G.R. No.

L-30642 April 30, 1985

PERFECTO S. FLORESCA, in his own behalf and on behalf of the minors ROMULO and NESTOR
S. FLORESCA; and ERLINDA FLORESCA-GABUYO, PEDRO S. FLORESCA, JR., CELSO S.
FLORESCA, MELBA S. FLORESCA, JUDITH S. FLORESCA and CARMEN S. FLORESCA;
LYDIA CARAMAT VDA. DE MARTINEZ in her own behalf and on behalf of her minor children
LINDA, ROMEO, ANTONIO JEAN and ELY, all surnamed Martinez; and DANIEL MARTINEZ and
TOMAS MARTINEZ;
SALUSTIANA ASPIRAS VDA. DE OBRA, in her own behalf and on behalf of her minor children
JOSE, ESTELA, JULITA SALUD and DANILO, all surnamed OBRA;
LYDIA CULBENGAN VDA. DE VILLAR, in her own behalf and on behalf of her minor children
EDNA, GEORGE and LARRY III, all surnamed VILLAR;
DOLORES LOLITA ADER VDA. DE LANUZA, in her own behalf and on behalf of her minor children
EDITHA, ELIZABETH, DIVINA, RAYMUNDO, NESTOR and AURELIO, JR. all surnamed LANUZA;
EMERENCIANA JOSE VDA. DE ISLA, in her own behalf and on behalf of her minor children JOSE,
LORENZO, JR., MARIA, VENUS and FELIX, all surnamed ISLA, petitioners,
vs.
PHILEX MINING CORPORATION and HON. JESUS P. MORFE, Presiding Judge of Branch XIII,
Court of First Instance of Manila, respondents.
Rodolfo C. Pacampara for petitioners.
Tito M. Villaluna for respondents.

MAKASIAR, J.:
This is a petition to review the order of the former Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch XIII, dated
December 16, 1968 dismissing petitioners' complaint for damages on the ground of lack of jurisdiction.
Petitioners are the heirs of the deceased employees of Philex Mining Corporation (hereinafter referred to
as Philex), who, while working at its copper mines underground operations at Tuba, Benguet on June 28,
1967, died as a result of the cave-in that buried them in the tunnels of the mine. Specifically, the complaint
alleges that Philex, in violation of government rules and regulations, negligently and deliberately failed to
take the required precautions for the protection of the lives of its men working underground. Portion of the
complaint reads:
xxx xxx xxx
9. That for sometime prior and up to June 28,1967, the defendant PHILEX, with
gross and reckless negligence and imprudence and deliberate failure to take the
required precautions for the due protection of the lives of its men working
underground at the time, and in utter violation of the laws and the rules and
regulations duly promulgated by the Government pursuant thereto, allowed great
amount of water and mud to accumulate in an open pit area at the mine above

Block 43-S-1 which seeped through and saturated the 600 ft. column of broken
ore and rock below it, thereby exerting tremendous pressure on the working
spaces at its 4300 level, with the result that, on the said date, at about 4 o'clock
in the afternoon, with the collapse of all underground supports due to such
enormous pressure, approximately 500,000 cubic feet of broken ores rocks, mud
and water, accompanied by surface boulders, blasted through the tunnels and
flowed out and filled in, in a matter of approximately five (5) minutes, the
underground workings, ripped timber supports and carried off materials,
machines and equipment which blocked all avenues of exit, thereby trapping
within its tunnels of all its men above referred to, including those named in the
next preceding paragraph, represented by the plaintiffs herein;
10. That out of the 48 mine workers who were then working at defendant
PHILEX's mine on the said date, five (5) were able to escape from the terrifying
holocaust; 22 were rescued within the next 7 days; and the rest, 21 in number,
including those referred to in paragraph 7 hereinabove, were left mercilessly to
their fate, notwithstanding the fact that up to then, a great many of them were still
alive, entombed in the tunnels of the mine, but were not rescued due to
defendant PHILEX's decision to abandon rescue operations, in utter disregard of
its bounden legal and moral duties in the premises;
xxx xxx xxx
13. That defendant PHILEX not only violated the law and the rules and
regulations duly promulgated by the duly constituted authorities as set out by the
Special Committee above referred to, in their Report of investigation, pages 7-13,
Annex 'B' hereof, but also failed completely to provide its men working
underground the necessary security for the protection of their lives
notwithstanding the fact that it had vast financial resources, it having made,
during the year 1966 alone, a total operating income of P 38,220,254.00, or net
earnings, after taxes of P19,117,394.00, as per its llth Annual Report for the year
ended December 31, 1966, and with aggregate assets totalling P 45,794,103.00
as of December 31, 1966;
xxx xxx xxx
(pp. 42-44, rec.)
A motion to dismiss dated May 14, 1968 was filed by Philex alleging that the causes of action of
petitioners based on an industrial accident are covered by the provisions of the Workmen's Compensation
Act (Act 3428, as amended by RA 772) and that the former Court of First Instance has no jurisdiction over
the case. Petitioners filed an opposition dated May 27, 1968 to the said motion to dismiss claiming that
the causes of action are not based on the provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Act but on the
provisions of the Civil Code allowing the award of actual, moral and exemplary damages, particularly:
Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being
fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or
negligence, if there is no pre- existing contractual relation between the parties, is
called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter.
Art. 2178. The provisions of articles 1172 to 1174 are also applicable to a quasidelict.

(b) Art. 1173The fault or negligence of the obligor consists in the omission of
that diligence which is required by the nature of the obligation and corresponds
with the circumstances of the persons, of the time and of the place. When
negligence shows bad faith, the provisions of Articles 1171 and 2201, paragraph
2 shall apply.
Art. 2201. x x x x x x x x x
In case of fraud, bad faith, malice or wanton attitude, the obligor shall be
responsible for all damages which may be reasonably attributed to the nonperformance of the obligation.
Art. 2231. In quasi-delicts, exemplary damages may be granted if the defendant
acted with gross negligence.
After a reply and a rejoinder thereto were filed, respondent Judge issued an order dated June 27, 1968
dismissing the case on the ground that it falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Workmen's
Compensation Commission. On petitioners' motion for reconsideration of the said order, respondent
Judge, on September 23, 1968, reconsidered and set aside his order of June 27, 1968 and allowed Philex
to file an answer to the complaint. Philex moved to reconsider the aforesaid order which was opposed by
petitioners.
On December 16, 1968, respondent Judge dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction and ruled that in
accordance with the established jurisprudence, the Workmen's Compensation Commission has exclusive
original jurisdiction over damage or compensation claims for work-connected deaths or injuries of
workmen or employees, irrespective of whether or not the employer was negligent, adding that if the
employer's negligence results in work-connected deaths or injuries, the employer shall, pursuant to
Section 4-A of the Workmen's Compensation Act, pay additional compensation equal to 50% of the
compensation fixed in the Act.
Petitioners thus filed the present petition.
In their brief, petitioners raised the following assignment of errors:
I
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING THE PLAINTIFFSPETITIONERS' COMPLAINT FOR LACK OF JURISDICTION.
II
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO CONSIDER THE CLEAR
DISTINCTION BETWEEN CLAIMS FOR DAMAGES UNDER THE CIVIL CODE
AND CLAIMS FOR COMPENSATION UNDER THE WORKMEN'S
COMPENSATION ACT.
A
In the first assignment of error, petitioners argue that the lower court has jurisdiction over the cause of
action since the complaint is based on the provisions of the Civil Code on damages, particularly Articles
2176, 2178, 1173, 2201 and 2231, and not on the provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Act. They
point out that the complaint alleges gross and brazen negligence on the part of Philex in failing to take the
necessary security for the protection of the lives of its employees working underground. They also assert

that since Philex opted to file a motion to dismiss in the court a quo, the allegations in their complaint
including those contained in the annexes are deemed admitted.
In the second assignment of error, petitioners asseverate that respondent Judge failed to see the
distinction between the claims for compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Act and the claims
for damages based on gross negligence of Philex under the Civil Code. They point out that workmen's
compensation refers to liability for compensation for loss resulting from injury, disability or death of the
working man through industrial accident or disease, without regard to the fault or negligence of the
employer, while the claim for damages under the Civil Code which petitioners pursued in the regular
court, refers to the employer's liability for reckless and wanton negligence resulting in the death of the
employees and for which the regular court has jurisdiction to adjudicate the same.
On the other hand, Philex asserts that work-connected injuries are compensable exclusively under the
provisions of Sections 5 and 46 of the Workmen's Compensation Act, which read:
SEC. 5. Exclusive right to compensation.The rights and remedies granted by
this Act to an employee by reason of a personal injury entitling him to
compensation shall exclude all other rights and remedies accruing to the
employee, his personal representatives, dependents or nearest of kin against the
employer under the Civil Code and other laws because of said injury ...
SEC. 46. Jurisdiction. The Workmen's Compensation Commissioner shall have
exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide claims for compensation under the
Workmen's Compensation Act, subject to appeal to the Supreme Court, ...
Philex cites the case of Manalo vs. Foster Wheeler (98 Phil. 855 [1956]) where it was held that "all claims
of workmen against their employer for damages due to accident suffered in the course of employment
shall be investigated and adjudicated by the Workmen's Compensation Commission," subject to appeal to
the Supreme Court.
Philex maintains that the fact that an employer was negligent, does not remove the case from the
exclusive character of recoveries under the Workmen's Compensation Act; because Section 4-A of the
Act provides an additional compensation in case the employer fails to comply with the requirements of
safety as imposed by law to prevent accidents. In fact, it points out that Philex voluntarily paid the
compensation due the petitioners and all the payments have been accepted in behalf of the deceased
miners, except the heirs of Nazarito Floresca who insisted that they are entitled to a greater amount of
damages under the Civil Code.
In the hearing of this case, then Undersecretary of Labor Israel Bocobo, then Atty. Edgardo Angara, now
President of the University of the Philippines, Justice Manuel Lazaro, as corporate counsel and Assistant
General Manager of the GSIS Legal Affairs Department, and Commissioner on Elections, formerly UP
Law Center Director Froilan Bacungan, appeared as amici curiae and thereafter, submitted their
respective memoranda.
The issue to be resolved as WE stated in the resolution of November 26, 1976, is:
Whether the action of an injured employee or worker or that of his heirs in case
of his death under the Workmen's Compensation Act is exclusive, selective or
cumulative, that is to say, whether his or his heirs' action is exclusively restricted
to seeking the limited compensation provided under the Workmen's
Compensation Act or whether they have a right of selection or choice of action
between availing of the worker's right under the Workmen's Compensation Act
and suing in the regular courts under the Civil Code for higher damages (actual,
moral and/or exemplary) from the employer by virtue of negligence (or fault) of

the employer or of his other employees or whether they may avail cumulatively of
both actions, i.e., collect the limited compensation under the Workmen's
Compensation Act and sue in addition for damages in the regular courts.
There are divergent opinions in this case. Justice Lazaro is of the opinion that an injured employee or
worker, or the heirs in case of his death, may initiate a complaint to recover damages (not compensation
under the Workmen's Compensation Act) with the regular court on the basis of negligence of an employer
pursuant to the Civil Code provisions. Atty. Angara believes otherwise. He submits that the remedy of an
injured employee for work-connected injury or accident is exclusive in accordance with Section 5 of the
Workmen's Compensation Act, while Atty. Bacungan's position is that the action is selective. He opines
that the heirs of the employee in case of his death have a right of choice to avail themselves of the
benefits provided under the Workmen's Compensation Act or to sue in the regular court under the Civil
Code for higher damages from the employer by virtue of negligence of the latter. Atty. Bocobo's stand is
the same as that of Atty. Bacungan and adds that once the heirs elect the remedy provided for under the
Act, they are no longer entitled to avail themselves of the remedy provided for under the Civil Code by
filing an action for higher damages in the regular court, and vice versa.
On August 3, 1978, petitioners-heirs of deceased employee Nazarito Floresca filed a motion to dismiss on
the ground that they have amicably settled their claim with respondent Philex. In the resolution of
September 7, 1978, WE dismissed the petition only insofar as the aforesaid petitioners are connected, it
appearing that there are other petitioners in this case.
WE hold that the former Court of First Instance has jurisdiction to try the case,
It should be underscored that petitioners' complaint is not for compensation based on the Workmen's
Compensation Act but a complaint for damages (actual, exemplary and moral) in the total amount of eight
hundred twenty-five thousand (P825,000.00) pesos. Petitioners did not invoke the provisions of the
Workmen's Compensation Act to entitle them to compensation thereunder. In fact, no allegation appeared
in the complaint that the employees died from accident arising out of and in the course of their
employments. The complaint instead alleges gross and reckless negligence and deliberate failure on the
part of Philex to protect the lives of its workers as a consequence of which a cave-in occurred resulting in
the death of the employees working underground. Settled is the rule that in ascertaining whether or not
the cause of action is in the nature of workmen's compensation claim or a claim for damages pursuant to
the provisions of the Civil Code, the test is the averments or allegations in the complaint (Belandres vs.
Lopez Sugar Mill, Co., Inc., 97 Phil. 100).
In the present case, there exists between Philex and the deceased employees a contractual relationship.
The alleged gross and reckless negligence and deliberate failure that amount to bad faith on the part of
Philex, constitute a breach of contract for which it may be held liable for damages. The provisions of the
Civil Code on cases of breach of contract when there is fraud or bad faith, read:
Art. 2232. In contracts and quasi-contracts, the court may award exemplary
damages if the defendant acted in a wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive or
malevolent manner.
Art. 2201. In contracts and quasi-contracts, the damages for which the obligor
who acted in good faith is able shall be those that are the natural and probable
consequences of the breach of the obligation, and which the parties have
foreseen or could have reasonably foreseen at the time the obligation was
constituted.
In cases of fraud, bad faith, malice or wanton attitude, the obligor shall be
responsible for all damages which may be reasonably attributed to the nonperformance of the obligation.

Furthermore, Articles 2216 et seq., Civil Code, allow the payment of all kinds of damages, as assessed by
the court.
The rationale in awarding compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Act differs from that in
giving damages under the Civil Code. The compensation acts are based on a theory of compensation
distinct from the existing theories of damages, payments under the acts being made as compensation
and not as damages (99 C.J.S. 53). Compensation is given to mitigate the harshness and insecurity of
industrial life for the workman and his family. Hence, an employer is liable whether negligence exists or
not since liability is created by law. Recovery under the Act is not based on any theory of actionable
wrong on the part of the employer (99 C.J.S. 36).
In other words, under the compensation acts, the employer is liable to pay compensation benefits for loss
of income, as long as the death, sickness or injury is work-connected or work-aggravated, even if the
death or injury is not due to the fault of the employer (Murillo vs. Mendoza, 66 Phil. 689). On the other
hand, damages are awarded to one as a vindication of the wrongful invasion of his rights. It is the
indemnity recoverable by a person who has sustained injury either in his person, property or relative
rights, through the act or default of another (25 C.J.S. 452).
The claimant for damages under the Civil Code has the burden of proving the causal relation between the
defendant's negligence and the resulting injury as well as the damages suffered. While under the
Workmen's Compensation Act, there is a presumption in favor of the deceased or injured employee that
the death or injury is work-connected or work-aggravated; and the employer has the burden to prove
otherwise (De los Angeles vs. GSIS, 94 SCRA 308; Carino vs. WCC, 93 SCRA 551; Maria Cristina
Fertilizer Corp. vs. WCC, 60 SCRA 228).
The claim of petitioners that the case is not cognizable by the Workmen's Compensation Commission
then, now Employees Compensation Commission, is strengthened by the fact that unlike in the Civil
Code, the Workmen's Compensation Act did not contain any provision for an award of actual, moral and
exemplary damages. What the Act provided was merely the right of the heirs to claim limited
compensation for the death in the amount of six thousand (P6,000.00) pesos plus burial expenses of two
hundred (P200.00) pesos, and medical expenses when incurred (Sections 8, 12 and 13, Workmen's
Compensation Act), and an additional compensation of only 50% if the complaint alleges failure on the
part of the employer to "install and maintain safety appliances or to take other precautions for the
prevention of accident or occupational disease" (Section 4-A, Ibid.). In the case at bar, the amount sought
to be recovered is over and above that which was provided under the Workmen's Compensation Act and
which cannot be granted by the Commission.
Moreover, under the Workmen's Compensation Act, compensation benefits should be paid to an
employee who suffered an accident not due to the facilities or lack of facilities in the industry of his
employer but caused by factors outside the industrial plant of his employer. Under the Civil Code, the
liability of the employer, depends on breach of contract or tort. The Workmen's Compensation Act was
specifically enacted to afford protection to the employees or workmen. It is a social legislation designed to
give relief to the workman who has been the victim of an accident causing his death or ailment or injury in
the pursuit of his employment (Abong vs. WCC, 54 SCRA 379).
WE now come to the query as to whether or not the injured employee or his heirs in case of death have a
right of selection or choice of action between availing themselves of the worker's right under the
Workmen's Compensation Act and suing in the regular courts under the Civil Code for higher damages
(actual, moral and exemplary) from the employers by virtue of that negligence or fault of the employers or
whether they may avail themselves cumulatively of both actions, i.e., collect the limited compensation
under the Workmen's Compensation Act and sue in addition for damages in the regular courts.
In disposing of a similar issue, this Court in Pacana vs. Cebu Autobus Company, 32 SCRA 442, ruled that
an injured worker has a choice of either to recover from the employer the fixed amounts set by the

Workmen's Compensation Act or to prosecute an ordinary civil action against the tortfeasor for higher
damages but he cannot pursue both courses of action simultaneously.
In Pacaa WE said:
In the analogous case of Esguerra vs. Munoz Palma, involving the application of
Section 6 of the Workmen's Compensation Act on the injured workers' right to
sue third- party tortfeasors in the regular courts, Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes, again
speaking for the Court, pointed out that the injured worker has the choice of
remedies but cannot pursue both courses of action simultaneously and thus
balanced the relative advantage of recourse under the Workmen's Compensation
Act as against an ordinary action.
As applied to this case, petitioner Esguerra cannot maintain his action for
damages against the respondents (defendants below), because he has elected
to seek compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Law, and his claim
(case No. 44549 of the Compensation Commission) was being processed at the
time he filed this action in the Court of First Instance. It is argued for petitioner
that as the damages recoverable under the Civil Code are much more extensive
than the amounts that may be awarded under the Workmen's Compensation Act,
they should not be deemed incompatible. As already indicated, the injured
laborer was initially free to choose either to recover from the employer the fixed
amounts set by the Compensation Law or else, to prosecute an ordinary civil
action against the tortfeasor for higher damages. While perhaps not as profitable,
the smaller indemnity obtainable by the first course is balanced by the claimant's
being relieved of the burden of proving the causal connection between the
defendant's negligence and the resulting injury, and of having to establish the
extent of the damage suffered; issues that are apt to be troublesome to establish
satisfactorily. Having staked his fortunes on a particular remedy, petitioner is
precluded from pursuing the alternate course, at least until the prior claim is
rejected by the Compensation Commission. Anyway, under the proviso of Section
6 aforequoted, if the employer Franklin Baker Company recovers, by derivative
action against the alleged tortfeasors, a sum greater than the compensation he
may have paid the herein petitioner, the excess accrues to the latter.
Although the doctrine in the case of Esguerra vs. Munoz Palma (104 Phil. 582), applies to third-party
tortfeasor, said rule should likewise apply to the employer-tortfeasor.
Insofar as the heirs of Nazarito Floresca are concerned, as already stated, the petition has been
dismissed in the resolution of September 7, 1978 in view of the amicable settlement reached by Philex
and the said heirs.
With regard to the other petitioners, it was alleged by Philex in its motion to dismiss dated May 14, 1968
before the court a quo, that the heirs of the deceased employees, namely Emerito Obra, Larry Villar, Jr.,
Aurelio Lanuza, Lorenzo Isla and Saturnino Martinez submitted notices and claims for compensation to
the Regional Office No. 1 of the then Department of Labor and all of them have been paid in full as of
August 25, 1967, except Saturnino Martinez whose heirs decided that they be paid in installments (pp.
106-107, rec.). Such allegation was admitted by herein petitioners in their opposition to the motion to
dismiss dated May 27, 1968 (pp. 121-122, rec.) in the lower court, but they set up the defense that the
claims were filed under the Workmen's Compensation Act before they learned of the official report of the
committee created to investigate the accident which established the criminal negligence and violation of
law by Philex, and which report was forwarded by the Director of Mines to the then Executive Secretary
Rafael Salas in a letter dated October 19, 1967 only (p. 76, rec.).

WE hold that although the other petitioners had received the benefits under the Workmen's
Compensation Act, such may not preclude them from bringing an action before the regular court because
they became cognizant of the fact that Philex has been remiss in its contractual obligations with the
deceased miners only after receiving compensation under the Act. Had petitioners been aware of said
violation of government rules and regulations by Philex, and of its negligence, they would not have sought
redress under the Workmen's Compensation Commission which awarded a lesser amount for
compensation. The choice of the first remedy was based on ignorance or a mistake of fact, which nullifies
the choice as it was not an intelligent choice. The case should therefore be remanded to the lower court
for further proceedings. However, should the petitioners be successful in their bid before the lower court,
the payments made under the Workmen's Compensation Act should be deducted from the damages that
may be decreed in their favor.
B
Contrary to the perception of the dissenting opinion, the Court does not legislate in the instant case. The
Court merely applies and gives effect to the constitutional guarantees of social justice then secured by
Section 5 of Article 11 and Section 6 of Article XIV of the 1935 Constitution, and now by Sections 6, 7, and
9 of Article 11 of the DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES AND STATE POLICIES of the 1973 Constitution,
as amended, and as implemented by Articles 2176, 2177, 2178, 1173, 2201, 2216, 2231 and 2232 of the
New Civil Code of 1950.
To emphasize, the 1935 Constitution declares that:
Sec. 5. The promotion of social justice to insure the well-being and economic
security of all the people should be the concern of the State (Art. II).
Sec. 6. The State shall afford protection to labor, especially to working women,
and minors, and shall regulate the relations between landowner and tenant, and
between labor and capital in industry and in agriculture. The State may provide
for compulsory arbitration (Art. XIV).
The 1973 Constitution likewise commands the State to "promote social justice to insure the dignity,
welfare, and security of all the people "... regulate the use ... and disposition of private property and
equitably diffuse property ownership and profits "establish, maintain and ensure adequate social services
in, the field of education, health, housing, employment, welfare and social security to guarantee the
enjoyment by the people of a decent standard of living" (Sections 6 and 7, Art. II, 1973 Constitution); "...
afford protection to labor, ... and regulate the relations between workers and employers ..., and assure the
rights of workers to ... just and humane conditions of work" (Sec. 9, Art. II, 1973 Constitution, emphasis
supplied).
The foregoing constitutional guarantees in favor of labor institutionalized in Section 9 of Article 11 of the
1973 Constitution and re-stated as a declaration of basic policy in Article 3 of the New Labor Code, thus:
Art. 3. Declaration of basic policy.The State shall afford protection to labor,
promote full employment, ensure equal work opportunities regardless of sex,
race or creed, and regulate the relations between workers and employers. The
State shall assure the rights of workers to self-organization, collective bargaining,
security of tenure, and just and humane conditions of work. (emphasis supplied).
The aforestated constitutional principles as implemented by the aforementioned articles of the New Civil
Code cannot be impliedly repealed by the restrictive provisions of Article 173 of the New Labor Code.
Section 5 of the Workmen's Compensation Act (before it was amended by R.A. No. 772 on June 20,
1952), predecessor of Article 173 of the New Labor Code, has been superseded by the aforestated
provisions of the New Civil Code, a subsequent law, which took effect on August 30, 1950, which obey the

constitutional mandates of social justice enhancing as they do the rights of the workers as against their
employers. Article 173 of the New Labor Code seems to diminish the rights of the workers and therefore
collides with the social justice guarantee of the Constitution and the liberal provisions of the New Civil
Code.
The guarantees of social justice embodied in Sections 6, 7 and 9 of Article II of the 1973 Constitution are
statements of legal principles to be applied and enforced by the courts. Mr. Justice Robert Jackson in the
case of West Virginia State Board of Education vs. Barnette, with characteristic eloquence, enunciated:
The very purpose of a Bill of Rights was to withdraw certain subjects from the
vicissitudes of political controversy, to place them beyond the reach of majorities
and officials and to establish them as legal principles to be applied by the courts.
One's right to life, liberty, and property, to free speech, a free press, freedom of
worship and assembly, and other fundamental rights may not be submitted to
vote; they depend on the outcome of no elections (319 U.S. 625, 638, 87 L.ed.
1638, emphasis supplied).
In case of any doubt which may be engendered by Article 173 of the New Labor Code, both the New
Labor Code and the Civil Code direct that the doubts should be resolved in favor of the workers and
employees.
Thus, Article 4 of the New Labor Code, otherwise known as Presidential Decree No. 442, as amended,
promulgated on May 1, 1974, but which took effect six months thereafter, provides that "all doubts in the
implementation and interpretation of the provisions of this Code, including its implementing rules and
regulations, shall be resolved in favor of labor" (Art. 2, Labor Code).
Article 10 of the New Civil Code states: "In case of doubt in the interpretation or application of laws, it is
presumed that the law-making body intended right and justice to prevail. "
More specifically, Article 1702 of the New Civil Code likewise directs that. "In case of doubt, all labor
legislation and all labor contracts shall be construed in favor of the safety and decent living of the laborer."
Before it was amended by Commonwealth Act No. 772 on June 20, 1952, Section 5 of the Workmen's
Compensation Act provided:
Sec. 5. Exclusive right to compensation.- The rights and remedies granted by this
Act to an employee by reason of a personal injury entitling him to compensation
shall exclude all other rights and remedies accruing to the employee, his
personal representatives, dependents or nearest of kin against the employer
under the Civil Code and other laws, because of said injury (emphasis supplied).
Employers contracting laborecsrs in the Philippine Islands for work outside the
same may stipulate with such laborers that the remedies prescribed by this Act
shall apply exclusively to injuries received outside the Islands through accidents
happening in and during the performance of the duties of the employment; and
all service contracts made in the manner prescribed in this section shall be
presumed to include such agreement.
Only the second paragraph of Section 5 of the Workmen's Compensation Act No. 3428, was amended by
Commonwealth Act No. 772 on June 20, 1952, thus:
Sec. 5. Exclusive right to compensation.- The rights and remedies granted by this
Act to an employee by reason of a personal injury entitling him to compensation

shall exclude all other rights and remedies accruing to the employee, his
personal representatives, dependents or nearest of kin against the employer
under the Civil Code and other laws, because of said injury.
Employers contracting laborers in the Philippine Islands for work outside the
same shall stipulate with such laborers that the remedies prescribed by this Act
shall apply to injuries received outside the Island through accidents happening in
and during the performance of the duties of the employment. Such stipulation
shall not prejudice the right of the laborers to the benefits of the Workmen's
Compensation Law of the place where the accident occurs, should such law be
more favorable to them (As amended by section 5 of Republic Act No. 772).
Article 173 of the New Labor Code does not repeal expressly nor impliedly the applicable provisions of
the New Civil Code, because said Article 173 provides:
Art. 173. Exclusiveness of liability.- Unless otherwise provided, the liability of the
State Insurance Fund under this Title shall be exclusive and in place of all other
liabilities of the employer to the employee, his dependents or anyone otherwise
entitled to receive damages on behalf of the employee or his dependents. The
payment of compensation under this Title shall bar the recovery of benefits as
provided for in Section 699 of the Revised Administrative Code, Republic Act
Numbered Eleven hundred sixty-one, as amended, Commonwealth Act
Numbered One hundred eighty- six, as amended, Commonwealth Act Numbered
Six hundred ten, as amended, Republic Act Numbered Forty-eight hundred Sixtyfour, as amended, and other laws whose benefits are administered by the
System during the period of such payment for the same disability or death, and
conversely (emphasis supplied).
As above-quoted, Article 173 of the New Labor Code expressly repealed only Section 699 of the Revised
Administrative Code, R.A. No. 1161, as amended, C.A. No. 186, as amended, R.A. No. 610, as amended,
R.A. No. 4864, as amended, and all other laws whose benefits are administered by the System (referring
to the GSIS or SSS).
Unlike Section 5 of the Workmen's Compensation Act as aforequoted, Article 173 of the New Labor Code
does not even remotely, much less expressly, repeal the New Civil Code provisions heretofore quoted.
It is patent, therefore, that recovery under the New Civil Code for damages arising from negligence, is not
barred by Article 173 of the New Labor Code. And the damages recoverable under the New Civil Code
are not administered by the System provided for by the New Labor Code, which defines the "System" as
referring to the Government Service Insurance System or the Social Security System (Art. 167 [c], [d] and
[e] of the New Labor Code).
Furthermore, under Article 8 of the New Civil Code, decisions of the Supreme Court form part of the law
of the land.
Article 8 of the New Civil Code provides:
Art. 8. Judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall
form a part of the legal system of the Philippines.
The Court, through the late Chief Justice Fred Ruiz Castro, in People vs. Licera ruled:

Article 8 of the Civil Code of the Philippines decrees that judicial decisions
applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution form part of this jurisdiction's
legal system. These decisions, although in themselves not laws, constitute
evidence of what the laws mean. The application or interpretation placed by the
Court upon a law is part of the law as of the date of the enactment of the said law
since the Court's application or interpretation merely establishes the
contemporaneous legislative intent that the construed law purports to carry into
effect" (65 SCRA 270, 272-273 [1975]).
WE ruled that judicial decisions of the Supreme Court assume the same authority as the statute itself
(Caltex vs. Palomer, 18 SCRA 247; 124 Phil. 763).
The aforequoted provisions of Section 5 of the Workmen's Compensation Act, before and after it was
amended by Commonwealth Act No. 772 on June 20, 1952, limited the right of recovery in favor of the
deceased, ailing or injured employee to the compensation provided for therein. Said Section 5 was not
accorded controlling application by the Supreme Court in the 1970 case of Pacana vs. Cebu Autobus
Company (32 SCRA 442) when WE ruled that an injured worker has a choice of either to recover from the
employer the fixed amount set by the Workmen's Compensation Act or to prosecute an ordinary civil
action against the tortfeasor for greater damages; but he cannot pursue both courses of action
simultaneously. Said Pacana case penned by Mr. Justice Teehankee, applied Article 1711 of the Civil
Code as against the Workmen's Compensation Act, reiterating the 1969 ruling in the case of Valencia vs.
Manila Yacht Club (28 SCRA 724, June 30,1969) and the 1958 case of Esguerra vs. Munoz Palma (104
Phil. 582), both penned by Justice J.B.L. Reyes. Said Pacana case was concurred in by Justices J.B.L.
Reyes, Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Castro, Fernando and Villamor.
Since the first sentence of Article 173 of the New Labor Code is merely a re-statement of the first
paragraph of Section 5 of the Workmen's Compensation Act, as amended, and does not even refer,
neither expressly nor impliedly, to the Civil Code as Section 5 of the Workmen's Compensation Act did,
with greater reason said Article 173 must be subject to the same interpretation adopted in the cases of
Pacana, Valencia and Esguerra aforementioned as the doctrine in the aforesaid three (3) cases is faithful
to and advances the social justice guarantees enshrined in both the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions.
It should be stressed likewise that there is no similar provision on social justice in the American Federal
Constitution, nor in the various state constitutions of the American Union. Consequently, the restrictive
nature of the American decisions on the Workmen's Compensation Act cannot limit the range and
compass of OUR interpretation of our own laws, especially Article 1711 of the New Civil Code, vis-a-vis
Article 173 of the New Labor Code, in relation to Section 5 of Article II and Section 6 of Article XIV of the
1935 Constitution then, and now Sections 6, 7 and 9 of the Declaration of Principles and State Policies of
Article II of the 1973 Constitution.
The dissent seems to subordinate the life of the laborer to the property rights of the employer. The right to
life is guaranteed specifically by the due process clause of the Constitution. To relieve the employer from
liability for the death of his workers arising from his gross or wanton fault or failure to provide safety
devices for the protection of his employees or workers against the dangers which are inherent in
underground mining, is to deprive the deceased worker and his heirs of the right to recover indemnity for
the loss of the life of the worker and the consequent loss to his family without due process of law. The
dissent in effect condones and therefore encourages such gross or wanton neglect on the part of the
employer to comply with his legal obligation to provide safety measures for the protection of the life, limb
and health of his worker. Even from the moral viewpoint alone, such attitude is un-Christian.
It is therefore patent that giving effect to the social justice guarantees of the Constitution, as implemented
by the provisions of the New Civil Code, is not an exercise of the power of law-making, but is rendering
obedience to the mandates of the fundamental law and the implementing legislation aforementioned.

The Court, to repeat, is not legislating in the instant case.

It is axiomatic that no ordinary statute can override a constitutional provision.
The words of Section 5 of the Workmen's Compensation Act and of Article 173 of the New Labor Code
subvert the rights of the petitioners as surviving heirs of the deceased mining employees. Section 5 of the
Workmen's Compensation Act and Article 173 of the New Labor Code are retrogressive; because they are
a throwback to the obsolete laissez-faire doctrine of Adam Smith enunciated in 1776 in his treatise Wealth
of Nations (Collier's Encyclopedia, Vol. 21, p. 93, 1964), which has been discarded soon after the close of
the 18th century due to the Industrial Revolution that generated the machines and other mechanical
devices (beginning with Eli Whitney's cotton gin of 1793 and Robert Fulton's steamboat of 1807) for
production and transportation which are dangerous to life, limb and health. The old socio-politicaleconomic philosophy of live-and-let-live is now superdesed by the benign Christian shibboleth of live-andhelp others to live. Those who profess to be Christians should not adhere to Cain's selfish affirmation that
he is not his brother's keeper. In this our civilization, each one of us is our brother's keeper. No man is an
island. To assert otherwise is to be as atavistic and ante-deluvian as the 1837 case of Prisley vs. Fowler
(3 MN 1,150 reprint 1030) invoked by the dissent, The Prisley case was decided in 1837 during the era of
economic royalists and robber barons of America. Only ruthless, unfeeling capitalistics and egoistic
reactionaries continue to pay obeisance to such un-Christian doctrine. The Prisley rule humiliates man
and debases him; because the decision derisively refers to the lowly worker as "servant" and utilizes with
aristocratic arrogance "master" for "employer." It robs man of his inherent dignity and dehumanizes him.
To stress this affront to human dignity, WE only have to restate the quotation from Prisley, thus: "The mere
relation of the master and the servant never can imply an obligation on the part of the master to take more
care of the servant than he may reasonably be expected to do himself." This is the very selfish doctrine
that provoked the American Civil War which generated so much hatred and drew so much precious blood
on American plains and valleys from 1861 to 1864.
"Idolatrous reverence" for the letter of the law sacrifices the human being. The spirit of the law insures
man's survival and ennobles him. In the words of Shakespeare, "the letter of the law killeth; its spirit
giveth life."
C
It is curious that the dissenting opinion clings to the myth that the courts cannot legislate.
That myth had been exploded by Article 9 of the New Civil Code, which provides that "No judge or court
shall decline to render judgment by reason of the silence, obscurity or insufficiency of the laws. "
Hence, even the legislator himself, through Article 9 of the New Civil Code, recognizes that in certain
instances, the court, in the language of Justice Holmes, "do and must legislate" to fill in the gaps in the
law; because the mind of the legislator, like all human beings, is finite and therefore cannot envisage all
possible cases to which the law may apply Nor has the human mind the infinite capacity to anticipate all
situations.
But about two centuries before Article 9 of the New Civil Code, the founding fathers of the American
Constitution foresaw and recognized the eventuality that the courts may have to legislate to supply the
omissions or to clarify the ambiguities in the American Constitution and the statutes.
'Thus, Alexander Hamilton pragmatically admits that judicial legislation may be justified but denies that the
power of the Judiciary to nullify statutes may give rise to Judicial tyranny (The Federalist, Modern Library,
pp. 503-511, 1937 ed.). Thomas Jefferson went farther to concede that the court is even independent of
the Nation itself (A.F.L. vs. American Sash Company, 1949 335 US 538).

Many of the great expounders of the American Constitution likewise share the same view. Chief Justice
Marshall pronounced: "It is emphatically the province and duty of the Judicial department to say what the
law is (Marbury vs. Madison I Cranch 127 1803), which was re-stated by Chief Justice Hughes when he
said that "the Constitution is what the judge says it is (Address on May 3, 1907, quoted by President
Franklin Delano Roosevelt on March 9, 1937). This was reiterated by Justice Cardozo who pronounced
that "No doubt the limits for the judge are narrower. He legislates only between gaps. He fills the open
spaces in the law. " (The Nature of the Judicial Process, p. 113). In the language of Chief Justice Harlan
F. Stone, "The only limit to the judicial legislation is the restraint of the judge" (U.S. vs. Butler 297 U.S. 1
Dissenting Opinion, p. 79), which view is also entertained by Justice Frankfurter and Justice Robert
Jackson. In the rhetoric of Justice Frankfurter, "the courts breathe life, feeble or strong, into the inert
pages of the Constitution and all statute books."
It should be stressed that the liability of the employer under Section 5 of the Workmen's Compensation
Act or Article 173 of the New Labor Code is limited to death, ailment or injury caused by the nature of the
work, without any fault on the part of the employers. It is correctly termed no fault liability. Section 5 of the
Workmen's Compensation Act, as amended, or Article 173 of the New Labor Code, does not cover the
tortious liability of the employer occasioned by his fault or culpable negligence in failing to provide the
safety devices required by the law for the protection of the life, limb and health of the workers. Under
either Section 5 or Article 173, the employer remains liable to pay compensation benefits to the employee
whose death, ailment or injury is work-connected, even if the employer has faithfully and diligently
furnished all the safety measures and contrivances decreed by the law to protect the employee.
The written word is no longer the "sovereign talisman." In the epigrammatic language of Mr. Justice
Cardozo, "the law has outgrown its primitive stage of formalism when the precise word was the sovereign
talisman, and every slip was fatal" (Wood vs. Duff Gordon 222 NW 88; Cardozo, The Nature of the
Judicial Process 100). Justice Cardozo warned that: "Sometimes the conservatism of judges has
threatened for an interval to rob the legislation of its efficacy. ... Precedents established in those items
exert an unhappy influence even now" (citing Pound, Common Law and Legislation 21 Harvard Law
Review 383, 387).
Finally, Justice Holmes delivered the coup de grace when he pragmatically admitted, although with a
cautionary undertone: "that judges do and must legislate, but they can do so only interstitially they are
confined from molar to molecular motions" (Southern Pacific Company vs. Jensen, 244 US 204 1917).
And in the subsequent case of Springer vs. Government (277 US 188, 210-212, 72 L.ed. 845, 852- 853),
Justice Holmes pronounced:
The great ordinances of the Constitution do not establish and divide fields of
black and white. Even the more specific of them are found to terminate in a
penumbra shading gradually from one extreme to the other. x x x. When we
come to the fundamental distinctions it is still more obvious that they must be
received with a certain latitude or our government could not go on.
To make a rule of conduct applicable to an individual who but for such action
would be free from it is to legislate yet it is what the judges do whenever they
determine which of two competing principles of policy shall prevail.
xxx xxx xxx
It does not seem to need argument to show that however we may disguise it by
veiling words we do not and cannot carry out the distinction between legislative
and executive action with mathematical precision and divide the branches into
waterlight compartments, were it ever so desirable to do so, which I am far from
believing that it is, or that the Constitution requires.

True, there are jurists and legal writers who affirm that judges should not legislate, but grudgingly concede
that in certain cases judges do legislate. They criticize the assumption by the courts of such law-making
power as dangerous for it may degenerate into Judicial tyranny. They include Blackstone, Jeremy
Bentham, Justice Black, Justice Harlan, Justice Roberts, Justice David Brewer, Ronald Dworkin, Rolf
Sartorious, Macklin Fleming and Beryl Harold Levy. But said Justices, jurists or legal commentators, who
either deny the power of the courts to legislate in-between gaps of the law, or decry the exercise of such
power, have not pointed to examples of the exercise by the courts of such law-making authority in the
interpretation and application of the laws in specific cases that gave rise to judicial tyranny or oppression
or that such judicial legislation has not protected public interest or individual welfare, particularly the lowly
workers or the underprivileged.
On the other hand, there are numerous decisions interpreting the Bill of Rights and statutory enactments
expanding the scope of such provisions to protect human rights. Foremost among them is the doctrine in
the cases of Miranda vs. Arizona (384 US 436 1964), Gideon vs. Wainright (372 US 335), Escubedo vs.
Illinois (378 US 478), which guaranteed the accused under custodial investigation his rights to remain
silent and to counsel and to be informed of such rights as even as it protects him against the use of force
or intimidation to extort confession from him. These rights are not found in the American Bill of Rights.
These rights are now institutionalized in Section 20, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution. Only the peaceand-order adherents were critical of the activism of the American Supreme Court led by Chief Justice Earl
Warren.
Even the definition of Identical offenses for purposes of the double jeopardy provision was developed by
American judicial decisions, not by amendment to the Bill of Rights on double jeopardy (see Justice
Laurel in People vs. Tarok, 73 Phil. 260, 261-268). And these judicial decisions have been re-stated in
Section 7 of Rule 117 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, as well as in Section 9 of Rule 117 of the
1964 Revised Rules of Court. In both provisions, the second offense is the same as the first offense if the
second offense is an attempt to commit the first or frustration thereof or necessarily includes or is
necessarily included in the first offense.
The requisites of double jeopardy are not spelled out in the Bill of Rights. They were also developed by
judicial decisions in the United States and in the Philippines even before people vs. Ylagan (58 Phil. 851853).
Again, the equal protection clause was interpreted in the case of Plessy vs. Ferguson (163 US 537) as
securing to the Negroes equal but separate facilities, which doctrine was revoked in the case of Brown vs.
Maryland Board of Education (349 US 294), holding that the equal protection clause means that the
Negroes are entitled to attend the same schools attended by the whites-equal facilities in the same
school-which was extended to public parks and public buses.
De-segregation, not segregation, is now the governing principle.
Among other examples, the due process clause was interpreted in the case of People vs. Pomar (46 Phil.
440) by a conservative, capitalistic court to invalidate a law granting maternity leave to working womenaccording primacy to property rights over human rights. The case of People vs. Pomar is no longer the
rule.
As early as 1904, in the case of Lochner vs. New York (198 US 45, 76, 49 L. ed. 937, 949), Justice
Holmes had been railing against the conservatism of Judges perverting the guarantee of due process to
protect property rights as against human rights or social justice for the working man. The law fixing
maximum hours of labor was invalidated. Justice Holmes was vindicated finally in 1936 in the case of
West Coast Hotel vs. Parish (300 US 377-79; 81 L. ed. 703) where the American Supreme Court upheld
the rights of workers to social justice in the form of guaranteed minimum wage for women and minors,
working hours not exceeding eight (8) daily, and maternity leave for women employees.

The power of judicial review and the principle of separation of powers as well as the rule on political
questions have been evolved and grafted into the American Constitution by judicial decisions (Marbury vs.
Madison, supra Coleman vs. Miller, 307 US 433, 83 L. ed. 1385; Springer vs. Government, 277 US 210212, 72 L. ed. 852, 853).
It is noteworthy that Justice Black, who seems to be against judicial legislation, penned a separate
concurring opinion in the case of Coleman vs. Miller, supra, affirming the doctrine of political question as
beyond the ambit of judicial review. There is nothing in both the American and Philippine Constitutions
expressly providing that the power of the courts is limited by the principle of separation of powers and the
doctrine on political questions. There are numerous cases in Philippine jurisprudence applying the
doctrines of separation of powers and political questions and invoking American precedents.
Unlike the American Constitution, both the 1935 and 1973 Philippine Constitutions expressly vest in the
Supreme Court the power to review the validity or constitutionality of any legislative enactment or
executive act.
WHEREFORE, THE TRIAL COURT'S ORDER OF DISMISSAL IS HEREBY REVERSED AND SET
ASIDE AND THE CASE IS REMANDED TO IT FOR FURTHER PROCEEDINGS. SHOULD A GREATER
AMOUNT OF DAMAGES BE DECREED IN FAVOR OF HEREIN PETITIONERS, THE PAYMENTS
ALREADY MADE TO THEM PURSUANT TO THE WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION ACT SHALL BE
DEDUCTED. NO COSTS.
SO ORDERED.
Fernando, C.J., Teehankee, Plana, Escolin, De la Fuente, Cuevas and Alampay JJ., concur.
Concepcion, Jr., J., is on leave.
Abad Santos and Relova, JJ., took no part.
G.R. No. 108763 February 13, 1997
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and RORIDEL OLAVIANO MOLINA, respondents.
PANGANIBAN, J.:
The Family Code of the Philippines provides an entirely new ground (in addition to those enumerated in
the Civil Code) to assail the validity of a marriage, namely, "psychological incapacity." Since the Code's
effectivity, our courts have been swamped with various petitions to declare marriages void based on this
ground. Although this Court had interpreted the meaning of psychological incapacity in the recent case of
Santos vs. Court of Appeals, still many judges and lawyers find difficulty in applying said novel provision
in specific cases. In the present case and in the context of the herein assailed Decision of the Court of
Appeals, the Solicitor General has labelled exaggerated to be sure but nonetheless expressive of his
frustration Article 36 as the "most liberal divorce procedure in the world." Hence, this Court in addition
to resolving the present case, finds the need to lay down specific guidelines in the interpretation and
application of Article 36 of the Family Code.
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 challenging the January 25, 1993 Decision 1
of the Court of Appeals 2 in CA-G.R. CV No. 34858 affirming in toto the May 14, 1991 decision of the
Regional Trial Court of La Trinidad, 3 Benguet, which declared the marriage of respondent Roridel

Olaviano Molina to Reynaldo Molina void ab initio, on the ground of "psychological incapacity" under
Article 36 of the Family Code.
The Facts
This case was commenced on August 16, 1990 with the filing by respondent Roridel O. Molina of a
verified petition for declaration of nullity of her marriage to Reynaldo Molina. Essentially, the petition
alleged that Roridel and Reynaldo were married on April 14, 1985 at the San Agustin Church 4 in Manila;
that a son, Andre O. Molina was born; that after a year of marriage, Reynaldo showed signs of
"immaturity and irresponsibility" as a husband and a father since he preferred to spend more time with his
peers and friends on whom he squandered his money; that he depended on his parents for aid and
assistance, and was never honest with his wife in regard to their finances, resulting in frequent quarrels
between them; that sometime in February 1986, Reynaldo was relieved of his job in Manila, and since
then Roridel had been the sole breadwinner of the family; that in October 1986 the couple had a very
intense quarrel, as a result of which their relationship was estranged; that in March 1987, Roridel resigned
from her job in Manila and went to live with her parents in Baguio City; that a few weeks later, Reynaldo
left Roridel and their child, and had since then abandoned them; that Reynaldo had thus shown that he
was psychologically incapable of complying with essential marital obligations and was a highly immature
and habitually quarrel some individual who thought of himself as a king to be served; and that it would be
to the couple's best interest to have their marriage declared null and void in order to free them from what
appeared to be an incompatible marriage from the start.
In his Answer filed on August 28, 1989, Reynaldo admitted that he and Roridel could no longer live
together as husband and wife, but contended that their misunderstandings and frequent quarrels were
due to (1) Roridel's strange behavior of insisting on maintaining her group of friends even after their
marriage; (2) Roridel's refusal to perform some of her marital duties such as cooking meals; and (3)
Roridel's failure to run the household and handle their finances.
During the pre-trial on October 17, 1990, the following were stipulated:
1. That the parties herein were legally married on April 14, 1985 at the Church of
St. Augustine, Manila;
2. That out of their marriage, a child named Albert Andre Olaviano Molina was
born on July 29, 1986;
3. That the parties are separated-in-fact for more than three years;
4. That petitioner is not asking support for her and her child;
5. That the respondent is not asking for damages;
6. That the common child of the parties is in the custody of the petitioner wife.
Evidence for herein respondent wife consisted of her own testimony and that of her friends Rosemarie
Ventura and Maria Leonora Padilla as well as of Ruth G. Lalas, a social worker, and of Dr. Teresita
Hidalgo-Sison, a psychiatrist of the Baguio General Hospital and Medical Center. She also submitted
documents marked as Exhibits "A" to "E-1." Reynaldo did not present any evidence as he appeared only
during the pre-trial conference.
On May 14, 1991, the trial court rendered judgment declaring the marriage void. The appeal of petitioner
was denied by the Court of Appeals which affirmed in toto the RTC's decision. Hence, the present
recourse.

The Issue
In his petition, the Solicitor General insists that "the Court of Appeals made an erroneous and incorrect
interpretation of the phrase 'psychological incapacity' (as provided under Art. 36 of the Family Code) and
made an incorrect application thereof to the facts of the case," adding that the appealed Decision tended
"to establish in effect the most liberal divorce procedure in the world which is anathema to our culture."
In denying the Solicitor General's appeal, the respondent Court relied 5 heavily on the trial court's findings
"that the marriage between the parties broke up because of their opposing and conflicting personalities."
Then, it added it sown opinion that "the Civil Code Revision Committee (hereinafter referred to as
Committee) intended to liberalize the application of our civil laws on personal and family rights. . . ." It
concluded that:
As ground for annulment of marriage, We view psychologically incapacity as a
broad range of mental and behavioral conduct on the part of one spouse
indicative of how he or she regards the marital union, his or her personal
relationship with the other spouse, as well as his or her conduct in the long haul
for the attainment of the principal objectives of marriage. If said conduct,
observed and considered as a whole, tends to cause the union to self-destruct
because it defeats the very objectives of marriage, then there is enough reason
to leave the spouses to their individual fates.
In the case at bar, We find that the trial judge committed no indiscretion in
analyzing and deciding the instant case, as it did, hence, We find no cogent
reason to disturb the findings and conclusions thus made.
Respondent, in her Memorandum, adopts these discussions of the Court of Appeals.
The petitioner, on the other hand, argues that "opposing and conflicting personalities" is not equivalent to
psychological incapacity, explaining that such ground "is not simply the neglect by the parties to the
marriage of their responsibilities and duties, but a defect in their psychological nature which renders them
incapable of performing such marital responsibilities and duties."
The Court's Ruling
The petition is meritorious.
In Leouel Santos vs. Court of Appeals 6 this Court, speaking thru Mr. Justice Jose C. Vitug, ruled that
"psychological incapacity should refer to no less than a mental (nor physical) incapacity . . . and that
(t)here is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of
'psychological incapacity' to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an
utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. This psychologic condition
must exist at the time the marriage is celebrated." Citing Dr. Gerardo Veloso, a former presiding judge of
the Metropolitan Marriage Tribunal of the Catholic Archdiocese of Manila, 7 Justice Vitug wrote that "the
psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c)
incurability."
On the other hand, in the present case, there is no clear showing to us that the psychological defect
spoken of is an incapacity. It appears to us to be more of a "difficulty," if not outright "refusal" or "neglect"
in the performance of some marital obligations. Mere showing of "irreconciliable differences" and
"conflicting personalities" in no wise constitutes psychological incapacity. It is not enough to prove that the
parties failed to meet their responsibilities and duties as married persons; it is essential that they must be
shown to be incapable of doing so, due to some psychological (nor physical) illness.

The evidence adduced by respondent merely showed that she and her husband could nor get along with
each other. There had been no showing of the gravity of the problem; neither its juridical antecedence nor
its incurability. The expert testimony of Dr. Sison showed no incurable psychiatric disorder but only
incompatibility, not psychological incapacity. Dr. Sison testified: 8
COURT
Q It is therefore the recommendation of the psychiatrist based on
your findings that it is better for the Court to annul (sic) the
marriage?
A Yes, Your Honor.
Q There is no hope for the marriage?
A There is no hope, the man is also living with another woman.
Q Is it also the stand of the psychiatrist that the parties are
psychologically unfit for each other but they are psychologically
fit with other parties?
A Yes, Your Honor.
Q Neither are they psychologically unfit for their professions?
A Yes, Your Honor.
The Court has no more questions.
In the case of Reynaldo, there is no showing that his alleged personality traits were constitutive of
psychological incapacity existing at the time of marriage celebration. While some effort was made to
prove that there was a failure to fulfill pre-nuptial impressions of "thoughtfulness and gentleness" on
Reynaldo's part of being "conservative, homely and intelligent" on the part of Roridel, such failure of
expectation is nor indicative of antecedent psychological incapacity. If at all, it merely shows love's
temporary blindness to the faults and blemishes of the beloved.
During its deliberations, the Court decided to go beyond merely ruling on the facts of this case vis-a-vis
existing law and jurisprudence. In view of the novelty of Art. 36 of the Family Code and the difficulty
experienced by many trial courts interpreting and applying it, the Court decided to invite two amici curiae,
namely, the Most Reverend Oscar V. Cruz, 9 Vicar Judicial (Presiding Judge) of the National Appellate
Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, and Justice Ricardo C. Puno, 10 a member
of the Family Code Revision Committee. The Court takes this occasion to thank these friends of the Court
for their informative and interesting discussions during the oral argument on December 3, 1996, which
they followed up with written memoranda.
From their submissions and the Court's own deliberations, the following guidelines in the interpretation
and application of Art. 36 of the Family Code are hereby handed down for the guidance of the bench and
the bar:
(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be
resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity.
This is rooted in the fact that both our Constitution and our laws cherish the validity of marriage and unity
of the family. Thus, our Constitution devotes an entire Article on the Family, 11 recognizing it "as the

foundation of the nation." It decrees marriage as legally "inviolable," thereby protecting it from dissolution
at the whim of the parties. Both the family and marriage are to be "protected" by the state.
The Family Code 12 echoes this constitutional edict on marriage and the family and emphasizes the
permanence, inviolability and solidarity
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged
in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision. Article 36 of
the Family Code requires that the incapacity must be psychological not physical. although its
manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. The evidence must convince the court that the parties,
or one of them, was mentally or physically ill to such an extent that the person could not have known the
obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid assumption thereof. Although
no example of such incapacity need be given here so as not to limit the application of the provision under
the principle of ejusdem generis, 13 nevertheless such root cause must be identified as a psychological
illness and its incapacitating nature explained. Expert evidence may be given qualified psychiatrist and
clinical psychologists.
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the celebration" of the marriage. The
evidence must show that the illness was existing when the parties exchanged their "I do's." The
manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable at such time, but the illness itself must have attached
at such moment, or prior thereto.
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. Such
incurability may be absolute or even relative only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily absolutely
against everyone of the same sex. Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant to the assumption of
marriage obligations, not necessarily to those not related to marriage, like the exercise of a profession or
employment in a job. Hence, a pediatrician may be effective in diagnosing illnesses of children and
prescribing medicine to cure them but may not be psychologically capacitated to procreate, bear and
raise his/her own children as an essential obligation of marriage.
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the essential
obligations of marriage. Thus, "mild characteriological peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional
outbursts" cannot be accepted as root causes. The illness must be shown as downright incapacity or
inability, nor a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. In other words, there is a natal or supervening
disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral element in the personality structure that effectively
incapacitates the person from really accepting and thereby complying with the obligations essential to
marriage.
(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code
as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to
parents and their children. Such non-complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition,
proven by evidence and included in the text of the decision.
(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the
Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts. It is clear that
Article 36 was taken by the Family Code Revision Committee from Canon 1095 of the New Code of
Canon Law, which became effective in 1983 and which provides:
The following are incapable of contracting marriage: Those who are unable to
assume the essential obligations of marriage due to causes of psychological
nature. 14
Since the purpose of including such provision in our Family Code is to harmonize our civil laws with the
religious faith of our people, it stands to reason that to achieve such harmonization, great persuasive

weight should be given to decision of such appellate tribunal. Ideally subject to our law on evidence
what is decreed as canonically invalid should also be decreed civilly void.
This is one instance where, in view of the evident source and purpose of the Family Code provision,
contemporaneous religious interpretation is to be given persuasive effect. Here, the State and the Church
while remaining independent, separate and apart from each other shall walk together in synodal
cadence towards the same goal of protecting and cherishing marriage and the family as the inviolable
base of the nation.
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as
counsel for the state. No decision shall he handed down unless the Solicitor General issues a
certification, which will be quoted in the decision, briefly staring therein his reasons for his agreement or
opposition, as the case may be, to the petition. The Solicitor General, along with the prosecuting attorney,
shall submit to the court such certification within fifteen (15) days from the date the case is deemed
submitted for resolution of the court. The Solicitor General shall discharge the equivalent function of the
defensor vinculi contemplated under Canon 1095.
In the instant case and applying Leouel Santos, we have already ruled to grant the petition. Such ruling
becomes even more cogent with the use of the foregoing guidelines.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The
marriage of Roridel Olaviano to Reynaldo Molina subsists and remains valid.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-34964 January 31, 1973
CHINA BANKING CORPORATION and TAN KIM LIONG, petitioners-appellants,
vs.
HON. WENCESLAO ORTEGA, as Presiding Judge of the Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch
VIII, and VICENTE G. ACABAN, respondents-appellees.
Sy Santos, Del Rosario and Associates for petitioners-appellants.
Tagalo, Gozar and Associates for respondents-appellees.
MAKALINTAL, J.:
The only issue in this petition for certiorari to review the orders dated March 4, 1972 and March 27, 1972,
respectively, of the Court of First Instance of Manila in its Civil Case No. 75138, is whether or not a
banking institution may validly refuse to comply with a court process garnishing the bank deposit of a
judgment debtor, by invoking the provisions of Republic Act No. 1405. *
On December 17, 1968 Vicente Acaban filed a complaint in the court a quo against Bautista Logging Co.,
Inc., B & B Forest Development Corporation and Marino Bautista for the collection of a sum of money.
Upon motion of the plaintiff the trial court declared the defendants in default for failure to answer within
the reglementary period, and authorized the Branch Clerk of Court and/or Deputy Clerk to receive the
plaintiff's evidence. On January 20, 1970 judgment by default was rendered against the defendants.
To satisfy the judgment, the plaintiff sought the garnishment of the bank deposit of the defendant B & B
Forest Development Corporation with the China Banking Corporation. Accordingly, a notice of
garnishment was issued by the Deputy Sheriff of the trial court and served on said bank through its
cashier, Tan Kim Liong. In reply, the bank' cashier invited the attention of the Deputy Sheriff to the

provisions of Republic Act No. 1405 which, it was alleged, prohibit the disclosure of any information
relative to bank deposits. Thereupon the plaintiff filed a motion to cite Tan Kim Liong for contempt of court.
In an order dated March 4, 1972 the trial court denied the plaintiff's motion. However, Tan Kim Liong was
ordered "to inform the Court within five days from receipt of this order whether or not there is a deposit in
the China Banking Corporation of defendant B & B Forest Development Corporation, and if there is any
deposit, to hold the same intact and not allow any withdrawal until further order from this Court." Tan Kim
Liong moved to reconsider but was turned down by order of March 27, 1972. In the same order he was
directed "to comply with the order of this Court dated March 4, 1972 within ten (10) days from the receipt
of copy of this order, otherwise his arrest and confinement will be ordered by the Court." Resisting the two
orders, the China Banking Corporation and Tan Kim Liong instituted the instant petition.
The pertinent provisions of Republic Act No. 1405 relied upon by the petitioners reads:
Sec. 2. All deposits of whatever nature with banks or banking institutions in the
Philippines including investments in bonds issued by the Government of the
Philippines, its political subdivisions and its instrumentalities, are hereby
considered as of absolutely confidential nature and may not be examined,
inquired or looked into by any person, government official, bureau or office,
except upon written permission of the depositor, or in cases of impeachment, or
upon order of a competent court in cases of bribery or dereliction of duty of public
officials, or in cases where the money deposited or invested is the subject matter
of the litigation.
Sec 3. It shall be unlawful for any official or employee of a banking institution to
disclose to any person other than those mentioned in Section two hereof any
information concerning said deposits.
Sec. 5. Any violation of this law will subject offender upon conviction, to an
imprisonment of not more than five years or a fine of not more than twenty
thousand pesos or both, in the discretion of the court.
The petitioners argue that the disclosure of the information required by the court does not fall within any of
the four (4) exceptions enumerated in Section 2, and that if the questioned orders are complied with Tan
Kim Liong may be criminally liable under Section 5 and the bank exposed to a possible damage suit by B
& B Forest Development Corporation. Specifically referring to this case, the position of the petitioners is
that the bank deposit of judgment debtor B & B Forest Development Corporation cannot be subject to
garnishment to satisfy a final judgment against it in view of the aforequoted provisions of law.
We do not view the situation in that light. The lower court did not order an examination of or inquiry into
the deposit of B & B Forest Development Corporation, as contemplated in the law. It merely required Tan
Kim Liong to inform the court whether or not the defendant B & B Forest Development Corporation had a
deposit in the China Banking Corporation only for purposes of the garnishment issued by it, so that the
bank would hold the same intact and not allow any withdrawal until further order. It will be noted from the
discussion of the conference committee report on Senate Bill No. 351 and House Bill No. 3977, which
later became Republic Act 1405, that it was not the intention of the lawmakers to place bank deposits
beyond the reach of execution to satisfy a final judgment. Thus:
Mr. MARCOS. Now, for purposes of the record, I should like the Chairman of the
Committee on Ways and Means to clarify this further. Suppose an individual has
a tax case. He is being held liable by the Bureau of Internal Revenue for, say,
P1,000.00 worth of tax liability, and because of this the deposit of this individual is
attached by the Bureau of Internal Revenue.

Mr. RAMOS. The attachment will only apply after the court has pronounced
sentence declaring the liability of such person. But where the primary aim is to
determine whether he has a bank deposit in order to bring about a proper
assessment by the Bureau of Internal Revenue, such inquiry is not authorized by
this proposed law.
Mr. MARCOS. But under our rules of procedure and under the Civil Code, the
attachment or garnishment of money deposited is allowed. Let us assume, for
instance, that there is a preliminary attachment which is for garnishment or for
holding liable all moneys deposited belonging to a certain individual, but such
attachment or garnishment will bring out into the open the value of such deposit.
Is that prohibited by this amendment or by this law?
Mr. RAMOS. It is only prohibited to the extent that the inquiry is limited, or rather,
the inquiry is made only for the purpose of satisfying a tax liability already
declared for the protection of the right in favor of the government; but when the
object is merely to inquire whether he has a deposit or not for purposes of
taxation, then this is fully covered by the law.
Mr. MARCOS. And it protects the depositor, does it not?
Mr. RAMOS. Yes, it protects the depositor.
Mr. MARCOS. The law prohibits a mere investigation into the existence and the
amount of the deposit.
Mr. RAMOS. Into the very nature of such deposit.
Mr. MARCOS. So I come to my original question. Therefore, preliminary
garnishment or attachment of the deposit is not allowed?
Mr. RAMOS. No, without judicial authorization.
Mr. MARCOS. I am glad that is clarified. So that the established rule of procedure
as well as the substantive law on the matter is amended?
Mr. RAMOS. Yes. That is the effect.
Mr. MARCOS. I see. Suppose there has been a decision, definitely establishing
the liability of an individual for taxation purposes and this judgment is sought to
be executed ... in the execution of that judgment, does this bill, or this proposed
law, if approved, allow the investigation or scrutiny of the bank deposit in order to
execute the judgment?
Mr. RAMOS. To satisfy a judgment which has become executory.
Mr. MARCOS. Yes, but, as I said before, suppose the tax liability is P1,000,000
and the deposit is half a million, will this bill allow scrutiny into the deposit in order
that the judgment may be executed?
Mr. RAMOS. Merely to determine the amount of such money to satisfy that
obligation to the Government, but not to determine whether a deposit has been
made in evasion of taxes.

xxx xxx xxx

Mr. MACAPAGAL. But let us suppose that in an ordinary civil action for the
recovery of a sum of money the plaintiff wishes to attach the properties of the
defendant to insure the satisfaction of the judgment. Once the judgment is
rendered, does the gentleman mean that the plaintiff cannot attach the bank
deposit of the defendant?
Mr. RAMOS. That was the question raised by the gentleman from Pangasinan to
which I replied that outside the very purpose of this law it could be reached by
attachment.
Mr. MACAPAGAL. Therefore, in such ordinary civil cases it can be attached?
Mr. RAMOS. That is so.
(Vol. II, Congressional Record, House of Representatives, No. 12, pp. 38393840, July 27, 1955).
It is sufficiently clear from the foregoing discussion of the conference committee report of the two houses
of Congress that the prohibition against examination of or inquiry into a bank deposit under Republic Act
1405 does not preclude its being garnished to insure satisfaction of a judgment. Indeed there is no real
inquiry in such a case, and if the existence of the deposit is disclosed the disclosure is purely incidental to
the execution process. It is hard to conceive that it was ever within the intention of Congress to enable
debtors to evade payment of their just debts, even if ordered by the Court, through the expedient of
converting their assets into cash and depositing the same in a bank.
WHEREFORE, the orders of the lower court dated March 4 and 27, 1972, respectively, are hereby
affirmed, with costs against the petitioners-appellants.
Zaldivar, Castro, Fernando, Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio and Esguerra, JJ., concur.
Concepcion, C.J. and Teehankee, J., took no part.

G.R. No. L-37867 February 22, 1982

BOARD OF ADMINISTRATORS, PHILIPPINES VETERANS ADMINISTRATION, petitioner,
vs.
HON. JOSE G. BAUTISTA, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of the CFI Manila, Branch III, and
CALIXTO V. GASILAO, respondents.

GUERRERO, J.:
This is a petition to review on certiorari the decision of respondent Court of First Instance of Manila,
Branch III, rendered on October 25, 1973 in Civil Case No. 90450 for mandamus filed by Calixto V.
Gasilao against the Board of Administrators of the Philippine Veterans Administration.
The facts as found by the Court a quo to have been established by the pleadings find by the parties are
stated in the decision under review from which We quote the following:

Calixto V. Gasilao, pauper litigant and petitioner in the above-entitled case, was a
veteran in good standing during World War II. On October 19, 1955, he filed a
claim for disability pension under Section 9, Republic Act No. 65. The claim was
disapproved by the Philippine Veterans Board (now Board of Administrators,
Philippine Veterans Administration).
Meanwhile, Republic Act 65 was amended by Republic Act 1362 on June 22,
1955 by including as part of the benefit of P50.00, P10.00 a month for each of
the unmarried minor children below 18 of the veteran Republic Act No. 1362 was
implemented by the respondents only on July 1, 1955.
On June 18, 1957, Section 9 of Republic Act No. 65 was further amended by
Republic Act 1920 increasing the life pension of the veteran to P100.00 a month
and maintaining the P10.00 a month each for the unmarried minor children below
18.
Fortunately, on August 8, 1968, the claim of the petitioner which was disapproved
in December, 1955 was reconsidered and his claim was finally approved at the
rate of P100.00 a month, life pension, and the additional Pl0.00 for each of his
ten unmarried minor children below 18. In view of the approval of the claim of
petitioner, he requested respondents that his claim be made retroactive as of the
date when his original application was flied or disapproved in 1955. Respondents
did not act on his request.
On June 22, 1969, Section 9 of Republic Act No. 65 was amended by Republic
Act No. 5753 which increased the life pension of the veteran to P200.00 a month
and granted besides P30.00 a month for the wife and P30.00 a month each for
his unmarried minor children below 18. In view of the new law, respondents
increased the monthly pension of petitioner to P125.00 effective January 15,
1971 due to insufficient funds to cover full implementation. His wife was given a
monthly pension of P7.50 until January 1, 1972 when Republic Act 5753 was fully
implemented.
Petitioner now claims that he was deprived of his right to the pension from
October 19, 1955 to June 21, 1957 at the rate of P50.00 per month plus P10.00 a
month each for his six (6) unmarried minor children below 18. lie also alleges that
from June 22, 1957 to August 7, 1968 he is entitled to the difference of P100.00
per month plus P10.00 a month each for his seven (7) unmarried nor children
below 18. Again, petitioner asserts the difference of P100.00 per month, plus
P30.00 a month for his wife and the difference of P20.00 a month each for his
four (4) unmarried minor children below 18 from June 22, 1969 up to January 14,
1971 and finally, the difference of P75.00 per month plus P30.00 a month for his
wife and the difference of P20.00 a month for his three (3) unmarried minor
children below 18 from January 15, 1971 to December 31, 1971. 1
According to the records, the parties, through their respective counsels, filed on September 24, 1973 the
following stipulation of facts in the lower Court:
STIPULATION OF FACTS
COME NOW the parties thru their respective counsel, and unto this Honorable
Court, respectfully state that they agree on the following facts which may be
considered as proved without the need of the introduction of any evidence
thereon, to wit:

1. Petitioner was a veteran in good standing during the last World War that took
active participation in the liberation drive against the enemy, and due to his
military service, he was rendered disabled.
2. The Philippine Veterans Administration, formerly the Philippine Veterans
Board, (now Philippine Veterans Affairs Office) is an agency of the Government
charged with the administration of different laws giving various benefits in favor of
veterans and their orphans/or widows and parents; that it has the power to adopt
rules and regulations to implement said laws and to pass upon the merits and
qualifications of persons applying for rights and privileges extended by this Act
pursuant to such rules and regulations as it may adopt to insure the speedy and
honest fulfillment of its aims and purposes.
3. On July 23, 1955, petitioner filed a claim (Claim No. Dis-12336) for disability
pension under Section 9 of RA 65, with the Philippine Veterans Board (later
succeeded by the Philippine Veterans Administration, now Philippine Veterans
Affairs Office), alleging that he was suffering from PTB, which he incurred in line
of duty.
4. Due to petitioner's failure to complete his supporting papers and submit
evidence to establish his service connected illness, his claim was disapproved by
the Board of the defunct Philippine Veterans Board on December 18, 1955.
5. On August 8, 1968, petitioner was able to complete his supporting papers and,
after due investigation and processing, the Board of Administrators found out that
his disability was 100% thus he was awarded the full benefits of section 9 of RA
65, and was therefore given a pension of P100.00 a month and with an additional
P 10.00 a month for each of his unmarried minor children pursuant to RA 1920,
amending section 9 of RA 65.
6. RA 5753 was approved on June 22, 1969, providing for an increase in the
basic pension to P200.00 a month and the additional pension, to P30.00 a month
for the wife and each of the unmarried minor children. Petitioner's monthly
pension was, however, increased only on January 15, 1971, and by 25% of the
increases provided by law, due to the fact that it was only on said date that funds
were released for the purpose, and the amount so released was only sufficient to
pay only 25% of the increase.
7. On January 15, 1972, more funds were released to implement fully RA 5753
and snow payment in full of the benefits thereunder from said date.
WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed that a decision be rendered in
accordance with the foregoing stipulation of facts. It is likewise prayed that the
parties be granted a period of (15) days within which to file their memoranda. 2
Upon consideration of the foregoing and the Memoranda filed by the parties, the lower Court rendered
judgment against therein respondent Board of Administrators, the dispositive portion of which reads as
follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered for petitioner
and the respondents are ordered to make petitioner's pension effective as of
December 18, 1955 at the rate of P50.00 per month; and the rate increased to
P100.00 per month plus P10.00 per month each for his ten unmarried minor
children below 18 years of age from June 22, 1957 up to August 7..1968; to pay

the difference of P100.00 per month plus P30.00 per month and P20.00 per
month each for his ten unmarried children below 18 years of age from June 22,
1969 up to January 15, 1971, the difference of P75.00 per month plus P22.50 per
month for his wife and P20.00 per month each for his unmarried nor children then
below 18 years of age from January 16, 1971 up to December 31, 1971.
SO ORDERED.
Manila, October 25, 1973. 3
In its Petition before this Court, the Board of Administrators of the Philippine Veterans Administration,
through the Office of the Solicitor General, challenges the abovementioned decision of the Court a quo on
the following grounds:
1. The lower Court erred in ordering the petitioners to retroact the effectivity of
their award to respondent Calixto V. Gasilao of full benefits under section 9 of RA
65 to December 18, 1955, the date when his application was disapproved due to
dis failure to complete his supporting papers and submit evidence to establish his
service connected illness, and not August 8, 1968, the date when he was able to
complete his papers and allow processing and approval of his application.
2. The lower Court erred in ordering payment of claims which had prescribed.
3. The lower Court erred in allowing payment of claims under a law for which no
funds had been released. 4
The question raised under the first assigned error is: When should private respondent Gasilao's pension
benefits start
The lower Court, quoting excerpts from Our decision in Begosa vs. Chairman Philippine Veterans
Administration, 5 ruled that Gasilao's pension benefits should retroact to the date of the disapproval of his
claim on December 18, 1955, and not commence from the approval thereon on August 8, 1968 as
contended by the Board of Administrators.
Petitioner maintains the stand that the facts of the Begosa case are not similar to those of the case at bar
to warrant an application of the ruling therein on the retroactivity of a pension award to the date of prior
disapproval of the claim. In the Begosa case, the Supreme Court speaking thru then Associate Justice,
now Chief Justice Fernando, affirmed the decision of the lower Court, and ruled in part as follows:
From the facts just set out, it will be noted that plaintiff filed his said claim for
disability pension as far back as March 4, 1955; that it was erroneously
disapproved on June 21, 1955, because his dishonorable discharge from the
Army was not a good or proper ground for the said disapproval and that on
reconsideration asked for by him on November 1, 1957, which he continued to
follow up, the Board of Administrators, Philippine Veterans Administration,
composed of herein defendants, which took over the duties of the Philippine
Veterans Board, finally approved his claim on September 2, 1964, at the rate of
P30.00 a month. 6
Had it not been for the said error, it appears that there was no good ground to
deny the said claim, so that the latter was valid and meritorious even as of the
date of its filing on March 4, 1955, hence to make the same effective only as of

the date of its approval on September 2, 1964 according to defendant's stand

would be greatly unfair and prejudicial to plaintiff. 7
In other words, the favorable award which claimant Begosa finally obtained on September 2, 1964 was
made to retroact to the date of prior disapproval of the claim on June 2, 1955 for the reason that such
disapproval was erroneously made.
In the instant case, on the other hand, the herein claim of respondent Gasilao was denied on December
18, 1955 because of his "failure to complete his supporting papers and submit evidence to establish his
service-connected illness" (Stipulation of Facts, Par. 4, ante). Nonetheless, the Stipulation of Facts
admitted in par. 1 that "Petitioner was a veteran in good standing during the last World War that took
active participation in the liberation drive against the enemy, and due to his military service, he was
rendered disabled." From this admission in par. 1, it can reasonably be deduced that the action on the
claim of Gasilao was merely suspended by the Philippine Veterans Administration pending the completion
of the required supporting papers and evidence to establish his service-connected illness. Hence, Our
ruling in the Begosa case making retroactive the award in favor of the veteran still holds.
Republic Act No. 65 otherwise known as the Veterans' Bill of Rights, as amended, does not explicitly
provide for the effectivity of pension awards. However, petitioner seeks to remedy this legislative
deficiency by citing Section 15 of the law which in part reads as follows:
Sec. 15. Any person who desires to take advantage of the rights and privileges
provided for in this Act should file his application with the Board ...
Petitioner contends that since the foregoing section impliedly requires that the application filed should first
be approved by the Board of Administrators before the claimant could receive his pension, therefore, an
award of pension benefits should commence form the date of he approval of the application.
This stand of the petitioner does not appear to be in consonance with the spirit and intent of the law,
considering that Republic Act 65 is a veteran pension law which must be accorded a liberal construction
and interpretation in order to favor those entitled to the rights, privileges and benefits granted thereunder,
among which are the right to resume old positions in the government, educational benefits, the privilege
to take promotional examinations, a life pension for the incapacitated, pensions for widow and children,
hospitalization and medical care benefits.
As it is generally known, the purpose of Congress in granting veteran pensions is to compensate, as far
as may be, a class of men who suffered in the service for the hardships they endured and the dangers
they encountered, 8 and more particularly, those who have become incapacitated for work owing to
sickness, disease or injuries sustained while in line of duty. 9 A veteran pension law is, therefore, a
governmental expression of gratitude to and recognition of those who rendered service for the country,
especially during times of war or revolution, by extending to them regular monetary aid. For this reason, it
is the general rule that a liberal construction is given to pension statutes in favor of those entitled to
pension. Courts tend to favor the pensioner, but such constructional preference is to be considered with
other guides to interpretation, and a construction of pension laws must depend on its own particular
language. 10
Significantly, the original text of RA 65 provided that:
Sec. 6. It also shall be the duty of the Board (then the Philippine Veterans Board)
to pass upon the merits and qualifications of persons applying for the rights
and/or privileges extended by this Act, pursuant to such rules as it may adopt to
insure the speedy and honest fulfillment of its aims and purposes. (Emphasis
supplied.)

The foregoing provision clearly makes it incumbent upon the implementing Board to carry out the
provisions of the statute in the most expeditious way possible and without unnecessary delay. In the
Begosa case, it took nine years (from June 2, 1955 to September 2, 1964) before the claimant finally
obtained his pension grant, whereas in the instant case, it took about twelve years (from December, 1955
to August 8, 1968) for respondent Gasilao to receive his pension claim. To Our mind, it would be more in
consonance with the spirit and intentment of the law that the benefits therein granted be received and
enjoyed at the earliest possible time by according retroactive effect to the grant of the pension award as
We have done in the Begosa case.
On the other hand, if the pension awards are made effective only upon approval of the corresponding
application which would be dependent on the discretion of the Board of Administrators which as noted
above had been abused through inaction extending to nine years, even to twelve years, the noble and
humanitarian purposes for which the law had enacted could easily be thwarted or defeated.
On the issue of prescription, petitioner cites Article 1144 of the Civil Code which provides:
Art. 1144. The following actions must be brought within ten years from the time
the right of action accrues:
(1) Upon a written contract;
(2) Upon an obligation created by law; and
(3) Upon a judgment.
Petitioner now contends that since the action was filed in the lower Court on April 13, 1973 seeking the
payment of alleged claims which have accrued more than ten (10) years prior to said date, the same
should have been disallowed as to the prescribed claims.
The obligation of the government to pay pension was created by law (Sec. 9, R.A. 65). Hence, the tenyear prescriptive period should be counted from the date of passage of the law which is September 25,
1946, the reason being that it is only from said date that private respondent could have filed his
application. Taking September 25, 1946 as the point of reference, the actual filing of Gasilao's application
on July 23, 1955 was clearly made within and effectively interrupted the prescriptive period. It is not the
date of the commencement of the action in the lower Court which should be reckoned with, for it was not
on said date that Gasilao first sought to claim his pension benefits, but on July 23, 1955 when he filed his
application with the defunct Philippine Veterans Board. As We had the occasion to state in the case of
Vda. de Nator vs. C.I.R., 11 "the basis of prescription is the unwarranted failure to bring the matter to the
attention of those who are by law authorized to take cognizance thereof."
The Stipulation of Facts do not show and neither do the records indicate when Gasilao attempted to
reinstate his claim after the same was disapproved on December 18, 1955. What is evident is that he did
take steps to reinstate his claim because on August 8, 1968, herein petitioner finally approved his
application. We find it more logical to presume that upon being properly notified of the disapproval of his
application and the reasons therefor, Gasilao, being the interested party that he was proceeded to work
for the completion of the requirements of the Board, as in fact he was successful in meeting such
requirements. There is nothing in the record to show intentional abandonment of the claim to as to make
the prescriptive period continue to run again.
The third ground relied upon in support of this Petition involves the issue as to whether or not the
payment of increased pension provided in the amendatory Act, R.A. 5753, could be ordered, even where
there was no actual release of funds for the purpose, although the law itself expressly provided for an
appropriation. In the case of Board of Adminitrators, Philippine Veterans Administration vs. Hon. Agcoili,
et al., 12 penned by Chief Justice Fred Ruiz Castro, the same issue was treated in this wise:

... The inability of the petitioner to pay Abrera the differential of P60.00 in monthly
pension is attributed by it, in its own words, "to the failure of Congress to
appropriate the necessary funds to cover all claims for benefits, pensions and
allowances." And the petitioner states that it has "no alternative but to suspend
(full implementation of said laws until such time, as sufficient funds have been
appropriated by Congress" to cover the total amount of all approved claims.
We find the explanation of the petitioner satisfactory, but we nevertheless hold
that as a matter of law Abrera is entitled to a monthly pension of P120.00 from
January 1, 1972 when Republic Act 5753 was implemented up to the present, if
his physical disability rating has continued and continues to be 60%. Payment to
him of what is due him from January 1, 1972 must however remain subject to the
availability of Government funds duly set aside for the purpose and subject
further periodic re-rating of his physical disability.
But even if we have thus defined the precise terms, nature and scope of the
entitlement of the respondent Abrera, for the guidance of petitioner, we
nevertheless refrain from ordering the petitioner to pay the amount of P120.00
per month from January 1, 1972 that is due to the respondent by virtue of the
mandate of section 9 of Republic Act 65, as amended by Republic Act 5753,
because the Government has thus far not provided the necessary funds to pay
all valid claims duly approved under the authority of said statute. 13 (Emphasis
supplied.)
ACCORDINGLY, the judgment of the Court a quo is hereby modified to read as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Board of Administrators of the
Philippine Veterans Administration (now the Philippine Veterans Affairs Office) is
hereby ordered to make Gasilao's pension effective December 18, 1955 at the
rate of P50-00 per month plus P10.00 per month for each of his then unmarried
minor children below 18, and the former amount increased to P100.00 from June
22, 1957 to August 7, 1968.
The differentials in pension to which said Gasilao, his wife and his unmarried
minor children below 18 are entitled for the period from June 22, 1969 to January
14, 1972 by virtue of Republic Act No. 5753 are hereby declared subject to the
availability of Government funds appropriated for the purpose.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-15045

January 20, 1961

IN RE: PETITION FOR EXEMPTION FROM COVERAGE BY THE SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM.
ROMAN CATHOLIC ARCHBISHOP OF MANILA, petitioner-appellant,
vs.
SOCIAL SECURITY COMMISSION, respondent-appellee.
Feria, Manglapus and Associates for petitioner-appellant.
Legal Staff, Social Security System and Solicitor General for respondent-appellee.
GUTIERREZ DAVID, J.:

On September 1, 1958, the Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila, thru counsel, filed with the Social
Security Commission a request that "Catholic Charities, and all religious and charitable institutions and/or
organizations, which are directly or indirectly, wholly or partially, operated by the Roman Catholic
Archbishop of Manila," be exempted from compulsory coverage of Republic Act No. 1161, as amended,
otherwise known as the Social Security Law of 1954. The request was based on the claim that the said
Act is a labor law and does not cover religious and charitable institutions but is limited to businesses and
activities organized for profit. Acting upon the recommendation of its Legal Staff, the Social Security
Commission in its Resolution No. 572, series of 1958, denied the request. The Roman Catholic
Archbishop of Manila, reiterating its arguments and raising constitutional objections, requested for
reconsideration of the resolution. The request, however, was denied by the Commission in its Resolution
No. 767, series of 1958; hence, this appeal taken in pursuance of section 5(c) of Republic Act No. 1161,
as amended.
Section 9 of the Social Security Law, as amended, provides that coverage "in the System shall be
compulsory upon all members between the age of sixteen and sixty rears inclusive, if they have been for
at least six months a the service of an employer who is a member of the System, Provided, that the
Commission may not compel any employer to become member of the System unless he shall have been
in operation for at least two years and has at the time of admission, if admitted for membership during the
first year of the System's operation at least fifty employees, and if admitted for membership the following
year of operation and thereafter, at least six employees x x x." The term employer" as used in the law is
defined as any person, natural or juridical, domestic or foreign, who carries in the Philippines any trade,
business, industry, undertaking, or activity of any kind and uses the services of another person who is
under his orders as regards the employment, except the Government and any of its political subdivisions,
branches or instrumentalities, including corporations owned or controlled by the Government" (par. [c],
see. 8), while an "employee" refers to "any person who performs services for an 'employer' in which either
or both mental and physical efforts are used and who receives compensation for such services" (par. [d],
see. 8). "Employment", according to paragraph [i] of said section 8, covers any service performed by an
employer except those expressly enumerated thereunder, like employment under the Government, or any
of its political subdivisions, branches or instrumentalities including corporations owned and controlled by
the Government, domestic service in a private home, employment purely casual, etc.
From the above legal provisions, it is apparent that the coverage of the Social Security Law is predicated
on the existence of an employer-employee relationship of more or less permanent nature and extends to
employment of all kinds except those expressly excluded.
Appellant contends that the term "employer" as defined in the law should following the principle of
ejusdem generis be limited to those who carry on "undertakings or activities which have the element of
profit or gain, or which are pursued for profit or gain," because the phrase ,activity of any kind" in the
definition is preceded by the words "any trade, business, industry, undertaking." The contention cannot be
sustained. The rule ejusdem generis applies only where there is uncertainty. It is not controlling where the
plain purpose and intent of the Legislature would thereby be hindered and defeated. (Grosjean vs.
American Paints Works [La], 160 So. 449). In the case at bar, the definition of the term "employer" is, we
think, sufficiently comprehensive as to include religious and charitable institutions or entities not organized
for profit, like herein appellant, within its meaning. This is made more evident by the fact that it contains
an exception in which said institutions or entities are not included. And, certainly, had the Legislature
really intended to limit the operation of the law to entities organized for profit or gain, it would not have
defined an "employer" in such a way as to include the Government and yet make an express exception of
it.
It is significant to note that when Republic Act No. 1161 was enacted, services performed in the employ of
institutions organized for religious or charitable purposes were by express provisions of said Act excluded
from coverage thereof (sec. 8, par. [j] subpars. 7 and 8). That portion of the law, however, has been
deleted by express provision of Republic Act No. 1792, which took effect in 1957. This is clear indication
that the Legislature intended to include charitable and religious institutions within the scope of the law.

In support of its contention that the Social Security Law was intended to cover only employment for profit
or gain, appellant also cites the discussions of the Senate, portions of which were quoted in its brief.
There is, however, nothing whatsoever in those discussions touching upon the question of whether the
law should be limited to organizations for profit or gain. Of course, the said discussions dwelt at length
upon the need of a law to meet the problems of industrializing society and upon the plight of an employer
who fails to make a profit. But this is readily explained by the fact that the majority of those to be affected
by the operation of the law are corporations and industries which are established primarily for profit or
gain.
Appellant further argues that the Social Security Law is a labor law and, consequently, following the rule
laid down in the case of Boy Scouts of the Philippines vs. Araos (G.R. No. L-10091, January 29, 1958)
and other cases1, applies only to industry and occupation for purposes of profit and gain. The cases cited,
however, are not in point, for the reason that the law therein involved expressly limits its application either
to commercial, industrial, or agricultural establishments, or enterprises. .
Upon the other hand, the Social Security Law was enacted pursuant to the "policy of the Republic of the
Philippines to develop, establish gradually and perfect a social security system which shall be suitable to
the needs of the people throughout the Philippines and shall provide protection to employees against the
hazards of disability, sickness, old age and death." (See. 2, Republic Act No. 1161, as amended.) Such
enactment is a legitimate exercise of the police power. It affords protection to labor, especially to working
women and minors, and is in full accord with the constitutional provisions on the "promotion of social
justice to insure the well-being and economic security of all the people." Being in fact a social legislation,
compatible with the policy of the Church to ameliorate living conditions of the working class, appellant
cannot arbitrarily delimit the extent of its provisions to relations between capital and labor in industry and
agriculture.
There is no merit in the claim that the inclusion of religious organizations under the coverage of the Social
Security Law violates the constitutional prohibition against the application of public funds for the use,
benefit or support of any priest who might be employed by appellant. The funds contributed to the System
created by the law are not public funds, but funds belonging to the members which are merely held in
trust by the Government. At any rate, assuming that said funds are impressed with the character of public
funds, their payment as retirement death or disability benefits would not constitute a violation of the cited
provisions of the Constitution, since such payment shall be made to the priest not because he is a priest
but because he is an employee.
Neither may it be validly argued that the enforcement of the Social Security Law impairs appellant's right
to disseminate religious information. All that is required of appellant is to make monthly contributions to
the System for covered employees in its employ. These contributions, contrary to appellant's contention,
are not in the nature of taxes on employment." Together with the contributions imposed upon the
employees and the Government, they are intended for the protection of said employees against the
hazards of disability, sickness, old age and death in line with the constitutional mandate to promote social
justice to insure the well-being and economic security of all the people.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, Resolutions Nos. 572 kind 767, series of 1958, of the Social Security
Commission are hereby affirmed. So ordered with costs against appellant.
Paras, C.J., Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Paredes and Dizon, JJ., concur.
Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L. and Barrera, JJ., concur in the result.
Bengzon, J., reserves his vote.
EN BANC

[G.R. No. 127116. April 8, 1997]

ALEX L. DAVID, in his own behalf as Barangay Chairman of Barangay 77, Zone 7, Kalookan City
and as President of the LIGA NG MGA BARANGAY SA PILIPINAS, petitioner, vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, THE HONORABLE SECRETARY, Department of Interior and
Local Government, and THE HONORABLE SECRETARY, Department of Budget and
Management, respondents.

[G.R. No. 128039. April 8, 1997]

LIGA NG MGA BARANGAY QUEZON CITY CHAPTER, Represented by BONIFACIO M. RILLON,

petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND
MANAGEMENT, respondents.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
The two petitions before us raise a common question: How long is the term of office of barangay
chairmen and other barangay officials who were elected to their respective offices on the second Monday
of May 1994? Is it three years, as provided by RA 7160 (the Local Government Code) or five years, as
contained in RA 6679? Contending that their term is five years, petitioners ask this Court to order the
cancellation of the scheduled barangay election this coming May 12, 1997 and to reset it to the second
Monday of May, 1999.

The Antecedents
G.R. No. 127116
In his capacity as barangay chairman of Barangay 77, Zone 7, Kalookan City and as president of the
Liga ng mga Barangay sa Pilipinas, Petitioner Alex L. David filed on December 2, 1996 a petition for
prohibition docketed in this Court as G.R. No. 127116, under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, to prohibit the
holding of the barangay election scheduled on the second Monday of May 1997. On January 14, 1997,
the Court resolved to require the respondents to comment on the petition within a non-extendible period
of fifteen days ending on January 29, 1997.
On January 29, 1997, the Solicitor General filed his four-page Comment siding with petitioner and
praying that the election scheduled on May 12, 1997 be held in abeyance. Respondent Commission on
Elections filed a separate Comment, dated February 1, 1997 opposing the petition. On February 11,
1997, the Court issued a Resolution giving due course to the petition and requiring the parties to file
simultaneous memoranda within a non-extendible period of twenty days from notice. It also requested
former Senator Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr.i to act as amicus curiae and to file a memorandum also within a
non-extendible period of twenty days. It noted but did not grant petitioners Urgent Motion for Issuance of
Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction dated January 31, 1997 (as well as his
Urgent Ex-Parte Second Motion to the same effect, dated March 6, 1997). Accordingly, the parties filed
their respective memoranda. The Petition for Leave to Intervene filed on March 17, 1997 by Punong
Barangay Rodson F. Mayor was denied as it would just unduly delay the resolution of the case, his
interest like those of all other barangay officials being already adequately represented by Petitioner David
who filed this petition as president of the Liga ng mga Barangay sa Pilipinas.

G.R. No. 128039

On February 20, 1997, Petitioner Liga ng mga Barangay Quezon City Chapter represented by its
president Bonifacio M. Rillon filed a petition, docketed as G.R. No. 128039, to seek a judicial review by
certiorari to declare as unconstitutional:
1.Section 43(c) of R.A. 7160 which reads as follows:
(c)
The term of office of barangay officials and members of the
sangguniang kabataan shall be for three (3) years, which shall begin after the regular
election of barangay officials on the second Monday of May 1994.
2.
COMELEC Resolution Nos. 2880 and 2887 fixing the date of the holding of the
barangay elections on May 12, 1997 and other activities related thereto;
3.
The budgetary appropriation of P400 million contained in Republic Act No. 8250
otherwise known as the General Appropriations Act of 1997 intended to defray the costs and
expenses in holding the 1997 barangay elections; ii
Comelec Resolution 2880,iii promulgated on December 27, 1996 and referred to above, adopted a
Calendar of Activities and List and Periods of Certain Prohibited Acts for the May 12, 1997 Barangay
Elections. On the other hand, Comelec Resolution 2887 promulgated on February 5, 1997 moved
certain dates fixed in Resolution 2880.iv
Acting on the petition, the Court on February 25, 1997 required respondents to submit their comment
thereon within a non-extendible period of ten days ending on March 7, 1997. The Court further resolved
to consolidate the two cases inasmuch as they raised basically the same issue. Respondent Commission
filed its Comment on March 6, 1997v and the Solicitor General, in representation of the other respondent,
filed his on March 6, 1997. Petitioners Urgent Omnibus Motion for oral argument and temporary
restraining order was noted but not granted. The petition was deemed submitted for resolution by the
Court without need of memoranda.

The Issues
Both petitions though worded differently raise the same ultimate issue: How long is the term of office
of barangay officials?
Petitionersvi contend that under Sec. 2 of Republic Act No. 6653, approved on May 6, 1988, (t)he
term of office of barangay officials shall be for five (5) years x x x. This is reiterated in Republic Act No.
6679, approved on November 4, 1988, which reset the barangay elections from the second Monday of
November 1988 to March 28, 1989 and provided in Sec. 1 thereof that such five-year term shall begin on
the first day of May 1989 and ending on the thirty-first day of May 1994. Petitioners further aver vii that
although Sec. 43 of RA 7160 reduced the term of office of all local elective officials to three years, such
reduction does not apply to barangay officials because (1) RA 6679 is a special law applicable only to
barangays while RA 7160 is a general law which applies to all other local government units; (2) RA 7160
does not expressly or impliedly repeal RA 6679 insofar as the term of barangay officials is concerned; (3)
while Sec. 8 of Article X of the 1987 Constitution fixes the term of elective local officials at three years, the
same provision states that the term of barangay officials shall be determined by law; and (4) thus, it
follows that the constitutional intention is to grant barangay officials any term, except three years;
otherwise, there would be no rhyme or reason for the framers of the Constitution to except barangay
officials from the three year term found in Sec. 8 (of) Article X of the Constitution. Petitioners conclude
(1) that the Commission on Elections committed grave abuse of discretion when it promulgated
Resolution Nos. 2880 and 2887 because it substituted its own will for that of the legislative and usurped
the judicial function x x x by interpreting the conflicting provisions of Sec. 1 of RA 6679 and Sec. 43 (c) of
RA 7160; and (2) that the appropriation of P400 million in the General Appropriation Act of 1997 (RA

8250) to be used in the conduct of the barangay elections on May 12, 1997 is itself unconstitutional and a
waste of public funds.
The Solicitor General agrees with petitioners, arguing that RA 6679 was not repealed by RA 7160
and thus he believes that the holding of the barangay elections (o)n the second Monday of May 1997 is
without sufficient legal basis.
Respondent Commission on Elections, through Chairman Bernardo P. Pardo, defends its assailed
Resolutions and maintains that the repealing clause of RA 7160 includes all laws, whether general or
special, inconsistent with the provisions of the Local Government Code, citing this Courts dictum in
Paras vs. Comelecviii that the next regular election involving the barangay office is barely seven (7)
months away, the same having been scheduled in May 1997. Furthermore, RA 8250 (the General
Appropriations Act for 1997) and RA 8189 (providing for a general registration of voters) both indicate
that Congress considered that the barangay elections shall take place in May, 1997, as provided for in RA
7160, Sec. 43 (c).ix Besides, petitioners cannot claim a term of more than three years since they were
elected under the aegis of the Local Government Code of 1991 which prescribes a term of only three
years. Finally, Respondent Comelec denies the charge of grave abuse of discretion stating that the
question presented x x x is a purely legal one involving no exercise of an act without or in excess of
jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion.x
As amicus curiae, former Senator Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr. urges the Court to deny the petitions
because (1) the Local Autonomy Code repealed both RA 6679 and 6653 not only by implication but by
design as well; (2) the legislative intent is to shorten the term of barangay officials to three years; (3) the
barangay officials should not have a term longer than that of their administrative superiors, the city and
municipal mayors; and (4) barangay officials are estopped from contesting the applicability of the threeyear term provided by the Local Government Code as they were elected under the provisions of said
Code.
From the foregoing discussions of the parties, the Court believes that the issues can be condensed
into three, as follows:
1

Which law governs the term of office of barangay officials: RA 7160 or RA 6679?

2.Is RA 7160 insofar as it shortened such term to only three years constitutional?
3. Are petitioners estopped from claiming a term other than that provided under RA 7160?

The Courts Ruling

The petitions are devoid of merit.

Brief Historical Background of Barangay Elections

For a clear understanding of the issues, it is necessary to delve briefly into the history of barangay
elections.
As a unit of government, the barangay antedated the Spanish conquest of the Philippines. The word
barangay is derived from the Malay balangay, a boat which transported them (the Malays) to these
shores.xi Quoting from Juan de Plasencia, a Franciscan missionary in 1577, Historian Conrado Benitez xii
wrote that the barangay was ruled by a dato who exercised absolute powers of government. While the
Spaniards kept the barangay as the basic structure of government, they stripped the dato or rajah of his
powers.xiii Instead, power was centralized nationally in the governor general and locally in the
encomiendero and later, in the alcalde mayor and the gobernadorcillo. The dato or rajah was much later
renamed cabeza de barangay, who was elected by the local citizens possessing property. The position

degenerated from a title of honor to that of a mere government employee. Only the poor who needed a
salary, no matter how low, accepted the post.xiv
After the Americans colonized the Philippines, the barangays became known as barrios. xv For some
time, the laws governing barrio governments were found in the Revised Administrative Code of 1916 and
later in the Revised Administrative Code of 1917. xvi Barrios were granted autonomy by the original Barrio
Charter, RA 2370, and formally recognized as quasi-municipal corporations xvii by the Revised Barrio
Charter, RA 3590. During the martial law regime, barrios were declared or renamed barangays -- a
reversion really to their pre-Spanish names -- by PD. No. 86 and PD No. 557. Their basic organization
and functions under RA 3590, which was expressly adopted as the Barangay Charter, were retained.
However, the titles of the officials were changed to barangay captain, barangay councilman, barangay
secretary and barangay treasurer.
Pursuant to Sec. 6 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 222, xviii a Punong Barangay (Barangay Captain) and six
Kagawads ng Sangguniang Barangay (Barangay Councilmen), who shall constitute the presiding officer
and members of the Sangguniang Barangay (Barangay Council) respectively were first elected on May
17, 1982. They had a term of six years which began on June 7, 1982.
The Local Government Code of 1983 xix also fixed the term of office of local elective officials at six
years.xx Under this Code, the chief officials of the barangay were the punong barangay, six elective
sangguniang barangay members, the kabataang barangay chairman, a barangay secretary and a
barangay treasurer.xxi
B.P. Blg. 881, the Omnibus Election Code, xxii reiterated that barangay officials shall hold office for six
years, and stated that their election was to be held on the second Monday of May nineteen hundred and
eighty eight and on the same day every six years thereafter.xxiii
This election scheduled by B.P. Blg. 881 on the second Monday of May 1988 was reset to the
second Monday of November 1988 and every five years thereafter xxiv by RA 6653. Under this law, the
term of office of the barangay officials was cut to five years xxv and the punong barangay was to be chosen
from among themselves by seven kagawads, who in turn were to be elected at large by the barangay
electorate.xxvi
But the election date set by RA 6653 on the second Monday of November 1988 was again
postponed and reset to March 28, 1989 by RA 6679, xxvii and the term of office of barangay officials was
to begin on May 1, 1989 and to end on May 31, 1994. RA 6679 further provided that there shall be held
a regular election of barangay officials on the second Monday of May 1994 and on the same day every
five (5) years thereafter. Their term shall be for five years x x x.xxviii Significantly, the manner of election of
the punong barangay was changed. Sec. 5 of said law ordained that while the seven kagawads were to
be elected by the registered voters of the barangay, (t)he candidate who obtains the highest number of
votes shall be the punong barangay and in the event of a tie, there shall be a drawing of lots under the
supervision of the Commission on Elections.
Under the Local Government Code of 1991, RA 7160, xxix several provisions concerning barangay
officials were introduced:
(1)The term of office was reduced to three years, as follows:
SEC. 43. Term of Office. -x x xx x x

xxx

(c)
The term of office of barangay officials and members of the
sangguniang kabataan shall be for three (3) years, which shall begin after the regular
election of barangay officials on the second Monday of May, 1994 (Underscoring
supplied.)
(2)
The composition of the Sangguniang Barangay and the manner of electing its
officials were altered, inter alia, the barangay chairman was to be elected directly by the
electorate, as follows:

SEC. 387. Chief Officials and Offices. -- (a) There shall be in each barangay a
punong barangay, seven (7) sanggunian barangay members, the sanggunian
kabataan chairman, a barangay secretary and a barangay treasurer.
x x xx x x

xxx

SEC. 390. Composition. -- The Sangguniang barangay, the legislative body of

the barangay, shall be composed of the punong barangay as presiding officer, and the
seven (7) regular sanguniang barangay members elected at large and the sanguniang
kabataan chairman as members.
SEC. 41. Manner of Election. -- (a) The x x x punong barangay shall be elected
at large x x x by the qualified voters in the barangay. (Underscoring supplied.)
Pursuant to the foregoing mandates of the Local Autonomy Code, the qualified barangay voters
actually voted for one punong barangay and seven (7) kagawads during the barangay elections held on
May 9, 1994. In other words, the punong barangay was elected directly and separately by the electorate,
and not by the seven (7) kagawads from among themselves.
The First Issue: Clear Legislative Intent and Design to Limit Term to Three Years
In light of the foregoing brief historical background, the intent and design of the legislature to limit the
term of barangay officials to only three (3) years as provided under the Local Government Code emerges
as bright as the sunlight. The cardinal rule in the interpretation of all laws is to ascertain and give effect to
the intent of the law.xxx And three years is the obvious intent.
First.RA 7160, the Local Government Code, was enacted later than RA 6679. It is basic that in case
of an irreconciliable conflict between two laws of different vintages, the later enactment prevails. xxxi Legis
posteriores priores contrarias abrogant. The rationale is simple: a later law repeals an earlier one
because it is the later legislative will. It is to be presumed that the lawmakers knew the older law and
intended to change it. In enacting the older law, the legislators could not have known the newer one and
hence could not have intended to change what they did not know. Under the Civil Code, laws are
repealed only by subsequent ones --xxxii and not the other way around.
Under Sec. 43-c of RA 7160, the term of office of barangay officials was fixed at three (3) years
which shall begin after the regular election of barangay officials on the second Monday of May 1994.
This provision is clearly inconsistent with and repugnant to Sec. 1 of RA 6679 which states that such
term shall be for five years. Note that both laws refer to the same officials who were elected on the
second Monday of May 1994.
Second.RA 6679 requires the barangay voters to elect seven kagawads and the candidate obtaining
the highest number of votes shall automatically be the punong barangay. RA 6653 empowers the seven
elected barangay kagawads to select the punong barangay from among themselves. On the other hand,
the Local Autonomy Code mandates a direct vote on the barangay chairman by the entire barangay
electorate, separately from the seven kagawads. Hence, under the Code, voters elect eight barangay
officials, namely, the punong barangay plus the seven kagawads. Under both RA 6679 and 6653, they
vote for only seven kagawads, and not for the barangay chairman.
Third.
During the barangay elections held on May 9, 1994 (second Monday), the voters actually
and directly elected one punong barangay and seven kagawads. If we agree with the thesis of
petitioners, it follows that all the punong barangays were elected illegally and thus, Petitioner Alex David
cannot claim to be a validly elected barangay chairman, much less president of the national league of
barangays which he purports to represent in this petition. It then necessarily follows also that he is not
the real party-in-interest and on that ground, his petition should be summarily dismissed.
Fourth.
In enacting the general appropriations act of 1997, xxxiii Congress appropriated the amount
of P400 million to cover expenses for the holding of barangay elections this year. Likewise, under Sec. 7
of RA 8189, Congress ordained that a general registration of voters shall be held immediately after the
barangay elections in 1997. These are clear and express contemporaneous statements of Congress
that barangay officials shall be elected this May, in accordance with Sec. 43-c of RA 7160.

Fifth.In Paras vs. Comelec,xxxiv this Court said that the next regular election involving the barangay
office concerned is barely seven (7) months away, the same having been scheduled in May, 1997. This
judicial decision, per Article 8 of the Civil Code, is now a part of the legal system of the Philippines.
Sixth.Petitioners pompously claim that RA 6679, being a special law, should prevail over RA 7160,
an alleged general law pursuant to the doctrine of generalia specialibus non derogant. Petitioners are
wrong. RA 7160 is a codified set of laws that specifically applies to local government units. It specifically
and definitively provides in its Sec. 43-c that the term of office of barangay officials x x x shall be for three
years. It is a special provision that applies only to the term of barangay officials who were elected on the
second Monday of May 1994. With such particularity, the provision cannot be deemed a general law.
Petitioner may be correct in alleging that RA 6679 is a special law, but they are incorrect in stating
(without however giving the reasons therefor) that RA 7160 is necessarily a general law. xxxv It is a special
law insofar as it governs the term of office of barangay officials. In its repealing clause, xxxvi RA 7160 states
that all general and special laws x x x which are inconsistent with any of the provisions of this Code are
hereby repealed or modified accordingly. There being a clear repugnance and incompatibility between
the two specific provisions, they cannot stand together. The later law, RA 7160, should thus prevail in
accordance with its repealing clause. When a subsequent law encompasses entirely the subject matter
of the former enactments, the latter is deemed repealed. xxxvii

The Second Issue: Three-Year Term Not Repugnant to Constitution

Sec. 8, Article X of the Constitution states:
SEC. 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, which shall
be determined by law, shall be three years, and no such official shall serve for more than three
consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be
considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for which he was
elected.
Petitioner Liga ng mga Barangay Quezon City Chapter posits that by excepting barangay officials
whose term shall be determined by law from the general provision fixing the term of elective local
officials at three years, the Constitution thereby impliedly prohibits Congress from legislating a three-year
term for such officers. We find this theory rather novel but nonetheless logically and legally flawed.
Undoubtedly, the Constitution did not expressly prohibit Congress from fixing any term of office for
barangay officials. It merely left the determination of such term to the lawmaking body, without any
specific limitation or prohibition, thereby leaving to the lawmakers full discretion to fix such term in
accordance with the exigencies of public service. It must be remembered that every law has in its favor
the presumption of constitutionality.xxxviii For a law to be nullified, it must be shown that there is a clear and
unequivocal (not just implied) breach of the Constitution. xxxix To strike down a law as unconstitutional,
there must be a clear and unequivocal showing that what the fundamental law prohibits, the statute
permits.xl The petitioners have miserably failed to discharge this burden and to show clearly the
unconstitutionality they aver.
There is absolutely no doubt in our mind that Sec. 43-c of RA 7160 is constitutional. Sec. 8, Article X
of the Constitution -- limiting the term of all elective local officials to three years, except that of barangay
officials which shall be determined by law -- was an amendment proposed by Constitutional
Commissioner (now Supreme Court Justice) Hilario G. Davide, Jr. According to Fr. Joaquin G. Bernas,
S.J., the amendment was readily accepted without much discussion and formally approved. Indeed, a
search into the Record of the Constitutional Commission yielded only a few pages xli of actual
deliberations, the portions pertinent to the Constitutional Commissions intent being the following:
MR. NOLLEDO.One clarificatory question, Madam President. What will be the term of the office of
barangay officials as provided for?
MR. DAVIDE.

As may be determined by law.

MR. NOLLEDO.

As provided for in the Local Government Code?

MR. DAVIDE.

Yes.
x x xx x x

xxx

THE PRESIDENT. Is there any other comment? Is there any objection to this proposed new section
as submitted by Commissioner Davide and accepted by the Committee?
MR. RODRIGO. Madam President, does this prohibition to serve for more than three consecutive
terms apply to barangay officials?
MR. DAVIDE.
Madam President, the voting that we had on the terms of office did not include
the barangay officials because it was then the stand of the Chairman of the Committee on Local
Governments that the term of barangay officials must be determined by law. So it is now for the
law to determine whether the restriction on the number of reelections will be included in the
Local Government Code.
MR. RODRIGO.

So that is up to Congress to decide.

MR. DAVIDE.

Yes.

MR. RODRIGO.

I just wanted that clear in the record.

Although the discussions in the Constitutional Commission were very brief, they nonetheless provide
the exact answer to the main issue. To the question at issue here on how long the term of barangay
officials is, the answer of the Commission was simple, clear and quick: As may be determined by law;
more precisely, (a)s provided for in the Local Autonomy Code. And the Local Autonomy Code, in its
Sec. 43-c, limits their term to three years.

The Third Issue: Petitioners Estopped From Challenging Their Three-Year Terms
We have already shown that constitutionally, statutorily, logically, historically and commonsensically,
the petitions are completely devoid of merit. And we could have ended our Decision right here. But there
is one last point why petitioners have no moral ascendancy for their dubious claim to a longer term of
office: the equities of their own petition militate against them. As pointed out by Amicus Curiae
Pimentel,xlii petitioners are barred by estoppel from pursuing their petitions.
Respondent Commission on Elections submitted as Annex A of its memorandum, xliii a machine
copy of the certificate of candidacy of Petitioner Alex L. David in the May 9, 1994 barangay elections, the
authenticity of which was not denied by said petitioner. In said certificate of candidacy, he expressly
stated under oath that he was announcing his candidacy for the office of punong barangay for Barangay
77, Zone 7 of Kalookan City and that he was eligible for said office. The Comelec also submitted as
Annex Bxliv to its said memorandum, a certified statement of the votes obtained by the candidates in said
elections, thus:
BARANGAY 77
CERTIFIED LIST OF CANDIDATES
VOTES OBTAINED
May 9, 1994 BARANGAY ELECTIONS
PUNONG BARANGAY
1. DAVID, ALEX L.

VOTES OBTAINED
112

KAGAWAD
1. Magalona, Ruben

150

2. Quinto, Nelson L.
3. Ramon, Dolores Z.
4. Dela Pena, Roberto T.
5. Castillo, Luciana
6. Lorico, Amy A.
7. Valencia, Arnold
8. Ang, Jose
9. Dequilla, Teresita D.
10.Primavera, Marcelina

130
120
115
114
107
102
97
58
52

If, as claimed by petitioners, the applicable law is RA 6679, then (1) Petitioner David should not have
run and could not have been elected chairman of his barangay because under RA 6679, there was to be
no direct election for the punong barangay; the kagawad candidate who obtained the highest number of
votes was to be automatically elected barangay chairman; (2) thus, applying said law, the punong
barangay should have been Ruben Magalona, who obtained the highest number of votes among the
kagawads -- 150, which was much more than Davids 112; (3) the electorate should have elected only
seven kagawads and not one punong barangay plus seven kagawads.
In other words, following petitioners own theory, the election of Petitioner David as well as all the
barangay chairmen of the two Liga petitioners was illegal.
The sum total of these absurdities in petitioners theory is that barangay officials are estopped from
asking for any term other than that which they ran for and were elected to, under the law governing their
very claim to such offices: namely, RA 7160, the Local Government Code. Petitioners belated claim of
ignorance as to what law governed their election to office in 1994 is unacceptable because under Art. 3 of
the Civil Code, (i)gnorance of the law excuses no one from compliance therewith.

Epilogue
It is obvious that these two petitions must fail. The Constitution and the laws do not support them.
Extant jurisprudence militates against them. Reason and common sense reject them. Equity and
morality abhor them. They are subtle but nonetheless self-serving propositions to lengthen governance
without a mandate from the governed. In a democracy, elected leaders can legally and morally justify
their reign only by obtaining the voluntary consent of the electorate. In this case however, petitioners
propose to extend their terms not by seeking the peoples vote but by faulty legal argumentation. This
Court cannot and will not grant its imprimatur to such untenable proposition. If they want to continue
serving, they must get a new mandate in the elections scheduled on May 12, 1997.
WHEREFORE, the petitions are DENIED for being completely devoid of merit.
SO ORDERED.

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