty to the Modernist (or at least objectivist) model, so it allows latitude to those who would embrace the surface as a site for the playing out of the critics/viewers own imagination as part of the creative process and, therefore, of the meaning of the work. In his lecture Homage to the Half Truth, Stuart Morgan (1991) argues the case for an art criticism which, although adhering to
certain historical precedents with regard to objectivity, also allows for
the creativity of the critic as writer (as subject and expert) to supplement and add perspective to the critical task of interpretation. The assault on the barrier between the traditional notions of artist and writer is not new, with the Conceptual artists proposal that art practice and art theory are equivalent and that language is a legitimate form of art. However, where these practices saw a transformation of language into art (and, therefore, away from literature), Morgan deliberately blurs the line between art, criticism and literature. Morgans writing provides interpretation, backed up by informed argument, explaining the interpretation in relation to his position as viewer/ reader. He acknowledges the radically relativistic situation within which he writes (and with which others have seemed to struggle), and recognises the contingent nature of his interpretations in relation to the unique historical moment within which the artwork exists (at each moment of its existence) and is viewed. Robert Stecker (1995) describes the situation thus: If an interpretation aims at understanding a work as the product of the intentional activity of the historically situated artist, then it had better get right both the intentional activity and the historical situation of the artist. An interpreter that is merely trying to achieve an understanding of the work does not have to meet this standard but had better offer an interpretation that renders the work coherent in a way that promotes appreciation. The relativist interpretation (all interpretations) can be valid, indeed valuable, to the extent that it can be carefully argued within the conceptual scheme of the interpretive community. So long as the interpretation and its context/aims are explained, then the interpretation can be convincing relative to its context. Morgans criticism presents an interpretation in the sense that each is supported through his knowledge of the artist and their oeuvre, and his careful arguing through of his interpretations in relation to the context within which he is offering them, whilst acknowledging the possibility of multiple interpretations. Moreover, it is not only that multivalence is a constituent characteristic of the contemporary cultural condition, but also, Morgan suggests, indicative of quality in art. He provides the example of the literary criticism of William Empson who, in his book Seven Types of Ambiguity, presents multiple interpretations of a single
Shakespeare sonnet, suggesting an equation between greatness and
multivalence The most striking aspect of Morgans writing is the creative element. In Homage he argues that to gain full impact criticism has to display qualities of creative thinking. And no definition of criticism should omit this element of artistic inspiration. Although it is difficult to agree with the absolutism of the latter part of this statement, Morgans proposition of the critic as collaborator with the artist in terms of who creates meaning seems closer to the contemporary cultural (and theoretical) condition which no longer allows for the supposition that the artwork exists as separate from the subjectivity of the artist and, especially, from the viewer and critic. The critic and the artist (or, rather, the critic and the work) find themselves, then, in a Hegelian 1 face-off, the subjectivities of each fighting for mastery over the other. This, then, provides the backdrop to Morgans metaphoric confrontation between artist and critic. Where, for the Modernist, the artwork was read within a (mythically) fixed value system that allowed for the critics interpretation to claim mastery over meaning, the unfixedness of the postmodern text forces an impasse where meaning floats somewhere between artist, artwork and viewer. Stuart Morgan accepts this, indeed embraces it, describing art and criticism as rivals, not allies, since under the guise of critics lurk potential usurpers. Morgans criticism can be read as the playing out of this battle of subjectivities, and, often, Morgan appears to win because his subjective voice is supported by an underlying knowledge of the oeuvre of the artist in question. It is in the interview mode that this is most evident. In an interview with Morgan, Christian Boltanski (Morgan, 1988) offers that a piece of art is always made by the person looking at that art. I send a stimulus so that each person sees something different. I try to send a message so that anyone can construct a private story. Because of that I say that the artist is someone who disappears. In a sense, Boltanski is removing his subjectivity from the equation. The critic, in this case, is freed by the artist to bring his subjectivity into play, and this is exactly what Morgan does. As the interview progresses, we see Morgan gradually pushing his story onto Boltanski who is (or at least seems to be) in agreement. So in the first 1 In Phenomenology of Spirit , Hegel (Findlay & Miller 1979) perceived the ego as only possessing an independent self-existence through its dependence on another ego. Two self-consciences face each other, each thinking of the other in terms of him/herself. In the other, I see myself reflected, and the only way to break the mirroring cycle is to fight, the winner the master, the loser the slave. Morgan places the critic and the artist into this very conflict, where understanding (interpretation) is reached only when one subject claims mastery over the other and, therefore, over meaning.
part of the interview, Morgan asks open questions, allowing the
artists interpretation to prosper, and Boltanski weaves his story around the objects in question. But there is then a moment when the critic offers an interpretation, and from hereon, his questioning becomes more didactic, closed, and Boltanski is given the option of agreeing, or not. When this happens in the interview model of criticism, it is rare to find the artist contradicting the critic (for what reason it is not presently my intention to speculate). Towards the end of the interview with Boltanski, Morgan offers his own summary of the meanings in the artists work, but as gleaned through his own interpretations presented to the artist through the course of the conversation. So after that early tactile stage you shut up the objects you made so that no one could see them, as in the piece where small handmade sculptures are supposed to suggest to the viewer what your mood was on the successive days when you made them. But you put them all into biscuit tins. The conclusion must be that youre an expressionist who hates himself for it. Although it would appear that the artist has been, mostly, in agreement with the critic, it is Morgan who has been in control of any interpretation taking place here. His interpretation is subjective to an extent (albeit based on his knowledge of the artists oeuvre), but he wins the agreement (or at least the surrender) of the artist. In a sense, as far as Morgan is concerned, it matters little which of these is the case, as he is claiming the creation of meaning, at least in part, for the critic. The interpretation or, perhaps, understanding, is arrived at somewhere between the interpretations (understandings) of both artist and critic. Morgan allows for the nature of the postmodern text, by accepting the fact that his interpretations can only be partial at best. This is what he celebrates in Homage to the Half - truth, and he provides an example in his interpretation of a piece by Louise Bourgeois (Morgan, 1991). He tells a story of how, when he asked to buy a wooden sculpture which vaguely represented a figure, and she told him that he couldnt have it because it has been broken many times, he offers that, since the work is a portrait of her son, my suspicion is that when he was a child, she kept it lying around the house and if he was naughty, instead of losing her temper and hitting him, she reached for the sculpture and broke it over a boiler or a table.2 2 My emphasis
So Morgan addresses the Barthesian text, the space of endlessly
proliferating meanings (Burgin, 1986) between the work and the viewer/ reader. Morgans interpretations rely, often, on his own dejalu, as we see in the Bourgeois example. In spite of the depth of his knowledge of the artist (she and he had become close friends by this time), in this case, this would not be enough. So Morgan uses his own experience and knowledge of Bourgeois as a starting point for his reading, which is then furnished by all that he has already read. If the critic can explain how he has arrived at his interpretation, the subjective interpretation is both useful and interesting. Although, as Burgin puts it, there can be no final closure of meaning, the reader is at least provided with one carefully argued, but not didactic, interpretation which may then form the starting point of that readers (and potential viewers) experience of the work. By using terms like my suspicion is, Morgan is making explicit the provisional nature of his interpretation. What Morgan delivers as a result of this mix of objective knowledge and subjective reading is a kind of poetics of art criticism. The truth of meaning floats somewhere between Morgans words and the artwork, but in the process of interpretation another work (of writing) is produced which both supplements and compliments the artwork in question. Morgans articles themselves, then, become objects for (aesthetic) contemplation, working language around and through the work of art (sometimes via the artist), but utilising his own creative voice to engage with and respond to what the surface of the work reveals to him (at that particular moment in time). So, in this sense, perhaps the critic and artist are not so much enemies as collaborators, the critic not a usurper, but an ally. Bibliography BAUDRILLARD, J. (1976). Symbolic Exchange and Death. In: Poster, M.(ed.) (1988), Jean Baudrillard: Selected Writings, 143-7. Stanford BURGIN, V. (1986). Re-reading Camera Lucida. In The end of Art Theory: Criticism and Postmodernity, 71-92. Basingstoke: MacMillan FRIED, M (1967). Art and Objecthood. In: Harrison, C. & Wood, P. (eds.), Art In Theory 1900-2000, 835-846. Oxford: Blackwell FULLER, P. (1983). Richard Hamilton in The Naked Artist , 121. Writers and Readers Publishing Greenberg, C. (1981). Intermedia. Arts 56/2: 92-93
GREENBERG, C. (1965). Modernist Painting Art & Literature 4:193201
FINDLAY, J.N. & Miller, A.V. (1979).Hegels Phenomenology of Spirit . Oxford: OUP MELVILLE, S. (1996). Compelling Acts, Haunting Convictions. In Gilbert-Rolfe, J. and Melville, S. Seams: Art as Philosophical Context, 187-198. London: Taylor & Francis Group. MORGAN, S. (1991). Homage to the Half -Truth. In Hunt, I.(ed.), What the Butler Saw: Selected Writings by Stuart Morgan , 233-238. London: Durian Publications Ltd. MORGAN, S. (1988). Little Christians: A conversation with Christian Boltansky. In Hunt, I.(ed.), What the Butler Saw: Selected Writings by Stuart Morgan , 195-201. London: Durian Publications Ltd. OWENS, C. (1980). The Allegorical Impulse: Toward a Theory of Postmodernism and The Allegorical Impulse: Toward a Theory of Postmodernism, part 2. In: TILMAN, S.(ed.) (1992) Beyond Recognition. Berkeley and London: University of California Press. STECKER, R. (1995). Relativism about Interpretation. The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 53/1: 14-18.