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ABELARDO LIM VS CA
Facts:
A 10 wheeler truck lost its breaks. It swerved to the left in order to avoid collision
with another vehicle until it reached the center island. However, the center island was not
sufficient to stop the truck, it went further to the left and smashed into a Ferroza and a
passenger Jeepney. The impact caused severe damage to both the Ferroza and the
passenger Jeepney which left one passenger dead and many other wounded.
The truck was driven by Gunnaban and owned by Lim. The Jeepney was owned by
Gonzales under the Kabit System. Gonzales purchased the jeep in 1982 for P30,000.
However, the registration and certificate of public convenience remained in the previous
owners name.
Gunnaban owned responsibility for the accident. Lim shouldered the cost for the
hospitalization of the victims, compensated the heirs of the deceased passenger, and had
restored the Ferroza to a good condition.
Lim made several offers with the Jeepney owner. Gonazales refused to have his
jeepney repaired in Lims shop. He also refused payment P20,000, which was the
assessment for the damage. Gonzales demanded a brand new jeep or the amount of
P236,000. Lim increased his bid to P40,000 which was again rejected by Gonzales.
Gonzales filed for an action for damages against the Gunnaban and Lim. The trial
court ruled in favor of Gonzales and awarded him P236,000. The CA upheld the trial
courts decision.
Issues:
1) Whether or not Gonzales is barred from filing the action since he is not the
operator of the record under the kabit system
2) Whether or not Gunnaban and Lim were negligent
3) Whether or not an award of P236,000 is inconceivably larger and would amount
to unjust enrichment considering Gonzales only purchased it for P30,000
4) Whether or not the Gonzales unconcern towards the damage vehicle may
mitigate the damage
Held:
1)
The kabit system is an arrangement whereby a person who has been granted a
certificate of public convenience allows other persons who own motor vehicles to operate
them under his license, sometimes for a fee or percentage of the earnings.
In the early case of Dizon v. Octavio the Court explained that one of the primary
factors considered in the granting of a certificate of public convenience for the business of
public transportation is the financial capacity of the holder of the license, so that liabilities
arising from accidents may be duly compensated.
It would seem then that the thrust of the law in enjoining the kabit system is not so
much as to penalize the parties but to identify the person upon whom responsibility may
be fixed in case of an accident with the end view of protecting the riding public. The policy
therefore loses its force if the public at large is not deceived, much less involved. In the
present case it is at once apparent that the evil sought to be prevented in enjoining the
kabit system does not exist. First, neither of the parties to the pernicious kabit system is
being held liable for damages. Second, the case arose from the negligence of another
vehicle in using the public road to whom no representation, or misrepresentation, as
regards the ownership and operation of the passenger jeepney was made and to whom no
such representation, or misrepresentation, was necessary. Thus it cannot be said that
private respondent Gonzales and the registered owner of the jeepney were in estoppel for
leading the public to believe that the jeepney belonged to the registered owner. Third, the
riding public was not bothered nor inconvenienced at the very least by the illegal
arrangement. On the contrary, it was private respondent himself who had been wronged
and was seeking compensation for the damage done to him. Certainly, it would be the
height of inequity to deny him his right.
In light of the foregoing, it is evident that private respondent has the right to
proceed against petitioners for the damage caused on his passenger jeepney as well as on
his business. Any effort then to frustrate his claim of damages by the ingenuity with which
petitioners framed the issue should be discouraged, if not repelled.
2)
Gunnaban was found by the trial court to have caused the accident since he
panicked in the face of an emergency which was rather palpable from his act of directing
his vehicle to a perilous streak down the fast lane of the superhighway then across the
island and ultimately to the opposite lane where it collided with the jeepney.
On the other hand, petitioner Lim's liability for Gunnaban's negligence was
premised on his want of diligence in supervising his employees. It was admitted during
trial that Gunnaban doubled as mechanic of the ill-fated truck despite the fact that he was
neither tutored nor trained to handle such task.
3)
In the present case, petitioners insist that as the passenger jeepney was purchased
in 1982 for only P30,000.00 to award damages considerably greater than this amount
would be improper and unjustified. Petitioners are at best reminded that indemnification
for damages comprehends not only the value of the loss suffered but also that of the
profits which the obligee failed to obtain. In other words, indemnification for damages is
not limited todamnum emergens or actual loss but extends to lucrum cessans or the
amount of profit lost.
Had private respondent's jeepney not met an accident it could reasonably be
expected that it would have continued earning from the business in which it was engaged.
Private respondent avers that he derives an average income of P300.00 per day from his
passenger jeepney and this earning was included in the award of damages made by the
trial court and upheld by the appeals court. The award therefore of P236,000.00 as
compensatory damages is not beyond reason nor speculative as it is based on a
reasonable estimate of the total damage suffered by private respondent, i.e. damage
wrought upon his jeepney and the income lost from his transportation business. Petitioners
for their part did not offer any substantive evidence to refute the estimate made by the
courts a quo.
4)
One last word. We have observed that private respondent left his passenger
jeepney by the roadside at the mercy of the elements. Article 2203 of the Civil Code
exhorts parties suffering from loss or injury to exercise the diligence of a good father of a
family to minimize the damages resulting from the act or omission in question. One who is
injured then by the wrongful or negligent act of another should exercise reasonable care
and diligence to minimize the resulting damage. Anyway, he can recover from the
wrongdoer money lost in reasonable efforts to preserve the property injured and for
injuries incurred in attempting to prevent damage to it. However we sadly note that in the
present case petitioners failed to offer in evidence the estimated amount of the damage
caused by private respondent's unconcern towards the damaged vehicle. It is the burden
of petitioners to show satisfactorily not only that the injured party could have mitigated his
damages but also the amount thereof; failing in this regard, the amount of damages
awarded cannot be proportionately reduced
Held:
The law involved in the instant case is Article 103 in relation to Article 100, both
of the Revised Penal Code, which reads thus:
Art. 103. Subsidiary civil liability of other persons. The subsidiary liability
established in the next preceding article shall apply to employers,
teachers, persons, and corporations engaged in any kind of industry for
felonies committed by their servants, pupils, workmen, apprentices, or
employees in the discharge of their duties.
Respondent contends that the case of Pajarito v. Seneris cannot be applied to
the present case, the former being an action involving culpa-contractual, while the
latter being one of culpa-aquiliana. Such a declaration is erroneous. The subsidiary
liability in Art. 103 should be distinguished from the primary liability of employers,
which is quasi-delictual in character as provided in Art. 2180 of the New Civil Code.
Under Art. 103, the liability emanated from a delict. On the other hand, the liability
under Art. 2180 is founded on culpa-aquiliana. The present case is neither an action
for culpa-contractual nor for culpa-aquiliana. This is basically an action to enforce the
civil liability arising from crime under Art. 100 of the Revised Penal Code. In no case
can this be regarded as a civil action for the primary liability of the employer under
Art. 2180 of the New Civil Code, i.e., action for culpa-aquiliana.
In order that an employer may be held subsidiarily liable for the employee's civil
liability in the criminal action, it should be shown (1) that the employer, etc. is
engaged in any kind of industry, (2) that the employee committed the offense in the
discharge of his duties and (3) that he is insolvent (Basa Marketing Corp. v. Bolinao,
117 SCRA 156). The subsidiary liability of the employer, however, arises only after
conviction of the employee in the criminal action. All these requisites present, the
employer becomes ipso facto subsidiarily liable upon the employee's conviction and
upon proof of the latter's insolvency. Needless to say, the case at bar satisfies all these
requirements.
Finally, the position taken by the respondent appellate court that to grant the
motion for subsidiary writ of execution would in effect be to amend its decision which
has already become final and executory cannot be sustained. Compelling the owneroperator to pay on the basis of his subsidiary liability does not constitute an
amendment of the judgment because in an action under Art. 103 of the Revised Penal
Code, once all the requisites as earlier discussed are met, the employer becomes ipso
facto subsidiarily liable, without need of a separate action. Such being the case, the
subsidiary liability can be enforced in the same case where the award was given, and
this does not constitute an act of amending the decision. It becomes incumbent upon
the court to grant a motion for subsidiary writ of execution (but only after the
employer has been heard), upon conviction of the employee and after execution is
returned unsatisfied due to the employee's insolvency.
Under Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code, liability originates from a delict
committed by the employee who is primarily liable therefor and upon whose primary
liability his employer's subsidiary liability is to be based. Before the employer's
subsidiary liability may be proceeded against, it is imperative that there should be a
criminal action whereby the employee's criminal negligence or delict and
corresponding liability therefor are proved. If no criminal action was instituted, the
employer's liability would not be predicated under Article 103.
In the case at bar, no criminal action was instituted because the person who
should stand as the accused and the party supposed to be primarily liable for the
damages suffered by private respondents as a consequence of the vehicular mishap
died. Thus, petitioners' subsidiary liability has no leg to stand on considering that their
liability is merely secondary to their employee's primary liability. Logically therefore,
recourse under this remedy is not possible.
The Court in the aforecited M.D. Transit case went further to say that there can
be no automatic subsidiary liability of defendant employer under Article 103 of the
Revised Penal Code where his employee has not been previously criminally convicted.
Having thus established that Civil Case No. 2154 is a civil action to impose the
primary liability of the employer as a result of the tortious act of its alleged reckless
driver, we confront ourselves with the plausibility of defendants-petitioners' defense
that they observed due diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and
supervision of their employees. On this point, the appellate court has unequivocally
spoken in affirmation of the lower court's findings, to wit:
Anyway, a perusal of the record shows that the appellants were not able to
establish the defense of a good father of a family in the supervision of their bus
driver. The evidence presented by the appellants in this regard is purely selfserving. No independent evidence was presented as to the alleged supervision
of appellants' bus drivers, especially with regard to driving habits and reaction
to actual traffic conditions. The appellants in fact admitted that the only kind of
supervision given the drivers referred to the running time between the terminal
points of the line (t.s.n., September 16, 1976, p. 21). Moreover, the appellants
who ran a fleet of 12 buses plying the Manila-Laoag line, have only two
inspectors whose duties were only ticket inspection. There is no evidence that
they are really safety inspectors.
Basically, the Court finds that these determinations are factual in nature. As a
painstaking review of the evidence presented in the case at bar fails to disclose any
evidence or circumstance of note sufficient to overrule said factual findings and
conclusions, the Court is inclined to likewise reject petitioners' affirmative defense of
due diligence.
180. YONAHA VS CA
Facts:
A Toyota Tamaraw bumped and hit Canete. As a result of his death, Elmer, the driver
was charged with the crime of Reckless Imprudence Resulting to Homicide after pleading
guilty on the said information. The vehicle was registered under the name of Raul Cabahug
and owned by EK Sea Products.
The Writ of Execution was returned unsatisfied for the reason that Elmer was unable
to pay the monetary obligation. A Motion for Subsidiary Execution was filed and was
granted by the trial with neither notice of hearing nor notice to petitioner.
Petitioner filed a motion to stay and to recall the subsidiary writ of execution
principally anchored on the lack of prior notice to her and on the fact that the employers
liability had yet to be established.
The trial court denied petitioners motion.
The appellate court initially restrained the implementation of the assailed orders
and issued a writ of preliminary injunction upon the filing of a P10,000.00 bond.
Ultimately, however, the appellate court, in its decision, dismissed the petition for lack of
merit and thereby lifted the writ of preliminary injunction.
Issue:
Whether or not the writ of subsidiary execution may be issued without giving the employer
his full day in court
Held:
The statutory basis for an employers subsidiary liability is found in Article 103 of
the Revised Penal Code. This Court has since sanctioned the enforcement of this
subsidiary liability in the same criminal proceedings in which the employee is adjudged
guilty, on the thesis that it really is a part of, and merely an incident in, the execution
process of the judgment. But, execution against the employer must not issue as just a
matter of course, and it behooves the court, as a measure of due process to the employer,
to determine and resolve a priori, in a hearing set for the purpose, the legal applicability
and propriety of the employers liability. The requirement is mandatory even when it
appears prima facie that execution against the convicted employee cannot be satisfied.
The court must convince itself that the convicted employee is in truth in the employ of the
employer; that the latter is engaged in an industry of some kind; that the employee has
committed the crime to which civil liability attaches while in the performance of his duties
as such; and that execution against the employee is unsuccessful by reason of insolvency.
The assumption that, since petitioner in this case did not aver any exculpatory facts
in her motion to stay and recall, as well as in her motion for reconsideration, which could
save her from liability, a hearing would be a futile and a sheer rigmarole is unacceptable.
The employer must be given his full day in court. To repeat, the subsidiary liability
of an employer under Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code requires (a) the existence of
an employer-employee relationship; (b) that the employer is engaged in some kind of
industry; (c) that the employee is adjudged guilty of the wrongful act and found to have
committed the offense in the discharge of his duties (not necessarily any offense he
commits while in the discharge of such duties); and (d) that said employee is insolvent.
The judgment of conviction of the employee, of course, concludes the employer ] and the
subsidiary liability may be enforced in the same criminal case, but to afford the employer
due process, the court should hear and decide that liability on the basis of the conditions
required therefor by law.