The Price We Pay: Environmental and Health Impacts of Nuclear Weapons

Production and Testing

M. V. Ramana and Surendra Gadekar

Published in Prisoners of the Nuclear Dream ed. M. V. Ramana and C. Rammanohar

Reddy (New Delhi: Orient Longman, 2003).

If one were to look at the official announcements of the May 1998 tests and the
bulk of the discussion in the media, one would be left with the impression that the only
consequences of acquiring nuclear weapons are strategic. A few commentators also
analyzed the economic repercussions. One of the missing elements in the discussion was
any appreciation of the enormous impact on the environment, and occupational and
public health arising from the manufacture of nuclear weapons. These effects occur well
before the deployment or use of nuclear weapons. Like some of the other deleterious
consequences of making nuclear weapons, it is the weaker and disempowered sections of
society that bear the bulk of the burden.
As a result of such activities around the world, millions of people have been
affected. Thousands of square kilometres have been highly contaminated, including entire
river systems, lakes, and farmland. Millions of tonnes of nuclear waste have been
produced, but no satisfactory solutions to the problem of their disposal have been found.
Radioactive fallout from atmospheric nuclear tests has likely led to thousands of deaths
due to cancer already; even if no more nuclear tests are conducted, the incidence of
cancer and other diseases resulting from exposure to long-lived radionuclides will

continue to kill for several centuries, taking a total toll of millions in all. The immense
quantities of radioactive material remaining in the ground from underground testing
around the globe are likely to lead to the contamination of water and the food chain in the
long-term.
In this paper we shall try to estimate the costs paid by the people of India in terms
of their health and the environment from the activities of the Department of Atomic
Energy that, in the words of Abdul Kalam, is said to have conferred the country with a
capability to vacate nuclear threats.1 We will first enumerate the reasons why estimating
these costs is a difficult task. Then we describe the different stages of the nuclear fuel
cycle and the various processes involved in making nuclear weapons and detail the
environmental and the health impact of each activity. Due to the vastness of the subject,
we will not deal with the effects of making all the other non-nuclear components that go
into making nuclear weapons.

A Difficult Task
The task of estimating the impacts on public health and the environment from
nuclear weapons production and testing is difficult for four reasons.
First, the subject is intrinsically difficult and controversial. Despite decades of
research, experts are still divided on the effects of radiation on health, especially at low
doses. In part this is because the onset of cancer, one of the chief health outcomes of
exposure to radiation, occurs only many years after the exposure and cannot be easily
correlated with it. An added complication is that cancers can have a great variety of

causal agents. Further, the question of adverse health and environmental consequences of
nuclear weapons production goes beyond just radiation effects. Nuclear weapons
production involves the use of large quantities of organic and inorganic toxic materials,
which have their own health and environmental effects.2 For example, chronic exposure
to beryllium could lead to berylliosis, a potentially fatal lung disease. The US Department
of Energy recently admitted, after decades of knowing but not disclosing, the hazards to
workers exposed to beryllium.3
Second, because academic research on the subject the world over is largely
supported by government funds, often through the nuclear or defence agencies,
researchers do not easily receive funding to work on the health and environmental impact
of nuclear and defence projects. In India, the nuclear establishment has for years been
granted a large share of research funds to the exclusion of other subjects.4 As a
consequence they have tremendous financial influence over the universities, which are
starved of research funds. The universities therefore are loath to come into conflict with
the nuclear establishment and shy away from researching subjects that may bring them

Sukumar Muralidharan and John Cherian, The BJPs Bombs, Frontline (23 May 1998); available on the
internet at http://www.indiaserver.com/frontline/1998/05/23/15110040.htm
2
International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War and The Institute for Energy and
Environmental Research, Nuclear Wastelands: A Global Guide to Nuclear Weapons Production and its
Health and Environmental Effects (Cambridge, USA: The MIT Press, 1995). Also see Arjun Makhijani,
Making the Bomb: Without Consent, With Injury, The Hindu Survey of the Environment (May 1999), pp.
21-27.
3
Secretary Richardson Announces Proposal to Compensate Thousands of Sick Workers, U.S.
Department of Energy Press Release, 12 April 2000; available on the internet at
http://tis.eh.doe.gov/portal/feature/pr00103.htm
4
In the late 1950s, over a quarter of all resources devoted to Science and Technology Development in the
country went to the Atomic Energy department. Though it was subsequently overtaken by the Department
of Space, the total amount spent on the Department of Atomic Energy, the Defence Research and
Development Organisation, and the Department of Space has been increasing as a fraction of all
government Research and Development budgets. In the late 1980s, for example, the proportion was over 60
per cent of the total. See Itty Abraham, Security, Technology and Ideology: Strategic Enclaves in Brazil
and India, 1945-1989, (Ph. D. dissertation, University of Illinois at Urbana Champaign, 1993), p. 177.

into the bad books of the nuclear establishment.

Knowledge about the impact on health and the environment from nuclear
weapons production is also not desirable to governments. All nuclear weapons states
have been so enamoured of the idea of possessing bombs that they are willing to pay any
price required in terms of the health of their own voiceless poor and harm to the
environment of remote regions. As a consequence they are careless when it comes to
quantifying these costs. What little accounting is done is entrusted to the bomb makers
themselves; the proverbial foxes are called upon to guard the environmental hen house.
Besides the fact that these people often lack the expertise, what impedes this task
significantly is their lack of motivation. Faced with contradictory expectations, nuclear
establishments know very well that their primary purpose is to produce bombs. There are
no perks or privileges for keeping meticulous records of the ill effects of the production
process.
Third, whatever little knowledge is available is treated with such secrecy that
getting even the basic facts from the nuclear establishment is a Herculean task. In the
Indian case this is illustrated by an example. The exact site of the first Pokhran test was
not published in the various accounts of the explosion. Although the spot was well known
to hundreds of villagers living in the vicinity, as well as to all foreign information
agencies with access to satellite photography, getting its location from the Indian
Department of Atomic Energy (DAE) or other government agencies was impossible. It
was only when two researchers from the United States, Vipin Gupta and Frank Pabian,
pinpointed the spot using commercially available satellite imagery and old photographs

of the time that the location became known to a larger audience.5

Such independent checks are difficult in India given the paucity of people with
technical expertise outside the establishment.6 Unlike many other countries, knowledge
regarding reactor engineering or other related nuclear subjects is available essentially at
one centre, namely the Bhabha Atomic Research Centre (BARC). Subsequent
employment to trainees is also available with only one employer, the DAE.
Making the task more difficult are the draconian Atomic Energy and the Official
Secrets Acts with provisions for rigorous imprisonment for a period of five years, to be
held aloft as a suitably impressive stick.7 Passed on 15 September 1962, the Atomic
Energy Act empowers the government to restrict the disclosure of information, whether
contained in a document, drawing, photograph, plan, model, or in any other form
whatsoever, which relates to, represents or illustrates:
a) an existing or proposed plant used or proposed to be used for the purpose of
producing, developing or using atomic energy, or
b) the purpose or method of operation of any such existing or proposed plant, or
c) any process operated or proposed to be operated in any such existing or proposed
plant.8

Vipin Gupta and Frank Pabian, Investigating the Allegations of Indian Nuclear Test Preparations in the
Rajasthan Desert: A CTBT Verification Exercise Using Commercial Satellite Imagery, Science and
Global Security 6 (1996), pp. 101-89.
6
Paucity, however, does not mean absence. There is a small but growing trend of outsiders challenging the
nuclear and defence establishments on technical grounds, which needs to be further encouraged. See the
paper by M. V. Ramana in this book.
7
M. Rama Jois, Hazards Arising from Nuclear Plants: The Right to Information, in Nuclear Energy and
Public Safety, ed. Vinod Gaur (Delhi: INTACH, 1996), pp. 102-113.
8
Available on the internet at http://www.dae.gov.in/rules/aeact.htm.

The DAE has used the acts in Indian courts to, for example, refuse to divulge
information about issues related to the safety of nuclear reactors.9 However, the
application of this act has been limited to a small extent by the tradition of free discourse
that exists in India.
Finally, it is impossible to separate the so-called peaceful nuclear activities from
the making of bombs. Again this is especially true in India, where the very raison dtre
of keeping a large non-performing nuclear establishment seems to be the making of
bombs. After 50 years of relatively large investments in atomic energy, the share of
nuclear power is less than 3 per cent of the countrys electricity output.
There are two reasons for the overlap between nuclear energy and weapons
activities. The first is that all nuclear reactors produce plutonium, the fissile material
commonly used in nuclear bombs. J. Carson Mark, the former director of the theoretical
division of Las Alamos National Laboratory, USA, has shown that even reactor grade
plutonium can be used to make a nuclear explosive.10 In 1994, the US Department of
Energy announced that a US nuclear test in 1962 used reactor grade plutonium.11
Provided a country has a reprocessing facility to separate the plutonium from the other

Buddhi Kota Subbarao, Indias Nuclear Prowess: False Claims and Tragic Truths, Manushi
109 (November December 1998); available on the internet at
http://www.freespeech.org/manushi/109/nuke.html; For an application of these provisions to an individual
critical of the nuclear establishment see M. S. Siddhu, Victimised by the Official Secrets Act: the story of
Dr. B. K. Subbarao, Manushi 108 (September October 1998); available on the internet at
http://www.freespeech.org/manushi/108/subbprof.html
10
J. Carson Mark, Explosive Properties of Reactor-Grade Plutonium, Science and Global Security 4, no.
1 (1993), pp. 111-124; US National Academy of Sciences, Management and Disposition of Excess
Weapons Plutonium (Washington, DC: National Academy Press, 1994), p. 32; Nonproliferation and Arms
Control Assessment of Weapons-usable Fissile Material Storage and Excess Plutonium Disposition
Alternatives (Washington, DC: US Department of Energy, 1997), p. 37.
11
U.S. Department of Energy, Additional Information Concerning Nuclear Weapon Test of Reactor-Grade
Plutonium, Openness Press Conference, 27 June 1994; available on the internet at
http://www.osti.gov/html/osti/opennet/document/press/pc29.html.

elements in spent fuel, it could make nuclear weapons if it has nuclear reactors that are
not safeguarded or monitored. Making nuclear weapons, then, become a matter of choice
and not one of capability. As though illustrating this point, it has been reported that one
of the tests conducted by India in May 1998 used reactor grade plutonium from its
peaceful programme.12
Second, many of the physical steps involved in the two pursuits are the same and
the infrastructure for and personnel involved in one can contribute substantially to the
other. For example, the uranium mines in Jaduguda serve both the weapons and energy
programmes. Methodologically, therefore, it is impossible to clearly separate the impacts
from nuclear weapons production and nuclear energy production. This is especially true
in India, where until recently, there was no officially admitted nuclear weapons
programme.

Official Limits
As a way of dealing with the risks to human health from radiation exposure,
international and national bodies have tried to come up with recommendations for
limiting the exposure to workers. In 1991, following revised estimates of the risks of
cancer from radiation exposure, the International Commission on Radiological Protection
(ICRP) recommended that radiation doses to occupational workers be limited to 20
milliSievert (mSv) per year on average (1 mSv = 0.1 rem). To members of the general
public, the radiation dose limit from all anthropogenic activities has been set at 1 mSv per
year. For comparison, the average dose from background natural sources is about 2-3

12

R. Ramachandran, Pokharan II: The Scientific Dimensions, in Indias Nuclear Deterrent: Pokharan II

mSv per year. According to the ICRP a dose of 20 mSv leads to, on average, a 1 in a
1000 chance of dying from radiation-induced cancer.13 A dose that is twice as large
would lead to twice the probability of getting cancer.
The Indian DAE claims to follow these guidelines. 14 Leaving aside the ethics of
trying to compensate, or not compensate, those exposed to such risks, it is worth
examining the record of how well these recommendations have been followed. The
Indian experience, as we shall detail has been patchy at best. To do this, we rely largely
on official sources, which are incomplete and often contradictory.15 But for the most part
they are all that are available.
Given the secrecy mentioned earlier, there is also no practical way of
independently verifying stated exposure data. According to independent analysts and
investigative journalists, the record is even worse. For example, an early report on the
Indian nuclear energy programme observes that at the Tarapur atomic power station, the
radiation dose limit for radiation workers exposure means very little in practice: it has
been breached so frequently as to make one wonder why it exists at all.16

and Beyond ed. Amitabh Mattoo (New Delhi: Har Anand Publications, 1999), pp. 34-61.
13
ICRP, 1990 Recommendations of the International Commission on Radiological Protection (Oxford:
Pergamon Press, 1991), p. 22.
14
See for example Radiation Exposure Limits, Nuclear India (March 2000); available on the internet at
http://www.dae.gov.in/ni/mar2000/mar2000.htm.
15
For example, the stated figures for Argon-41 releases from the Madras Atomic Power Station in 1990
vary by 37.5 per cent. See E. Chandrasekharan, V. Rajagopal, M. A. R. Iyengar and S. Venkatraman,
Dose Estimates due to Argon-41 in the Kalpakkam Environment, Bulletin of Radiation Protection 15, no.
1 (January March 1992), pp. 18 19, and I. S. Bhat, M. A. R. Iyengar, R. P. Gurg, S. Krishnamony, and
K. C. Pillai, Environmental impact of PHWR type power stations India experience, Conference
Proceedings on Small and Medium Scale Nuclear Reactors, New Delhi, 1991, pp. 532-539. Since there is
one author (M. A. R. Iyengar) who is a co-author in both papers, this is even more inexplicable.
16
Nuclear Power in India: A White Elephant? Business India (4 September 1978), pp. 20-35.

The Materials Involved

There are different processes involved in the production of different kinds of
nuclear weapons. Nuclear weapons are basically of three types:

Pure fission weapons: The energy produced is due to fission, i.e., a heavy nucleus
splitting into two lighter nuclei, also releasing some extra neutrons in the process.
Under suitable circumstances, these neutrons could be absorbed by other heavy
nuclei, in turn causing these nuclei to split and so on, thus leading to a chain reaction.
Very few materials can undergo a chain reaction; among these are the isotopes,
uranium-233, uranium-235 and plutonium-239. Fission weapons use either
plutonium, usually with a large fraction of plutonium-239, or uranium that has been
highly enriched in the uranium-235 isotope; some weapons use both.17 Uranium-233
is not often used since its production process is more involved.

Boosted fission weapons: These are similar to fission weapons, but in addition to the
fissile material there is also some tritium gas that provides a large supply of neutrons.
These are produced through a reaction with deuterium that can occur only at the high
temperatures produced by the fission explosion. This neutron flux increases the
efficiency of fission, i.e., increases the fraction of fissile material that undergoes
fission before the weapon is blown apart. Though the fusion of tritium does produce a
small amount of energy, the energy released is overwhelmingly due to fission.

Thermonuclear weapons: The energy released is due to fusion, wherein two light
nuclei combine to form a heavier nucleus. Fusion can happen only at very high

17

Chuck Hansen, US Nuclear Weapons: The Secret History (Arlington: Aerofax, 1988), p. 32.

temperatures; for this reason, all fusion weapons designed so far start with a primary
fission trigger. The elements used in fusion weapons are isotopes of hydrogen
deuterium and tritium. Besides energy, the fusion reaction between deuterium and
tritium that also releases high-energy neutrons; these neutrons then go on to fission
uranium-235 and uranium-238 found in the secondary in such weapons, releasing
more energy. The yield is typically much larger than from pure fission weapons.
India has developed implosion type plutonium fission bombs and claims to have
detonated a thermonuclear device on May 11, 1998. Doubts have been expressed about
the success of the thermonuclear explosion.18 However, it is fairly certain that India has
manufactured all the raw materials needed to make such a weapon; hence the
environmental damage caused by their production has already occurred.
We shall not enumerate the various processes involved in the highly enriched
uranium route although Pakistan has chosen that route.19
Plutonium is not ordinarily found in nature. It is a man-made element. To produce
plutonium, one first needs to mine uranium, convert it into a form suitable for use as
reactor fuel and burn it in a reactor. The resulting spent fuel is then reprocessed to
recover the plutonium. In India, tritium is produced as a by-product in heavy water
reactors when the deuterium in the heavy water absorbs a neutron. This is separated using
a catalytic exchange process.20

18

Brian Barker et al, Monitoring Nuclear Tests, Science (25 September 1998), pp. 1967-8.
India does claim to done some amount of uranium enrichment at the Rare Materials Plant at Rattehalli
near Mysore. However, since uranium enrichment is not the focus of the Indian bomb making efforts, we
shall not consider it.
20
T. S. Gopi Rethinaraj, Tritium Breakthrough brings India closer to an H-bomb Arsenal, Janes
Intelligence Review (January 1998), pp. 29-31.
19

10

The Nuclear Fuel Cycle and its Impacts

Starting Point: Uranium Mining and Milling
The common starting point for the production of nuclear weapons, through either
the uranium or plutonium routes, as well as the production of nuclear energy is the
mining of uranium. Uranium mining and milling or refining has often severely impacted
the health of workers around the world. The radioactive hazards of uranium mines and
concentrating plants arise less from uranium than from the radionuclides in the
radioactive decay chain of uranium, especially radium-226, radon-222 (a gas) and its
decay products (daughters), and polonium-210, all alpha emitters.21
Under the poorly ventilated conditions that are characteristic of many uranium
mines, miners inhale radon and ore dust (including uranium), resulting in radiation doses.
Averaging exposure data from around the world, the United Nations Scientific
Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation (UNSCEAR) estimates that about 70 per
cent of the total radiation exposure to the miners comes from radon and radon daughters,
3 per cent from ore dust and the remaining 27 per cent from external radiation.22
Inhalation of alpha emitting radionuclides increases the risk of lung cancer. The
US National Research Councils Biological Effects of Ionizing Radiation (BEIR)
committee estimates that the extra relative risk of death from lung cancer from exposure
to 1 Working Level Month (WLM, a unit used to measure radon exposure) when

21

There are three chief forms of ionizing radiation from radioactive substances alpha, beta and gamma
radiation. For details see the paper in this book by Dr. Thomas George.
22
United Nations Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation, Sources and Effects of Ionizing
Radiation: UNSCEAR 1993 Report to the General Assembly (New York: United Nations, 1993), p. 390.

11

compared to an unexposed individual is 0.5 per cent/WLM.23 Average exposures to

uranium miners in Czechoslovakia, US, Canada and France ranged from 21.2 WLM in
one Canadian mine to 578.6 WLM in US mines in Colorado.24 Thus, the Colorado miners
had a (fatal) lung cancer risk of nearly four times that of an unexposed individual. Miners
are also apt to suffer from silicosis as a result of exposure to high levels of dust.
India has uranium mines at Jaduguda in Bihar; significant exploration for uranium
has been conducted near Domiasiat in Meghalaya and near the Andhra Pradesh Karnataka border. The uranium thus obtained is then milled at the mill-complex at
Jaduguda. The ore is first crushed, ground and leached into solution using sulphuric
acid.25 The solution is then filtered, purified by an ion-exchange process and uranium
precipitated in the form of magnesium diuranate. The remaining solution contains
contaminants including sulphuric acid, heavy metals, nitrates, sulphates, amines and
chlorides. This barren liquor is treated with lime and barium salts to reduce the
radioactivity and acidity; however, the effluent, which is discharged into a tailing pond,
does contain some radioactivity. The tailing pond in Jaduguda is close to villages and till
recently was not fenced off to prevent access by people or cattle.26
Mill tailings, i.e., the solid material left behind after uranium has been extracted
from the ore, are produced in large quantities in uranium milling because the typical
amount of uranium in the ore is about 0.1 per cent or less. Indian uranium ores on

23

Committee on Health Risks of Exposure to Radon (BEIR VI), Health Effects of Exposure to Radon
(Washington: National Academy Press, 1999), p. 110.
24
Committee on Health Risks of Exposure to Radon (BEIR VI), Health Effects of Exposure to Radon, p.
270.
25
T. Subramaniam and Suhrid Sankar Chattopadhyay, From Ore to Yellow Cake, Frontline (10
September 1999), pp. 65-69.
26
Aziz ur Rahman and Jayanta Basu, Living in death shadow, Sunday (4 April 1999).

12

average contain about 0.067 per cent of uranium oxide (U3O8).27 Thus, for each kilogram
of uranium metal produced, over 1750 kilograms of mill tailings are left behind. These
are contaminated with toxic heavy metals, such as molybdenum, arsenic and vanadium,
and with radioactive materials, principally thorium-230 and radium-226. The radium-226
decays into radon gas; in the case of exposed mill tailings, radon emissions can be
detected up to about one mile.28
Due to its fine sandy texture, mill tailings have been used to construct homes and
public buildings. Residents of these buildings are then exposed to gamma radiation and
radon. The US Environmental Protection Agency estimates the lifetime excess lung
cancer risk of residents of such homes at 4 cases per 100. In Jaduguda, tailings have been
used for road and home construction but the health impacts of these practices have not
been computed. Neither have the authorities informed the residents of the risks involved.
Mill tailings have contaminated water supplies at many locations. This becomes
particularly important in the Indian case because of heavy rainfall in the Jaduguda area.
The contamination of ground and surface water by seepage introduces radium-226 and
other hazardous substances like arsenic into drinking water supplies and in fish from the
area. The seepage problem is very important with acidic tailings, as the radionuclides
involved are more mobile under acidic conditions.29
Tailing dams are often not of stable construction. In most cases, they were made

27

This is at the Jaduguda mines, the richest uranium deposit; see Sanjib Chandra Sarkar, Geology and ore
mineralisation of the Singhbhum copper-uranium belt, Eastern India, (Calcutta: Jadavpur University,
1984), p. 193.
28
Merril Eisenbud and Thomas Gesell, Environmental Radioactivity (San Diego: Academic Press, 1997),
p. 206.

13

from sedimentation of the coarse fraction of the tailing sludge. They are subject to the
risk of dam failures due to earthquakes or strong rains. It is of no surprise that dam
failures have repeatedly occurred all over the world. For example, there was a spill
involving 1000 tonnes of contaminated sediment and 370 million litres of contaminated
water in Church Rock, New Mexico, USA, in July 1979.30
What makes the concern about health effects due to radiation even more
worrisome in the Indian case is because ores in subsurface mines like Jaduguda and
Mosabani have high rates of radon exhalation.31 The relatively scant official data
available in the public domain on the state of health of workers exposed to this material
only heightens this concern. In 1986, for example, 42 per cent of all workers at the
Uranium Corporation of India Limited (UCIL) received a radiation dose greater than the
ICRP recommended value of 20 mSv/year; 6 per cent received doses in excess of 35
mSv/year.32 Table 1 shows exposures for India as well as world averages from a United
Nations survey.
Table 1: Radiation Exposures from Uranium Mining and Milling
Region

India (1981-84)
India (1985-89)
World (1980-84)

Annual Collective Effective Dose

Total
Average per unit
(man Sv) extracted (man-Sv/kt)
Uranium Mining
13.8
108
15.2
101
1580
29

29

Average Dose
Per Monitored
Worker (mSv)
11.9
11.3
5.15

Peter Diehl, Uranium Mining and Milling Wastes: An Introduction, World Information Service on
Energy website http://www.antenna.nl/wise/uranium/uwai.html
30
World Information Service on Energy website http://www.antenna.nl/wise/uranium/mdaf.html
31
A. K. Singh, D. Sengupta and Rajendra Prasad, Radon Exhalation Rate and Uranium Estimation in
Rock Samples from Bihar Uranium and Copper Mines using the SSNTD Technique, Applied Radiation
and Isotopes 51 (1999), pp. 107-113.
32
A. U. Sonawane et al, New ICRP Dose Limit and Prospects for its Implementation in Nuclear Fuel
Cycle, Bulletin of Radiation Protection 15, no. 1 (January March 1992), pp. 10-12.

14

World (1985-89)

1140
25.9
4.45
Uranium Milling and Extraction
India (1981-84)
3.58
27.9
7.35
India (1985-89)
3.40
22.6
5.86
World (1980-84)
117
1.84
5.1
World (1985-89)
116
2.01
6.3
Source: United Nations Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation
(UNSCEAR), Sources and Effects of Ionizing Radiation (New York: United Nations,
1993), pp. 447 51.
UCIL, which is responsible for uranium mining, seems to have taken the policy of
stoutly denying all health effects. A. N. Mullick, who served as UCILs chief medical
officer for 25 years is reported to have said: I have not come across any radiation-related
ailments during my entire career.33 However, this statement is not based on any concrete
data. The DAE did not conduct any baseline studies at Jaduguda to evaluate the health
status of the people of the area before commencing mining and milling operations.
Neither have there been careful health studies later to establish if there have been any
deleterious consequences. However, a number of newspaper and magazine reports and
recently a documentary film Buddha Weeps In Jaduguda do report a very high incidence
of congenital anomalies and cancer.34
A recent health survey conducted by Anumukti in selected villages both near and
far from Jaduguda observed a statistically significant increase in congenital deformities in
the villages close to Jaduguda. It also appears that a number of people suffer from various
lung diseases; however, these are all routinely classified as tuberculosis by the medical
authorities. Members of the survey team also noted several practices that unnecessarily
increased the radiation exposure to the workers and the inhabitants of the area. Some of

33

A Deformed Existence, Down to Earth (15 June 1999); available on the internet at
http://www.oneworld.org/cse/html/dte/dte990615/dte_srep.htm
34
Shriprakash Buddha Weeps in Jaduguda, Krittika Films (1999).

15

the problems are improper ventilation in the mines, use of material leftover from mining
to build roads and houses, and drying up of tailing ponds during the summer.

NUCLEAR FUEL FABRICATION

Since the bulk of Indias nuclear reactors use natural uranium, the uranium goes
directly to fuel fabrication facilities after mining and milling. This is done at the Nuclear
Fuel Complex (NFC) at Hyderabad.
Some studies of workers in uranium processing facilities have observed high rates
of cancer, especially lung cancer and radiosensitive solid cancers.35 These result from
inhalation of fine particles of uranium and other materials by workers. If the uranium is in
a state that is relatively insoluble in bodily fluids and the particles are small enough to be
absorbed into the lung, inhalation leads to increased risk of lung cancer. If not, the
uranium accumulates in the kidney and there is a risk of renal damage and possibly
kidney failure due to heavy metal toxicity effects.
In addition, it has been shown that genomic instabilities can also result from
exposure to uranium. For example, a study of nuclear fuel workers by researchers from
Osmania University demonstrated a significant increase in sister-chromatid exchanges.36
Among a set of 24 workers monitored for the amount of uranium inhaled (technically, the
uranium thorax burden), at least two had exceeded the annual limit.37

35

See for example Beate Ritz, Radiation Exposure and Cancer Mortality in Uranium Processing
Workers, Epidemiology 10, no. 5 (September 1999), pp. 531 - 538.
36
P. Aruna Prabhavati et al, Sister-chromatid Exchanges in Nuclear Fuel Workers, Mutation Research
347 (1995), pp. 31-35. Sister chromatid exchanges are reciprocal interchanges of the two chromatid arms
within a single chromosome.
37
R. C. Sharma et al, Inferences from Thorax Counting on Selected Occupational Workers of Nuclear
Fuel Complex, Bulletin of Radiation Protection 10, no. 1&2 (January June 1987), pp. 121-124. Though
not specified, it appears that this limit is based on the radiation dose delivered rather than the chemical

16

Apart from exposure to toxic chemicals and (mostly) internal and external doses
of radiation, workers are also at risk from a variety of accidents. In the 1990s alone, the
NFC has had at least four accidents that have been publicly acknowledged. Though these
were all relatively small, there is also the risk of more serious criticality accidents, i.e., an
accidental chain reaction, especially in facilities like the NFC that make different kinds of
fuel for different reactors. An example of such an accident was the one that occurred in
1999 at the Tokaimura fuel fabrication facility in Japan.38 The accident occurred because
workers put fuel enriched to 16 per cent uranium-235 in a container meant to hold fuel
for light water reactors, which is usually only enriched to 3-5 per cent. Unlike Tokaimura
which is in a somewhat remote location, the NFC is near the densely populated city of
Hyderabad and such an accident would have more serious consequences.

Nuclear Reactors
Two steps are involved in producing plutonium from nuclear fuel. First, a nuclear
reactor, either one whose main purpose is to produce electricity or one whose sole aim is
the production of plutonium, transmutes uranium-238 in the nuclear fuel into plutonium239 and heavier plutonium isotopes. The plutonium as it comes out from the reactor is
mixed with fission products and the remaining uranium. The process of separating the
plutonium from the other materials is called reprocessing and is the second step in
producing plutonium. Reprocessing will be considered in the next section.
As with many other things, information about the primary reactors used for
production of fissile material for nuclear weapons, namely CIRUS and Dhruva, is hard to

toxicity. See for example Shiv Datta et al, Computations of Uranium Burden Buildups in the Bodu Organs

17

come by. Therefore, to get a sense of the radiation exposures to workers there, we look at
practices at power reactors, about which more information is publicly available.
Even routine operations in nuclear plants lead to some amount of radiation
exposure to workers; in some Indian reactors such exposure has sometimes led to
significant radiation doses. A 1992 Atomic Energy Regulatory Board (AERB) study of
workers in various units of the Department of Atomic Energy (DAE) showed that
between 1986 and 1990 nearly 3-5 per cent of all workers employed by the DAE received
over 20 mSv/year.39 Considering that the DAE employed over 17,000 workers during that
period, the sheer number of people with significant radiation exposures is clearly quite
large. However, expressing the number of workers receiving high doses of radiation as a
percentage of the total workforce is somewhat misleading because it is averaged over
different plants and workers in various situations with different levels of routine
exposure. Specific plants had much higher doses. For example, in 1987 over 18 per cent
of all workers at the Madras Atomic Power Station received a dose greater than 20
mSv/year; 5.5 per cent received doses in excess of 35 mSv/year.40 The average dose to
MAPS workers was 11 mSv/year.41
Another indicator of the high radiation dose to workers in Indian nuclear reactors
is to compare the total radiation exposure to the amount of power they produce. For

of Occupational Workers, Bulletin of Radiation Protection 10, no. 1&2 (January June 1987), pp. 37-40.
38
Nuclear Horror, Hindu (14 October 1999).
39
A. U. Sonawane et al, New ICRP Dose Limit and Prospects for its Implementation in Nuclear Fuel
Cycle.
40
A. U. Sonawane et al, New ICRP Dose Limit and Prospects for its Implementation in Nuclear Fuel
Cycle.
41
U. C. Mishra and S. Krishnamony, Radiation Protection and Environmental Impact from Nuclear Power
Plants, Indian Journal of Power and River Valley Development: Development in Nuclear Power
Generation Number, (October November 1994), pp. 332-346.

18

example, in the year 1980, the collective dose (i.e., the sum of all individual worker
doses) at the two boiling water reactors at Tarapur Atomic Power Station was 43.06 manSv, sufficient to cause 2 cancer deaths.42 During that year, the reactors produced 0.2
GigaWatt-years (GWy) of electricity.43 This works out to a per-unit exposure of 215.3
man-Sv per GWy. The corresponding figure at the pressurized heavy water reactors at the
Rajasthan Atomic Power Station was 91.2 man-Sv per GWy in 1980, corresponding to
nearly 5 cancer deaths. Such high exposures in the case of Indian reactors are not
exceptional; average exposures have been high as well, as illustrated in Table 2, which
also gives world averages for exposures.
Table 2: Radiation Exposures at Nuclear Power Reactors
Average per unit Per Monitored
energy generated Worker (mSv)
(man-Sv/GWy)
Boiling Water Reactors
India (1980-84)
38
189
11.4
India (1985-89)
23.2
113
8.63
World (1980-84)
454
18
4.47
World (1985-89)
331
7.94
2.38
Pressurised Heavy Water Reactors
India (1981-84)
15.7
103
5.08
India (1985-89)
3.40
76
6.51
World (1980-84)
46
8.0
3.2
World (1985-89)
60
6.2
3.4
Source: United Nations Scientific Committee on the Effects of
Atomic Radiation (UNSCEAR), Sources and Effects of Ionizing
Radiation (New York: United Nations, 1993), pp. 457 461.
Region

Total
(man Sv)

If radiation exposures even during regular operations are so high, one can imagine

42

M. R. Srinivasan, Thirty Reactor Years of Maintenance Experience An Introspection, in Selected

Lectures of Dr. M. R. Srinivasan, (Bombay: Bhabha Atomic Research Centre, 1990), pp. 78-85.
43
Data from International Atomic Energy Agency, Operating Experience with Nuclear Power Stations in
Member States in 1997 (Vienna: International Atomic Energy Agency, 1998).

19

how much higher they would be due to accidents, even small ones. The heavy water spill
of March 26, 1999 at the Madras Atomic Power Station provides an example. During this
accident, somewhere between four and fourteen tonnes of heavy water leaked out.
Mopping up the spill required 42 workers. Using standard methods of radiation
exposure calculation, it can be shown that each worker who was involved in cleaning up
the spill would have received a radiation dose of at least 6 8 mSv for every hour of the
job.44 Therefore, even working for 4 hours in such an environment would have led to a
dose in excess of ICRP recommendations. One must remember that this dose is in
addition to those that they would have received over the course of routine reactor
operations during the rest of the year. Such heavy water leaks are relatively frequent.
Over the years the MAPS reactors have experienced at least 3 such leaks. Just in 1997,
the Kakrapar I, MAPS II and Narora II reactors had heavy water leaks.45
Apart from heavy water leaks, there have also been numerous other kinds of
accidents in Indian nuclear facilities.46 An AERB report released in May 1993 revealed
that there had been 147 accidents of varying magnitudes in the previous year. Some of
them could have potentially led to major catastrophes. The best known, but by no means
the only, example of a catastrophic nuclear reactor accident is the Chernobyl explosion in
1986.47
The only power station in India around which there has been a scientific study of

44

See M. V. Ramana, Disturbing Questions, Frontline (4 June 1999), pp. 119-120.

International Atomic Energy Agency, Operating Experience with Nuclear Power Stations in Member
States in 1997, pp. 301 320.
46
See Nayan Chanda, The Perils of Power, Far Eastern Economic Review (4 February 1999) and T. S.
Gopi Rethinaraj, In the Comfort of Secrecy, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 55, no. 6
(November/December 1999), pp. 52-57.
45

20

health consequences on the local population, i.e., not just workers in the plants, is the
Rajasthan Atomic Power Station (RAPS) located at Rawatbhata near Kota in central
India.48 This study, conducted in 1991, surveyed five villages (total population: 2860)
within ten kilometres of the plant and compared them with four other villages (total
population: 2544) more than fifty kilometres away; the results were published in 1993.
The study observed:

An increase in the rate of congenital deformities

A significantly higher rate of spontaneous abortions, still births and one day
deaths of new born babies

A significant increase in chronic diseases especially amongst the young, but

no differences in acute infections

A significantly higher rate of solid tumours

More cancer patients and cancer deaths in villages near the plant

It is worth noting that the survey also observed that there were significantly fewer
number of electrified household and pumping set connections near the plant. Thus it is
clear that with the exception of generating employment for the workers, the benefits from
running the plant do not flow to the inhabitants of the region.
In addition to these health consequences from routine operations and accidents,

47

For a list of nuclear related accidents see the list put out by Greenpeace on the internet at:
http://www.greenpeace.org/~comms/nukes/chernob/rep02.html
48
This study has been published in detail in a special issue on Rawatbhata in Anumukti 6, no. 5 (April/May
1993). Extracts from the study have been published in International Perspectives in Public Health 10
(1994). See also Sanghamitra Gadekar and Surendra N. Gadekar, Rawatbhata, in Nuclear Energy and

21

there is also a long-term threat to the environment and human health from a variety of
wastes that are produced during the operation of nuclear reactors. Additional wastes will
be produced when reactors are decommissioned. Though it has been claimed that these
are safely stored and handled in waste management facilities, such facilities at BARC and
at Tarapur have had leaks leading to radiation exposure to workers involved in cleaning
up the resulting mess.49
Gaseous wastes produced during routine operations are released through stacks
(75-100 m tall) into the environment. This mainly consists of tritium, Argon-41 and
Iodine-131, fission product noble gases and a small amount of particulate matter. More
recent nuclear plants are designed to trap the short-lived (half-life = 1.83 hours) Argon41.50 Low level liquid wastes, consisting mostly of tritium but also small quantities of
Cesium-137 and Strontium-90, are released into nearby water bodies, such as the sea in
the case of coastal reactors. Data on such releases are scarce and often conflicting but
the available data suggests that releases at Indian reactors are much higher on a per unit
electricity output basis when compared to similar reactors elsewhere.
Reactors also produce a number of solid and liquid wastes during operation and
maintenance that are not directly discharged into the environment. Solid wastes include
materials, such as protective clothing, paper and cloth wipers and discarded equipment,
that are contaminated by contact with the reactor system; and materials, such as ion-

Public Safety, ed. Vinod Gaur (New Delhi: Indian National Trust for Art and Cultural Heritage, 1996), pp.
57-87.
49
Rupa Chinai, The Sunday Observer (6 September 1992); available on the internet at
http://members.tripod.com/~no_nukes_sa/other.html; Villagers at Risk from Atom Leak, Experts Claim,
The Daily Telegraph (6 July 1995), p. 12.
50
I. S. Bhat et al, Environmental impact of PHWR type power stations India experience, Conference
Proceedings on Small and Medium Scale Nuclear Reactors, New Delhi, 1991.

22

exchange resins and filters, that are contaminated by their use in cleaning and
conditioning the reactor coolant and moderator and the fuel storage bay water. The bulk
of the radioactivity, however, is contained in the spent fuel coming out of the reactors,
which is reprocessed.

Reprocessing
The next step in the process of making nuclear weapons is to reprocess the spent
fuel that comes out of nuclear reactors to obtain plutonium. The irradiated spent fuel
contains the largest quantities of radioactivity produced in the fuel cycle. Spent fuel is
first stored in water filled pools for cooling. After cooling, the fuel rods are chopped up,
dissolved in acid and other solvents and different chemicals added to precipitate out
different elements. Reprocessing, in many ways, is the dirtiest part of the nuclear fuel
cycle producing large amounts of solid, liquid and gaseous radioactive waste. The largest
component (by volume) is low level waste that comprises 84% by volume of the waste
stream; however, this only contains about 0.1% of the total activity from the spent fuel.
Intermediate level waste accounts for 14% (vol.) and contains about 1% of the
radioactivity. High level waste constitutes the remaining 2% but contains nearly 99% of
the total radioactivity. For each tonne of spent fuel reprocessed, Indian reprocessing
facilities generate 2.2 cubic metres of high level waste, 15.4 cubic metres of intermediate
level waste and 92.4 cubic metres of low level waste.
Since there is no way of removing the radioactive nature of these wastes,
exposure to these wastes will continue to be harmful to humans and other forms of life
for thousands of years. They have to be isolated from human contact and possibly
monitored if they are not to cause radiation doses. This need for stewardship is

23

unprecedented in human history.

Table 3: Total Nuclear Waste Generation in India
Step in Nuclear Fuel Cycle
Waste Estimate (2 significant digits)
Uranium Mining and Milling
4.1 million tonnes
Fuel Fabrication
2000 cubic metres
Reactor Operations (low level waste)
22000 cubic metres
Reactor Operations (intermediate level waste)
280 cubic metres
Spent Fuel Storage (not reprocessed so far)
400 tonnes
Reprocessing (high level waste)
5000 cubic metres
Reprocessing (intermediate level waste)
35000 cubic metres
Reprocessing (low level waste)
210000 cubic metres
Source: M. V. Ramana, Dennis Thomas and Susy Varughese, Estimating Nuclear
Waste Production in India, (Current Science 81, no. 11 (10 December 2001), pp.
1458-1462).
Apart from radiation exposure and waste generation during regular operations,
these facilities also become extremely contaminated and have to be decontaminated. In
the case of Indias smallest full-scale reprocessing facility at Trombay, decontamination
generated about 300 tonnes of solid wastes, about 60,000 litres of medium-level liquid
wastes and about 13 million litres of low-level liquid effluents.51 The official collective
dose to workers was about 30 person-Sv. There are also reports that many of these
operations use temporary workers whose radiation exposure is not monitored. This would
only increase the total radiation exposure and adverse health impact.
Because of the radioactivity which releases heat, the wastes coming from
reprocessing must be stored in cooled tanks. Loss of cooling could cause explosions. For
example, on 29 September 1957, a large explosion (estimated to be between 70 and 100
tons of TNT equivalent) occurred at the Mayak nuclear weapons facility in the then
Soviet Union; it contained 70-80 tons of highly radioactive waste with a total

24

radioactivity of 20 million curies.52 The chief long-lived components and their

contributions to total activity are listed in Table 4; it has been estimated that the
collective radiation dose was nearly 6000 person-Sv, which would result in about 300
cancer deaths. The fallout settled along a 400 km long swath of land, covering an area of
over 20,000 square kilometers.53
Table 4: Characteristics of Radioactivity Released in the 1957 Accident
Radionuclide

Contribution to Total
Half Life
Radiation Emitted
Activity of Mixture, %
Sr-90 + Y-90
5.4
28.6 y
Beta
Zr-95 + Nb-95
24.9
65 d
Beta, Gamma
Ru-106 + Rh-106
3.7
1y
Beta, Gamma
Cs-137
0.036
30 y
Beta, Gamma
Ce-144 + Pr-144
66
284 d
Beta, Gamma
Source: B. V. Nikipelov et al, Accident in the Southern Urals on 29 September 1957,
International Atomic Energy Agency Information Circular, 28 May 1989; cited in
Thomas B. Cochran, Robert S. Norris and Oleg A. Bukharin, Making the Russian Bomb:
From Stalin to Yeltsin (Boulder: Westview Press, 1995), p. 111.
Fabrication
The making of the cores of nuclear weapons, known as pits, from plutonium
requires extensive chemical and metallurgical operations. These involve not only
plutonium but also other toxic materials such as beryllium and hydrofluoric acid.
Plutonium dust if inhaled in large quantities (about 100 mg of plutonium for adult
humans) would cause death from acute respiratory failure within a week. At lower doses
that are likely to result from working in pit manufacturing facilities, inhalation of
plutonium increases the risk of lung, bone and liver cancers. It has been estimated that

51

Ann MacLachlan, Indias Kalpakkam Plant can reprocess mixed-carbide fuel from FBTR, Nuclear
Fuel (3 June 1985), p. 11.
52
Thomas B. Cochran, Robert S. Norris and Oleg A. Bukharin, Making the Russian Bomb: From Stalin to
Yeltsin (Boulder: Westview Press, 1995), pp. 109-113.
53
Richard Stone, Retracing Mayaks Radioactive Cloud, Science (8 January 1999), p. 164.

25

somewhere between 3 and 12 cancer deaths would be caused for each milligram of
plutonium inhaled.54 This estimate assumes that the plutonium is relatively insoluble. If it
were to be in a chemical form that dissolves rapidly, then this would increase by a factor
of up to 6.
Plutonium metal is also very susceptible to fires. In the US, for example, there
were many fires in the nuclear weapons complex, especially at the Rocky Flats Plant.55
Fortunately, the amount of plutonium converted to respirable aerosol in such fires is only
about 0.05 0.07 per cent.56 But since the total amount of plutonium at facilities could be
quite large, even this small fraction could lead to releases of sizeable quantities. The
release of 1 kg of plutonium aerosol near one of South Asias large and crowded cities
and its dispersal by wind could lead to 5,000 20,000 cancer deaths.57
Plutonium fabrication operations also carry the risk of accidental criticality. At
least eight accidental criticality events are known to have occurred in the U.S. nuclear
weapons complex; some have had fatal consequences due to very high radiation
exposure.58
There is also the danger of an accidental detonation during the process of

54

Steve Fetter and Frank von Hippel, The Hazard from Plutonium Dispersal by Nuclear-warhead
Accidents, Science and Global Security 2, no. 1 (1990), pp. 21-41.
55
Len Ackland, The Day we Almost Lost Denver, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 55, no. 4
(July/August 1999), pp. 58-65.
56
D. R. Stephens, Source Terms for Plutonium Aerosolization from Nuclear Weapons Accidents Lawrence
Livermore National Laboratory Report UCRL-ID-119303 (undated); John M. Haschke, Evaluation of
Source-Term for Plutonium Aerosolization Los Alamos National Laboratory Report LA-1231 (1992).
57
Zia Mian, M. V. Ramana and R. Rajaraman,Risks and Consequences of Nuclear Weapons Accidents in
South Asia, Princeton University/Center for Energy and Environmental Studies Report No. 326,
September 2000; available on the internet at http://www.princeton.edu:80/~cees/arms/index.shtml
58
International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War and The Institute for Energy and
Environmental Research, Plutonium: Deadly Gold of the Nuclear Age (Cambridge, USA: International
Physicians Press, 1992), p 50.

26

assembling the chemical high explosive components around the plutonium pit. This has
occurred at least once in the U.S. in March 1977.59

Nuclear Testing
The last step before manufacturing and deploying nuclear weapons is conducting
explosive tests. Since 1945, 2051 nuclear tests have been conducted all over the world.
Of these, 528 have been in the atmosphere, under water, or in space. The rest have been
underground.60 The effects of atmospheric testing are both local and global. Local effects
in regions near testing sites and, in some cases, due to winds, even hundreds of
kilometres away, led to relatively large doses to the inhabitants of these areas. Dissident
Soviet scientist Andrei Sakharov was one of the first to calculate that atmospheric tests
cause about 10,000 deaths and other health injuries globally per megatonne of the
explosion.61 These deaths would occur over thousands of years, largely due to inhalation
of Carbon-14 (which has a half-life of 5730 years) resulting from the explosion. Since the
estimated cumulative yield of atmospheric tests by the U.S., Russia, U.K, France and
China is about 545 megatonnes, this implies that over the next few thousands of years,
over 5 million people will die from cancers induced by atmospheric testing.
There are two kinds of environmental dangers associated with radioactivity from
underground tests. Both of these stem from the radioactive remnants left behind by the

59

International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War and The Institute for Energy and
Environmental Research, Nuclear Wastelands: A Global Guide to Nuclear Weapons Production and its
Health and Environmental Effects, p. 62.
60
Robert S. Norris and William M. Arkin, Known Nuclear Tests Worldwide, 1945-98, Bulletin of the
Atomic Scientists 54, no. 6 (November/December 1998), pp. 65-67.
61
Andrei D. Sakharov, Radioactive Carbon from Nuclear Explosions and Nonthreshold Biological
Effects, Atomic Energy (USSR) 4, no. 6 (June 1958); reproduced in Science and Global Security 1 (1990),
pp. 175-187.

27

nuclear reactions that are responsible for the energy produced in a nuclear explosion. The
first is that radioactive contamination may escape into the atmosphere. The second is that
the radioactivity left underground makes its way into ground water or to the surface.
Table 5: Key Radioactive Remnants, Half-lives, Production Rates
Fission Product

Half-life

Principal Decay
Yield per
Mode
kiloton (Ci/kt)
Strontium-90
28 years
beta radiation
0.1
Iodine-131
8 days
beta and gamma
125.0
radiation
Cesium-137
30 years
beta and gamma
0.16
radiation
Plutonium-239 (un24,100
alpha radiation
approx. 2.5
fissioned material)
years
kg/explosion
Source: Merrill Eisenbud and Thomas Gesell, Environmental
Radioactivity (San Diego: Academic Press, 1997), p. 279.
Releases to Atmosphere: Several underground tests have vented i.e., failed to
contain the radioactivity due to faulty design, and released fission products into the
atmosphere. Others have late-time seeps, whereby radioactive gases were released into
the atmosphere gradually over a period of several weeks or months. And finally
radioactivity is sometimes released during routine post-test activities. In the US, more
than half of all the underground tests conducted at the Nevada Test site after 1963 have
led to radioactivity being released to the atmosphere. 62 Similarly in the Soviet Union,
nearly 60 per cent of the underground nuclear tests conducted at the Novaya Zemlya test
site released radioactivity into the atmosphere.63 While these releases are typically small
compared to releases from atmospheric tests, they demonstrate that underground testing
does lead to radioactive contamination of the atmosphere. The following table lists some

62

C. R. Schoengold, M. E. DeMarre, and E. M. Kirkwood, Radiological Effluents Released from U.S.

Continental Tests 1961 through 1992 DOE/NV-317 (Las Vegas, NV: Bechtel Nevada, 1996).

28

of the significant venting incidents in the U.S.

Table 6: Significant Incidents of Venting
Year

Test name

Amount of Radioactivity vented

(12 hours after explosion)
1962
Platte
1.9 million curies
1962
Eel
1.9 million curies
1962
Des Moines
11 million curies
1970
Baneberry
6.7 million curies
Source: Office of Technology Assessment, U.S. Congress, The
Containment of Underground Nuclear Explosions (Washington,
DC: OTA, 1989).
According to public statements by the DAE, none of the tests conducted at
Pokharan released any radioactivity. However, residents of the villages near the test site
have complained, both in 1974 and in 1998, of different kinds of physical illnesses. In
particular, reported cases of nose bleeding and burning eyes may have resulted from
exposure to beta radiation.64 Without a thorough independent examination, it is not
possible to decide on the veracity of the complaints or their causes.
It is worth mentioning that it is difficult to predict, a priori, whether a test is likely
to vent. On the basis of several hundred tests, the US uses a formula that relates the depth
of burial to the cube root of the yield, with a minimum depth of burial of about 185
metres. A 10 kiloton explosion is buried at a depth of about 260 metres or more.65 Based
on this estimate, the Indian explosions of 11 May 1998, which are said to have been
conducted at a depth of 200-300 metres with the largest explosion having a yield of 45
kilotons, could well have resulted in venting of radioactivity. The 1970 Baneberry test,

63

Donald J. Bradley, Behind the Nuclear Curtain: Radioactive Waste Management in the Former Soviet
Union (Columbus, U.S.A.: Pacific Northwest National Laboratory/Batelle Press, 1997), p. 506.
64
Amar De, In Pokhran, their Eyes are Burning, Noses Bleeding, The Economic Times (21 May 1998).
65
Office of Technology Assessment, U.S. Congress, The Containment of Underground Nuclear Explosions
(Washington, DC: OTA, 1989).

29

which resulted in a massive vent, had a yield of only 10 kilotonnes and was conducted at
a depth of about 275 metres.66 Thus, even if the Pokharan tests did not actually result in
venting, there was considerable risk of that occurring.
Releases to Groundwater: The major effects of atmospheric releases of radioactivity
from underground tests are relatively short-lived, and in most countries have been
dominated by such releases from aboveground testing. The long term effects of
underground testing are more likely to arise from the immense quantities of radioactive
material, much of it very long-lived, left below the ground and which may lead to
contamination of water and the food chain. The extent of the problem can be seen from
Table 7, which estimates the amounts of various radioactive isotopes that have been left
underground in different countries.
Table 7: Approximate Underground Radioactivity Estimates, as of 1999 (in Curies)
Country
USA
USSR

Strontium-90
2.2 million
1.8 million

Cesium-137
3.5 million
2.9 million

Plutonium-239
122250
74400

Main Locations
Nevada Test Site
Kazakh Test Site & Novaya
Zemlya
UK
UK carried out all of its underground testing in Nevada and these
estimates have been included in the U.S. totals
France
150,000
240,000
24000
In Ecker, Moruroa, Fangataufa
China
94,000
117,000
3300
Lop Nor
67
India
6300
10,000
900
Pokharan
Pakistan68
3400
5500
900
Chagai
Total
4.3 million
6.9 million
226,000
(Totals rounded off )
Source: M. V. Ramana, Underground Tests: Ravaging Nature, The Hindu Survey of the
Environment (June 1999).
For long, officials in charge of nuclear testing have claimed that because all the

66

Barton C. Hacker, Elements of Controversy: The Atomic Energy Commission and Radiation Safety in
Nuclear Weapons Testing 1947 1974, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994), p. 248.
67
Assuming the official yields of the Indian tests in 1974 and 1998 of 12 kt and 58 kt (5 explosions).
68
Assuming that the total yield of the Pakistani tests is 35 kilotonnes (6 explosions).

30

radioactive material is trapped within the cavity left behind by the explosion, this vast
accumulation of radioactive material under the ground did not lead to any hazards. In
particular, though it stayed radioactive for thousands of years, plutonium was considered
not to pose a threat because it is largely insoluble in water.69
However, as recent studies have shown, plutonium has indeed escaped from
underground test cavities and migrated a significant distance, by attaching itself to
colloids, i.e, small particles suspended in water.70 Through this process, plutonium is
transported at a rate approximately that of the motion of groundwater (about a hundred
metres per year). While the transportation rate is small, the long half-life of plutonium
allows the possibility of migrating significant distances in groundwater.
Besides plutonium, it is known that tritium has contaminated subsurface
groundwater.71 Tritium is a radioactive isotope of hydrogen with a half-life of 12.3 years;
it decays by emitting a beta particle. Since its chemical properties are identical to
hydrogen, it can combine with oxygen and isotopes of hydrogen to produce tritiated
heavy water, which is easily absorbed by plants, animals and humans. Any tritiated water
vapour that is breathed in, absorbed through the skin, or ingested, would result in
complete absorption of the entire radioactivity. The absorbed tritiated water is rapidly
distributed throughout the body via the blood, which in turn equilibriates with
extracellular fluid in about 12 minutes. Since tritiated water can pass through the

69

More precisely, the Pu ion-exchange factor = ratio of velocity of ions to velocity of water = 10-4; see
Bernard L. Cohen, High Level Radioactive Waste, Reviews of Modern Physics 49, no. 1 (January 1977),
pp. 1-20.
70
A. Kersting et al, Migration of Plutonium in Ground Water at the Nevada Test Site, Nature 397, no.
6714 (7 January 1999), pp. 56-59.
71
United States Department of Energy, Nevada Operations Office, Final Impact Statement for the Nevada
Test Site and Off-Site Locations in the State of Nevada, August 1996, Summary, p. S-21.

31

placenta, it also could lead to mental retardation and other developmental effects when
ingested by pregnant women.
Even if the extent of contamination and its rate of spreading are slow, it must be
remembered that test sites such as Pokharan are usually located in desert environments.
Water is a precious commodity in such places. Even polluting a few wells could cause
incredible hardships and make it impossible for a local community to live there.

CONCLUSIONS
Dr. Rosalie Bertell has put it most succinctly: If we kept accounts of our health,
as well as we do of our money, nuclear activities whether for war or peace would be
banned immediately. Unfortunately keeping good and reliable accounts of public health
is not a priority since those with hefty bank balances do not mind sacrificing those
without any in the name of development, progress, national security and prestige.
Nuclear weapons do not have to be used in war to affect peoples health and the
environment; the process of manufacturing and testing them does precisely that along
every step of the way. Many of these harmful effects arise from producing nuclear energy
as well. The people who bear the brunt of these are often disempowered in the first place.
Thus, for them and for others, nuclear weapons are a constant threat to their well-being.

Acknowledgements: We would like to thank the Anumukti team for their help. MVR
would like to thank Ahnde Lin for procuring several useful references and Arjun
Makhijani and Frank von Hippel for useful comments. MVRs research was supported in
part by a Research and Writing grant from the MacArthur foundation and in part by a

32

grant from the Carnegie Corporation.

33