TANO V SOCRATES

G.R. No. 110249

DAVIDE, JR; August 21, 1997
FACTS:
-Dec 15, 1992: Sangguniang Panlungsod ng Puerto
Princesa City enacted Ordinance No. 15-92 w/c took
effect on 1 Jan 1993, banning the shipment of all live
fish and lobster outside Puerto Princesa City from 1 Jan
1993 to 1 Jan 1998 and providing penalties for violation
therefor
-Jan 22, 1993: To implement said city ordinance, then
Acting City Mayor Lucero issued Office Order No. 23
authorizing the conduct of necessary inspections on
cargoes containing live fish and lobster being shipped
out from the Puerto Princesa Airport, Puerto Princesa
Wharf or at any port w/in the jurisdiction of the City to
any point of destination either via aircraft or seacraft.
The purpose of inspection is to ascertain whether the
shipper possessed the required Mayor's Permit and the
shipment is covered by invoice or clearance issued by
the local office of the Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic
Resources and as to compliance with all other existing
rules and regulations on the matter. Said order further
provides that any cargo containing live fish and lobster
without the required documents as stated therein must
be held for proper disposition.
-Feb 19, 1993: Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Palawan
enacted Resn No. 33 prohibiting the catching,
gathering, possessing, buying, selling and shipment of
live marine coral dwelling aquatic organisms for a
period 5yrs in and coming from Palawan waters; and
enacted Ordinance No. 2 for the purpose.
-Tano, et al argue that implementing said ordinances
meant depriving all the fishermen of the province of
Palawan and the City of Puerto Princesa of their only
means of livelihood and petitioner marine merchants
from performing their lawful occupation and trade. A
number of the petitioners were even charged criminally
for violating said ordinances.
-Without seeking redress from the concerned LGUs,
prosecutor's office and courts, petitioners directly
invoked SCs original jurisdiction by filing this petition
which they caption as one for "Certiorari, Injunction
with Preliminary and Mandatory Injunction, w/ Prayer
for TRO." They pray that SC declare as unconstitutional
the said issuances; enjoin the enforcement thereof;
and restrain respondent prosecutors and judges from
assuming jurisdiction over & hearing cases concerning
violation of said issuances.
[SC: More appropriately, the petition is, and shall be
treated as, a special civil action for certiorari and
prohibition.]
-Petitioners argue that said issuances violate due
process of law, the equal protection clause, the nondelegation doctrine, the non-impairment clause, as well
as Sec 2, Art XII and Secs 2 and 7 of Article XIII of the
1987 Consti.
-Respondents argue that the said issuances are a
valid exercise of the Provincial Government's power
under the general welfare clause (Section 16 of the
Local Government Code of 1991 [LGC]), and its specific
power to protect the environment and impose
appropriate penalties for acts which endanger the
environment. They likewise maintained that there was
no violation of the due process and equal protection
clauses of the Constitution.

-Upon motion of petitioners, SC issued a TRO directing

Judge Miclat to cease and desist from proceeding with
the arraignment and pre-trial of the petitioners
impleaded in the criminal cases pending before his
sala.
-OSG was excused from filing a comment, considering
that respondents were already represented by counsel.
SC thereafter resolved to consider the comment on the
petition as the Answer, gave due course to the petition
and required the parties to submit their respective
memoranda.
-22 April 1997: SC ordered impleaded as party
respondents the Dept of Agriculture and the Bureau of
Fisheries and Aquatic Resources and required the OSG
to comment on their behalf. But in light of the latter's
motion for an extension of time to file the comment
which would only result in further delay, SC dispensed
with said comment and deliberated on the pleadings
filed.
PRELIMINARIES: There are two sets of petitioners in
this case.
1. Individuals who were criminally charged with
violating said issuances seek to prevent the
prosecution, trial and determination of the criminal
cases until the constitutionality or legality of the
ordinances they allegedly violated shall have been
resolved.
2. The rest of the petitioners [76 fishermen and the
Airline Shippers Association of Palawan (private
association of several marine merchants)] claim that
they would be adversely affected by the ordinances.
ISSUE: WON the writs of certiorari and prohibition
should issue
HELD:
As to the first set of petitioners, NO. This special
civil for certiorari must fail on the ground of
prematurity amounting to a lack of cause of action.
-There is no showing that said petitioners, as the
accused in the criminal cases, have filed motions to
quash [MTQ] the informations therein & that the same
were denied. Even if petitioners did file motions to
quash, the denial thereof would not forthwith give rise
to a COA under Rule 65, ROC.
-Where MTQ is denied, remedy therefrom is not
certiorari, but for the party aggrieved thereby to go to
trial w/o prejudice to reiterating special defenses
involved in said motion, and if, after trial on the merits
an adverse decision is rendered, to appeal therefrom in
the manner authorized by law. And, even where in an
exceptional circumstance such denial may be the
subject of a special civil action for certiorari, MFR must
have to be filed to allow the court concerned an
opportunity to correct its errors, unless such motion
may be dispensed with because of existing exceptional
circumstances. Finally, even if a motion for
reconsideration has been filed and denied, the remedy
under Rule 65 is still unavailable absent any showing of
the grounds provided for in Section 1 thereof.
As to the second set of petitioners, NO. The instant
petition is obviously one for declaratory relief; as such,
their petition must likewise fail. SC is not possessed of
original jurisdiction over petitions for declaratory relief
even if only questions of law are involved; SC merely
exercises appellate jurisdiction over such petitions.

Even granting arguendo that the first set of

petitioners have a COA ripe for the extraordinary
writ of certiorari, there is here a clear disregard of
the hierarchy of courts, and no special and important
reason or exceptional and compelling circumstance has
been adduced why direct recourse to us should be
allowed. While SC has concurrent jurisdiction with RTCs
and the CA to issue writs of certiorari, prohibition,
mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpus and
injunction, such concurrence gives petitioners no
unrestricted freedom of choice of court forum.
-People v. Cuaresma: This concurrence of jurisdiction is
not to be taken as according to parties seeking any of
the writs an absolute unrestrained freedom of choice of
the court to which application therefor will be directed.
There is after all hierarchy of courts. That hierarchy is
determinative of the venue of appeals, and should also
serve as a general determinant of the appropriate
forum for petitions for the extraordinary writs. A
becoming regard for that judicial hierarchy most
certainly indicates that petitions for the issuance of
extraordinary writs against first level ("inferior") courts
should be filed w/ the RTC, and those against the latter,
with the Court of Appeals. A direct invocation of the
Supreme Court's original jurisdiction to issue these
writs should be allowed only when there are special
and important reasons therefor, clearly and specifically
set out in the petition. This is established policy. It is a
policy necessary to prevent inordinate demands upon
the Court's time and attention which are better
devoted to those matters within its exclusive
jurisdiction, and to prevent further over-crowding of the
Court's docket.
-Santiago v. Vasquez: the propensity of litigants and
lawyers to disregard the hierarchy of courts must be
put to a halt, not only because of the imposition upon
the precious time of this Court, but also because of the
inevitable and resultant delay, intended or otherwise,
in the adjudication of the case which often has to be
remanded or referred to the lower court, the proper
forum under the rules of procedure, or as better
equipped to resolve the issues since this Court is not a
trier of facts. We reiterated "the judicial policy that this
Court will not entertain direct resort to it unless the
redress desired cannot be obtained in the appropriate
courts
or
where
exceptional
and
compelling
circumstances justify availment of a remedy within and
calling for the exercise of [its] primary jurisdiction
Notwithstanding
the
foregoing
procedural
obstacles, SC opted to resolve the case on its merits
considering that life-time of the challenged issuances is
about to end1 and that the ordinances were
undoubtedly enacted in the exercise of powers under
the new LGC relative to the protection and preservation
of the environment [issues are novel and of paramount
importance].
-Laws (including ordinances enacted by LGUs) enjoy
the presumption of constitutionality. To overthrow this
presumption, there must be a clear and unequivocal
breach of the Consti, not merely a doubtful or
argumentative contradiction. Conflict with the Consti
must be shown beyond reasonable doubt. Where doubt

exists, even if well-founded, there can be no finding of

unconstitutionality. To doubt is to sustain.
-After scrutiny of the challenged ordinances and the
provisions of Consti petitioners claim to have been
violated, SC finds petitioners' contentions baseless and
so hold that the former do not suffer from any infirmity,
both under the Constitution and applicable laws.
-There is absolutely no showing that any of the
petitioners qualifies as a subsistence or marginal
fisherman2 protected by Section 2, Article XII and
Sections 2 and 7, Article XIII of the Constitution.
Petitioner Airline Shippers Association of Palawan is
self-described as "a private association composed of
Marine Merchants;" petitioners Robert Lim and Virginia
Lim, as "merchants;" while the rest of the petitioners
claim to be "fishermen," without any qualification,
however, as to their status.
-Besides, Section 2 of Article XII aims primarily not to
bestow any right to subsistence fishermen, but to lay
stress on the duty of the State to protect the nation's
marine wealth. Anent Section 7 of Article XIII, it speaks
not only of the use of communal marine and fishing
resources, but of their protection, development and
conservation. The ordinances in question are meant
precisely to protect and conserve our marine resources
to the end that their enjoyment may be guaranteed not
only for the present generation, but also for the
generations to come.
-LGC provisions invoked by respondents merely seek to
give flesh and blood to the right of the people to a
balanced and healthful ecology. Sec 5(c) of the LGC
explicitly mandates that the general welfare provisions
of the LGC "shall be liberally interpreted to give more
powers to the local government units in accelerating
economic development and upgrading the quality of
life for the people of the community."
-In light of the principles of decentralization and
devolution enshrined in the LGC and the powers
granted therein to LGUs under the General Welfare
Clause, and under the other sections, which
unquestionably involve the exercise of police power,
the validity of the questioned Ordinances cannot be
doubted. Parenthetically, these Ordinances find full
support under the Strategic Environmental Plan (SEP)
for Palawan Act (RA 7611).
-It is clear to the Court that the Ordinances have two
principal objectives or purposes: (1) to establish a
"closed season" for the species of fish or aquatic
animals covered therein for a period of five years; and
(2) to protect the coral in the marine waters of the City
of Puerto Princesa and the Province of Palawan from
further destruction due to illegal fishing activities. The
accomplishment of the first objective is well within the
devolved power to enforce fishery laws in municipal
waters. The realization of the second clearly falls w/in
both the general welfare clause of the LGC and the
express mandate thereunder to cities and provinces to
protect the environment and impose appropriate
penalties for acts which endanger the environment.
In closing, we commend the Sangguniang Panlungsod
of the City of Puerto Princesa and Sangguniang

2 SC cited and applied Webster definitions: A marginal fisherman is an individual

1 Ordinance No. 15-92 of the City of Puerto Princesa is effective only up to 1 January
1998, while Ordinance No. 2 of the Province of Palawan, enacted on 19 February
1993, is effective for only five (5) years.

engaged in fishing whose margin of return or reward in his harvest of fish as measured
by existing price levels is barely sufficient to yield a profit or cover the cost of gathering
the fish, while a subsistence fisherman is one whose catch yields but the irreducible
minimum for his livelihood.

Panlalawigan of the Province of Palawan for exercising

the requisite political will to enact urgently needed
legislation to protect and enhance the marine
environment, thereby sharing in the herculean task of
arresting the tide of ecological destruction. We hope
that other local government units shall now be roused
from their lethargy and adopt a more vigilant stand in
the battle against the decimation of our legacy to
future generations. At this time, the repercussions of
any further delay in their response may prove
disastrous, if not, irreversible.
Disposition Petition dismissed for lack of merit.
[Note: Please see full case for the separate opinions of
Justices Mendoza and Bellosillo. I opted not to include
them here since their discussions did not touch upon
the CivPro topic under consideration: certiorari.]

Velarde v SJS (2004)

Doctrine: Decision, more specifically a decision not
conforming to the form and substance required by the
Constitution is void and deemed legally inexistent
(Panganiban)
Mike Velarde, Petitioner vs. SOCIAL JUSTICE SOCIETY,
respondent.
Date promulgated: April 28, 2004
Ponente: J. Panganiban
Facts:
-On January 28, 2003, SJS filed a Petition for
Declaratory Relief before the RTC-Manila against
Velarde and his co-respondents Eminence, Jaime
Cardinal Sin, Executive Minister Erao Manalo, Brother
Eddie Villanueva and Brother Eliseo F. Soriano.
-SJS, a registered political party, sought the
interpretation of several constitutional provisions,
specifically on the separation of church and state; and
a declaratory judgment on the constitutionality of the
acts of religious leaders endorsing a candidate for an
elective office, or urging or requiring the members of
their flock to vote for a specified candidate.
-The petitioner filed a Motion to dismiss before the
trial court owing to the fact that alleged that the
questioned SJS Petition did not state a cause of
action and that there was no justiciable controversy.
-The trial courts junked the Velarde petitions under
certain reasons:
1. It said that it had jurisdiction over the SJS petition,
because in praying for a determination as to whether
the actions imputed to the respondents were violative
of Article II, Section 6 of the Fundamental Law, the
petition has raised only a question of law.
2. It then proceeded to a lengthy discussion of the
issue raised in the Petition the separation of church
and state even tracing, to some extent, the historical
background of the principle. Through its discourse, the
court quipped at some point that the "endorsement of
specific candidates in an election to any public office is
a clear violation of the separation clause."
-The trial courts essay did not contain a statement of
facts and a dispositive portion, however. Due to
thisaberration, Velarde and Soriano filed separate
Motions for Reconsideration before the trial court owing
to these facts.
-The lower court denied these Motions. Hence, this
petition for review.
On April 13, 2004, the Court en banc conducted an
Oral Argument.14
-In his Petition, Brother Mike Velarde submits the
following issues for this Courts resolution:
1. Whether or not the Decision dated 12 June 2003
rendered by the court a quo was proper and valid;
2. Whether or not there exists justiciable controversy
in herein respondents Petition for declaratory relief;
3. Whether or not herein respondent has legal
interest in filing the Petition for declaratory relief;
4. Whether or not the constitutional question sought
to be resolved by herein respondent is ripe for judicial
determination;
5. Whether or not there is adequate remedy other
than the declaratory relief; and,
6. Whether or not the court a quo has jurisdiction
over the Petition for declaratory relief of herein
respondent.
Issues:

In its oral argument, the Supreme Court condensed

Velardes issues and divided it into 2 groups:
A. Procedural Issues
1. Did the Petition for Declaratory Relief raise a
justiciable controversy?
2. Did it state a cause of action?
3.Did respondent have any legal standing to file the
Petition for Declaratory Relief?
B. Substantive Issues
1. Did the RTC Decision conform to the form and
substance required by the Constitution, the law and the
Rules of Court?
2.
May religious leaders like herein
petitioner, Bro. Mike Velarde, be prohibited from
endorsing candidates for public office? Corollarily, may
they be banned from campaigning against said
candidates? (Not answered in the affirmative)
Decision:
Petition for Review GRANTED. The assailed June 12,
2003 Decision and July 29, 2003 Order of the Regional
Trial Court of Manila DECLARED NULL AND VOID and
thus SET ASIDE. The SJS Petition for Declaratory Relief
is DISMISSED for failure to state a cause of action.
Holding:
Procedural Issues:
1.
NO. A justiciable controversy to an
existing case or controversy that is appropriate
or ripe for judicial determination, not one that is
conjectural or merely anticipatory. A petition filed
with the trial court should contain a plain, concise
and direct statement of the ultimate facts on
which the party pleading relies for his claim.
The SJS Petition fell short of the requirements to
constitutue a jusiciable controversy. Why?
a. It stated no ultimate facts. The petition
simply theorized that the people elected who were
endorsed by these religious leaders might become
beholden to the latter.
b.
It did not sufficiently state a
declaration of its rights and duties, what specific legal
right of the petitioner was violated by the respondents
therein, and what particular act or acts of the latter
were in breach of its rights, the law or the constitution,
c.
The petition did not pray for a
stoppage of violated rights (duh, wala ngang rights na
sinabi eh). It merely sought an opinion of the trial
court. However, courts are proscribed from rendering
an advisory opinion. (tantamount to making laws,
remember the questionability of justice
panganibans guidelines for article 36 of the family
code)
It must also be considered that even the religious
leaders were puzzled as to the breach of rights they
were claimed to have committed. As pointed out by
Soriano, what exactly has he done that merited the
attention of SJS? Jaime Cardinal Sin adds that the
election season had not even started at the time SJS
filed its Petition and that he has not been actively
involved in partisan politics. The Petition does not even
allege any indication or manifest intent on the part
of any of the respondents below to champion an
electoral candidate, or to urge their so-called flock to
vote for, a particular candidate. It is a time-honored

rule that sheer speculation does not give rise to an

actionable right.
2.
NO. A cause of action is an act or an
omission of one party in violation of the legal right or
rights of another, causing injury to the latter. (Rebollido
v. Court of Appeals, 170 SCRA 800)
Its essential elements are the following: (1) a right in
favor of the plaintiff; (2) an obligation on the part of the
named defendant to respect or not to violate such
right; and (3) such defendants act or omission that is
violative of the right of the plaintiff or constituting a
breach of the obligation of the former to the latter.
The court held that the complaints failure to state
a cause of action became a ground for its outright
dismissal. Why?
The Court found nothing in the SJS Petition to suggest
that an explicit allegation of fact that SJS had a legal
right to protect. (trigger for the cause of action)
In special civil actions for declaratory relief, the
concept of cause of action under ordinary civil actions
does not strictly apply. The reason for this exception is
that an action for declaratory relief presupposes that
there has been no actual breach of the instruments
involved or of rights arising thereunder.
Nevertheless, a breach or violation should be
impending, imminent or at least threatened.
The justices could only infer that the interest from its
allegation was its mention of its (SJS) thousands of
members who are citizens-taxpayers-registered voters
and who are keenly interested. Aside from the fact
that this general averment did not constitute a legal
right or interest, the courts inferred interest too vague
and speculative in character. Rules require that the
interest must be material to the issue and
affected by the questioned act or instrument.
To bolster its point, the SJS cited the Corpus Juris
Secundum and submitted that the plaintiff in a
declaratory judgment action does not seek to enforce a
claim against the defendant, but sought a judicial
declaration of the rights of the parties for the purpose
of guiding their future conduct, and the essential
distinction between a declaratory judgment action
and the usual action is that no actual wrong need
have been committed or loss have occurred in
order to sustain the declaratory judgment
action, although there must be no uncertainty
that the loss will occur or that the asserted
rights will be invaded. (???)
During the Oral Argument, Velarde and corespondents strongly asserted that they had not in any
way engaged or intended to participate in partisan
politics. Not even the alleged proximity of the elections
to the time the Petition was filed below would have
provided the certainty that it had a legal right that
would be jeopardized or violated by any of those
respondents.
Even if the SJS petition asserted a legal right, there
was nevertheless no certainty that such right would be
invaded by the said respondents.

3.
NO. Legal standing or locus standi has
been defined as a personal and substantial
interest in the case, such that the party has
sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result
of the challenged act.
Interest means a material interest in issue that is
affected by the questioned act or instrument, as
distinguished from a mere incidental interest in the
question involved.
SJS has no legal interest in the controversy and
has failed to establish how the resolution of the
proffered question would benefit or injure it.
Parties bringing suits challenging the constitutionality
of a law, an act or a statute must demonstrate
that they have been, or are about to be, denied
some right or privilege to which they are lawfully
entitled, or that they are about to be subjected
to some burdens or penalties by reason of the
statute or act complained of.
If the petition were to be valid, it should satisfy:
First, parties suing as taxpayers must specifically
prove that they have sufficient interest in preventing
the illegal expenditure of money raised by taxation,
particularly that of Congress' taxing power.
Second, there was no showing in the Petition for
Declaratory Relief that SJS as a political party or its
members as registered voters would be adversely
affected by the alleged acts of the respondents below,
such as the deprivation of votes or barring of suffrage
to its constituents.
Finally, the allegedly keen interest of its "thousands
of members who are citizens-taxpayers-registered
voters" is too general and beyond the contemplation of
the standards set by our jurisprudence. Not only is the
presumed interest impersonal in character; it is
likewise too vague, highly speculative and uncertain to
satisfy the requirement of standing.
In not a few cases, the Court has liberalized
the locus standi requirement when a petition
raises an issue of transcendental significance or
importance to the people (IBP v Zamora). The Court
deemed the constitutional issue raised to be both
transcendental in importance and novel in nature.
Nevertheless, the barren allegations in the SJS Petition
as well as the abbreviated proceedings in the court
would prevent the resolution of the transcendental
issue.
Substantive Issues
1.
NO. The Constitution commands
that no decision shall be rendered by any court
without expressing therein clearly and distinctly
the facts and the law on which it is based. No
petition for review or motion for reconsideration
of a decision of the court shall be refused due
course or denied without stating the basis
therefor.
Consistent with this are Section 1 of Rule 36 of the
Rules on Civil Procedure, Rule 120 of the Rules of Court

on Criminal Procedure, Administrative Circular No. 1.

which states that :
A judgment or final order determining the merits of
the case shall be rendered. The decision shall be in
writing, personally and directly prepared by the
judge, stating clearly and distinctly the facts and
law on which it is based, signed by the issuing
magistrate, and filed with the clerk of court.
The SC has reminded magistrates to heed the
demand of Section `4, Art VIII of the contsitution. This
was evinced in Yao v. Court of Appeals where Davide,
CJ said that faithful adherence to the requirements of
Section 14, Article VIII of the Constitution is
indisputably a paramount component of due
process and fair play.
In People v. Bugarin, the court held that the
requirement that the decisions of courts must be in
writing and that they must set forth clearly and
distinctly the facts and the law on which they are
based is intended, among other things, to inform the
parties of the reason or reasons for the decision so that
if any of them appeals, he can point out to the
appellate court the finding of facts or the rulings
on points of law with which he disagrees.
The assailed Decision contains no statement of
facts (much less an assessment or analysis thereof) or
of the courts findings as to the probable facts. The
assailed Decision begins with a statement of the nature
of
the
action
and
the
question
or
issue
presented. Then follows a brief explanation of the
constitutional provisions involved, and what the
Petition sought to achieve. Thereafter, the ensuing
procedural incidents before the trial court are
tracked. The Decision proceeds to a full-length opinion
on the nature and the extent of the separation of
church and state. Without expressly stating the final
conclusion she has reached or specifying the relief
granted or denied, the trial judge ends her Decision
with the clause SO ORDERED.
A decision that does not clearly and distinctly
state the facts and the law on which it is based
leaves the parties in the dark as to how it was
reached and is precisely prejudicial to the losing
party, who is unable to pinpoint the possible
errors of the court for review by a higher
tribunal. More than that, the requirement is an
assurance to the parties that, in reaching
judgment, the judge did so through the
processes of legal reasoning.
It was truly obvious that the RTCs Decision did not
adhere to the Bugarin precedent because of its failure
to express clearly and distinctly the facts on which it
was based. The significance of factual findings lies in
the value of the decision as a precedent(how will the
ruling be applied in the future, if there is no point of
factual comparison?).
Respondent SJS insisted that the dispositive portion
can be found in the body (p. 10) of the assailed
Decision. Stating Endorsement of specific candidates
in an election to any public office is a clear violation of
the separation clause.

The Court held that the statement is merely an

answer to a hypothetical legal question and just a part
of the opinion of the trial court. It does not conclusively
declare the rights (or obligations) of the parties to the
Petition. Neither does it grant any -- much less, the
proper -- relief under the circumstances, as required of
a dispositive portion.
The standard for a dispositive was set in Manalang v.
Tuason de Rickards where the resolution of the Court
on a given issue as embodied in the dispositive part of
the decision or order is the investitive
or controlling factor that determines and settles
the rights of the parties and the questions
presented therein, notwithstanding the existence of
statements or declaration in the body of said order that
may be confusing.
In Magdalena Estate, Inc. v. Caluag: The rule is
settled that where there is a conflict between the
dispositive part and the opinion, the former must
prevail over the latter on the theory that
the dispositive portion is the final order while the
opinion is merely a statement ordering nothing.
The statement quoted by SJS does not conclusively
declare the rights (or obligations) of the parties to the
Petition. Neither does it grant proper relief under the
circumstances, as required of a dispositive portion.
Failure to comply with the constitutional injunction is
a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction. Decisions or orders issued in
careless disregard of the constitutional mandate are a
patent nullity and must be struck down asvoid.
2.
It is not legally possible to take up, on
the merits, the paramount question involving a
constitutional principle. It is a time-honored rule that
the constitutionality of a statute or act will be passed
upon only if, and to the extent that, it is directly and
necessarily involved in a justiciable controversy and is
essential to the protection of the rights of the parties
concerned. (So no answer)

Almeda vs. Bathala Marketing Industries,Inc.

As a rule, the petition for declaratory relief should be

Facts: In May 1997, respondent Bathala Marketing

Industries, Inc. (lessee) entered into a contract of lease
with petitioners (lessors). Provisions of the contract of
lease include:

new tax imposed on the property

-

In

case

of

supervening

value of PHP at the time of the establishment of the

obligation shall be the basis of payment
Petitioners later demanded payment of VAT and 73%
adjusted rentals pursuant to the foregoing provisions.
Respondent refused and filed an action for declaratory
relief. Petitioners filed an action for ejectment.
Issue: Whether or not declaratory relief is proper.
Petitioners insist that

respondent

was

already in breach of the contract when the petition was

filed, thus, respondent is barred from filing an action
for

declaratory

relief.

However,

after

petitioners

demanded payment of adjusted rentals and in the

months that followed, respondent complied with the
terms and conditions set forth in their contract of lease
by paying the rentals stipulated therein. Respondent
religiously fulfilled its obligations to petitioners even
during the pendency of the present suit. There is no
showing that respondent committed an act constituting
a breach of the subject contract of lease. Thus,
respondent is not barred from instituting before the
trial court the petition for declaratory relief.
Petitioners further claim that the instant petition is not
proper because a separate action for rescission,
ejectment and damages had been commenced before
another court; thus, the construction of the subject
contractual provisions should be ventilated in the same
forum.

court had not yet resolved the rescission/ejectment

case during the pendency of the declaratory relief
case was on appeal, initiated the suspension of the
proceedings pending the resolution of the action for
declaratory relief.

extraordinary inflation or devaluation of the PHP, the

Held: YES.

for unlawful detainer. In this case, however, the trial

petition. In fact, the trial court, where the rescission

6th - Lessee shall pay an increased rent if there is any

7th

dismissed in view of the pendency of a separate action