PHILIPPINES AS A STATE CASE DIGESTS ON RIVER BEDS AND TAX EXEMPTIONS

POLITICAL LAW REVIEW CASE DIGESTS [2]: THE PHILIPPINES AS A STATE
REPUBLIC VS SANTOS III

G.R. No. 160453, November 12, 2012
CRUZ
DOCTRINE:
All river beds remain property of public dominion and
cannot be acquired by acquisitive prescription unless
previously declared by the Government to be alienable
and disposable.
fl ood control program; that the property was within the

legal easement of 20 meters from the river bank; and
that assuming that the property was not covered by the
legal easement, title to the property could not be
registered in favor of the applicants for the reason that
the property was an orchard that had dried up and had
not resulted from accretion.
RTC: In favor of petitioners
CA: Affirmed RTC decision
To prove that the land subject of an application for

registration is alienable, an applicant must conclusively
establish the existence of a positive act of the
Government, such as a presidential proclamation,
executive order, administrative action, investigation
reports of the Bureau of Lands investigator, or a
legislative act or statute.
ISSUE:
FACTS:
NO. The land is belongs to the inalienable public domain.

Indeed, under the Regalian doctrine, all lands not otherwise
appearing to be clearly within private ownership are presumed to
belong to the State. No public land can be acquired by private
persons without any grant, express or implied, from the
Government. It is indispensable, therefore, that there is a showing
of a title from the State. Occupation of public land in the concept of
owner, no matter how long, cannot ripen into ownership and be
registered as a title.
Alleging continuous and adverse possession of more than

ten years, respondent Arcadio Ivan A. Santos III (Arcadio
Ivan) applied on March 7, 1997 for the registration of Lot
4998-B (the property) in the RTC in Paranaque City. The
property, which had an area of 1,045 square meters,
more or less, was located in Barangay San Dionisio,
Paranaque City, and was bounded
in the Northeast by Lot 4079 belonging to respondent
Arcadio C. Santos, Jr. (Arcadio,
Jr.), in the Southeast by the Paranaque River, in the
Southwest by an abandoned road, and in the Northwest
by Lot 4998-A also owned by Arcadio Ivan.
On May 21, 1998, Arcadio Ivan amended his application
for land registration to include Arcadio, Jr. as his coapplicant because of the latter's co-ownership of the
property. He alleged that the property had been formed
through accretion and had been in their joint open,
notorious, public, continuous and adverse possession for
more than 30 years.
The City of Paranaque opposed the application for land
registration, stating that it needed the property for its
WON the land claimed is an alienable and disposable land hence

Government specifically City of Paranaque in this case cannot
claim ownership.
HELD:
Subject to the exceptions defined in Article 461 of the Civil Code

(which declares river beds that are abandoned through the natural
change in the course of the waters as ipso facto belonging to the
owners of the land occupied by the new course, and which gives to
the owners of the adjoining lots the right to acquire only the
abandoned river beds not ipso facto belonging to the owners of the
land affected by the natural change of course of the waters only
after paying their value), all river beds remain property of
public dominion and cannot be acquired by acquisitive
prescription unless previously declared by the Government
to be alienable and disposable. Considering that Lot 4998-B
was not shown to be already declared to be alienable and
disposable, respondents could not be deemed to have acquired the
property through prescription.
1 CRUZ, GATACELO, GOMEZ, LAZARO, MUNEZ, MURILLO
To prove that the land subject of an application for registration is

alienable, an applicant must conclusively establish the existence of
a positive act of the Government, such as a presidential
proclamation, executive order, administrative action, investigation
reports of the Bureau of Lands investigator, or a legislative act or
statute. Until then, the rules on confirmation of imperfect title do
not apply.
In the case of Menguito v Republic and Republic v. Sarmiento, a
notation on a survey plan that the land is alienable and disposable
is not a sufficient proof. For the original registration of title,
the applicant (petitioners in thiscase) must overcome the
presumption that the land sought to be registered forms
part of the public domain. Unless public land is shown to have
been reclassified or alienated to a private person by the State, it
remains part of the inalienable public domain. Indeed, "occupation
thereof in the concept of owner, no matter how long, cannot ripen
into ownership and be registered as a title." To overcome such
presumption, incontrovertible evidence must be shown by the
applicant. Absent such evidence, the land sought to be registered
remains inalienable.
We find applicability of the ruling in the mentioned case, the
notation in the survey plan of Lot 4998-B stating it is alienable and
disposable is not a sufficient proof. The rulings of RTC and CA was
reversed and set aside.
CIR vs CAMPOS RUEDA
G.R. No. L-13250. October 29, 1971
DOCTRINE:
A foreign country is to be identified with a state, it is required in
line with Pound's formulation that it be a politically organized
sovereign community independent of outside control bound by ties
of nationhood, legally supreme within its territory, acting through a
government functioning under a regime of law.
The international zone of Tangier, even if it is not recognized by the
Philippine Government as a state or even if w/o international
personalitya, could avail of the reciprocal provisions of our Tax
Code
Maria Cerdeira is a Spanish national and was a resident of Tangier,

Morocco from 1931 up to her death. At the time of her demise she
left, among others, intangible personal properties in the
Philippines. Antonio Campos Rueda, as administrator of the estate
of Maria Cerdeira, filed a provisional estate and inheritance tax
return on all the properties of the latter. The CIR, pending
investigation, issued an assessment for state and inheritance taxes
in the amount of P369,383.96, which tax liabilities were paid by
petitioner. Campos Rueda filed an amended return wherein
intangible personal properties with the value of P396,308.90 were
claimed as exempted from taxes. The CIR, pending investigation,
issued another assessment for estate and inheritance taxes in the
amount of P469,665.24. In a letter, the CIR denied the request for
exemption on the ground that the law of Tangier is not reciprocal to
Section 122 of the National Internal Revenue Code.
Hence, CIR demanded the payment of the sums representing
deficiency estate and inheritance taxes including ad valorem
penalties, surcharges, interests and compromise penalties. In a
letter, Campos Rueda requested for the reconsideration of the
decision denying the claim for tax exemption of the intangible
personal properties and the imposition of the ad valorem penalties.
However,the CIR denied request. The denial is premised on the
grounds that there was no reciprocity [with Tangier, which
was moreover] a mere principality, not a foreign country.
Consequently, CIR demanded the payment of a total of
P161,874.95 as deficiency estate and inheritance taxes including
surcharges, interests and compromise penalties.
The matter was then elevated to the Court of Tax Appeals. In
ruling against the contention of the Collector of Internal Revenue,
the appealed decision states: "In fine, we believe, and so hold, that
the expression "foreign country", used in the last proviso of Section
122 of the National Internal Revenue Code, refers to a
government of that foreign power which, although not an
international person in the sense of international law, does
not impose transfer or death upon intangible person properties of
our citizens not residing therein, or whose law allows a similar
exemption from such taxes. It is, therefore, not necessary that
Tangier should have been recognized by our Government
order to entitle the petitioner to the exemption benefits of
the proviso of Section 122 of our Tax. Code."
ISSUE:
FACTS:
Whether or not the acquisition of international personality is a

condition sine qua non to Tangier being considered a "foreign
country".
HELD:
allotted area a supremacy over all other institutions. It is the power

entrusted to its government to maintain within its territory the
conditions of a legal order and to enter into international relations.
With the latter requisites satisfied, international law does not exact
independence as a condition of statehood.
NO. International personality is not required to be considered as a

foreign country.
SHIPSIDE INC. VS CA
G.R. No. 143377, February 20, 2001
Even on the assumption then that Tangier is bereft of international

personality petitioner has not successfully made out a case. Note
that four days prior to the filing of this petition, In Collector of
Internal Revenue vs. De Lara, it was specifically held by the court
that: "Considering the State of California as a foreign country in
relation to Section 122 of our Tax Code we believe and hold, as did
the Tax Court that the Ancilliary Administrator is entitled to
exemption from the inheritance tax on the intangible personal
property found in the Philippines." There can be no doubt that
California as a state in the American Union was lacking in the
alleged requisite of international personality. Nonetheless, it was
held to be a foreign country within the meaning of Section 122 of
the NIRC. Even prior to the De Lara ruling, this Court did commit
itself to the doctrine that even a tiny principality, that of
Liechtenstein, hardly an international personality in the traditional
sense, did fall under this exempt category.
DOCTRINE:
It does not admit of doubt that if a foreign country is to be

identified with a state, it is required in line with Pound's formulation
that it be a politically organized sovereign community independent
of outside control bound by ties of nationhood, legally supreme
within its territory, acting through a government functioning under
a regime of law. It is thus a sovereign person with the people
composing it viewed as an organized corporate society under a
government with the legal competence to exact obedience its
commands. It has been referred to as a body-politic
organized by common consent for mutual defense and
mutual safety and to promote the general welfare. Correctly
has it been described as "the juridical personification of the
nation." This is to view it in the light its historical development.
The stress is on its being a nation, its people occupying a definite
territory, politically organized, exercising by means of its
government its sovereign will over the individuals within it and
maintaining its separate international personality. It is a territorial
society divided into government and subjects, claiming within its
The Republic of the Philippines cannot be barred by the rules on

prescription
BCDA is not a mere agency of the Government but a corporate
body performing proprietary BCDA is not a mere agency of the
Government but a corporate body performing proprietary
functions.
FACTS:
April 1960, Lots No. 1 and 4, covered by Original Certificate of Title
No. 0-381 in the name of Rafael Galvez, were sold by the latter to
Filipina Mamaril, Cleopatra Llana, ReginaBustos, and Erlinda
Balatbat. Thereafter, in August. 1960, Mamaril, et al. sold the same
lots to Lepanto Consolidated Mining Company and the latter in turn
conveyed the property to Shipside Incorporated, herein
petitioner, on1963, resulting in the issuance of new Transfer
Certificate of Title No. T-57 10.
Unknown to Lepanto Consolidated Mining Company, OCT No. 0-381
was already declared null and void and was ordered cancelled by
the then Court of First Instance of La Union, in its order dated
February 1, 1963. The decision of the CFI became final and
executor on October 23, 1973.
On April 21, 1999 (24 years after), the Office of the Solicitor
General, after being notified that the aforesaid order remained
unexecuted despite the writ of execution issued by the trial court,
filed a complaint for revival of judgment and cancellation of titles
before the Regional Trial Court of San Fernando, La Union.
Petitioner Shipside, Inc. moved to dismiss the complaint, alleging,
among others that the respondent Republic was not the
real party-in-interest and that the cause of action was

already barred by prescription (impt contentions). The trial
court denied petitioner's motion to dismiss and its motion for
reconsideration was likewise turned down. Petitioner elevated the
matter to the Court of Appeals through petition for certiorari and
prohibition. The appeal court denied the petition as well as the
motion for reconsideration.
Other contentions of Petitioner are as follows:
(1) the complaint stated no cause of action because only final and
executory judgments may be subject of an action for revival of
judgment;
(2) the plaintiff is not the real party-in-interest because the real
property covered by the Torrens titles sought to be cancelled,
allegedly part of Camp Wallace (Wallace Air Station), were under
the ownership and administration of the Bases Conversion
Development Authority (BCDA) under Republic Act No. 7227;
(3) plaintiff's cause of action is barred by prescription;
(4) twenty-five years having lapsed since the issuance of the writ
of execution, no action for revival of judgment may be instituted
because under Paragraph 3 of Article 1144 of the Civil Code, such
action may be brought only within ten (10) years from the time the
judgment had been rendered.
ISSUE:
1.
2.
WON the Republic of the Philippines can maintain the

action for revival of judgment in this case.
WON Republic can be barred by extinctive prescription.
HELD:
of such time, and before it is barred by the statute of

limitations, a judgment may be enforced by action.
But this rule on prescription does not run against the state.
While it is true that prescription does not run against the State, the
same may not be invoked by the government in this case since it is
no longer interested in the subject matter. While Camp Wallace
may have belonged to the government at the time Rafael Galvez's
title was ordered cancelled in Land Registration Case No. N-361,
the same no longer holds true today.
Why? Because R.A 7227 and Proc. No. 216 transferred Wallace Air
Bases/Areasor simply called military reservations to Bases and
Conversion Development Authority (BCDA). With the transfer
of Camp Wallace to the BCDA, the government no longer has a
right or interest to protect. Consequently, the Republic is not a real
party in interest and it may not institute the instant action. Nor
may it raise the defense of imprescriptibility, the same being
applicable only in cases where the government is a party in
interest.
The rule that prescription does not run against the State
does not apply to corporations or artificial bodies created
by the State for special purposes, it being said that when
the title of the Republic has been divested, its grantees,
although artificial bodies of its own creation, are in the
same category as ordinary persons
The BCDA is an entity invested with a personality separate and
distinct from the government. Section 3 of Republic Act No. 7227
reads:
No to (1) and (2)

As a general rule, it is plain that an action for revival of judgment
must be brought within ten years from the time said judgment
becomes final. Taking these 2 provisions in consideration:
1. Article 1144(3) provides that an action upon a judgment
"must be brought within 10 years from the time the right of
action accrues."
2. Section 6, Rule 39 provides that a final and executory
judgment or order may be executed on motion within five
(5) years from the date of its entry, but that after the lapse
SECTION 3. Creation of the Bases Conversion and Development

Authority. There is hereby created a body corporate to be known
as the Conversion Authority which shall have the attribute of
perpetual succession and shall be vested with the powers of a
corporation.
It may not be amiss to state at this point that the functions of
government have been classified into governmental or constituent
and proprietary or ministrant. While public benefit and public
welfare, particularly, the promotion of the economic and social
development of Central Luzon, may be attributable to the
operation of the BCDA, yet it is certain that the functions

performed by the BCDA are basically proprietary in nature.
The promotion of economic and social development of Central
Luzon, in particular, and the country's goal for enhancement, in
general, do not make the BCDA equivalent to the Government.
Other corporations have been created by government to act as its
agents for the realization of its programs, the SSS, GSIS, NAWASA
and the NIA, to count a few, and yet, the Court has ruled that these
entities, although performing functions aimed at promoting public
interest and public welfare, are not government-function
corporations invested with governmental attributes. It may thus
be said that the BCDA is not a mere agency of the
Government but a corporate body performing proprietary
functions.
By raising the claim of imprescriptibility, a claim which cannot be
raised by the BCDA, the Government not only assists the BCDA.
Moreover, to recognize the Government as a proper party to sue in
this case would set a bad precedent as it would allow the Republic
to prosecute, on behalf of government-owned or controlled
corporations, causes of action which have already prescribed, on
the pretext that the Government is the real party in interest
against whom prescription does not run, said corporations having
been created merely as agents for the realization of government
programs.
Addl info: Since the portion in dispute now forms part of the
property owned and administered by the Bases Conversion and
Development Authority, it is alienable and registerable real
property.
The civil case filed by RP is ordered dismissed w/o prejudice to the
right of BCDA to institute proper action.
MELCHORA CABANAS vs. FRANCISCO PILAPIL
G.R. No. L-25843. July 25, 1974
Gatacelo
DOCTRINE:
This prerogative of parens patriae is inherent in the supreme power
of every Stat. The judiciary, as an agency of the State acting as
parens patriae, is called upon whenever a pending suit of litigation
affects one who is a minor to accord priority to his best interest.
FACTS:
The insured, Florentino Pilapil had a child, Millian Pilapil, with a
married woman, the plaintiff, Melchora Cabanas. She was ten years
old. The defendant, Francisco Pilapil, is the brother of the
deceased.
The deceased insured himself and instituted as beneficiary, his
child, with his brother to act as trustee during her minority. Upon
his death, the proceeds were paid to him. Hence this complaint by
the mother, with whom the child is living, seeking the delivery of
such sum. She filed the bond required by the Civil Code. Defendant
would justify his claim to the retention of the amount in question
by invoking the terms of the insurance policy.
Trial Court: judgment ordering the defendant to deliver the
proceeds of the policy in question to plaintiff. Articles 320 provides:
"The father, or in his absence the mother, is the legal administrator
of the property pertaining to the child under parental authority. If
the property is worth more than two thousand pesos, the father or
mother shall give a bond subject to the approval of the Court of
First Instance. Article 321 states: "The property which the
unemancipated child has acquired or may acquire with his work or
industry, or by any lucrative title, belongs to the child in ownership,
and in usufruct to the father or mother under whom he is under
parental authority and whose company he lives; . . ."
ISSUE:
WON the doctrine of parens patriae finds application in this case.
[Walang discussion sa facts kung ano contentions ng parties; bigla
na lang sumulpot yang parens patriae na yan, ganyan.]
HELD:
Yes. The Court adheres to the concept that the judiciary, as an
agency of the State acting as parens patriae, is called upon
whenever a pending suit of litigation affects one who is a minor to
accord priority to his best interest. Certainly the judiciary as the
instrumentality of the State in its role of parens patriae cannot
remain insensible to the validity of the mothers plea. The United
States Supreme Court opines: "This prerogative of parens patriae is
inherent in the supreme power of every State, whether that power
is lodged in a royal person or in the legislature, and has no affinity

to those arbitrary powers which are sometimes exerted by
irresponsible monarchs to the great detriment of the people and
the destruction of their liberties." What is more, there is this
constitutional provision vitalizing this concept. It reads: "The State
shall strengthen the family as a basic social institution." If, as the
Constitution so wisely dictates, it is the family as a unit that has to
be strengthened, it does not admit of doubt that even if a stronger
case were presented for the uncle, still deference to a
constitutional mandate would have led the lower court to decide as
it did.
ANASTACIO LAUREL vs. ERIBERTO MISA
G.R. No. L-409, January 30, 1947
DOCTRINE:
Military occupant cannot repeal or suspend operation of law of
treason.
Facts:
Laurel, a Filipino citizen, was arrested in Camarines Sur by the
United States Army and was interned under a commitment order
"for his active collaboration with the Japanese during the Japanese
occupation," but in September, 1945, he was turned over to the
Commonwealth Government, and since then has been under the
custody of the respondent Director of Prisons.
The Court denied the petition for habeas corpus filed by Laurel
(this was discussed in another case). Laurel posited the theory that
a Filipino citizen who adhered to the enemy giving the latter aid
and comfort during the Japanese occupation cannot be prosecuted
for the crime of treason defined and penalized by article 114 of the
Revised Penal Code, for the reason (1) that the sovereignty of the
legitimate government in the Philippines and, consequently, the
correlative allegiance of Filipino citizens thereto was then
suspended; and (2) that there was a change of sovereignty over
these Islands upon the proclamation of the Philippine Republic:
ISSUE:
WON the law on treason is suspended in times of belligerent
occupation.
HELD:
No. A citizen or subject owes, not a qualified and temporary, but an
absolute and permanent allegiance, which consists in the
obligation of fidelity and obedience to his government or
sovereign. The absolute and permanent allegiance of the
inhabitants of a territory occupied by the enemy to their legitimate
government or sovereign is not abrogated or severed by the
enemy occupation, because the sovereignty of the government or
sovereign de jure is not transferred thereby to the occupier. The
subsistence of the sovereignty of the legitimate government in a
territory occupied by the military forces of the enemy during a war,
"although the former is in fact prevented from exercising the
supremacy over them" is one of the "rules of international law of
our times."
The words "temporary allegiance," as descriptive of the relations
borne by the inhabitants of the territory occupied by the enemy
toward the military government established over them, may, at
most, be considered similar to the temporary allegiance which a
foreigner owes to the government or sovereign of the territory
wherein he resides in return for the protection he receives and
does not do away with the absolute and permanent allegiance
which the citizen residing in a foreign country owes to his own
government or sovereign.
Just as a citizen or subject of a government or sovereign may be
prosecuted for and convicted of treason committed in a foreign
country, in the same way an inhabitant of a territory occupied by
the military forces of the enemy may commit treason against his
own legitimate government or sovereign if he adheres to the
enemies of the latter by giving them aid and comfort. Article 114 of
the Revised Penal Code, was applicable to treason committed
against the national security of the legitimate government,
because the inhabitants of the occupied territory were still bound
by their allegiance to the latter during the enemy occupation.
In short, military occupant cannot repeal or suspend operation of
law of treason. Since the preservation of the allegiance or the
obligation of fidelity and obedience of a citizen or subject to his
government or sovereign does not demand from him a positive
action, but only passive attitude or forbearance from adhering to
the enemy by giving the latter aid and comfort, the occupant has
no power, as a corollary of the preceding consideration, to repeal

or suspend the operation of the law of treason.
Adoption of the petitioner's theory of suspended allegiance would
lead to disastrous consequences for small and weak nations or
states, and would be repugnant to the laws of humanity and
requirements of public conscience, for it would allow invaders to
legally recruit or enlist the Quisling inhabitants of the occupied
territory to fight against their own government without the latter
incurring the risk of being prosecuted for treason, and even compel
those who are not to aid them in their military operation against
the resisting enemy forces in order to completely subdue and
conquer the whole nation, and thus deprive them all of their own
independence or sovereignty such theory would sanction the
action of invaders in forcing the people of a free and sovereign
country to be a party in the nefarious task of depriving themselves
of their own freedom and independence and repressing the
exercise by them of their own sovereignty; in other words, to
commit a political suicide.
Just as treason may be committed against the Federal as well as
against the State Government, in the same way treason may have
been committed during the Japanese occupation against the
sovereignty of the United States as well as against the sovereignty
of the Philippine Commonwealth; and that the change of our form
of government from Commonwealth to Republic does not affect the
prosecution of those charged with the crime of treason committed
during the Commonwealth, because it is an offense against the
same government and the same sovereign people, for Article XVIII
of our Constitution provides that: "The government established by
this Constitution shall be known as the Commonwealth of the
Philippines. Upon the final and complete withdrawal of the
sovereignty of the United States and the proclamation of Philippine
Independence, the Commonwealth of the Philippines shall
thenceforth be known as the Republic of the Philippines."
N.B. Although the military occupant is enjoined to respect or
continue in force, unless absolutely prevented by the
circumstances, those laws that enforce public order and regulate
the social and commercial life of the country, he has, nevertheless,
all the powers of a de facto government and may, at his pleasure,
either change the existing laws or make new ones when the
exigencies of the military service demand such action, that is,
when it is necessary for the occupier to do so for the control of the
country and the protection of his army, subject to the restrictions

or limitations imposed by the Hague Regulations, the usages
established by civilized nations, the laws of humanity and the
requirements of public conscience.
WILLIAM F. PERALTA vs. THE DIRECTOR OF PRISONS
G.R. No. L-49, November 12, 1945
DOCTRINE:
During a belligerent occupation, the political laws of the occupied
territory are merely suspended, subject to revival under the
principle of jus postliminium upon the end of the occupation. But
non-political laws are deemed continued unless changed by the
belligerent occupant since they are intended to govern the
relations of individuals as among themselves.
FACTS:
Peralta, a member of the Metropolitan Constabulary of Manila, was
prosecuted for the crime of robbery pursuant to Act 65 (issued
during the Japanese occupation). He was found guilty and
sentenced to life imprisonment by the Court of Special and
Exclusive Criminal Jurisdiction, created in section 1 of Ordinance
No. 7 promulgated by the President of the so-called Republic of the
Philippines.
Peralta filed a petition for habeas corpus on the ground that the
Court of Special and Exclusive Criminal Jurisdiction "was a political
instrumentality of the military forces of the Japanese Imperial
Army, the aims and political purposes of the Commonwealth of the
Philippines, as well as those of the United States of America, and
therefore, null and void ab initio", and he is being punished by a
law created to serve the political purpose of the Japanese Imperial
Army in the Philippines.
The Solicitor General supports Peralta and states that Court of
Special
and Exclusive Criminal Jurisdiction created and the summary
procedure prescribed therefor are tinged with political complexion,
do not afford a fair trial, violate the Constitution of the
Commonwealth, and impair the constitutional rights of accused
persons under their legitimate Constitution.
Some of the features of the summary procedure are: that the court
may interrogate the accused and witnesses before trial in order to
clarify the points in dispute; that the refusal of the accused to
answer the questions may be considered unfavorable to him,
among others.
ISSUE:
1.
2.
3.
WON the Constitution of the Commonwealth or of Republic

should be applied.
WON the (a) court, (b) summary procedure, and (c) Act 65
are valid under the laws of nation.
WON reoccupation renders the subject act invalid.
HELD:
1. No. As the so-called Republic of the Philippines was a de
facto government of the second kind (of paramount force -existence is maintained by active military power within the
territories, and against the rightful authority of an
established and lawful government|), the questions
involved in the present case cannot be decided in the light
of the Constitution of the Commonwealth Government,
because the belligerent occupant was totally independent
of the constitution of the occupied territory in carrying out
the administration over said territory.
The Constitution of the so-called Republic of the Philippines
can neither be applied, since the validity of an act of a
belligerent occupant cannot be tested in the light of
another act of the same occupant, whose criminal
jurisdiction is drawn entirely from the law martial as
defined in the usages of nations. The government
established over an enemy's territory during the military
occupation may exercise all the powers given by the laws
of war to the conqueror over the conquered, and is subject
to all restrictions which that code imposes. Its character is
the same and the source of its authority the same. In either
case it is a government imposed by the laws of war, and so
far as it concerns the inhabitants of such territory or the
rest of the world, those laws alone determine the legality
or illegality of its acts.
The so-called Republic of the Philippines, apparently

established and organized as a sovereign state
independent from any other government by the Filipino
people, was in truth and reality, a government established
by the belligerent occupant or the Japanese forces of
occupation.
2. Yes.
a. The so called Republic of the Philippines, being a
governmental instrumentality of the belligerent occupant,
had the power or was competent to create the Court of
Special and Exclusive Criminal Jurisdiction. No question
may arise as to whether or not a court is of a political
complexion, for it is a mere governmental agency charged
with the duty of applying the law to cases falling within its
jurisdiction. Its judgments and sentences may be of
political complexion or not depending upon the nature or
character of the law so applied.
b. There is also no question as to the power or competence
of the belligerent occupant to promulgate the law providing
for such procedure. The only restrictions or limitations
imposed upon the power of a belligerent occupant to alter
the laws or promulgate new ones, especially the criminal
law as well as the laws regarding procedure, so far as it is
necessary for military purposes, that is, for his control of
the territory and the safety and protection of his army, are
those imposed by the Hague Regulations, the usages
established by civilized nations, the laws of humanity and
the requirements of public conscience. It is obvious that
the summary procedure under consideration does not
violate these precepts. It cannot be considered as violating
the laws of humanity and public conscience, for it is less
objectionable, even from the point of view of those who are
used to the accusatory system of criminal procedure, than
the procedural laws based on the semi-inquisitorial or
mixed system prevailing in France and other countries in
continental Europe.
c. It was within the power and competence of the
belligerent occupant to promulgate, through the National
Assembly of the so-called Republic of the Philippines, Act
No. 65 of the said Assembly, which penalizes the crimes of
robbery and other offenses as new crimes and offenses
demanded by military necessity, incident to a state of war,

and necessary for the control of the country by the
belligerent occupant, the protection and safety of the army
of occupation, its support and efficiency, and the success
of its operations. They are not the same ordinary offenses
penalized by the Revised Penal Code. The act aims to
prevent food and other necessaries from reaching the
"guerrillas" which were harassing the belligerent occupant
from every nook and corner of the country and to preserve
the food supply and other necessaries in order that in case
of necessity, the Imperial Japanese forces could easily
requisition them.
3.
Yes. During a belligerent occupation, the political laws of

the occupied territory are merely suspended, subject to
revival under the principle of jus postliminium upon the
end of the occupation. But non-political laws are deemed
continued unless changed by the belligerent occupant
since they are intended to govern the relations of
individuals as among themselves.
Most acts penalized by Act 65 were political in nature.
Peralta was prosecuted for robbery connected with the
supervision, control and distribution of foods and other
necessaries. The law effectively penalized the robbery of
its food resources by its enemies, particularly the
guerrillas. The SC said that such offense is political in
nature.
All judgments of political nature of the courts during the
Japanese regime ceased to be valid upon the restoration of
the national government by virtue of the principle of
postliminium. Though no redress can be claimed by the
prisoner as to the sentence he has already served, the law
that convicted him has also ceased validity. As such the
detained prisoner must be released. The writ of habeas
corpus was granted.
Postliminium a principle of public international law that
provides for the invalidity of all illegitimate acts that an
occupant may have performed on a given territory after its
recapture by the legitimate sovereign.
SOUTHEAST ASIAN FISHERIES DEVELOPMENT CENTER-
AQUACULTURE DEPARTMENT (SEAFDEC-AQD) vs. NLRC

G.R. No. 86773. February 14, 1992; 206 SCRA 283
LAZARO
DOCTRINE:
International organizations enjoy immunity from local jurisdiction.
FACTS:
SEAFDEC-AQD is a department of an international organization, the
Southeast Asian Fisheries Development Center, organized through
an agreement entered into in Bangkok, Thailand on December 28,
1967 by the governments of Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand,
Vietnam, Indonesia and the Philippines with Japan as the
sponsoring country.
On April 20, 1975, private respondent Juvenal Lazaga was
employed as a Research Associate on a probationary basis by the
SEAFDEC-AQD and was appointed Senior External Affairs Officer on
January 5, 1983. Thereafter, he was appointed to the position of
Professional III and designated as Head of External Affairs Office
with the same pay and benefits.
On May 8, 1986, petitioner Lacanilao in his capacity as Chief of
SEAFDEC-AQD sent a notice of termination to private respondent
informing him that due to the financial constraints being
experienced by the department, his services shall be terminated at
the close of office hours on May 15, 1986 and that he is entitled to
separation benefits equivalent to one (1) month of his basic salary
for every year of service plus other benefits. Because of
petitioner's failure to pay private respondent his separation pay,
the latter filed on March 18, 1987 a complaint against petitioners
for non-payment of separation benefits plus moral damages and
attorney's fees with the Arbitration Branch of the NLRC.
PETITIONER'S ALLEGATION: NLRC has no jurisdiction over the case
inasmuch as the SEAFDEC-AQD is an international organization and
that private respondent must first secure clearances from the
proper departments for property or money accountability before
any claim for separation pay will be paid, and which clearances
had not yet been obtained by the private respondent.
LABOR ARBITER AND NLRC: ruled in favor of private respondent.
DOCTRINE:
ISSUE:
WON NLRC has jurisdiction over petitioner.
HELD:
No. Being an intergovernmental organization, SEAFDEC including
its Departments (AQD) (established in Iloilo), enjoys functional
independence and freedom from control of the state in whose
territory its office is located. Permanent international commissions
and administrative bodies have been created by the agreement of
a considerable number of States for a variety of international
purposes, economic or social and mainly non-political. In so far as
they are autonomous and beyond the control of any one State,
they have a distinct juridical personality independent of the
municipal law of the State where they are situated. As such,
according to one leading authority they must be deemed to
possess a species of international personality of their own.
Pursuant to its being a signatory to the Agreement, the Republic of
the Philippines agreed to be represented by one Director in the
governing SEAFDEC Council and that its national laws and
regulations shall apply only insofar as its contribution to SEAFDEC
of "an agreed amount of money, movable and immovable property
and services necessary for the establishment and operation of the
Center" are concerned. It expressly waived the application of the
Philippine laws on the disbursement of funds of petitioner
SEAFDEC-AQD.
One of the basic immunities of an international organization is
immunity from local jurisdiction, i.e., that it is immune from the
legal writs and processes issued by the tribunals of the country
where it is found. The obvious reason for this is that the subjection
of such an organization to the authority of the local courts would
afford a convenient medium thru which the host government may
interfere in their operations or even influence or control its policies
and decisions of the organization: besides, such subjection to local
jurisdiction would impair the capacity of such body to discharge its
responsibilities impartially on behalf of its member-state.
MINUCHER vs. CA
G.R. No. 142396. February 11, 2003
IF THE ACTS GIVING RISE TO A SUIT ARE THOSE OF A FOREIGN

GOVERNMENT DONE BY ITS FOREIGN AGENT, ALTHOUGH NOT
NECESSARILY A DIPLOMATIC PERSONAGE, BUT ACTING IN HIS
OFFICIAL CAPACITY, THE COMPLAINT COULD BE BARRED BY THE
IMMUNITY OF THE FOREIGN SOVEREIGN FROM SUIT WITHOUT ITS
CONSENT.
FACTS:
Petitioner Khosrow Minucher, an Iranian national, was charged for
violation of Section 4 of Republic Act No. 6425, otherwise known as
the "Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972." The narcotic agents who
raided the house of Minucher were accompanied by private
respondent Arthur Scalzo. Minucher was acquitted by the trial court
of the charges. Minucher filed a civil case before the Regional Trial
Court of Manila for damages on account of what he claimed to
have been trumped-up charges of drug trafficking made by Arthur
Scalzo. Scalzo filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the
ground that, being a special agent of the United States Drug
Enforcement Administration, he was entitled to diplomatic
immunity.
ISSUE:
WON private respondent Scalzo, although he cannot invoke
diplomatic immunity (kasi di nya na-prove yung diplomatic status
nya), can invoke the defense of state immunity from suit.
HELD:
Yes. While the diplomatic immunity of Scalzo might thus remain
contentious, it was sufficiently established that, indeed, he worked
for the United States Drug Enforcement Agency and was tasked to
conduct surveillance of suspected drug activities within the country
on the dates pertinent to this case. If it should be ascertained that
Arthur Scalzo was acting well within his assigned functions when
he committed the acts alleged in the complaint, the present
controversy could then be resolved under the related doctrine of
State Immunity from Suit. The precept that a State cannot be sued
in the courts of a foreign state is a long-standing rule of customary
international law then closely identified with the personal immunity
of a foreign sovereign from suit and, with the emergence of
democratic states, made to attach not just to the person of the

head of state, or his representative, but also distinctly to the state
itself in its sovereign capacity. If the acts giving rise to a suit are
those of a foreign government done by its foreign agent, although
not necessarily a diplomatic personage, but acting in his official
capacity, the complaint could be barred by the immunity of the
foreign sovereign from suit without its consent. Suing a
representative of a state is believed to be, in effect, suing the state
itself. The proscription is not accorded for the benefit of an
individual but for the State, in whose service he is, under the
maxim par in parem, non habet imperium that all states are
sovereign equals and cannot assert jurisdiction over one another.
The implication, in broad terms, is that if the judgment against an
official would require the state itself to perform an affirmative act
to satisfy the award, such as the appropriation of the amount
needed to pay the damages decreed against him, the suit must be
regarded as being against the state itself, although it has not been
formally impleaded.
A foreign agent, operating within a territory, can be cloaked with
immunity from suit but only as long as it can be established that he
is acting within the directives of the sending state. The consent of
the host state is an indispensable requirement of basic courtesy
between the two sovereigns. The official exchanges of
communication between agencies of the government of the two
countries, certifications from officials of both the Philippine
Department of Foreign Affairs and the United States Embassy, as
well as the participation of members of the Philippine Narcotics
Command in the "buy-bust operation" conducted at the residence
of Minucher at the behest of Scalzo, may be inadequate to support
the "diplomatic status" of the latter but they give enough
indication that the Philippine government has given its imprimatur,
if not consent, to the activities within Philippine territory of agent
Scalzo of the United States Drug Enforcement Agency. The job
description of Scalzo has tasked him to conduct surveillance on
suspected drug suppliers and, after having ascertained the target,
to inform local law enforcers who would then be expected to make
the arrest. In conducting surveillance activities on Minucher, later
acting as the poseur-buyer during the buy-bust operation, and then
becoming a principal witness in the criminal case against Minucher,
Scalzo hardly can be said to have acted beyond the scope of his
official function or duties. All told, this Court is constrained to rule
that respondent Arthur Scalzo, an agent of the United States Drug
Enforcement Agency allowed by the Philippine government to
conduct activities in the country to help contain the problem on the

drug traffic, is entitled to the defense of state immunity from suit.
PHILIPPINE TOURISM AUTHORITY vs. PGDE
668 SCRA 406 G.R. No. 176628. March 19, 2012
DOCTRINE:
The application of state immunity is proper only when the
proceedings arise out of sovereign transactions and not in cases of
commercial activities or economic affairs.
FACTS:
PTA, an agency of the Department of Tourism, whose main function
is to bolster and promote tourism, entered into a contract with
Atlantic Erectors, Inc. (AEI) for the construction of the Intramuros
Golf Course Expansion Projects for a contract price of
P57,954,647.94. The civil works of the project commenced. Since
AEI was incapable of constructing the golf course aspect of the
project, it entered into a sub-contract agreement with PHILGOLF, a
duly organized domestic corporation, to build the golf course
amounting to P27,000,000.00. The sub-contract agreement also
provides that PHILGOLF shall submit its progress billings directly to
PTA and, in turn, PTA shall directly pay PHILGOLF. PHILGOLF filed a
collection suit against PTA amounting to P11,820,550.53, plus
interest, for the construction of the golf course. PTA, as a
government entity, invokes its state immunity.
ISSUE:
WON PTA can invoke state immunity.
HELD:
No. The application of state immunity is proper only when the
proceedings arise out of sovereign transactions and not in cases of
commercial activities or economic affairs. The State, in entering
into a business contract, descends to the level of an individual and
is deemed to have tacitly given its consent to be sued. Since the
Intramuros Golf Course Expansion Projects partakes of a
proprietary character entered into between PTA and PHILGOLF, PTA
cannot avoid its financial liability by merely invoking immunity
from suit.
SSS VS. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. L-41299. February 21, 1983.

Muez
DOCTRINE:
The Trial Court rendered judgment against SSS directing it to pay

damages in favor of the plaintiff spouses. On appeal, the CA
affirmed the lower courts decision. Hence, the instant petition.
SSS' own organic act specifically provides that it can sue and be
sued in Court. These words "sue and be sued" embrace all civil
process incident to a legal action. So that, even assuming that the
SSS, as it claims, enjoys immunity from suit as an entity
performing governmental functions, by virtue of the explicit
provision of the aforecited enabling law, the Government must be
deemed to have waived immunity in respect of the SSS, although it
does not thereby concede its liability.
SSS contends, among others, that it is not liable for

damages not being a profit-oriented governmental
institution but one performing governmental functions.
FACTS:
HELD:
Sometime in March, 1963 the spouses David B. Cruz and

Socorro Concio Cruz applied for and were granted a real estate
loan by the SSS with their residential lot located in Rizal as
collateral. The spouses executed on March 26, 1963 the
corresponding real estate mortgage. From the proceeds of the real
estate loan the mortgagors constructed their residential house on
the mortgaged property and were furnished by the SSS with a
passbook to record the monthly payments of their amortizations.
The mortgagors, plaintiffs herein, complied with their monthly
payments although there were times when delays were incurred in
their monthly payments which were due every first five (5) days of
the month. On July 9, 1968, defendant SSS filed an application
with the Provincial Sheriff of Rizal for the foreclosure of the real
estate mortgage executed by the plaintiffs on the ground,
among others:
Yes. SSS can be made legally responsible for its acts through a
judicial action.
'That the conditions of the mortgage have been broken since

October, 1967 with the default on the part of the mortgagor
to pay in full the installments then due and payable on the
principal debt and the interest thereon, and, all of the monthly
installments due and payable thereafter up to the present date
The Cruz spouses, together with their daughter Lorna C. Cruz,
instituted before the Court of First Instance of Rizal an action for
damages and attorney's fees against the Social Security System
(SSS) and the Provincial Sheriff of Rizal, alleging, among other
things, that they had fully and religiously paid their monthly
amortizations and had not defaulted in any payment.
ISSUE:
WON SSS can be made legally responsible for its acts through a
judicial action.
To our minds, there should be no question on this score considering

that the SSS is a juridical entity with a personality of its own. It has
corporate powers separate and distinct from the
Government. SSS' own organic act specifically provides that
it can sue and be sued in Court. These words "sue and be
sued" embrace all civil process incident to a legal action.
So that, even assuming that the SSS, as it claims, enjoys
immunity from suit as an entity performing governmental
functions, by virtue of the explicit provision of the
aforecited enabling law, the Government must be deemed
to have waived immunity in respect of the SSS, although it
does not thereby concede its liability. That statutory law has
given to the private citizen a remedy for the enforcement and
protection of his rights. The SSS thereby has been required to
submit to the jurisdiction of the Courts, subject to its right to
interpose any lawful defense. Whether the SSS performs
governmental or proprietary functions thus becomes unnecessary
to belabor. For by that waiver, a private citizen may bring a suit
against it for varied objectives, such as, in this case, to obtain
compensation in damages arising from contract, and even for tort.
The proposition that the SSS is not profit-oriented was rejected in
the case of SSS Employees' Association vs. Hon. Soriano. But even
conceding that the SSS is not, in the main, operated for profit, it
cannot be denied that, in so far as contractual loan agreements
with private parties are concerned, the SSS enters into them for
profit considering that the borrowers pay interest, which is money
paid for the use of money, plus other charges.
What is of paramount importance in this controversy is that an
injustice is not perpetrated and that when damage is caused to a
citizen, the latter should have a right of redress particularly when it
arises from a purely private and contractual relationship between
said individual and the System.
The SC ruled that there was clear negligence on the part of SSS
when they mistook the loan account of Socorro J. Cruz for that of
private respondent Socorro C. Cruz. Its attention was called to the
error, but it adamantly refused to acknowledge its mistake. The
SSS can be held liable for nominal damages. This type of
damages is not for the purpose of indemnifying private
respondents for any loss suffered by them but to vindicate or
recognize their rights which have been violated or invaded by
petitioner SSS. As to all other damages, the SC deleted them for
lack of basis.
in regard to hire and tenure of their employment in order to

discourage them from pursuing their union activities.
Answering the complaint, the petitioners Bureau of Printing, Serafin
Salvador and Mariano Ledesma denied the charges of unfair labor
practices attributed to them and prayed that the case be dismissed
for lack of jurisdiction.
Petitioners, by way of affirmative defenses, alleged, among other
things, that:
1 that the Bureau of Printing has no juridical personality to
sue and be sued;
2 that said Bureau of Printing is not an industrial concern
engaged for the purpose of gain but is an agency of the
Republic performing governmental functions
The trial judge of the Industrial Court sustained the
jurisdiction of the court on the theory that the functions of the
Bureau of Printing are "exclusively proprietary in nature," and,
consequently, denied the prayer for dismissal.
BUREAU OF PRINTING VS. THE BUREAU OF PRINTING

EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION (NLU)
G.R. No. L-15751. January 28, 1961.
Petitioners brought the case to this court through the present

petition for certiorari and prohibition.
DOCTRINE:
ISSUE:
The Bureau of Printing is an office of the Government created by

the Administrative Code of 1916. Indeed, as an office of the
Government, without any corporate or juridical personality, the
Bureau of Printing cannot be sued. Any suit, action or proceeding
against it, if it were to produce any effect, would actually be a suit,
action or proceeding against the Government itself, and the rule is
settled that the Government cannot be sued without its consent,
much less over its objection.
WON Court of Industrial Relations acquired jurisdiction over the

petitioner Bureau of Printing.
FACTS:
Respondent Bureau of Printing Employees Association (NLU) filed a
complaint alleging that Serafin Salvador (Acting Secretary of the
Dept. of General Services) and Mariano Ledesma (Director of the
Bureau of Printing) have been engaging in unfair labor practice
by interfering with, or coercing the employees of the Bureau of
Printing, particularly the members of the complaining association,
in the exercise of their right to self-organization and discriminating
HELD:
No. The CIR did not acquire jurisdiction over the petitioner Bureau
of Printing.
The Bureau of Printing is an office of the Government
created by the Administrative Code of 1916 (Act No. 2657). As
such instrumentality of the Government, it operates under the
direct supervision of the Executive Secretary, Office of the
President, and is "charged with the execution of all printing and
binding, including work incidental to those processes, required by
the National Government and such other work of the same
character as said Bureau may, by law or by order of the (Secretary
of Finance) Executive Secretary, be authorized to undertake . . .."
(Sec. 1644, Rev. Adm. Code.) It has no corporate existence, and
its appropriations are provided for in the General Appropriations

Act. Designed to meet the printing needs of the Government, it is
primarily a service bureau and is obviously, not engaged in
business or occupation for pecuniary profit.
This Court has already held in a long line of decisions that the
Industrial Court has no jurisdiction to hear and determine
the complaint for unfair labor practice filed against
institutions or corporations not organized for profit and,
consequently, not an industrial or business organization.
This is so because the Industrial Peace Act was intended to apply
only to industrial employment, and to govern the relations between
employers engaged in industry and occupations for purposes of
gain, and their industrial employees.
Indeed, as an office of the Government, without any
corporate or juridical personality, the Bureau of Printing
cannot be sued. (Sec. 1, Rule 3, Rules of Court.) Any suit,
action or proceeding against it, if it were to produce any
effect, would actually be a suit, action or proceeding
against the Government itself, and the rule is settled that
the Government cannot be sued without its consent, much
less over its objection.
DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE VS. NLRC
G.R. No. 104269. November 11, 1993.
DOCTRINE:
Where the State gives its consent to be sued by private parties
either by general or special law, it may limit claimant's action "only
up to the completion of proceedings anterior to the stage of
execution" and that the power of the Courts ends when the
judgment is rendered, since government funds and properties may
not be seized under writs of execution or garnishment to satisfy
such judgments, is based on obvious considerations of public
policy. Disbursements of public funds must be covered by the
correspondent appropriation as required by law. The functions and
public services rendered by the State cannot be allowed to be
paralyzed or disrupted by the diversion of public funds from their
legitimate and specific objects, as appropriated by law.
FACTS:
The Department of Agriculture (herein petitioner) and Sultan

Security Agency entered into a contract for security services
to be provided by the latter to the said governmental entity.
Pursuant to their arrangements, guards were deployed by Sultan
Agency in the various premises of the petitioner. On 13 September
1990, several guards of the Sultan Security Agency filed a
complaint for underpayment of wages, non-payment of 13th month
pay, uniform allowances, night shift differential pay, holiday pay
and overtime pay, as well as for damages, before the Regional
Arbitration Branch X of Cagayan de Oro City, against the
Department of Agriculture and Sultan Security Agency.
The Executive Labor Arbiter rendered a decision on 31 May 1991,
finding herein petitioner jointly and severally liable with sultan
Security Agency for the payment of the money claims, aggregating
P266,483.91, of the complainant security guards. The petitioner
and Sultan Security Agency did not appeal the decision of the
Labor Arbiter. Thus, the decision became final and executory.
The Labor Arbiter issued a writ of execution, commanding the City
Sheriff to enforce and execute the judgment against the property
of the two respondents. The City Sheriff levied on execution the
motor vehicles of the petitioner, i.e., one unit Toyota Hi-Ace, one
unit Toyota Mini Cruiser, and one unit Toyota Crown.
A petition for injunction, prohibition and mandamus, with prayer for
preliminary writ of injunction, was filed by the petitioner with the
National Labor Relations Commission ("NLRC"), Cagayan de Oro.
The petition was dismissed for lack of basis.
Petitioner filed the instant Petition for Certiorari. Petitioner asserts
the NLRC has disregarded the cardinal rule on the non-suability of
the State.
The private respondents, on the other hand, argue that the
petitioner has impliedly waived its immunity from suit by
concluding a service contract with Sultan Security Agency.
ISSUE:
1. WON The Department of Agriculture is immune from suit
pursuant to the doctrine of Non-suability of the State.
2.
WON a Writ of Execution may be issued against it.
HELD:
1. No. The doctrine only conveys, "the state may not be sued
without its consent;" its clear import then is that the State
may at times be sued.
foreign sovereign, its commercial activities or economic

affairs. Stated differently, a State may be said to have
descended to the level of an individual and can thus
be deemed to have tacitly given its consent to be
sued only when it enters into business contracts. It
does not apply where the contracts relates to the
exercise of its sovereign functions.
2. No. When the State gives its consent to be sued, it does

not thereby necessarily consent to an unrestrained
execution against it.
REASONS:
1. The rule, in any case, is not really absolute for it does not
say that the state may not be sued under any
circumstance. On the contrary, as correctly phrased, the
doctrine only conveys, "the state may not be sued without
its consent;" its clear import then is that the State may at
times be sued. The States' consent may be given either
expressly or impliedly. Express consent may be made
through a general law or a special law. In this
jurisdiction, the general law waiving the immunity of the
state from suit is found in Act No. 3083, (AN ACT
DEFINING THE CONDITIONS UNDER WHICH THE
GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS MAY BE SUED,
[1923]) , where the Philippine government "consents and
submits to be sued upon any money claim involving
liability arising from contract, express or implied, which
could serve as a basis of civil action between private
parties." Implied consent, on the other hand, is
conceded when the State itself commences
litigation, thus opening itself to a counterclaim or
when it enters into a contract. In this situation, the
government is deemed to have descended to the level of
the other contracting party and to have divested itself of
its sovereign immunity. This rule, relied upon by
the NLRC and the private respondents, is not, however,
without qualification. Not all contracts entered into by
the government operate as a waiver of its nonsuability; distinction must still be made between
one which is executed in the exercise of its
sovereign functions and another which is done in its
proprietary capacity.
In US vs Ruiz, This court held that: The restrictive
application of State immunity is proper only when the
proceedings arise out of commercial transactions of the
In the instant case, the Department of Agriculture has not

pretended to have assumed a capacity apart from its being
a governmental entity when it entered into the questioned
contract; nor that it could have, in fact, performed any act
proprietary in character.
2.
But, be that as it may, the claims of private respondents,

i.e., for underpayment of wages, holiday pay, overtime pay
and similar other items, arising from the Contract for
Security Services, clearly constitute money claims. Act
No. 3083, gives the consent of the State to be "sued upon
any moneyed claim involving liability arising from contract,
express or implied, . . ." Pursuant, however,
to Commonwealth Act ("C.A.") No. 327, as amended by
Presidential Decree ("P.D.") No. 1445, the money claim
should first be brought to the Commission on Audit.
As to the Writ of Execution, when the State gives its
consent to be sued, it does not thereby necessarily consent
to an unrestrained execution against it. Tersely put, when
the State waives its immunity, all it does, in effect, is to
give the other party an opportunity to prove, if it can, that
the State has a liability.
In Republic vs. Villasor this Court, in nullifying the issuance
of an alias writ of execution directed against the funds of
the Armed Forces of the Philippines to satisfy a final and
executory judgment, has explained, thus
The universal rule that where the State gives its
consent to be sued by private parties either by
general or special law, it may limit claimant's action
"only up to the completion of proceedings anterior
to the stage of execution" and that the power of the
Courts ends when the judgment is rendered, since
government funds and properties may not be seized under
writs of execution or garnishment to satisfy such
judgments, is based on obvious considerations of public

policy. Disbursements of public funds must be covered by
the correspondent appropriation as required by law. The
functions and public services rendered by the State cannot
be allowed to be paralyzed or disrupted by the diversion of
public funds from their legitimate and specific objects, as
appropriated by law.
SANDERS vs. VERIDIANO
G.R. No. L-46930. June 10, 1988.
Murillo
DOCTRINE:
Acts of public officers in the discharge of their official duties are
covered under the state
immunity doctrine.
FACTS:
Sanders was the special services director of the U.S. Naval Station
(NAVSTA) in Olongapo City. Moreau was the commanding officer of
the Subic Naval Base. Private respondents were both employed as
gameroom attendants in the special services department of the
NAVSTA. On October 3, 1975, the private respondents were
advised that their employment had been converted from full-time
part-time. Their reaction was to protest this conversion and to
institute grievance proceedings under the U.S. Department of
Defense. The result was a recommendation for the reinstatement
of the private respondents to permanent full-time status plus
backwages.
In a letter addressed to petitioners, Sanders disagreed with the
said result and asked for the rejection of the recommendation. The
letter contained the statements that: a) "Mr. Rossi tends to alienate
most co-workers and supervisors;" b) "Messrs. Rossi and Wyers
have proven, according to their immediate supervisors, to be
difficult employees to supervise;" among others.
The petitioners then claimed that the letters contained libelous
imputations that had exposed them to ridicule and caused them
mental anguish. The private respondents also made it clear that
the petitioners were being sued in their private or personal
capacity. However, the petitioners argued that the acts complained
of were performed by them in the discharge of their official duties
and that, consequently, the court had no jurisdiction over them

under the doctrine of state immunity.
ISSUE:
W/N petitioners are covered under the state immunity doctrine
HELD:
Yes. SC found the complained acts were done by petitioners in the
discharge of their official duties. Sanders, as director of the special
services, had supervision over its personnel, and had a hand in
their employment, work assignments, discipline, dismissal and
other related matters. It is not disputed that the letter he had
written was in fact a reply to a request from his superior for more
information regarding the case of the private respondents. As for
Moreau, what he is claimed to have done was write the Chief of
Naval Personnel for concurrence with the conversion of the private
respondents' type of employment even before the grievance
proceedings commenced. This act is clearly official in nature.
Given the official character of the above-described letters, we have
to conclude that the petitioners were, legally speaking, being sued
as officers of the United States government. As they have acted on
behalf of that government, and within the scope of their authority,
it is that government, and not the petitioners personally, that is
responsible for their acts. There should be no question by now that
such complaint cannot prosper unless the government sought to
be held ultimately liable has given its consent to be sued.
REPUBLIC VS SANDOVAL
G.R. No. 84607. March 19, 1993.
DOCTRINE:
The State's recommendation to indemnify the victims of a certain
case does not amount to waiver of immunity from suits.
FACTS:
Mendiola massacre. Basically, this was about the farmers'

continuing struggle for genuine agrarian reform. In 1988, they held
a massive rally - together with progressive groups and thousands
of marchers - which resulted to a deadly clash between civilians
and military/policemen. 12 were confirmed dead, all of whom were
from the side of the protesting civilians. Due to this, the
commission formed by President Aquino (to probe the incident)
decided to make recommendations such as the prosecution of
erring officers, policemen, and civilians.
G.R. No. L-35645. May 22, 1985

DOCTRINE:
Acts devoted to essential aspects of the state are also covered
under State immunity
FACTS:
The last and the most significant recommendation of the

Commission was for the deceased and wounded victims of the
Mendiola incident to be compensated by the government. It was
this portion where petitioners invoke in their claim for damages
from the government. The petitioners were not able to recover
anything from the government years after.
The USA had a naval base in Subic, Zambales. The base was one of
those provided in the military bases agreement between the
Philippines and the US. Respondent alleges that it won in the
bidding conducted by the US for the construction of wharves in
said base that was merely awarded to another group. For this
reason, a suit for specific performance was filed by him against the
US.
ISSUE:
ISSUE:
W/N petitioners can sue the State for damages after said
recommendation
W/N the US naval base, in bidding for said contracts, exercised

governmental functions to be able to invoke state immunity
HELD:
HELD:
No. The recommendation made by the Commission regarding

indemnification of the heirs of the deceased and the victims of the
incident by the government does not in any way mean that liability
automatically attaches to the State. In effect, whatever may be the
findings of the Commission, the same shall only serve as the cause
of action in the event that any party decides to litigate his/her
claim. Therefore, the Commission is merely a preliminary venue.
The Commission is not the end in itself. Whatever recommendation
it makes cannot in any way bind the State immediately, such
recommendation not having become final and executory. This is
precisely the essence of it being a fact-finding body.
Secondly, whatever acts or utterances that then President Aquino
may have done or said, the same are not tantamount to the State
having waived its immunity from suit. The President's act of joining
the marchers, days after the incident, does not mean that there
was an admission by the State of any liability.
Yes. The traditional role of the state immunity exempts a state from
being sued in the courts of another state without its consent or
waiver. This rule is necessary consequence of the principle of
independence and equality of states. However, the rules of
international law are not petrified; they are continually and
evolving and because the activities of states have multiplied. It has
been necessary to distinguish them between sovereign and
governmental acts and private, commercial and proprietory acts.
The result is that state immunity now extends only to sovereign
and governmental acts.
US vs RUIZ
In this case, the projects are integral part of the naval base which
is devoted to the defense of both US and Philippines. Indisputably,
it is a function of the government of the highest order. They are not
utilized for, nor dedicated to commercial or business purposes.
RCBC vs. De Castro
G.R. No. L-34548. November 29, 1988
GOMEZ
FACTS:
In a civil case entitled Badoc Planters, Inc. vs. Phil. Virginia Tobacco
Administration, et al., the CFI of Rizal, Quezon City Branch IX
issued an Order (Partial Judgment) on January 15, 1970 by the then
Presiding Judge San Diego. The said order required defendants to
pay jointly and severally, the plaintiff Badoc Planters, Inc.
Therafter, Judge San Diego was promoted as a Justice of the CA so
herein public respodent (Judge De Castro) took over and acted on
the Urgent Ex-Parte Motion filed by BADOC. Judge De Castro
granted said Motion.
Accordingly, the Branch Clerk of Court on the very same day,
issued a Writ of Execution addressed to Special Sheriff Faustino
Rigor, who then issued a Notice of Garnishment addressed to the
General Manager and/or Cashier of RCBC, requesting a reply within
five (5) days to said garnishment as to any property which the
Philippine Virginia Tobacco Administration (PVTA) might have in the
possession or control of petitioner or of any debts owing by the
petitioner to said defendant. Upon receipt of such Notice, RCBC
notified PVTA thereof to enable the PVTA to take the necessary
steps for the protection of its own interest.
Respondent PVTA filed a Motion for Reconsideration which was
eventually granted. The court set aside the Orders of Execution
and of Payment and the Writ of Execution. It likewise ordered
petitioner and BADOC "to restore, jointly and severally, the account
of PVTA with the said bank in the same condition and state it was
before the issuance of the aforesaid Orders by reimbursing the
PVTA of the amount of P 206, 916.76 with interests at the legal rate
from January 27, 1970 until fully paid to the account of the PVTA.
The Motion for Reconsideration filed by herein petitioner was
denied. It then appealed to the CA. CA in turn certified this case to
the SC as it involves purely questions of law.
ISSUE:
WON PVTA funds are public funds exempt from garnishment
HELD:
PVTA funds are subject to garnishment.
RA No. 2265 created the PVTA as an ordinary corporation with all

the attributes of a corporate entity subject to the provisions of the
Corporation Law. Hence, it possesses the power "to sue and be
sued" and "to acquire and hold such assets and incur such
liabilities resulting directly from operations authorized by the
provisions of this Act or as essential to the proper conduct of such
operations."
Among the specific powers vested in the PVTA are: 1) to buy
Virginia tobacco grown in the Philippines for resale to local bona
fide tobacco manufacturers and leaf tobacco dealers [Section 4(b),
R.A. No. 2265]; 2) to contracts of any kind as may be necessary or
incidental to the attainment of its purpose with any person, firm or
corporation, with the Government of the Philippines or with any
foreign government, subject to existing laws [Section 4(h), R.A. No.
22651; and 3) generally, to exercise all the powers of a corporation
under the Corporation Law, insofar as they are not inconsistent
with the provisions of this Act [Section 4(k), R.A. No. 2265.]
From the foregoing, it is clear that PVTA has been endowed with a
personality distinct and separate from the government which owns
and controls it. Accordingly, this Court has heretofore declared that
the funds of the PVTA can be garnished since "funds of public
corporation which can sue and be sued were not exempt from
garnishment."
In National Shipyards and Steel Corp. v. CIR [G.R. No. L-17874,
August 31, 1964, 8 SCRA 781], this Court held that the allegation
to the effect that the funds of the NASSCO are public funds of the
government and that as such, the same may not be garnished,
attached or levied upon is untenable for, as a government-owned
or controlled corporation, it has a personality of its own, distinct
and separate from that of the government. This court has likewise
ruled that other govemment-owned and controlled corporations
like National Coal Company, the National Waterworks and
Sewerage Authority (NAWASA), the National Coconut Corporation
(NACOCO) the National Rice and Corn Corporation (NARIC) and the
Price Stabilization Council (PRISCO) which possess attributes
similar to those of the PVTA are clothed with personalities of their
own, separate and distinct from that of the government [National
Coal Company v. Collector of Internal Revenue, 46 Phil. 583 (1924);
Bacani and Matoto v. National Coconut Corporation et al., 100 Phil.
471 (1956); Reotan v. National Rice & Corn Corporation, G.R. No. L16223, February 27, 1962, 4 SCRA 418.] The rationale in vesting it
with a separate personality is not difficult to find. It is well-settled

that when the government enters into commercial business, it
abandons its sovereign capacity and is to be treated like any other
corporation [Manila Hotel Employees' Association v. Manila Hotel
Co. and CIR, 73 Phil. 734 (1941).]
Inasmuch as the Tobacco Fund, a special fund, was by law,
earmarked specifically to answer obligations incurred by PVTA in
connection with its proprietary and commercial operations
authorized under the law, it follows that said funds may be
proceeded against by ordinary judicial processes such as execution
and garnishment. If such funds cannot be executed upon or
garnished pursuant to a judgment sustaining the liability of the
PVTA to answer for its obligations, then the purpose of the law in
creating the PVTA would be defeated. For it was declared to be a
national policy, with respect to the local Virginia tobacco industry,
to encourage the production of local Virginia tobacco of the
qualities needed and in quantities marketable in both domestic and
foreign markets, to establish this industry on an efficient and
economic basis, and to create a climate conducive to local
cigarette manufacture of the qualities desired by the consuming
public, blending imported and native Virginia leaf tobacco to
improve the quality of locally manufactured cigarettes [Section 1,
Republic Act No. 4155.]
MUNICIPALITY OF MAKATI VS. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. Nos. 89898-99. October 1, 1990
FACTS:
The present petition for review is an off-shoot of expropriation
proceedings initiated by petitioner Municipality of Makati against
private respondent Admiral Finance Creditors Consortium, Inc.,
Home Building System & Realty Corporation and one Arceli P. Jo,
involving a parcel of land and improvements thereon located at
Mayapis St., San Antonio Village, Makati and registered in the
name of Arceli P. Jo.
An action for eminent domain was filed on May 20, 1986. Attached
to petitioner's complaint was a certification that a bank account
had been opened with the PNB Buendia Branch under petitioner's
name containing the sum of P417,510.00, made pursuant to the
provisions of P.D. No. 42. After due hearing where the parties
presented their respective appraisal reports regarding the value of
the property, respondent RTC judge rendered a decision on June 4,

1987, fixing the appraised value of the property at P5,291,666.00,
and ordering petitioner to pay this amount minus the advanced
payment of P338,160.00 which was earlier released to private
respondent.
After this decision became final and executory, private respondent
moved for the issuance of a writ of execution. This motion was
granted by respondent RTC judge. After issuance of the writ of
execution, a Notice of Garnishment dated January 14, 1988 was
served by respondent sheriff Silvino R. Pastrana upon the manager
of the PNB Buendia Branch. However, respondent sheriff was
informed that a "hold code" was placed on the account of
petitioner.
Private respondent filed a motion praying that an order be issued
directing the bank to deliver to said sheriff the unpaid balance. On
the other hand, petitioner filed a motion to lift the garnishment, on
the ground that the manner of payment of the expropriation
amount should be done in installments which the respondent RTC
judge failed to state in his decision.
Pending resolution of the above motions, petitioner filed a
Manifestation informing the court that the subject property is
now owned by PS Bank, Inc (PSB). Thereafter, respondent trial
judge subsequently issued an order which among other things
ordered PNB Buendia Branch to immediately release to PSB the
corresponding balance of P4,953,506.45.
Petitioner field a motion for reconsideration (MFR). Petitioner
contended that its funds at the PNB Buendia Branch could neither
be garnished nor levied upon execution, for to do so would result in
the disbursement of public funds without the proper appropriation
required under the law, citing the case of Republic of the
Philippines v. Palacio [G.R. No. L-20322, May 29, 1968, 23 SCRA
899].
Respondent judge denied petitioners MFR. On appeal, the CA
dismissed the same for lack of merit.
On appeal to the SC, Petitioner alleged for the first time that it has
actually 2 accounts with PNB Buendia Branch:
(1) Account No. S/A 265-537154-3 exclusively for the
expropriation of the subject property, with an outstanding balance
of P99,743.94.
(2)
Account No. S/A 263-530850-7 for statutory obligations and
other purposes of the municipal government, with a balance of
P170,098,421.72, as of July 12, 1989.
Admitting that its PNB Account No. S/A 265-537154-3 was

specifically opened for expropriation proceedings it had initiated
over the subject property, petitioner poses no objection to the
garnishment or the levy under execution of the funds deposited
therein amounting to P99,743.94. However, it is petitioner's main
contention that inasmuch as the assailed orders of respondent RTC
judge involved the net amount of P4,965,506.45, the funds
garnished by respondent sheriff in excess of P99,743.94, which are
public funds earmarked for the municipal government's other
statutory obligations, are exempted from execution without the
proper appropriation required under the law.
ISSUE:
WON public funds earmarked for the municipal governments other
statutory obligations, are exempted from execution without the
proper appropriation required under the law
Nevertheless, this is not to say that private respondent and PSB

are left with no legal recourse. Where a municipality fails or
refuses, without justifiable reason, to effect payment of a final
money judgment rendered against it, the claimant may avail of the
remedy of mandamus in order to compel the enactment and
approval of the necessary appropriation ordinance, and the
corresponding disbursement of municipal funds therefor [Viuda De
Tan Toco v. The Municipal Council of Iloilo, supra; Baldivia v. Lota,
107 Phil. 1099 (1960); Yuviengco v. Gonzales, 108 Phil. 247
(1960)].
The State's power of eminent domain should be exercised within
the bounds of fair play and justice. In the case at bar, considering
that valuable property has been taken, the compensation to be
paid fixed and the municipality is in full possession and utilizing the
property for public purpose, for three (3) years, the Court finds that
the municipality has had more than reasonable time to pay full
compensation.
HELD:
There is merit in this contention. The funds deposited in the second
PNB Account No. S/A 263-530850-7 are public funds of the
municipal government. In this jurisdiction, well-settled is the rule
that public funds are not subject to levy and execution, unless
otherwise provided for by statute.
More particularly, the properties of a municipality, whether real or
personal, which are necessary for public use cannot be attached
and sold at execution sale to satisfy a money judgment against the
municipality. Municipal revenues derived from taxes, licenses and
market fees, and which are intended primarily and exclusively for
the purpose of financing the governmental activities and functions
of the municipality, are exempt from execution.
The foregoing rule finds application in the case at bar. Absent a
showing that the municipal council of Makati has passed an
ordinance appropriating from its public funds an amount
corresponding to the balance due under the RTC decision dated
June 4, 1987, less the sum of P99,743.94 deposited in Account No.
S/A 265-537154-3, no levy under execution may be validly effected
on the public funds of petitioner deposited in Account No. S/A 263530850-7.
FONTANILLA VS. MALIAMAN

G.R. No. L-55963. December 1, 1989
FACTS:
On August 21, 1976 at about 6:30 P.M., a pickup owned and
operated by respondent National Irrigation Administration (NIA), a
government agency, then driven officially by Hugo Garcia, an
employee of said agency as its regular driver, bumped a bicycle
ridden by Francisco Fontanilla, son of herein petitioners, and
Restituto Deligo, at Maasin, San Jose City along the Maharlika
Highway. As a result of the impact, Francisco Fontanilla and
Restituto Deligo were injured and brought to the San Jose City
Emergency Hospital for treatment. Fontanilla was later transferred
to the Cabanatuan Provincial Hospital where he died.
Garcia was then a regular driver of respondent NIA who, at the
time of the accident, was a licensed professional driver and who
qualified for employment as such regular driver of respondent after
having passed the written and oral examinations on traffic rules
and maintenance of vehicles given by National Irrigation
Administration authorities.
Spouses Fontanilla filed a case for damages (death benefits) and
actual expenses for the death of their son. CFI of Nueva Ecija ruled
in favor of spouses Fontanilla. NIA then filed its motion for

reconsideration which CFI denied. NIA then appealed to CA.
This assumption of liability, however, is predicated upon the

existence of negligence on the part of respondent NIA. The
negligence referred to here is the negligence of supervision.
ISSUE:
WON the award of moral damages, exemplary damages and
attorney's fees is legally proper in a complaint for damages based
on quasi-delict which resulted in the death of the son of herein
petitioners
HELD:
At this juncture, the matter of due diligence on the part of

respondent NIA becomes a crucial issue in determining its liability
since it has been established that respondent is a government
agency performing proprietary functions and as such, it assumes
the posture of an ordinary employer which, under Par. 5 of Art.
2180, is responsible for the damages caused by its employees
provided that it has failed to observe or exercise due diligence in
the selection and supervision of the driver.
The liability of the State has two aspects, namely:

1.
2.
Its public or governmental aspects where it is liable for the

tortious acts of special agents only.
Its private or business aspects (as when it engages in
private enterprises) where it becomes liable as an ordinary
employer.
In this jurisdiction, the State assumes a limited liability for the

damage caused by the tortious acts or conduct of its special agent.
Under paragrah 6 of Art. 2180, the State has voluntarily assumed
liability for acts done through special agents. The State's agent, if a
public official, must not only be specially commissioned to do a
particular task but that such task must be foreign to said official's
usual governmental functions. If the State's agent is not a public
official, and is commissioned to perform non-governmental
functions, then the State assumes the role of an ordinary employer
and will be held liable as such for its agent's tort. Where the
government commissions a private individual for a special
governmental task, it is acting through a special agent within the
meaning of the provision.
The National Irrigation Administration is an agency of the
government exercising proprietary functions.
Indubitably, the NIA is a government corporation with juridical
personality and not a mere agency of the government. Since it is a
corporate body performing non-governmental functions, it now
becomes liable for the damage caused by the accident resulting
from the tortious act of its driver-employee. In this particular case,
the NIA assumes the responsibility of an ordinary employer and as
such, it becomes answerable for damages.
It should be emphasized that the accident happened along the

Maharlika National Road within the city limits of San Jose City, an
urban area. Considering the fact that the victim was thrown 50
meters away from the point of impact, there is a strong indication
that driver Garcia was driving at a high speed. This is confirmed by
the fact that the pick-up suffered substantial and heavy damage as
above-described and the fact that the NIA group was then "in a
hurry to reach the campsite as early as possible", as shown by
their not stopping to find out what they bumped as would have
been their normal and initial reaction.
Evidently, there was negligence in the supervision of the driver for
the reason that they were travelling at a high speed within the city
limits and yet the supervisor of the group, Ely Salonga, failed to
caution and make the driver observe the proper and allowed speed
limit within the city. Under the situation, such negligence is further
aggravated by their desire to reach their destination without even
checking whether or not the vehicle suffered damage from the
object it bumped, thus showing imprudence and reckelessness on
the part of both the driver and the supervisor in the group.
Significantly, this Court has ruled that even if the employer can
prove the diligence in the selection and supervision (the latter
aspect has not been established herein) of the employee, still if he
ratifies the wrongful acts, or take no step to avert further damage,
the employer would still be liable.
PROVINCE OF NORTH COTABATO VS. GRP PEACE PANEL ON
ANCESTRAL DOMAIN, ET AL.
G.R. No. 183591. October 14, 2008
GOMEZ
FACTS:
On August 5, 2008, the Government of the Republic of the

Philippines (GRP) and the MILF, through the Chairpersons of their
respective peace negotiating panels, were scheduled to sign a
Memorandum of Agreement on the Ancestral Domain (MOA-AD)
Aspect of the GRP-MILF Tripoli Agreement on Peace of 2001 in
Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia.
The signing of the MOA-AD between the GRP and the MILF was not
to materialize, however, for upon motion of petitioners, specifically
those who filed their cases before the scheduled signing of the
MOA-AD, the SC issued a Temporary Restraining Order enjoining
the GRP from signing the same.
Formal peace talks between the parties were held in Tripoli, Libya
from June 20-22, 2001, the outcome of which was the GRP-MILF
Tripoli Agreement on Peace (Tripoli Agreement 2001) containing the
basic principles and agenda on the following aspects of the
negotiation: Security Aspect, Rehabilitation Aspect, and Ancestral
Domain Aspect. With regard to the Ancestral Domain Aspect, the
parties in Tripoli Agreement 2001 simply agreed "that the same be
discussed further by the Parties in their next meeting."
On July 23, 2008, the Province of North Cotabato and ViceGovernor Emmanuel Piol filed a petition, docketed as G.R. No.
183591, for Mandamus and Prohibition with Prayer for the Issuance
of Writ of Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order.
This initial petition was followed by another one, docketed as G.R.
No. 183752, also for Mandamus and Prohibition filed by the City of
Zamboanga, Mayor Celso Lobregat, Rep. Ma. Isabelle Climaco and
Rep. Erico Basilio Fabian who likewise pray for similar injunctive
reliefs.
By Resolution of August 4, 2008, the Court issued a Temporary
Restraining Order commanding and directing public respondents
and their agents to cease and desist from formally signing the
MOA-AD.
Meanwhile, the City of Iligan filed a petition for Injunction and/or
Declaratory Relief, docketed as G.R. No. 183893, praying that
respondents be enjoined from signing the MOA-AD or, if the same
had already been signed, from implementing the same, and that
the MOA-AD be declared unconstitutional.
The Province of Zamboanga del Norte, Governor Rolando Yebes,

Vice-Governor Francis Olvis, Rep. Cecilia Jalosjos-Carreon, Rep.
Cesar Jalosjos, and the members18 of the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan of Zamboanga del Norte filed on August 15, 2008 a
petition for Certiorari, Mandamus and Prohibition,19 docketed as
G.R. No. 183951
By subsequent Resolutions, the Court ordered the consolidation of
the petitions.
ISSUES:
WON the MOA-AD grants to the Bangsamoro Juridical Entity (BJE)
the status of a STATE
WON the BJE contains the 4 elements of a State
HELD:
The MOA-AD proceeds to refer to the "Bangsamoro homeland," the
ownership of which is vested exclusively in the Bangsamoro people
by virtue of their prior rights of occupation. Both parties to the
MOA-AD acknowledge that ancestral domain does not form part of
the public domain.
The territory of the Bangsamoro homeland is described as the land
mass as well as the maritime, terrestrial, fluvial and alluvial
domains, including the aerial domain and the atmospheric space
above it, embracing the Mindanao-Sulu-Palawan geographic region.
More specifically, the core of the BJE is defined as the present
geographic area of the ARMM - thus constituting the following
areas: Lanao del Sur, Maguindanao, Sulu, Tawi-Tawi, Basilan, and
Marawi City. Significantly, this core also includes certain
municipalities of Lanao del Norte that voted for inclusion in the
ARMM in the 2001 plebiscite.
These provisions of the MOA indicate, among other things, that the
Parties aimed to vest in the BJE the status of an associated state
or, at any rate, a status closely approximating it. The concept of
association is not recognized under the present Constitution No
province, city, or municipality, not even the ARMM, is recognized
under our laws as having an "associative" relationship with the
national government. Indeed, the concept implies powers that go
beyond anything ever granted by the Constitution to any local or
regional government. It also implies the recognition of the
associated entity as a state. The Constitution, however, does not

contemplate any state in this jurisdiction other than the Philippine
State, much less does it provide for a transitory status that aims to
prepare any part of Philippine territory for independence.
The BJE is a far more powerful entity than the autonomous region
recognized in the Constitution It is not merely an expanded version
of the ARMM, the status of its relationship with the national
government being fundamentally different from that of the ARMM.
Indeed, BJE is a state in all but name as it meets the criteria of a
state laid down in the Montevideo Convention,namely, a
permanent population, a defined territory, a government, and a
capacity to enter into relations with other states.
Even assuming arguendo that the MOA-AD would not necessarily

sever any portion of Philippine territory, the spirit animating it which has betrayed itself by its use of the concept of association runs counter to the national sovereignty and territorial integrity of
the Republic.
The defining concept underlying the relationship between the
national government and the BJE being itself contrary to the
present Constitution, it is not surprising that many of the specific
provisions of the MOA-AD on the formation and powers of the BJE
are in conflict with the Constitution and the laws.

PHILIPPINES AS A STATE CASE DIGESTS ON RIVER BEDS AND TAX EXEMPTIONS

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PHILIPPINES AS A STATE CASE DIGESTS ON RIVER BEDS AND TAX EXEMPTIONS

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POLITICAL LAW REVIEW CASE DIGESTS [2]: THE PHILIPPINES AS A STATE

REPUBLIC VS SANTOS III

fl ood control program; that the property was within the

To prove that the land subject of an application for

NO. The land is belongs to the inalienable public domain.

Alleging continuous and adverse possession of more than

WON the land claimed is an alienable and disposable land hence

Subject to the exceptions defined in Article 461 of the Civil Code

1 CRUZ, GATACELO, GOMEZ, LAZARO, MUNEZ, MURILLO

POLITICAL LAW REVIEW CASE DIGESTS [2]: THE PHILIPPINES AS A STATE

To prove that the land subject of an application for registration is

Maria Cerdeira is a Spanish national and was a resident of Tangier,

2 CRUZ, GATACELO, GOMEZ, LAZARO, MUNEZ, MURILLO

POLITICAL LAW REVIEW CASE DIGESTS [2]: THE PHILIPPINES AS A STATE

Whether or not the acquisition of international personality is a

allotted area a supremacy over all other institutions. It is the power

NO. International personality is not required to be considered as a

Even on the assumption then that Tangier is bereft of international

It does not admit of doubt that if a foreign country is to be

The Republic of the Philippines cannot be barred by the rules on

3 CRUZ, GATACELO, GOMEZ, LAZARO, MUNEZ, MURILLO

POLITICAL LAW REVIEW CASE DIGESTS [2]: THE PHILIPPINES AS A STATE

real party-in-interest and that the cause of action was

WON the Republic of the Philippines can maintain the

of such time, and before it is barred by the statute of

No to (1) and (2)

SECTION 3. Creation of the Bases Conversion and Development

4 CRUZ, GATACELO, GOMEZ, LAZARO, MUNEZ, MURILLO

POLITICAL LAW REVIEW CASE DIGESTS [2]: THE PHILIPPINES AS A STATE

operation of the BCDA, yet it is certain that the functions

5 CRUZ, GATACELO, GOMEZ, LAZARO, MUNEZ, MURILLO

POLITICAL LAW REVIEW CASE DIGESTS [2]: THE PHILIPPINES AS A STATE

is lodged in a royal person or in the legislature, and has no affinity

6 CRUZ, GATACELO, GOMEZ, LAZARO, MUNEZ, MURILLO

POLITICAL LAW REVIEW CASE DIGESTS [2]: THE PHILIPPINES AS A STATE

no power, as a corollary of the preceding consideration, to repeal

country and the protection of his army, subject to the restrictions

7 CRUZ, GATACELO, GOMEZ, LAZARO, MUNEZ, MURILLO

POLITICAL LAW REVIEW CASE DIGESTS [2]: THE PHILIPPINES AS A STATE

WON the Constitution of the Commonwealth or of Republic

The so-called Republic of the Philippines, apparently

8 CRUZ, GATACELO, GOMEZ, LAZARO, MUNEZ, MURILLO

POLITICAL LAW REVIEW CASE DIGESTS [2]: THE PHILIPPINES AS A STATE

demanded by military necessity, incident to a state of war,

Yes. During a belligerent occupation, the political laws of

SOUTHEAST ASIAN FISHERIES DEVELOPMENT CENTER-

AQUACULTURE DEPARTMENT (SEAFDEC-AQD) vs. NLRC

9 CRUZ, GATACELO, GOMEZ, LAZARO, MUNEZ, MURILLO

POLITICAL LAW REVIEW CASE DIGESTS [2]: THE PHILIPPINES AS A STATE

IF THE ACTS GIVING RISE TO A SUIT ARE THOSE OF A FOREIGN

10 CRUZ, GATACELO, GOMEZ, LAZARO, MUNEZ, MURILLO

POLITICAL LAW REVIEW CASE DIGESTS [2]: THE PHILIPPINES AS A STATE

democratic states, made to attach not just to the person of the

conduct activities in the country to help contain the problem on the

11 CRUZ, GATACELO, GOMEZ, LAZARO, MUNEZ, MURILLO

POLITICAL LAW REVIEW CASE DIGESTS [2]: THE PHILIPPINES AS A STATE

G.R. No. L-41299. February 21, 1983.

The Trial Court rendered judgment against SSS directing it to pay

SSS contends, among others, that it is not liable for

Sometime in March, 1963 the spouses David B. Cruz and

'That the conditions of the mortgage have been broken since

To our minds, there should be no question on this score considering