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Emerson's Strange Equality, KERRY LARSON, Nineteenth-Century

Literature, Vol. 59, No. 3 (December 2004), pp. 315-339 Published


by: University of California Press Stable URL:
http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1525/ncl.2004.59.3.315 .Accessed:
29/04/2013
In his eyes equality is less a social or political ideal than a timeless and universal
truth, less a good that must be protected by laws and enforced by governments
than a sentiment or divine impulse lodged within the soul.
But if equality is a source of inspiration, then what exactly does it inspire?
Equality, in this view, inevitably fosters a wish for autonomy, self-realization, and
other things commonly associated with individualism.
equality does not eliminate so much as it relocates and reframes social division. If it
abolishes class, caste, and the traditions of rank that separate members of society
into different groups, then it also places a special emphasis on the need of
individuals to stand apart from one another.
Precisely because we are all the same, we must all be different
As John E. Coons and Patrick M. Brennan point out, while many people believe that
most people are at bottom equal, it is very difficult to come up with nontrivial
reasons for why they should think so. Presumably any account of equality as an
intrinsic feature of human beings needs, at a minimum, to identify some common
property that, first, is important and meaningful and, second, is reasonably
inclusive.
We should assume, in other words, that the common possession must be something
that we do in fact all have (like chromosomes) but do not necessarily possess to the
same degree (like Reason): put the two propositions together and we get a common
trait that, in principle, does not have to vary but very well might vary from
individual to individual.
This way of looking at equality makes it interesting because it allows for the
possibility of variation at the same time that it retains the crucial need for
uniformity.
In this, as in so much else concerning racial attitudes among whites, Jefferson holds
the dubious honor of leading the way. In his highly influential Notes on the State of
Virginia (1787) he flatly asserts that the blacks ... are inferior to the whites in the
endowments both of body and mind at the same time that it concedes that our
conclusion would degrade a whole race of men from the rank in the scale of beings
which their Creator may perhaps have given them (Thomas Jefferson, Notes on the
State of Virginia, in his Writings,ed. Merrill D. Peterson [New York: Literary Classics of
the United States, 1984], p. 270).
Something buried deep within the soul that links the one to the many remains
constant, even if it is not always acknowledged and made manifest to the same
extent by different individuals.

We are all equal in our common possession of a primal ethical knowledge, and we
are all capable, in principle, of exemplifying (perceiving, manifesting, acting upon)
that knowledge to the same degree.
Does Emerson single out a special moral faculty that everyone necessarily
possesses even as, once again, not everyone necessarily possesses to the same
degree? The short answer is no. Although he does posit a faculty, universal and
innate, that is crucial to human flourishing, it has nothing in particular to do with
morality. The name that Emerson gives to this faculty is genius,
To believe your own thought, to believe that what is true for you in your private
heart is true for all men,that is genius
As we have seen, genius for him has nothing to do with intelligence and everything
to do with faithspecifically the faith in knowing that a universal commonality or
sameness may shine through and empower seemingly local or individual acts
equality does in fact matter to Emerson, and that, because it does, equality plays an
active role in the shaping of his beliefsas we can see from the pressure it brings to
bear on his writings and the contradictions it can engender.
What it does mean is setting aside the insistence on approaching equality as an
exclusively normative or moral concept () and organizing principle of democratic
societies.

Yelizaveta Rapoport
Fyodor Dostoevsky: An Analysis of Existentialism within Notes
from Underground
The novel is a tremendous achievement in existentialist thought because it
illustrates the existence of a single individual man who in the midst of his infinite
failures struggles to exist, to define himself, to define the universe around him and
to belong.
The underground man explains that the purpose of his writing is self-inspection
and the desire to better conceptualize his thoughts. He is struggling to understand
his life, to make sense of his existence, and to comprehend the true nature of his
being.
He exists in a perpetual state of self negation. The underground man holds on to
only one positive characteristic, his intelligence. He prides himself on being
intelligent because without it he is lost.
The underground man struggles to exist and belong in a world in which he clearly
does not. He attempts to define himself in some way and comes to the conclusion
that he cannot
(I did not know how to become anything; neither spiteful nor kind, neither a rascal
nor an honest man, neither a hero nor an insect) (Dostoevsky 1).
The fact that the underground man believes that to be conscious is to suffer
illustrates the inherent torment of his existence.

The underground man in his hopelessness seems to give up because he cannot


define himself or the world around him. Because he cannot belong he surrenders to
a state of withdrawal. In that state he feels a sense of belonging.
The underground man reaches this dialectical step. In that moment of despair,
shame, and hopelessness he feels relief and understanding, he then feels
enjoyment.
5). He writes that consciousness by nature produces movement, which abides by
the laws of nature. People act in accordance to nature and define themselves
through their actions. The writer claims that this is limited and stupid. He writes that
nature controls the being, and the being has no true individuality or freedom.
inertia pushes him, yet he is only a slave to the world in which he resides.
The underground mans succumbing to nature is fundamentally anti-existentialist.
The narrator becomes overpowered by his very own intense individualism and
philosophically collapses.
underground mans sudden infatuation with inertia and his surrender to nature is
a fundamental betrayal of existentialism. Precisely for this reason is his return to the
notion of free will and ultimate personal responsibility so triumphant.
becomes disenchanted with the idea of inaction and surrender; instead he becomes
inflamed with the notion of free will.
because rational thought limits ones ability to act freely.
The author forces the young girl to look introspectively at her life. He confronts her
and illustrates to her the truly hideous nature of her existence. He attempts to
convince her to quit her current position and to find love. For the first time in the
novel the author speaks of love. It is shocking, and a high contrast to the rest of the
novel.
This hope is almost instantly shattered. As quickly as he rises above his depraved
condition he plummets back down. When the young girl shows up at his home he is
instantly cruel to her. To prove to the two of them that he is dominant and powerful
he terrorizes her, uses her, debases her and throws her out into the street.
After professing that salvation lies in love, the author asserts that he is incapable of
love, and is only capable of cruelty.
However, he is in fact better off. Through his struggle to comprehend his humanity,
his existence and the universe around him, he truly sees himself. In his anguish he
ceases to be engulfed in the details of his existence, and instead develops an
oneness with his true being.
He is not lost or inhuman. He is in fact profoundly human, and an extreme
individual. Through his struggle he comprehends his being and does so through his
own understanding, while also assuming responsibility for his actions. The
underground man is a true example of the humanity of the individual, an
individual struggling with the nature of his being, with his existence and with the
universe around him.

The underground man struggles to define himself, and to place himself into the
world, into a reality in which he feels he does not belong.
He struggles to attain a sense of connection with the outside world, while
simultaneously demanding free will and independence.
The underground man never escapes his suffering and alienation. At its core his
failure is caused by his paradox of need. He yearns to belong and yet demands to
be independent.

Dostoevsky indicates the profounder psychological level, which is manifest in the


contradiction between the narrator's analyses and his behavior. Parenthetically, it
might be pointed out that the narrator's knowledge is not emotional but rational;
although he claims that the Notes are "hardly literature so much as corrective
punishment,"
Dostoevsky's psychological insight permits him to trace a portrait which is, or can
be, clear to the reader despite the narrator's evasions, repetitions, con- tradictions,
self-lacerations. At their deepest level the narrator's analyses are honestly meant.
That they appear not to be so, or to be incorrect, must be attributed to the fact that
these analyses and judgments are distorted by the narrator's personality. The
reader must constantly dis- count the distorting prism, and assess the nar? rator's
incorrect judgments about others and himself in terms of what they tell about the
narrator. To put it more clearly, the narrator is portrayed twice. His own statements
account for his actions at one level, yet his statements are not trustworthy.
Dostoevsky indicates the profounder psychological level, which is manifest in the
contradiction between the narrator's analyses and his behavior. Parenthetically, it
might be pointed out that the narrator's knowledge is not emotional but rational;
although he claims that the Notes are "hardly literature so much as corrective
punishment,"
If the Notes are to be considered as a psychological document, then the structure,
and even its confessional aspect, gains another dimension. The relationship of the
two parts might be described as follows: most of the interest of the Notes for the
narrator consists in his recreation of the experiences in Part ii. But the narrator is
not at first capable of committing himself to such an exposition. He evades the
subject, attempts to build up his ego by rationalization, by philosophical
speculation, and avoids the recapitulation of his past until the time that the need for
disclosure and security in such disclosure coincide. From this point of view
practically all the first part is a false start, leading the reader away from the real
subject of the work.3 Dostoevsky had orig? inally indicated the true center of the
book himself. The only significant change from the first printed text to the second is
the elimination of the last sentence in Dostoevsky's footnote: "Thus this first excerpt
should be considered as an introduction to the whole book, almost as a foreword."
3 The first two sentences of the Notes also contain a false start and, in peto, expose
the narrator's personality: "I am a sick man . . . I am a spiteful man. I am a repulsive
man." The first clause apparently strikes the narrator as a request for sympathy.
Since he denies such desires he restarts, now attempting to alienate the reader ("I

am a spiteful man"), and then extends his hostility ("I am a repulsive man"). This is
more clearly marked in the original, because in Russian, unlike English, the first
person singular pronoun is not usually capitalized, so that the second clause,
following inter- punction, is more clearly a new beginning. The psychological
movement is also more sharply marked. A literal rendering of the opening is: "I man
sick ... I spiteful man. Repulsive I man." All three clauses are stylistically correct in
Russian, but the shift in emphasis and tone is unmistakable.
The fact that the double exists is indubitably psychological; the reason for its
existence, in Dostoevsky's work, is primarily social. In the Notes we may clearly see
Dostoevsky's ethical-psychological duality in operation
I shall here touch only on four episodes that with the officer, the farewell party for
Zverkov, the affair with Liza, and the attitude of the narrator to his servant Apollon
in an attempt to see how Dostoevsky's method gradually forces the narrator into his
final position.
The future underground man, usually immersed in books and daydreaming, is
drawn to the Nevsky at every possible opportunity, drawn to partake in the rush and
movement of life. The Nevsky in this sense is almost a commonplace of Russian
literature.
represents the emotional awakening of the character. The officer's crime was lack of
notice, lack of consideration for a fellow being. By im- proving his appearance, the
narrator defeats the primary social purpose of his plan, since the re? spect he may
obtain will be merely a tribute to his external appearance. Thus his rationalization
leads him to duplicate the officer's crime: he is unable to consider himself a social
being. His be? havior is socially conditioned?the material em? phasis has been
inculcated too strongly?but his inability to exact revenge is also motivated
psychologically.
The second major event is again precipitated by a combination of social and
psychological forces. The narrator experiences one of those rare moments when he
feels a need for human companionship. But since the day is a Thursday and the
only person whose house he frequents (his superior, Setochin, who also figures in
the Double) receives only on Tuesday, the narrator must hold his desire in
abeyance. He finally de- cides to visit a former classmate and there in- sinuates
himself into the farewell party for Zverkov.

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