SOCORRO LIMOS, ROSA DELOS REYES and SPOUSES

ROLANDO DELOS REYES and EUGENE DELOS REYES

Petitioners, vs. SPOUSES FRANCISCO P. ODONES and
ARWENIA R. ODONES, Respondents
G.R. No. 186979 | August 11, 2010 (2D)
Facts:

Private respondents-spouses Francisco Odones and

Arwenia Odones, filed a complaint for Annulment of
Deed, Title and Damages against petitioners Socorro
Limos, Rosa Delos Reyes and Spouses Rolando Delos
Reyes and Eugene Delos Reyes.
The complaint alleged that spouses Odones are the
owners of a 940- square meter parcel of land located at
Pao 1st, Camiling, Tarlac by virtue of an Extrajudicial
Succession of Estate and Sale dated executed by the
surviving grandchildren and heirs of Donata Lardizabal
in whom the original title to the land was registered.
Petitioners, on the other hand, were able to secure a
TCT of the subject lot by virtue of a Deed of Absolute
Sale allegedly executed by Donata Lardizabal and her
husband Francisco Razalan.
RTC denied Petitioners Motion to Set for Preliminary
Hearing on the Special and Affirmative Defenses: The
Extrajudicial Succession of Estate and Sale appended to
the complaint and by the Sinumpaang Salaysay of
Amadeo Razalan, one of the grandchildren of the
deceased spouses, denied petitioners Request for
Admission of the fact that no heirs have executed the
said Extrajudicial Succession of Estate and Sale.
On appeal, CA dismissed the petition ruling that the
affirmative defenses raised by petitioners were not
indubitable, and could be best proven in a full-blown
hearing.

Issue: W/N the status of the heirs of Donata Lardizabal who sold
the property to the respondents must first be established in a
special proceeding
Held: No
The pronouncements in Heirs of Yaptinchay v. Hon. Del
Rosario and in Reyes v. Enriquez that the petitioners
invoke do not find application in the present
controversy.
In both cases, this Court held that the declaration of
heirship can be made only in a special proceeding and
not in a civil action.
o
It must be noted that in Yaptinchay and
Enriquez, plaintiffs action for annulment of
title was anchored on their alleged status as
heirs of the original owner whereas in this
case, the respondents claim is rooted on a
sale transaction.
o
Respondents herein are enforcing their
rights as buyers in good faith and for
value of the subject land and not as heirs
of the original owner.

Unlike in Yaptinchay and Enriquez,

the filiation of herein respondents to
the
original
owner
is
not
determinative of their right to claim
title to and ownership of the property.
CELESTINO BALUS, Petitioner, vs. SATURNINO BALUS and
LEONARDA BALUS VDA. DE CALUNOD, Respondents.
G.R. No. 168970 | January 15, 2010 (3D)
Facts:

Part 4

Herein petitioner and respondents are the children of

the spouses Rufo and Sebastiana Balus.
Rufo mortgaged a parcel of land, which he owns, as
security for a loan he obtained from the Rural Bank of
Maigo, Lanao del Norte (Bank). As a result of Rufos

failure to pay the loan, the mortgaged property was

foreclosed and was subsequently sold to the Bank as
the sole bidder at a public auction held for that
purpose.
Thereafter, herein petitioner and respondents executed
an Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate adjudicating to
each of them a specific one-third portion of the subject
property. The Extrajudicial Settlement also contained
provisions wherein the parties admitted knowledge of
the fact that their father mortgaged the subject
property to the Bank and that they intended to redeem
the same at the soonest possible time.
Three years after the execution of the Extrajudicial
Settlement, herein respondents bought the subject
property from the Bank. Meanwhile, petitioner
continued possession of the subject lot.
Respondents then filed a Complaint for Recovery of
Possession and Damages against petitioner. RTC
dismissed the same.
On appeal, CA reversed the trial court. Hence this
petition.

Issue: W/N the right of petitioner to purchase from the

respondents his share in the disputed property as provided by
the Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate, which the parties had
executed before the respondents bought the subject lot from the
Bank, should prevail
Held: No
Petitioner and respondents are arguing on the wrong
premise that, at the time of the execution of the
Extrajudicial Settlement, the subject property formed
part of the estate of their deceased father to which
they may lay claim as his heirs.
The rights to a person's succession are transmitted
from the moment of his death. In addition, the
inheritance of a person consists of the property and
transmissible rights and obligations existing at the time
of his death, as well as those which have accrued
thereto since the opening of the succession.
o
In the present case, since Rufo lost ownership
of the subject property during his lifetime, it
only follows that at the time of his death, the
disputed parcel of land no longer formed part
of his estate to which his heirs may lay claim.
Stated differently, petitioner and respondents
never inherited the subject lot from their
father.
Petitioner and respondents, therefore, were wrong in
assuming that they became co-owners of the subject
lot. Thus, any issue arising from the supposed right of
petitioner as co-owner of the contested parcel of land is
negated by the fact that, in the eyes of the law, the
disputed lot did not pass into the hands of petitioner
and respondents as compulsory heirs of Rufo at any
given point in time.
For petitioner to claim that the Extrajudicial Settlement
is an agreement between him and his siblings to
continue what they thought was their ownership of the
subject property, even after the same had been bought
by the Bank, is stretching the interpretation of the said
Extrajudicial Settlement too far.
o
In the first place, as earlier discussed, there is
no co-ownership to talk about and no property
to partition, as the disputed lot never formed
part of the estate of their deceased father.
Furthermore, petitioner's contention that he and his
siblings intended to continue their supposed coownership of the subject property contradicts the
provisions of the subject Extrajudicial Settlement where
they clearly manifested their intention of having the
subject property divided or partitioned by assigning to

each of the petitioner and respondents a specific 1/3

portion of the same.
o
Partition calls for the segregation and
conveyance of a determinate portion of the
property owned in common. It seeks a
severance of the individual interests of each
co-owner, vesting in each of them a sole
estate in a specific property and giving each
one a right to enjoy his estate without
supervision or interference from the other.
o
In other words, the purpose of partition is to
put an end to co-ownership, an objective
which negates petitioner's claims in the
present case.

TEODORO ACAP, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and

EDY DE LOS REYES, respondents.
G.R. No. 118114 | December 7, 1995 (1D)
Facts:

HEIRS OF GUIDO YAPTINCHAY AND ISABEL YAPTINCHAY,

petitioners, vs. HON. ROY S. DEL ROSARIO, PRESIDING
JUDGE, RTC, BRANCH 21, IMUS, CAVITE et. al, respondents.
G.R. No. 124320 | March 2, 1999 (3D)
Facts:

Petitioners claim that they are the legal heirs of the late
Guido and Isabel Yaptinchay, the owners-claimants of
the Lot in controversy.
Petitioners executed an Extra-Judicial Settlement of the
estate of the deceased Guido and Isabel Yaptinchay.
They then discovered that a portion, if not all, of the
aforesaid properties were titled in the name of
respondent Golden Bay Realty and Development
Corporation ("Golden Bay"), prompting them to file a
complaint for annulment of Golden Bays TCT.
Respondent court dismissed the Complaint, as
amended by petitioners. Petitioners interposed a
Motion for Reconsideration but to no avail.
Undaunted, petitioners have come before this Court to
seek relief from respondent court's Orders under
attack. It is petitioners' submission that the respondent
court should have proceeded with the trial and
simultaneously resolved the issue of heirship in the
same case.

Issue: W/N the issue of heirship should first be determined

before trial of the case could proceed

Held: No
Respondent court did not commit grave abuse of
discretion in issuing the questioned Order dismissing
the Second Amended Complaint of petitioners, as it
aptly ratiocinated and ruled:

Part 4

But the plaintiffs who claimed to be the legal heirs of

the said Guido and Isabel Yaptinchay have not shown
any proof or even a semblance of it except the
allegations that they are the legal heirs of the
aforementioned Yaptinchays that they have been
declared the legal heirs of the deceased couple. Now,
the determination of who are the legal heirs of the
deceased couple must be made in the proper special
proceedings in court, and not in an ordinary suit for
reconveyance of property. This must take precedence
over the action for reconveyance (Elena c. Monzon, et
al., v. Angelita Taligato, CA-G-R- No. 33355, August 12,
1992).
The trial court cannot make a declaration of
heirship in the civil action for the reason that
such a declaration can only be made in a special
proceeding.
o
Under Section 3, Rule 1 of the 1997 Revised
Rules of Court, a civil action is defined as "one
by which a party sues another for the
enforcement or protection of a right, or the
prevention or redress of a wrong" while a
special proceeding is "a remedy by which a

party seeks to establish a status, a right, or a

particular fact."
It is then decisively clear that the declaration
of heirship can be made only in a special
proceeding inasmuch as the petitioners here
are seeking the establishment of a status or
right.

The title over the lot in controversy was issued and is

registered in the name of spouses Santiago Vasquez
and Lorenza Oruma. After both spouses died, their only
son Felixberto inherited the lot. In 1975, Felixberto
executed a duly notarized document entitled
"Declaration of Heirship and Deed of Absolute Sale" in
favor of Cosme Pido.
The evidence before the court a quo established that
since 1960, petitioner Teodoro Acap had been the
tenant of a portion of the said land. When ownership
was transferred in 1975 by Felixberto to Cosme Pido,
Acap continued to be the registered tenant thereof and
religiously paid his leasehold rentals to Pido and
thereafter, upon Pido's death, to his widow
Laurenciana.
At the time of Cosme Pido's death, title to the property
continued to be registered in the name of the Vasquez
spouses. Upon obtaining the Declaration of Heirship
with Waiver of Rights in his favor, private respondent
Edy de los Reyes filed the same with the Registry of
Deeds as part of a notice of an adverse claim against
the original certificate of title.
Thereafter, private respondent sought for petitioner
(Acap) to personally inform him that he (Edy) had
become the new owner of the land and that the lease
rentals thereon should be paid to him. In 1983,
however, petitioner refused to pay any further lease
rentals on the land, prompting private respondent to
seek the assistance of the then Ministry of Agrarian
Reform (MAR)
During the trial before the court a quo, petitioner
reiterated his refusal to recognize private respondent's
ownership over the subject land.
The trial court ruled in favor of private respondent. This
was upheld by the CA.
CA brushed aside petitioner's argument that the
Declaration of Heirship and Waiver of Rights, the
document relied upon by private respondent to prove
his ownership to the lot, was excluded by the lower
court in its order noting that the document was not
identified by Cosme Pido's heirs and was not registered
with the Registry of Deeds. According to respondent
court, however, since the Declaration of Heirship and
Waiver of Rights appears to have been duly notarized,
no further proof of its due execution was necessary.

Issue: W/N the subject declaration of heirship and waiver of

rights is a recognized mode of acquiring ownership by private
respondent over the lot in question
Held: No
In the first place, an asserted right or claim to
ownership or a real right over a thing arising from a
juridical act, however justified, is not per se sufficient to
give rise to ownership over the res. That right or title
must be completed by fulfilling certain conditions
imposed by law. Hence, ownership and real rights are
acquired only pursuant to a legal mode or process.
While title is the juridical justification, mode is the
actual process of acquisition or transfer of ownership
over a thing in question.

Under Article 712 of the Civil Code, the modes of

acquiring ownership are generally classified into two
(2) classes, namely, the original mode (i.e., through
occupation, acquisitive prescription, law or intellectual
creation) and the derivative mode (i.e., through
succession mortis causa or tradition as a result of
certain contracts, such as sale, barter, donation,
assignment or mutuum).
In the case at bench, the trial court was obviously
confused as to the nature and effect of the Declaration
of Heirship and Waiver of Rights, equating the same
with a contract (deed) of sale. They are not the same.
o
In a Contract of Sale, one of the contracting
parties obligates himself to transfer the
ownership of and to deliver a determinate
thing, and the other party to pay a price
certain in money or its equivalent.
o
Upon the other hand, a declaration of
heirship and waiver of rights operates as
a public instrument when filed with the
Registry of Deeds whereby the intestate
heirs adjudicate and divide the estate
left by the decedent among themselves
as they see fit. It is in effect an
extrajudicial settlement between the
heirs under Rule 74 of the Rules of Court.
Hence, there is a marked difference between a sale of
hereditary rights and a waiver of hereditary rights. The
first presumes the existence of a contract or deed of
sale between the parties. The second is, technically
speaking, a mode of extinction of ownership where
there is an abdication or intentional relinquishment of a
known right with knowledge of its existence and
intention to relinquish it, in favor of other persons who
are co-heirs in the succession.
o
Private respondent, being then a stranger to
the succession of Cosme Pido, cannot
conclusively claim ownership over the subject
lot on the sole basis of the waiver document
which neither recites the elements of either a
sale, or a donation, or any other derivative
mode of acquiring ownership.

Succession, Death and Family Home; Co-ownership

Art. 152. The family home, constituted jointly by the
husband and the wife or by an unmarried head of a
family, is the dwelling house where they and their family
reside, and the land on which it is situated. (223a)

VILMA G. ARRIOLA and ANTHONY RONALD G. ARRIOLA,

petitioners, vs. JOHN NABOR C. ARRIOLA, respondent.
G.R. No. 177703 | January 28, 2008 (3D)
Facts:

Issue: W/N the subject house and lot is the family home of the
deceased and his heirs, thus, not subject to partition for a period
of 10 years
Held: Yes
One significant innovation introduced by The Family
Code is the automatic constitution of the family home
from the time of its occupation as a family residence,
without need anymore for the judicial or extrajudicial
processes provided under the defunct Articles 224 to
251 of the Civil Code and Rule 106 of the Rules of
Court.
Furthermore, Articles 152 and 153 specifically extend
the scope of the family home not just to the dwelling
structure in which the family resides but also to the lot
on which it stands.
o
Thus, applying these concepts, the subject
house as well as the specific portion of the
subject land on which it stands are deemed
constituted as a family home by the deceased
and petitioner Vilma from the moment they
began occupying the same as a family
residence 20 years back.
It being settled that the subject house (and the subject
lot on which it stands) is the family home of the
deceased and his heirs, the same is shielded from
immediate partition under Article 159 of The Family
Code, viz:

Art. 153. The family home is deemed constituted on a

house and lot

from the time it is occupied as a family residence. From

the time of its constitution and so long as any of its
beneficiaries actually resides therein, the family home
continues to be such and is exempt from execution,
forced sale or attachment except as hereinafter provided
and to the extent of the value allowed by law. (223a)
Art. 159. The family home shall continue despite the
death of one or both spouses or of the unmarried head of
the family for a period of ten years or for as long as there
is a minor beneficiary, and the heirs cannot partition the
same unless the court finds compelling reasons therefor.
This rule shall apply regardless of whoever owns the
property or constituted the family home. (238a)

Part 4

Respondent filed a Special Civil Action against

petitioners for judicial partition of the properties of
decedent Fidel Arriola (the decedent Fidel). Respondent
is the son of decedent Fidel with his first wife, while
petitioner Anthony is the son of decedent Fidel with his
second wife, petitioner Vilma.
RTC ordered the partition. As the parties failed to agree
on how to partition among them subject land,
respondent sought its sale through public auction, and
petitioners acceded to it. The public auction sale was
reset when petitioners refused to include in the auction
the subject house standing on the subject land,
prompting respondent to file with the RTC an Urgent
Manifestation and Motion for Contempt of Court,
praying that petitioners be declared in contempt.
RTC denied the motion. This was reversed by the CA.

Article 159. The family home shall continue despite the

death of one or both spouses or of the unmarried head
of the family for a period of ten years or for as long as
there is a minor beneficiary, and the heirs cannot
partition the same unless the court finds compelling
reasons therefor. This rule shall apply regardless of
whoever owns the property or constituted the family
home. (Emphasis supplied.)
The purpose of Article 159 is to avert the
disintegration of the family unit following the
death of its head. To this end, it preserves the
family home as the physical symbol of family
love, security and unity by imposing the
following restrictions on its partition:
o
first, that the heirs cannot extra-judicially
partition it for a period of 10 years from the
death of one or both spouses or of the
unmarried head of the family, or for a longer
period, if there is still a minor beneficiary
residing therein; and
o
second, that the heirs cannot judicially
partition it during the aforesaid periods unless
the court finds compelling reasons therefor.

No compelling reason has been alleged by the parties;

nor has the RTC found any compelling reason to order
the partition of the family home, either by physical
segregation or assignment to any of the heirs or
through auction sale as suggested by the parties.
More importantly, Article 159 imposes the proscription
against the immediate partition of the family home
regardless of its ownership. This signifies that even if
the family home has passed by succession to the coownership of the heirs, or has been willed to any one of
them, this fact alone cannot transform the family home
into an ordinary property, much less dispel the
protection cast upon it by the law. The rights of the
individual co-owner or owner of the family home cannot
subjugate the rights granted under Article 159 to the
beneficiaries of the family home.
Set against the foregoing rules, the family home -consisting of the subject house and lot on which it
stands -- cannot be partitioned at this time, even if it
has passed to the co-ownership of his heirs, the parties
herein.
o
Decedent Fidel died on March 10, 2003. Thus,
for 10 years from said date or until March 10,
2013, or for a longer period, if there is still a
minor beneficiary residing therein, the family
home he constituted cannot be partitioned,
much less when no compelling reason exists
for the court to otherwise set aside the
restriction and order the partition of the
property.
The Court ruled in Honrado v. Court of Appeals that a
claim for exception from execution or forced sale under
Article 153 should be set up and proved to the Sheriff
before the sale of the property at public auction. Herein
petitioners timely objected to the inclusion of the
subject house although for a different reason.
To recapitulate, the evidence of record sustain the CA
ruling that the subject house is part of the judgment of
co-ownership and partition. The same evidence also
establishes that the subject house and the portion of
the subject land on which it is standing have been
constituted as the family home of decedent Fidel and
his heirs. Consequently, its actual and immediate
partition cannot be sanctioned until the lapse of a
period of 10 years from the death of Fidel Arriola, or
until March 10, 2013.

Succession; Equitable Title and Legal Title; Heirs and

Estate; Rule 73-91, Rules of Court
JOSELITO MUSNI PUNO (as heir of the late Carlos Puno),
Petitioner, vs. PUNO ENTERPRISES, INC., represented by
JESUSA PUNO, Respondent.
G.R. No. 177066 | September 11, 2009 (3D)
Facts:

Part 4

Petitioner, claiming to be an heir of Carlos L. Puno,

initiated a complaint for specific performance against
respondent, alleging that he is the son of the deceased
with the latters common-law wife, Amelia Puno.
As surviving heir, he claimed entitlement to the rights
and privileges of his late father as stockholder of
respondent. The complaint thus prayed that respondent
allow petitioner to inspect its corporate book, render an
accounting of all the transactions it entered into from
1962, and give petitioner all the profits, earnings,
dividends, or income pertaining to the shares of Carlos
L. Puno.
Respondent filed a motion to dismiss on the ground
that petitioner did not have the legal personality to sue
because his birth certificate names him as "Joselito
Musni Muno." The court ordered that the proceedings
be held in abeyance, ratiocinating that petitioners

certificate of live birth was no proof of his paternity and

relation to Carlos L. Puno.
Petitioner submitted the corrected birth certificate with
the name "Joselito M. Puno," certified by the Civil
Registrar. The court then rendered a decision in favor of
petitioner.
On appeal, CA reversed: Petitioner was not able to
establish the paternity of and his filiation to Carlos L.
Puno since his birth certificate was prepared without
the
intervention
of
and
the
participatory
acknowledgment of paternity by Carlos L. Puno. His
action for specific performance therefore appeared to
be premature; the proper action to be taken was to
prove the paternity of and his filiation to Carlos L. Puno
in a petition for the settlement of the estate of the
latter.

Issue: W/N petitioner was able to prove satisfactorily his filiation

to the deceased stockholder, establishing his right as an heir to
inspect respondent corporations books and receive dividends
on the stocks owned by Carlos L. Puno
Held: No
A certificate of live birth purportedly identifying the
putative father is not competent evidence of paternity
when there is no showing that the putative father had a
hand in the preparation of the certificate. The local civil
registrar has no authority to record the paternity of an
illegitimate child on the information of a third person.
o
As correctly observed by the CA, only
petitioners mother supplied the data in the
birth certificate and signed the same. There
was no evidence that Carlos L. Puno
acknowledged petitioner as his son.
As for the baptismal certificate, we have already
decreed that it can only serve as evidence of the
administration of the sacrament on the date specified
but not of the veracity of the entries with respect to the
childs paternity.
Upon the death of a shareholder, the heirs do not
automatically become stockholders of the corporation
and acquire the rights and privileges of the deceased
as shareholder of the corporation. The stocks must be
distributed first to the heirs in estate proceedings, and
the transfer of the stocks must be recorded in the
books of the corporation. Section 63 of the Corporation
Code provides that no transfer shall be valid, except as
between the parties, until the transfer is recorded in
the books of the corporation.16 During such interim
period, the heirs stand as the equitable owners of the
stocks, the executor or administrator duly appointed by
the court being vested with the legal title to the
stock.17 Until a settlement and division of the estate is
effected, the stocks of the decedent are held by the
administrator or executor.18 Consequently, during such
time, it is the administrator or executor who is entitled
to exercise the rights of the deceased as stockholder.
Thus, even if petitioner presents sufficient evidence in
this case to establish that he is the son of Carlos L.
Puno, he would still not be allowed to inspect
respondents books and be entitled to receive
dividends from respondent, absent any showing in its
transfer book that some of the shares owned by Carlos
L. Puno were transferred to him. This would only be
possible if petitioner has been recognized as an heir
and has participated in the settlement of the estate of
the deceased.
Corollary to this is the doctrine that a determination
of whether a person, claiming proprietary rights
over the estate of a deceased person, is an heir
of the deceased must be ventilated in a special
proceeding instituted precisely for the purpose
of settling the estate of the latter. The status of
an illegitimate child who claims to be an heir to a

decedents estate cannot be adjudicated in an

ordinary civil action, as in a case for the recovery
of property. The doctrine applies to the instant case,
which is one for specific performance to direct
respondent corporation to allow petitioner to exercise
rights that pertain only to the deceased and his
representatives.

OSCAR C. REYES, petitioner, vs. HON. REGIONAL TRIAL

COURT OF MAKATI, Branch 142, ZENITH INSURANCE
CORPORATION, and RODRIGO C. REYES, respondents.
G.R. No. 165744 | August 11, 2008 (2D)
Facts:

Oscar and private respondent Rodrigo are two of the

four children of the spouses Pedro and Anastacia
Reyes. Pedro, Anastacia, Oscar, and Rodrigo each
owned shares of stock of Zenith Insurance Corporation
(Zenith), a domestic corporation established by their
family.
Upon the death of Pedro and Anastacia, Zenith and
Rodrigo filed a complaint with SEC against petitioner to
determine the shares of stock of deceased spouses
Pedro and Anastacia Reyes that were arbitrarily and
fraudulently appropriated by petitioner.
Petitioner, as a defense, questioned the SECs
jurisdiction to entertain the complaint because it
pertains to the settlement of the estate of Anastacia
Reyes.
When Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8799 took effect, the
SECs exclusive and original jurisdiction over cases
enumerated in Section 5 of Presidential Decree (P.D.)
No. 902-A was transferred to the RTC designated as a
special commercial court. The records of Rodrigos SEC
case were thus turned over to the respondent court.
Oscar filed a Motion to Declare Complaint as Nuisance
or Harassment Suit. Such motion was denied by the
RTC. The appellate court affirmed the RTC Order

special proceeding because it is subject to specific

prescribed rules. [Emphasis supplied.]
That an accounting of the funds and assets of Zenith to
determine the extent and value of Anastacias
shareholdings will be undertaken by a probate court
and not by a special commercial court is completely
consistent with the probate courts limited jurisdiction.
o
It has the power to enforce an accounting as a
necessary means to its authority to determine
the properties included in the inventory of the
estate to be administered, divided up, and
distributed. Beyond this, the determination of
title or ownership over the subject shares
(whether belonging to Anastacia or Oscar)
may be conclusively settled by the probate
court as a question of collation or
advancement.
Coca v. Pangilinan: As a general rule, the question as to
title to property should not be passed upon in the
testate or intestate proceeding. That question should
be ventilated in a separate action. That general rule
has qualifications or exceptions justified by expediency
and convenience.
Thus, the probate court may provisionally pass upon in
an intestate or testate proceeding the question of
inclusion in, or exclusion from, the inventory of a piece
of property without prejudice to its final determination
in a separate action.
Although generally, a probate court may not
decide a question of title or ownership, yet if the
interested parties are all heirs, or the question is
one of collation or advancement, or the parties
consent to the assumption of jurisdiction by the
probate court and the rights of third parties are
not impaired, the probate court is competent to
decide the question of ownership. [Citations
omitted. Emphasis supplied.]

Forms of Wills, Et Seq. Arts 804-809; Art 838

Issue: W/N the complaint filed by Rodrigo is not a bona fide

derivative suit but is in fact in the nature of a petition for
settlement of estate; hence, it is outside the jurisdiction of the
RTC acting as a special commercial court
Held: Yes
A relevant provision Section 2 of Rule 90 of the
Revised Rules of Court that contemplates properties
of the decedent held by one of the heirs declares:
Questions as to advancement made or alleged to have
been made by the deceased to any heir may be heard
and determined by the court having jurisdiction of the
estate proceedings; and the final order of the court
thereon shall be binding on the person raising the
questions and on the heir. [Emphasis supplied.]

Worth noting are this Courts statements in the case of

Natcher v. Court of Appeals:
Matters
which
involve
settlement
and
distribution of the estate of the decedent fall
within the exclusive province of the probate
court in the exercise of its limited jurisdiction.
xxxx
It is clear that trial courts trying an ordinary action
cannot resolve to perform acts pertaining to a

Part 4

SUBSECTION 3. Forms of Wills

Article 804. Every will must be in writing and executed in
a language or dialect known to the testator. (n)
Article 805. Every will, other than a holographic will,
must be subscribed at the end thereof by the testator
himself or by the testator's name written by some other
person in his presence, and by his express direction, and
attested and subscribed by three or more credible
witnesses in the presence of the testator and of one
another.
The testator or the person requested by him to write his
name and the instrumental witnesses of the will, shall
also sign, as aforesaid, each and every page thereof,
except the last, on the left margin, and all the pages shall
be numbered correlatively in letters placed on the upper
part of each page.
The attestation shall state the number of pages used
upon which the will is written, and the fact that the
testator signed the will and every page thereof, or caused
some other person to write his name, under his express
direction, in the presence of the instrumental witnesses,
and that the latter witnessed and signed the will and all
the pages thereof in the presence of the testator and of
one another.
If the attestation clause is in a language not known to the
witnesses, it shall be interpreted to them. (n)

provisions of the Rules of Court for the allowance of wills

after the testator's a death shall govern.
The Supreme Court shall formulate such additional Rules
of Court as may be necessary for the allowance of wills on
petition of the testator.
Subject to the right of appeal, the allowance of the will,
either during the lifetime of the testator or after his death,
shall be conclusive as to its due execution. (n)

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR THE PROBATE OF

THE LAST WILL AND TESTAMENT OF ENRIQUE S. LOPEZ
RICHARD B. LOPEZ, Petitioner, vs. DIANA JEANNE LOPEZ,
MARYBETH DE LEON and VICTORIA L. TUAZON,
Respondents.
G.R. No. 189984 | November 12, 2012 (2D)
Facts:

Article 806. Every will must be acknowledged before a

notary public by the testator and the witnesses. The
notary public shall not be required to retain a copy of the
will, or file another with the office of the Clerk of Court.(n)
Article 807. If the testator be deaf, or a deaf-mute, he
must personally read the will, if able to do so; otherwise,
he shall designate two persons to read it and
communicate to him, in some practicable manner, the
contents thereof. (n)
Article 808. If the testator is blind, the will shall be read
to him twice; once, by one of the subscribing witnesses,
and again, by the notary public before whom the will is
acknowledged. (n)
Article 809. In the absence of bad faith, forgery, or fraud,
or undue and improper pressure and influence, defects
and imperfections in the form of attestation or in the
language used therein shall not render the will invalid if it
is proved that the will was in fact executed and attested
in substantial compliance with all the requirements of
article 805. (n)
SUBSECTION 8. Allowance and Disallowance of Wills
Article 838. No will shall pass either real or personal
property unless it is proved and allowed in accordance
with the Rules of Court.
The testator himself may, during his lifetime, petition the
court having jurisdiction for the allowance of his will. In
such case, the pertinent

Richard filed a petition for the probate of his father's

Last Will and Testament with prayer for the issuance of
letters testamentary in his favor.
Marybeth opposed the petition contending that the
purported last will and testament was not executed and
attested as required by law, and that it was procured
by undue and improper pressure and influence on the
part of Richard. The said opposition was also adopted
by Victoria.
RTC disallowed the probate of the will for failure to
comply with Article 805 of the Civil Code which requires
a statement in the attestation clause of the number of
pages used upon which the will is written.
o
It held that while Article 809 of the same Code
requires mere substantial compliance of the
form laid down in Article 805 thereof, the rule
only applies if the number of pages is reflected
somewhere else in the will with no evidence
aliunde or extrinsic evidence required.
o
While the acknowledgment portion stated that
the will consists of 7 pages including the page
on which the ratification and acknowledgment
are written, the RTC observed that it has 8
pages including the acknowledgment portion.
As such, it disallowed the will for not having
been executed and attested in accordance
with law.
CA dismissed appeal filed by petitioner.

Issue: W/N the failure to state the number of pages of the will in
the attestation clause was fatal
Held: Yes
The provisions of the Civil Code on Forms of Wills,
particularly, Articles 805 and 809 of the Civil Code
provide:
ART. 805. Every will, other than a holographic will, must
be subscribed at the end thereof by the testator
himself or by the testator's name written by some
other person in his presence, and by his express
direction, and attested and subscribed by three or
more credible witnesses in the presence of the testator
and of one another.
The testator or the person requested by him to write
his name and the instrumental witnesses of the will,
shall also sign, as aforesaid, each and every page
thereof, except the last, on the left margin, and all the
pages shall be numbered correlatively in letters placed
on the upper part of each page.

Part 4

The attestation shall state the number of pages used

upon which the will is written, and the fact that the
testator signed the will and every page thereof, or
caused some other person to write his name, under his
express direction, in the presence of the instrumental
witnesses, and that the latter witnessed and signed the
will and all the pages thereof in the presence of the
testator and of one another.
If the attestation clause is in a language not known to
the witnesses, it shall be interpreted to them.1wphi1
(underscoring supplied)
ART. 809. In the absence of bad faith, forgery, or fraud,
or undue and improper pressure and influence, defects
and imperfections in the form of attestation or in the
language used therein shall not render the will invalid if
it is proved that the will was in fact executed and
attested in substantial compliance with all the
requirements of Article 805.

The law is clear that the attestation must state the

number of pages used upon which the will is written.
The purpose of the law is to safeguard against possible
interpolation or omission of one or some of its pages
and prevent any increase or decrease in the pages.
While Article 809 allows substantial compliance for
defects in the form of the attestation clause, Richard
likewise failed in this respect.
o
The statement in the Acknowledgment portion
of the subject last will and testament that it
"consists of 7 pages including the page on
which the ratification and acknowledgment are
written" cannot be deemed substantial
compliance. The will actually consists of 8
pages including its acknowledgment which
discrepancy cannot be explained by mere
examination of the will itself but through the
presentation of evidence aliund. On this score
is the comment of Justice J.B.L. Reyes
regarding the application of Article 809, to wit:
x x x The rule must be limited to disregarding
those defects that can be supplied by an
examination of the will itself: whether all the
pages are consecutively numbered; whether
the signatures appear in each and every page;
whether the subscribing witnesses are three
or the will was notarized. All these are facts
that the will itself can reveal, and defects or
even omissions concerning them in the
attestation clause can be safely disregarded.
But the total number of pages, and whether
all persons required to sign did so in the
presence of each other must substantially
appear in the attestation clause, being the
only check against perjury in the probate
proceedings. (Emphasis supplied)
Hence, the CA properly sustained the disallowance of
the will. Moreover, it correctly ruled that Richard
pursued the wrong mode of appeal as Section 2(a),
Rule 41 of the Rules of Court explicitly provides that in
special proceedings, as in this case, the appeal shall be
made by record on appeal.

ANTONIO B. BALTAZAR, SEBASTIAN M. BALTAZAR,

ANTONIO L. MANGALINDAN, ROSIE M. MATEO, NENITA A.
PACHECO, VIRGILIO REGALA, JR., and RAFAEL TITCO,
Petitioners, vs. LORENZO LAXA, Respondent.
G.R. No. 174489 | April 11, 2012 (1D)
Facts:

Part 4

Paciencia was a 78 year old spinster when she made

her last will and testament entitled "Tauli Nang Bilin o
Testamento Miss Paciencia Regala".

Childless and without any brothers or sisters, Paciencia

bequeathed all her properties to respondent Lorenzo R.
Laxa (Lorenzo), her nephew whom she treated as her
own son, and his wife and children.
Lorenzo then filed a petition four years after the death
of Paciencia for the probate of the Will of the deceased
and for the issuance of Letters of Administration in his
favor.
Petitioners then filed an opposition asking the RTC to
deny the probate of Paciencias Will on the following
grounds: the Will was not executed and attested to in
accordance with the requirements of the law; that
Paciencia was mentally incapable to make a Will at the
time of its execution; that she was forced to execute
the Will under duress or influence of fear or threats;
that the execution of the Will had been procured by
undue and improper pressure and influence by Lorenzo
or by some other persons for his benefit; that the
signature of Paciencia on the Will was forged; that
assuming the signature to be genuine, it was obtained
through fraud or trickery; and, that Paciencia did not
intend the document to be her Will.

Issue: W/N the authenticity and due execution of the notarial

Will was sufficiently established to warrant its allowance for
probate
Held: Yes
Faithful compliance with the formalities laid down by
law is apparent from the face of the Will. Courts are
tasked to determine nothing more than the extrinsic
validity of a Will in probate proceedings. This is
expressly provided for in Rule 75, Section 1 of the Rules
of Court.
Here, a careful examination of the face of the Will
shows faithful compliance with the formalities laid
down by law.
o
The signatures of the testatrix, Paciencia, her
instrumental witnesses and the notary public,
are all present and evident on the Will.
o
Further, the attestation clause explicitly states
the critical requirement that the testatrix and
her instrumental witnesses signed the Will in
the presence of one another and that the
witnesses attested and subscribed to the Will
in the presence of the testator and of one
another. In fact, even the petitioners acceded
that the signature of Paciencia in the Will may
be authentic although they question her state
of mind when she signed the same as well as
the voluntary nature of said act.
The burden to prove that Paciencia was of unsound
mind at the time of the execution of the will lies on the
shoulders of the petitioners.
Petitioners, through their witness Rosie, claim that
Paciencia was "magulyan" or forgetful so much so that
it effectively stripped her of testamentary capacity.
o
We agree with the position of the CA that the
state of being forgetful does not necessarily
make a person mentally unsound so as to
render him unfit to execute a Will.
Forgetfulness is not equivalent to being of
unsound mind. Besides, Article 799 of the New
Civil Code states:
Art. 799. To be of sound mind, it is not
necessary that the testator be in full
possession of all his reasoning faculties, or
that his mind be wholly unbroken, unimpaired,
or unshattered by disease, injury or other
cause.
It shall be sufficient if the testator was able at
the time of making the will to know the nature

of the estate to be disposed of, the proper

objects of his bounty, and the character of the
testamentary act.
In this case, apart from the testimony of Rosie
pertaining to Paciencias forgetfulness, there is no
substantial evidence, medical or otherwise, that would
show that Paciencia was of unsound mind at the time of
the execution of the Will.
o
More importantly, a testator is presumed to be
of sound mind at the time of the execution of
the Will and the burden to prove otherwise lies
on the oppositor. Article 800 of the New Civil
Code states:

Art. 800. The law presumes that every person

is of sound mind, in the absence of proof to
the contrary.

Part 4

The burden of proof that the testator was not

of sound mind at the time of making his
dispositions is on the person who opposes the
probate of the will; but if the testator, one
month, or less, before making his will was
publicly known to be insane, the person who
maintains the validity of the will must prove
that the testator made it during a lucid
interval.
o
Here, there was no showing that Paciencia was
publicly known to be insane one month or less
before the making of the Will. Clearly, thus,
the burden to prove that Paciencia was of
unsound mind lies upon the shoulders of
petitioners.
However
and
as
earlier
mentioned, no substantial evidence was
presented by them to prove the same, thereby
warranting the CAs finding that petitioners
failed to discharge such burden.
An essential element of the validity of the Will is the
willingness of the testator or testatrix to execute the
document
that
will
distribute
his/her
earthly
possessions upon his/her death. Petitioners claim that
Paciencia was forced to execute the Will under duress
or influence of fear or threats; that the execution of the
Will had been procured by undue and improper
pressure and influence by Lorenzo or by some other
persons for his benefit; and that assuming Paciencias
signature to be genuine, it was obtained through fraud
or trickery. The Court is not persuaded.
o
In
this
case,
evidence
shows
the
acknowledged
fact
that
Paciencias
relationship with Lorenzo and his family is
different from her relationship with petitioners.
The very fact that she cared for and raised
Lorenzo and lived with him both here and
abroad, even if the latter was already married
and already has children, highlights the
special
bond
between
them.
This
unquestioned relationship between Paciencia
and the devisees tends to support the
authenticity of the said document as against
petitioners allegations of duress, influence of
fear or threats, undue and improper influence,
pressure, fraud, and trickery which, aside from
being factual in nature, are not supported by
concrete, substantial and credible evidence on
record. It is worth stressing that bare
arguments, no matter how forceful, if not
based on concrete and substantial evidence
cannot suffice to move the Court to uphold
said allegations.
Petitioners insist that all subscribing witnesses and the
notary public should have been presented in court
since all but one witness, Francisco, are still living. The
Court is not persuaded.

It is an established rule that "[a] testament

may not be disallowed just because the
attesting witnesses declare against its due
execution; neither does it have to be
necessarily allowed just because all the
attesting witnesses declare in favor of its
legalization; what is decisive is that the court
is convinced by evidence before it, not
necessarily from the attesting witnesses,
although they must testify, that the will was or
was not duly executed in the manner required
by law."
The very existence of [the Will] is in itself prima facie
proof that the supposed [testatrix] has willed that [her]
estate be distributed in the manner therein provided,
and it is incumbent upon the state that, if legally
tenable, such desire be given full effect independent of
the attitude of the parties affected thereby.
o
This, coupled with Lorenzos established
relationship with Paciencia, the evidence and
the testimonies of disinterested witnesses, as
opposed to the total lack of evidence
presented by petitioners apart from their selfserving testimonies, constrain us to tilt the
balance in favor of the authenticity of the Will
and its allowance for probate.
o

MANUEL
A.
ECHAVEZ,
Petitioner,
vs.
DOZEN
CONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION and
THE REGISTER OF DEEDS OF CEBU CITY, Respondents.
G.R. No. 192916 | October 11, 2010 (3D)
Facts:

Vicente Echavez donated the herein subject lots to

petitioner Manuel Echavez through a Deed of Donation
Mortis Causa. Manuel accepted the donation.
Vicente executed a Contract to Sell over the same lots
in favor of respondent Corporation.
When Vicente died, Manuel filed a petition to approve
Vicentes donation mortis causa in his favor and an
action to annul the contracts of sale Vicente executed
in favor of Dozen Corporation.
RTC dismissed Manuels petition to approve the
donation and his action for annulment of the contracts
of sale.
CA affirmed RTC: Since the donation in favor of Manuel
was a donation mortis causa, compliance with the
formalities for the validity of wills should have been
observed.

Issue: W/N a donation mortis causa must comply with the

formalities prescribed by law for the validity of wills
Held: Yes
Articles 805 and 806 of the Civil Code should have
been applied.
As the CA correctly found, the purported attestation
clause embodied in the Acknowledgment portion does
not contain the number of pages on which the deed
was written. The exception to this rule in Singson v.
Florentino and Taboada v. Hon. Rosal, cannot be
applied to the present case, as the facts of this case
are not similar with those of Singson and Taboada.
o
In those cases, the Court found that although
the attestation clause failed to state the
number of pages upon which the will was
written, the number of pages was stated in
one portion of the will. This is not the factual
situation in the present case.
Even granting that the Acknowledgment embodies
what the attestation clause requires, we are not
prepared to hold that an attestation clause and an
acknowledgment can be merged in one statement.

Part 4

That
the
requirements
of
attestation
and
acknowledgment are embodied in two separate
provisions of the Civil Code (Articles 805 and 806,
respectively) indicates that the law contemplates two
distinct acts that serve different purposes. An
acknowledgment is made by one executing a deed,
declaring before a competent officer or court that the
deed or act is his own. On the other hand, the
attestation of a will refers to the act of the instrumental
witnesses themselves who certify to the execution of
the instrument before them and to the manner of its
execution.

Although the witnesses in the present case

acknowledged the execution of the Deed of Donation
Mortis Causa before the notary public, this is not the
avowal the law requires from the instrumental
witnesses to the execution of a decedents will. An
attestation must state all the details the third
paragraph of Article 805 requires. In the absence of the
required avowal by the witnesses themselves, no
attestation clause can be deemed embodied in the
Acknowledgement of the Deed of Donation Mortis
Causa.