Political Law Case Digests 1

POLITICAL LAW REVIEW CASE DIGESTS [1]: THE 1987 CONSTITUTION
COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS

EMPLOYEES
ASSOCIATION (CHREA) VS. COMMISSION ON HUMAN
RIGHTS
G.R. No. 155336, November 25, 2004, July 21, 2006.
(CRUZ)
DOCTRINE:
A proper party is one who has sustained or is in immediate
danger of sustaining an injury as a result of the act
complained of.
The 1987 Constitution expressly and unambiguously grants
fiscal autonomy only to the Judiciary, the constitutional
commissions, and the Office of the Ombudsman; CHR is not
one of them.
FACTS:
On 14 February 1998, Congress passed Republic Act No.
8522, otherwise known as the General Appropriations Act of
1998. It provided for Special Provisions Applicable to All
Constitutional Offices Enjoying Fiscal Autonomy. The last
portion of Article XXXIII covers the appropriations of the CHR.
On the strength of these special provisions, CHR promulgated
Resolution No. A98-047 on 04 September 1998, adopting an
upgrading and reclassification scheme among selected
positions in the Commission. Annexed to said resolution is
the proposed creation of ten additional plantilla positions,
namely: one Director IV position, with Salary Grade 28 for the
Caraga Regional Office, four Security Officer II with Salary
Grade 15, and five Process Servers, with Salary Grade 5
under the Office of the Commissioners.
On 19 October 1998, CHR issued Resolution No. A98-055
providing for the upgrading or raising of salary grade of the
several positions in the Commission. To support the
implementation of such scheme, the CHR, in the same
resolution, authorized the augmentation of a commensurate
amount generated from savings under Personnel Services. By
virtue of Resolution No. A98-062 dated 17 November 1998,

the CHR collapsed the vacant positions in the body to
provide additional source of funding for said staffing
modification.
Among the positions collapsed were: one
Attorney III, four Attorney IV, one Chemist III, three Special
Investigator I, one Clerk III, and one accounting Clerk II.
The CHR forwarded said staffing modification and upgrading
scheme to the Department of Budget and Management
[DBM] with a request for its approval, but the DBM secretary
Benjamin Diokno denied the request on the following
grounds:
It involved the elevation of the field units from
divisions to services.
In the absence of a specific provision of law which

may be used as a legal basis to elevate the level of
divisions to a bureau or regional office, and the
services to offices, such scheme should be denied.
Pursuant to Section 78 of the General Provisions of the
General Appropriations Act (GAA) FY 1998, no
organizational unit or changes in key positions shall be
authorized unless provided by law or directed by the
President, thus, the creation of a Finance Management
Office and a Public Affairs Office cannot be given
favorable recommendation.
Moreover, as provided under Section 2 of RA No. 6758,
otherwise known as the Compensation Standardization
Law, the Department of Budget and Management is
directed to establish and administer a unified
compensation and position classification system in the
government. The Supreme Court ruled in the case of
Victorina Cruz vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 119155,
dated January 30, 1996, that DBM the sole power and
discretion to administer the compensation and position
classification system of the National Government.
Being a member of the fiscal autonomy group does not
vest the agency with the authority to reclassify,
upgrade, and create positions without approval of the
CHRISTINE CRUZ, STEVEN GATACELO, LORALYN LAZARO, RAMON MUNEZ, ANGELO MURILLO A.Y. 2014-2015

DBM. While the members of the Group are authorized
to formulate and implement the organizational
structures of their respective offices and determine the
compensation of their personnel, such authority is not
absolute and must be exercised within the parameters
of the Unified Position Classification and Compensation
System established under RA 6758 more popularly
known as the Compensation Standardization Law. We
therefore reiterate our previous stand on the matter.
In light of the DBMs disapproval of the proposed personnel
modification scheme, the CSC-National Capital Region Office,
through a memorandum dated 29 March 1999 recommended
to the CSC-Central Office that the subject appointments be
rejected owing to the DBMs disapproval of the plantilla
reclassification.
Meanwhile, the officers of petitioner Commission on Human
Rights Employees Association [CHREA], in representation of
the rank and file employees of the CHR, requested the CSCCentral office to affirm the recommendation of the CSCRegional Office. CHREA stood its ground in saying that the
DBM is the only agency with appropriate authority mandated
by law to evaluate and approve matters of reclassification
and upgrading, as well as creation of positions.
The CSC-Central Office denied CHREAs request in a
Resolution dated 16 December 1999, and reversed the
recommendation of the CSC-Regional Office that the
upgrading scheme be censured. Petitioner CHREA elevated
the matter to the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals
affirmed the pronouncement of the CSC-Central Office and
upheld the validity of the upgrading, retitling, and
reclassification scheme in the CHR on the justification that
such action is within the ambit of CHRs fiscal autonomy.
Petitioner elevated its case to the Supreme Court and
successfully obtained the favorable action in its Decision
dated 25 November 2004. Respondent then filed its Motion
for Reconsideration.
CONTENTION:
** Supreme Court erred when it ruled that there is no legal
basis to support the contention that the CHR enjoys fiscal
autonomy.
** Supreme Court erred in stating that the special provision
of the RA No. 8522 did not specifically mention CHR as
among those offices to which the special provision to
formulate and implement organizational structures apply, but
merely states its coverage to include constitutional
commissions and offices enjoying fiscal autonomy;
** Supreme Court erred when it ruled that the CHR although
admittedly a constitutional creation is nonetheless not
included in the genus of the offices accorded fiscal autonomy
by constitutional or legislative fiat.
** Supreme Court erred in deciding to reinstate the ruling
dated 29 march 1999 of the civil service commission
national capital region;
** Supreme Court erred in deciding to disallow the
Commission On Human Rights Resolution No. A98-047 dated
September 04, 1998, Resolution No. A98-055 dated 19
october 1998 and Resolution No. A98-062 dated 17
November 1998 without the approval of the department of
budget and management.
ISSUES:
1. WON CHREA has the capacity to sue and/or the proper
party
2. WON CHR is one of the constitutional bodies clothed
with fiscal autonomy
3. WON approval of DBM is a condition precedent to the
approval of the scheme
HELD:
1. YES.
On petitioner's personality to bring this suit, we held in a
multitude of cases that a proper party is one who has

sustained or is in immediate danger of sustaining an
injury as a result of the act complained of. 13 Here,
petitioner, which consists of rank and file employees of
respondent CHR, protests that the upgrading and
collapsing of positions benefited only a select few in the
upper level positions in the Commission resulting to the
demoralization of the rank and file employees. This
sufficiently meets the injury test. Indeed, the CHR's
upgrading scheme, if found to be valid, potentially entails
eating up the Commission's savings or that portion of its
budgetary pie otherwise allocated for Personnel Services,
from which the benefits of the employees, including those
in the rank and file, are derived.
Further, the personality of petitioner to file this case was
recognized by the CSC when it took cognizance of the
CHREA's request to affirm the recommendation of the CSCNational Capital Region Office. CHREA's personality to bring
the suit was a non-issue in the Court of Appeals when it
passed upon the merits of this case. Thus, neither should our
hands be tied by this technical concern. Indeed, it is settled
jurisprudence that an issue that was neither raised in the
complaint nor in the court below cannot be raised for the first
time on appeal, as to do so would be offensive to the basic
rules of fair play, justice, and due process.
2. NO.
The 1987 Constitution expressly and
unambiguously grants fiscal autonomy only to the
Judiciary, the constitutional commissions, and the
Office of the Ombudsman. As already settled in the
assailed Decision of this Court, the creation of
respondent may be constitutionally mandated, but it is
not, in the strict sense, a constitutional commission.
The creation of respondent may be constitutionally
mandated, but it is not, in the strict sense, a
constitutional commission.
Article IX of the 1987
Constitution,
plainly
entitled
Constitutional
Commissions, identifies only the Civil Service
Commission, the Commission on Elections, and the
Commission on Audit. The mandate for the creation of

the respondent is found in Section 17 of Article XIII of
the 1987 Constitution on Human Rights. Thus, the
respondent cannot invoke provisions under Article IX of
the 1987 Constitution on constitutional commissions
for its benefit. It must be able to present constitutional
and/or statutory basis particularly pertaining to it to
support its claim of fiscal autonomy. The 1987
Constitution extends to respondent a certain degree of
fiscal autonomy through the privilege of having its
approved annual appropriations released automatically
and regularly. However, it withholds from respondent
fiscal autonomy, in its broad or extensive sense, as
granted to the Judiciary, constitutional commissions,
and the Office of the Ombudsman.
The 1987 Constitution recognizes the fiscal autonomy of the
Judiciary in Article VIII, Section 3. Constitutional commissions
are granted fiscal autonomy by the 1987 Constitution in
Article IX, Part A, Section 5, a provision applied in common to
all constitutional commissions. The Office of the Ombudsman
enjoys fiscal autonomy by virtue of Article XI, Section 14, of
the 1987 Constitution.
Each of the afore-quoted provisions consists of two sentences
stating that: (1) The government entity shall enjoy fiscal
autonomy; and (2) its approved annual appropriation shall be
automatically and regularly released.
The respondent
anchors its claim to fiscal autonomy on the fourth paragraph
of Article XIII, Section 17, which provides that the approved
annual appropriations of the Commission shall be
automatically and regularly released.
As compared to Article VIII, Section 3; Article IX, Part A,
Section 5; and Article XI, Section 14 of the 1987 Constitution
on the Judiciary, the constitutional commissions, and the
Office of the Ombudsman, respectively, Article XIII, Section
17(4) on the Commission of Human Rights (CHR) evidently
does not contain the first sentence on the express grant of

fiscal autonomy, and reproduces only the second sentence
on the automatic and regular release of its approved annual
appropriations.
Fiscal Autonomy defined. It means independence or
freedom regarding financial matters from outside control and
is characterized by self direction or self determination. It
does not mean mere automatic and regular release of
approved appropriations to agencies vested with such power
in a very real sense, the fiscal autonomy contemplated in the
constitution is enjoyed even before and, with more reasons,
after the release of the appropriations. Fiscal autonomy
encompasses, among others, budget preparation and
implementation, flexibility in fund utilization of approved
appropriations, use of savings and disposition of receipts.
This Court concludes that the 1987 Constitution extends to
respondent a certain degree of fiscal autonomy through the
privilege of having its approved annual appropriations
released automatically and regularly. However, it withholds
from respondent fiscal autonomy, in its broad or extensive
sense, as granted to the Judiciary, constitutional
commissions, and the Office of the Ombudsman. Operative
herein is the rule of statutory construction, expressio unius
est exclusio alterius, wherein the express mention of one
person, thing, or consequence implies the exclusion of all
others. The rule proceeds from the premise that the
legislature (or in this case, the ConCom) would not have
made specific enumerations in a statute (or the Constitution)
had the intention not been to restrict its meaning and to
confine its terms to those expressly mentioned.
3. YES. This Court staunchly holds that as prescinding
from the legal and jurisprudential yardsticks discussed
in length in the assailed Decision, the imprimatur of
the DBM must first be sought prior to implementation
of any reclassification or upgrading of positions in
government.
Regardless of whether or not respondent enjoys fiscal

autonomy, this Court shares the stance of the DBM that the
grant of fiscal autonomy notwithstanding, all government
offices must, all the same, kowtow to the Salary
Standardization Law.
The Motion for Reconsideration is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The
assailed Decision of this Court dated 25 November 2004 is
hereby MODIFIED, declaring the respondent CHR as a
constitutional body enjoying limited fiscal autonomy, in the
sense that it is entitled to the automatic and regular release
of its approved annual appropriations; nonetheless, it is still
required to conform to the Salary Standardization Law.
Accordingly, its entire reclassification scheme remains
subject to the approval of the DBM.
GALICIO VS. AQUINO ET AL.
G.R. No. 193978, February 28, 2012.
DOCTRINE:
Locus standi or legal standing has been defined as a personal
and substantial interest in a case such that the party has
sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the
governmental act that is being challenged.
A moot case is one that ceases to present a justiciable
controversy by virtue of supervening events, so that a
declaration thereon would be of no practical use or value.
EO 7 is constitutional. The question as to constitutionality of
EO 7 serves no useful purpose since such issue is moot in its
face in light of the enactment of R.A. No. 10149.
FACTS:
The petitioner is a Filipino citizen and an employee of the
Philippine Health Insurance Corporation (PhilHealth). He is
currently holding the position of Court Attorney IV and is
assigned at the PhilHealth Regional Office CARAGA.

On July 26, 2010, Pres. Aquino made public in his first State
of the Nation Address the alleged excessive allowances,
bonuses and other benefits of Officers and Members of the
Board of Directors of the Manila Waterworks and Sewerage
System a government owned and controlled corporation
(GOCC) which has been unable to meet its standing
obligations. Subsequently, the Senate of the Philippines
(Senate) conducted an inquiry in aid of legislation on the
reported excessive salaries, allowances, and other benefits of
GOCCs and government financial institutions (GFIs).
Based on its findings that officials and governing boards of
various [GOCCs] and [GFIs] x x x have been granting
themselves unwarranted allowances, bonuses, incentives,
stock options, and other benefits [as well as other] irregular
and abusive practices, the Senate issued Senate Resolution
No. 17 urging the President to order the immediate
suspension of the unusually large and apparently excessive
allowances, bonuses, incentives and other perks of members
of the governing boards of [GOCCs] and [GFIs].
Heeding the call of Congress, Pres. Aquino, on September 8,
2010, issued EO 7, entitled Directing the Rationalization of
the Compensation and Position Classification System in the
[GOCCs] and [GFIs], and for Other Purposes. EO 7 provided
for the guiding principles and framework to establish a fixed
compensation and position classification system for GOCCs
and GFIs. It ordered (1) a moratorium on the increases in the
salaries and other forms of compensation, except salary
adjustments under EO 8011 and EO 900, of all GOCC and GFI
employees for an indefinite period to be set by the President,
and (2) a suspension of all allowances, bonuses and
incentives of members of the Board of Directors/Trustees
until December 31, 2010.
It took effect on September 25, 2010 and precluded the
Board of Directors, Trustees and/or Officers of GOCCs from
granting and releasing bonuses and allowances to members
of the board of directors, and from increasing salary rates of
and granting new or additional benefits and allowances to

their employees.
CONTENTIONS:
**The petitioner claims that as a PhilHealth employee, he is
affected by the implementation of EO 7, which was issued
with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction. He contended that:
1. EO 7 is null and void for lack of legal basis. PD 985 is
not applicable as its basis because the GOCCs were
subsequently granted the power to fix compensation
long after such power has been revoked by PD 1597
and RA 6758. GOCCs do not need to have its
compensation plans, rates and policies reviewed by
the DBM and approved by the President because PD
1597 requires only the GOCCs to report to the
President their plans and rates but the same does not
give the President the power of control over the fiscal
power of the GOCCs. JR No. 4, Series of 2009 is not
applicable as legal basis because it had not ripened
into law.
2. EO 7 is invalid for divesting the Board of Directors of
the GOCCs of their power to fix the compensation, a
power which is a legislative grant and which could not
be revoked or modified by an executive fiat.
3. EO 7 is by substance a law which is a derogation of
congressional
prerogative
and
is
therefore
unconstitutional.
4. The acts of suspending and imposing moratorium are
ultra vires acts because JR No. 4 does not expressly
authorize the President to exercise such powers.
5. EO 7 is an invalid issuance because it has no sufficient
standards and is therefore arbitrary, unreasonable and
a violaton of substantive due process.
6. EO 7 involves the determination and discretion as to
what the law shall be and is therefore invalid for its
usurpation of legislative power.
7. Consistent with the decision of the SC in Pimentel vs

Aguirre Case,
mandatory.
EO
is
only
directory
and
not
HELD:
1. NO. Petitioner lacks locus standi.
**As defense of respondents, the following are procedural

defects as grounds for the dismissal of the petition:
1. the petitioner lacks locus standi;
2. the petitioner failed to attach a board resolution or
secretarys certificate authorizing him to question EO 7
in behalf of PhilHealth;
3. the petitioners signature does not indicate his PTR
Number, Mandatory Continuing Legal Education
(MCLE) Compliance Number and Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) Number;
4. the jurat of the Verification and Certification of NonForum Shopping failed to indicate a valid identification
card as provided under A.M. No. 02-8-13-SC;
5. the President should be dropped as a party respondent
as he is immune from suit; and
6. certiorari is not applicable to this case.
7. They claim that the President exercises control over
the governing boards of the GOCCs and GFIs; thus, he
can fix their compensation packages. In addition, EO
7 was issued in accordance with law for the purpose of
controlling the grant of excessive salaries, allowances,
incentives and other benefits to GOCC and GFI
employees. They also advocate the validity of Joint
Resolution (J.R.) No. 4, which they point to as the
authority for issuing EO 7.
Meanwhile, on June 6, 2011, Congress enacted Republic Act
(R.A.) No. 10149,[15] otherwise known as the GOCC
Governance Act of 2011. Section 11 of RA 10149 expressly
authorizes the President to fix the compensation framework
of GOCCs and GFIs.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not petitioner has locus standi.
2. Whether or not EO 7 is valid.
In the present case, we are not convinced that the

petitioner has demonstrated that he has a personal
stake or material interest in the outcome of the case
because his interest, if any, is speculative and based
on a mere expectancy. In this case, the curtailment of
future increases in his salaries and other benefits
cannot but be characterized as contingent events or
expectancies. To be sure, he has no vested rights to
salary increases and, therefore, the absence of such
right deprives the petitioner of legal standing to assail
EO 7. We note that while the petition raises vital
constitutional and statutory questions concerning the
power of the President to fix the compensation
packages of GOCCs and GFIs with possible implications
on their officials and employees, the same cannot
infuse or give the petitioner locus standi under the
transcendental importance or paramount public
interest doctrine.
Locus standi or legal standing has been defined as a personal
and substantial interest in a case such that the party has
sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the
governmental act that is being challenged. The gist of the
question on standing is whether a party alleges such
personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure
that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation
of issues upon which the court depends for illumination of
difficult constitutional questions. This requirement of
standing relates to the constitutional mandate that this Court
settle only actual cases or controversies.
Thus, as a general rule, a party is allowed to raise a
constitutional question when (1) he can show that he will
personally suffer some actual or threatened injury because of
the allegedly illegal conduct of the government; (2) the injury

is fairly traceable to the challenged action; and (3) the injury
is likely to be redressed by a favorable action.
Jurisprudence defines interest as "material interest, an
interest in issue and to be affected by the decree, as
distinguished from mere interest in the question involved, or
a mere incidental interest. By real interest is meant a present
substantial interest, as distinguished from a mere expectancy
or a future, contingent, subordinate, or consequential
interest."
To support his claim that he has locus standi to file the
present petition, the petitioner contends that as an employee
of PhilHealth, he stands to be prejudiced by [EO] 7, which
suspends or imposes a moratorium on the grants of salary
increases or new or increased benefits to officers and
employees of GOCC[s] and x x x curtail[s] the prerogative of
those officers who are to fix and determine his
compensation. The petitioner also claims that he has
standing as a member of the bar in good standing who has
an interest in ensuring that laws and orders of the Philippine
government are legally and validly issued and implemented.
The respondents meanwhile argue that the petitioner is not a
real party-in-interest since future increases in salaries and
other benefits are merely contingent events or expectancies.
The petitioner, too, is not asserting a public right for which he
is entitled to seek judicial protection.
It has been held that as to the element of injury, such aspect
is not something that just anybody with some grievance or
pain may assert. It has to be direct and substantial to make
it worth the courts time, as well as the effort of inquiry into
the constitutionality of the acts of another department of
government. If the asserted injury is more imagined than
real, or is merely superficial and insubstantial, then the
courts may end up being importuned to decide a matter that
does not really justify such an excursion into constitutional
adjudication. The rationale for this constitutional requirement
of locus standi is by no means trifle. Not only does it assure

the vigorous adversary presentation of the case; more
importantly, it must suffice to warrant the Judiciarys
overruling the determination of a coordinate, democratically
elected organ of government, such as the President, and the
clear approval by Congress, in this case. Indeed, the rationale
goes to the very essence of representative democracies.
Since the petitioner has failed to demonstrate a material and
personal interest in the issue in dispute, he cannot also be
considered to have filed the present case as a representative
of PhilHealth. In this regard, we cannot ignore or excuse the
blatant failure of the petitioner to provide a Board Resolution
or a Secretarys Certificate from PhilHealth to act as its
representative.
2. YES. The issue is rendered moot.
The petition was dismissed for its patent formal and
procedural infirmities and for having been mooted by
subsequent events. With the enactment of the GOCC
Governance Act of 2011, the President is now authorized to
fix the compensation framework of GOCCs and GFIs. The new
law amended R.A. No. 7875 and other laws that enabled
certain GOCCs and GFIs to fix their own compensation
frameworks; the law now authorizes the President to fix the
compensation and position classification system for all
GOCCs and GFIs, as well as other entities covered by the law.
This means that, the President can now reissue an EO
containing these same provisions without any legal
constraints. Congress, thru R.A. No. 10149, has expressly
empowered the President to establish the compensation
systems of GOCCs and GFIs. For the Court to still rule upon
the supposed unconstitutionality of EO 7 will merely be an
academic exercise
The petition has been mooted by supervening events.
Because of the transitory nature of EO 7, it has been pointed
out that the present case has already been rendered moot by

these supervening events: (1) the lapse on December 31,
2010 of Section 10 of EO 7 that suspended the allowances
and bonuses of the directors and trustees of GOCCs and GFIs;
and (2) the enactment of R.A. No. 10149 amending the
provisions in the charters of GOCCs and GFIs empowering
their board of directors/trustees to determine their own
compensation system, in favor of the grant of authority to
the President to perform this act.
entertain a petition touching on an issue that has become

moot because x x x there would [be] no longer x x x a flesh
and blood case for the Court to resolve.
With the enactment of the GOCC Governance Act of 2011,

the President is now authorized to fix the compensation
framework of GOCCs and GFIs.
DOCTRINE:
In case of doubt, the Constitution should be considered selfexecuting rather than non-self-executing.
Unless it is expressly provided that a legislative act is
necessary to enforce a constitutional mandate, the
presumption now is that all provisions of the constitution are
self-executing.
As may be gleaned from these provisions, the new law

amended R.A. No. 7875 and other laws that enabled certain
GOCCs and GFIs to fix their own compensation frameworks;
the law now authorizes the President to fix the compensation
and position classification system for all GOCCs and GFIs, as
well as other entities covered by the law. This means that,
the President can now reissue an EO containing these same
provisions without any legal constraints.
A moot case is one that ceases to present a justiciable
controversy by virtue of supervening events, so that a
declaration thereon would be of no practical use or value.
[A]n action is considered moot when it no longer presents
a justiciable controversy because the issues involved have
become academic or dead[,] or when the matter in dispute
has already been resolved and hence, one is not entitled to
judicial intervention unless the issue is likely to be raised
again between the parties x x x. Simply stated, there is
nothing for the x x x court to resolve as [its] determination x
x x has been overtaken by subsequent events.
This is the present situation here. Any further discussion of
the constitutionality of EO 7 serves no useful purpose since
such issue is moot in its face in light of the enactment of R.A.
No. 10149. In the words of the eminent constitutional law
expert, Fr. Joaquin Bernas, S.J., the Court normally [will not]
Petition was DISMISSED.

MANILA PRINCE HOTEL VS. GSIS ET AL.
G.R. No. 122156. February 3, 1997
Manila Hotel is part of our national patrimony. National

patrimony refers not only to the natural resources of the
Philippines, as the Constitution could have very well used the
term natural resources, but also to the cultural heritage of
the Filipinos.
FACTS:
Pursuant to the privatization program of the Philippine
Government under Proclamation No. 50 dated December 8,
1986, GSIS decided to sell through public bidding 30% to
51% of the issued and outstanding shares of respondent
MHC.
The winning bidder is to provide management
expertise and/or an international marketing/reservation
system, and financial support to strengthen the profitability
and performance of the Manila Hotel. In a close bidding held
on 18 September 1995 only two (2) bidders participated: (1.)
Petitioner Manila Prince Hotel Corporation, a Filipino
corporation, which offered to buy 51% of the MHC or
15,300,000 shares at P41.58 per share, and (2.) Renong
Berhad, a Malaysian firm, with ITT-Sheraton as its hotel
operator, which bid for the same number of shares at P44.00
per share, or P2.42 more than the bid of petitioner.

Pending the declaration of Renong Berhard as the winning
bidder/strategic partner and the execution of the necessary
contracts, petitioner in a letter to respondent GSIS dated 28
September 1995 matched the bid price of P44.00 per share
tendered by Renong Berhad which respondent GSIS refused
to accept.
On 17 October 1995, perhaps apprehensive that respondent
GSIS has disregarded the tender of the matching bid and that
the sale of 51% of the MHC may be hastened by respondent
GSIS and consummated with Renong Berhad, petitioner came
to this Court on prohibition and mandamus. On 18 October
1995 the Court issued a temporary restraining order
enjoining respondents from perfecting and consummating
the sale to the Malaysian firm.
CONTENTION:
**Petitioner invokes Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, of the 1987
Constitution and submits that the Manila Hotel has been
identified with the Filipino nation and has practically become
a historical monument which reflects the vibrancy of
Philippine heritage and culture. It is a proud legacy of an
earlier generation of Filipinos who believed in the nobility and
sacredness of independence and its power and capacity to
release the full potential of the Filipino people. To all intents
and purposes, it has become a part of the national patrimony.
Since 51% of the shares of the MHC carries with it the
ownership of the business of the hotel which is owned by
respondent GSIS, a government-owned and controlled
corporation, the hotel business of respondent GSIS being a
part of the tourism industry is unquestionably a part of the
national economy. Thus, any transaction involving 51% of the
shares of stock of the MHC is clearly covered by the term
national economy, to which Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII,
1987 Constitution, applies.
Since Manila Hotel is part of the national patrimony and its

business also unquestionably part of the national economy
petitioner should be preferred after it has matched the bid
offer of the Malaysian firm. For the bidding rules mandate
that if for any reason, the Highest Bidder cannot be awarded
the Block of Shares, GSIS may offer this to the other Qualified
Bidders that have validly submitted bids provided that these
Qualified Bidders are willing to match the highest bid in
terms of price per share.
**Respondents contended that Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII,
of the 1987 Constitution is merely a statement of principle
and policy since it is not a self-executing provision and
requires implementing legislation(s). Thus, for the said
provision to operate, there must be existing laws to lay
down conditions under which business may be done.
Granting that this provision is self-executing, Manila Hotel
does not fall under the term national patrimony which only
refers to lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal,
petroleum and other mineral oils, all forces of potential
energy, fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna
and all marine wealth in its territorial sea, and exclusive
marine zone as cited in the first and second paragraphs of
Sec. 2, Art. XII, 1987 Constitution.
While petitioner speaks of the guests who have slept in the
hotel and the events that have transpired therein which
make the hotel historic, these alone do not make the hotel
fall under the patrimony of the nation. What is more, the
mandate of the Constitution is addressed to the State, not to
respondent GSIS which possesses a personality of its own
separate and distinct from the Philippines as a State.
Granting that the Manila Hotel forms part of the national
patrimony, the constitutional provision invoked is still
inapplicable since what is being sold is only 51% of the
outstanding shares of the corporation, not the hotel building
nor the land upon which the building stands. Certainly, 51%

of the equity of the MHC cannot be considered part of the
national patrimony. Moreover, if the disposition of the shares
of the MHC is really contrary to the Constitution, petitioner
should have questioned it right from the beginning and not
after it had lost in the bidding.
Respondents postulate that the privilege of submitting a
matching bid has not yet arisen since it only takes place if for
any reason, the Highest Bidder cannot be awarded the Block
of Shares. Thus the submission by petitioner of a matching
bid is premature since Renong Berhad could still very well be
awarded the block of shares and the condition giving rise to
the exercise of the privilege to submit a matching bid had not
yet taken place.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the provisions of the constitution is
self-executing
2. Whether or not the shares of Manila Hotel is part of the
national national economy and patrimony covered by
the protective mantle of the Constitution.
3. Whether GSIS is included in the term State, hence,
mandated to implement section 10, paragraph 2 of
Article XII of the Constitution
4. Whether or not the Filipino First policy should be
applied
HELD:
1. YES. The prevailing view is that in case of doubt, the
Constitution should be considered self-executing rather
than non-self-executing unless the contrary is clearly
intended.
A provision which is complete in itself and becomes
operative without the aid of supplementary or enabling
legislation, or that which supplies sufficient rule by
means of which the right it grants may be enjoyed or
protected, is self-executing. A constitutional provision
is self-executing if the nature and extent of the right

conferred and the liability imposed are fixed by the
constitution itself, so that they can be determined by
an examination and construction of its terms, and
there is no language indicating that the subject is
referred to the legislature for action.
Apparently, Sec. 10, second par., of Art XII is couched
in such a way as not to make it appear that it is nonself-executing but simply for purposes of style. But,
certainly, the legislature is not precluded from
enacting further laws to enforce the constitutional
provision so long as the contemplated statute squares
with the Constitution. Minor details may be left to the
legislature without impairing the self-executing nature
of constitutional provisions.
In
self-executing
constitutional
provisions,
the
legislature may still enact legislation to facilitate the
exercise of powers directly granted by the constitution,
further the operation of such a provision, prescribe a
practice to be used for its enforcement, provide a
convenient remedy for the protection of the rights
secured or the determination thereof, or place
reasonable safeguards around the exercise of the
right. The mere fact that legislation may supplement
and add to or prescribe a penalty for the violation of a
self-executing constitutional provision does not render
such a provision ineffective in the absence of such
legislation. The omission from a constitution of any
express provision for a remedy for enforcing a right or
liability is not necessarily an indication that it was not
intended to be self-executing. The rule is that a selfexecuting provision of the constitution does not
necessarily exhaust legislative power on the subject,
but any legislation must be in harmony with the
constitution, further the exercise of constitutional right
and make it more available. Subsequent legislation
however does not necessarily mean that the subject

constitutional
enforceable.
provision
is
not,
by
itself,
fully
Unless it is expressly provided that a legislative act is

necessary to enforce a constitutional mandate, the
presumption now is that all provisions of the
constitution are self-executing.
Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII of the 1987 Constitution is a
mandatory, positive command which is complete in itself and
which needs no further guidelines or implementing laws or
rules for its enforcement. From its very words the provision
does not require any legislation to put it in operation. It is
per se judicially enforceable.
When our Constitution
mandates that [i]n the grant of rights, privileges, and
concessions covering national economy and patrimony, the
State shall give preference to qualified Filipinos, it means just
that - qualified Filipinos shall be preferred. And when our
Constitution declares that a right exists in certain specified
circumstances an action may be maintained to enforce such
right notwithstanding the absence of any legislation on the
subject; consequently, if there is no statute especially
enacted to enforce such constitutional right, such right
enforces itself by its own inherent potency and puissance,
and from which all legislations must take their bearings.
Where there is a right there is a remedy.
Ubi jus ibi
remedium.
2. YES. As regards our national patrimony, a member of
the 1986 Constitutional Commission explained
(1) The patrimony of the Nation that should be
conserved and developed refers not only to our rich
natural resources but also to the cultural heritage
of our race. It also refers to our intelligence in arts,
sciences and letters. Therefore, we should develop
not only our lands, forests, mines and other natural
resources but also the mental ability or faculty of
our people.
In its plain and ordinary meaning, the term patrimony

pertains to heritage. When the Constitution speaks of
national patrimony, it refers not only to the natural
resources of the Philippines, as the Constitution could
have very well used the term natural resources, but
also to the cultural heritage of the Filipinos.
(2) Manila Hotel has become a landmark - a living
testimonial of Philippine heritage. While it was
restrictively an American hotel when it first opened
in 1912, it immediately evolved to be truly Filipino.
Formerly a concourse for the elite, it has since then
become the venue of various significant events
which have shaped Philippine history. It was called
the Cultural Center of the 1930s. It was the site of
the festivities during the inauguration of the
Philippine Commonwealth. Dubbed as the Official
Guest House of the Philippine Government it plays
host to dignitaries and official visitors who are
accorded the traditional Philippine hospitality.
(3) For more than eight (8) decades Manila Hotel has
bore mute witness to the triumphs and failures,
loves and frustrations of the Filipinos; its existence
is impressed with public interest; its own historicity
associated with our struggle for sovereignty,
independence and nationhood. Verily, Manila Hotel
has become part of our national economy and
patrimony. For sure, 51% of the equity of the MHC
comes within the purview of the constitutional
shelter for it comprises the majority and controlling
stock, so that anyone who acquires or owns the
51% will have actual control and management of
the hotel. In this instance, 51% of the MHC cannot
be disassociated from the hotel and the land on
which the hotel edifice stands.
NOTE: The term qualified Filipinos simply means that
preference shall be given to those citizens who can make a
viable contribution to the common good, because of credible

competence and efficiency. It certainly does NOT mandate
the pampering and preferential treatment to Filipino citizens
or organizations that are incompetent or inefficient, since
such
an
indiscriminate
preference
would
be
counterproductive and inimical to the common good.
In the granting of economic rights, privileges, and
concessions, when a choice has to be made between a
qualified foreigner and a qualified Filipino, the latter shall
be chosen over the former.
Lastly, the word qualified is also determinable. Petitioner
was so considered by respondent GSIS and selected as one of
the qualified bidders. It was pre-qualified by respondent GSIS
in accordance with its own guidelines so that the sole
inference here is that petitioner has been found to be
possessed of proven management expertise in the hotel
industry, or it has significant equity ownership in another
hotel company, or it has an overall management and
marketing proficiency to successfully operate the Manila
Hotel.
3. YES. It is undisputed that the sale of 51% of the MHC
could only be carried out with the prior approval of the
State acting through respondent Committee on
Privatization. As correctly pointed out by Fr. Joaquin G.
Bernas, S.J., this fact alone makes the sale of the
assets of respondents GSIS and MHC a state action.
When the Constitution addresses the State it refers not
only to the people but also to the government as
elements of the State. Accordingly, a constitutional
mandate directed to the State is correspondingly
directed to the three (3) branches of government. In
this case the subject constitutional injunction is
addressed among others to the Executive Department
and respondent GSIS, a government instrumentality
deriving its authority from the State.
In constitutional jurisprudence, the acts of persons
distinct from the government are considered state

action covered by the Constitution (1) when the
activity it engages in is a public function; (2) when
the government is so significantly involved with the
private actor as to make the government responsible
for his action; and, (3) when the government has
approved or authorized the action. It is evident that
the act of respondent GSIS in selling 51% of its share
in respondent MHC comes under the second and third
categories of state action. Without doubt therefore
the transaction, although entered into by respondent
GSIS, is in fact a transaction of the State and therefore
subject to the constitutional command.
4. YES. The Manila Hotel or, for that matter, 51% of the
MHC, is not just any commodity to be sold to the
highest bidder solely for the sake of privatization. The
patrimony of the Nation that should be conserved and
developed refers not only to our rich natural resources
but also to the cultural heritage of our race. It also
refers to our intelligence in arts, sciences and letters.
In its plain and ordinary meaning, the term patrimony
pertains to heritage. When the Constitution speaks of
national patrimony, it refers not only to the natural
resources of the Philippines, as the Constitution could
have very well used the term natural resources, but
also to the cultural heritage of the Filipinos.
The Filipino First Policy enshrined in the 1987
Constitution, i.e., in the grant of rights, privileges, and
concessions covering the national economy and
patrimony, the State shall give preference to qualified
Filipinos is invoked by petitioner in its bid to acquire
51% of the shares of the Manila Hotel Corporation
(MHC) which owns the historic Manila Hotel. Opposing,
respondents maintain that the provision is not selfexecuting but requires an implementing legislation for
its enforcement. Corollarily, they ask whether the 51%
shares form part of the national economy and

patrimony covered by the protective mantle of the
Constitution.
In the present case, it should be stressed that while the
Malaysian firm offered the higher bid it is not yet the winning
bidder. The bidding rules expressly provide that the highest
bidder shall only be declared the winning bidder after it has
negotiated and executed the necessary contracts, and
secured the requisite approvals. Since the Filipino First Policy
provision of the Constitution bestows preference on qualified
Filipinos the mere tending of the highest bid is not an
assurance that the highest bidder will be declared the
winning bidder. Resultantly, respondents are not bound to
make the award yet, nor are they under obligation to enter
into one with the highest bidder. For in choosing the awardee
respondents are mandated to abide by the dictates of the
1987 Constitution the provisions of which are presumed to be
known to all the bidders and other interested parties.
GSIS was directed to cease and desist from selling the shares
of Manila Hotel Corporation and to accept the matching bid of
petitioner Manila Prince Hotel Corporation to purchase the
subject shares.
KILOSBAYAN ET AL. VS. GUINGONA ET AL.
G.R. No. 113375 May 5, 1994
GATACELO
DOCTRINE:
A party's standing before this Court is a procedural
technicality which it may, in the exercise of its discretion, set
aside in view of the importance of the issues raised.
FACTS:
PCSO decided to establish an on- line lottery system for the
purpose of increasing its revenue base and diversifying its
sources of funds. After learning of the same, the Berjaya
Group Berhad, a multinational company and one of the ten
largest public companies in Malaysia, became interested to
offer its services and resources to PCSO. As an initial step,

Berjaya Group Berhad organized with some Filipino investors
a Philippine corporation known as the Philippine Gaming
Management Corporation (PGMC), which was intended to be
the medium through which the technical and management
services required for the project would be offered and
delivered to PCSO. Considering the Constitutions citizenship
requirement, the PGMC claims that the Berjaya Group
undertook to reduce its equity stakes in PGMC to 40% by
selling 35% out of the original 75% foreign stockholdings to
local investors.
Office of the President announced that it had given the
respondent PGMC the go-signal to operate the country's online lottery system and that the corresponding implementing
contract would be submitted thereafter. KILOSBAYAN sent an
open letter to Presidential Ramos strongly opposing the
setting up to the on-line lottery system on the basis of
serious moral and ethical considerations. Nevertheless, an
agreement denominated as "Contract of Lease" was finally
executed by respondent PCSO and respondent PGMC. The
President, per the press statement issued by the Office of the
President, approved it on 20 December 1993.
KILOSBAYAN, a non-stock domestic corporation composed of
civic-spirited citizens, pastors, priests, nuns, and lay leaders
who are committed to the cause of truth, justice, and
national renewal, along with Senators Webb and Taada and
Representative Joker Arroyo acting in their capacities as
members of Congress and as taxpayers and concerned
citizens of the Philippines, want to nullify the said contract.
They claim that the Office of the President, acting through
Executive Secretary Guingona and/or Assistant Executive
Secretary for Legal Affairs Corona, and the PCSO gravely
abused their discretion and/or functions tantamount to lack
of jurisdiction and/or authority in respectively. Moreover, they
alleged that PCSO is prohibited from holding and conducting
lotteries "in collaboration, association or joint venture with
any person, association, company or entity" pursuant to its

charter, a Congressional franchise is required before any
person may be allowed to establish and operate said
telecommunications system, among others.
Meanwhile, PGMC asserts that it is merely an independent
contractor for a piece of work, (i.e., the building and
maintenance of a lottery system to be used by PCSO in the
operation of its lottery franchise) and not a co-operator of the
lottery franchise with PCSO, nor is PCSO sharing its franchise,
'in collaboration, association or joint venture' with PGMC; and
that the petitioners do not appear to have the legal standing
or real interest in the subject contract and in obtaining the
reliefs sought. Guingona, Corona, and PCSO assert similar
counter-arguments.
ISSUE:
WON petitioners have locus standi.
HELD:
Yes. A party's standing before this Court is a procedural
technicality which it may, in the exercise of its discretion, set
aside in view of the importance of the issues raised. In the
landmark Emergency Powers Cases, this Court brushed
aside this technicality because the transcendental
importance to the public of these cases demands that they
be settled promptly and definitely, brushing aside, if we
must, technicalities of procedure. Insofar as taxpayers' suits
are concerned, this Court had declared that it is not devoid of
discretion as to whether or not it should be entertained, or
that it enjoys an open discretion to entertain the same or not.
Several cases were cited to bolster this claim, and one of
those was from Association of Small Landowners in the
Philippines, Inc. vs. Secretary of Agrarian Reform. It declared:
With particular regard to the requirement of proper party as
applied in the cases before us, we hold that the same is
satisfied by the petitioners and intervenors because each of
them has sustained or is in danger of sustaining an
immediate injury as a result of the acts or measures

complained of. And even if, strictly speaking, they are not
covered by the definition, it is still within the wide discretion
of the Court to waive the requirement and so remove the
impediment to its addressing and resolving the serious
constitutional questions raised.
In the first Emergency Powers Cases, ordinary citizens and
taxpayers were allowed to question the constitutionality of
several executive orders issued by President Quirino although
they were invoking only an indirect and general interest
shared in common with the public. The Court dismissed the
objective that they were not proper parties and ruled that the
transcendental importance to the public of these cases
demands that they be settled promptly and definitely,
brushing aside, if we must, technicalities of procedure. We
have since then applied this exception in many other cases.
Likewise, SC finds the instant petition to be of transcendental
importance to the public. The issues it raised are of
paramount public interest. The ramifications of such issues
immeasurably affect the social, economic, and moral wellbeing of the people even in the remotest barangays of the
country and the counter-productive and retrogressive effects
of the envisioned on-line lottery system are as staggering as
the billions in pesos it is expected to raise. The legal standing
then of the petitioners deserves recognition and, in the
exercise of its sound discretion, this Court hereby brushes
aside the procedural barrier which the respondents tried to
take advantage of.
RE: COA OPINION ON THE COMPUTATION OF THE
APPRAISED VALUE OF THE PROPERTIES PURCHASED BY
THE RETIRED CHIEF/ ASSOCIATE JUSTICES OF THE
SUPREME COURT
A.M. NO. 11-7-10-SC JULY 31, 2012
DOCTRINE:
Any kind of interference on how these retirement privileges

and benefits are exercised and availed of, not only violates
the fiscal autonomy and independence of the Judiciary, but
also encroaches upon the constitutional duty and privilege of
the Chief Justice and the Supreme Court En Banc to manage
the Judiciarys own affairs.
FACTS:
Office of the General Counsel of the Commission on Audit
(COA) found that an underpayment amounting to
P221,021.50 resulted when five retired Supreme Court
justices purchased from the Supreme Court the personal
properties assigned to them during their incumbency in the
Court. The COA attributed this underpayment to the use by
the Property Division of the Supreme Court of the wrong
formula in computing the appraisal value of the purchased
vehicles. According to the COA, the Property Division
erroneously appraised the subject motor vehicles by applying
Constitutional Fiscal Autonomy Group (CFAG) Joint Resolution
No. 35 and its guidelines, in compliance with the Resolution
of the Court En Banc in A.M. No. 03-12-01, when it should
have applied the formula found in COA Memorandum No. 98569-A4.
Atty. Candelaria, Deputy Clerk of Court and Chief
Administrative Officer, recommended that the Court advise
the COA to respect the in-house computation based on the
CFAG formula, noting that this was the first time that the COA
questioned the authority of the Court in using CFAG Joint
Resolution No. 35 and its guidelines in the appraisal and
disposal of government property since these were issued in
1997. As a matter of fact, in two previous instances involving
two retired Court of Appeals Associate Justices, the COA
upheld the in-house appraisal of government property using
the formula found in the CFAG guidelines. More importantly,
the Constitution itself grants the Judiciary fiscal autonomy in
the handling of its budget and resources.
ISSUE:
WON COAs interference, in this case, violates the judiciarys
autonomy.
HELD:
Yes. The COAs authority to conduct post-audit examinations
on constitutional bodies granted fiscal autonomy is provided
under Section 2(1), Article IX-D of the 1987 Constitution. This
authority, however, must be read not only in light of the
Courts fiscal autonomy, but also in relation with the
constitutional provisions on judicial independence and the
existing jurisprudence and Court rulings on these matters.
The concept of the independence of the three branches of
government extends from the notion that the powers of
government must be divided to avoid concentration of these
powers in any one branch; the division, it is hoped, would
avoid any single branch from lording its power over the other
branches or the citizenry. To achieve this purpose, the divided
power must be wielded by co-equal branches of government
that are equally capable of independent action in exercising
their respective mandates; lack of independence would result
in the inability of one branch of government to check the
arbitrary or self-interest assertions of another or others.
Thus, judicial independence can be broken down into two
distinct concepts: decisional independence and institutional
independence. Decisional independence refers to a judges
ability to render decisions free from political or popular
influence based solely on the individual facts and applicable
law.On the other hand, institutional independence
describes the separation of the judicial branch from the
executive and legislative branches of government.
While, as a general proposition, the authority of legislatures
to control the purse in the first instance is unquestioned, any
form of interference by the Legislative or the Executive on
the Judiciarys fiscal autonomy amounts to an improper check
on a co-equal branch of government. If the judicial branch is
to perform its primary function of adjudication, it must be
able to command adequate resources for that purpose. This
authority to exercise (or to compel the exercise of) legislative
power over the national purse (which at first blush appears to

be a violation of concepts of separateness and an invasion of
legislative autonomy) is necessary to maintain judicial
independence and is expressly provided for by the
Constitution through the grant of fiscal autonomy under
Section 3, Article VIII.
availed of, not only violates the fiscal autonomy and

independence of the Judiciary, but also encroaches upon the
constitutional duty and privilege of the Chief Justice and the
Supreme Court En Banc to manage the Judiciarys own
affairs.
The Judiciarys fiscal autonomy is realized through the

actions of the Chief Justice, as its head, and of the Supreme
Court En Banc, in the exercise of administrative control and
supervision of the courts and its personnel. As the Court En
Bancs Resolution reflects, the fiscal autonomy of the
Judiciary serves as the basis in allowing the sale of the
Judiciarys properties to retiring Justices of the Supreme Court
and the appellate courts. The Judiciary has full flexibility to
allocate and utilize (its) resources with the wisdom and
dispatch that (its) needs require.
SANIDAD VS. COMELEC

G.R. NO. L-44640 OCTOBER 12, 1976
By way of a long standing tradition, partly based on the

intention to reward long and faithful service, the sale to the
retired Justices of specifically designated properties that they
used during their incumbency has been recognized both as a
privilege and a benefit. This has become an established
practice within the Judiciary that even the COA has previously
recognized. The En Banc Resolution also deems the grant of
the privilege as a form of additional retirement benefit that
the Court can grant its officials and employees in the exercise
of its power of administrative supervision. Under this
administrative authority, the Court has the power to
administer the Judiciarys internal affairs, and this includes
the authority to handle and manage the retirement
applications and entitlements of its personnel as provided by
law and by its own grants.
In the context of the grant now in issue, the use of the
formula provided in CFAG Joint Resolution No. 35 is a part of
the Courts exercise of its discretionary authority to
determine the manner the granted retirement privileges and
benefits can be availed of. Any kind of interference on how
these retirement privileges and benefits are exercised and
DOCTRINE:
The amending process both as to proposal and ratification
raises a judicial question.
FACTS:
President Marcos issued PD. No. 991 calling for a national
referendum on October 16, 1976 for the Citizens Assemblies
("barangays") to resolve, among other things, the issues of
martial law, the assembly, its replacement, the powers of
such replacement, the period of its existence, the length of
the period for tile exercise by the President of his present
powers. Thereafter, the President issued PD No. 1031,
amending PD No. 991, by providing for the manner of voting
and canvass of votes in "barangays" (Citizens Assemblies)
applicable to the national referendum-plebiscite of October
16, 1976.
Soon, the President issued PD No. 1033, stating the questions
to be submitted to the people in the referendum-plebiscite on
October 16, 1976. The Decree recites in its "whereas" clauses
that the people's continued opposition to the convening of
the National Assembly evinces their desire to have such body
abolished and replaced thru a constitutional amendment,
providing for a legislative body, which will be submitted
directly to the people in the referendum-plebiscite of October
16. The questions ask, to wit: (1) Do you want martial law to
be continued? (2) Whether or not you want martial law to be
continued, do you approve the following amendments to the
Constitution? For the purpose of the second question, the
referendum shall have the effect of a plebiscite within the
contemplation of Section 2 of Article XVI of the Constitution.

And some of the proposed amendments were: 1) In lieu of
the interim National Assembly, an interim Batasang
Pambansa shall be established; 2) Batasang Pambansa shall
have the same powers and its members shall have the same
functions,
responsibilities,
rights,
privileges,
and
disqualifications as the interim National Assembly and the
regular National Assembly and the members thereof; 3) The
incumbent President shall convene the interim Batasang
Pambansa and preside over its sessions until the Speaker
shall have been elected. The incumbent President shall be
the Prime Minister and he shall continue to exercise all his
powers even after the interim Batasang Pambansa is
organized and ready to discharge its functions...; and among
others.
Pablo and Pablito Sanidad, father and son, commenced a suit
for Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction seeking to enjoin
the Commission on Elections from holding and conducting
the Referendum Plebiscite on October 16. They contend that
under the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions, there is no grant to
the incumbent President to exercise the constituent power to
propose amendments to the new Constitution. As a
consequence, the Referendum-Plebiscite on October 16 has
no constitutional or legal basis.
On the other hand, the Solicitor General principally maintains
that petitioners have no standing to sue; the issue raised is
political in nature, beyond judicial cognizance of this Court; at
this state of the transition period, only the incumbent
President has the authority to exercise constituent power; the
referendum-plebiscite is a step towards normalization.
On September 30, 1976, another action for Prohibition with
Preliminary Injunction, docketed as L-44684, was instituted
by VICENTE M. GUZMAN, a delegate to the 1971
Constitutional Convention, asserting that the power to
propose amendments to, or revision of the Constitution
during the transition period is expressly conferred on the
interim National Assembly under Section 16, Article XVII of
the Constitution.3
Still another petition for Prohibition with Preliminary
Injunction was filed on October 5, 1976 by RAUL M.
GONZALES, his son RAUL, JR., and ALFREDO SALAPANTAN,
docketed as L- 44714, to restrain the implementation of
Presidential Decrees relative to the forthcoming ReferendumPlebiscite of October 16.
These last petitioners argue that even granting him
legislative powers under Martial Law, the incumbent
President cannot act as a constituent assembly to propose
amendments to the Constitution; a referendum-plebiscite is
untenable under the Constitutions of 1935 and 1973; the
submission of the proposed amendments in such a short
period of time for deliberation renders the plebiscite a nullity;
to lift Martial Law, the President need not consult the people
via referendum; and allowing 15-.year olds to vote would
amount to an amendment of the Constitution, which confines
the right of suffrage to those citizens of the Philippines 18
years of age and above.
We find the petitions in the three entitled cases to be devoid
of merit.
Issues:
1. WON Pablo and Pablito Sanidad have locus
standi.
2. WON the amendment process is justiciable.
3. WON
President
Marcos
can
amendments to the Constitution.
propose
Held:
1. Yes. Pablo and Pablito Sanidad possess locus standi. It
is now an ancient rule that Presidential Decrees may
be contested by one who will sustain direct injuries as

a result of its enforcement. At the instance of
taxpayers, laws providing for the disbursement of
public funds may be enjoined, upon the theory that the
expenditure of public funds by an officer of the State
for the purpose of executing an unconstitutional act
constitutes a misapplication of such funds. The
breadth of Presidential Decree No. 991 carries all
appropriation of Five Million Pesos for the effective
implementation of its purposes. Presidential Decree
No. 1031 appropriates the sum of Eight Million Pesos to
carry out its provisions. The interest of the petitioners
as taxpayers in the lawful expenditure of these
amounts of public money sufficiently clothes them with
that personality to litigate the validity of the Decrees
appropriating said funds. Moreover, as regards
taxpayer's suits, this Court enjoys that open discretion
to entertain the same or not. For the present case, We
deem it sound to exercise that discretion affirmatively
so that the authority upon which the disputed Decrees
are predicated may be inquired into.
1033 to the people in a Referendum-Plebiscite on

October 16. Unavoidably, the regularity of the
procedure for amendments, written in lambent words
in the very Constitution sought to be amended, raises
a contestable issue. The implementing Presidential
Decree Nos. 991, 1031, and 1033, which commonly
purport to have the force and effect of legislation are
assailed as invalid, thus the issue of the validity of said
Decrees is plainly a justiciable one, within the
competence of this Court to pass upon. Section 2 (2),
Article X of the new Constitution provides: "All cases
involving the constitutionality of a treaty, executive
agreement, or law may shall be heard and decided by
the Supreme Court en banc and no treaty, executive
agreement, or law may be declared unconstitutional
without the concurrence of at least ten Members." The
Supreme Court has the last word in the construction
not only of treaties and statutes, but also of the
Constitution itself. The amending, like all other powers
organized in the Constitution, is in form a delegated
and hence a limited power, so that the Supreme Court
is vested with that authorities to determine whether
that power has been discharged within its limits.
2. Yes. The amending process both as to proposal and

ratification raises a judicial question. Under the terms
of the 1973 Constitution, the power to propose
amendments to the constitution resides in the interim
National Assembly in the period of transition (See. 15,
Transitory provisions). After that period, and the
regular National Assembly in its active session, the
power to propose amendments becomes ipso facto the
prerogative of the regular National Assembly (Sec. 1,
pars. 1 and 2 of Art. XVI, 1973 constitution). The
normal course has not been followed. Rather than
calling the National Assembly to constitute itself into a
constituent assembly, the incumbent President
undertook the proposal of amendments and submitted
the proposed amendments thru Presidential Decree
What is in the heels of the Court is not the wisdom of

the act of the incumbent President in proposing
amendments to the Constitution, but his constitutional
authority to perform such act or to assume the power
of a constituent assembly. Whether the amending
process confers on the President that power to propose
amendments is therefore a downright justiciable
question. Should the contrary be found, the actuation
of the President would merely be a brutum fulmen
[empty threat]. If the Constitution provides how it may
be amended, the judiciary as the interpreter of that
Constitution, can declare whether the procedure
followed or the authority assumed was valid or not.
3. Yes. There are two periods contemplated in the

constitutional life of the nation, i.e., period of normalcy
and period of transition. In times of normally, the
amending process may be initiated by the proposals of
the (1) regular National Assembly upon a vote of threefourths of all its members; or (2) by a Constitutional
Convention called by a vote of two-thirds of all the
Members of the National Assembly. However the
calling of a Constitutional Convention may be
submitted to the electorate in an election voted upon
by a majority vote of all the members of the National
Assembly. In times of transition, amendments may be
proposed by a majority vote of all the Members of the
National Assembly upon special call by the interim
Prime Minister.
The power then to legislate is constitutionally
consigned to the interim National Assembly during the
transition period. However, the initial convening of that
Assembly is a matter fully addressed to the judgment
of the incumbent President. And, in the exercise of that
judgment, the President opted to defer convening of
that body in utter recognition of the people's
preference. Likewise, in the period of transition, the
power to propose amendments to the Constitution lies
in the interim National Assembly upon special call by
the President (See. 15 of the Transitory Provisions).
Again, harking to the dictates of the sovereign will, the
President decided not to call the interim National
Assembly. Would it then be within the bounds of the
Constitution and of law for the President to assume
that constituent power of the interim Assembly vis-avis his assumption of that body's legislative functions?
The answer is yes. If the President has been
legitimately discharging the legislative functions of the
interim Assembly, there is no reason why he cannot
validly discharge the function of that Assembly to
propose amendments to the Constitution, which is but
adjunct, although peculiar, to its gross legislative
power. This, of course, is not to say that the President
has converted his office into a constituent assembly of

that nature normally constituted by the legislature.
Rather, with the interim National Assembly not
convened and only the Presidency and the Supreme
Court in operation, the urges of absolute necessity
render it imperative upon the President to act as agent
for and in behalf of the people to propose amendments
to the Constitution. Parenthetically, by its very
constitution, the Supreme Court possesses no capacity
to propose amendments without constitutional
infractions. For the President to shy away from that
actuality and decline to undertake the amending
process would leave the governmental machineries at
a stalemate or create in the powers of the State a
destructive vacuum, thereby impeding the objective of
a crisis government "to end the crisis and restore
normal times." In these parlous times, that Presidential
initiative to reduce into concrete forms the constant
voices of the people reigns supreme. After all,
constituent assemblies or constitutional conventions,
like the President now, are mere agents of the people.
LAMP vs. SEC. OF DBM
G.R. No. 164987 April 24, 2012
LAZARO
DOCTRINE:
In order for a court to exercise the power of judicial review,
the four requisites must be present.
FACTS:
The GAA of 2004 provides, among others, the use and
release of priority development assistance fund in the
amount of 8,327,000,000.00. According to LAMP (LAWYERS
AGAINST
MONOPOLY
AND
POVERTY),
the
General
Appropriations Act of 2004 (GAA) is silent and, therefore,
prohibits an automatic or direct allocation of lump sums to
individual senators and congressmen for the funding of
projects.
It does not empower individual Members of

Congress to propose, select and identify programs and
projects to be funded out of PDAF. In previous GAAs, said
allocation and identification of projects were the main
features of the pork barrel system technically known as
Countrywide Development Fund (CDF). Nothing of the sort is
now seen in the present law (R.A. No. 9206 of CY 2004). The
omission of the PDAF provision to specify sums as
allocations to individual Members of Congress is a casus
omissus signifying an omission intentionally made by
Congress that this Court is forbidden to supply. Hence, LAMP
is of the conclusion that the pork barrel has become legally
defunct under the present state of GAA 2004.
Respondents contend that the petition miserably lacks legal
and factual grounds. Without probative value, media reports
cited by the petitioner deserve scant consideration especially
the accusation that corrupt legislators have allegedly
proposed cuts or slashes from their pork barrel. Hence, the
Court should decline the petitioners plea to take judicial
notice of the supposed iniquity of PDAF because there is no
concrete proof that PDAF, in the guise of pork barrel, is a
source of dirty money for unscrupulous lawmakers and
other officials who tend to misuse their allocations.
ISSUE:
WON the mandatory requisites for the exercise of judicial
review are met in this case.
RULING:
Yes.
Like almost all powers conferred by the Constitution, the
power of judicial review is subject to limitations, to wit: (1)
there must be an actual case or controversy calling for the
exercise of judicial power; (2) the person challenging the act
must have the standing to question the validity of the subject
act or issuance; otherwise stated, he must have a personal
and substantial interest in the case such that he has
sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its
enforcement; (3) the question of constitutionality must be
raised at the earliest opportunity; and (4) the issue of

constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case. In our
jurisdiction, the issue of ripeness is generally treated in terms
of actual injury to the plaintiff. Hence, a question is ripe for
adjudication when the act being challenged has had a direct
adverse effect on the individual challenging it.
In this case, the petitioner contested the implementation of
an alleged unconstitutional statute, as citizens and
taxpayers.
According to LAMP, the practice of direct
allocation and release of funds to the Members of Congress
and the authority given to them to propose and select
projects is the core of the laws flawed execution resulting in
a serious constitutional transgression involving the
expenditure of public funds. Undeniably, as taxpayers, LAMP
would somehow be adversely affected by this. A finding of
unconstitutionality would necessarily be tantamount to a
misapplication of public funds which, in turn, cause injury or
hardship to taxpayers. This affords ripeness to the present
controversy.
Anent locus standi, the rule is that the person who impugns
the validity of a statute must have a personal and substantial
interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will
sustained, direct injury as a result of its enforcement. The
gist of the question of standing is whether a party alleges
such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as
to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the
presentation of issues upon which the court so largely
depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions.
In public suits, the plaintiff, representing the general public,
asserts a public right in assailing an allegedly illegal official
action. The plaintiff may be a person who is affected no
differently from any other person, and could be suing as a
stranger, or as a citizen or taxpayer. Thus, taxpayers
have been allowed to sue where there is a claim that public
funds are illegally disbursed or that public money is being
deflected to any improper purpose, or that public funds are
wasted through the enforcement of an invalid or

unconstitutional law. Of greater import than the damage
caused by the illegal expenditure of public funds is the mortal
wound inflicted upon the fundamental law by the
enforcement of an invalid statute. Here, the sufficient interest
preventing the illegal expenditure of money raised by
taxation required in taxpayers suits is established. Thus, in
the claim that PDAF funds have been illegally disbursed and
wasted through the enforcement of an invalid or
unconstitutional law, LAMP should be allowed to sue.
Taxpayers have sufficient interest in preventing the illegal
expenditures of moneys raised by taxation and may
therefore question the constitutionality of statutes requiring
expenditure of public moneys.
Lastly, the Court is of the view that the petition poses issues
impressed with paramount public interest. The ramification of
issues involving the unconstitutional spending of PDAF
deserves the consideration of the Court, warranting the
assumption of jurisdiction over the petition.
(ADDITIONAL INFO)
The petition was dismissed by the court. The petition is
seriously wanting in establishing that individual Members of
Congress receive and thereafter spend funds out of PDAF.
Although the possibility of this unscrupulous practice cannot
be entirely discounted, surmises and conjectures are not
sufficient bases for the Court to strike down the practice for
being offensive to the Constitution. Moreover, the authority
granted the Members of Congress to propose and select
projects was already upheld in Philconsa case. This remains
as valid case law. The Court sees no need to review or
reverse the standing pronouncements in the said case. So
long as there is no showing of a direct participation of
legislators in the actual spending of the budget, the
constitutional boundaries between the Executive and the
Legislative in the budgetary process remain intact.
DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO vs. COMELEC
G.R. No. 127325 March 19, 1997
DOCTRINE:
RA 6735 is incomplete, inadequate, or wanting in essential
terms and conditions insofar as initiative on amendments to
the Constitution is concerned.
FACTS:
Private respondent Atty. Jesus S. Delfin filed with public
respondent COMELEC a "Petition to Amend the Constitution,
to Lift Term Limits of Elective Officials, by People's Initiative"
(hereafter, Delfin Petition). The Delfin Petition alleged, among
others, that the provisions sought to be amended are
Sections 4 and 7 of Article VI, Section 4 of Article VII, and
Section 8 of Article X of the Constitution. Attached to the
petition is a copy of a "Petition for Initiative on the 1987
Constitution" embodying the proposed amendments which
consist in the deletion from the aforecited sections of the
provisions concerning term limits, and with the following
proposition: DO YOU APPROVE OF LIFTING THE TERM LIMITS
OF ALL ELECTIVE GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS, AMENDING FOR
THE PURPOSE SECTIONS 4 AND 7 OF ARTICLE VI, SECTION 4
OF ARTICLE VII, AND SECTION 8 OF ARTICLE X OF THE 1987
PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION? After complying with the order
of the COMELEC, the petition was set for hearing. After
hearing their arguments, the COMELEC directed Delfin and
the
oppositors
to
file
their
"memoranda
and/or
oppositions/memoranda" within five days. The petitioners
herein (Santiago, Padilla, Ongpin) filed a special civil action
for prohibition for the ff. reasons: (1) The constitutional
provision on people's initiative to amend the Constitution can
only be implemented by law to be passed by Congress. No
such law has been passed; (2) It is true that R.A. No. 6735
provides for three systems of initiative, namely, initiative on
the Constitution, on statutes, and on local legislation.
However, it failed to provide any subtitle on initiative on the
Constitution, unlike in the other modes of initiative, which are
specifically provided for in Subtitle II and Subtitle III; (3)
Republic Act No. 6735 provides for the effectivity of the law
after publication in print media. This indicates that the Act

covers only laws and not constitutional amendments because
the latter take effect only upon ratification and not after
publication; (4) COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 adopted to
govern "the conduct of initiative on the Constitution and
initiative and referendum on national and local laws, is ultra
vires insofar as initiative on amendments to the Constitution
is concerned, since the COMELEC has no power to provide
rules and regulations for the exercise of the right of initiative
to amend the Constitution. Only Congress is authorized by
the Constitution to pass the implementing law; (5) The
people's initiative is limited to amendments to the
Constitution, not to revision thereof. Extending or lifting of
term limits constitutes a revision and is, therefore, outside
the power of the people's initiative; (6) Finally, Congress has
not yet appropriated funds for people's initiative; neither the
COMELEC nor any other government department, agency, or
office has realigned funds for the purpose.
ISSUE:
WON RA 6735 is sufficient insofar as
amendments to the Constitution is concerned.
initiative
on
RULING:
No.
Section 2 of Article XVII of the Constitution provides for the
exercise of the right of the people to propose amendments to
the Constitution through initiative.The Congress shall provide
for the implementation of the exercise of this right. This
provision is not self-executory. The Court agrees that R.A. No.
6735 was, as its history reveals, intended to cover initiative
to propose amendments to the Constitution. However, it is
not in full compliance with the power and duty of Congress to
"provide for the implementation of the exercise of the right.
First, contrary to the assertion of public respondent
COMELEC, Section 2 of the Act does not suggest an initiative
on amendments to the Constitution. The said section reads:
Sec. 2. Statement and Policy. The power of the people
under a system of initiative and referendum to directly
propose, enact, approve or reject, in whole or in part,

the Constitution, laws, ordinances, or resolutions passed by
any legislative body upon compliance with the requirements
of this Act is hereby affirmed, recognized and guaranteed.
(Emphasis supplied).
The inclusion of the word "Constitution" therein was a
delayed afterthought. That word is neither germane nor
relevant to said section, which exclusively relates to initiative
and referendum on national laws and local laws, ordinances,
and resolutions. That section is silent as to amendments on
the Constitution. As pointed out earlier, initiative on the
Constitution is confined only to proposals to AMEND.
The people are not accorded the power to "directly
propose, enact, approve, or reject, in whole or in part,
the Constitution" through the system of initiative.
They can only do so with respect to "laws, ordinances, or
resolutions."
Second, unlike in the case of the other systems of initiative,
the Act does not provide for the contents of a petition for
initiative on the Constitution. Section 5, paragraph (c)
requires, among other things, statement of the proposed law
sought to be enacted, approved or rejected, amended or
repealed, as the case may be. It does not include, as among
the contents of the petition, the provisions of the Constitution
sought to be amended, in the case of initiative on the
Constitution.
Third, while the Act provides subtitles for National Initiative
and Referendum (Subtitle II) and for Local Initiative and
Referendum (Subtitle III), no subtitle is provided for initiative
on the Constitution. This conspicuous silence as to the latter
simply means that the main thrust of the Act is initiative and
referendum on national and local laws. If Congress intended
R.A. No. 6735 to fully provide for the implementation of the
initiative on amendments to the Constitution, it could have
provided for a subtitle therefor, considering that in the order
of things, the primacy of interest, or hierarchy of values, the

right of the people to directly propose amendments to the
Constitution is far more important than the initiative on
national and local laws. It is "national initiative," if what is
proposed to be adopted or enacted is a national law, or a law
which only Congress can pass. It is "local initiative" if what is
proposed to be adopted or enacted is a law, ordinance, or
resolution which only the legislative bodies of the
governments of the autonomous regions, provinces, cities,
municipalities, and barangays can pass. Hence, to complete
the classification under subtitles there should have been a
subtitle on initiative on amendments to the Constitution. As
to initiative on amendments to the Constitution, R.A. No.
6735, in all of its twenty-three sections, merely (a) mentions,
the word "Constitution" in Section 2; (b) defines "initiative on
the Constitution" and includes it in the enumeration of the
three systems of initiative in Section 3; (c) speaks of
"plebiscite" as the process by which the proposition in an
initiative on the Constitution may be approved or rejected by
the people; (d) reiterates the constitutional requirements as
to the number of voters who should sign the petition; and (e)
provides for the date of effectivity of the approved
proposition. There was, therefore, an obvious downgrading of
the more important or the paramount system of initiative.
RA. No. 6735 thus delivered a humiliating blow to the system
of initiative on amendments to the Constitution by merely
paying it a reluctant lip service. 5
SALONGA vs. PAO
134 SCRA 438 G.R. No. L-59524 February 18, 1985
DOCTRINE:
The Court exercised the power of judicial review even if the
issue had become moot and academic since it has the duty
to formulate guiding and controlling constitutional principles,
precepts, doctrines, or rules.
FACTS:
A rash of bombings occurred in the Metro Manila area in the
months of August, September and October of 1980. One
Victor Burns Lovely, Jr., a Philippine-born American citizen

from Los Angeles, California, almost killed himself and injured
his younger brother, Romeo, as a result of the explosion of a
small bomb inside his room at the YMCA building in Manila.
Found in Lovely's possession by police and military
authorities were several pictures taken sometime in May,
1980 at the birthday party of former Congressman Raul Daza
held at the latter's residence in a Los Angeles suburb.
Petitioner Jovito R. Salonga and his wife were among those
whose likenesses appeared in the group pictures together
with other guests, including Lovely. Mr. Lovely and his two
brothers, Romeo and Baltazar Lovely were charged with
subversion, illegal possession of explosives, and damage to
property. On September 20, 1980, the President's
anniversary television radio press conference was broadcast.
The younger brother of Victor Lovely, Romeo, was presented
during the conference. In his interview, Romeo stated that he
had driven his elder brother, Victor, to the petitioner's house
in Greenhills on two occasions. The first time was on August
20, 1980. Romeo stated that Victor did not bring any bag
with him on that day when he went to the petitioner's
residence and did not carry a bag when he left. The second
time was in the afternoon of August 31, 1980 when he
brought Victor only to the gate of the petitioner's house.
Romeo did not enter the petitioner's residence. Neither did
he return that day to pick up his brother. The next day,
newspapers came out with almost Identical headlines stating
in effect that petitioner had been linked to the various
bombings in Metro Manila. Arrest, search, and seizure orders
(ASSOs) were issued against persons who were apparently
implicated by Victor Lovely in the series of bombings in Metro
Manila. One of them was herein petitioner. Elements of the
military went to the hospital room of the petitioner at the
Manila Medical Center where he was confined due to his
recurrent and chronic ailment of bronchial asthma and placed
him under arrest. The petitioner was transferred against his
objections from his hospital arrest to an isolation room
without windows in an army prison camp at Fort Bonifacio,
Makati. The petitioner states that he was not informed why

he was transferred and detained, nor was he ever
investigated or questioned by any military or civil authority.
Subsequently, the petitioner was released for humanitarian
reasons from military custody and placed "under house arrest
in the custody of Mrs. Lydia Salonga" still without the benefit
of any investigation or charges. The counsel for petitioner
filed a motion to dismiss the charges against petitioner for
failure of the prosecution to establish a prima facie case
against him. The respondent judge denied the motion. He
issued a resolution ordering the filing of an information for
violation of the Revised Anti-Subversion Act, as amended,
against forty (40) people, including herein petitioner. The
resolutions of the respondent judge are now the subject of
the petition. It is the contention of the petitioner that no
prima facie case has been established by the prosecution to
justify the filing of an information against him.
ISSUE:
WON the Court in this case may still exercise the power of
judicial review even if the issue has become moot and
academic.
RULING:
Yes.
This case falls under the exception that the Court has the
duty to formulate guiding and controlling constitutional
principles, precepts, doctrines, or rules. The Court had
already deliberated on this case, a consensus on the Court's
judgment had been arrived at, and a draft ponencia was
circulating for concurrences and separate opinions, if any,
when on January 18, 1985, respondent Judge Rodolfo Ortiz
granted the motion of respondent City Fiscal Sergio Apostol
to drop the subversion case against the petitioner. Pursuant
to instructions of the Minister of Justice, the prosecution
restudied its evidence and decided to seek the exclusion of
petitioner Jovito Salonga as one of the accused in the
information filed under the questioned resolution.
We were constrained by this action of the prosecution and
the respondent Judge to withdraw the draft ponencia from

circulating for concurrences and signatures and to place it
once again in the Court's crowded agenda for further
deliberations.
Insofar as the absence of a prima facie case to warrant the
filing of subversion charges is concerned, this decision has
been rendered moot and academic by the action of the
prosecution. Recent developments in this case serve to focus
attention on a not too well known aspect of the Supreme
Court's functions.
The setting aside or declaring void, in proper cases, of
intrusions of State authority into areas reserved by the Bill of
Rights for the individual as constitutionally protected spheres
where even the awesome powers of Government may not
enter at will is not the totality of the Court's functions.
The Court also has the duty to formulate guiding and
controlling constitutional principles, precepts, doctrines, or
rules. It has the symbolic function of educating bench and
bar on the extent of protection given by constitutional
guarantees. In this case, the respondents agree with the
Courts earlier finding that the prosecution evidence
miserably fails to establish a prima facie case against the
petitioner, either as a co-conspirator of a destabilization plan
to overthrow the government or as an officer or leader of any
subversive organization. They have taken the initiative of
dropping the charges against the petitioner. The Court
reiterates the rule, however, that this Court will not
validate the filing of an information based on the kind
of evidence against the petitioner found in the
records.
TANADA VS ANGARA
G.R. No. 118295. May 2, 1997.
MUEZ
DOCTRINE:

Where an action of the legislative branch is seriously alleged
to have infringed the Constitution, it becomes not only the
right but in fact the duty of the judiciary to settle the dispute.
The duty to adjudicate remains to assure that the supremacy
of the Constitution is upheld. Once a controversy as to the
application or interpretation of a constitutional provision is
raised before this Court, it becomes a legal issue which the
Court is bound by constitutional mandate to decide.
FACTS:
This is a petition seeking to nullify the Philippine ratification
of the World Trade Organization (WTO) Agreement.
Petitioners question the concurrence of herein respondents
acting in their capacities as Senators via signing the said
agreement.
On April 15, 1994, the Philippine Government represented by
its Secretary of the Department of Trade and Industry,
Rizalino Navarro, signed the Final Act binding the Philippine
Government to submit to its respective competent
authorities the WTO (World Trade Organization) Agreements
to seek approval for such. On December 14, 1994, Resolution
No. 97 was adopted by the Philippine Senate to ratify the
WTO
Agreement.
The WTO opens access to foreign markets, especially its
major trading partners, through the reduction of tariffs on its
exports, particularly agricultural and industrial products.
Thus, provides new opportunities for the service sector cost
and uncertainty associated with exporting and more
investment in the country. These are the predicted benefits
as reflected in the agreement and as viewed by the signatory
Senators, a free market espoused by WTO.
Petitioners on the other hand viewed the WTO agreement as
one that limits, restricts and impair Philippine economic
sovereignty and legislative power. Petitioners assail the
constitutionality of the WTO agreement as it violates Sec 19,
Article II, providing for the development of a self reliant and
independent national economy, and Sections 10 and 12,

Article XII, providing for the Filipino first policy. That the
Filipino First policy of the Constitution was taken for granted
as it gives foreign trading intervention.
ISSUE/S:
(1) WHETHER OR NOT THE PETITION INVOLVES A POLITICAL
QUESTION.
(2) WHETHER OR NOT THE WTO AGREEMENT CONTRAVENE
SEC. 19, ARTICLE II, AND SECS. 10 AND 12, ARTICLE XII, OF
THE PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION.
HELD:
(1) NO. The petition raises a justiciable controversy. Where
an action of the legislative branch is seriously alleged to have
infringed the Constitution, it becomes not only the right but
in fact the duty of the judiciary to settle the dispute. The duty
to adjudicate remains to assure that the supremacy of the
Constitution is upheld. Once a controversy as to the
application or interpretation of a constitutional provision is
raised before this Court, it becomes a legal issue which the
Court is bound by constitutional mandate to decide.
In deciding to take jurisdiction over this petition, this Court
will not review the wisdom of the decision of the President
and the Senate in enlisting the country into the WTO, or pass
upon the merits of trade liberalization as a policy espoused
by said international body. Neither will it rule on
the propriety of the governments economic policy of
reducing/removing tariffs, taxes, subsidies, quantitative
restrictions, and other import/trade barriers. Rather, it will
only exercise its constitutional duty to determine whether or
not there had been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the Senate in
ratifying the WTO Agreement and its three annexes.
(2) NO. Article II of the Constitution, declaration of principles
and state policies, are not intended to be self-executing
principles ready for enforcement through the courts. They are

used by the judiciary as aids or as guides in the exercise of
its power of judicial review, and by the legislature in its
enactment of laws. They do not embody judicially
enforceable constitutional rights but guidelines for
legislation. Broad constitutional principles need legislative
enactments to implement them. They were rather directives
addressed to the executive and to the legislature. If the
executive and the legislature failed to heed the directives of
the article, the available remedy was not judicial but
political.
On the other hand, Secs. 10 and 12 of Article XII, apart from
merely laying down general principles relating to the national
economy and patrimony, should be read and understood in
relation to the other sections in said article, especially Secs.
1 and 13 thereof. With these goals in context, the
Constitution then ordains the ideals of economic nationalism
(1) by expressing preference in favor of qualified Filipinos in
the grant of rights, privileges and concessions covering the
national economy and patrimony and in the use of Filipino
labor, domestic materials and locally-produced goods; (2) by
mandating the State to adopt measures that help make
them competitive; and (3) by requiring the State to develop
a self-reliant and independent national economy effectively
controlled by Filipinos.
It is true that in the recent case of Manila Prince Hotel vs.
Government Service Insurance System, et al., this Court held
that Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII of the 1987 Constitution is
a mandatory, positive command which is complete in itself
and which needs no further guidelines or implementing laws
or rules for its enforcement. From its very words the
provision does not require any legislation to put it in
operation. It is per se judicially enforceable. However, as
the constitutional provision itself states, it is enforceable only
in regard to the grants of rights, privileges and concessions
covering national economy and patrimony and not to every
aspect of trade and commerce. It refers to exceptions rather
than the rule. The issue here whether, as a rule, there are
enough balancing provisions in the Constitution to allow the

Senate to ratify the Philippine concurrence in the WTO
Agreement. And we hold that there are.
The Constitution did not intend to pursue an isolationist
policy. It did not shut out foreign investments, goods and
services in the development of the Philippine economy. While
the Constitution does not encourage the unlimited entry of
foreign goods, services and investments into the country, it
does not prohibit them either. In fact, it allows an exchange
on the basis of equality and reciprocity, frowning only on
foreign competition that is unfair.
SANLAKAS VS. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
G.R. NO. 159085
February 3, 2004
MUEZ
DOCTRINE:
Only real parties in interest or those with standing, as the
case may be, may invoke the judicial power. The jurisdiction
of this Court, even in cases involving constitutional
questions, is limited by the "case and controversy"
requirement of Art. VIII, 5. This requirement lies at the very
heart of the judicial function. It is what differentiates decision
making in the courts from decisionmaking in the political
departments of the government and bars the bringing of
suits by just any party.
Facts:
During the wee hours of July 27, 2003, some three-hundred
junior officers and enlisted men of the AFP, acting upon
instigation, command and direction of known and unknown
leaders have seized the Oakwood Building in Makati. Publicly,
they complained of the corruption in the AFP and declared
their withdrawal of support for the government, demanding
the resignation of the President, Secretary of Defense and
the PNP Chief.

These acts constitute a violation of Article 134 of the Revised
Penal Code, and by virtue of Proclamation No. 427 and
General Order No. 4, the Philippines was declared under the
State of Rebellion. Negotiations took place and the officers
went back to their barracks in the evening of the same day.
On August 1, 2003, both the Proclamation and General
Orders were lifted, and Proclamation No. 435, declaring the
Cessation of the State of Rebellion was issued.
In the interim, however, the following petitions were filed:
(1) SANLAKAS AND PARTIDO NG MANGGAGAWA VS.
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, petitioners contending that Sec. 18
Article VII of the Constitution does not require the declaration
of a state of rebellion to call out the AFP, and that there is no
factual basis for such proclamation.
(2)SJS Officers/Members v. Hon. Executive Secretary, et al,
petitioners contending that the proclamation is a
circumvention of the report requirement under the same
Section 18, Article VII, commanding the President to submit a
report to Congress within 48 hours from the proclamation of
martial law. Finally, they contend that the presidential
issuances cannot be construed as an exercise of emergency
powers as Congress has not delegated any such power to the
President.
(3) Rep. Suplico et al. v. President Macapagal-Arroyo and
Executive Secretary Romulo, petitioners contending that
there was usurpation of the power of Congress granted by
Section 23 (2), Article VI of the Constitution.
(4) Pimentel v. Romulo, et al, petitioner fears that the
declaration of a state of rebellion "opens the door to the
unconstitutional implementation of warrantless arrests" for
the
crime
of
rebellion.
Issues:
(1) WON Petitioners have legal standing.
(2) Whether or Not Proclamation No. 427 and General Order
No.
4
are
constitutional?
Held:
(1) No. Petitioners Sanlakas and PM assert that:
a. As a basic principle of the organizations and as an
important plank in their programs, petitioners are committed
to assert, defend, protect, uphold, and promote the rights,
interests, and welfare of the people, especially the poor and
marginalized classes and sectors of Philippine society.
Petitioners are committed to defend and assert human rights,
including political and civil rights, of the citizens.
b. Members of the petitioner organizations resort to mass
actions and mobilizations in the exercise of their
Constitutional rights to peaceably assemble and their
freedom of speech and of expression under Section 4,
Article III of the 1987 Constitution, as a vehicle to publicly
ventilate their grievances and legitimate demands and to
mobilize public opinion to support the same.
Even assuming that petitioners are "people's organizations,"
this status would not vest them with the requisite personality
to question the validity of the presidential issuances
Only real parties in interest or those with standing, as the
case may be, may invoke the judicial power. The jurisdiction
of this Court, even in cases involving constitutional
questions, is limited by the "case and controversy"
requirement of Art. VIII, 5. This requirement lies at the very
heart of the judicial function. It is what differentiates
decisionmaking in the courts from decisionmaking in the
political departments of the government and bars the
bringing of suits by just any party.
That petitioner SJS officers/members are taxpayers and
citizens does not necessarily endow them with standing. A

taxpayer may bring suit where the act complained of directly
involves the illegal disbursement of public funds derived from
taxation. No such illegal disbursement is alleged.
On the other hand, a citizen will be allowed to raise a
constitutional question only when he can show that he has
personally suffered some actual or threatened injury as a
result of the allegedly illegal conduct of the government; the
injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action; and the
injury is likely to be redressed by a favorable action. Again,
no such injury is alleged in this case.
(2) Yes. The Court rendered that the both the Proclamation
No. 427 and General Order No. 4 are constitutional. Section
18, Article VII does not expressly prohibit declaring state or
rebellion. The President in addition to its Commander-in-Chief
Powers is conferred by the Constitution executive powers. It
is not disputed that the President has full discretionary power
to call out the armed forces and to determine the necessity
for the exercise of such power. While the Court may examine
whether the power was exercised within constitutional limits
or in a manner constituting grave abuse of discretion, none
of the petitioners here have, by way of proof, supported their
assertion that the President acted without factual basis.
The issue of the circumvention of the report is of no merit as
there was no indication that military tribunals have replaced
civil courts or that military authorities have taken over the
functions of Civil Courts.
The issue of usurpation of the legislative power of the
Congress is of no moment since the President, in declaring a
state of rebellion and in calling out the armed forces, was
merely exercising a wedding of her Chief Executive and
Commander-in-Chief powers. These are purely executive
powers, vested on the President by Sections 1 and 18, Article
VII, as opposed to the delegated legislative powers
contemplated by Section 23 (2), Article VI.
The fear on warrantless arrest is unreasonable, since any

person may be subject to this whether there is rebellion or
not as this is a crime punishable under the Revised Penal
Code, and as long as a valid warrantless arrest is present.
DAVID VS. MACAPAGAL-ARROYO
G.R. NO. 171396
May 3, 2006
MUEZ
DOCTRINE:
The "moot and academic" principle is not a magical formula
that can automatically dissuade the courts in resolving a
case. Courts will decide cases, otherwise moot and academic,
if: first, there is a grave violation of the Constitution; second,
the exceptional character of the situation and the paramount
public interest is involved; third, when constitutional issue
raised requires formulation of controlling principles to guide
the bench, the bar, and the public; and fourth, the case is
capable of repetition yet evading review
Facts: PGMA, declaring that Communist insurgents as well as
political opponents have conspired in order to bring down her
government, issued Proclamation 1017 declaring a state of
national emergency and calling out the Armed Forces to
suppress lawless violence and rebellion and enforce
obedience to laws and decrees. She issued General Order 5
to implement the said PP, instructing the armed forces to
carry out the necessary measures to prevent and suppress
terrorism and violence. One week later, she issued PP 1021
lifting the declaration of the state of national emergency.
Seven suits were filed contesting the validity of the said
proclamations.
Issues:
1) Are PP 1017 and GO 5 unconstitutional?
2) Did the issuance of PP 1021 render PP1017 and GO 5 moot
and academic?

Held:
1) Partly. While the Constitution grants the President the
take care power under 17, Art. VII, which provides that
The President shall have control of all the executive
departments, bureaus and offices. He shall ensure that the
laws be faithfully executed, this does not grant the President
the authority to make decrees, which is essentially a
legislative function. Thus, the assailed PP is PARTLY
CONSTITUTIONAL insofar as it calls out the Armed Forces,
and PARTLY UNCONSTITUTIONAL insofar as it allows the
President to promulgate decrees, thereby encroaching on a
legislative function.
2) A moot and academic case is one that ceases to present a
justiciable controversy by virtue of supervening events, so
that a declaration thereon would be of no practical use or
value. Generally, courts decline jurisdiction over such case or
dismiss it on ground of mootness.
the bench and the bar, and in the present petitions, the
military and the police, on the extent of the protection
given by constitutional guarantees. And lastly, respondents
contested actions are capable of repetition. Certainly, the
petitions are subject to judicial review.
An otherwise "moot" case may still be decided "provided the
party raising it in a proper case has been and/or continues to
be prejudiced or damaged as a direct result of its issuance."
The present case falls right within this exception to the
mootness rule pointed out by the Chief Justice.
Additional Info:
By way of summary, the following rules may be culled from
the cases decided by this Court. Taxpayers, voters,
concerned citizens, and legislators may be accorded standing
to sue, provided that the following requirements are met:
(1) the cases involve constitutional issues;
The "moot and academic" principle is not a magical formula

that can automatically dissuade the courts in resolving a
case. Courts will decide cases, otherwise moot and academic,
if: first, there is a grave violation of the Constitution; second,
the exceptional character of the situation and the paramount
public interest is involved; third, when constitutional issue
raised requires formulation of controlling principles to guide
the bench, the bar, and the public; and fourth, the case is
capable of repetition yet evading review.
All the foregoing exceptions are present here and justify this
Courts assumption of jurisdiction over the instant petitions.
Petitioners alleged that the issuance of PP 1017 and G.O. No.
5 violates the Constitution. There is no question that the
issues being raised affect the publics interest, involving as
they do the peoples basic rights to freedom of expression, of
assembly and of the press. Moreover, the Court has the duty
to formulate guiding and controlling constitutional precepts,
doctrines or rules. It has the symbolic function of educating
(2) for taxpayers, there must be a claim of illegal

disbursement of public funds or that the tax measure is
unconstitutional;
(3) for voters, there must be a showing of obvious interest in
the validity of the election law in question;
(4) for concerned citizens, there must be a showing that the
issues raised are of transcendental importance which must
be settled early; and
(5) for legislators, there must be a claim that the official
action complained of infringes upon their prerogatives as
legislators.
It must always be borne in mind that the question of locus
standi is but corollary to the bigger question of proper
exercise of judicial power. This is the underlying legal tenet of

the "liberality doctrine" on legal standing. It cannot be
doubted that the validity of PP No. 1017 and G.O. No. 5 is a
judicial question which is of paramount importance to the
Filipino people. To paraphrase Justice Laurel, the whole of
Philippine society now waits with bated breath the ruling of
this Court on this very critical matter. The petitions thus call
for the application of the "transcendental importance"
doctrine, a relaxation of the standing requirements for the
petitioners in the "PP 1017 cases."
FORTUN VS MACAPAGAL ARROYO
GR NO. 190293 MARCH 20, 2012
MURILLO
DOCTRINE:
Impose martial law for flimsy reasons and revoke the same
before the Congress acts on it. Youll be off the hook. Joke.
Kidding aside, the existence of an actual case/controversy is
an essential requisite of judicial review. The issues raised
must not be moot and academic.
Liberation Front. Two days later (December 6, 2009),

President Arroyo submitted her report to Congress in
accordance with Section 18, Article VII of the 1987
Constitution which required her, within 48 hours from the
proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege
of the writ of habeas corpus, to submit to that body a report
of her action. On December 9, 2009 Congress, in joint
session, convened pursuant to Section 18, Article VII of the
1987 Constitution to review the validity of the Presidents
action. However, two days later (December 12) before
Congress could even act on the issue, the President issued
Presidential Proclamation 1963, lifting martial law and
restoring the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in
Maguindanao.
Petitioners Philip Sigfrid A. Fortun and the other petitioners in
G.R. 190293, 190294, 190301,190302, 190307, 190356, and
190380 brought the present actions to still challenge the
constitutionality of President Arroyos Proclamation 1959
affecting Maguindanao.
ISSUE:
FACTS:
These cases are about the constitutionality of a presidential
proclamation of martial law and suspension of the privilege of
habeas corpus in 2009 in a province in Mindanao which were
withdrawn after just eight days.
On November 23, 2009 heavily armed men, allegedly led by
the ruling Ampatuan family, gunned down and buried under
shoveled dirt 57 innocent civilians on a highway in
Maguindanao. In response to this, President Arroyo issued
Presidential Proclamation 1946 on November 24, declaring a
state of emergency in Maguindanao, Sultan Kudarat, and
Cotabato City to prevent and suppress similar lawless
violence. On December 4, 2009 President Arroyo issued
Presidential Proclamation 1959 declaring martial law and
suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in that
province except for identified areas of the Moro Islamic
W/N the courts can still pass upon the constitutionality of the
Presidential Proclamation
HELD:
NO. Here, President Arroyo withdrew Proclamation 1959
before the joint houses of Congress, which had in fact
convened, could act on the same. Consequently, the
petitions in these cases have become moot and the Court
has nothing to review. The lifting of martial law and
restoration of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in
Maguindanao was a supervening event that removed any
justiciable controversy. The court dismissed the consolidated
petitions on the ground that the same have become moot
and academic.

P.S.
Theres a lengthy dissenting opinion from Justice Antonio
Carpio, which seems, personally, to be more sound and
logical. Basically, he argued that the case must not be
considered moot and academic just because the President
already lifted the proclamation before the Congress can even
have the chance to act on it. And I quote:
I dissent from the majority's dismissal of the petitions as
moot. I find Proclamation No. 1959 unconstitutional for lack
of factual basis as required in Section 18, Article VII of the
1987 Constitution for the declaration of martial law and
suspension of the writ.
Moreover, given the transcendental importance of the issues
raised in the present
petitions, the Court may relax the
standing requirement and allow a suit to prosper even where
there is no direct injury to the party claiming the right of
judicial review.
In David v. Arroyo, this Court held that the "moot and
academic" principle is not a magical formula that
automatically dissuades courts in resolving a case. Courts are
not
prevented from deciding cases, otherwise moot and
academic, if (1) there is a grave violation of the Constitution;
(2) the situation is of exceptional character and of paramount
public interest; (3) the constitutional issue raised requires
formulation of
controlling principles to guide the bench,
the bar, and the public; and (4) the case is capable of
repetition yet evading review.
Failing to determine the constitutionality of Proclamation No.
1959 by dismissing the cases on the ground of mootness sets
a very dangerous precedent to the leaders of this country
that they could easily impose martial law or suspend the writ
without any factual or legal basis at all, and before this Court
could review such declaration, they
would simply lift the
same and escape possible judicial rebuke.
BAYAN VS SECRETARY ERMITA

GR NO. 169838 APRIL 25, 2006
DOCTRINE:
In a judicial review, a proper party is one who has sustained
or is in imminent danger of sustaining injury as a result of the
act/law complained of.
FACTS:
The case concerns the constitutionality of Batas Pambansa
No. 880, which regulates the rights of people to peaceably
assemble and organize. The first petitioners (Bayan, et al.)
allege that they are citizens and taxpayers of the Philippines
and that their rights as organizations and individuals were
violated when the rally they participated in on October 6,
2005 was violently dispersed by policemen implementing BP
880. The second group consists of 26 individual petitioners
(Jess del Prado, et al.) who allege that they were injured,
arrested and detained when a peaceful mass action they held
on September 26, 2005 was preempted and violently
dispersed by the police. The third group (Kilusang Mayo Uno
(KMU), et al.) alleges that they conduct peaceful mass
actions and that their rights as organizations and those of
their individual members as citizens, specifically the right to
peaceful assembly, are affected by BP 880 and the policy of
"Calibrated Preemptive Response" (CPR) being followed to
implement it. All petitioners assail BP 880, some of them in
toto and others only Sections 4, 5, 6, 12, 13(a), and 14(a), as
well as the policy of CPR. They seek to stop violent dispersals
of rallies under the "no permit, no rally" policy and the CPR
policy recently announced.
Respondents, on the other hand, argue that petitioners have
no standing because they have not presented any evidence
that they had been "injured, arrested or detained because of
BP 880 and the CPR," and that "those arrested stand to be
charged with violating BP 880 and other offenses."
ISSUE:

W/N petitioners have legal standing to file the case in court
HELD:
YES. Petitioners standing cannot be seriously challenged.
Their right as citizens to engage in peaceful assembly and
exercise the right of petition, as guaranteed by the
Constitution, is directly affected by B.P. No. 880 which
requires a permit for all who would publicly assemble in the
nations streets and parks. They have, in fact, purposely
engaged in public assemblies without the required permits to
press their claim that no such permit can be validly required
without violating the Constitutional guarantee. Respondents,
on the other hand, have challenged such action as contrary
to law and dispersed the public assemblies held without the
permit. the petitions are granted in part, and respondents,
more particularly the Secretary of the Interior and Local
Governments, are directed to take all necessary steps for the
immediate compliance with Section 15 of BP 880 through the
establishment or designation of at least one suitable freedom
park or plaza in every city and municipality of the country.
The petitions are dismissed in all other respects, and the
constitutionality of BP 880 is sustained.
ROQUE VS COMELEC
GR NO. 188456 SEPTEMBER 10, 2009
DOCTRINE:
The existence of an actual case or controversy is essential for
judicial review. Mere speculations and conjectures cannot be
the basis of a sound judgment.
FACTS:
This case is a motion for reconsideration filed by the
petitioners of the September 10, 2009 ruling of the Supreme
Court, denying the petition of H. Harry L. Roque, Jr., et al. for
certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus to nullify the contractaward of the 2010 Election Automation Project to the joint
venture of Total Information Management Corporation (TIM)
and Smartmatic International Corporation (Smartmatic).
Petitioners aver that the contract was made in violation of

the Constitution, statutes, and jurisprudence. Intervening
petitioner also interposed a similar motion, but only to pray
that the Board of Election Inspectors be ordered to manually
count the ballots after the printing and electronic
transmission of the election returns. Petitioners seek a
reconsideration of the September 10, 2009 Decision on many
issues or grounds, one of which is:
1. The Comelecs public pronouncements show that there
is a "high probability" that there will be failure of
automated elections; X X X
Both public and private respondents, upon the other hand,
insist that petitioners motion for reconsideration should be
held devoid of merit, because the motion, for the most part,
either advances issues or theories not raised in the petition
for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus, and argues along
speculative and conjectural lines.
ISSUE:
W/N the Court
reconsideration
should
grant
the
said
motion
for
HELD:
NO. Petitioners threshold argument delves on possibilities,
on matters that may or may not occur. The conjectural and
speculative nature of the first issue raised is reflected in the
very manner of its formulation and by statements, such as
"the public pronouncements of public respondent COMELEC x
x x clearly show that there is a high probability that there will
be automated failure of elections"; "there is a high
probability that the use of PCOS machines in the May 2010
elections will result in failure of elections"; "the unaddressed
logistical nightmaresand the lack of contingency plans that
should have been crafted as a result of a pilot testmake an
automated failure of elections very probable"; and "COMELEC
committed grave abuse of discretion when it signed x x x the

contract for full automation x x x despite the likelihood of a
failure of elections." Speculations and conjectures are not
equivalent to proof; they have little, if any, probative value
and, surely, cannot be the basis of a sound judgment.
While a motion for reconsideration may tend to dwell on
issues already resolved in the decision sought to be
reconsideredand this should not be an obstacle for a
reconsiderationthe hard reality is that petitioners have
failed to raise matters substantially plausible or compellingly
persuasive to warrant the desired course of action.
Moving still to another issue, petitioners claim that "there are
very strong indications that Private Respondents will not be
able to provide for telecommunication facilities for areas
without these facilities." This argument, being again highly
speculative, is without evidentiary value and hardly provides
a ground for the Court to nullify the automation contract.
Surely, a possible breach of a contractual stipulation is not a
legal reason to prematurely rescind, much less annul, the
contract. Motion for reconsideration was, therefore, denied.
GONZALES III VS OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
GR NO. 196231-32 SEPTEMBER 4, 2012
DOCTRINE:
Ut magis valeat quam pereat. The laws have to be
interpreted as a whole.
Ration legis et anima. The laws have to be interpreted in
accordance with the intent of the framers.
FACTS:
G.R. No. 196231: The case deals with the Manila hostage
crisis committed by Manila Police District Senior Inspector
Rolando Mendoza - foreigners and tourists as his victims.
Apparently, the hostage drama was ignited by Mendozas
frustration regarding the case filed against him which
warranted his removal from office. Mendoza has a pending
motion for reconsideration before Deputy Ombudsman

Gozales III (petitioner) which dragged on for nine months
(without any justifiable reason for the long delay). This was
seen by the IIRC as one of the main reasons why Mendoza
became motivated to hostage innocent tourists. In a way,
Gonzales negligence was blamed. Due to this, the Office of
the President recommended his removal from office as
Deputy Ombudsman.
G.R. No. 196232: Acting Deputy Special Prosecutor of the
Office of the Ombudsman charged Major General Carlos F.
Garcia, his wife Clarita D. Garcia, their sons Ian Carl Garcia,
Juan Paulo Garcia and Timothy Mark Garcia, and several
unknown persons, with Plunder and Money
Laundering
before the Sandiganbayan. At the conclusion of these public
hearings, the Committee on Justice passed and adopted
Committee Resolution No. 3, recommending to the President
the dismissal of petitioner from the service and the filing of
appropriate charges against her Deputies and Assistants
before the appropriate
government office for having
committed acts and/or omissions tantamount to culpable
violations of the Constitution and betrayal of public trust,
which are violations under the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act and grounds for removal from office under the
Ombudsman Act.
The cases, G.R. No. 196231 and G.R. No. 196232 primarily
seek to declare as unconstitutional Section 8(2) of Republic
Act (R.A.) No. 6770, otherwise known as the Ombudsman Act
of 1989, which gives the President the power to dismiss a
Deputy Ombudsman of the Office of the Ombudsman. They
aver that only the Ombudsman has the power to impose
sanctions on them.
ISSUE:
W/N the Office of the President has jurisdiction to exercise
administrative disciplinary power over a Deputy Ombudsman
and a Special Prosecutor who belong to the constitutionallycreated Office of the Ombudsman

HELD:
YES. The Ombudsman's administrative disciplinary power
over a DeputyOmbudsman and Special Prosecutor is not
exclusive. While the Ombudsman's authority to discipline
administratively is extensive and covers all government
officials, whether appointive or elective, with the exception
only of those officials removable by impeachment such
authority is by no means exclusive. Petitioners cannot insist
that they should be solely and directly subject to the
disciplinary authority of the Ombudsman. For, while Section
21 of R.A. 6770 declares the Ombudsman's disciplinary
authority over all government officials, Section 8(2), on the
other hand, grants the President express power of removal
over a Deputy Ombudsman and a Special Prosecutor. A
harmonious construction of these two apparently conflicting
provisions in R.A. No 6770 leads to the inevitable conclusion
that Congress had intended the Ombudsman and the
President to exercise concurrent disciplinary jurisdiction over
petitioners as Deputy Ombudsman and Special Prosecutor,
respectively. Indubitably, the manifest intent of Congress in
enacting both provisions - Section 8(2) and Section 21 - in
the same Organic Act was to provide for an
external authority, through the person of the President, that
would exercise the power of administrative discipline over
the Deputy Ombudsman and Special Prosecutor without in
the least diminishing the constitutional and plenary authority

of the Ombudsman over all government officials and
employees. Such legislative design is simply a measure of
"check and balance" intended to address the lawmakers' real
and valid concern that the Ombudsman and his Deputy may
try to protect one another from administrative liabilities. By
granting express statutorypower to the President to removea
Deputy Ombudsman and a Special Prosecutor, Congress
merely filled an obvious gap inthe law. While the removal of
the Ombudsman himself is also expressly provided for in the
Constitution, which is by impeachment under Section 2 of the
same Article, there is, however, no constitutional provision
similarly dealing with the removal from office of a Deputy
Ombudsman, or a Special Prosecutor, for that matter. By
enacting Section 8(2) of R.A. 6770, Congress simply filled a
gap in the law without running afoul of any provision in the
Constitution or existing statutes. In fact, the Constitution
itself, under Section 2, authorizes Congress to provide for the
removal of all other public officers, including the Deputy
Ombudsman and Special Prosecutor, who are not subject to
impeachment.
The challenge to the constitutionality of Section 8(2) of the
Ombudsman Act is, thus, denied.

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POLITICAL LAW REVIEW CASE DIGESTS [1]: THE 1987 CONSTITUTION

COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS

virtue of Resolution No. A98-062 dated 17 November 1998,

In the absence of a specific provision of law which

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POLITICAL LAW REVIEW CASE DIGESTS [1]: THE 1987 CONSTITUTION

Commission on Audit. The mandate for the creation of

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Regardless of whether or not respondent enjoys fiscal

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and granting new or additional benefits and allowances to

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**As defense of respondents, the following are procedural

In the present case, we are not convinced that the

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of locus standi is by no means trifle. Not only does it assure

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entertain a petition touching on an issue that has become

With the enactment of the GOCC Governance Act of 2011,

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Petition was DISMISSED.

Manila Hotel is part of our national patrimony. National

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Since Manila Hotel is part of the national patrimony and its

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is self-executing if the nature and extent of the right

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Unless it is expressly provided that a legislative act is

In its plain and ordinary meaning, the term patrimony

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distinct from the government are considered state

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offer its services and resources to PCSO. As an initial step,

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immediate injury as a result of the acts or measures

POLITICAL LAW REVIEW CASE DIGESTS [1]: THE 1987 CONSTITUTION

POLITICAL LAW REVIEW CASE DIGESTS [1]: THE 1987 CONSTITUTION

availed of, not only violates the fiscal autonomy and

The Judiciarys fiscal autonomy is realized through the

SANIDAD VS. COMELEC

By way of a long standing tradition, partly based on the

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POLITICAL LAW REVIEW CASE DIGESTS [1]: THE 1987 CONSTITUTION

1033 to the people in a Referendum-Plebiscite on

2. Yes. The amending process both as to proposal and

What is in the heels of the Court is not the wisdom of

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has converted his office into a constituent assembly of

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raised at the earliest opportunity; and (4) the issue of

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POLITICAL LAW REVIEW CASE DIGESTS [1]: THE 1987 CONSTITUTION

propose, enact, approve or reject, in whole or in part,

POLITICAL LAW REVIEW CASE DIGESTS [1]: THE 1987 CONSTITUTION

Victor Burns Lovely, Jr., a Philippine-born American citizen

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the respondent Judge to withdraw the draft ponencia from

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independent national economy, and Sections 10 and 12,

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enough balancing provisions in the Constitution to allow the

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