Should the sciences adopt

Poppers falsificationism?
In this paper, I will argue that the sciences should not adopt Poppers
fasificationism. While Poppers falsificationism provides a tool to test a
theory deductively and to distinguish science from pseudo-science, it does
not bypass all the problems of induction as it still relies on a timedependent assumption of uniformity. Secondly, one can never reach the
truth science aims at by using Poppers account.
To this end, I will firstly explain the problem of induction. Secondly, I
will showcase Poppers reasons for proposing falsification as a scientific
tool and guide for distinguishing science from pseudo-science and as a
means for gaining scientific knowledge. I will object to Poppers view by
showing that even if falsification is adopted in the sciences, the disproval
of any theory will be temporally bounded, as any finding (as a result of
falsification) would still rely on a principle of uniformity in order for it to be
established. Secondly, Poppers account falls short of what is required for
a method of science, as it cannot provide definite answers on what is the
case, but only on what is not the case at time t.
When distinguishing relations of ideas (a priori necessities) from
matters of fact (a posteriori contingencies), Hume shows that while
associating ideas a priori, one is bounded by deductive proofs (unpacking
of definitions through demonstration), in the case of matters of fact,
reasoning is based on inductive inference (Enquiry, IV, 1-2). Unlike
deductive arguments, inductive inferences cannot establish proofs. This is
the case as firstly, any inductive arguments truth depends on how the
world actually is and secondly, any inductive argument suffers from
underdetermination (i.e., the premises leave open for other possibilities)

PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE

(Lipton, Induction, 6). Let us take an example: all swans are white because
all the swans that have been observed are white. The underdetermination
arises from the jump between the premises to the conclusion: while I may
have observed 455 000 swans that are white, this cannot prove that all
swans are white as I havent seen all swans. This leaves open the
possibility of there being a swan that is black. Hume correctly maintains
that the connection between swans and whiteness that makes us
conclude that all swans are white arises from the experience of constant
conjoining of the former with the latter (Enquiry, IV, 4-5). However, the
jump between constant conjoining (in the form of the 455 000
observations in our case) to a generalization (all swans are white), can
only rely on an unjustified principle: the expectation of uniformity. This
means that, when making inferences, one relies on the belief that all
nature is uniform to breach the gap between observation and generality.
Without this belief, one cannot suppose that an observation would be
generalized: purple and green swans could lay about, waiting to be
discovered. However, the added premise (nature is uniform) cannot be
justified either deductively (as there is no analytic way to establish this,
short of observing all nature) or inductively (as it is circular because any
inductive argument needs the uniformity principle).
The only way1 for justifying our inferences is by abiding to the
principle of best explanation: It is reasonable to conclude that all swans
are white on the basis of our observations as it is the best explanation to
our findings. However, even if this can be admitted, there seem to be
problems associated with it. How many observations would one need to
be justified to conclude that all swans are white? 100? 1000? Secondly,
how can one be justified in concluding something in light of the possibility
of there being other, yet undiscovered, findings that make a different
explanation more coherent with the observations? Newtons law of gravity
was coherent with its findings but was replaced by Einsteins theory. It is
perfectly conceivable that Einsteins theory could be superseded by a
1 I havent considered probability as it suffers from the same problems
Hume acknowledged in his works.
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model with a better explanatory power in the future. Therefore, there is no

justification to uphold one theory over another while expecting utmost
accuracy in explanation, given the conceivability of new discoveries that
can subvert it. Analogous to this, the best explanation to an inference can
change as a result of new observations. This secondary example can show
how this is the case.2
Let us assume that I am on the beach of a deserted island. While
looking towards the sea, I see a shiny spot in the sand. Upon closer
inspection, I realize that the shiny object is, in fact, a watch. Now, from
this I can infer that the best explanation is that humans have been here
before. However, if I see a half-sunken ship in the water nearby, I would
have to add another option: perhaps, the watch just got washed ashore
from the shipwreck. With the addition of other relevant observations, the
range of hypothesis will likely increase. While each individual observation
can bring about its own hypothesis, the conjunction of all observations can
help us decide which theory is more likely to explain them. However, there
can be cases where one explanation can be equally likely to another:
without any evidence apart from the shipwreck and the watch, it seems
hard, if not impossible, to decide which is the best explanation. Even if a
decision would be made, the best explanation would be arbitrary, an
intuition that is shared only by some, but not all.
Applying this in the context of science, without any other principle
beyond a best explanation that relies on intuition rather than logic,
science can never definitely show something to be true, as there could
always be the possibility of another observation shifting the explanation to
an alternative hypothesis. Moreover, the reliance on intuition when
inferring the best explanation out of a set of data it is the best
explanation is merely a relativistic view that relies only on a subjectdependent perception of being in coherence with background beliefs
makes the explanation of data in science dependent on our conceivability
of something to be the case. This can result in doubtful intuitions that,
2 Im adapting an example from Humes Enquiry Concerning Human
Understanding (IV, 4).
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while they cohere with the world-view, they can be inherently vague.
Popper (Conjectures and Refutations, I, 6) exemplifies this when he
recounts the moment he became dissatisfied with psycho-analysis and
individual psychology. The two psychological accounts of Freud and Adler,
once entertained, can be observed in anything: Popper remarked that the
explanatory power of those theories was indeed what made them very
popular. However, it seemed that any observation could be accounted for
by any of them with similar ease: a case rather similar to the astrological
explanation of human affairs. While it was true that a behaviour could be
interpreted in light of those theories, this is the only thing that those
theories could do: they expressed merely a possibility that, as a result of
vagueness, could capture any account of human behaviour. Because of
this, none of these theories could be falsified in any conceivable way. For
Popper, there is a need in science to distinguish between a scientific
account that explains something and a theory that merely expresses a
possibility. Therefore, either a set of further principles beyond the best
explanation justification is required, or a method that distinguishes
pseudo-science from science.
One proposal for this is Poppers fasificationism, a method that avoids
the problem of induction and also helps to distinguish between science
and pseudo-science. According to Popper, instead of trying to see whether
a theory is the case (a move that relies on inductive inference), it is better
to try to disprove it, a move that relies on deduction and, therefore,
bypasses the problem of induction (The Problem of Induction, I, 428).
Putting the swan example in this context, if someone finds a black swan
(thereby falsifying the claim that all swans are white), then it deductively
follows that not all swans are white. For Popper, the first step for
falsification is identifying a hypothesis (unlike inductive inference that
starts from observations to general principles). This hypothesis should not
be justified in any way so as to avoid the situation when the hypothesis
cannot be falsified. Secondly, testable predictions should be derived
based on that hypothesis. An attempt to falsify these predictions should
be sought: if they are indeed falsified, it deductively follows that the

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proposed theory is not the case. If the predictions are not falsified, more
attempts to falsify them should be sought after. Through this method, in
time, less and less theories will remain yet unfalsified. According to
Popper, these theories that have withstood the tests of falsifiability should
be corroborated, but not fully accepted as there can always be something
that falsifies them. Moreover, Popper considers that theories that cannot
be (conceivably) falsified are not science as their unfalsifiablilty can result
only on the basis of their vagueness (Astrology is an example of this).
Considering this, it seems that Poppers proposal is a step forward for
science in so far as it relies only on inferences to the best explanation 3 as
it relies on a deductive form of argument, rather than inductive.
Despite having the deductive way of acquiring scientific knowledge
through falsification, there is still a problem with Poppers account that
mirrors the problem of induction: there still is an unsupported assumption
of uniformity in any argument that relies on matters of fact.
Firstly,

the

truth

value

of

matters

of

fact

or

posteriori

contingencies relies solely on whether they are objectified in the world:

The granite city is in Scotland is true only in so far as there is a place
denoted by granite city which lies in a region that is called Scotland.
Popper seems to wrongly believe that when any hypothesis becomes
falsified, it can be readily discounted as it deductively follows that x is
not the case. However, an argument is true only if the premises are true
as well. However, contingencies and their truth value can change with
time. By discounting x on the basis of its falsification, it seems, one
assumes that the premises that show that not x will always stay the
same. Therefore, it seems that instead of eliminating the need for an
assumption of uniformity of nature, that assumption is merely shifted to
the premises themselves in the form of an assumption of uniformity
through time: when one takes a premise to be true (I saw a black swan),
one assumes that this premise will always be true. But it seems plausible
that all black swans could become extinct and therefore, the conclusion
3 In actu, scientific theories rely on many other principles as well. For
example, the theory that can explain something in the most simple form is
always preferred to a more complicated one.
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that not all swans are white would no longer be supported. By merely
eliminating the falsified hypothesis, Popper leaves open the possibility of
the hypothesis ceasing to not be the case.
This example aims at showing that the assumption of uniformity
through time is not only unjustified but simply unsupported, at least by
some sciences, the ones that attempt to describe changeable things, such
as Psychology. It is well known that the brain is a changing thing as it gets
modified on the basis of experience (environment): a blind person will
become adapted to its environment by learning to use the other senses
for navigation. Concurrently, the brain will change its structure for those
things to happen, changes that are measurable with brain-imaging
techniques4. The deviation of the findings from the brains of blind persons
is considered different only because of the existence of a baseline, that
of a normal human adults brain. Now, assume that by seeing how
normal people behave, we have established that hypothesis x, y and z
are not the case by using the falsificationist method. Isnt it conceivable
that any of those hypotheses of truth can change if some changes in the
environment would bring about the relevant changes in the brain?
Poppers method, while able to arrive at scientific knowledge through
falsification has to account for the fact that all contingent facts about the
world are time-bounded and, thus, subject to change. However, Poppers
account can be vindicated quite by the simple indication that falsified
claims need to be repeatedly confirmed after their establishment.
A secondary problem of his account relies precisely on the incongruity
between the purpose of science and his method. Through corroborating
theories, Popper aims at scientific knowledge. However, for Popper,
corroboration does not act as the definitive proof for some theory, but
only as a temporary support for it as the falsification of any prediction that
acts against it renders it unsupported (The Problem of Induction, I, 431).
This is a problem as science seeks to find knowledge about the world (i.e.,
describing the world in terms that are true to the way the world is) while
4 Im endorsing the view that mental states are at least supervenient on
physical states for the purpose of the example.
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Poppers account can have definite answers only on what is not the case
at time t. While falsifiable predictions that havent been falsified as a
result of rigorous testing can act as a degree of confidence in a theory
being the case, taken in that way, the problem of induction arises again.
In conclusion, Karl Poppers falsificationism should not be adopted in
the sciences because it does not justify the endurance of the truth value
of any deductive proof and also because falsificationism does not reach
the criteria of truth that science aspires to.

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References

Peter Lipton 1991: Induction. Reprinted in Curd and Cover (eds.)

1998: Philosophy of Science: The Central Issues, pp. 412-425.
Karl Popper 1959: The Problem of Induction. Reprinted in Curd and
Cover (eds.) 1998: Philosophy of Science: The Central Issues, pp. 426-432.
Karl Popper 1963: Science: Conjectures and Refutations. Reprinted
in Curd and Cover (eds.) 1998: Philosophy of Science: The Central Issues,
pp. 3-10.

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