20150508-g. H. Schorel-Hlavka O.W.B. To MR Tony Abbott Pm-Re The Marriage Issue

1
WITHOUT PREJUDICE
Mr Tony Abbott PM
Cc:
10
8-5-2015
C/o josh.frydenberg.mp@aph.gov.au
Bill Shorten Bill.Shorten.MP@aph.gov.au
Daniel Andrews Premier Victoria daniel.andrews@parliament.vic.gov.au
Senator George Brandis senator.brandis@aph.gov.au
George Williams george.williams@unsw.edu.au
Mr Clive Palmer Admin@PalmerUnited.com
Jacqui Lambie senator.ketter@aph.gov.au
Joe (smoking) Hockey Treasurer J.Hockey.MP@aph.gov.au
Ref; 20150508-G. H. Schorel-Hlavka O.W.B. to Mr Tony Abbott PM- Re THE MARRIAGE ISSUE
15
20
Tony,
As a CONSTITUTIONALIST I am concerned as to if politicians and others understand
and comprehend the true meaning and application of the constitution!
As the Framers of the Constitution held that marriage is a civil contract or partnership and
this:
HANSARD 22-9-1897 Constitution Convention Debates (Official Record of the Debates of the National
Australasian Convention)
QUOTE
Mr. SYMON: That is incident to the marriage law!
25
The Hon. Sir J.W. DOWNER: It comes from the marriage law, and ought to flow as a corollary. It is
a corollary as far as marriage is concerned.
[start page 1085]
The Hon. R.E. O'CONNOR: It would not necessarily follow the law of husband and wife!
END QUOTE
30
It is clear from the above quotation that the Framers of the Constitution held that a marriage
was between a husband and wife! And as they refer to custody of children it was clearly
about the children born within such a marriage!
35
Before delving in constitutional embedded legal principles I will quote also from below;
QUOTE
40
45
CONSIDER TWO PEOPLE GOING TO GET MARRIED AND BOTH PURPORT TO BE

NON-GENDER, BUT ARE ACTUALLY HAVING DIFFERENT SEXUAL ORGANS SINCE
BIRTH. But they are deemed to be a same-sex marriage because they are both claiming to be
non-gender regardless of their sexual organs!
This now means that all sporting events that provides for male and female trophies/awards now
must also provide for non-gender trophies/awards. Come to think of it why not just make
everyone non-gender? After all, we then no longer will have a different awarding system!
Well this might be gender-bias that non-gender masculine persons may achieve better in sports
then non-gender born female persons, and boy will we have an utter mesh.
p1
8-5-2015
Mr G. H. Schorel-Hlavka O.W.B.
INSPECTOR-RIKATI about the BLACK HOLE in the CONSTITUTION-DVD
A 1st edition limited special numbered book on Data DVD ISBN 978-0-9803712-6-0
PLEASE NOTE: You may order books in the INSPECTOR-RIKATI series by E-mail INSPECTORRIKATI@schorel-hlavka.com See also www.schorel-hlavka.com at blog Http://www.scribd.com/InspectorRikati
10
2
Does it really make a difference if a person has a penis or a vagina, if this can be altered by
operations? Is it not that the difference of gender is generally associated in sports because of a
man being masculine can have a better sports performance in heavy lifting, etc?
Consider this, are we having to have medical check-up after a race to determine if the nongender person has male or female characteristics as to determine who might have won a race?
For sure there are those born where there is a problem to ascertain at the time if the child is a boy
or a girls and at times doctors had it wrong in the past, and later corrective surgery might have
been performed but surely this is different than a person changing sex but not changing sex
merely changing a sex or better to say changing to a non-sex status.
Why have separate toilets if any male can claim to be a non-gender and can then use either
male or female toilets? Perverts will love this kind of a system!
END QUOTE
15
20
25
30
35
40
We must also keep in mind that if the Commonwealth were not to have any constitutional powers
to declare what a marriage can be (see below quotation of USA litigation) about then we may
end up with bestiality and paedophilia to become the order of the day. After all where the USA
Supreme Court were to accept that marriage cannot be limited to two persons of opposite sex
(make and female) then why would then the courts (such as the High Court of Australia) not
accept that bestiality and paedophilia can be part of a marriage as long as the person has a certain
mental status. At times men do enjoys pretending to be a child in sexual games and so if the
Norrie doctrine were to apply and a man takes to have the mental view of being a child then
playing a sex game with another (real) child may circumvent the rule of law as both may be
deemed to be a child.
I have set out below a lot more to consider and I view the Commonwealth of Australia
better addresses this issue before the High Court of Australia goes rampant and declare
that the Norrie mental status is applicable.
The Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act 1900 (UK) is not just what is listed in part 9
of the constitution but also includes the legal principles embedded otherwise in it.
.
Hansard 2-2-1898 Constitution Convention Debates
QUOTE Mr. DEAKIN (Victoria).The record of these debates may fairly be expected to be widely read, and the observations to which I
allude might otherwise lead to a certain amount of misconception.
END QUOTE
Hansard 21-9-1897 Constitution Convention Debates (Official Record of the Debates of the National
QUOTE
The Right Hon. C.C. KINGSTON (South Australia)[9.21]: I trust the Drafting Committee will not fail to
exercise a liberal discretion in striking out words which they do not understand, and that they will put
in words which can be understood by persons commonly acquainted with the English language.
45
50
55
END QUOTE
.
QUOTE
Mr. CARRUTHERS:
This is a Constitution which the unlettered people of the community ought to be able to understand.
END QUOTE
.
Hansard 8-3-1898 Constitution Convention Debates (Official Record of the Debates of the National Australasian
Convention)
QUOTE Mr. ISAACS.p2
8-5-2015
3
We want a people's Constitution, not a lawyers' Constitution.
END QUOTE

QUOTE Mr. SYMON (South Australia).-
10
15
That this is not like an Act of Parliament which we are passing. It is not in the position which Mr. Barton has
described, of choosing or setting up a code of laws to interpret the common law of England. This
Constitution we are framing is not yet passed. It has to be handed over not to a Convention similar to
this, not to a small select body of legislators, but to the whole body of the people for their acceptance or
rejection. It is the whole body of the people whose understanding you have to bring to bear upon it, and
it is the whole body of the people, the more or less instructed body of the people, who have to
understand clearly everything in the Constitution, which affects them for weal or woe during the whole
time of the existence of this Commonwealth. We cannot have on the platform, when this Constitution is
commended to the people, lawyers on both sides, drawing subtle distinctions, which may or may not be
appreciated by the people.
END QUOTE
20
25
30
35
40
45
50
55
As such, not only the constitution but any legislation within the ambit of legislative powers
provided for in the constitution must be in plain English so that the unlettered person can
understand and comprehend it.
HANSARD 17-3-1898 Constitution Convention Debates
QUOTE
Mr. BARTON.- We have simply said that the guarantee of the liberalism of this Constitution is
responsible government, and that we decline to impair or to infect in any way that guarantee.
END QUOTE
And
QUOTE
Mr. BARTON.- Of course it will be argued that this Constitution will have been made by the
Parliament of the United Kingdom. That will be true in one sense, but not true in effect, because the
provisions of this Constitution, the principles which it embodies, and the details of enactment by which
those principles are enforced, will all have been the work of Australians.
END QUOTE
And
QUOTE
Mr. BARTON.- Having provided in that way for a free Constitution, we have provided for an
Executive which is charged with the duty of maintaining the provisions of that Constitution; and,
therefore, it can only act as the agents of the people.
END QUOTE
.
QUOTE
Mr. DEAKIN.- In this Constitution, although much is written much remains unwritten,
END QUOTE
QUOTE Mr. DEAKIN.What a charter of liberty is embraced within this Bill-of political liberty and religious liberty-the
liberty and the means to achieve all to which men in these days can reasonably aspire. A charter of
liberty is enshrined in this Constitution, which is also a charter of peace-of peace, order, and good
government for the whole of the peoples whom it will embrace and unite.
END QUOTE
p3
8-5-2015
4
Therefore, not just the commonwealth but also the courts are bound to interpret the constitution
as to the legal principles embedded in the constitution, which includes the Hansard records.
.
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
45
50
55
QUOTE
Mr. BARTON.-They do not require to get authority from home, for this reason: That the local
Constitutions empower the colonies separately to make laws for the peace, order, and good government
of the community, and that is without restriction, except such small restrictions as are imposed by the
Constitutions themselves, and, of course, the necessary restriction that they can only legislate for their
own territory. The position with regard to this Constitution is that it has no legislative power, except
that which is actually given to it in express terms or which is necessary or incidental to a power given.
END QUOTE
.
QUOTE Mr. THYNNE:
The constitution of this federation will not be charged with the duty of resisting privileged classes, for
the whole power will be vested in the people themselves. They are the complete legislative power of the
whole of these colonies, and they shall be so. From [start page 106] them will rise, first of all, the federal
constitution which we are proposing to establish, and in the next place will come the legislative powers of the
several colonies. The people will be the authority above and beyond the separate legislatures, and the
royal prerogative exercised, in their interest and for their benefit, by the advice of their ministers will be
practically vested in them. They will exercise the sovereignty of the states, they will be charged with the
full power and dignity of the state, and it is from them that we must seek the giving to each of those bodies
that will be in existence concurrently the necessary powers for their proper management and existence. Each
assembly, each legislature, whether state or federal existing under this constitution, will be as Dicey
again says-a merely subordinate law-making body whose laws will be valid, whilst within the authority
conferred upon it by the constitution, but invalid and unconstitutional if they go beyond the limits of
such authority.
END QUOTE
QUOTE
Dr. COCKBURN: All our experience hitherto has been under the condition of parliamentary
sovereignty. Parliament has been the supreme body. But when we embark on federation we throw
parliamentary sovereignty overboard. Parliament is no longer supreme. Our parliaments at present are
not only legislative, but constituent bodies. They have not only the power of legislation, but the power
of amending their constitutions. That must disappear at once on the abolition of parliamentary
sovereignty. No parliament under a federation can be a constituent body; it will cease to have the
power of changing its constitution at its own will. Again, instead of parliament being supreme, the
parliaments of a federation are coordinate bodies-the main power is split up, instead of being vested in
one body. More than all that, there is this difference: When parliamentary sovereignty is dispensed
with, instead of there being a high court of parliament, you bring into existence a powerful judiciary
which towers above all powers, legislative and executive, and which is the sole arbiter and interpreter
of the constitution.
END QUOTE
.
While the constitution in subsection 51(xxxvii) provide for the Commonwealth to accept a
reference of legislative powers it is not however that the States can do so without the consent of
the State electors, as it would require a state referendum, this is because to refer state legislative e
power to the Commonwealth includes the giving away of the States court judicial power relating
to it.
.
QUOTE
p4
8-5-2015
10
15
Mr. DEAKIN.-My point is that by the requests of different colonies at different times you may arrive at a
position in which all the colonies have adopted a particular law, and it is necessary for the working of that law
that certain fees, charges, or taxation should be imposed. That law now relates to the whole of the Union,
because every state has come under it. As I read clause 52, the Federal Parliament will have no power,
until the law has thus become absolutely federal, to impose taxation to provide the necessary revenue
for carrying out that law. Another difficulty of the sub-section is the question whether, even when a
state has referred a matter to the federal authority, and federal legislation takes place on it, it has anyand if any, what-power of amending or repealing the law by which it referred the question? I should be
inclined to think it had no such power, but the question has been raised, and should be settled. I should
say that, having appealed to Caesar, it must be bound by the judgment of Caesar, and that it would not
be possible for it afterwards to revoke its reference.
END QUOTE
This then places in question any purported reference of power by any State not approved by the
State electors by way of a State referendum. After all, referring legislative powers from a State to
the Commonwealth includes an amendment to the State constitution as it removes the authority
of the subject matter from the ordinary legislative powers provided for in the state constitution.
Hence the Commonwealth Powers (Family Law---Children) Act 1986 (Vic) cannot be
constitutionally valid for this also.
20
25
30
As was indicated the States would be able to legislate for peace, order and good government
and as the 2-1-1901 Gazette published in the state of Victoria made clear the Crown withdrew its
commission for the Colonial Governor for the Colony of Victoria and provided for a perpetual
Office of the Governor for Victoria instead, bound to appoint impartial judiciary.
The Commonwealth while being able to grant the High Court of Australia additional judicial
powers cannot however remove any of its original jurisdiction. As such neither can the
commonwealth validly provide for the International Criminal Court or for any other matter such
as by some Free Trade Agreement) to be litigated outside the Commonwealth of Australia where
it related to a matter within the original jurisdiction of the High Court of Australia.
S116 of the constitution actually also prohibit the Family Court of Australia to deal with
religious issues, albeit this is blatantly disregarded by the Family Court of Australia.
We have to ask what did the Framers of the Constitution a marriage was about in legal terms?
.
35
40
QUOTE
The Hon. C.H. GRANT (Tasmania)[3.33]:
Since the law only recognises marriages as civil contracts or partnerships, it would seem intolerable
that when the partners can prove the impossibility of their maintaining friendly relations, they should
be compelled by law to make a semblance of doing so, and both lives be in effect wasted.
END QUOTE
As such, a marriage is constitutionally a civil contract or a partnership.

45
50
As this is a constitution power for the Commonwealth of Australia to legislate as to marriages

and divorce and in relation thereof custody and guardianship then the states cannot and couldnt
provide any kind of relationship legislation that was deemed a civil contract or partnership.
This is that albeit at federation s51 was a concurrent legislative power for both the States and
the Commonwealth to legislate it became an exclusive legislative power of the Commonwealth
on each subject matter the Commonwealth commenced to legislate upon.
QUOTE
p5
8-5-2015
6
Mr. BARTON.-I was going to explain when I was interrupted that the moment the Commonwealth
legislates on this subject the power will become exclusive.
END QUOTE

QUOTE
Mr. BARTON (New South Wales).-If this is left as an exclusive power the laws of the states will
nevertheless remain in force under clause 100.
Mr. TRENWITH.-Would the states still proceed to make laws?
10
Mr. BARTON.-Not after this power of legislation comes into force. Their existing laws will, however,
remain. If this is exclusive they can make no new laws, but the necessity of making these new laws will be
all the more forced on the Commonwealth.
END QUOTE
15
QUOTE
Mr. GORDON.-Well, I think not. I am sure that if the honorable member applies his mind to the subject he
will see it is not abstruse. If a statute of either the Federal or the states Parliament be taken into court
the court is bound to give an interpretation according to the strict hyper-refinements of the law. It may
be a good law passed by "the sovereign will of the people," although that latter phrase is a common one which
I do not care much about. The court may say-"It is a good law, but as it technically infringes on the
Constitution we will have to wipe it out." As I have said, the proposal I support retains some remnant of
parliamentary sovereignty, leaving it to the will of Parliament on either side to attack each other's laws.
END QUOTE
20
25
As such any State/Territory legislation as to same-sex relationships must be deemed

unconstitutional once the Commonwealth of Australia commenced to legislate as to marriages.
30
35
The Commonwealth however is exercising limited legislative powers as it cannot act in violation
of the constitution and so its embedded legal principles.
.
QUOTE
The Hon. J.H. HOWE: I will bow to the suggestion of the Chairman.
40
45
50
55
The Hon. J.H, CARRUTHERS (New South Wales)[3.46]: 1 hope the Committee will strike out this sub
clause. It is proposed by the legislative assemblies of New South Wales and South Australia, and by the
Council and Assembly of Tasmania, that the sub-clause should be omitted. I can apply no better arguments
than those which the hon. and learned member, Mr. O'Connor, used just now with reference to lunacy. The
hon. and learned member said that where a permissive power was given there was pressure brought to bear
for the exercise of that power, and that when it was exercised in one direction pressure was brought to bear
that it might be exercised to the fullest extent. Applying that argument to lunacy, if we had this power
exercised at all, we should find strong arguments used for the taking over of our lunatic asylums. If the power
in this sub-clause were exercised at all, a strong argument would be offered for the state taking over the
whole of the benevolent institutions of the various colonies which have to deal with children, and they would
become federal institutions. If you do that you must do what the hon. member, Mr. Howe, proposes. If you
interfere with the children in these institutions you will have to take over the institutions for the infirm and
the old. Now, there is a decided objection in this colony to any federal interference with what the people
conceive to be matters most sacred in the family. We have in this colony a law modelled upon the English
law dealing with the custody of children and with parental rights. That question of parental rights is one
which opens up a very large range of questions. We may have all sorts of interference between parents and
their children under a proposal of this character. The state laws, up to the present, have been perfectly
effective to deal with this question, and I think the argument of hon. members against applying federal action
to lunacy apply equally well against federal action in this matter. I shall apply those arguments now in my
vote.
p6
8-5-2015
7
[start page 1083]
10
The Hon. E. BARTON (New South Wales)[3.48]: This may not be a matter of as great importance as are
some of the other matters in the clause, but I think it is worth consideration. I will put it to my hon. friend that
if the commonwealth are empowered to legislate on the subject of marriage and divorce without having the
power to legislate as to the children, the issue of the marriage, this complication may arise-that the judge,
having to pronounce a decree of divorce or of judicial separation, and having also to deal with the question of
the custody of infants, if the commonwealth cannot legislate in regard to both subjects, will administer one
law with respect to the issue relating to divorce, whilst the consequent portion of the decree dealing with the
custody of the children will have to be under a totally different and varying law.
The Hon. I.A. ISAACS: Why not add the words "in relation to divorce"?
The Hon. E. BARTON: If the subclause can be amended in the direction which the hon. and learned
member suggests, my objection will have disappeared, and there will be a reasonable consistency in the law. I
think the difficulty might be overcome by inserting before the words "parental rights" the word "also," and at
the end of the sub-clause the words "in relation thereto."
15
20
25
Mr. SYMON (South Australia)[3.51]: Is it worth while to deal with the matter in that way? If you give the
federal parliament power in relation to marriage generally and divorce generally, then anything that concerns
parental rights and the custody and guardianship of infants is connected with either one or the other. It seems
to me that if you intrust the federal authority with the power of dealing with marriage and divorce, which
involves everything relating to the highest earthly ties-that of marriage-it ought, consequent on that, also to
regulate the custody of infants. It does not involve what the hon. member, Mr. Carruthers, seems to
think is in the minds of many who see some objection to this-that it might empower the federal
authority to interfere with domestic relations in some mysterious manner so as to reduce children to a
position of slavery. This is a control that seems to me to be consequent upon marriage, and which might
come into operation, perhaps, in relation to all matters of divorce; but it is not confined to matters of divorce,
and might depend simply on marriage when the question of divorce does not arise. It will, perhaps, be better
to leave the sub-clause as it is and consider the matter further later on.
The Hon. E. BARTON: Before the hon. and learned gentleman sits down he will, perhaps, deal with what
I forgot, namely, a suggestion from the hon. member, Mr. Carruthers, that if this power were granted it would
involve the probability of the commonwealth having to take over the control of the institutions?
30
Mr. SYMON: I did not think that the hon. member, Mr. Carruthers, seriously meant that.
The Hon. J.H. CARRUTHERS: That argument was successfully used against me in regard to lunatics!
35
40
45
50
Mr. SYMON: I am sure that the hon. member will be able to successfully dispose of it when it is next used
against him. It would be just as reasonable to adopt the suggestion of the hon. member, Mr. Howe, and say
that the federal authority are to take control of all institutions for the care of the aged and infirm. I think that
hon. members will, on consideration, see that there is no parallel between the cases, and, that as this affects
one part of the relationship of the citizens to the commonwealth, it ought fairly to be under a uniform law and
under federal control.
The Hon. C.H. GRANT (Tasmania)[3.53]: I think that the words as they [start page 1084] stand,
"custody and guardianship of infants," are rather too wide. It seems to me that these words, without
any qualification, would apply to destitute children. It would be better for the state authorities to control
the custody and guardianship of infants, because they are immediately on the spot. They have opportunities
of inquiring into the relationship of the children and their parents, and into their condition if they are destitute
and neglected. Therefore, I think it is advisable to omit those words, and allow the sub-clause to remain as
proposed to be amended by the leader of the Convention.
The Hon. Sir J.W. DOWNER (South Australia)[3.54]: I think it would be better to leave the sub-clause
as it is. I can understand that it will be a very good thing for each state to make its own laws with
respect to parental rights and the custody and guardianship of children; but supposing that the
children went into another state, and were thus taken away from the law of which the previous state
approved, and came under the law of another state which had altogether a different method of dealing
with such matters, and under which the parent was not able to again get the custody of his child, or the
guardian was not able to again get the custody of an infant, what could he do? He could not proceed
under his own law. His own law might be good enough, but the person that he wanted to proceed
against would be out of the jurisdiction of his state.
p7
8-5-2015
8
Mr. SYMON: And the order would not have any force!
The Hon. Sir J.W. DOWNER: The order would not have any force. The result would be that, however
good his own law was, he would be unable to enforce it because the law of the other state was of a varying
character.
The Hon. J.H. CARRUTHERS: Sub-clause 26 provides for that!

The Hon. Sir J.W. DOWNER: That is only an evidence clause, and will not have the slightest effect in
this matter.
Mr. SYMON: The hon. and learned gentleman's point is a point of jurisdiction!
10
The Hon. Sir J.W. DOWNER: Yes; and it has nothing whatever to do with that. The order would be good
enough as a record of the action of the court in the first-named state, but it would not be a record of the court
in the other state; nor would it make the law of the other state subsidiary to the law of the state which
contained that record.
The Right Hon. C.C. KINGSTON: Does the hon. and learned member read the word "recognition" as
meaning proof?
15
The Hon. Sir J.W. DOWNER: It is no more than recognition; it means what it says. The word is plain
enough.
The Hon. J.H. CARRUTHERS: Look at sub-clause 25, which says:
The service and execution throughout the commonwealth of the civil and criminal process, and
judgments of the courts of the states.
20
The Hon. Sir J.W. DOWNER: But it must be in respect of a matter over which the court has jurisdiction.
Mr. SYMON: Suppose you change the domicile!
25
The Hon. Sir J.W. DOWNER: That will not operate to give jurisdiction. I think that when we have given
the most sacred of all relations-the, relation of marriage-over to the commonwealth, and very properly, it
follows, as a matter of course, that we must do this. Parental rights-that is all we propose to give to the
commonwealth. The commonwealth parliament can make a definition and pass a uniform law.
Mr. SYMON: That is incident to the marriage law!
The Hon. Sir J.W. DOWNER: It comes from the marriage law, and ought to flow as a corollary. It is
a corollary as far as marriage is concerned.
[start page 1085]
30
The Hon. R.E. O'CONNOR: It would not necessarily follow the law of husband and wife!
The Hon. Sir J.W. DOWNER: We are only talking about parental rights; that is the right of the
parent over the child!
The Hon. J.H. CARRUTHERS: If the hon. and learned member is willing to hand over the rights,
why not the obligations?
35
40
The Hon. Sir J.W. DOWNER: If the hon. member would like them added I have no objection; but if the
hon. gentleman wants to exclude them, I cannot see that any difficulty need arise. So far as I know, the laws
of all the colonies are exactly the same in respect to the matters mentioned here, and there is very little
probability of their being any different, so far as parental rights and the custody and guardianship of infants
are concerned. We want to prevent the possibility of any difference, that is all, and to give the federal
parliament power to legislate on the subject if they please. I can see difficulties that might arise in the
enforcement of state laws through the child or infant being taken away from the custody of its parent
or guardian, and being out of the jurisdiction of the court of the state in which the parent or guardian
resides, and I think it is necessary to have one uniform law on this matter as well as in regard to
marriage and divorce.
p8
8-5-2015
The Hon. J.H. GORDON (South Australia)[3.59]: I think we are quarrelling about terms and not about
substance. I believe that the hon. member, Mr. Carruthers, agrees with almost everyone of us that as
regards parental rights and the custody and, guardianship of children so far as divorce is concerned,
power should be given to the commonwealth; but this clause goes much further and includes the whole
region of, parental rights and the custody and guardianship of children.
The Hon. E. BARTON: Put in the words "and in relation thereto" before "parental rights "!
The Hon. J.H. GORDON: That will cover the whole ground. All our acts relating to the custody and
guardianship of children have relation to parental rights.
Mr. SYMON: Suppose a child is deserted?
10
The Hon. J.H. GORDON: That suspends the parental custody; but the parental liability remains. I
think that the amendment suggested by the hon. and learned member, Mr. Barton, covers the whole
ground.
The Hon. E. BARTON: I move:
That the figures "24" be omitted with a view to the insertion of the words "and in relation thereto."
15
20
This will confine the operation of the subclause to the rights and obligations arising out of divorce
suits. The other matters to which attention has been directed will be considered by the Drafting Committee.
The Hon. J.H. CARRUTHERS (New South Wales)[4.3]: I would point out that if we are going to deal
with the service and process of writs in regard to this matter in one state when the parent resides in
another, it will be just as well for the Drafting Committee to consider the aspect of the case in relation
to deserted wives. If the amendment of the hon. and learned member, Mr. Barton, is carried, I think
we might leave the matter to the Drafting Committee.
Amendment agreed to.
Sub-clause 24, as amended, agreed to.
END QUOTE
25
30
35
40
45
As such to claim that Child support is a Debt to the commonwealth would effectively be a
violation of the legal principle embedded in the constitution that children cannot be turned in a
form of slavery.
Neither can it be held that the Commonwealth is acting for and on behalf of the custodian parent
as an agent, this is because the custodian parent would have no right to access the Australian
Taxation Office records of declared income of the non-custodian parent and as such cannot give
the Commonwealth authority as an agent to which the custodian parent has no power itself for.
Where the laws of the Commonwealth that is the Family Law Act 1975 refers to a marriage is
between one man and one woman then obviously, I view Centrelink is violating this to allow
payments of De Facto marriages, because it would allow a person to be in a marriage as well as
being at the same time in one or more de facto marriages.
Moreover, the State of Victoria/Commonwealth of Australia as an example provided that even if
there is so to say a one night stand (albeit it can happen during the day time) then somehow there
is a De Facto relationship. The absurdity being that a woman or a man raped (Yes men also are
raped at times) and then a child is resulting from this then somehow this is deemed to be a De
Facto relationship.
Ok I am a senior citizen and not likely to get a lot of women pregnant but even if I did I would be
a married man to a wife and somehow be deemed to be in a De Facto relationship with the
number of women I was to get pregnant.
p9
8-5-2015
10
If the institution of marriage is between one man and one woman then it defies logic to
hold that a man/woman can be in a marriage like relationship with someone else.
10
Humanity continuation depends upon a male/female relationship as the human society is doomed
if there were only same sex relationships. That is what makes a marriage standing out, because
it was designed in many societies to say Hold off she is my wife or Hold off he is my
husband and so reproduction is limited to 2 people of opposite sex to create another human
being.
Yet, we have that the High Court of Australia somehow discovered that another gender or nongender (it) is possible!
QUOTE 11-4-2014 CORRESPONDENCE
WITHOUT PREJUDICE
Mr Tony Abbott MP
11-4-2014
Tony.Abbott.MP@aph.gov.au, info@pm.gov.au
15
20140411-G. H .Schorel-Hlavka O.W.B. to Mr Tony Abbott PM- Re Norrie HCA case of non-gender - etc
Tony,
20
I made various postings (comments) regarding the HCA Norrie decision and I am
concerned that taxpayers monies are wasted on so called sex affirmation procedures as set out
below.
25
For those interested in the Norrie case about non-specific

gender I have quoted below material including my various
comments and the Court judgment.
1. G. H. Schorel-Hlavka O.W.B.
30
35
40
45
Constitutionalist
Jena Zelezny, Marian Pitts may have a education in the English language, whereas
English was not my native language and neither did I have any formal education in the
English language, but lets see how she used the reference to Norrie "Norrie was born
male, undertook gender reassignment surgery, but subsequently felt that neither gender
matched their feelings." She uses the wording "their" for a singular person like Norrie. I
do not know what the court used in its judgment, but it seems to me that those with a
better understanding of the English language cannot manage to refer to a singular person.
In my view, and again I had no formal education in the English language "their" is plural
and cannot be used for a single person. So where Norrie objects to an identification as a
male or female then I view "it" is the correct usage for Norrie.
if the word "their" feelings was to be understood that Norrie is both a male and also a
female in some extent then the usage of plural might be used but it would I view be
offensive in usage of the English language to refer to a singular person in plural format.
Jena Zelezny while picking upon my kind of (self professed) "crummy English failed to
address this issue with Marian Pitts. Also Marian Pitts stated "And even within
transgender, there are some who clearly identify with their re-assigned binary, while
others insist on the gender trans in its own right.", and while not using "it" is using "its"
p10
8-5-2015
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
45
50
11
and in the manner it is written I view this is the correct version of "it". Because Norrie
doesn't identify to either a male or female then again "it" in my view is the correct usage.
While this might be as if one is referring to a item rather then a human being, that is the
choice Norrie and anyone else in Norrie's situation I view prescribes to. Clearly Marian
Pitts herself had a problem to refer to Norrie as either "he" or :"she" and so referred
incorrectly to "their" and to "its" from "it".
I have absolutely no issue with a child born with incomplete sexual organs to be given a
non-gender status until the appropriate time arrives where the child sexual organs can be
appropriately established. That to me is important rather then to force after birth upon a
child a sexual status that might be incompatible with the real organs within the body.
However, as with my brother who fathered 3 children and then had a operation to
purportedly turn him into some female, I view this doesn't make him a female as he
lacked from onset the female organs. Some may describe this conduct as that of a freak
who belong to a circus, but I view they have a mental problem failing to accept their
biological status. But that is their problem to sort out, as long as they do not bother me
with it. As yet I have not read the courts judgment and if it refers to Norrie as a "he",
"she", "it" or some new definition or just twist the English language to refer to a non
gender person as "person" even so the usage of English may then become twisted in its
proper usage. But, despite my lack of formal education in the English language I view
that "it" is the correct usage to refer to a non-gender person. Ordinary in law, at least as I
am aware off, the reference to "he" includes "she" the reference to "male" includes
"female". I am however unaware of any legislation that refers to the "male" gender that it
also includes a "non gender" person. As far as I understand it nature has provided us with
plants and other creatures which can change their sexuality (gender), but that is a
biological event, that is spontaneously and as such is not something done in an unnatural
manner. Obviously one has to ask why on earth did a person have a operation to change
from a "male" to "non gender, but nevertheless desires to have or at least look like in
some parts the body of a female? In my view the kind of genitals or the change of it
doesn't make the person to be of a certain gender or non gender. My late brother at least
seemed to accept no longer to be a "male" as he later became married as being a
"female". But to me he remained to be "it'. If however a child registered as a "nonGender" subsequently has a gender re-assignment to create the genitals appropriate for
the organs within that body then whatever that gender-reassignment might be I view is
appropriate. that I would consider being a "gender re-assignment" (gender correction)
because the body is being corrected to its real gender purpose. I do not consider that one
can use "gender re-assignment" merely because a person desires to have some genital
changes contrary to the biological basics of the body as born.
I may add that while now retired during the decades of representing parties as a
Professional Advocate, I was used to have lawyers criticising my self professed "crummy
English" but in the end they were on the losing end of their cases. So, their so to say
superior knowledge in the English language didn't get them anywhere other then having
lost their clients cases. Where then you seek to make an issue about my gramma rather
than to address the issues at hand then you seem to me to have a misplaced confidence.
And as set out above where Marian Pitts refers to "their" and "its" but you failed to
address this then it seems to me you are side tracked by your criticism upon me about my
usage of the English language rather than addressing the real issues.
I for one have a friend who suffers dyslexia but nevertheless despite of this has refused to
go on disability payments but has been managing his own business, and at times taken
advantage of by unscrupulous persons. I would never dare to criticise him for any
dyslexia issues rather always held it over the decades an honour to assist him when he
asked me to do so. We can pick on a disability or other issue of anyone but what we
p11
8-5-2015
10
15
20
12
ought to do is to recognise that a person despite of any disability or problem nevertheless
seeks to be part of society and not withdraw from this. Regretfully those who have a
inferior perception of themselves will often seek to criticise others instead of recognising
the good of them.
When Norrie commented upon me initially with what I consider inappropriate language, I
didn't respond in kind as I view doing so would so to say rather place me also in the
gutter. I do not know if Norrie is a change from Norman as to be a change of gender but
considering that Norrie prefers, at least to my understanding, a non gender reference then
perhaps using a "non gender" Christian name might be something to consider. then again
I am aware that there are persons who just have one name representing their identity in
whole, without any specific Christian name or surname and are recorded as such for
electoral purposes (Albeit an elector was at the time a "male" and didn't express to me
any gender issue).. As such, we may perhaps see in future "non gender" persons to do
without any Christian name as it might offend to be associated with either "male" or
"female". And perhaps do altogether without so called "gender re-assignment" but have
no genitals whatsoever" so as not to be of either gender. To me a person having specific
biological male items (whatever they are) and then under go a surgery to purport to be
female genitals doesn't change the biological make up of that person. And the same visa
versa. We had the reports of a woman having become a male but then wanting to have a
baby, and did so. This, as the ovaries were still in the body. what kind of gender reassignment is this where a person selectively uses the body as male or female? hence to
me neither can then be applicable and a better reference is "it".
END QUOTE 11-4-2014 CORRESPONDENCE
25
https://theconversation.com/why-norries-court-victory-is-a-leap-forward-for-everyone25200#comment_351864
Gerrit Hendrik Schorel-Hlavka O.W.B.

30
35
40
45
Constitutionalist
My late bother had a sex change and became "it", albeit to me I only knew him as a
brother. When my wife enters the facilities of a public washroom for women she would
like any other person to be identifiable as "women" and not of some undescribed sex.
In some professions it does make a difference as to which gender a person belongs. When
I was in management of factories women were only allowed to lift 5KG's but men 25kg,
this albeit women demanded equal wages. Their reverse discrimination was that men had
to do all the heavy work! In my view it has gone well out of all proportions. When a
person attends to a bank and appears as a male whereas the bank account is in the name
of a female then this can for legal reasons prevent fraudulent usage of an account.
Wouldn't a women argue that the bank wrongly paid out to her husband as they should
have known he was a male and not a female? Likewise so the reverse.
People with twisted minds will always argue against what is normal as they want society
to be converted to their kind of twisted reasoning and perceptions.
Let's get back to normal, can we?
p12
8-5-2015
13

Constitutionalist
In reply to Jena Zelezny
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
The issue is not if my wife has anything to say she can do so for herself because
other then making it known to me it is below her standards to get involved in such
discussions. She uses her own laptop when on the internet and as such she is not
limited in that regard.
As for "normal" that is what generally is held to be in a natural manner to be. For
example the difference between male and female is that one ordinary (*but not
always) can bear children, being the female. For sure there are women which due
to medical issues cannot do so but ordinary women can. And ordinary men cannot
give birth to a child! As such, on that basis one can define what is normal. I
recently provided to my brothers children photo's when he was a 22 old young
man. His children are now in their 40's and yet never had seen their father as a
male, as he had a sex change when they were still small children. No one seems to
consider the emotional and mental issues affecting children who had a father but
no longer has one. This selfish conduct by those who dictate upon children their
personal desires above that of what is in the interest of the children to me are
appalling human beings, if I can still call them that.
They used to argue that what they do in the privacy of their bedroom as
consenting adults was no one else business. This I had no issue with. But, now
they are so to say shoving it down our throat and seek to convert everything that
people have to accept homosexuals as "normal", and books have to be re-written
to accept this. Well, again, what they do in their bedrooms as 2 consenting adults
is their business but when they try to so to say shove it down my throat then they
make it my business. when compelling children to be subjected to their kind of
life style then it no longer is their private issue. As the children of my late brother
made clear that even after 40 years they are still suffering. After fathering 3
children he allegedly suddenly held he was a female. Well, he should have
considered this before fathering any children. The blatant disregard shown by so
many towards the children they created is in my view appalling. They want and
indeed demand we allow them their rights but they themselves are not willing to
acknowledge and provide for the rights of the children they created. My view
always has been that you cannot expect let alone demand others to respect your
rights if you do not first acknowledge their rights.
40

45
Constitutionalist
In reply to Jena Zelezny
I noticed that the news bulletin referred to Norrie as "she" which to me is "female"
considering Norrie had allegedly a sex change. If it is not "she" "female" and
p13
8-5-2015
14
neither "he" ("male") but non gender than is it "it" as I referred to as my late
brother? "it" is non gender descriptive. But is this really valid where Norrie
supposedly became a "female"?
5
10
15
20
The Victorian State Government has indicated that is demands that more women are placed in
high positions and I understand the labour party requires that half of the candidates should be
female, etc. OK now we get the problem that we have a non-gender well at least one, so will
the labour party and the Victorian Government now insist that one third should be male, one
third be female and one third be non-gender even so there may not be one third non-gender
available? Why indeed did Norrie change to have the genitals of a woman if this was ultimately
not what the end was to be. If a non-gender person can have female genitals then why not also
accept for non-gender to have male genitals? Or is this a gender non-gender discrimination
against male genitals?
Are we going to have a non-gender person with male genitals and a non-gender person with
female genitals to become married as husband and wife? Meaning that any make can simply
declare to be non-gender and so likewise any female and this without any real change.
I will now quote another correspondence to you dated 12-4-2014
25
WITHOUT PREJUDICE
Mr Tony Abbott MP
12-4-2014
30
20140412-G. H .Schorel-Hlavka O.W.B. to Mr Tony Abbott PM- Re Norrie HCA-marriage and non-specific gender - etc
Tony,
35
40
45
50
Whereas a marriage is to be between a man and a woman the question now is what
constitutes to be a male and what constitutes to be a woman and what constitutes to be a nonspecific gender/sex? What constitutes a "sex affirmation procedure"? What constitutes a
person's sex may be indeterminate.? And one has to concern one selves also with the
statement by the court The material before the Registrar (and the Tribunal) was to the effect
that the sex affirmation procedure had not eliminated the ambiguities relating to Norrie's
sex.?
It is now that the reproductive organs and the genitals of a person are irrelevant as only the
alleged mental perception of the person now decides what a person might be from time to time?
So, a person ordinary a male in every sense merely have to assume the mental framework of
being a non-specific gender person and that is it?
A female may ordinary have all female biological organs and physics in every sense merely have
to assume the mental framework of being a non-specific gender person and that is it? Or just
hold the view to be a male and that constitutes to be a female?
What about if the person holds the view to be some super human being or some creator or alien
from outer space, is the Registrar of a court than required to register this person making the claim
as being an alien of outer space or being say the creator of all human being?
What legal status can be ascertained by this?
While the N.S.W. legislation appears to prohibit a person in a marriage to undergo a sex
affirmation procedure the Norrie case rather indicates that even with the sex affirmation
procedure the person still somehow had not at all confirmed the sex what was supposed to
p14
8-5-2015
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
45
50
15
have been the aim but that because of the mental perceptions of Norrie the sex was not
affirmed. As such, the sex affirmation procedure cannot be deemed to be a critical issue to
determine a persons gender or non-specific gender.
In my view there is a critical defect in the purported sex affirmation procedure if it fails to
accomplish what was set out to be achieved.
Why did the experts involved to justify any medical procedure for a sex affirmation procedure
not detect what really was within the perceptions/mind, etc, of Norrie?
What now appears to me is that Norrie has male reproduction p\organs and female genitals and
the court refer to being in an indeterminate status. Obviously without female organs Norrie can
never become a female in the biological sense. Nor can a female become a male lacking the
male reproduction system even if the medical profession create from skin a male genital.
What this essential provides for now is that people may undergo a sex affirmation procedure to
affirm what, a non-specific gender? Surely that never was the intention of the sex affirmation
procedure was set out to achieve. The word affirmation I view specifically is that it is to
affirm something that was deemed to exist all along. So, the so to say shrinks who are involved
in justifying a sex affirmation procedure clear got it utterly wrong.
We had the 60Minutes television program that reported about a male desiring to become and
known as a female and underwent certain surgery and was given female hormones. Then some
time down the line 60 minutes provided an update that this alleged female now was back
showing a beard and wanting to be a male and not a :female. As such the shrinks involved
in the sex affirmation procedure had it really utterly wrong.
What astounded me was the lack of any principle legal concepts referred to by the High court of
Australia in its Norrie decision as to establish if a person is a male, female or a non-specific
gender/sex.
We have that municipal councils provide exclusive women swimming time at council pools
where women are following Islamic religious customs. Whit a person like Norrie then No0rrie
could nevertheless go in the pool exclusively provided for women. And Norrie could go into the
male changing rooms also.
As I indicated in my previous writings, a male is a he/him and a female is her/she
and I view a non-specific gender can be neither and so is an it.
To hold that a non-specific gender can referred to as he/him or female is her/she
makes a mockery of the non-specific gender.
As a CONSTITUTIONALIST I have the view that the Commonwealth of Australia would have
legislative powers to deal with this matter;
QUOTE
Mr. BARTON.-They do not require to get authority from home, for this reason: That the local
Constitutions empower the colonies separately to make laws for the peace, order, and good government
of the community, and that is without restriction, except such small restrictions as are imposed by the
Constitutions themselves, and, of course, the necessary restriction that they can only legislate for their
own territory. The position with regard to this Constitution is that it has no legislative power, except
that which is actually given to it in express terms or which is necessary or incidental to a power given.
END QUOTE
The commonwealth of Australia is clearly empowers to provide for passports of citizens to travel
abroad. The States cannot interfere with this constitutional legislative powers. Hence, no matter
what the N.S.W. registrar may be directed by the High court of Australia to register, the
Commonwealth of Australia is in that regard above the N.S.W. legislative powers. Therefore
when it comes to passports and marriage, etc, the Commonwealth of Australia would have
legislative powers to determine what constitute legally a status of a male, female and if there
is such a thing as a non-specific gender/sex.
We must however also acknowledge that at times a child may be born of which the genitals are
not properly developed or at all. It may not be in the interest of the child to immediately demand
p15
8-5-2015
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
45
50
16
the child be assigned a certain sexual organ (genitals) and so the Commonwealth could legislate
that a child may be held to be of a non-specific gender until the childs biological status has
been appropriately ascertained by what reproductive organs are within the child.
As such the Commonwealth of Australia may limit the usage of a persons status as a nonspecific gender/sex for say a period of 2 years, this as to prevent a misuse of this period as to
allow it to go on for unlimited time.
In my view it would be essential that no child while having a status of being of a non-specific
gender/sex. This I view is essential for example as to avoid any child to be ending up in prison
while traveling overseas for merely entering a toilet that may be of a designated gender. Not
every country may support what alternative or other statuses the Commonwealth of Australia
may provide for. And, the Commonwealth could limit problems by making clear that the person
designated for the time being as non-specific gender/sex however is considered to be a male or
a female. This, so the person can perhaps travel overseas and use toilets confirming the usage as
provided for in the passport.
The problem we seem to have is that being of a non-specific: gender/.sex appears considering
the Norries case to be now based upon nothing else but what the mental perception might be of
the person concerned. This is extremely problematic.
We have for example sports such as the Olympics. Are we not going to have a person with male
masculine features to proclaim to be a non-specific gender/sex or to be a female and then
being able to complete in female sport?
It is well known that the game standards for males and females are different in golf. If we
were to apply the Norrie principle then a male golfer merely has to mentally assume to be a
female and then can play as a female in a female competition. In my view this kind of
mental perception is hilarious and absurd.
We must have appropriate legal standards to what constitute to be a male or a female or
non-specific gender/sex.
If anything the Norrie case has now exposed the fraud within the so called sex affirmation
procedure industry, as clearly it didnt affirm anything, to the contrary it changed in this case a
male to an non-specific gender./sex.
Taxpayers should not have to feed the abuse of taxpayers monies to create what may be held by
many to be biological freaks.
Medicare should not fund such purported sex affirmation procedure where in the end it
affirms nothing as in the end the mental status of the subject seems to determine what the
gender/sex is or may not be at all.
While the States may have legislative powers to determine the registration of births, deaths and
marriages, in the end it cannot override the commonwealth legislative powers to determine what
constitutes to be a male, female or a non-specific gender/sex.
As I understand it the specialist and medical team involved in the sex affirmation procedure all
seemed to rely upon the mental status of Norrie to change the male genitals to female genitals as
this somehow was to change Norrie from a male to a female but then Norrie claims not to
have the mental perception to be either a male or a female and so claimed to be a nonspecific gender/sex.
In my view the Commonwealth of Australia ought to appeal the Norrie decision, this as none of
the judges appeared to have considered how any decision by the court could upset the social
status and social application of so called non-specific gender/sex.
.
QUOTE Duncan v Queensland (1916) 22 CLR 556, 582 (per Griffith C.J.)
That case (a previous decision of the High Court, Foggit, Jones & Co v NSW (1915) 21 CLR 357) was
very briefly, and I regret to say, insufficiently argued and considered on the last day of the Sydney
sitting..... The arguments which now commend themselves to me as conclusive did not find entrance to
my mind. In my judgment that case was wrongly decided, and should be overruled.
END QUOTE
p16
8-5-2015
17
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
45
50
In my view, the Court failed to set out in its reason of judgment, and I view this omission was an
error in law, what it held constituted a status of non-specific gender/sex.
It is in my view merely social engineering by the court to somehow create a new kind of
gender/sex or non-existing sex/gender without stating what principles it relied upon to establish
in law why Norrie was neither a male or as female.
This is a backdoor manner to legislate by the Court, a reported Mason CJ conduct.
The Court must remain impartial and couldnt accept a non-specific gender/sex without setting
out under what special conditions, including biological relevant issues, a person could be deemed
to be a non-specific gender/sex.
We have elected representatives to the parliament who are to express the intentions and the views
of those they represent in legislative provisions within the ambit of constitutional provided
legislative powers. Where then the legislators didnt provide for a non-specific gender/sex as
no definition existed to establish a person to be a non-specific gender/sex then I view the court
crossed the separation of powers and was not adjudicating but purported to legislate or use their
judgment to legislate.
Basically it was a gross abuse and misuse of judicial powers.
While the Court did refer to that the N.S.W. legislation allowed for indeterminate registration
it failed (again) to set out what in legal terms constituted a person to be in an indeterminate
status. One may hold that when a male person undergoes a sex affirmation procedure to
remove the male genitals and create a female genital then this person may be held to be in an
indeterminate situation during the sex affirmation procedure being conducted. However, no
one in his/her right mind would hold that while this sex affirmation procedure is being
conducted someone then quickly goes to the Registrar to amend the registration from male to
non-specific gender/sex.
My concern is that those involved with the purported sex affirmation procedure may making a
clear error of judgment in regard of Norrie, being an adult, then hardly can be trusted to know
when it comes to an under aged person. Again, the 60 Minutes reported case underlines this.
In my view all and any sex affirmation procedure must immediately stopped to go ahead as
taxpayers also are entitled to know if this alleged sex affirmation procedure is actually to
affirm some sex/gender or merely an abuse of taxpayers monies be used so to say to create so
to say Franken stein monsters, etc.
If the court were to hold that the mental perception of a person determines the sex/gender or the
lack thereof then people can instantly change their sex/gender status pending then consider the
following hypothetical court room hearing;
PROSECUTOR: Is it correct that you entered last Friday a female locker room?
DEFENDANT: Yes.
PROSECUTOR: Is it correct that you are a male?
DEFENDANT: Yes.
PROSECUTOR: What is your excuse as a male to enter a female locker room?
DEFENDANT: I didnt.
PROSECUTOR: You didnt enter the locker room, are you changing your evidence you gave earlier?
DEFENDANT: I entered the female locker room as a female.
PROSECUTOR: May I ask you inform this court how you became a female?
DEFENDANT: I rely upon the Norrie case where as I understand it one merely has the mental conception to be of
a certain sex or not being of a certain sex and the court then accept this.
PROSECUTOR: Did you undergo any medical procedure to alter you from a male to a female?
DEFENDANT: I understand from the Norrie case this is irrelevant, all one need to do is to have a certain status of
the mind and that determines if a person then is a male, female or of a non-specific
gender/sex.
PROSECUTOR: And your status of mind was at the time of entering the female locker room?
DEFENDANT: I had the status of female in my mind and so was entitled to enter the female changing room.
PROSECUTOR: Did you register this with the Registrar of birth, deaths and Marriage?
p17
8-5-2015
18
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
45
50
55
DEFENDANT: I am not aware that the Registrar determines the legal sex/gender status of any person. The
Registrar merely records what the person may claim at the time of the registration.
PROSECUTOR: And when did you consider in your mind to be a male again?
DEFENDANT: I saw those fed bodies and got scared to death that I didnt want to end up like that and left then
quickly and once I was outside the female locker room I realized I had the mental perception to
be a male again.
PROSECUTOR: If you were scared about what you had seen why then did you enter the female changing room then
the following day. And is it correct that the police removed you upon complaints of the women
concerned?
DEFENDANT: I entered the female locker room because my mental status was again to be a woman and the
bodies I saw of the women surely confirmed this to be glad to be a woman. Just that the women
didnt like that I was in the female locker room and called the police. The Police refused to
accept that I had the mental status to be a female and removed me and charged me.
PROSECUTOR: So the police removed you?
DEFENDANT: Yes they did. They didnt accept that my mental status determines if I am a male, female or nonspecific sex. Their argument was that as I had male genitals then I was deemed to be a male
regardless if I had a mental perception of being a female.
PROSECUTOR: Can you inform the court as to how do you change your mental status to being a male, female
or of a non-specific gender?
DEFENDANT: I cannot explain this as it just happens to come up. When I come near women playing golf I just
feel to be a woman and so start playing golf with them.
PROSECUTOR: It is correct that you entered last Saturday the female toilets of the primary school and the girls run
out of their toilets afraid of you?
DEFENDANT: I was entering the toilet as a female as I was having the mental perception I was a female. Just
that the girls didnt seem to accept me as a female.
PROSECUTOR: Do you know what legally defines a female?
JUDGE:
Mr Prosecutor, I cannot allow this question and the accused doesnt have to respond to this. If you
have an issue that the accused was not a female at each time the accused entered a female
changing room then you have the onus to prove the accused was not a female. How do you
contemplate to prove what was essential a status of the mind of the accused at each time of an
incident?
PROSECUTOR: Your Honour, surely this Honourable Court cannot accept that the mental status of a person
determines the person to be a male, female or of a non-specific gender/sex? The accused is
registered as a male.
JUDGE:
So was Norrie and the High Court of Australia nevertheless held that despite a sex affirmation
procedure Norrie still was neither a male or a female and so was of no specific gender/sex,
this even so Norrie was born with male reproduction organs. As such, unless you can establish
the mental status of the accused not being that of a female, I am afraid you have no case.
PROSECUTOR: In the circumstances I seek to withdraw the charges without prejudice.
JUDGE:
I am not prepared to do so without prejudice. The accused appeared and is entitled to a judgment in
his favour where you obviously cannot prove any legal standards what constitute a person to be
a male, female or of a non-specific gender/sex. I dismiss the case with cost against the
State. The Defendant is free to go.
Pedophiles will enjoy this kind of mental status as what stops them to claim that at the time
accused of unlawfully interfering with a child they themselves held to be :mentally to be a child
of say 10 years old. What the High Court of Australia so to say did was to open a Pandora Box or
a can of worms where whatever the mental status of a person may have been at the time will be
what may or may not determine the persons conduct to be lawful or not.
No longer can a person be held liable as a male procuring a girl for sex, because the male may
claim to have the mental perception of being a female. Even to the question of a male raping a
female it may be argued that the male had the mental perception of being a female and in
defiance to her perceptions the male organ nevertheless pursued an intercourse with the other
female. If we go any further the purported female with male organs then can blame the victim for
causing this fatal attraction to the male organs of this purported female.
We are so to say on a slippery slope that demand we get the Norrie judgment overturned and
based judgments upon realistic legal principles. We must have legal standards to establish when
is a person deemed to be a male, female or a Non-specific gender/sex.
p18
8-5-2015
10
15
19
When a person having male reproduction organs and male genitals can claim nevertheless to be a
woman in mind, and then upon that mental perception claim can obtain a sex affirmation
procedure (that actually is an oxymoron as it establish nothing) even so the person has no
female reproduction organs and no female genitals, etc, and must rely upon injection of female
hormones, then what is really being accomplished one may ask.
As such, in the case of Norrie it cannot be questioned that Norrie become an it a nongender/sex person not having all relevant male items and neither all female items to enable to
claim to be either male or female and so ended up with becoming a non-specific gender/sex.
The same might be claimed with females undergoing a sex affirmation procedure to become a
male without ever being able to have male reproduction organs.
While the medical profession may enjoy experiments with the human race and perhaps like to
construct, if not already done so, a half man-beast in the end the question must be ask should
taxpayers monies be squandered on these kind of experiments at the cost of the sanity of their
victims?
http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/cth/HCA/2014/11.html
NSW Registrar of Births, Deaths and Marriages v Norrie

[2014] HCA 11 (2 April 2014)
Last Updated: 2 April 2014
HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA
20
RENCH CJ,
HAYNE, KIEFEL, BELL AND KEANE JJ
NSW REGISTRAR OF BIRTHS, DEATHS AND
MARRIAGES APPELLANT
AND
25
NORRIE RESPONDENT
[2014] HCA 11
2 April 2014
S273/2013
30
ORDER
35
40
1.
Set aside paragraph 3(b) of the order of the Court of Appeal of the Supreme Court of New South
Wales made on 14 June 2013 and, in its place, order that the respondent's applications dated 26 November
2009 be remitted to the NSW Registrar of Births, Deaths and Marriages for determination in accordance
with the reasons of this Court.
2.
Appeal otherwise dismissed.
3.
Appellant to pay the respondent's costs of the appeal to this Court.
On appeal from the Supreme Court of New South Wales
Representation
J K Kirk SC with K M Richardson for the appellant (instructed by Crown Solicitor (NSW))
D M J Bennett QC with A J Abadee for the respondent (instructed by DLA Piper Australia)
K L Walker with E A Bennett for A Gender Agenda Inc, as amicus curiae (instructed by Human Rights Law Centre)
p19
8-5-2015
20
Notice: This copy of the Court's Reasons for Judgment is subject to formal revision prior to publication in the
Commonwealth Law Reports.
CATCHWORDS
Statutes Interpretation Registrar's power to register a "change of sex" under Births, Deaths and Marriages
Registration Act 1995 (NSW) Respondent underwent sex affirmation procedure Respondent applied for
registration of change of sex under Act Whether Registrar has power to register change of sex to "non-specific".
Words and phrases "change of sex".
Births, Deaths and Marriages Registration Act 1995 (NSW), ss 32A, 32DA, 32DB, 32DC, 32J.
10
15
20
1.
FRENCH CJ, HAYNE, KIEFEL, BELL AND KEANE JJ. Not all human beings can be classified
by sex as either male or female[1]. The Births, Deaths and Marriages Registration Act 1995 (NSW) ("the
Act") expressly recognises that a person's sex may be ambiguous[2]. It also recognises that a person's sex
may be sufficiently important to the individual concerned to warrant that person undergoing a sex
affirmation procedure to assist that person "to be considered to be a member of the opposite sex"[3].
When a person has undergone a sex affirmation procedure, s 32DC of the Act empowers the Registrar to
register a change of sex of the person upon an application by that person.
2.
The question in this appeal is whether it was within the Registrar's power to record in the Register
that the sex of the respondent, Norrie[4], was, as she said in her application, "non-specific". That question
should be answered in the affirmative.
3.
It is convenient to begin an explanation of the reasons why that is so by referring to the material
provisions of the Act while summarising the circumstances of Norrie's application to the Registrar.
The Act and the application
25
30
35
4.
The Act provides for the registration of births, deaths and marriages. Section 6 of the Act provides
that the Registrar is to "establish and maintain the registers necessary for the purposes of this Act".
5.
The objects of the Act, stated in s 3, include "the recording of changes of sex". Pursuant to s
43(1) of the Act, the Registrar must maintain a register of "registrable events". Section 4(1) provides that a
change of sex is a registrable event.
6.
The provisions of the Act relating to the registration of a change of sex are contained in Pt 5A.
They are engaged by an application made by an adult or, in respect of a child, by its parent or guardian. Part
5A of the Act was inserted by the Transgender (Anti-Discrimination and Other Acts Amendment) Act 1996
(NSW) ("the 1996 Amending Act"). The 1996 Amending Act made provision for the alteration of the
Register to record a change of sex in the case of persons born in New South Wales[5].
7.
The Act was further amended by the Courts and Crimes Legislation Amendment Act 2008 (NSW)
to address the situation of people who were not born in New South Wales. This amendment added ss 32DA
to 32DD and s 32J to Pt 5A of the Act. This case concerns an application made under these provisions.
8.
Section 32DA provides that a person whose birth was not registered in New South Wales may
apply to register that person's sex. Sub-section (1) is in the following terms:
"(1) A person who is 18 or above:
40
45
50
(a) who is an Australian citizen or permanent resident of Australia, and

(b) who lives, and has lived for at least one year, in New South Wales, and
(c) who has undergone a sex affirmation procedure, and
(d) who is not married, and
(e) whose birth is not registered under this Act or a corresponding law,
may apply to the Registrar, in a form approved by the Registrar, for the registration of the person's sex in the
Register."
9.
Norrie was born in Scotland with male reproductive organs. In 1989 she underwent a "sex
affirmation procedure".
10.
A sex affirmation procedure is defined in s 32A as:
"a surgical procedure involving the alteration of a person's reproductive organs carried out:
(a) for the purpose of assisting a person to be considered to be a member of the opposite sex, or
(b) to correct or eliminate ambiguities relating to the sex of the person."
11.
Norrie considered that the surgery did not resolve her sexual ambiguity. She applied on 26
November 2009 for her sex to be registered under the Act as "non-specific".
p20
8-5-2015
21
12.
Section 32DB of the Act requires that an application under s 32DA be accompanied by:
"statutory declarations by 2 doctors, or by 2 medical practitioners ... verifying that the person the subject of the
application has undergone a sex affirmation procedure".
10
13.
In conformity with s 32DB, Norrie's application was accompanied by statutory declarations from
two medical practitioners. Each medical practitioner stated that Norrie had undergone a sex affirmation
procedure. Each also stated, in a pro forma sentence in the declaration, that he supported the application of
Norrie to have her birth record altered showing the sex now to be non-specific. Despite the provision in the
statutory declaration for a statement of support, it had no apparent statutory significance as it was neither
required nor provided for by the Act or the regulations made under the Act.
14.
Section 32DC of the Act provides for the determination of an application under s 32DA in the
following terms:
"(1) The Registrar is to determine an application under section 32DA by registering the person's change of sex or
refusing to register the person's change of sex.
15
20
25
30
35
40
45
50
(2) Before registering a person's change of sex, the Registrar may require the applicant to provide such particulars
relating to the change of sex as may be prescribed by the regulations.
(3) A registration of a person's change of sex must not be made if the person is married."
15.
Four points should be noted in respect of these provisions. First, a sex affirmation procedure is
defined by reference to its purpose, not its outcome. Section 32DA(1)(c) does not refer to a "successful" sex
affirmation procedure.
16.
Secondly, the function of the Registrar is principally that of recording in the Register information
provided by members of the community. Section 32DB makes express provision for the verification of an
aspect of the information to be provided. Further, s 32DC(1) confers a limited and specific decision-making
power on the Registrar. While the Registrar may require such particulars "relating to the change of sex as
may be prescribed by the regulations", neither the Act nor the regulations suggest that the Registrar's
function extends to the making of any moral or social judgments; it certainly does not extend to the
resolution of medical questions or the formation of a view about the outcome of a sex affirmation
procedure.
17.
Thirdly, s 32DA is headed "Application to register change of sex"; but s 32DA(1) expressly
authorises an application by a person "for the registration of the person's sex" rather than "a change of sex".
Further, the modes of determination of an application under s 32DA provided by s 32DC, which involve
either registration or refusal of registration of a "change of sex", are not precisely congruent with the
express terms of s 32DA(1). It is tolerably clear, however, and it was not disputed, that s 32DC speaks of
the registration of, or refusal to register, a "person's change of sex" on the basis of a legislative assumption
that this first registration in New South Wales of an applicant's sex may differ from an earlier record (made
outside New South Wales) of that person's sex. On that basis, an application under s 32DA for the
registration of the sex of a person for the first time in New South Wales falls to be determined under s
32DC by a registration of, or a refusal to register, the person's change of sex.
18.
Fourthly, the 1996 Amending Act, which introduced Pt 5A (but not including ss 32DA to 32DD
and s 32J) into the Act, also amended the Anti-Discrimination Act 1977 (NSW) by adding to that Act
definitions of "recognised transgender person" (a person "the record of whose sex is altered under Part
5A of the Births, Deaths and Marriages Registration Act 1995") and "transgender person" (which is
defined to include a person "who, being of indeterminate sex, identifies as a member of a particular sex by
living as a member of that sex"). These definitions in the 1996 Amending Act are part of the context in
which Pt 5A of the Act was enacted. Accordingly, the provisions of Pt 5A are to be applied in a context of
express legislative recognition of the existence of persons of "indeterminate sex".
19.
Section 32J of the Act provides that registration of a person's sex under Pt 5A is effective to
deem the person to be of that sex. Importantly, it has that effect subject to other New South Wales laws. It
relevantly provides:
"(1) A person the record of whose sex is registered under this Part is, for the purposes of, but subject to, any law of
New South Wales, a person of the sex so registered.
(2) A person to whom an interstate recognised details certificate relates is, for the purposes of, but subject to, any
law of New South Wales, a person of the sex stated in the certificate." (emphasis added)
The Registrar's decision
55
20.
In response to Norrie's application, the Registrar wrote to her on 24 February 2010 approving her
application. The Registrar also approved an application by Norrie for the registration of a change of name.
The letter of 24 February attached a "Recognised Details (Change of Sex) Certificate" and a Change of
Name Certificate, each of which recorded Norrie's sex as "not specified". Later, the Registrar wrote to
p21
8-5-2015
22
Norrie again, this time advising her that the Recognised Details (Change of Sex) Certificate was invalid.
Norrie's Change of Name Certificate was re-issued recording Norrie's sex as "not stated".
21.
Norrie lodged an application for review of the Registrar's decision in the Administrative Decisions
Tribunal of New South Wales ("the Tribunal").
The course of proceedings

The Tribunal
10
15
22.
The issue before the Tribunal was whether it was open to the Registrar under s 32DC of the
Act to register an applicant's sex as "non-specific". The Registrar argued that his powers were confined
to registering a person's sex as either "male" or "female"[6].
23.
The Tribunal found that, as a matter of fact, Norrie does not identify as male or female, but as
"non-specific"[7], and that she considers that identifying herself as male or female would be a false
statement[8]. Nevertheless, the Tribunal concluded that it was not open to the Registrar to register her sex
as "non-specific"[9]. In this regard, the Tribunal proceeded on the footing that "the Act is predicated on an
assumption that all people can be classified into two distinct and plainly identifiable sexes, male and female
... [T]he Registrar does not have the power under section 32DC of the Act to register a change of sex by a
person to 'Non specific'"[10].
24.
Norrie appealed to the appeal panel of the Tribunal, which dismissed her appeal[11].
The Court of Appeal
20
25
30
35
40
45
50
55
25.
Norrie appealed to the Court of Appeal of New South Wales, which allowed her appeal and
ordered that the decision of the Tribunal be set aside and that the matter be remitted to the Tribunal for
determination[12].
26.
The Court of Appeal remitted the matter to the Tribunal because it held that the Act contemplated
that Norrie might be assigned to a specific category of sex other than male or female such as "intersex",
"transgender" or "androgynous"[13]. Whether the Tribunal should take that course was a matter which
would depend upon findings of fact which had not yet been made as to Norrie's specific sex
classification[14].
27.
The Registrar appealed to this Court pursuant to special leave granted on 8 November 2013. It was
a condition of the grant of special leave that the Registrar pay Norrie's costs in this Court and that the order
for costs made in her favour by the Court of Appeal not be disturbed.
The arguments in this Court
28.
The Registrar submitted that the Court of Appeal strayed too far from the text of the Act in
reaching its conclusions. It was said that the Act does not contemplate a range of categories of sex,
additional to the "opposite" sexes of male and female. In particular, the definition of "sex affirmation
procedure" in s 32A suggests a process of seeking to become male or female, given that s 32A(a) states
that the sex affirmation procedure is carried out for the purpose of "assisting a person to be considered to
be a member of the opposite sex"; and to speak of the opposite sex is necessarily to speak only of male or
female. Further, the Registrar submitted, it is reasonable to expect that an intention to recognise another
category of "sex" would have been expressly stated in the Act. In this regard, the definition of "transgender"
in Pt 3A of the Anti-Discrimination Act does refer to a person being of an "indeterminate" sex; but,
significantly, this language was not used in Pt 5A of the Act.
29.
The Registrar also argued that unacceptable confusion would flow from the acceptance of more
than two categories of sex given that s 32J of the Act affects the operation of other laws which assume the
binary division of sex. This particular argument will be addressed after the submissions made on behalf of
Norrie have been summarised.
30.
Norrie submitted that the purpose of the Register is to state the truth about matters recorded in the
Register to the greatest possible extent. If the Act proceeded on the assumption that every person was male
or female, then s 32A(b) would be superfluous because any change of sex would fall within the scope of s
32A(a). A sex affirmation procedure described in s 32A(b) of the Act, the purpose of which is to "correct
or eliminate ambiguities relating to the sex of the person", was said to be predicated upon legislative
recognition that not everyone may be classified as male or female. In this case, the sex affirmation
procedure, which is a precondition of an application under s 32DA, was carried out, but Norrie's sex
remained ambiguous so that it would be to record misinformation in the Register to classify her as male or
female. There is evident force in this submission.
31.
Norrie's counsel went further, arguing that, as the Court of Appeal accepted, Norrie might more
accurately be assigned to a category of sex such as "intersex" or "transgender". On this view, the expression
"change of sex" in s 32DC does not mean changing from one sex (male or female) to another (female or
male): a reference to change of sex simply means an "alteration" of a person's sex so that registration of
p22
8-5-2015
23
categories of sex such as "transgender" and "intersex" is within the scope of the Registrar's powers under s
32DC. This further argument goes too far; it should be rejected.
32.
The Registrar's submission that the Act recognises only male or female as registrable classes of
sex must be accepted. But to accept that submission does not mean that the Act requires that this
classification can apply, or is to be applied, to everyone. And there is nothing in the Act which suggests that
the Registrar is entitled, much less duty-bound, to register the classification of a person's sex inaccurately as
male or female having regard to the information which the Act requires to be provided by the applicant.
Additional categories of sex
10
15
20
33.
As a matter of the ordinary use of language, to speak of the opposite sex is to speak of the
contrasting categories of sex: male and female[15]. Yet given the terms of s 32A(b) and the context in
which it is to be construed, the Act recognises that a person's sex may be indeterminate.
34.
Norrie's application to the Registrar and the Registrar's determination did not give rise to an
occasion to consider whether Pt 5A contemplates the existence of specific categories of sex other than male
and female, such as "intersex", "transgender" or "androgynous". It was unnecessary to do so given that the
Act recognises that a person's sex may be neither male nor female.
35.
The Registrar's initial determination of Norrie's application was right. The appropriate record of
her change of sex was from "male" (as it may be taken to have previously been recorded outside of New
South Wales) to "non-specific". To make that record in the Register would be no more than to recognise, as
the Act does, that not everyone is male or female and that the change to be registered was from an assumed
registered classification outside of New South Wales as a male to, as Norrie's application put it, nonspecific.
Ambiguities and indeterminacy
25
30
35
40
45
50
36.
The Registrar's submission must be rejected at the point at which it insists that the Registrar is
required to decide whether he or she is satisfied (let alone that it has been demonstrated objectively) that,
despite an application showing persisting ambiguity in the sex of the applicant following a sex
affirmation procedure, the applicant's sex should be recorded in the Register as being either male or
female. The registration of a change of sex records the facts supplied by the application so long as the
application is supported in accordance with s 32DB.
37.
The provision of the Act which acknowledges "ambiguities" and the context of the 1996
Amending Act, which referred to persons of "indeterminate sex", are a sufficient indication that the Act
recognises that, as this Court observed in AB v Western Australia[16], "the sex of a person is not ... in every
case unequivocally male or female."
38.
There is nothing in the text of the Act which gives support to the view that the Registrar must
initiate, much less resolve, a dispute concerning matters of fact and expert opinions presented to the
Registrar under ss 32DA and 32DB. Such a role would not be consistent with the provisions of the Act
which charge the Registrar with the role of establishing and maintaining the registers by recording
information provided by members of the community.
39.
There may be occasions when the Registrar is prompted by the circumstances of an application to
address a concern as to whether an application to record a state of affairs in the Register is made in good
faith. But this is not such an occasion. There is no suggestion that Norrie's application was not made in
good faith. Norrie had undergone a sex affirmation procedure and verified that fact as required by s
32DB of the Act. Norrie's application was not deficient in terms of the information required by the Act.
The opinions of the medical practitioners required by s 32DB were to the same effect as Norrie's own
statement. The material before the Registrar (and the Tribunal) was to the effect that the sex affirmation
procedure had not eliminated the ambiguities relating to Norrie's sex. In these circumstances no
question was raised by Norrie's application which required the Registrar to pursue or resolve any further
issue.
40.
It was open to the Registrar, in the exercise of the power conferred by s 32DC, to register Norrie's
change of sex by recording the change from classification as male to non-specific. Moreover, there was
no reason for the matter to be remitted to the Tribunal to make further findings of fact in order for the
matter to be finally determined.
Section 32J
55
41.
The submission made on behalf of the Registrar that, given s 32J of the Act, unacceptable
confusion would ensue if the Act recognised more than two categories of sex or an "uncategorised" sex
should be rejected.
42.
The difficulty foreshadowed by this argument could only arise in cases where other legislation
requires that a person is classified as male or female for the purpose of legal relations. For the most part, the
sex of the individuals concerned is irrelevant to legal relations. In this regard, s 8(a) of the Interpretation
Act 1987 (NSW) provides that "[i]n any Act or instrument ... a word or expression that indicates one or
p23
8-5-2015
24
10
15
20
25
more particular genders shall be taken to indicate every other gender". The chief, perhaps the only, case
where the sex of the parties to the relationship is legally significant is marriage, as defined in the fashion
found in s 5(1) of the Marriage Act 1961 (Cth)[17].
43.
As the Registrar acknowledged, the circumstance that s 32J operates subject to other laws of New
South Wales serves to ensure that where another Act does differentiate between male and female it will
prevail over s 32J so that an individual is not left in a "legal no-man's land". The Registrar during the
course of argument did not identify any particular statute which could not be construed so as to
operate as intended in respect of a person whose sex was recorded in the Register as "non-specific".
44.
The Registrar's argument from inconvenience should be rejected.
Conclusions and orders
45.
The Court of Appeal went beyond the scope of Norrie's application to the Registrar and the issue
as to the Registrar's power under s 32DC raised by the Registrar's refusal to record her sex as "nonspecific". While the Court of Appeal did not proceed without encouragement from Norrie's counsel[18], it
was neither necessary nor appropriate for it to accept that encouragement. It would have been sufficient for
it to determine the issue raised by the determination of Norrie's application and the appeal from the
Tribunal to hold that the Tribunal erred in answering the question as to the Registrar's power under s 32DC
on the basis that the Act is predicated on the assumption that "all people can be classified into two distinct
and plainly identifiable sexes, male and female."[19]
46.
The Act does not require that people who, having undergone a sex affirmation procedure, remain
of indeterminate sex that is, neither male nor female must be registered, inaccurately, as one or the
other. The Act itself recognises that a person may be other than male or female and therefore may be taken
to permit the registration sought, as "non-specific".
47.
Accordingly, the orders of the Court of Appeal should be varied to the extent of setting aside the
order of the Court of Appeal remitting the matter to the Tribunal, and ordering that Norrie's applications to
the Registrar of 26 November 2009 should be remitted to the Registrar for determination in accordance
with these reasons. Otherwise, the appeal should be dismissed.
48.
In accordance with the conditions subject to which special leave was granted, the order as to costs
made by the Court of Appeal should not be disturbed, and the Registrar must pay Norrie's costs of the
appeal to this Court.
30
[1] Corbett v Corbett [1971] P 83 at 100; Bellinger v Bellinger [2003] 2 AC 467 at 472 [5]-[6]; AB v Western
Australia [2011] HCA 42; (2011) 244 CLR 390 at 402 [23]; [2011] HCA 42.
[2] Section 32A(b).
[3] Section 32A(a).
35
[4] The respondent uses, and these reasons use, the personal pronouns "she" and "her" to refer to the respondent.
[5] Sections 32B to 32D.
[6] Norrie v Registry of Births Deaths and Marriages [2011] NSWADT 102 at [38], [91].
[7] Norrie v Registry of Births Deaths and Marriages [2011] NSWADT 102 at [5].
40
[10] Norrie v Registry of Births Deaths and Marriages [2011] NSWADT 102 at [98]- [99].
[11] Norrie v Registrar of Births, Deaths and Marriages [2011] NSWADTAP 53 at [20].
[12] Norrie v NSW Registrar of Births, Deaths and Marriages [2013] NSWCA 145 at [207].
45
[13] Norrie v NSW Registrar of Births, Deaths and Marriages [2013] NSWCA 145 at [200]- [205], [257], [288][290].
[14] Norrie v NSW Registrar of Births, Deaths and Marriages [2013] NSWCA 145 at [203]- [205], [277]-[278].
[15] Bellinger v Bellinger [2003] 2 AC 467 at 483 [59], 488-489 [76].
p24
8-5-2015
25
[16] [2011] HCA 42; (2011) 244 CLR 390 at 402 [23].
[17] In the Marriage of C and D (1979) 28 ALR 524; Bellinger v Bellinger [2003] 2 AC 467 at 483 [58].
[18] Norrie v NSW Registrar of Births, Deaths and Marriages [2013] NSWCA 145 at [205]- [206].
10
15
20
I expect that the Commonwealth of Australia will ensure appropriate response upon the Norrie
case as to avoid this to make the vulnerable even more vulnerable. The legislative powers for
Peace, order and good government clearly provides for the commonwealth to do as such and
ensure good government is pursued by avoiding this mental obsession perception of a person
being a male, female or non-specific gender pending the mental perception at each relevant time.
We ought to have specific doctrines what constitutes a male, female and/or a non-specific
gender/sex.
Will the Commonwealth of Australia tolerate this so to say social engineering by the High Court
of Australia in the most irresponsible manner and undermine the basic concepts in law as well as
ordinary in society what constitutes a male or female?
And, obviously if a non-specific gender/sex person is neither he/him or she/her then the English
language may need to be updated to it being non-specific gender.to refer to a non-gender
sex/gender.
I look forwards to your details response, if any courtesy will eventuate as such.
Awaiting your response, G. H. Schorel-Hlavka O.W.B. (Friends call me Gerrit)
MAY JUSTICE ALWAYS PREVAIL
25
Our name is our motto!)
(
30
WITHOUT PREJUDICE
The Hon Barry O'Farrell, MP
35
14-4-2014
Premier
Minister for Western Sydney
GPO Box 5341
SYDNEY NSW 2001
http://www.premier.nsw.gov.au/contact-premier-new-south-wales
Cc:
40
Mr Tony Abbott MP
20140414-G. H. Schorel-Hlavka O.W.B. to Mr B. O'Farrell, Premier and Mr Tony Abbott PM- Re Norrie HCA-s42A and nonspecific gender etc
Mr OFarrell,
45
I have not available to me and so neither read all relevant documents of the Norrie
case but I am concerned that the High Court of Australia erred in law in regard of ruling that the
Registrar must register a non-gender person.
p25
8-5-2015
26
As I understand it from the reason of judgment
http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/cth/HCA/2014/11.html
QUOTE
11.
A sex affirmation procedure is defined in s 32A as:
"a surgical procedure involving the alteration of a person's reproductive organs carried out:
1. for the purpose of assisting a person to be considered to be a member of the opposite sex, or
(b) to correct or eliminate ambiguities relating to the sex of the person."
10
13.
Norrie considered that the surgery did not resolve her sexual ambiguity. She applied on 26
November 2009 for her sex to be registered under the Act as "non-specific".
14.
Section 32DB of the Act requires that an application under s 32DA be accompanied by:
"statutory declarations by 2 doctors, or by 2 medical practitioners ... verifying that the person the subject
of the application has undergone a sex affirmation procedure".
15
20
25
30
35
END QUOTE
http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/american_english/sex?q=sex
QUOTE
1.1
[in
singular]
euphemistic
A
persons
genitals.
2Either of the two main categories (male and female) into which humans and many other living things are
divided
on
the
basis
of
their
reproductive
functions:
adults
of
both
sexes
More
example
sentences
o While there are only two sexes - male and female - there can be an unlimited number of genders.
END QUOTE
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Organ_(anatomy)
QUOTE
Organ
systems[edit]
Main
article:
Biological
system
Two or more organs working together in the execution of a specific body function form an organ system, also
called a biological system or body system. The functions of organ systems often share significant overlap.
For instance, the nervous and endocrine system both operate via a shared organ, the hypothalamus. For this
reason, the two systems are combined and studied as the neuroendocrine system. The same is true for the
musculoskeletal system because of the relationship between the muscular and skeletal systems.
Mammals such as humans have a variety of organ systems. These specific systems are also widely studied in
human anatomy.
END QUOTE
40
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Organ_(anatomy)
QUOTE
Reproductive system: the sex organs, such as ovaries, fallopian tubes, uterus, vagina, mammary glands,
testes, vas deferens, seminal vesicles, prostate and penis.
END QUOTE
45
As the legislation refers to sex Affirmation procedure and not to gender Affirmation
procedure then the issue is if there can be deemed to exist more than one sex besides male
and female in a biological manner.
50
In my view s32A doesnt provide for any consideration as to if the subject matter (the person
undergoing the sex Affirmation procedure mentally may or may not accept the change of
sexuality as it is clearly limited to the a surgical procedure involving the alteration of a person's
reproductive organs carried out. And the brain is not indicated to be part of the reproduction
system as an organ.
55
The question that arises, in my view, is if the sex affirmation procedure can at all be used upon
a perceived sex change from male to female or visa versa if the basic organs do not exist neither
can be created in the subject matters body. For example if a male is subjected to this sex
Affirmation procedure to become a female but cannot be provided with say ovaries then I
p26
8-5-2015
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
45
50
27
view the sex affirmation procedure from onset cannot succeed in a sex change from male to
female. Likewise, visa versa from a female to a male if in the end the testicles to assist in
creating sperm doesnt exist and neither can be created as such then the sex affirmation
procedure cannot succeed. If therefore the Court relies upon s32A I view it erred to pursue
something within s32A that was not provided for.
While the court referred to intermediate and other terms in my view s32A is limited to the actual
sex change having been completed and not any partly progress in a change of sex.
It appears to me that the High Court of Australia involved itself in seeking to social engineer via
its judgment to provide for backdoor legislation outside its permitted scope of judicial power of
adjudicating.
It appears to me that s32A narrowly limits the sex affirmation procedure to a biological change
from male to female or from female to male and is not concerned about the mental
perceptions or mental status of the person who undergoes the sex affirmation procedure. And
unless the sex affirmation procedure actually can affirm the so to say newly acquired sex I
view s32A cannot be invoked for registration.
The issue is not if a person may or may not mentally accept a successful sex affirmation
procedure having eventuated but if in fact this occurred in physical manner. If it failed then I
view the person must be deemed not to have changed from male to female or from female
to male and the original registration of sex cannot be changed.
It therefore is critical for the subject undergoing a sex affirmation procedure to have a
reasonable expectation that the person has or can end up after the sex affirmation procedure
with all sex organs that ordinary is deemed to establish a person to be of a certain sex. If for
example the medical provision seeking to invoke a sex affirmation procedure is aware that a
male seeking to become a female has no ovaries and cannot be provided with ovaries then a
critical organ needed to become a female can never become a reality and as such for purpose
of s32A I view no change of sex could be permitted for registration.
Ordinary those in the law enforcement may ordinary hold that the physical presence of certain
genitals determines if they are dealing with a male or a female and it would be absurd for the
police having to inquire in a persons mental perceptions as to understand if a person is or is not
a male, female or non-specific gender or sex. What will be the status of charges against any
person if the person can claim not to be of the sex that the genitals indicate? Also while I
understand that the N.S.W.; act doesnt allow for a married person to engage in a sex
affirmation procedure it now may be that a married person merely has to have the mental status
of considering to be a non specific sex or to be a female or male and we can end up that
this sidestep the limitations of the legislation where the actual surgical procedure is side stepped,
and the Registrar can be forced to change a Registration of a person merely on the say so of what
the person at the time may or may not mentally prescribe to as being of a sex or being nonspecific.
In my view the medical profession involved in sex affirmation procedure may now
(considering the Norrie decision) leave itself open to be sued for failing to accomplish the sex
change if it fails to provide a person who was registered as a male with ovaries to become a
female or a female to become a male with reproductive organs to become a male.
As I understand it Mason CJ was reported to have made known that he held that where the court
deemed the legislators had failed to provide for certain provisions then the court would provide
for it in its judgment. In my view this is what appears to have been done in the Norrie case again.
This, even so it is offending the separation of powers between the judiciary and the legislators.
p27
8-5-2015
28
Indeed, it is not the function of the judiciary to interfere with the legislative powers of the
Parliament as much as the parliament is not to interfere with the judicial powers of the judiciary
(consider Kable).
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
45
50
In my view, the legislation intended that where a person was wrongly assigned a certain sex
status being it male or female then the legislation would provide for the correction of this
status where a sex affirmation procedure had provided for the surgical procedure to successfully
conclude the change of sex. In my view this doesnt include the mental status of a person as it is
up to the medical profession engaged in the sex affirmation procedure to establish beforehand
before engaging in the surgical procedure that the mental state, etc, is certified to be accepting this
sex affirmation procedure intend.
It would be beyond the capability or competence of a registrar to inquire into the mental status of
a person seeking to amend a change of sex status. No one can expect a registrar to act as some
member of the medical profession as to evaluate what the person seeking the change of sex status
may or may not mentally prescribed to. In my view the High Court of Australia placed an
unreasonable burden upon the Registrar as now anyone who can come up with some
documentation of members of the medical profession providing that the person has the mental
status of being a non-specific sex or being a :male instead of a female or a female instead of a
male irrespective of what the sex organs in that person might be, then would force the registrar
to alter the sex status, even so as it appears from the court judgment the filing of the medical
statements itself is not an issue for the registrar to consider.
As such, a person charged as a male loitering in or near a female changing room, etc, merely then
has to go to the Registrar that same day and request a change of sex status and can then
undermine the charges laid as while having male reproductive organs being registered as a
:female, etc.
And, even this may not avoid undermining the charges as effectively it appears that not the
Registrar changing the sex status determines the persons sex status but rather what the person
beforehand prescribes to.
In my view the intent of the legislation has been grossly abused and hijacked by the court, as it
appears to me the real intent was that where a person was wrongly provided with say a penis but
was found to have ovaries then a sex affirmation procedure using a surgical procedure could
then have the physical conditions corrected to correspond. Likewise, if a person recorded as a
female was found to have testicles but was provided with a vagina at birth then again the
surgical procedure could correct this to affirm the biological status. As such the wording
affirmative was meaning to affirm the real biological status of the person at birth but not as
such known at the time of registration but now corrected and so affirmed.
In my view the legislation may need to be amended to specifically exclude any mental
perceptions as to dictate if the sex affirmation procedure was or was not successful, as for
example paedophiles might welcome now the courts ruling to undermine any charges against
them of procuring a child for sexual purposes if they can alter their sex status merely by claiming
that they mentally view to be so.
It appears to me that the intend of the legislation was to cater for the unfortunate people who
after birth may have been provided with the wrong sex status but regretfully the court now so to
say hijacked this for a conduct of social engineering on its own contemporary views, which I
view cannot be tolerated.
If there are only 2 sexes male and female for reproduction purposes then the court
claiming a person to be of a non-specific sex cannot be justified, because it is not as such
a sex in a biological sense, for which the legislation of s32A appears to relate to.
I look forwards to your details response, if any courtesy will eventuate as such.
p28
8-5-2015
29
Awaiting your response, G. H. Schorel-Hlavka O.W.B. (Friends call me Gerrit)
(
10
15
20
25
CONSIDER TWO PEOPLE GOING TO GET MARRIED AND BOTH PURPORT TO BE

NON-GENDER, BUT ARE ACTUALLY HAVING DIFFERENT SEXUAL ORGANS SINCE
BIRTH. But they are deemed to be a same-sex marriage because they are both claiming to be
non-gender regardless of their sexual organs!
This now means that all sporting events that provides for male and female trophies/awards now
must also provide for non-gender trophies/awards. Come to think of it why not just make
everyone non-gender? After all, we then no longer will have a different awarding system!
Well this might be gender-bias that non-gender masculine persons may achieve better in sports
then non-gender born female persons, and boy will we have an utter mesh.
Does it really make a difference if a person has a penis or a vagina, if this can be altered by
operations? Is it not that the difference of gender is generally associated in sports because of a
man being masculine can have a better sports performance in heavy lifting, etc?
Consider this, are we having to have medical check-up after a race to determine if the nongender person has male or female characteristics as to determine who might have won a race?
For sure there are those born where there is a problem to ascertain at the time if the child is a boy
or a girls and at times doctors had it wrong in the past, and later corrective surgery might have
been performed but surely this is different than a person changing sex but not changing sex
merely changing a sex or better to say changing to a non-sex status.
Why have separate toilets if any male can claim to be a non-gender and can then use either
male or female toilets? Perverts will love this kind of a system!
30
QUOTE ARTICLE AND ADDITIONS
From: Jon Roland jon.roland@constitution.org [AMOJ_MAIN] <amoj_main@yahoogroups.com>
To: LPTexas <LPTexas-L@LPTexas.org>
Cc:
Date: Thursday, May 07, 2015 01:29 am
Subject: [AMOJ_MAIN] Same-sex marriage cases misframed
Same-sex marriage cases misframed

The Supreme Court is currently hearing the case of Obergfell v. Hodges, addressing the
constitutionality of laws restricting marriage to opposite-sex couples. However, most of
arguments are abysmally confused.
First there is confusion on what marriage is. As a matter of law it is a contract among two (or
more) individuals. (Most can agree it would make no sense to use the term for a contract
between an individual and a corporation.) As a custom, it is the physical relationship among
individuals, involving activities like living together and having sex. But the relationship can
p29
8-5-2015
30
exist without the contract and the contract without the relationship. So what is involved in the
litigation? Does it make sense to say that two individuals have a "right to marry" that some
jurisdictions are trying to forbid? Do the parties to such a relationship have some right to have
the state call it "marriage", as distinct from calling it a "domestic partnership" or some other
term?
The simple obvious answer to the last question is no. A state, like an individual, may use any
name it pleases for anything it wants. No one has some right to dictate the choice of words
anyone or anything must use for anything. Conflicting uses of different words for the same
things, or the same words for different things, may cause confusion, but constitutionally there is
no right or power to require anyone to use terms in certain ways, as long as there is not
confusion or fraud.
Part of the confusion seems to come from regarding official recognition of some relationship as
a "marriage" as some kind of license, that could be withheld, or that such a relationship can
constitutionally be banned by banning the contract. In the past, in some jurisdictions, that has
been attempted, with things like marriage licenses, or criminal prosecution for relationships that
were not officially authorized, such as with individuals that were too young, or among more
than two, or fraudulently marrying one individual while still being married to another. But there
are no more marriage licenses that carry criminal penalties, and officially recognizing a
"marriage" is not some kind of license.
Constitutionally, no government in the United States may forbid any two or more consenting
adults to enter into any contract to do anything. The activity under the contract might be made a
crime, and the existence of a contract deemed evidence of a conspiracy, but, except for fraud,
there is no constitutional way to penalize parties from merely entering into a contract of any
kind. The courts of a jurisdiction may decline to enforce certain contracts which it disapproves,
but not to prevent entry into them.
This case is not about attempts to forbid the relationship. The decision in Lawrence v. Texas
established that it is unconstitutional to penalize consenting adults of the same gender from
having sex with one another. That disposes of the issue of official restriction of the relationship.
But can the state constitutionally refuse to call the relationship "marriage"? Yes. Can it
constitutionally refuse to enforce the terms of a contract governing such a relationship? Also
yes. Can it constitutionally withhold benefits to the parties in such a relationship? That
depends. It may withhold some benefits to the parties to some relationships and not to others,
but not because the parties call it marriage. It is the substance of things, not the names for them,
that matters in law. It could, for example, extend benefits to couples with children that are
withheld from couples without children.
Many of the issues raised involve benefits like inheritance or hospital visitation. As the first may
be consented to by a written will, and the second by a consent form, such as a "living will, then
by by calling their relationship "marriage", perhaps in writing so they have something to show
to others, the state has no rational basis for discriminating against some wills or consent forms
and not others. The appropriate remedy is for the parties to put it in writing.
One of the benefits government can provide is to make available a standard contract that people
can invoke by name, without having to renegotiate the terms that have taken millennia to
develop. That is a great convenience. Of course, people can refer to the standard contract, but
then contract to deviate from the standard or to supplement it in some ways. We call those
p30
8-5-2015
31
"prenuptial agreements". Government does that for many kinds of standard contract, such as
between landlord and tenant, employer and employee, or seller and buyer. Having such standard
contracts is a great convenience for all concerned. But can government constitutionally forbid
anyone from using one of its standard contracts, by merely referring to it by name? No, unless
there is fraud, and fraud is a separate issue from entry into the contract, which might be
evidence of fraud but is not essentially fraud.
Advocates of government recognition or certification of same-sex marriage also sometimes
argue that it is not about licensing the contract or relationship, but about conferring dignity on it,
the way churches and other religious institutions have traditionally done in most countries. The
explanation is that such recognition or dignity operates to dispel much of the customary social
rejection that might otherwise occur. They argue that there is an equal right to having such
dignity conferred on their contract or relationship. But is that a constitutional right?
Constitutional rights, at least in the Constitution of 1787, are restrictions on government not to
exert some kind of force on individuals. They are not rights to receive a sufficiency of some
benefit, no matter how inexpensive it might be, except the benefit of disclosure of information
about the operations of government. There is not even a right to have a trial on the legal merits
of a dispute, because the parties always have the options of self-help, although self-help by
government would be tyranny, or of private courts, to avoid the destruction self-help is prone to
bring. On the other hand, if conferring the benefit costs nothing, or almost nothing, there can
certainly be an equal right not to have government withhold the benefit.
But how much dignity would be conferred on something if there was indiscriminate recognition
of everything for anything? The dignity would be meaningless if it is not withheld from some
while being conferred on others. If so, then for whom might the dignity be reasonably and
constitutionally withheld, and who decides? Should it be decided by anyone but a jury?
Would it make more sense, or be more constitutional, for government to simply withhold all
recognition or other acts that confer dignity? Clearly, it has to recognize some things, and not
others, to perform its duties, but if society takes such recognition as the conferring of dignity,
that is a matter of custom, not law. If people insist on adopting such customs, then perhaps it
would be better for government to get and stay out of the recognition business for any but
essential government purposes, and marriage is not one of those. Even default contracts could
be published by private institutions. There is no need for government to do so.
The Supreme Court could do us all a great favor by making all of the above points clear. That
would mean judgment for the plaintiffs, but not for their arguments.
----------------------------------------------------------Constitution Society
http://constitution.org
13359 N Hwy 183 #406-144
twitter.com/lex_rex
Austin, TX 78750 512/299-5001 jon.roland@constitution.org
----------------------------------------------------------
http://www.scotusblog.com/case-files/cases/obergefell-v-hodges/
5
Obergefell v. Hodges
p31
8-5-2015
32
Linked with:
Tanco v. Haslam
DeBoer v. Snyder
Bourke v. Beshear
Docket No. Op. Below Argument
Opinion Vote Author Term
Apr 28, 2015

14-556
6th Cir.
TBD
TBD TBD
OT 2014
Tr.Aud.
Issue: 1) Does the Fourteenth Amendment require a state to license a marriage between two people of the
same sex? 2) Does the Fourteenth Amendment require a state to recognize a marriage between two people
of the same sex when their marriage was lawfully licensed and performed out-of-state?
SCOTUSblog Coverage
Super-cuts from same-sex marriage arguments
10
A view from the Courtroom, Same-Sex Marriage Edition

No clear answers on same-sex marriage: In Plain English
Live blog: Obergefell v. Hodges oral argument updates
Same-sex marriage, in Plain English -- Part I
Same-sex marriage: The decisive questions
15
A reporters guide to covering the same-sex marriage cases at the Supreme Court
Preview on same-sex marriage -- Part IV, Supporting the state bans
Commentary: The Supreme Court and marriage for same-sex couples Part II
Commentary: The Supreme Court and marriage for same-sex couples -- Part I
Preview on same-sex marriage -- Part III, Supporting the couples
20
Preview on same-sex marriage -- Part II, The states' views

Preview on same-sex marriage -- Part I, The couples' views
Lawyers for same-sex marriage plea named
U.S. joins fight for same-sex marriage
p32
8-5-2015
33
Symposium: Supreme Court should address the domestic-relations exception to
federal jurisdiction in its marriage-case decision
Symposium: Original meaning, public deliberation, and marriage equality
Symposium: Unveiling marriage equality?
Symposium: Lets be clear the marriage bans are about animus

Symposium: Cert. grant signals promising vehicle to affirm marriage
Symposium: Good faith and caution, not irrationality or malice
Date
Proceedings and Orders
Nov 14 2014
Petition for a writ of certiorari filed. (Response due December 15, 2014)
Dec 8 2014
Consent to the filing of amicus curiae briefs, in support of either party or of neither party,
received from counsel for the respondents.
Dec 12 2014
Brief of respondent Richard Hodges, Director, Ohio Department of Health filed.
Dec 15 2014
Brief amicus curiae of Idaho Governor C.L. "Butch" Otter filed. VIDED.
Dec 15 2014
Brief amici curiae of Colage; Equality Federation, et al. filed. VIDED.
Dec 15 2014
Brief amici curiae of 76 Scholars of Marriage filed. VIDED.
Dec 19 2014
Letter from counsel for petitioners dated December 19, 2014, received waiving 14-day
waiting period pursuant to Rule 15.5.
Dec 21 2014
Reply of petitioners James Obergefell, et al. filed.
Dec 23 2014
DISTRIBUTED for Conference of January 9, 2015.
Jan 12 2015
DISTRIBUTED for Conference of January 16, 2015.
Jan 16 2015
Petition GRANTED The petitions for writs of certiorari in No. 14-562, No. 14-571, and No.
14-574 are granted. The cases are consolidated and the petitions for writs of certiorari are
granted limited to the following questions: 1) Does the Fourteenth Amendment require a
p33
8-5-2015
34
state to license a marriage between two people of the same sex? 2) Does the Fourteenth
Amendment require a state to recognize a marriage between two people of the same sex
when their marriage was lawfully licensed and performed out-of-state? A total of ninety
minutes is allotted for oral argument on Question 1. A total of one hour is allotted for oral
argument on Question 2. The parties are limited to filing briefs on the merits and presenting
oral argument on the questions presented in their respective petitions. The briefs of
petitioners are to be filed on or before 2 p.m., Friday, February 27, 2015. The briefs of
respondents are to be filed on or before 2 p.m., Friday, March 27, 2015. The reply briefs are
to be filed on or before 2 p.m., Friday, April 17, 2015. VIDED
Jan 26 2015
received from counsel for respondents Steve Beshear, et al., in No. 14-574. VIDED
Jan 26 2015
received from counsel for respondents Rick Snyder, Governor of Michigan, et al., in No. 14571. VIDED
Feb 4 2015
received from counsel for respondents Haslam, et al., in No. 14-562. VIDED
Feb 12 2015
received from counsel for respondents Hodges, et al., in No. 14-556. VIDED
Feb 27 2015
Joint appendix for No. 14-556, 14-562 & 14-574 filed (2 volumes). VIDED.
Feb 27 2015
Brief of petitioners James Obergefell, et al. filed.
Feb 27 2015
Brief amicus curiae of The County of Cuyahoga, Ohio filed.
Feb 27 2015
Brief amici curiae of Mae Kuykendall, David Upham and Michael Worley in support of
neither party and urging affirmance on question 1 filed. VIDED.
Mar 2 2015
Brief amici curiae of Langley Hill Friends Meeting, et al. filed. VIDED.
Mar 3 2015
Brief amicus curiae of Columbia Law School Sexuality and Gender Law Clinic filed.
VIDED.
Mar 3 2015
Brief amici curiae of Outserve-Servicemembers Legal Defense Network, et al. filed.

VIDED.
p34
8-5-2015
35
Mar 3 2015
Brief amicus curiae of Hawaii filed. VIDED.
Mar 3 2015
Brief amicus curiae of Indiana University filed. VIDED.
Mar 3 2015
Brief amicus curiae of BiLaw filed. VIDED.
Mar 4 2015
Brief amici curiae of Services and Advocacy for Gay, Lesbian, Bisexual and Transgender
Elders, et al. filed. VIDED.
Mar 4 2015
Brief amicus curiae of The Cleveland Choral Arts Association Inc. a/k/a The North Coast
Men's Chorus filed. VIDED.
Mar 4 2015
Brief amici curiae of Elected Officials and Former Officeholders of Michigan, et al. filed.
VIDED.
Mar 4 2015
Brief amici curiae of Survivors of Sexual Orientation Change Therapies filed. VIDED.
Mar 4 2015
Brief amici curiae of Equality Ohio, et al. filed. VIDED.
Mar 4 2015
Brief amicus curiae of Professor W. Burlette Carter in support of neither party filed. VIDED.
Mar 4 2015
Brief amici curiae of California Council of Churches, et al. filed. VIDED.
Mar 5 2015
Brief amici curiae of Conflict of Law Scholars filed. VIDED.
Mar 5 2015
Brief amici curiae of Bay Area Lawyers for Individual Freedom, et al. filed. VIDED.
Mar 5 2015
Brief amici curiae of Kenneth B. Mehlman, et al. filed. VIDED.
Mar 5 2015
Brief amici curiae of National Women's Law Center, et al. filed. VIDED.
Mar 5 2015
Brief amicus curiae of The American Humanist Association and Center for Inquiry filed.
VIDED.
Mar 5 2015
Brief amicus curiae of The Organization of American Historians filed. VIDED.
p35
8-5-2015
36
Mar 5 2015
Brief amicus curiae of Citizens United for the Individual Freedom to Define Marriage in
support of neither party filed. VIDED.
Mar 5 2015
Brief amici curiae of President of the House of Deputies of the Episcopal Church, et al. filed.
VIDED.
Mar 5 2015
Brief amici curiae of 379 Employers and Organizations Representing Employers filed.
VIDED.
Mar 5 2015
Brief amicus curiae of Institute for Justice filed. VIDED.
Mar 5 2015
Brief amicus curiae of The Alliance: State Advocates for Women's Rights and Gender
Equality filed. VIDED.
Mar 5 2015
Brief amici curiae of GLMA, et al. filed. VIDED.
Mar 5 2015
Brief amicus curiae of American Sociological Association filed. VIDED.
Mar 5 2015
Brief amicus curiae of Virginia filed. VIDED.
Mar 5 2015
Brief amici curiae of Scholars of the Constitutional Rights of Children filed. VIDED.
Mar 5 2015
Brief amicus curiae of National Family Civil Rights Center filed. VIDED. (Distributed)
Mar 6 2015
SET FOR ARGUMENT ON Tuesday, April 28, 2015
Mar 6 2015
Brief amici curiae of The Human Rights Campaign and 207,551 Americans filed. VIDED.
Mar 6 2015
Appendix of The Human Rights Campaign and 207,551 Americans filed. (10 Volumes)
VIDED.
Mar 6 2015
Brief amicus curiae of Constitutional Accountability Center filed. VIDED.
Mar 6 2015
Brief amici curiae of Kristin M. Perry, et al. filed. VIDED.
p36
8-5-2015
37
Mar 6 2015
Brief amicus curiae of Eagle Forum Education & Legal Defense Fund in support of neither
party filed. VIDED.
Mar 6 2015
Brief amicus curiae of United States filed. VIDED.
Mar 6 2015
Brief amici curiae of American Psychological Association, et al. filed. VIDED.
Mar 6 2015
Brief amici curiae of Anti-Defamation League, et al. filed. VIDED.
Mar 6 2015
Brief amicus curiae of PFLAG, Inc. filed. VIDED.
Mar 6 2015
Brief amici curiae of Leadership Conference on Civil and Human Rights, et al. filed.
VIDED.
Mar 6 2015
Brief amici curiae of Conflict of Laws and Family Law Professors filed. VIDED.
Mar 6 2015
Brief amici curiae of The Donaldson Adoption Institute, et al. filed.
Mar 6 2015
Brief amicus curiae of The Liberty Education Forum filed. VIDED.
Mar 6 2015
Brief amici curiae of American Public Health Association, and Whitman-Walker Health
filed. VIDED.
Mar 6 2015
Brief amici curiae of Lawrence J. Korb, et al. filed. VIDED.
Mar 6 2015
Brief amici curiae of 167 Members of the U.S. House of Representatives, and 44 U.S.
Senators filed. VIDED.
Mar 6 2015
Brief amicus curiae of Howard University School of Law Civil Rights Clinic filed. VIDED.
Mar 6 2015
Brief amici curiae of Law Enforcement Officers, First Responders, and Organizations filed.
VIDED.
Mar 6 2015
Brief amicus curiae of Legal Services NYC filed. VIDED.
p37
8-5-2015
38
Mar 6 2015
Brief amici curiae of Legal Scholars Stephen Clark, et al. filed. VIDED.
Mar 6 2015
Brief amici curiae of Family Law Scholars filed. VIDED.
Mar 6 2015
Brief amicus curiae of Freedom to Marry filed. VIDED.
Mar 6 2015
Brief amici curiae of American Academy of Matrimonial Lawyers, et al. filed. VIDED.
Mar 6 2015
Brief amicus curiae of Americans United for Separation of Church and State filed. VIDED.
Mar 6 2015
Brief amici curiae of Massachusetts, et al. filed. VIDED.
Mar 6 2015
Brief amicus curiae of John K. Olson filed. VIDED.
Mar 6 2015
Brief amicus curiae of Marriage Equality USA filed. VIDED.
Mar 6 2015
Brief amici curiae of LGBT Student Organizations at Undergraduate, Graduate, and

Professional Schools filed. VIDED.
Mar 6 2015
Brief amicus curiae of Minnesota filed. VIDED.
Mar 6 2015
Brief amicus curiae of Garden State Equality filed. VIDED.
Mar 6 2015
Brief amici curiae of 226 U.S. Mayors, et al. filed. VIDED.
Mar 6 2015
Brief amici curiae of NAACP Legal Defense & Educational Fund, Inc., et al. filed. VIDED.
Mar 6 2015
Brief amicus curiae of The Mattachine Society of Washington, D.C. filed. VIDED.
Mar 6 2015
Brief amici curiae of The General Conference of Seventh-Day Adventists, et al. in support of
neither party filed. VIDED.
Mar 6 2015
Brief amici curiae of Professors Laurence H. Tribe and Michael C. Dorf filed. VIDED.
p38
8-5-2015
39
Mar 6 2015
Brief amici curiae of Campaign for Southern Equality and Equality Federation filed.
VIDED.
Mar 6 2015
Brief amici curiae of Cato Institute, et al. filed. VIDED.
Mar 6 2015
Proposal to lodge excerpts of original, declassified documents, from counsel for amicus
curiae The Mattachine Society of Washington D.C. VIDE
Mar 6 2015
Brief amici curiae of Douglas Laycock, et al. filed. VIDED.
Mar 6 2015
Brief amici curiae of Human Rights Watch and The New York City Bar Association, et al.
filed. VIDED.
Mar 6 2015
Brief amici curiae of Historians of Marriage and the American Historical Association filed.
VIDED.
Mar 6 2015
Brief amici curiae of Ninety-Two Plaintiffs in Marriage Cases in Alabama, et al. filed.
VIDED.
Mar 6 2015
Brief amicus curiae of Gary J. Gates filed. VIDED.
Mar 6 2015
Brief amici curiae of Foreign and Comparative Law Experts Harold Hongju Koh, et al. filed.
VIDED.
Mar 6 2015
Brief amici curiae of Constitutional Law Scholars Ashutosh Bhagwat, et al. filed. VIDED.
Mar 6 2015
Brief amici curiae of Carlos A. Ball, Distinguished Professor of Law, Rutgers University, et
al. filed. VIDED.
Mar 6 2015
Brief amicus curiae of American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial

Organizations filed. VIDED.
Mar 6 2015
Brief amici curiae of Family Equality Council, et al. filed. VIDED.
Mar 6 2015
Brief amicus curiae of Experiential Learning Lab at New York University School of Law
filed. VIDED.
p39
8-5-2015
40
Mar 6 2015
Brief amici curiae of Chris Kluwe, et al. filed.
Mar 16 2015
CIRCULATED.
Mar 17 2015
Record requested from U.S.C.A. 6th Circuit.
Mar 17 2015
Joint letter of argument proposal from counsel for the petitioners. VIDED
Mar 17 2015
Joint letter of argument proposal from counsel for the respondents. VIDED
Mar 17 2015
Brief amicus curiae of Robert J. Bentley, Governor of Alabama filed. VIDED. (Distributed)
Mar 18 2015
Record received from U.S.C.A. 6th Circuit is electronic.
Mar 18 2015
Record from U.S.D.C. Southern Dist. of Ohio is electronic and located on PACER.
Mar 26 2015
Brief amicus curiae of Dr. Paul McHugh filed. VIDED. (Distributed)
Mar 26 2015
Brief amicus curiae of Professor Daniel N. Robinson, Ph.D. filed. VIDED. (Distributed)
Mar 27 2015
Brief of respondents Richard Hodges, Director, Ohio Department of Health, et al. filed.
(Distributed)
Mar 27 2015
Brief amici curiae of Scholars of History and Related Disciplines filed. VIDED.
(Distributed)
Mar 27 2015
Brief amicus curiae of Ryan T. Anderson, Ph.D. filed. VIDED. (Distributed)
Mar 27 2015
Brief amici curiae of Dawn Stefanowicz and Denise Shick filed. VIDED. (Distributed)
Mar 27 2015
Brief amici curiae of Heather Barwick and Katy Faust filed. VIDED. (Distributed)
Mar 27 2015
Brief amicus curiae of State of South Carolina filed. VIDED. (Distributed)
p40
8-5-2015
41
Mar 27 2015
Brief amici curiae of Robert Oscar Lopez and B.N. Klein filed. VIDED.(Distributed)
Mar 30 2015
Brief amici curiae of 54 International and Comparative Law Experts from 27 Countries filed.
VIDED. (Distributed)
Mar 30 2015
Brief amicus curiae of Family Trust Foundation of Kentucky, Inc., A/K/A The Family
Foundation filed. VIDED. (Distributed)
Mar 30 2015
Brief amici curiae of The Ruth Institute and Dr. Jennifer Roback Morse, Ph.D. filed.
Mar 30 2015
Brief amici curiae of North Carolina Values Coalition, et al. filed. VIDED. (Distributed)
Mar 31 2015
Supplemental joint letter of argument proposal from counsel for the petitioners. VIDED
Mar 31 2015
Brief amicus curiae of Family Research Council filed. VIDED. (Distributed)
Mar 31 2015
Brief amicus curiae of Lary S. Larson filed. VIDED. (Distributed)
Mar 31 2015
Brief amicus curiae of CatholicVote.org Education Fund filed. VIDED. (Distributed)
Mar 31 2015
Brief amici curiae of Organizations That Promote Biological Parenting filed. VIDED.
(Distributed)
Mar 31 2015
Brief amici curiae of Liberty Scholars and the Saint Thomas More Society of Dallas filed.
Apr 1 2015
Brief amici curiae of Scholars of Originalism filed. VIDED. (Distributed)
Apr 1 2015
Brief amicus curiae of Parents and Friends of Gays & Ex-Gays filed. VIDED. (Distributed)
Apr 1 2015
Brief amici curiae of Wyoming Legislators and Scholars of Full Faith and Credit filed.
Apr 1 2015
Brief amicus curiae of David A. Robinson filed. VIDED. (Distributed)
p41
8-5-2015
42
Apr 1 2015
Brief amicus curiae of Public Affairs Campaign and Opinion Expert Frank Schubert, et al.
filed. VIDED.
Apr 1 2015
Brief amicus curiae of Algirdas M. Liepas filed. VIDED. (Distributed)
Apr 1 2015
Brief amicus curiae of National Coalition of Black Pastors and Christian Leaders filed.
Apr 2 2015
Brief amici curiae of American College of Pediatricians, et al. filed. VIDED. (Distributed)
Apr 2 2015
Brief amicus curiae of United States Conference of Catholic Bishops filed. VIDED.
(Distributed)
Apr 2 2015
Brief amici curiae of 100 Scholars of Marriage filed. VIDED. (Distributed)
Apr 2 2015
Brief amicus curiae of Tri Valley Law, P.C. filed. VIDED. (Distributed)
Apr 2 2015
Brief amici curiae of Organizations and Scholars of Gender-Diverse Parenting filed. VIDED.
(Distributed)
Apr 2 2015
Brief amicus curiae of Catholic Answers filed. VIDED. (Distributed)
Apr 2 2015
Brief amici curiae of 47 Scholars filed. VIDED. (Distributed)
Apr 2 2015
Brief amici curiae of Scholars of the Welfare of Women, Children, and Underprivileged
Populations filed. VIDED. (Distributed)
Apr 2 2015
Brief amici curiae of Major Religious Organizations filed. VIDED. (Distributed)
Apr 2 2015
Brief amici curiae of Leaders of the 2012 Republican National Convention Committee on
the Platform, et al. filed. VIDED. (Distributed)
Apr 2 2015
Brief amici curiae of Religious Organizations, Public Speakers, and Scholars Concerned
About Free Speech filed. VIDED. (Distributed)
Apr 2 2015
Brief amicus curiae of The Committee for Justice filed. VIDED. (Distributed)
p42
8-5-2015
43
Apr 2 2015
Brief amici curiae of Louisiana, et al. filed. VIDED. (Distributed)
Apr 2 2015
Motion for leave to file amicus brief filed by Theodore Coates. VIDED. (Distributed)
Apr 3 2015
Upon consideration of the March 17 and March 31, 2015, letters from counsel for the
petitioners and the respondents, the following order of argument is adopted. On Question 1
the time is allocated as follows: 30 minutes for one advocate on behalf of the petitioners, 15
minutes for the Solicitor General, and 45 minutes for one advocate on behalf of the
respondents. On Question 2 the time is allocated as follows: 30 minutes for one advocate on
behalf of the petitioners, and 30 minutes for one advocate on behalf of the respondents.
VIDED
Apr 3 2015
Brief amici curiae of Texas Eagle Forum and Steven F. Hotze, M.D. filed. VIDED.
(Distributed)
Apr 3 2015
Brief amici curiae of Scholars of Fertility and Marriage filed. VIDED. (Distributed)
Apr 3 2015
Brief amicus curiae of Richard A. Lawrence filed. VIDED. (Distributed)
Apr 3 2015
Brief amici curiae of Mike Huckabee Policy Solutions and, Family Research Institute filed.
Apr 3 2015
Brief amicus curiae of Foundation for Moral Law filed. VIDED. (Distributed)
Apr 3 2015
Brief amici curiae of Public Advocate of the U.S., et al. filed. VIDED. (Distributed)
Apr 3 2015
Brief amicus curiae of State of Alabama filed. VIDED. (Distributed)
Apr 3 2015
Brief amicus curiae Idaho Governor C.L. "Butch" Otter filed. VIDED. (Distributed)
Apr 3 2015
Brief amicus curiae of Southeastern Legal Foundation filed. VIDED. (Distributed)
Apr 3 2015
Brief amici curiae of Earl M. Maltz, et al. filed. VIDED. (Distributed)
Apr 3 2015
Brief amici curiae of Jason Feliciano and Seventeen Pastors filed. VIDED. (Distributed)
p43
8-5-2015
44
Apr 3 2015
Brief amicus curiae of Judicial Watch, Inc. filed. VIDED. (Distributed)
Apr 3 2015
Brief amicus curiae of International Conference of Evangelical Endorsers filed. VIDED.

(Distributed)
Apr 3 2015
Brief amicus curiae of Lighted Candle Society filed. VIDED. (Distributed)
Apr 3 2015
Brief amicus curiae of Concerned Women for America filed. VIDED. (Distributed)
Apr 3 2015
Brief amici curiae of Institute for Marriage and Public Policy, et al. filed. VIDED.
(Distributed)
Apr 3 2015
Brief amici curiae of ProtectMarriage.com - Yes on 8, et al. filed. VIDED. (Distributed)
Apr 3 2015
Brief amici curiae of 57 Members of U.S. Congress filed. VIDED. (Distributed)
Apr 3 2015
Brief amicus curiae of Jon Simmons filed. VIDED. (Distributed)
Apr 3 2015
Brief amicus curiae of Texas Values filed. VIDED.(Distributed)
Apr 3 2015
Brief amici curiae of Dr. Judith Reisman, and Liberty Center for Child Protection filed.
Apr 3 2015
Brief amici curiae of Same-Sex Attracted Men and their Wives filed. VIDED. (Distributed)
Apr 3 2015
Brief amicus curiae of David Boyle filed. VIDED. (Distributed)
Apr 3 2015
Brief amicus curiae of Agudath Israel of America filed. VIDED. (Distributed)
Apr 17 2015
Reply of petitioners James Obergefell, et al. filed. (Distributed)
Apr 28 2015
Argued. For petitioners on Question 1: Mary L. Bonauto, Boston, Mass.; and Donald B.
Verrilli, Jr., Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D. C. (for United States,
as amicus curiae.) For respondents on Question 1: John J. Bursch, Special Assistant Attorney
General, Lansing, Mich. For petitioners on Question 2: Douglas Hallward-Driemeier,
Washington, D. C. For respondents on Question 2: Joseph F. Whalen, Associate Solicitor
p44
8-5-2015
45
General, Nashville, Tenn.
May 4 2015
Motion for leave to file amicus brief filed by Theodore Coates DENIED. VIDED.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lawrence_v._Texas
5
Lawrence v. Texas
From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
Jump to: navigation, search
Lawrence v. Texas
Supreme Court of the United States

Argued March 26, 2003
Decided June 26, 2003
Full case
name
John Geddes Lawrence and Tyron Garner v

Texas
Docket nos.
02-102
539 U.S. 558 (more)
Citations
123 S. Ct. 2472; 156 L. Ed. 2d 508; 2003

U.S. LEXIS 5013; 71 U.S.L.W. 4574; 2003
Cal. Daily Op. Service 5559; 2003 Daily
Journal DAR 7036; 16 Fla. L. Weekly Fed.
S 427
Defendants convicted, Harris County

Criminal Court (1999), rev'd, 2000 WL
729417 (Tex. App. 2000) (depublished),
Prior history
aff'd en banc, 41 S.W.3d 349 (Tex. App.
2001), review denied (Tex. App. 2002),
cert. granted, 537 U.S. 1044 (2002)
Subsequent
Complaint dismissed, 2003 WL 22453791,
p45
8-5-2015
46
history
2003 Tex. App. LEXIS 9191 (Tex. App.

2003)
Argument
Oral argument
Holding
A Texas law classifying consensual, adult homosexual

intercourse as illegal sodomy violated the privacy and
liberty of adults to engage in private intimate conduct under
the 14th Amendment. Texas state courts reversed and
charges dismissed.
Court membership
Chief Justice
William Rehnquist
Associate Justices
John P. Stevens Sandra Day O'Connor
Antonin Scalia Anthony Kennedy
David Souter Clarence Thomas
Ruth Bader Ginsburg Stephen Breyer
Case opinions
Majority
Kennedy, joined by Stevens, Souter,

Ginsburg, Breyer
Concurrence
O'Connor (in the judgment of the court

only)
Dissent
Scalia, joined by Rehnquist, Thomas
Dissent
Thomas
Laws applied
U.S. Const. amend. XIV; Tex. Penal Code 21.06(a) (2003)

This case overturned a previous ruling
Bowers v. Hardwick
p46
8-5-2015
47
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) is a landmark decision by the United States
Supreme Court. In the 63 ruling the Court struck down the sodomy law in Texas and, by
extension, invalidated sodomy laws in 13 other states, making same-sex sexual activity
legal in every U.S. state and territory. The Court overturned its previous ruling on the same
issue in the 1986 case Bowers v. Hardwick, where it upheld a challenged Georgia statute
and did not find a constitutional protection of sexual privacy.
Lawrence explicitly overruled Bowers, holding that it had viewed the liberty interest too
narrowly. The Court held that intimate consensual sexual conduct was part of the liberty
protected by substantive due process under the 14th Amendment. Lawrence invalidated
similar laws throughout the United States that criminalized sodomy between consenting
adults acting in private, whatever the sex of the participants.[1]
10
The case attracted much public attention, and a large number of amici curiae ("friends of
the court") briefs were filed. Its outcome was celebrated by gay rights advocates, who
hoped that further legal advances might result as a consequence.
Contents
15
[hide]
20
25
30
35
1 Background
2 History
2.1 Arrest of Lawrence and Garner
2.2 Prosecution and appeals
3 Consideration by the Supreme Court
4 Decision
4.1 Majority opinion
4.2 O'Connor's concurrence
4.3 Scalia's dissent
4.4 Thomas's dissent
5 Reactions
6 Subsequent cases
7 The level of scrutiny applied in Lawrence
8 Plaintiffs
9 See also
10 Footnotes
11 References
12 Further reading
13 External links
p47
8-5-2015
48
Background[edit]
10
15
20
25
30
35
Legal punishments for sodomy often included heavy fines and/or life prison sentences,
with some states, beginning with Illinois in 1827, denying other rights, such as suffrage, to
anyone convicted of the crime of sodomy.[2] In the late 19th and early 20th centuries,
several states imposed various eugenics laws against anyone deemed to be a "sexual
pervert".[citation needed] As late as 1970, Connecticut denied a driver's license to a man for being
an "admitted homosexual".[3]
As of 1960, every state had an anti-sodomy law.[4] In 1961, the American Law Institute's
Model Penal Code advocated repealing sodomy laws as they applied to private, adult,
consensual behavior.[5] Two years later the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) took
its first major case in opposition to these laws.[6] Most judges were largely unsympathetic to
the substantive due process claims raised.
In Griswold v. Connecticut (1965), the Supreme Court struck down a law barring the use of
contraceptives by married couples. In Griswold for the first time the Supreme Court
recognized, at least for married couples, a right to privacy,[7] drawing on the Fourth
Amendment's protection of private homes from searches and seizures without a warrant
based on probable cause, the Fourteenth Amendment's guarantee of due process of law in
the states, and the Ninth Amendment's assurance that rights not specified in the
Constitution are "retained by the people". Eisenstadt v. Baird (1972) expanded the scope of
sexual privacy rights to unmarried persons. In 1973, the choice whether to have an abortion
was found to be protected by the Constitution in Roe v. Wade.
In Bowers v. Hardwick (1986), the Supreme Court heard a constitutional challenge to
sodomy laws brought by a man who had been arrested, but was not prosecuted, for
engaging in oral sex with another man in his home. The Court rejected this challenge in a 5
to 4 decision. Justice Byron White's majority opinion emphasized that Eisenstadt and Roe
had only recognized a right to engage in procreative sexual activity, and that long-standing
moral antipathy toward homosexual sodomy was enough to argue against the notion of a
right to sodomy. Justice Blackmun, writing in dissent, argued that Eisenstadt held that the
Constitution protects people as individuals, not as family units.[8] He then reasoned that
because state intrusions are equally burdensome on an individual's personal life regardless
of his marital status or sexual orientation, then there is no reason to treat the rights of
citizens in same-sex couples any differently.[9]
By the time of the Lawrence decision, ten statesAlabama, Florida, Idaho, Louisiana,
Mississippi, North Carolina, South Carolina, Michigan, Utah and Virginiastill banned
consensual sodomy without respect to the sex of those involved, and fourTexas, Kansas,
Oklahoma and Missouriprohibited same-sex couples from engaging in anal and oral
sex.[4]
History[edit]
Arrest of Lawrence and Garner[edit]

40
45
On September 17, 1998, John Lawrence,[10][11] a gay 55-year-old medical technologist, was
hosting two gay acquaintances, Tyron Garner,[12] age 31, and Robert Eubanks,[13] 40, at his
apartment on the outskirts of Houston. Lawrence and Eubanks had been friends for more
than 20 years. Garner and Eubanks had a tempestuous on-again off-again romantic
relationship since 1990. Lacking transportation home, the couple were preparing to spend
the night. Eubanks, who had been drinking heavily, left to purchase a soda from a nearby
vending machine. Apparently outraged that Lawrence had been flirting with Garner, he
p48
8-5-2015
49
called police and reported "a black male going crazy with a gun" at Lawrence's
apartment.[14]
10
15
20
25
Four Harris County sheriff's deputies responded within minutes and Eubanks pointed them
to the apartment. They entered the unlocked apartment toward 11 p.m. with their weapons
drawn. In accordance with police procedures, the first to arrive, Joseph Quinn, took the
lead both in approaching the scene and later in determining what charges to bring. He later
reported seeing Lawrence and Garner having anal sex in the bedroom. A second officer
reported seeing them engaged in oral sex, and two others did not report seeing the pair
having sex. Lawrence did not acquiesce to the police. Instead he repeatedly challenged the
police for entering his home. Quinn had discretionary authority to charge them for a variety
of offenses and to determine whether to arrest them. When Quinn considered charging
them with having sex in violation of state law, he had to get an Assistant District Attorney
to check the statutes to be certain they covered sexual activity inside a residence. He was
told that Texas's anti-sodomy statute, the "Homosexual Conduct" law, made it a Class C
misdemeanor if someone "engages in deviate sexual intercourse with another individual of
the same sex".[15] The statute, Chapter 21, Sec. 21.06 of the Texas Penal Code, had been
adopted in 1973 when the state revised its criminal code to end its proscription on
heterosexual anal and oral intercourse.[16]
Quinn decided to arrest Lawrence and Garner and charge them with having "deviate sex".
In the opinion of the author of the most detailed account of the arrests, Quinn's decision
was likely driven by Lawrence's verbal abuse, along with some combination of Quinn's
negative response to homosexuality, the fact that Lawrence was white and Garner was
black, and the false gun report.[17] In the separate arrest reports he filed for each, he wrote
that he had seen the arrestee "engaged in deviate sexual conduct namely, anal sex, with
another man".[17] Lawrence and Garner were held in jail overnight. At a hearing the next
day, they pled not guilty to a charge of "homosexual conduct". They were released toward
midnight.[18] Eubanks pled no contest to charges of filing a false police report. He was
sentenced to 30 days in jail but released early.[19]
Prosecution and appeals[edit]

30
35
40
45
The gay rights advocates from Lambda Legal litigating the case convinced Lawrence and
Garner not to contest the charges and to plead no contest instead.[20] On November 20,
Lawrence and Garner pleaded no contest to the charges and waived their right to a trial.
Justice of the Peace Mike Parrott found them guilty and imposed a $100 fine and court
costs of $41.25 on each defendant. When the defense attorneys realized that the fine was
below the minimum required to permit them to appeal the convictions, they asked the judge
to impose a higher penalty. Parrott, well aware that the attorneys intended to use the case to
raise a constitutional challenge, increased it to $125 with the agreement of the
prosecutor.[21]
To appeal, Lawrence and Garner needed to have their cases tried in Texas Criminal Court.
Their attorneys asked the court to dismiss the charges against them on Fourteenth
Amendment equal protection grounds, claiming that the law was unconstitutional since it
prohibited sodomy between same-sex couples, but not between heterosexual couples. They
also asserted a right to privacy and that the Supreme Court's decision in Bowers v.
Hardwick that found no privacy protection for consensual sex between homosexuals was
"wrongly decided".[22] On December 22, Judge Sherman Ross denied the defense motions
to dismiss. The defendants again pled "no contest". Ross fined them $200 each, the amount
agreed upon in advance by both sides.[23]
p49
8-5-2015
50
A three-judge panel of the Texas Fourteenth Court of Appeals heard the case on November
3, 1999.[24] Their 21 decision issued on June 8, 2000, ruled the Texas law was
unconstitutional. Justice John S. Anderson and Chief Justice Paul Murphy found that the
law violated the 1972 Equal Rights Amendment to the Texas Constitution, which bars
discrimination based on sex, race, color, creed, or national origin. J. Harvey Hudson
dissented.[25] The Court of Appeals decided to review the case en banc. On March 15, 2001,
without hearing oral arguments, it reversed the three-judge panel's decision and upheld the
law's constitutionality 72, denying both the substantive due process and equal protection
arguments.[26] Attorneys for Lawrence and Garner asked the Texas Court of Criminal
Appeals, the highest appellate court in Texas for criminal matters, to review the case. After
a year's delay, on April 17, 2002, that request was denied. Lambda Legal's Harlow called
that decision "a major abdication of judicial responsibility". Bill Delmore, the Harris
County prosecutor who argued the case, called the judges "big chickens" and said: "They
have a history of avoiding the hot potato cases if they can."[27]
10
Consideration by the Supreme Court[edit]
15
In a petition for certiorari filed in the U.S. Supreme Court on July 16, 2002, Lambda Legal
attorneys asked the Court to consider:[28]
1.
Whether the petitioners' criminal convictions under the Texas "Homosexual Conduct"
lawwhich criminalizes sexual intimacy by same-sex couples, but not identical behavior
by different-sex couplesviolate the Fourteenth Amendment guarantee of equal protection
of the laws?
2.
Whether the petitioners' criminal convictions for adult consensual sexual intimacy in their
home violate their vital interests in liberty and privacy protected by the Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment?
20
25
30
35
40
45
3.
Whether Bowers v. Hardwick should be overruled?

On December 2, 2002, the Court agreed to hear the case. Lambda Legal coordinated the
submission of sixteen amicus curiae briefs to complement their own brief. Submitting
organizations included the American Bar Association, the American Psychological Society,
the American Public Health Association, the Cato Institute, the Log Cabin Republicans, a
group of history professors, and a group of religious denominations.[29] An op-ed in support
by former Sen. Alan Simpson appeared in The Wall Street Journal on the morning
scheduled for oral argument.[30] The attorneys for Texas did not control the amicus briefs
submitted in support of their position. Two were by noteworthy scholars, Jay Alan
Sekulow and Robert P. George, while the remainder represented religious and social
conservatism. Several, including that of Liberty Counsel, depicted homosexuals as selfdestructive, disease-prone, and promiscuous. The states of Alabama, South Carolina, and
Utah advised the Court that unlike heterosexual sodomy, homosexual sodomy had "severe
physical, emotional, psychological, and spiritual consequences".[31]
At oral argument on March 26, 2003, Paul M. Smith, an experienced litigator who had
argued eight cases before the Supreme Court, spoke on behalf of the plaintiffs.[32] Texas
Attorney General John Cornyn, then a candidate for the US Senate, refused to have his
office argue the case. Charles A. Rosenthal, District Attorney of Harris County,
represented the state.[33] His performance was later described as "the worst oral argument in
years", but some believe his lack of preparation reflected his lack of enthusiasm for the
statute he was defending.[34][35]
p50
8-5-2015
51
Decision[edit]
On June 26, 2003, the Supreme Court released its 63 decision striking down the Texas
statute. Five justices held it violated due process guarantees, and a sixth, Sandra Day
O'Connor, held it violated equal protection guarantees. The opinion overruled Bowers v.
Hardwick and implicitly invalidated similar sodomy statutes in 13 other states.
Majority opinion[edit]
10
15
20
25
30
35
Justice Anthony Kennedy wrote the majority opinion which Justices John Paul Stevens,
David Souter, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, and Stephen Breyer joined. The Court held that
homosexuals had a protected liberty interest to engage in private, sexual activity; that
homosexuals' moral and sexual choices were entitled to constitutional protection; and that
moral disapproval did not provide a legitimate justification for Texas's law criminalizing
sodomy.[36]
Kennedy wrote: "The petitioners [Lawrence and Garner] are entitled to respect for their
private lives. The State cannot demean their existence or control their destiny by making
their private sexual conduct a crime." Kennedy reviewed the assumption the court made in
Bowers, using the words of Chief Justice Burger's concurring opinion in that case, that
"Condemnation of [homosexual practices] is firmly rooted in Judeao-Christian moral and
ethical standards." He reviewed the history of legislation that criminalized certain sexual
practices, but without regard for the gender of those involved. He cited the Model Penal
Code's recommendations since 1955, the Wolfenden Report of 1963, and a 1981 decision
of the European Court of Human Rights.
He endorsed the views Justice Stevens had outlined in his dissent in Bowers and wrote:
"Bowers was not correct when it was decided, and it is not correct today. It ought not to
remain binding precedent. Bowers v. Hardwick should be and now is overruled." The
majority decision also held that the intimate, adult consensual conduct at issue here was
part of the liberty protected by the substantive component of the Fourteenth Amendment's
due process protections. Kennedy said that the Constitution protects "personal decisions
relating to marriage, procreation, contraception, family relationships, [and] child rearing"
and that homosexuals "may seek autonomy for these purposes."[37] Holding that "the Texas
statute furthers no legitimate state interest which can justify its intrusion into the personal
and private life of the individual", the court struck down the anti-sodomy law as
unconstitutional. Kennedy underscored the decision's focus on consensual adult sexual
conduct in a private setting:
The present case does not involve minors. It does not involve persons who might be injured
or coerced or who are situated in relationships where consent might not easily be refused. It
does not involve public conduct or prostitution. It does not involve whether the government
must give formal recognition to any relationship that homosexual persons seek to enter.[38]
O'Connor's concurrence[edit]
40
45
Justice Sandra Day O'Connor filed a concurring opinion in which she offered a different
rationale for invalidating the Texas sodomy statute. She disagreed with the overturning of
Bowersshe had been in the Bowers majorityand disputed the court's invocation of due
process guarantees of liberty in this context. Rather than including sexuality under
protected liberty, she would strike down the law as violating the equal protection clause
because it criminalized male-male but not male-female sodomy. O'Connor maintained that
a sodomy law that was neutral both in effect and application might be constitutional, but
that there was little to fear because "democratic society" would not tolerate it for long.
p51
8-5-2015
52
O'Connor noted that a law limiting marriage to heterosexual couples would pass the
rational scrutiny as long as it was designed to "preserv[e] the traditional institution of
marriage" and not simply based on the state's dislike of homosexual persons.
Scalia's dissent[edit]
5
10
15
Justice Antonin Scalia wrote a dissent, which Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist and
Justice Clarence Thomas joined. Scalia objected to the Court's decision to revisit Bowers,
pointing out many decisions from lower courts that relied on Bowers that might now need
to be reconsidered.[39] He noted that the same rationale used to overturn Bowers[40] could
have been used to overturn Roe v. Wade, which some of the Justices in the majority in
Lawrence had upheld in Planned Parenthood v. Casey (1992). Scalia also criticized the
majority opinion for failing to give the same respect to stare decisis that three of those in
the majority had insisted on in Casey.[41] O'Connor's concurrence noted that Scalia's dissent
conceded that if cases such as Romer v. Evans "have stare decisis effect, Texas sodomy
law would not pass scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause, regardless of the type of
rational basis review" applied.
Scalia wrote that if the court was not prepared to validate laws based on moral choices as it
had done in Bowers, state laws against bigamy, same-sex marriage, adult incest,
prostitution, masturbation, adultery, fornication, bestiality, and obscenity would not prove
sustainable.[42]
20
25
He wrote that:
Today's opinion is the product of a Court, which is the product of a law-profession culture,
that has largely signed on to the so-called homosexual agenda, by which I mean the agenda
promoted by some homosexual activists directed at eliminating the moral opprobrium that
has traditionally attached to homosexual conduct.... [T]he Court has taken sides in the
culture war, departing from its role of assuring, as neutral observer, that the democratic
rules of engagement are observed.
He cited the majority opinion's concern that the criminalization of sodomy could be the
basis for discrimination against homosexuals as evidence that the majority ignored the
views of most Americans:[43]
30
35
So imbued is the Court with the law profession's anti-anti-homosexual culture, that it is
seemingly unaware that the attitudes of that culture are not obviously "mainstream"; that in
most States what the Court calls "discrimination" against those who engage in homosexual
acts is perfectly legal.
He continued: "Let me be clear that I have nothing against homosexuals, or any other
group, promoting their agenda through normal democratic means." The majority's
"invention of a brand-new 'constitutional right'", he wrote, showed it was "impatient of
democratic change".
Thomas's dissent[edit]
40
Justice Thomas wrote in a separate dissent that the law the Court struck down was
"uncommonly silly", a phrase from Justice Potter Stewart's dissent in Griswold v.
Connecticut, but he voted to uphold it as he could find "no general right of privacy" or
relevant liberty in the Constitution. He added that if he were a member of the Texas
legislature he would vote to repeal the law.
p52
8-5-2015
53
Reactions[edit]
President Bush's press secretary Ari Fleischer refused to comment on the decision, noting
only that the administration had not filed a brief in the case. As governor, Bush had
opposed repeal of the Texas sodomy provision, which he called a "symbolic gesture of
traditional values".[44] After quoting Fleischer calling it "a state matter", Linda Greenhouse,
writing in The New York Times, commented: "In fact, the decision today...took what had
been a state-by-state matter and pronounced a binding national constitutional principle."[45]
15
The Lambda Legal's lead attorney in the case, Ruth Harlow, stated in an interview after the
ruling that "the court admitted its mistake in 1986, admitted it had been wrong then...and
emphasized today that gay Americans, like all Americans, are entitled to full respect and
equal claim to [all] constitutional rights."[46] Prof. Laurence Tribe has written that Lawrence
"may well be remembered as the Brown v. Board of Education of gay and lesbian
America".[47] Jay Alan Sekulow of the American Center for Law and Justice has referred to
the decision as having "changed the status of homosexual acts and changed a previous
ruling of the Supreme Court... this was a drastic rewrite".[48]
20
Peter LaBarbera, a senior policy analyst of the anti-LGBT group Culture and Family
Institute, later president of the anti-LGBT organization Americans for Truth about
Homosexuality, said that the end result of Lawrence v. Texas was "like the Roe v. Wade of
the homosexual issue".[49][50] The United States Conference of Catholic Bishops called the
decision "deplorable".[51]
10
25
30
Columbia Law Prof. Katherine M. Franke, in an analysis of Lawrence that appeared in

June 2004, criticized its "domesticated" conception of liberty that failed to present "a
robust concept of freedom". She contrasted it with the language of Planned Parenthood v.
Casey, which discussed "the right to define one's own concept of existence, of meaning, of
the universe, and of the mystery of human life". Lawrence's emphasis on geographical
privacy, in her view, described a circumscribed form of liberty and failed to develop the
court's evolving assertion of the right to autonomy and personal independence. Its
assumption, based on nothing in the record, that Lawrence and Garner were in a
relationship and had a personal bond leaves open the court's view of their right to express
their sexuality or fulfill erotic desires. She noted how a Kansas court in Limon v. Kansas
read Lawrence to allow far greater punishment for engaging in same-sex activity with a
minor than different-sex activity with a minor. She terms this "the legal enforcement of
heteronormative preferences".[52] The decision in Limon was later reversed, in part on the
basis of Lawrence.[53]
35
Subsequent cases[edit]
40
A few months later, on November 18, 2003, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court
ruled that same-sex couples have a right to marry. Though deciding the case on the basis of
the state constitution, Chief Justice Margaret Marshall quoted Lawrence in its second
paragraph: "Our obligation is to define the liberty of all, not to mandate our own moral
code."[54]
45
Upon rehearing Williams v. Pryor after Lawrence, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals
upheld Alabama's ban on the sale of sex toys.[55] Facing comparable facts, the Fifth Circuit
struck down Texas's sex toy ban holding that "morality is an insufficient justification for a
statute" and "interests in 'public morality' cannot constitutionally sustain the statute after
Lawrence".[56]
p53
8-5-2015
10
15
20
25
30
54
Lawrence invalidated age of consent laws that differed based on sexual orientation. The
day after the Lawrence decision, the Supreme Court ordered the State of Kansas to review
its 1999 "Romeo and Juliet" law that reduces the punishment for a teenager under 18 years
of age who has consensual sexual relations with a minor no more than four years their
junior, but explicitly excludes same-sex conduct from the sentence reduction.[57] In 2004,
the Kansas Appeals Court upheld the law as is, but the Kansas Supreme Court
unanimously reversed the lower court's ruling on October 21, 2005,[58] in State v. Limon.[59]
Subsequent federal and state case law has been quite explicit in limiting the scope of
Lawrence and upholding traditional state regulations on marriage, expressly allowing a
marriage-procreation link. (See Standhardt v. Superior Court ex rel County of Maricopa,
77 P.3d 451 (Ariz. App. 2003); Morrison v. Sadler, 821 N.E.2d 15 (Ind. App. 2005);
Hernandez v Robles (7 NY3d 338 2005).) In Muth v. Frank, 412 F.3d 808 (7th Cir. 2005),
the Seventh Circuit declined to extend Lawrence to cases of consensual adult incest,
although it did say that Lawrence v. Texas was "a new substantive rule and [...] thus
retroactive". The case was distinguished because parties were not similarly situated since
there is in the latter case an enhanced possibility of genetic mutation of a possible
offspring.
In Martin v. Ziherl, the Supreme Court of Virginia ruled the state's fornication law
unconstitutional.[60] In the Holm case a polygamist attempted without success to use
Lawrence to overturn Utah's laws banning these polygamous relationships. The Supreme
Court refused to hear his plea.[61] The Connecticut Supreme Court rejected an argument
based on Lawrence that a teacher had a constitutional right to engage in sexual activity
with his female students.[62][63]
The United States Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces, the last court of appeals for
Courts-Martial before the Supreme Court, has ruled that Lawrence applies to Article 125 of
the Uniform Code of Military Justice, the article banning sodomy. It has also twice upheld
prosecutions under Article 125 when applied as necessary to preserve good order and
discipline in the armed forces.[64][65]
Judge Vaughn Walker cited Scalia's dissent in his decision in Perry v. Brown that found
California's Proposition 8 banning same-sex marriage unconstitutional.[66]
The level of scrutiny applied in Lawrence[edit]
35
Justice Scalia and others[who?] have noted that the majority did not appear to apply the strict
scrutiny standard of review that would be appropriate if the Lawrence majority had
recognized a full-fledged "fundamental right". He wrote the majority, instead, applied "an
unheard-of form of rational basis review that will have far-reaching implications beyond
this case".[67]
40
Nan D. Hunter has argued that Lawrence used a new method of substantive due process
analysis, and that the Court intended to abandon its old method of categorizing due process
rights as either "fundamental" or "not fundamental" as too restrictive.[68] Justice Souter, for
example, argued in Washington v. Glucksberg that the role of the Court in all cases,
including unenumerated rights cases, is to ensure that the government's action has not been
arbitrary.[69] Justice Stevens has repeatedly criticized tiered scrutiny and prefers a more
active judicial balancing test based on reasonability.[70]
45
Lower courts have read Lawrence differently on the question of scrutiny. In Lofton v.
Secretary of the Department of Children and Family Services the United States Court of
Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit upheld a state law barring adoption of children by
p54
8-5-2015
55
homosexuals, holding explicitly that Lawrence did not apply strict scrutiny.[71] In Witt v.
Department of the Air Force, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held
that Lawrence applied intermediate scrutiny.[72]
Plaintiffs[edit]
5
John Lawrence died of complications from a heart ailment in 2011, aged 68.[73] Tyron
Garner died of meningitis in 2006, aged 39, and Robert Eubanks was beaten to death in
2000, in a case which was never solved.[74]
See also[edit]
10
Sodomy laws in the United States
LGBT rights in the United States
List of sex-related court cases in the United States
2003 in LGBT rights
Baker v. Wade
Law portal
LGBT portal
Government of the United States portal
Texas portal
Houston portal
Footnotes[edit]
15
1.
Jump up ^ 15 Geo. Mason U. C.R. L.J. 105 20042005; 102 Mich. L. Rev. 1555 20032004
2.
Jump up ^ de la Croix, St. Sukie (2012). Chicago Whispers: A History of LGBT Chicago Before
Stonewall. University of Wisconsin Press. p. 248. ISBN 9780299286934. Retrieved January 29, 2015.
3.
Jump up ^ "Homosexual To Fight Denial of Car License". The Day. November 2, 1972.
4.
^ Jump up to: a b The New York Times: Supreme Court Strikes Down Texas Law Banning
20
Sodomy", June 26, 2003, accessed July 16, 2012

5.
Jump up ^ Illinois in 1961 became the first state to repeal its sodomy law. Laws of Illinois 1961,
page 1983, enacted July 28, 1961, effective Jan. 1, 1962. The History of Sodomy Laws in the United States:
Illinois.
6.
Jump up ^ "ACLU and the History of LGBT Rights & HIV/AIDS". American Civil Liberties
Union. March 26, 2006. Retrieved December 14, 2012.
25
7.
Jump up ^ "Opinion of the Court (Griswold v. Connecticut)". Law.cornell.edu. Retrieved May 2,

2010.
30
8.
Jump up ^ Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. at 453.
9.
Jump up ^ Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U. S. at 219.
10.
Jump up ^ John Geddes Lawrence, August 2, 1943 November 20, 2011. MetroWeekly: Chris
Geidner, "John Geddes Lawrence, of Lawrence v. Texas, Has Died at 68", December 23, 2011, accessed
May 9, 2012
p55
8-5-2015
56
11.
Jump up ^ Liptak, Adam (December 23, 2011). "John Lawrence, Plaintiff in Gay Rights Case,
Dies at 68". The New York Times.
12.
Jump up ^ July 10, 1967 September 11, 2006. New York Times: "Tyron Garner, 39, Plaintiff in
Pivotal Sodomy Case, Dies", September 14, 2006, accessed September 14, 2006
13.
Jump up ^ Robert Royce Eubanks, July 22, 1958October 14, 2000. Social Security Death Index
14.
Jump up ^ Though Eubanks' report was false, it gave the police probable cause to enter
Lawrence's home.
15.
Jump up ^ "Section 21.06 Was Declared Unconstitutional by Lawrence v. Texas, 123 S.Ct. 2472.
Title 5. Offenses Against the Person Chapter 21. Sexual Offenses". Statutes.legis.state.tx.us. Retrieved May
2, 2010.
16.
Jump up ^ Carpenter, Dale (2012). Flagrant Conduct: The Story of Lawrence v. Texas. New
York: W. W. Norton & Company. pp. 1112. ISBN 978-0-393-06208-3. OCLC 761383909.
10
15
17.
^ Jump up to: a b Carpenter, Flagrant Conduct, 83
18.
Jump up ^ Carpenter, Flagrant Conduct, 1134
19.
20.
20
25
30
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
Jump up ^ Carpenter, Flagrant Conduct, 173, 175
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
Jump up ^ Carpenter, Flagrant Conduct, 211 ff.
33.
34.
35
Jump up ^ Lithwick, Dahlia (March 12, 2012). "Extreme Makeover: The story behind the story of
Lawrence v. Texas". The New Yorker. Retrieved March 9, 2012.
Jump up ^ Mark Tushnet, A Court Divided: The Rehnquist Court and the Future of
Constitutional Law (NY: W.W. Norton, 2005), 16970
35.
Jump up ^ Carpenter, Flagrant Conduct, 18991, 2146, 23447
36.
Jump up ^ Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003), at 564, 571.
37.
Jump up ^ Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003), at 574.
38.
Jump up ^ Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 578 (2003). Page 21 of the decision.
p56
8-5-2015
57
39.
Jump up ^ Williams v. Pryor, which upheld Alabama's prohibition on the sale of sex toys; Milner
v. Apfel, which asserted that "legislatures are permitted to legislate with regard to morality...rather than
confined to preventing demonstrable harms"; Holmes v. California Army National Guard, which upheld the
federal statute and regulations banning from military service those who engage in homosexual conduct;
Owens v. State, 352 Md. 663, which held that "a person has no constitutional right to engage in sexual
intercourse, at least outside of marriage."
40.
Jump up ^ He summarized the majority's criteria as: looking to (1) "whether its foundations have
been 'eroded' by subsequent decisions; (2) it has been subject to 'substantial and continuing' criticism; (3) it
has not induced 'individual or societal reliance'".
41.
Jump up ^ Scalia noted that in Casey stare decisis was of the utmost importance because of the
divisive nature of the case. The majority in Lawrence, he wrote, "do[es] not bother to distinguishor
indeed, even bother to mentionthe paean to stare decisis coauthored by three Members of today's
majority in Planned Parenthood v. Casey. There, when stare decisis meant preservation of judicially
invented abortion rights, the widespread criticism of Roe was strong reason to reaffirm it." He continued:
"Today, however, the widespread opposition to Bowers, a decision resolving an issue as 'intensely divisive'
as the issue in Roe, is offered as a reason in favor of overruling it."
42.
Jump up ^ For a critique of this argument, see Ruth E. Sternglantz, "Raining on the Parade of
Horribles: Of Slippery Slopes, Faux Slopes, and Justice Scalia's Dissent in Lawrence V. Texas", University
of Pennsylvania Law Review, vol. 153, no. 3 (January 2005), esp. 111820.
43.
Jump up ^ He denied any value to foreign law, too: see Quaderni costituzionali n. 2/2006, p. 294,
at (Italian) Diritto straniero e Corte suprema.
10
15
20
44.
25
45.
Jump up ^ The New York Times: Linda Greenhouse, "Justices, 6-3, Legalize Gay Sexual Conduct
in Sweeping Reversal of Court's '86 Ruling", June 27, 2003, accessed July 16, 2012
46.
Jump up ^ "Interview With Ruth Harlow". CNN. June 26, 2003. Retrieved May 2, 2010.
47.
Jump up ^ Tribe, Laurence H. (2004). "Lawrence v. Texas: The 'Fundamental Right' That Dare
Not Speak Its Name". Harvard Law Review. 117:189495.
48.
Jump up ^ Sekulow, Jay Alan (July 26, 2004). "Ask Jay: Today's Question: Do homosexuals now
have protected-class status?". American Center for Law and Justice. Archived from the original on October
1, 2004. Retrieved May 2, 2010.
49.
Jump up ^ Robertson, Tatsha (June 27, 2003). "Gays, Lesbians Praise Decision Others Compare
It to Roe v. Wade". The Boston Globe. National/Foreign p. A28. Retrieved February 16, 2011.
50.
Jump up ^ Shapiro, Ari. (October 13, 2006). "Gay Republicans Feel Heat from the Foley
Scandal". All Things Considered. National Public Radio. Retrieved February 16, 2011.
30
35
51.
52.
Jump up ^ Katherine M. Franke, "The Domesticated Liberty of Lawrence v. Texas", Columbia

Law Review, vol. 104, no. 5 (June 2004), esp. 14014, 14089, 14113. For a related discussion of the
jurisprudence of sexual freedom and same-sex marriage, see Ariela R. Dubler, "From McLaughlin v.
Florida to Lawrence v. Texas: Sexual Freedom and the Road to Marriage", Columbia Law Review, vol.
106, no. 5 (June 2006), 116587.
53.
Jump up ^ Kansas Courts: State v. Limon, October 21, 2005, accessed July 16, 2012: "we are
directed in our equal protection analysis by the United States Supreme Court's holding in Lawrence that
moral disapproval of a group cannot be a legitimate governmental interest".
54.
Jump up ^ The New York Times: Linda Greenhouse, "Supreme Court Paved Way for Marriage
Ruling With Sodomy Law Decision", November 19, 2003, accessed July 16, 2012
55.
Jump up ^ Williams v. Attorney General of Alabama, 378 F.3d 1232 (11th Cir. 2004)
40
45
56.
Jump up ^ Reliable Consultants, Inc., v. Earle, 517 F.3d 738 (5th Cir. 2008)
p57
8-5-2015
58
57.
58.
Jump up ^ American Civil Liberties Union of Kansas and Western Missouri
59.
Jump up ^ 280 Kan. 275, 122 P.3d 22 (2005)
60.
61.
63.
Jump up ^ "Jud.state.ce.us" (PORTABLE DOCUMENT FORMAT; REQUIRES ADOBE READER).

Retrieved May 2, 2010.
64.
Jump up ^ "U. S. v. Marcum". Armfor.uscourts.gov. Retrieved May 2, 2010.
65.
Jump up ^ "U. S. v. Stirewalt". Armfor.uscourts.gov. Retrieved May 2, 2010.
66.
Jump up ^ Perry v. Schwarzenegger Page 63 item 21 c [1]
67.
Jump up ^ Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. at 586.
68.
Jump up ^ Hunter, Nan D. (2004). "Living with Lawrence". Minnesota Law Review. 88:1104.
This interpretation is more consistent with the open-ended balancing style that the more liberal justices
have consistently advocated. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriquez, 411 U.S. 1, 98 (Marshall, J.,
dissenting) (showing "disagreement with the Court's rigidified approach to equal protection analysis").
69.
Jump up ^ Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997) (Souter, J., concurring).
70.
Jump up ^ City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 451 (1985) (Stevens, J.,
concurring): "I have never been persuaded that these so-called 'standards' adequately explain the decisional
process."
71.
Jump up ^ Lofton v. Secretary of the Department of Children & Family Services, 358 F.3d 804
(United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit 2004).
72.
30
Jump up ^ State v. Holm, 137 P.3d 726, 73840 (Utah 2006), cert. denied, 127 S.Ct. 1371 (2007).
Jump up ^ "Privacy Ruled Out In Sex Case". Hartford Courant. February 21, 2007. Archived
from the original on February 23, 2007. Retrieved December 14, 2012.
20
25
Jump up ^ Grossmann, Johanna (January 25, 2005). "Virginia Strikes Down State Fornication
Law". CNN. Retrieved May 9, 2012.
62.
10
15
Jump up ^ Sealey, Geraldine (January 17, 2003). "Imprisoned Teen Challenges Kansas Romeo
and Juliet Law". Sodomy Laws: Gay & Lesbian Archives of the Pacific Northwest. ABC News. Archived
from the original on December 12, 2008. Retrieved December 14, 2012.
Jump up ^ Witt v. Department of the Air Force, No. 06-35644.
73.
Jump up ^ "John Lawrence, Plaintiff in Gay Rights Case, Dies at 68". New York Times.
December 23, 2011.
74.
Jump up ^ "Tyron Garner, 39, Plaintiff in Pivotal Sodomy Case, Dies". New York Times.
September 15, 2006.
References[edit]
35
Official oral arguments (Transcript)
Reading of opinion (Transcript)
Oral arguments (MP3 file)
Reading of opinion (MP3 file)
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003)
Text file of Supreme Court opinion at Findlaw.com
Works related to Lawrence v. Texas at Wikisource
p58
8-5-2015
59
Further reading[edit]
10
15
Carpenter, Dale (2003). "The Unknown Past of Lawrence v. Texas". Michigan Law
Review (The Michigan Law Review Association) 102 (7): 1464. doi:10.2307/4141912.
JSTOR 4141912.
Haider-Markel, Donald P. (2003). "Media Coverage of Lawrence v. Texas: An Analysis

of Content, Tone, and Frames in National and Local News Reporting" (PDF).
Lithwick, Dahlia (March 12, 2012). "Extreme Makeover: The Story Behind the Story of
Lawrence v. Texas". The New Yorker. Retrieved July 15, 2012. A lengthy review of
Carpenter, Flagrant Conduct.
Richards, David A.J. (2009). The Sodomy Cases: Bowers v. Hardwick and Lawrence v.
Texas. University Press of Kansas.
Tribe, Laurence H. (2003). "Lawrence v. Texas: The Fundamental Right That Dare Not
Speak Its Name". Harvard Law Review (The Harvard Law Review Association) 117 (6):
18931955. doi:10.2307/4093306. JSTOR 4093306.
Tushnet, Mark (2008). I Dissent: Great Opposing Opinions in Landmark Supreme Court
Cases. Boston: Beacon Press. pp. 211220. ISBN 978-0-8070-0036-6.
Wilkes Jr., Donald E. (2003). Lawrence v. Texas: An Historic Human Rights Victory.
External links[edit]
Wikisource has original text related to this article:
Lawrence v. Texas
Text of Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) is available from:

Findlaw Justia resource.org OpenJurist
Sodomylaws.org
The Invasion of Sexual Privacy
20
[hide]
LGBT rights in the United States

By entity
State
Alabama
Alaska
Arizona
p59
8-5-2015
60
Arkansas
California
Colorado
Connecticut
Delaware
Florida
Georgia
Hawaii
Idaho
Illinois
Indiana
Iowa
Kansas
Kentucky
Louisiana
Maine
Maryland
Massachusetts
Michigan
Minnesota
Mississippi
p60
8-5-2015
61
Missouri
Montana
Nebraska
Nevada
New Hampshire
New Jersey
New Mexico
New York
North Carolina
North Dakota
Ohio
Oklahoma
Oregon
Pennsylvania
Rhode Island
South Carolina
South Dakota
Tennessee
Texas
Utah
Vermont
p61
8-5-2015
62
Virginia
Washington
West Virginia
Wisconsin
Wyoming
American
Samoa
District of
Columbia
Guam
Northern
Insular area
Mariana Islands
Puerto Rico
U.S. Virgin
Islands
By type
Same-sex unions
Marriage
Civil union
Domestic partnership
by municipal areas
Sexual orientation and the United
p62
8-5-2015
63
States military
o
Blue discharge
Don't ask, don't tell
2010 repeal
LGBT adoption in the United States
LGBT employment discrimination

in the United States
by municipality
Legal aspects of transsexualism in
the United States
State laws and

constitutional amendments
U.S. state constitutional

amendments banning same-sex
unions
Hate crime laws in the United States
Sodomy laws in the United States
Defense of Marriage Act
Matthew Shepard and James Byrd,
Federal laws and decisions
Jr. Hate Crimes Prevention Act
Romer v. Evans
Lawrence v. Texas
United States v. Windsor
p63
8-5-2015
64
Federal Marriage Amendment

(proposed)
Employment Non-Discrimination
Act (proposed)
See also
LGBT movements in the United

States
<img src="//en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Special:CentralAutoLogin/start?type=1x1" alt=""

title="" width="1" height="1" style="border: none; position: absolute;" />
Retrieved from
"http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Lawrence_v._Texas&oldid=659722017"
Categories:
10
15
2003 in LGBT history
2003 in Texas
2003 in United States case law
American Civil Liberties Union litigation
LGBT in Texas
United States privacy case law
United States equal protection case law
United States LGBT rights case law
United States substantive due process case law
United States Supreme Court cases
United States Supreme Court cases of the Rehnquist Court
United States Supreme Court decisions that overrule a prior Supreme Court decision
Harris County, Texas
20
https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/539/558/
Justia U.S. Law U.S. Case Law U.S. Supreme Court Volume 539 Lawrence v. Texas
Syllabus
p64
8-5-2015
65
Lawrence
539 U.S. 558 (2003)
v.
Texas
Annotate this Case

5
Opinion
PDF
Annotation
Syllabus
Case
OCTOBER TERM, 2002
10
Syllabus
LAWRENCE ET AL. v. TEXAS
CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TEXAS, FOURTEENTH DISTRICT
No. 02-102. Argued March 26, 2003-Decided June 26, 2003
15
20
Responding to a reported weapons disturbance in a private residence, Houston police

entered petitioner Lawrence's apartment and saw him and another adult man, petitioner
Garner, engaging in a private, consensual sexual act. Petitioners were arrested and
convicted of deviate sexual intercourse in violation of a Texas statute forbidding two
persons of the same sex to engage in certain intimate sexual conduct. In affirming, the State
Court of Appeals held, inter alia, that the statute was not unconstitutional under the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The court considered Bowers v. Hardwick,
478 U. S. 186, controlling on that point.
Held: The Texas statute making it a crime for two persons of the same sex to engage in
certain intimate sexual conduct violates the Due Process Clause. pp. 564-579.
25
30
35
40
(a) Resolution of this case depends on whether petitioners were free as adults to engage in
private conduct in the exercise of their liberty under the Due Process Clause. For this
inquiry the Court deems it necessary to reconsider its Bowers holding. The Bowers Court's
initial substantive statement-"The issue presented is whether the Federal Constitution
confers a fundamental right upon homosexuals to engage in sodomy ... ," 478 U. S., at 190discloses the Court's failure to appreciate the extent of the liberty at stake. To say that the
issue in Bowers was simply the right to engage in certain sexual conduct demeans the claim
the individual put forward, just as it would demean a married couple were it said that
marriage is just about the right to have sexual intercourse. Although the laws involved in
Bowers and here purport to do no more than prohibit a particular sexual act, their penalties
and purposes have more far-reaching consequences, touching upon the most private human
conduct, sexual behavior, and in the most private of places, the home. They seek to control
a personal relationship that, whether or not entitled to formal recognition in the law, is
within the liberty of persons to choose without being punished as criminals. The liberty
protected by the Constitution allows homosexual persons the right to choose to enter upon
relationships in the confines of their homes and their own private lives and still retain their
dignity as free persons. Pp. 564-567.
[559]
p65
8-5-2015
10
15
20
25
30
35
66
(b) Having misapprehended the liberty claim presented to it, the Bowers Court stated that
proscriptions against sodomy have ancient roots. 478 U. S., at 192. It should be noted,
however, that there is no longstanding history in this country of laws directed at
homosexual conduct as a distinct matter. Early American sodomy laws were not directed at
homosexuals as such but instead sought to prohibit nonprocreative sexual activity more
generally, whether between men and women or men and men. Moreover, early sodomy
laws seem not to have been enforced against consenting adults acting in private. Instead,
sodomy prosecutions often involved predatory acts against those who could not or did not
consent: relations between men and minor girls or boys, between adults involving force,
between adults implicating disparity in status, or between men and animals. The
longstanding criminal prohibition of homosexual sodomy upon which Bowers placed such
reliance is as consistent with a general condemnation of nonprocreative sex as it is with an
established tradition of prosecuting acts because of their homosexual character. Far from
possessing "ancient roots," ibid., American laws targeting same-sex couples did not
develop until the last third of the 20th century. Even now, only nine States have singled out
samesex relations for criminal prosecution. Thus, the historical grounds relied upon in
Bowers are more complex than the majority opinion and the concurring opinion by Chief
Justice Burger there indicated. They are not without doubt and, at the very least, are
overstated. The Bowers Court was, of course, making the broader point that for centuries
there have been powerful voices to condemn homosexual conduct as immoral, but this
Court's obligation is to define the liberty of all, not to mandate its own moral code, Planned
Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U. S. 833, 850. The Nation's laws and
traditions in the past half century are most relevant here. They show an emerging
awareness that liberty gives substantial protection to adult persons in deciding how to
conduct their private lives in matters pertaining to sex. See County of Sacramento v. Lewis,
523 U. S. 833, 857. Pp. 567-573.
(c) Bowers' deficiencies became even more apparent in the years following its
announcement. The 25 States with laws prohibiting the conduct referenced in Bowers are
reduced now to 13, of which 4 enforce their laws only against homosexual conduct. In
those States, including Texas, that still proscribe sodomy (whether for same-sex or
heterosexual conduct), there is a pattern of nonenforcement with respect to consenting
adults acting in private. Casey, supra, at 851-which confirmed that the Due Process Clause
protects personal decisions relating to marriage, procreation, contraception, family
relationships, child rearing, and education-and Romer v. Evans,517 U. S. 620, 624-which
struck down class-based legislation directed at homosexuals-cast Bow[560]
40
45
ers' holding into even more doubt. The stigma the Texas criminal statute imposes,
moreover, is not trivial. Although the offense is but a minor misdemeanor, it remains a
criminal offense with all that imports for the dignity of the persons charged, including
notation of convictions on their records and on job application forms, and registration as
sex offenders under state law. Where a case's foundations have sustained serious erosion,
criticism from other sources is of greater significance. In the United States, criticism of
Bowers has been substantial and continuing, disapproving of its reasoning in all respects,
not just as to its historical assumptions. And, to the extent Bowers relied on values shared
with a wider civilization, the case's reasoning and holding have been rejected by the
European Court of Human Rights, and that other nations have taken action consistent with
an affirmation of the protected right of homosexual adults to engage in intimate,
consensual conduct. There has been no showing that in this country the governmental
interest in circumscribing personal choice is somehow more legitimate or urgent. Stare
p66
8-5-2015
10
15
20
67
decisis is not an inexorable command. Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 828. Bowers'
holding has not induced detrimental reliance of the sort that could counsel against
overturning it once there are compelling reasons to do so. Casey, supra, at 855856.
Bowers causes uncertainty, for the precedents before and after it contradict its central
holding. Pp. 573577.
(d) Bowers' rationale does not withstand careful analysis. In his dissenting opinion in
Bowers JUSTICE STEVENS concluded that (1) the fact a State's governing majority has
traditionally viewed a particular practice as immoral is not a sufficient reason for upholding
a law prohibiting the practice, and (2) individual decisions concerning the intimacies of
physical relationships, even when not intended to produce offspring, are a form of liberty
protected by due process. That analysis should have controlled Bowers, and it controls
here. Bowers was not correct when it was decided, is not correct today, and is hereby
overruled. This case does not involve minors, persons who might be injured or coerced,
those who might not easily refuse consent, or public conduct or prostitution. It does involve
two adults who, with full and mutual consent, engaged in sexual practices common to a
homosexual lifestyle. Petitioners' right to liberty under the Due Process Clause gives them
the full right to engage in private conduct without government intervention. Casey, supra,
at 847. The Texas statute furthers no legitimate state interest which can justify its intrusion
into the individual's personal and private life. Pp. 577-579.
41 S. W. 3d 349, reversed and remanded.
[561]
25
30
KENNEDY J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which STEVENS, SOUTER,
GINSBURG, and BREYER, JJ., joined. O'CONNOR, J., filed an opinion concurring in the
judgment, post, p. 579. SCALIA, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which REHNQUIST, C.
J., and THOMAS, J., joined, post, p. 586. THOMAS, J., filed a dissenting opinion, post, p.
605.
Disclaimer: Official Supreme Court case law is only found in the print version of the
United States Reports. Justia case law is provided for general informational purposes only,
and may not reflect current legal developments, verdicts or settlements. We make no
warranties or guarantees about the accuracy, completeness, or adequacy of the information
contained on this site or information linked to from this site. Please check official sources.
END QUOTE ARTICLE AND ADDITIONS
35
I look forwards to your reply addressing the issues I raised.

This document is not intended and neither must be perceived to refer to all details/issues.

40
(
Awaiting your response,
G. H. Schorel-Hlavka O. W. B. (Friends call me Gerrit)
p67
8-5-2015

20150508-g. H. Schorel-Hlavka O.W.B. To MR Tony Abbott Pm-Re The Marriage Issue

Загружено:

Сведения о документе

Оригинальное название

Авторское право

Доступные форматы

Поделиться этим документом

Поделиться или встроить документ

Параметры публикации

Этот документ был вам полезен?

Это неприемлемый материал?

Авторское право:

Доступные форматы

20150508-g. H. Schorel-Hlavka O.W.B. To MR Tony Abbott Pm-Re The Marriage Issue

Загружено:

Авторское право:

Доступные форматы

1

CONSIDER TWO PEOPLE GOING TO GET MARRIED AND BOTH PURPORT TO BE

Hansard 22-2-1898 Constitution Convention Debates

As such, a marriage is constitutionally a civil contract or a partnership.

As this is a constitution power for the Commonwealth of Australia to legislate as to marriages

Hansard 27-1-1898 Constitution Convention Debates

As such any State/Territory legislation as to same-sex relationships must be deemed

The Hon. J.H. CARRUTHERS: Sub-clause 26 provides for that!

For those interested in the Norrie case about non-specific

Gerrit Hendrik Schorel-Hlavka O.W.B.

Gerrit Hendrik Schorel-Hlavka O.W.B.

Gerrit Hendrik Schorel-Hlavka O.W.B.

END QUOTE 11-4-2014 CORRESPONDENCE

QUOTE 12-4-2014 CORRESPONDENCE

NSW Registrar of Births, Deaths and Marriages v Norrie

(a) who is an Australian citizen or permanent resident of Australia, and

The course of proceedings

MAY JUSTICE ALWAYS PREVAIL

Our name is our motto!)

A sex affirmation procedure is defined in s 32A as:

MAY JUSTICE ALWAYS PREVAIL

Our name is our motto!)

CONSIDER TWO PEOPLE GOING TO GET MARRIED AND BOTH PURPORT TO BE

Same-sex marriage cases misframed

Opinion Vote Author Term

Apr 28, 2015

A view from the Courtroom, Same-Sex Marriage Edition

Preview on same-sex marriage -- Part II, The states' views

Symposium: Lets be clear the marriage bans are about animus

Proceedings and Orders

Brief of respondent Richard Hodges, Director, Ohio Department of Health filed.

Brief amici curiae of Colage; Equality Federation, et al. filed. VIDED.

Brief amici curiae of 76 Scholars of Marriage filed. VIDED.

Reply of petitioners James Obergefell, et al. filed.

DISTRIBUTED for Conference of January 9, 2015.

DISTRIBUTED for Conference of January 16, 2015.

Brief of petitioners James Obergefell, et al. filed.

Brief amicus curiae of The County of Cuyahoga, Ohio filed.

Brief amici curiae of Outserve-Servicemembers Legal Defense Network, et al. filed.

Brief amicus curiae of Hawaii filed. VIDED.

Brief amicus curiae of Indiana University filed. VIDED.

Brief amicus curiae of BiLaw filed. VIDED.

Brief amici curiae of Equality Ohio, et al. filed. VIDED.

Brief amici curiae of California Council of Churches, et al. filed. VIDED.

Brief amici curiae of Conflict of Law Scholars filed. VIDED.

Brief amici curiae of Kenneth B. Mehlman, et al. filed. VIDED.

Brief amicus curiae of The Organization of American Historians filed. VIDED.

Brief amicus curiae of Institute for Justice filed. VIDED.

Brief amici curiae of GLMA, et al. filed. VIDED.

Brief amicus curiae of American Sociological Association filed. VIDED.

Brief amicus curiae of Virginia filed. VIDED.

SET FOR ARGUMENT ON Tuesday, April 28, 2015

Brief amicus curiae of Constitutional Accountability Center filed. VIDED.

Brief amici curiae of Kristin M. Perry, et al. filed. VIDED.

Brief amicus curiae of United States filed. VIDED.

Brief amici curiae of American Psychological Association, et al. filed. VIDED.

Brief amici curiae of Anti-Defamation League, et al. filed. VIDED.

Brief amicus curiae of PFLAG, Inc. filed. VIDED.

Brief amici curiae of The Donaldson Adoption Institute, et al. filed.

Brief amicus curiae of The Liberty Education Forum filed. VIDED.

Brief amici curiae of Lawrence J. Korb, et al. filed. VIDED.

Brief amicus curiae of Legal Services NYC filed. VIDED.

Brief amici curiae of Family Law Scholars filed. VIDED.