RULE 72

[G.R. NO. 174975 : January 20, 2009]

LUISA KHO MONTAER, ALEJANDRO MONTAER, JR., LILLIBETH MONTAER-BARRIOS, AND
RHODORA

ELEANOR

MONTAER-DALUPAN, Petitioners, v. SHARI'A

DISTRICT

COURT,

FOURTH

SHARI'A JUDICIAL DISTRICT, MARAWI CITY, LILING DISANGCOPAN, AND ALMAHLEEN LILING S.
MONTAER, Respondents.
DECISION
PUNO, C.J.:
This Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition seeks to set aside the Orders of the Shari a District Court, Fourth
Shari a Judicial District, Marawi City, dated August 22, 2006 1 and September 21, 2006.2
On August 17, 1956, petitioner Luisa Kho Montaer, a Roman Catholic, married Alejandro Montaer, Sr. at
the Immaculate Conception Parish in Cubao, Quezon City. 3 Petitioners Alejandro Montaer, Jr., Lillibeth
Montaer-Barrios, and Rhodora Eleanor Montaer-Dalupan are their children. 4 On May 26, 1995, Alejandro
Montaer, Sr. died.5
On August 19, 2005, private respondents Liling Disangcopan and her daughter, Almahleen Liling S.
Montaer, both Muslims, filed a "Complaint" for the judicial partition of properties before the Shari a District
Court.6 The said complaint was entitled "Almahleen Liling S. Montaer and Liling M. Disangcopan v. the
Estates and Properties of Late Alejandro Montaer, Sr., Luisa Kho Montaer, Lillibeth K. Montaer,
Alejandro Kho Montaer, Jr., and Rhodora Eleanor K. Montaer," and docketed as "Special Civil Action No.
7-05."7 In the said complaint, private respondents made the following allegations: (1) in May 1995, Alejandro
Montaer, Sr. died; (2) the late Alejandro Montaer, Sr. is a Muslim; (3) petitioners are the first family of
the decedent; (4) Liling Disangcopan is the widow of the decedent; (5) Almahleen Liling S. Montaer is the
daughter of the decedent; and (6) the estimated value of and a list of the properties comprising the estate of
the decedent.8 Private respondents prayed for the Shari a District Court to order, among others, the following:
(1) the partition of the estate of the decedent; and (2) the appointment of an administrator for the estate of
the decedent.9
Petitioners filed an Answer with a Motion to Dismiss mainly on the following grounds: (1) the Shari a District
Court has no jurisdiction over the estate of the late Alejandro Montaer, Sr., because he was a Roman
Catholic; (2) private respondents failed to pay the correct amount of docket fees; and (3) private respondents'
complaint is barred by prescription, as it seeks to establish filiation between Almahleen Liling S. Montaer
and the decedent, pursuant to Article 175 of the Family Code. 10
On November 22, 2005, the Shari a District Court dismissed the private respondents' complaint. The district
court held that Alejandro Montaer, Sr. was not a Muslim, and its jurisdiction extends only to the settlement
and distribution of the estate of deceased Muslims. 11
On December 12, 2005, private respondents filed a Motion for Reconsideration. 12 On December 28, 2005,
petitioners filed an Opposition to the Motion for Reconsideration, alleging that the motion for reconsideration
lacked a notice of hearing.13 On January 17, 2006, the Shari a District Court denied petitioners'
opposition.14 Despite finding that the said motion for reconsideration "lacked notice of hearing," the district
court held that such defect was cured as petitioners "were notified of the existence of the pleading," and it
took cognizance of the said motion. 15 The Shari a District Court also reset the hearing for the motion for
reconsideration.16
In its first assailed order dated August 22, 2006, the Shari a District Court reconsidered its order of dismissal
dated November 22, 2005.17 The district court allowed private respondents to adduce further evidence. 18 In
its second assailed order dated September 21, 2006, the Shari a District Court ordered the continuation of
trial, trial on the merits, adducement of further evidence, and pre-trial conference. 19
Seeking recourse before this Court, petitioners raise the following issues:
I.
RESPONDENT SHARI A DISTRICT COURT - MARAWI CITY LACKS JURISDICTION OVER PETITIONERS WHO ARE
ROMAN CATHOLICS AND NON-MUSLIMS.
II.
RESPONDENT SHARI A DISTRICT COURT - MARAWI CITY DID NOT ACQUIRE JURISDICTION OVER "THE ESTATES
AND PROPERTIES OF THE LATE ALEJANDRO MONTAER, SR." WHICH IS NOT A NATURAL OR JURIDICAL
PERSON WITH CAPACITY TO BE SUED.

III.
RESPONDENT SHARI A DISTRICT COURT DID NOT ACQUIRE JURISDICTION OVER THE COMPLAINT OF PRIVATE
RESPONDENTS AGAINST PETITIONERS DUE TO NON-PAYMENT OF THE FILING AND DOCKETING FEES.
IV.
RESPONDENT SHARI A DISTRICT COURT MARAWI CITY COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION
AMOUNTING TO LACK OF JURISDICTION WHEN IT DENIED THE OPPOSITION OF PETITIONERS AND THEN
GRANTED THE MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION OF RESPONDENTS LILING DISANGCOPAN, ET AL. WHICH WAS
FATALLY DEFECTIVE FOR LACK OF A "NOTICE OF HEARING."
V.
RESPONDENT SHARI A DISTRICT COURT MARAWI CITY COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION
AMOUNTING TO LACK OF JURISDICTION WHEN IT SET SPL. CIVIL ACTION 7-05 FOR TRIAL EVEN IF THE
COMPLAINT PLAINLY REVEALS THAT RESPONDENT ALMAHLEEN LILING S. MONTAER SEEKS RECOGNITION
FROM ALEJANDRO MONTAER, SR. WHICH CAUSE OF ACTION PRESCRIBED UPON THE DEATH OF ALEJANDRO
MONTAER, SR. ON MAY 26, 1995.
In their Comment to the Petition for Certiorari, private respondents stress that the Shari a District Court must
be given the opportunity to hear and decide the question of whether the decedent is a Muslim in order to
determine whether it has jurisdiction.20
Jurisdiction: Settlement of the Estate of Deceased Muslims
Petitioners' first argument, regarding the Shari a District Court's jurisdiction, is dependent on a question of
fact, whether the late Alejandro Montaer, Sr. is a Muslim. Inherent in this argument is the premise that
there has already been a determination resolving such a question of fact. It bears emphasis, however, that
the assailed orders did not determine whether the decedent is a Muslim. The assailed orders did, however,
set a hearing for the purpose of resolving this issue.
Article 143(b) of Presidential Decree No. 1083, otherwise known as the Code of Muslim Personal Laws of the
Philippines, provides that the Shari a District Courts have exclusive original jurisdiction over the settlement of
the estate of deceased Muslims:
ARTICLE 143. Original jurisdiction. - (1) The Shari'a District Court shall have exclusive original jurisdiction
over:
xxx
(b) All cases involving disposition, distribution and settlement of the estate of deceased Muslims, probate of
wills, issuance of letters of administration or appointment of administrators or executors regardless of the
nature or the aggregate value of the property.
The determination of the nature of an action or proceeding is controlled by the averments and character of
the relief sought in the complaint or petition. 21 The designation given by parties to their own pleadings does
not necessarily bind the courts to treat it according to the said designation. Rather than rely on "a falsa
descriptio or defective caption," courts are "guided by the substantive averments of the pleadings." 22
Although private respondents designated the pleading filed before the Shari a District Court as a "Complaint"
for judicial partition of properties, it is a petition for the issuance of letters of administration, settlement, and
distribution of the estate of the decedent. It contains sufficient jurisdictional facts required for the settlement
of the estate of a deceased Muslim, 23 such as the fact of Alejandro Montaer, Sr.'s death as well as the
allegation that he is a Muslim. The said petition also contains an enumeration of the names of his legal heirs,
so far as known to the private respondents, and a probable list of the properties left by the decedent, which
are the very properties sought to be settled before a probate court. Furthermore, the reliefs prayed for reveal
that it is the intention of the private respondents to seek judicial settlement of the estate of the
decedent.24 These include the following: (1) the prayer for the partition of the estate of the decedent; and (2)
the prayer for the appointment of an administrator of the said estate.
We cannot agree with the contention of the petitioners that the district court does not have jurisdiction over
the case because of an allegation in their answer with a motion to dismiss that Montaer, Sr. is not a
Muslim. Jurisdiction of a court over the nature of the action and its subject matter does not depend upon the
defenses set forth in an answer 25 or a motion to dismiss. 26 Otherwise, jurisdiction would depend almost
entirely on the defendant27 or result in having "a case either thrown out of court or its proceedings unduly
delayed by simple stratagem.28 Indeed, the "defense of lack of jurisdiction which is dependent on a question
of fact does not render the court to lose or be deprived of its jurisdiction." 29

The same rationale applies to an answer with a motion to dismiss. 30 In the case at bar, the Shari a District
Court is not deprived of jurisdiction simply because petitioners raised as a defense the allegation that the
deceased is not a Muslim. The Shari a District Court has the authority to hear and receive evidence to
determine whether it has jurisdiction, which requires an a priori determination that the deceased is a Muslim.
If after hearing, the Shari a District Court determines that the deceased was not in fact a Muslim, the district
court should dismiss the case for lack of jurisdiction.
Special Proceedings
The underlying assumption in petitioners' second argument, that the proceeding before the Shari a District
Court is an ordinary civil action against a deceased person, rests on an erroneous understanding of the
proceeding before the court a quo. Part of the confusion may be attributed to the proceeding before the Shari
a District Court, where the parties were designated either as plaintiffs or defendants and the case was
denominated as a special civil action. We reiterate that the proceedings before the court a quo are for the
issuance of letters of administration, settlement, and distribution of the estate of the deceased, which is a
special proceeding. Section 3(c) of the Rules of Court (Rules) defines a special proceeding as "a remedy by
which a party seeks to establish a status, a right, or a particular fact." This Court has applied the Rules,
particularly the rules on special proceedings, for the settlement of the estate of a deceased Muslim. 31 In a
petition for the issuance of letters of administration, settlement, and distribution of estate, the applicants
seek to establish the fact of death of the decedent and later to be duly recognized as among the decedent's
heirs, which would allow them to exercise their right to participate in the settlement and liquidation of the
estate of the decedent.32 Here, the respondents seek to establish the fact of Alejandro Montaer, Sr.'s death
and, subsequently, for private respondent Almahleen Liling S. Montaer to be recognized as among his
heirs, if such is the case in fact.
Petitioners' argument, that the prohibition against a decedent or his estate from being a party defendant in a
civil action33 applies to a special proceeding such as the settlement of the estate of the deceased, is
misplaced. Unlike a civil action which has definite adverse parties, a special proceeding has no definite
adverse party. The definitions of a civil action and a special proceeding, respectively, in the Rules illustrate
this difference. A civil action, in which "a party sues another for the enforcement or protection of a right, or
the prevention or redress of a wrong" 34 necessarily has definite adverse parties, who are either the plaintiff or
defendant.35 On the other hand, a special proceeding, "by which a party seeks to establish a status, right, or a
particular fact,"36 has one definite party, who petitions or applies for a declaration of a status, right, or
particular fact, but no definite adverse party. In the case at bar, it bears emphasis that the estate of the
decedent is not being sued for any cause of action. As a special proceeding, the purpose of the settlement of
the estate of the decedent is to determine all the assets of the estate, 37 pay its liabilities,38 and to distribute
the residual to those entitled to the same.39
Docket Fees
Petitioners' third argument, that jurisdiction was not validly acquired for non-payment of docket fees, is
untenable. Petitioners point to private respondents' petition in the proceeding before the court a quo, which
contains an allegation estimating the decedent's estate as the basis for the conclusion that what private
respondents paid as docket fees was insufficient. Petitioners' argument essentially involves two aspects: (1)
whether the clerk of court correctly assessed the docket fees; and (2) whether private respondents paid the
correct assessment of the docket fees.
Filing the appropriate initiatory pleading and the payment of the prescribed docket fees vest a trial court with
jurisdiction over the subject matter.40 If the party filing the case paid less than the correct amount for the
docket fees because that was the amount assessed by the clerk of court, the responsibility of making a
deficiency assessment lies with the same clerk of court. 41 In such a case, the lower court concerned will not
automatically lose jurisdiction, because of a party's reliance on the clerk of court's insufficient assessment of
the docket fees.42 As "every citizen has the right to assume and trust that a public officer charged by law with
certain duties knows his duties and performs them in accordance with law," the party filing the case cannot
be penalized with the clerk of court's insufficient assessment. 43 However, the party concerned will be required
to pay the deficiency.44

In the case at bar, petitioners did not present the clerk of court's assessment of the docket fees. Moreover,
the records do not include this assessment. There can be no determination of whether private respondents
correctly paid the docket fees without the clerk of court's assessment.
Exception to Notice of Hearing
Petitioners' fourth argument, that private respondents' motion for reconsideration before the Shari a District
Court is defective for lack of a notice of hearing, must fail as the unique circumstances in the present case
constitute an exception to this requirement. The Rules require every written motion to be set for hearing by
the applicant and to address the notice of hearing to all parties concerned. 45 The Rules also provide that "no
written motion set for hearing shall be acted upon by the court without proof of service thereof." 46 However,
the Rules allow a liberal construction of its provisions "in order to promote [the] objective of securing a just,
speedy, and inexpensive disposition of every action and proceeding." 47 Moreover, this Court has upheld a
liberal construction specifically of the rules of notice of hearing in cases where "a rigid application will result
in a manifest failure or miscarriage of justice especially if a party successfully shows that the alleged defect in
the questioned final and executory judgment is not apparent on its face or from the recitals contained
therein."48 In these exceptional cases, the Court considers that "no party can even claim a vested right in
technicalities," and for this reason, cases should, as much as possible, be decided on the merits rather than
on technicalities.49
The case at bar falls under this exception. To deny the Shari a District Court of an opportunity to determine
whether it has jurisdiction over a petition for the settlement of the estate of a decedent alleged to be a
Muslim would also deny its inherent power as a court to control its process to ensure conformity with the law
and justice. To sanction such a situation simply because of a lapse in fulfilling the notice requirement will
result in a miscarriage of justice.
In addition, the present case calls for a liberal construction of the rules on notice of hearing, because the
rights of the petitioners were not affected. This Court has held that an exception to the rules on notice of
hearing is where it appears that the rights of the adverse party were not affected. 50 The purpose for the
notice of hearing coincides with procedural due process, 51 for the court to determine whether the adverse
party agrees or objects to the motion, as the Rules do not fix any period within which to file a reply or
opposition.52 In probate proceedings, "what the law prohibits is not the absence of previous notice, but the
absolute absence thereof and lack of opportunity to be heard." 53In the case at bar, as evident from the Shari
a District Court's order dated January 17, 2006, petitioners' counsel received a copy of the motion for
reconsideration in question. Petitioners were certainly not denied an opportunity to study the arguments in
the said motion as they filed an opposition to the same. Since the Shari a District Court reset the hearing for
the motion for reconsideration in the same order, petitioners were not denied the opportunity to object to the
said motion in a hearing. Taken together, these circumstances show that the purpose for the rules of notice of
hearing, procedural process, was duly observed.
Prescription and Filiation
Petitioners' fifth argument is premature. Again, the Shari a District Court has not yet determined whether it
has jurisdiction to settle the estate of the decedent. In the event that a special proceeding for the settlement
of the estate of a decedent is pending, questions regarding heirship, including prescription in relation to
recognition and filiation, should be raised and settled in the said proceeding. 54 The court, in its capacity as a
probate court, has jurisdiction to declare who are the heirs of the decedent. 55 In the case at bar, the
determination of the heirs of the decedent depends on an affirmative answer to the question of whether the
Shari a District Court has jurisdiction over the estate of the decedent.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is DENIED. The Orders of the Shari a District Court, dated August 22, 2006
and September 21, 2006 respectively, are AFFIRMED. Cost against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.

HEIRS OF TEOFILO GABATAN,namely: LOLITA GABATAN, POMPEYOG.R.

GABATAN,

PEREGRINO

GABATAN and JESUS

TUMALAand FREIRA

GABATAN,
JABINIS,

REYNALDO

GABATAN,

RIORITA

GABATAN,
Petitioners,

No.

NILA150206

GABATAN
Present:

-versusHON. COURT OF APPEALS andLOURDES EVERO PACANA,

Respondents.

PUNO, C.J.,
*

YNARESSANTIAGO,
**

CARPIO,
CORONA,
LEONARD
O-DE
CASTRO,
and
BRION,
J.

Promulgat
ed:
March

13,

2009
x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
Assailed and sought to be set aside in the instant petition for review on certiorari are the
Decision[1] dated April 28, 2000, and Resolution [2] dated September 12, 2001 of the Court of Appeals (CA), in
CA G.R. CV No. 52273. The challenged Decision affirmed the decision [3] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Cagayan de Oro City, Branch 19, dated October 20, 1995 in Civil Case No. 89-092, an action for Recovery of
Property and Ownership and Possession, thereat commenced by respondent Lourdes Evero Pacana against
petitioners, heirs of Teofilo Gabatan, Jesus Jabinis and Catalino Acantilado.
Subject of the present controversy is a 1.1062 hectare parcel of land, identified as Lot 3095 C-5 and
situated at Calinugan, Balulang, Cagayan de Oro City. This lot was declared for taxation in the name of Juan
Gabatan. In the complaint before the RTC, respondent alleged that she is the sole owner of Lot 3095 C-5,
having inherited the same from her deceased mother, Hermogena Gabatan Evero (Hermogena). Respondent
further claimed that her mother, Hermogena, is the only child of Juan Gabatan and his wife, Laureana
Clarito. Respondent alleged that upon the death of Juan Gabatan, Lot 3095 C-5 was entrusted to his brother,
Teofilo Gabatan (Teofilo), and Teofilos wife, Rita Gabatan, for administration. It was also claimed that prior to
her death Hermogena demanded for the return of the land but to no avail. After Hermogenas death,
respondent also did the same but petitioners refused to heed the numerous demands to surrender the
subject property. According to respondent, when Teofilo and his wife died, petitioners Jesus Jabinis and
Catalino Acantilado took possession of the disputed land despite respondents demands for them to vacate
the same.
In their answer, petitioners denied that respondents mother Hermogena was the daughter of Juan
Gabatan with Laureana Clarito and that Hermogena or respondent is the rightful heir of Juan
Gabatan. Petitioners maintained that Juan Gabatan died single in 1934 and without any issue and that Juan

was survived by one brother and two sisters, namely: Teofilo (petitioners predecessor-in-interest), Macaria
and Justa. These siblings and/or their heirs, inherited the subject land from Juan Gabatan and have been in
actual, physical, open, public, adverse, continuous and uninterrupted possession thereof in the concept of
owners for more than fifty (50) years and enjoyed the fruits of the improvements thereon, to the exclusion of
the whole world including respondent. Petitioners clarified that Jesus Jabinis and Catalino Acantilado have no
interest in the subject land; the former is merely the husband of Teofilos daughter while the latter is just a
caretaker. Petitioners added that a similar case was previously filed by respondent against Teofilos wife, Rita
Vda. de Gabatan, on February 21, 1978, docketed as Civil Case No. 5840 but the case was dismissed on May
3, 1983 for lack of interest. Finally, petitioners contended that the complaint lacks or states no cause of
action or, if there was any, the same has long prescribed and/or has been barred by laches.
On June 20, 1989, the complaint was amended wherein the heirs of Teofilo were individually named, to
wit: Lolita Gabatan, Pompeyo Gabatan, Peregrino Gabatan, Reynaldo Gabatan, Nila Gabatan and Jesus Jabinis,
Riorita Gabatan Tumal and Freira Gabatan.
On July 30, 1990, petitioners filed an amended answer, additionally alleging that the disputed land
was already covered by OCT No. P-3316 in the name of the heirs of Juan Gabatan represented by petitioner
Riorita Gabatan (Teofilos daughter).
On October 20, 1995, the RTC rendered a decision in favor of respondent, the dispositive portion of
which reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendants,
declaring the plaintiff the owner of Lot No. 3095 C-5 situated at Calinugan, Balulang, Cagayan de Oro City;
and ordering the defendants represented by Riorita Gabatan Tumala to RECONVEY Original Certificate of
Title No. P-3316 in favor of plaintiff Lourdes Evero Pacana, free of any encumbrance; ordering the defendants
to pay P10,000.00 by way of moral damages; P10,000.00 as Attorneys fees; and P2,000.00 for litigation
expenses.
SO ORDERED.[4]
Aggrieved, petitioners appealed to the CA whereat their recourse was docketed as CA-G.R. CV No.
52273.
On April 28, 2000, the CA rendered the herein challenged Decision affirming that of the
RTC. Dispositively, the Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the questioned decision of the lower court dated October 20,
1995 is hereby AFFIRMED. With costs against appellants.
SO ORDERED.
Discounting petitioners argument that respondent is not related to Juan Gabatan, the CA declared
that respondents claim of filiation with Juan Gabatan was sufficiently established during trial. Thus, the CA
echoed a long line of jurisprudence that findings of fact of the trial court are entitled to great weight and are
not disturbed except for cogent reasons, such as when the findings of fact are not supported by evidence.
The CA likewise gave weight to the Deed of Absolute Sale [5] executed by Macaria Gabatan de Abrogar,
Teofilo, Hermogena and heirs of Justa Gabatan, wherein Hermogena was identified as an heir of Juan Gabatan:
x x x HERMOGENA GABATAN, of legal age, married, Filipino citizen and presently residing at
Kolambugan, Lanao del Norte, Philippines, as Heir of the deceased, JUAN GABATAN; x x x.
To the CA, the Deed of Absolute Sale on July 30, 1966 containing such declaration which was signed by
Teofilo and the latters nearest relatives by consanguinity, is a tangible proof that they acknowledged
Hermogenas status as the daughter of Juan Gabatan. Applying Section 38, Rule 130[6] of the Rules of Court
on the declaration against interest, the CA ruled that petitioners could not deny that even their very own
father, Teofilo formally recognized Hermogenas right to heirship from Juan Gabatan which ultimately passed
on to respondent.
As to the issue of prescription, the CA ruled that petitioners possession of the disputed property could
not ripen into acquisitive prescription because their predecessor-in-interest, Teofilo, never held the property in
the concept of an owner.
Aggrieved, petitioners are now with this Court via the present recourse principally contending that the
CA committed the following reversible errors:
FIRST ERROR:
The lower court erred in not declaring that Juan Gabatan died single and without issue;
SECOND ERROR: The lower court erred in declaring the plaintiff-appellee (respondent) as the sole and
surviving heir of Juan Gabatan, the only child of a certain Hermogena Clareto GABATAN;

THIRD ERROR:

The lower court erred in declaring that a certain Hermogena Clareto GABATAN is the

child and sole heir of Juan Gabatan;

FOURTH ERROR: The lower court erred in failing to appreciate by preponderance of evidence in favor of the
defendants-appellants (petitioners) claim that they and the heirs of Justa and Macaria both surnamed
Gabatan are the sole and surviving heirs of Juan Gabatan and, therefore, entitled to inherit the land subject
matter hereof;
FIFTH ERROR:

The lower court erred in not declaring that the cause of action of plaintiff-appellee

(respondent) if any, has been barred by laches and/or prescription. [7]

Before proceeding to the merits of the case, we must pass upon certain preliminary matters.
In general, only questions of law may be raised in a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of
the Rules of Court. Questions of fact cannot be the subject of this particular mode of appeal, for this Court is
not a trier of facts.[8] It is not our function to examine and evaluate the probative value of the evidence
presented before the concerned tribunal upon which its impugned decision or resolution is based. [9]
However, there are established exceptions to the rule on conclusiveness of the findings of fact by the
lower courts, such as (1) when the findings are grounded entirely on speculation, surmises or conjectures; (2)
when the inference made is manifestly mistaken; (3) when there is grave abuse of discretion; (4) when the
judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; (5) when the findings of facts are conflicting; (6) when in
making its findings the Court of Appeals went beyond the issues of the case, or its findings are contrary to the
admissions of both the appellant and the appellee; (7) when the findings are contrary to the trial court; (8)
when the findings are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based; (9) when the
facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioners main and reply briefs are not disputed by the
respondent; (10) when the findings of fact are premised on the supposed absence of evidence and
contradicted by the evidence on record; and (11) when the Court of Appeals manifestly overlooked certain
relevant facts not disputed by the parties, which, if properly considered, would justify a different conclusion.
[10]

Moreover, our rules recognize the broad discretionary power of an appellate court to waive the lack of
proper assignment of errors and to consider errors not assigned. Thus, the Court is clothed with ample
authority to review rulings even if they are not assigned as errors in the appeal in these instances: (a)
grounds not assigned as errors but affecting jurisdiction over the subject matter; (b) matters not assigned as
errors on appeal but are evidently plain or clerical errors within contemplation of law; (c) matters not
assigned as errors on appeal but consideration of which is necessary in arriving at a just decision and
complete resolution of the case or to serve the interests of justice or to avoid dispensing piecemeal justice;
(d) matters not specifically assigned as errors on appeal but raised in the trial court and are matters of record
having some bearing on the issue submitted which the parties failed to raise or which the lower court
ignored; (e) matters not assigned as errors on appeal but closely related to an error assigned; and (f) matters
not assigned as errors on appeal but upon which the determination of a question properly assigned, is
dependent. [11]
In the light of the foregoing established doctrines, we now proceed to resolve the merits of the case.
The respondents main cause of action in the court a quo is the recovery of ownership and possession
of property. It is undisputed that the subject property, Lot3095 C-5, was owned by the deceased Juan
Gabatan, during his lifetime.[12] Before us are two contending parties, both insisting to be the legal heir(s) of
the decedent.
Jurisprudence dictates that the determination of who are the legal heirs of the deceased must be
made in the proper special proceedings in court, and not in an ordinary suit for recovery of ownership and
possession of property. This must take precedence over the action for recovery of possession and
ownership. The Court has consistently ruled that the trial court cannot make a declaration of heirship in the
civil action for the reason that such a declaration can only be made in a special proceeding. Under Section 3,
Rule 1 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Court, a civil action is defined as one by which a party sues another for
the enforcement or protection of a right, or the prevention or redress of a wrong while a special proceeding
is a remedy by which a party seeks to establish a status, a right, or a particular fact. It is then decisively

clear that the declaration of heirship can be made only in a special proceeding inasmuch as the petitioners
here are seeking the establishment of a status or right.[13]
In the early case of Litam, et al. v. Rivera,[14] this Court ruled that the declaration of heirship must be
made in a special proceeding, and not in an independent civil action. This doctrine was reiterated in Solivio
v. Court of Appeals[15] where the Court held:
xxx where despite the pendency of the special proceedings for the settlement of the intestate estate
of the deceased Rafael Litam, the plaintiffs-appellants filed a civil action in which they claimed that they were
the children by a previous marriage of the deceased to a Chinese woman, hence, entitled to inherit his onehalf share of the conjugal properties acquired during his marriage to Marcosa Rivera, the trial court in the civil
case declared that the plaintiffs-appellants were not children of the deceased, that the properties in question
were paraphernal properties of his wife, Marcosa Rivera, and that the latter was his only heir. On appeal to
this Court, we ruled that such declarations (that Marcosa Rivera was the only heir of the decedent) is
improper, in Civil Case No. 2071, it being within the exclusive competence of the court in Special Proceedings
No. 1537, in which it is not as yet, in issue, and, will not be, ordinarily, in issue until the presentation of the
project of partition.
In the more recent case of Milagros Joaquino v. Lourdes Reyes,[16] the Court reiterated its ruling that
matters relating to the rights of filiation and heirship must be ventilated in the proper probate court in a
special proceeding instituted precisely for the purpose of determining such rights. Citing the case of Agapay
v. Palang,[17]this Court held that the status of an illegitimate child who claimed to be an heir to a decedents
estate could not be adjudicated in an ordinary civil action which, as in this case, was for the recovery of
property.
However, we are not unmindful of our decision in Portugal v. Portugal-Beltran,[18] where the Court
relaxed its rule and allowed the trial court in a proceeding for annulment of title to determine the status of
the party therein as heirs, to wit:
It appearing, however, that in the present case the only property of the intestate estate of Portugal is
the Caloocan parcel of land, to still subject it, under the circumstances of the case, to a special
proceeding which could be long, hence, not expeditious, just to establish the status of
petitioners as heirs is not only impractical; it is burdensome to the estate with the costs and expenses
of an administration proceeding. And it is superfluous in light of the fact that the parties to the civil
case subject of the present case, could and had already in fact presented evidence before the
trial court which assumed jurisdiction over the case upon the issues it defined during pre-trial.
In fine, under the circumstances of the present case, there being no compelling reason to still subject
Portugals estate to administration proceedings since a determination of petitioners status as heirs could be
achieved in the civil case filed by petitioners (Vide Pereira v. Court of Appeals, 174 SCRA 154
[1989]; Intestate Estate of Mercado v. Magtibay, 96 Phil. 383 [1955]), the trial court should proceed to
evaluate the evidence presented by the parties during the trial and render a decision thereon upon the issues
it defined during pre-trial, x x x. (emphasis supplied)
Similarly, in the present case, there appears to be only one parcel of land being claimed by the
contending parties as their inheritance from Juan Gabatan. It would be more practical to dispense with a
separate special proceeding for the determination of the status of respondent as the sole heir of Juan
Gabatan, specially in light of the fact that the parties to Civil Case No. 89-092, had voluntarily submitted the
issue to the RTC and already presented their evidence regarding the issue of heirship in these
proceeding. Also the RTC assumed jurisdiction over the same and consequently rendered judgment thereon.
We GRANT the petition.
After a meticulous review of the records of this case, we find insufficient and questionable the basis of
the RTC in conferring upon respondent the status of sole heir of Juan Gabatan.
Respondent, in asserting to be entitled to possession and ownership of the property, pinned her claim
entirely on her alleged status as sole heir of Juan Gabatan. It was incumbent upon her to present
preponderant evidence in support of her complaint.
Under the Civil Code, the filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the following:
ART. 265. The filiation of legitimate children is proved by the record of birth appearing in the Civil Register, or
by an authentic document or a final judgment.

ART. 266. In the absence of the titles indicated in the preceding article, the filiation shall be proved by the
continuous possession of status of a legitimate child.
ART. 267. In the absence of a record of birth, authentic document, final judgment or possession of status,
legitimate filiation may be proved by any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws.
Here, two conflicting birth certificates [19] of respondent were presented at the RTC. Respondent, during
her direct testimony, presented and identified a purported certified true copy of her typewritten birth
certificate which indicated that her mothers maiden name was Hermogena Clarito Gabatan. Petitioners, on
the other hand, presented a certified true copy of respondents handwritten birth certificate which differed
from the copy presented by respondent. Among the differences was respondents mothers full maiden name
which was indicated as Hermogena Calarito in the handwritten birth certificate.
In resolving this particular issue, the trial court ruled in this wise:
The parties are trying to outdo with (sic) each other by presenting two conflicting Certificate (sic) of
Live Birth of plaintiff herein, Lourdes Evero Pacana, which are Exhibit A for the plaintiff and Exhibit 1 for
the defendants. Which of this (sic) is genuine, and which is falsified. These (sic) issue is crucial and requires
serious scrutiny. The Court is of the observation that Exhibit A for the plaintiff which is a certified true copy
is in due form and bears the as is and where is rule. It has the impression of the original certificate. The
forms (sic) is an old one used in the 1950s. Her mothers maiden name appearing thereof is Hermogina (sic)
Clarito Gabatan. While Exhibit 1, the entries found thereof (sic) is handwritten which is very unusual and of
dubious source. The form used is of latest vintage. The entry on the space for mothers maiden name is
Hermogena Calarito. There seems to be an apparent attempt to thwart plaintiffs mother filiation with the
omission of the surname Gabatan. Considering these circumstances alone the Court is inclined to believe that
Exhibit A for the plaintiff is far more genuine and authentic certificate of live birth. [20]
Having carefully examined the questioned birth certificates, we simply cannot agree with the abovequoted findings of the trial court. To begin with, Exhibit A, as the trial court noted, was an original typewritten
document, not a mere photocopy or facsimile. It uses a form of 1950s vintage [21] but this Court is unable to
concur in the trial courts finding that Exhibit 1 [22] was of a later vintage than Exhibit A which was one of the
trial courts bases for doubting the authenticity of Exhibit 1. On the contrary, the printed notation on the
upper left hand corner of Exhibit 1 states Municipal Form No. 102 (Revised, January 1945) which makes it
an older form than Exhibit A. Thus, the trial courts finding regarding which form was of more recent vintage
was manifestly contradicted by the evidence on record. No actual signature appears on Exhibit A except that
of a certain Maximo P. Noriga, Deputy Local Civil Registrar of the Office of the Local Civil Registrar, Cagayan
de Oro City, who purportedly certified on July 6, 1977 that Exhibit A was a true copy of respondents birth
certificate. The names of the attendant at birth (Petra Sambaan) and the local civil registrar (J.L. Rivera) in
1950 were typewritten with the notation (Sgd.) also merely typewritten beside their names. The words A
certified true copy: July 6, 1977 above the signature of Maximo P. Noriga on Exhibit A appear to be inscribed
by the same typewriter as the very entries in Exhibit A. It would seem that Exhibit A and the information
stated therein were prepared and entered only in 1977. Significantly, Maximo P. Noriga was never presented
as a witness to identify Exhibit A. Said document and the signature of Maximo P. Noriga therein were
identified by respondent herself whose self-serving testimony cannot be deemed sufficient authentication of
her birth certificate.
We cannot subscribe to the trial courts view that since the entries in Exhibit 1 were handwritten,
Exhibit 1 was the one of dubious credibility. Verily, the certified true copies of the handwritten birth certificate
of respondent (petitioners Exhibits 1 and 8) were duly authenticated by two competent witnesses; namely,
Rosita Vidal (Ms. Vidal), Assistant Registration Officer of the Office of the City Civil Registrar, Cagayan de Oro
City and Maribeth E. Cacho (Ms. Cacho), Archivist of the National Statistics Office (NSO), Sta. Mesa, Manila.
Both witnesses testified that: (a) as part of their official duties they have custody of birth records in their
respective offices,[23] and (b) the certified true copy of respondents handwritten birth certificate is a faithful
reproduction of the original birth certificate registered in their respective offices. [24] Ms. Vidal, during her
testimony, even brought the original of the handwritten birth certificate before the trial court and
respondents counsel confirmed that the certified true copy (which was eventually marked as Exhibit 1) was a

faithful reproduction of the original. [25] Ms. Vidal likewise categorically testified that no other copy of
respondents birth certificate exists in their records except the handwritten birth certificate. [26] Ms. Cacho, in
turn, testified that the original of respondents handwritten birth certificate found in the records of the NSO
Manila (from which Exhibit 8 was photocopied) was the one officially transmitted to their office by the Local
Civil Registry Office of Cagayan de Oro.[27] Both Ms. Vidal and Ms. Cacho testified and brought their respective
offices copies of respondents birth certificate in compliance with subpoenas issued by the trial court and
there is no showing that they were motivated by ill will or bias in giving their testimonies. Thus, between
respondents Exhibit A and petitioners Exhibits 1 and 8, the latter documents deserve to be given greater
probative weight.
Even assuming purely for the sake of argument that the birth certificate presented by respondent
(Exhibit A) is a reliable document, the same on its face is insufficient to prove respondents filiation to her
alleged grandfather, Juan Gabatan. All that Exhibit A, if it had been credible and authentic, would have
proven was that respondents mother was a certain Hermogena Clarito Gabatan. It does not prove that
same Hermogena Clarito Gabatan is the daughter of Juan Gabatan. Even the CA held that the conflicting
certificates of live birth of respondent submitted by the parties only proved the filiation of respondent to
Hermogena.[28]
It was absolutely crucial to respondents cause of action that she convincingly proves the filiation of
her mother to Juan Gabatan. To reiterate, to prove the relationship of respondents mother to Juan Gabatan,
our laws dictate that the best evidence of such familial tie was the record of birth appearing in the Civil
Register, or an authentic document or a final judgment. In the absence of these, respondent should have
presented proof that her mother enjoyed the continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child. Only
in the absence of these two classes of evidence is the respondent allowed to present other proof admissible
under the Rules of Court of her mothers relationship to Juan Gabatan.
However, respondents mothers (Hermogenas) birth certificate, which would have been the best
evidence of Hermogenas relationship to Juan Gabatan, was never offered as evidence at the RTC. Neither did
respondent present any authentic document or final judgment categorically evidencing Hermogenas
relationship to Juan Gabatan.
Respondent relied on the testimony of her witnesses, Frisco Lawan, Felicisima Nagac Pacana and
Cecilia Nagac Villareal who testified that they personally knew Hermogena (respondents mother) and/or Juan
Gabatan, that they knew Juan Gabatan was married to Laureana Clarito and that Hermogena was the child of
Juan and Laureana. However, none of these witnesses had personal knowledge of the fact of marriage of
Juan to Laureana or the fact of birth of Hermogena to Juan and Laureana. They were not yet born or were
very young when Juan supposedly married Laureana or when Hermogena was born and they all admitted that
none of them were present at Juan and Laureanas wedding or Hermogenas birth. These witnesses based
their testimony on what they had been told by, or heard from, others as young children. Their testimonies
were, in a word, hearsay.
Other circumstances prevent us from giving full faith to respondents witnesses testimonies. The
records would show that they cannot be said to be credible and impartial witnesses. Frisco Lawan testified
that he was the son of Laureana by a man other than Juan Gabatan and was admittedly not at all related to
Juan Gabatan.[29] His testimony regarding the relationships within the Gabatan family is hardly reliable. As for
Felicisima Nagac Pacana and Cecilia Nagac Villareal who are children of Justa Gabatan Nagac, [30] this Court is
wary of according probative weight to their testimonies since respondent admitted during her crossexamination that her (respondents) husband is the son of Felicisima Nagac Pacana. [31] In other words,
although these witnesses are indeed blood relatives of petitioners, they are also the mother and the aunt of
respondents husband. They cannot be said to be entirely disinterested in the outcome of the case.
Aside from the testimonies of respondents witnesses, both the RTC and the CA relied heavily on a
photocopy of a Deed of Absolute Sale[32] (Exhibit H) presented by respondent and which appeared to be
signed by the siblings and the heirs of the siblings of Juan Gabatan. In this document involving the sale of a
lot different from Lot 3095 C-5, Hermogena Gabatan as heir of the deceased Juan Gabatan was indicated as

10

one of the vendors. The RTC deemed the statement therein as an affirmation or recognition by Teofilo
Gabatan, petitioners predecessor in interest, that Hermogena Gabatan was the heir of Juan Gabatan. [33] The
CA considered the same statement as a declaration against interest on the part of Teofilo Gabatan. [34]
However, the admission of this Deed of Absolute Sale, including its contents and the signatures
therein, as competent evidence was vigorously and repeatedly objected to by petitioners counsel for being a
mere photocopy and not being properly authenticated. [35] After a close scrutiny of the said photocopy of the
Deed of Absolute Sale, this Court cannot uphold the admissibility of the same.
Under the best evidence rule, when the subject of inquiry is the contents of a document, no evidence
shall be admissible other than the original document itself. [36] Although the best evidence rule admits of
exceptions and there are instances where the presentation of secondary evidence would be allowed, such as
when the original is lost or the original is a public record, the basis for the presentation of secondary evidence
must still be established. Thus, in Department of Education Culture and Sports v. Del Rosario, [37] we held that
a party must first satisfactorily explain the loss of the best or primary evidence before he can resort to
secondary evidence. A party must first present to the court proof of loss or other satisfactory explanation for
non-production of the original instrument.
In the case at bar, a perusal of the transcript of the testimony of Felicisima Nagac Pacana (who
identified the photocopy of the Deed of Absolute Sale) plainly shows that she gave no testimony regarding
the whereabouts of the original, whether it was lost or whether it was recorded in any public office.
There is an ostensible attempt to pass off Exhibit H as an admissible public document. For this,
respondent relied on the stamped notation on the photocopy of the deed that it is a certified true xerox copy
and said notation was signed by a certain Honesto P. Velez, Sr., Assessment Officer, who seems to be an
officer in the local assessors office. Regarding the authentication of public documents, the Rules of
Court[38] provide that the record of public documents, when admissible for any purpose, may be evidenced by
an official publication thereof or by a copy attested by the officer having legal custody of the record, or by his
deputy.[39] The attestation of the certifying officer must state, in substance, that the copy is a correct copy of
the original, or a specific part thereof, as the case may be. [40]
To begin with, no proof whatsoever was presented by respondent that an original of Exhibit H was
registered or exists in the records of the local assessors office. Furthermore, the stamped certification of
Honesto P. Velez is insufficient authentication of Exhibit H since Velezs certification did not state that Exhibit
H was a true copy from the original. Even worse, Velez was not presented as a witness to attest that Exhibit
H was a true copy from the original. Indeed, it is highly doubtful that Velez could have made such an
attestation since the assessors office is not the official repository of original notarized deeds of sale and
could not have been the legal custodian contemplated in the rules.
It is the notary public who is mandated by law to keep an original of the Deed of Absolute Sale in his
notarial register and to forward the same to the proper court. It is the notary public or the proper court that
has custody of his notarial register that could have produced the original or a certified true copy
thereof. Instead, the Deed of Absolute Sale was identified by Felicisima Nagac Pacana who, despite
appearing to be a signatory thereto, is not a disinterested witness and as can be gleaned from her testimony,
she had no personal knowledge of the preparation of the alleged certified true copy of the Deed of Absolute
Sale. She did not even know who secured a copy of Exhibit H from the assessors office. [41] To be sure, the
roundabout and defective manner of authentication of Exhibit H renders it inadmissible for the purpose it was
offered, i.e. as proof that Teofilo Gabatan acknowledged or admitted the status of Hermogena Gabatan as heir
of Juan Gabatan.
Even if we are to overlook the lack of proper authentication of Exhibit H and consider the same
admissible, it still nonetheless would have only provided proof that a certain Hermogena Gabatan was the
heir of Juan Gabatan. Exhibit H does not show the filiation of respondent to either Hermogena Gabatan or
Juan Gabatan. As discussed above, the only document that respondent produced to demonstrate her filiation
to Hermogena Gabatan (respondents Exhibit A) was successfully put in doubt by contrary evidence
presented by petitioners.

11

As for the issue of laches, we are inclined to likewise rule against respondent. According to
respondents own testimony,[42] Juan Gabatan died sometime in 1933 and thus, the cause of action of the
heirs of Juan Gabatan to recover the decedents property from third parties or to quiet title to their
inheritance accrued in 1933. Yet, respondent and/or her mother Hermogena, if they were truly the legal heirs
of Juan Gabatan, did not assert their rights as such. It is only in 1978 that respondent filed her first complaint
to recover the subject property, docketed as Civil Case No. 5840, against Rita Gabatan, the widow of Teofilo
Gabatan.[43] However, that case was dismissed without prejudice for failure to prosecute. [44] Again,
respondent waited until 1989 to refile her cause of action, i.e. the present case.[45] She claimed that she
waited until the death of Rita Gabatan to refile her case out of respect because Rita was then already old. [46]
We cannot accept respondents flimsy reason. It is precisely because Rita Gabatan and her
contemporaries (who might have personal knowledge of the matters litigated in this case) were advancing in
age and might soon expire that respondent should have exerted every effort to preserve valuable evidence
and speedily litigate her claim. As we held in Republic of the Philippines v. Agunoy: Vigilantibus, sed non
dormientibus, jura subveniunt, the law aids the vigilant, not those who sleep on their rights[O]ne may not
sleep on a right while expecting to preserve it in its pristine purity. [47]
All in all, this Court finds that respondent dismally failed to substantiate, with convincing, credible and
independently verifiable proof, her assertion that she is the sole heir of Juan Gabatan and thus, entitled to the
property under litigation. Aggravating the weakness of her evidence were the circumstances that (a) she did
not come to court with clean hands for she presented a tampered/altered, if not outright spurious, copy of her
certificate of live birth and (b) she unreasonably delayed the prosecution of her own cause of action. If the
Court cannot now affirm her claim, respondent has her own self to blame.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Court of Appeals Decision in CA-G.R. CV No. 52273,
affirming the decision of the Regional Trial Court in Civil Case No. 89-092, is hereby REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. The complaint and amended complaint in Civil Case No. 89-092 are DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

Supreme Court
Manila
THIRD DIVISION

12

ALAN JOSEPH A. SHEKER,

G.R. No. 157912

Petitioner,
Present:

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.,
- versus -

Chairperson,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CHICO-NAZARIO,
NACHURA, and

ESTATE OF ALICE O. SHEKER,

REYES, JJ.

VICTORIA S. MEDINAAdministratrix,

Promulgated:
Respondent.

December 13, 2007

x------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
This resolves the Petition for Review on Certiorari seeking

the

reversal

of

the

Order [1] of

the Regional Trial Court of Iligan City, Branch 6 (RTC) dated January 15, 2003 and its Omnibus Order
dated April 9, 2003.
The undisputed facts are as follows.
The RTC admitted to probate the holographic will of Alice O. Sheker and thereafter issued an order for
all the creditors to file their respective claims against the estate. In compliance therewith, petitioner filed on
October

7,

2002

contingent

claim

for

agent's

commission

due

him

amounting

to

approximately P206,250.00 in the event of the sale of certain parcels of land belonging to the estate, and the
amount of P275,000.00, as reimbursement for expenses incurred and/or to be incurred by petitioner in the
course of negotiating the sale of said realties.
The executrix of the Estate of Alice O. Sheker (respondent) moved for the dismissal of said money claim
against the estate on the grounds that (1) the requisite docket fee, as prescribed in Section 7(a), Rule 141 of
the Rules of Court, had not been paid; (2) petitioner failed to attach a certification against non-forum
shopping; and (3) petitioner failed to attach a written explanation why the money claim was not filed and
served personally.
On January 15, 2003, the RTC issued the assailed Order dismissing without prejudice the money claim
based on the grounds advanced by respondent. Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied per
Omnibus Order dated April 9, 2003.
Petitioner then filed the present petition for review on certiorari, raising the following questions:
(a) must a contingent claim filed in the probate proceeding contain a certification against non-forum
shopping, failing which such claim should be dismissed?
(b) must a contingent claim filed against an estate in a probate proceeding be dismissed for failing to pay
the docket fees at the time of its filing thereat?
(c) must a contingent claim filed in a probate proceeding be dismissed because of its failure to contain a
written explanation on the service and filing by registered mail? [2]
Petitioner maintains that the RTC erred in strictly applying to a probate proceeding the rules requiring
a certification of non-forum shopping, a written explanation for non-personal filing, and the payment of
docket fees upon filing of the claim. He insists that Section 2, Rule 72 of the Rules of Court provides that
rules in ordinary actions are applicable to special proceedings only in a suppletory manner.

13

The Court gave due course to the petition for review on certiorari although directly filed with this
Court, pursuant to Section 2(c), Rule 41 of the Rules of Court. [3]
The petition is imbued with merit.
However, it must be emphasized that petitioner's contention that rules in ordinary actions are only
supplementary to rules in special proceedings is not entirely correct.
Section 2, Rule 72, Part II of the same Rules of Court provides:
Sec. 2. Applicability of rules of Civil Actions. - In the absence of special provisions, the rules
provided for in ordinary actions shall be, as far as practicable, applicable in special proceedings.
Stated differently, special provisions under Part II of the Rules of Court govern special proceedings; but
in the absence of special provisions, the rules provided for in Part I of the Rules governing ordinary civil
actions shall be applicable to special proceedings, as far as practicable.
The word practicable is defined as: possible to practice or perform; capable of being put into
practice, done or accomplished.[4] This means that in the absence of special provisions, rules in ordinary
actions may be applied in special proceedings as much as possible and where doing so would not pose an
obstacle to said proceedings. Nowhere in the Rules of Court does it categorically say that rules in ordinary
actions are inapplicable or merely suppletory to special proceedings. Provisions of the Rules of Court requiring
a certification of non-forum shopping for complaints and initiatory pleadings, a written explanation for
non-personal service and filing, and the payment of filing fees for money claims against an estate would not
in any way obstruct probate proceedings, thus, they are applicable to special proceedings such as the
settlement of the estate of a deceased person as in the present case
Thus, the principal question in the present case is: did the RTC err in dismissing petitioner's contingent
money claim against respondent estate for failure of petitioner to attach to his motion a certification against
non-forum shopping?
The Court rules in the affirmative.
The certification of non-forum shopping is required only for complaints and other initiatory
pleadings. The RTC erred in ruling that a contingent money claim against the estate of a decedent is an
initiatory pleading. In the present case, the whole probate proceeding was initiated upon the filing of
the petition for allowance of the decedent's will. Under Sections 1 and 5, Rule 86 of the Rules of Court,
after granting letters of testamentary or of administration, all persons having money claims against the
decedent are mandated to file or notify the court and the estate administrator of their respective money
claims; otherwise, they would be barred, subject to certain exceptions. [5]
Such being the case, a money claim against an estate is more akin to a motion for creditors' claims to
be recognized and taken into consideration in the proper disposition of the properties of the
estate. In Arquiza v. Court of Appeals,[6] the Court explained thus:
x x x The office of a motion is not to initiate new litigation, but to bring a material but
incidental matter arising in the progress of the case in which the motion is filed. A motion is not
an independent right or remedy, but is confined to incidental matters in the progress of a cause.
It relates to some question that is collateral to the main object of the action and is connected
with and dependent upon the principal remedy.[7] (Emphasis supplied)
A money claim is only an incidental matter in the main action for the settlement of the decedent's estate;
more so if the claim is contingent since the claimant cannot even institute a separate action for a mere
contingent claim. Hence, herein petitioner's contingent money claim, not being an initiatory
pleading, does not require a certification against non-forum shopping.
On the issue of filing fees, the Court ruled in Pascual v. Court of Appeals,[8] that the trial court has
jurisdiction to act on a money claim (attorney's fees) against an estate for services rendered by a lawyer to
the administratrix to assist her in fulfilling her duties to the estate even without payment of separate docket
fees because the filing fees shall constitute a lien on the judgment pursuant to Section 2, Rule 141 of the
Rules of Court, or the trial court may order the payment of such filing fees within a reasonable time. [9] After
all, the trial court had already assumed jurisdiction over the action for settlement of the estate. Clearly,
therefore, non-payment of filing fees for a money claim against the estate is not one of the grounds for
dismissing a money claim against the estate.

14

With

regard

to

the

requirement

of

written

explanation, Maceda v.

De

[10]

Guzman Vda. de Macatangay

is squarely in point. Therein, the Court held thus:
In Solar Team Entertainment, Inc. v. Ricafort, this Court, passing upon Section 11 of Rule 13 of the Rules
of Court, held that a court has the discretion to consider a pleading or paper as not filed if said rule is not
complied with.
Personal service and filing are preferred for obvious reasons. Plainly, such should expedite action or
resolution on a pleading, motion or other paper; and conversely, minimize, if not eliminate, delays likely to be
incurred if service or filing is done by mail, considering the inefficiency of the postal service.

Likewise,

personal service will do away with the practice of some lawyers who, wanting to appear clever, resort to the
following less than ethical practices: (1) serving or filing pleadings by mail to catch opposing counsel offguard, thus leaving the latter with little or no time to prepare, for instance, responsive pleadings or an
opposition; or (2) upon receiving notice from the post office that the registered mail containing the pleading
of or other paper from the adverse party may be claimed, unduly procrastinating before claiming the parcel,
or, worse, not claiming it at all, thereby causing undue delay in the disposition of such pleading or other
papers.
If only to underscore the mandatory nature of this innovation to our set of adjective rules requiring
personal service whenever practicable, Section 11 of Rule 13 then gives the court thediscretion to
consider a pleading or paper as not filed if the other modes of service or filing were not resorted
to and no written explanation was made as to why personal service was not done in the first
place. The exercise of discretion must, necessarily consider the practicability of personal
service, for Section 11 itself begins with the clause whenever practicable.
We thus take this opportunity to clarify that under Section 11, Rule 13 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, personal service and filing is the general rule, and resort to other modes of service and filing, the
exception. Henceforth, whenever personal service or filing is practicable, in the light of the circumstances of
time, place and person, personal service or filing is mandatory. Only when personal service or filing is not
practicable may resort to other modes be had, which must then be accompanied by a written explanation as
to why personal service or filing was not practicable to begin with. In adjudging the plausibility of an
explanation, a court shall likewise consider the importance of the subject matter of the case or the issues
involved therein, and the prima facie merit of the pleading sought to be expunged for violation of Section
11. (Emphasis and italics supplied)
In Musa v. Amor, this Court, on noting the impracticality of personal service, exercised its discretion
and liberally applied Section 11 of Rule 13:
As [Section 11, Rule 13 of the Rules of Court] requires, service and filing of pleadings must be done
personally whenever practicable. The court notes that in the present case, personal service would
not

be

practicable. Considering

the

distance

between

the

Court

of

Appeals

and Donsol, Sorsogon where the petition was posted, clearly, service by registered mail [sic]
would have entailed considerable time, effort and expense. A written explanation why service
was not done personally might have been superfluous. In any case, as the rule is so worded with
the use of may, signifying permissiveness, a violation thereof gives the court discretion
whether or not to consider the paper as not filed. While it is true that procedural rules are
necessary to secure an orderly and speedy administration of justice, rigid application of Section
11, Rule 13 may be relaxed in this case in the interest of substantial justice. (Emphasis and italics
supplied)
In the case at bar, the address of respondents counsel is Lopez, Quezon, while petitioner
Sonias counsels is Lucena City. Lopez, Quezon is 83 kilometers away from Lucena City. Such distance makes
personal service impracticable. As in Musa v. Amor, a written explanation why service was not done
personally might have been superfluous.

15

As this Court held in Tan v. Court of Appeals, liberal construction of a rule of procedure has been
allowed where, among other cases, the injustice to the adverse party is not commensurate with the degree
of his thoughtlessness in not complying with the procedure prescribed. [11] (Emphasis supplied)
In the present case, petitioner holds office in Salcedo Village, Makati City, while counsel for respondent
and the RTC which rendered the assailed orders are both in Iligan City. The lower court should have taken
judicial notice of the great distance between said cities and realized that it is indeed not practicable to serve
and file the money claim personally. Thus, following Medina v. Court of Appeals,[12] the failure of petitioner to
submit a written explanation why service has not been done personally, may be considered as superfluous
and the RTC should have exercised its discretion under Section 11, Rule 13, not to dismiss the money claim of
petitioner, in the interest of substantial justice.
The ruling spirit of the probate law is the speedy settlement of estates of deceased persons for the
benefit of creditors and those entitled to residue by way of inheritance or legacy after the debts and
expenses of administration have been paid. [13] The ultimate purpose for the rule on money claims was further
explained inUnion Bank of the Phil. v. Santibaez,[14] thus:
The filing of a money claim against the decedents estate in the probate court is mandatory. As we held
in the vintage case of Py Eng Chong v. Herrera:
x x x This requirement is for the purpose of protecting the estate of the deceased by
informing the executor or administrator of the claims against it, thus enabling him to examine each
claim and to determine whether it is a proper one which should be allowed. The plain and obvious design of
the rule is the speedy settlement of the affairs of the deceased and the early delivery of the property to
the distributees, legatees, or heirs. The law strictly requires the prompt presentation and disposition
of the claims against the decedent's estate in order to settle the affairs of the estate as soon as
possible, pay off its debts and distribute the residue.[15] (Emphasis supplied)
The RTC should have relaxed and liberally construed the procedural rule on the requirement of a written
explanation for non-personal service, again in the interest of substantial justice.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Orders of the Regional Trial Court of Iligan City, Branch 6
dated

January

15,

2003

and

April

9,

2003,

respectively,

are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Regional Trial Court of Iligan City, Branch 6, is hereby DIRECTED to
give due course and take appropriate action on petitioner's money claim in accordance with Rule 82 of the
Rules of Court.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.

SECOND DIVISION

ALFREDO HILADO, LOPEZ

SUGAR CORPORATION, FIRST
FARMERS HOLDING
CORPORATION,
Petitioners,

- versus BRION, JJ.

G.R. No. 164108

Present:
CARPIO MORALES, J.,*
Acting Chairperson,
TINGA,
VELASCO, JR.,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,** and

THE HONORABLE COURT OF

APPEALS, THE HONORABLE
AMOR A. REYES, Presiding Judge,
Regional Trial Court of Manila,
Branch 21 and ADMINISTRATRIX
JULITA CAMPOS BENEDICTO,

Promulgated:
May 8, 2009

16

Respondents.
x----------------------------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

TINGA, J.:
The well-known sugar magnate Roberto S. Benedicto died intestate on 15 May 2000. He was survived
by his wife, private respondent Julita Campos Benedicto (administratrix Benedicto), and his only daughter,
Francisca Benedicto-Paulino.[1] At the time of his death, there were two pending civil cases against Benedicto
involving the petitioners. The first, Civil Case No. 95-9137, was then pending with the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Bacolod City, Branch 44, with petitioner Alfredo Hilado as one of the plaintiffs therein. The second,
Civil Case No. 11178, was then pending with the RTC of Bacolod City, Branch 44, with petitioners Lopez Sugar
Corporation and First Farmers Holding Corporation as one of the plaintiffs therein. [2]
On 25 May 2000, private respondent Julita Campos Benedicto filed with the RTC of Manila a petition for
the issuance of letters of administration in her favor, pursuant to Section 6, Rule 78 of the Revised Rules of
Court. The petition was raffled to Branch 21, presided by respondent Judge Amor A. Reyes. Said petition
acknowledged the value of the assets of the decedent to be P5 Million, net of liabilities.[3] On 2 August 2000,
the Manila RTC issued an order appointing private respondent as administrator of the estate of her deceased
husband, and issuing letters of administration in her favor. [4] In January 2001, private respondent submitted
an Inventory of the Estate, Lists of Personal and Real Properties, and Liabilities of the Estate of her deceased
husband.[5] In the List of Liabilities attached to the inventory, private respondent included as among the
liabilities, the above-mentioned two pending claims then being litigated before the Bacolod City courts.
[6]

Private respondent stated that the amounts of liability corresponding to the two cases as P136,045,772.50

for Civil Case No. 95-9137 and P35,198,697.40 for Civil Case No. 11178.[7]Thereafter, the Manila RTC required
private respondent to submit a complete and updated inventory and appraisal report pertaining to the estate.
[8]

On 24 September 2001, petitioners filed with the Manila RTC a Manifestation/Motion Ex Abundanti
Cautela,[9] praying that they be furnished with copies of all processes and orders pertaining to the intestate
proceedings. Private respondent opposed the manifestation/motion, disputing the personality of petitioners to
intervene in the intestate proceedings of her husband. Even before the Manila RTC acted on the
manifestation/motion, petitioners filed an omnibus motion praying that the Manila RTC set a deadline for the
submission by private respondent of the required inventory of the decedents estate. [10] Petitioners also filed
other pleadings or motions with the Manila RTC, alleging lapses on the part of private respondent in her
administration of the estate, and assailing the inventory that had been submitted thus far as unverified,
incomplete and inaccurate.
On 2 January 2002, the Manila RTC issued an order denying the manifestation/motion, on the ground
that petitioners are not interested parties within the contemplation of the Rules of Court to intervene in the
intestate proceedings.[11] After the Manila RTC had denied petitioners motion for reconsideration, a petition
for certiorari was filed with the Court of Appeals. The petition argued in general that petitioners had the right
to intervene in the intestate proceedings of Roberto Benedicto, the latter being the defendant in the civil
cases they lodged with the Bacolod RTC.
On 27 February 2004, the Court of Appeals promulgated a decision [12] dismissing the petition and
declaring that the Manila RTC did not abuse its discretion in refusing to allow petitioners to intervene in the
intestate proceedings. The allowance or disallowance of a motion to intervene, according to the appellate
court, is addressed to the sound discretion of the court. The Court of Appeals cited the fact that the claims of
petitioners against the decedent were in fact contingent or expectant, as these were still pending litigation in
separate proceedings before other courts.
Hence, the present petition. In essence, petitioners argue that the lower courts erred in denying them
the right to intervene in the intestate proceedings of the estate of Roberto Benedicto. Interestingly, the rules

17

of procedure they cite in support of their argument is not the rule on intervention, but rather various other
provisions of the Rules on Special Proceedings.[13]
To recall, petitioners had sought three specific reliefs that were denied by the courts a quo. First, they
prayed that they be henceforth furnished copies of all processes and orders issued by the intestate court as
well as the pleadings filed by administratrix Benedicto with the said court. [14] Second, they prayed that the
intestate court set a deadline for the submission by administratrix Benedicto to submit a verified and
complete inventory of the estate, and upon submission thereof, order the inheritance tax appraisers of the
Bureau of Internal Revenue to assist in the appraisal of the fair market value of the same. [15] Third, petitioners
moved that the intestate court set a deadline for the submission by the administrator of her verified annual
account, and, upon submission thereof, set the date for her examination under oath with respect thereto,
with due notice to them and other parties interested in the collation, preservation and disposition of the
estate.[16]
The Court of Appeals chose to view the matter from a perspective solely informed by the rule on
intervention. We can readily agree with the Court of Appeals on that point. Section 1 of Rule 19 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure requires that an intervenor has a legal interest in the matter in litigation, or in the
success of either of the parties, or an interest against both, or is so situated as to be adversely affected by a
distribution or other disposition of property in the custody of the court x x x While the language of Section 1,
Rule 19 does not literally preclude petitioners from intervening in the intestate proceedings, case law has
consistently held that the legal interest required of an intervenor must be actual and material, direct and
immediate, and not simply contingent and expectant.[17]
Nonetheless, it is not immediately evident that intervention under the Rules of Civil Procedure
necessarily comes into operation in special proceedings. The settlement of estates of deceased persons fall
within the rules of special proceedings under the Rules of Court, [18] not the Rules on Civil Procedure. Section 2,
Rule 72 further provides that [i]n the absence of special provisions, the rules provided for in ordinary actions
shall be, as far as practicable, applicable to special proceedings.
We can readily conclude that notwithstanding Section 2 of Rule 72, intervention as set forth under Rule
19 does not extend to creditors of a decedent whose credit is based on a contingent claim. The definition of
intervention under Rule 19 simply does not accommodate contingent claims.
Yet, even as petitioners now contend before us that they have the right to intervene in the intestate
proceedings of Roberto Benedicto, the reliefs they had sought then before the RTC, and also now before us,
do not square with their recognition as intervenors. In short, even if it were declared that petitioners have no
right to intervene in accordance with Rule 19, it would not necessarily mean the disallowance of the reliefs
they had sought before the RTC since the right to intervene is not one of those reliefs.
To better put across what the ultimate disposition of this petition should be, let us now turn our focus
to the Rules on Special Proceedings.
In several instances, the Rules on Special Proceedings entitle any interested persons or any persons
interested in the estate to participate in varying capacities in the testate or intestate proceedings.
Petitioners cite these provisions before us, namely: (1) Section 1, Rule 79, which recognizes the right of any
person interested to oppose the issuance of letters testamentary and to file a petition for administration;
(2) Section 3, Rule 79, which mandates the giving of notice of hearing on the petition for letters of
administration to the known heirs, creditors, and to any other persons believed to have interest in the
estate; (3) Section 1, Rule 76, which allows a person interested in the estate to petition for the allowance
of a will; (4) Section 6 of Rule 87, which allows an individual interested in the estate of the deceased to
complain to the court of the concealment, embezzlement, or conveyance of any asset of the decedent, or of
evidence of the decedents title or interest therein; (5) Section 10 of Rule 85, which requires notice of the
time and place of the examination and allowance of the Administrators account to persons interested; (6)
Section 7(b) of Rule 89, which requires the court to give notice to the persons interested before it may hear
and grant a petition seeking the disposition or encumbrance of the properties of the estate; and (7) Section
1, Rule 90, which allows any person interested in the estate to petition for an order for the distribution of
the residue of the estate of the decedent, after all obligations are either satisfied or provided for.

18

Had the claims of petitioners against Benedicto been based on contract, whether express or implied,
then they should have filed their claim, even if contingent, under the aegis of the notice to creditors to be
issued by the court immediately after granting letters of administration and published by the administrator
immediately after the issuance of such notice. [19] However, it appears that the claims against Benedicto were
based on tort, as they arose from his actions in connection with Philsucom, Nasutra and Traders Royal Bank.
Civil actions for tort or quasi-delict do not fall within the class of claims to be filed under the notice to
creditors required under Rule 86.[20] These actions, being as they are civil, survive the death of the decedent
and may be commenced against the administrator pursuant to Section 1, Rule 87. Indeed, the records
indicate that the intestate estate of Benedicto, as represented by its administrator, was successfully
impleaded in Civil Case No. 11178, whereas the other civil case [21] was already pending review before this
Court at the time of Benedictos death.
Evidently, the merits of petitioners claims against Benedicto are to be settled in the civil cases where
they were raised, and not in the intestate proceedings. In the event the claims for damages of petitioners are
granted, they would have the right to enforce the judgment against the estate. Yet until such time, to what
extent may they be allowed to participate in the intestate proceedings?
Petitioners place heavy reliance on our ruling in Dinglasan v. Ang Chia,[22] and it does provide us with
guidance on how to proceed. A brief narration of the facts therein is in order. Dinglasan had filed an action for
reconveyance and damages against respondents, and during a hearing of the case, learned that the same
trial court was hearing the intestate proceedings of Lee Liong to whom Dinglasan had sold the property years
earlier. Dinglasan thus amended his complaint to implead Ang Chia, administrator of the estate of her late
husband. He likewise filed a verified claim-in-intervention, manifesting the pendency of the civil case, praying
that a co-administrator be appointed, the bond of the administrator be increased, and that the intestate
proceedings not be closed until the civil case had been terminated. When the trial court ordered the increase
of the bond and took cognizance of the pending civil case, the administrator moved to close the intestate
proceedings, on the ground that the heirs had already entered into an extrajudicial partition of the estate.
The trial court refused to close the intestate proceedings pending the termination of the civil case, and the
Court affirmed such action.
If the appellants filed a claim in intervention in the intestate proceedings it was only
pursuant to their desire to protect their interests it appearing that the property in litigation is
involved in said proceedings and in fact is the only property of the estate left subject of
administration and distribution; and the court is justified in taking cognizance of said civil case
because of the unavoidable fact that whatever is determined in said civil case will necessarily
reflect and have a far reaching consequence in the determination and distribution of the
estate. In so taking cognizance of civil case No. V-331 the court does not assume general jurisdiction over
the case but merely makes of record its existence because of the close interrelation of the two cases and
cannot therefore be branded as having acted in excess of its jurisdiction.
Appellants' claim that the lower court erred in holding in abeyance the closing of the intestate
proceedings pending determination of the separate civil action for the reason that there is no rule or
authority justifying the extension of administration proceedings until after the separate action pertaining to
its general jurisdiction has been terminated, cannot be entertained. Section 1, Rule 88, of the Rules of Court,
expressly provides that "action to recover real or personal property from the estate or to enforce a lien
thereon, and actions to recover damages for an injury to person or property, real or personal, may be
commenced against the executor or administrator." What practical value would this provision have if the
action against the administrator cannot be prosecuted to its termination simply because the heirs desire to
close the intestate proceedings without first taking any step to settle the ordinary civil case? This rule is but a
corollary to the ruling which declares that questions concerning ownership of property alleged to be part of
the estate but claimed by another person should be determined in a separate action and should be submitted
to the court in the exercise of its general jurisdiction. These rules would be rendered nugatory if we are to

19

hold that an intestate proceedings can be closed by any time at the whim and caprice of the heirs x x
x[23] (Emphasis supplied) [Citations omitted]
It is not clear whether the claim-in-intervention filed by Dinglasan conformed to an action-inintervention under the Rules of Civil Procedure, but we can partake of the spirit behind such pronouncement.
Indeed, a few years later, the Court, citing Dinglasan, stated: [t]he rulings of this court have always been to
the effect that in the special proceeding for the settlement of the estate of a deceased person, persons not
heirs, intervening therein to protect their interests are allowed to do so to protect the same, but not for a
decision on their action.[24]
Petitioners interests in the estate of Benedicto may be inchoate interests, but they are viable interests
nonetheless. We are mindful that the Rules of Special Proceedings allows not just creditors, but also any
person interested or persons interested in the estate various specified capacities to protect their
respective interests in the estate. Anybody with a contingent claim based on a pending action for quasi-delict
against a decedent may be reasonably concerned that by the time judgment is rendered in their favor, the
estate of the decedent would have already been distributed, or diminished to the extent that the judgment
could no longer be enforced against it.
In the same manner that the Rules on Special Proceedings do not provide a creditor or any person
interested in the estate, the right to participate in every aspect of the testate or intestate proceedings, but
instead provides for specific instances when such persons may accordingly act in those proceedings, we
deem that while there is no general right to intervene on the part of the petitioners, they may be allowed to
seek certain prayers or reliefs from the intestate court not explicitly provided for under the Rules, if the
prayer or relief sought is necessary to protect their interest in the estate, and there is no other modality
under the Rules by which such interests can be protected. It is under this standard that we assess the three
prayers sought by petitioners.
The first is that petitioners be furnished with copies of all processes and orders issued in connection
with the intestate proceedings, as well as the pleadings filed by the administrator of the estate. There is no
questioning as to the utility of such relief for the petitioners. They would be duly alerted of the developments
in the intestate proceedings, including the status of the assets of the estate. Such a running account would
allow them to pursue the appropriate remedies should their interests be compromised, such as the right,
under Section 6, Rule 87, to complain to the intestate court if property of the estate concealed, embezzled, or
fraudulently conveyed.
At the same time, the fact that petitioners interests remain inchoate and contingent counterbalances
their ability to participate in the intestate proceedings. We are mindful of respondents submission that if the
Court were to entitle petitioners with service of all processes and pleadings of the intestate court, then
anybody claiming to be a creditor, whether contingent or otherwise, would have the right to be furnished
such pleadings, no matter how wanting of merit the claim may be. Indeed, to impose a precedent that would
mandate the service of all court processes and pleadings to anybody posing a claim to the estate, much less
contingent claims, would unduly complicate and burden the intestate proceedings, and would ultimately
offend the guiding principle of speedy and orderly disposition of cases.
Fortunately, there is a median that not only exists, but also has been recognized by this Court, with
respect to the petitioners herein, that addresses the core concern of petitioners to be apprised of
developments in the intestate proceedings. In Hilado v. Judge Reyes,[25] the Court heard a petition for
mandamus filed by the same petitioners herein against the RTC judge, praying that they be allowed access to
the records of the intestate proceedings, which the respondent judge had denied from them. Section 2 of Rule
135 came to fore, the provision stating that the records of every court of justice shall be public records and
shall be available for the inspection of any interested person x x x. The Court ruled that petitioners were
interested persons entitled to access the court records in the intestate proceedings. We said:
Petitioners' stated main purpose for accessing the records tomonitor prompt compliance with the
Rules governing the preservation and proper disposition of the assets of the estate, e.g., the completion and
appraisal of the Inventory and the submission by the Administratrix of an annual accounting appears

20

legitimate, for, as the plaintiffs in the complaints for sum of money against Roberto Benedicto, et al., they
have an interest over the outcome of the settlement of his estate. They are in fact "interested persons" under
Rule 135, Sec. 2 of the Rules of Court x x x[26]
Allowing creditors, contingent or otherwise, access to the records of the intestate proceedings is an
eminently preferable precedent than mandating the service of court processes and pleadings upon them. In
either case, the interest of the creditor in seeing to it that the assets are being preserved and disposed of in
accordance with the rules will be duly satisfied. Acknowledging their right to access the records, rather than
entitling them to the service of every court order or pleading no matter how relevant to their individual claim,
will be less cumbersome on the intestate court, the administrator and the heirs of the decedent, while
providing a viable means by which the interests of the creditors in the estate are preserved.
Nonetheless, in the instances that the Rules on Special Proceedings do require notice to any or all interested
parties the petitioners as interested parties will be entitled to such notice. The instances when notice has
to be given to interested parties are provided in: (1) Sec. 10, Rule 85 in reference to the time and place of
examining and allowing the account of the executor or administrator; (2) Sec. 7(b) of Rule 89 concerning the
petition to authorize the executor or administrator to sell personal estate, or to sell, mortgage or otherwise
encumber real estates; and; (3) Sec. 1, Rule 90 regarding the hearing for the application for an order for
distribution of the estate residue. After all, even the administratrix has acknowledged in her submitted
inventory, the existence of the pending cases filed by the petitioners.
We now turn to the remaining reliefs sought by petitioners; that a deadline be set for the submission
by administratrix Benedicto to submit a verified and complete inventory of the estate, and upon submission
thereof: the inheritance tax appraisers of the Bureau of Internal Revenue be required to assist in the appraisal
of the fair market value of the same; and that the intestate court set a deadline for the submission by the
administratrix of her verified annual account, and, upon submission thereof, set the date for her examination
under oath with respect thereto, with due notice to them and other parties interested in the collation,
preservation and disposition of the estate. We cannot grant said reliefs.
Section 1 of Rule 83 requires the administrator to return to the court a true inventory and appraisal of
all the real and personal estate of the deceased within three (3) months from appointment, while Section 8 of
Rule 85 requires the administrator to render an account of his administration within one (1) year from receipt
of the letters testamentary or of administration. We do not doubt that there are reliefs available to compel an
administrator to perform either duty, but a person whose claim against the estate is still contingent is not the
party entitled to do so. Still, even if the administrator did delay in the performance of these duties in the
context of dissipating the assets of the estate, there are protections enforced and available under Rule 88 to
protect the interests of those with contingent claims against the estate
Concerning complaints against the general competence of the administrator, the proper remedy is to
seek the removal of the administrator in accordance with Section 2, Rule 82. While the provision is silent as to
who may seek with the court the removal of the administrator, we do not doubt that a creditor, even a
contingent one, would have the personality to seek such relief. After all, the interest of the creditor in the
estate relates to the preservation of sufficient assets to answer for the debt, and the general competence or
good faith of the administrator is necessary to fulfill such purpose
All told, the ultimate disposition of the RTC and the Court of Appeals is correct. Nonetheless, as we
have explained, petitioners should not be deprived of their prerogatives under the Rules on Special
Proceedings as enunciated in this decision.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED, subject to the qualification that petitioners, as persons
interested in the intestate estate of Roberto Benedicto, are entitled to such notices and rights as provided for
such interested persons in the Rules on Settlement of Estates of Deceased Persons under the Rules on
Special Proceedings. No pronouncements as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. 122646. March 14, 1997]

21

ADELIA C. MENDOZA, for herself and Administratrix of the Intestate Estate of the late NORBERTO B.
MENDOZA, petitioners, vs. Hon. Angelito C. Teh, Presiding Judge, Branch 87, RTC, Rosario,
Batangas, Sps. Herminio & Clarita Tayag @ Sps. George T. Tiglao & Clarizza T. Tiglao and/or @
Teofilo M. Esguera, Leonor M. Esguera. Leticia M. Esguera, Joel M. Esguera, Ricardo M. Esguera,
Voltaire E. Tayag, Benito I. Tayag, Merlie Malig, Alberto T. Tayag, Rosemarie T. Tayag. Leticia E.
Lulu and the Register of Deeds for the Province of Batangas, respondents.
DECISION
FRANCISCO, J.:
On October 28, 1994, petitioner for herself and as administratrix of the intestate estate of her
deceased husband Norberto Mendoza filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Batangas a complaint for
reconveyance of title (involving parcels of lot in Batangas) and damages with petition for preliminary
injunction docketed as Civil Case No. R94-009.[1]Paragraphs 2 and 3 of said complaint states:
2. That Adelia C. Mendoza likewise represents her co-plaintiff, the Intestate Estate of the late Norberto B.
Mendoza in her capacity as the surviving wife of the deceased Norberto B. Mendoza who died on December
29, 1993;
3. That Adelia C. Mendoza should be appointed by this Honorable Court as the judicial administratrix of her
co-plaintiff for purposes of this case;[2]
Private respondents filed on January 21, 1995 [3] their answer with motion to dismiss [4] alleging among
others that the complaint states no cause of action and that petitioners demand had already been paid. [5] On
February 17, 1995, private respondents filed another pleading entitled motion to dismiss invoking, this
time, lack of jurisdiction, lack of cause of action, estoppel, laches and prescription. In support of their
argument of lack of jurisdiction, private respondents contend that a special proceedings case for appointment
of administratrix of an estate cannot be incorporated in the ordinary action for reconveyance. In her
opposition to the motions, petitioner asserts among others, that the allegation seeking appointment as
administratrix is only an incidental matter which is not even prayed for in the complaint. Replying to the
opposition, private respondents argued that since petitioners husband resided in Quezon City at the time of
his death, the appointment of the estate administratrix should be filed in the RTC of that place in accordance
with Section 1 Rule 73 of the Rules of Court. Accordingly, it is their argument that the RTC of Batangas has no
jurisdiction over the case.
In a Resolution dated June 14, 1995, the RTC of Batangas thru respondent Judge Teh dismissed without
prejudice the complaint for lack of jurisdiction on the ground that the rules governing an ordinary civil
action and a special proceeding are different. Accordingly, the lower court found it unnecessary to discuss
the other grounds raised in the motion to dismiss. [6] Upon denial of petitioners motion for reconsideration, he
filed this petition under Rule 45 on pure questions of law. The Court thereafter gave due course to the
petition.
The issue is whether or not in an action for reconveyance, an allegation seeking appointment as
administratrix of an estate, would oust the RTC of its jurisdiction over the whole case?
We rule in the negative. First, Section 19 of B.P. 129 as amended by RA 7691 provides:
Jurisdiction in Civil Cases. - Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction:
(1)
(2)

In all civil actions in which the subject of the litigation is incapable of pecuniary estimation;
In all civil actions which involve the title to, or possession of, real property, or any interest therein,

where the assessed value of property involved exceeds Twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00)...
xxx

xxx

xx

x
(4)

In all matters of probate, both testate and intestate ....

22

Likewise, Section 33 of the same law provides that:

Metropolitan Trial Court shall exercise:
(1) Exclusive original jurisdiction over civil actions and probate proceedings, testate and intestate... (italics
ours).
The above law is clear. An action for reconveyance, which involves title title to property worth millions of
pesos, such as the lots subject of this case, is cognizable by the RTC. Likewise falling within its jurisdiction
are actions incapable of pecuniary estimation, such as the appointment of an administratrix for an estate.
Even the Rules on venue of estate proceedings (Section 1 of Rule 73 [7]) impliedly recognizes the jurisdiction of
the RTC over petitions for granting of letters of administration. On the other hand, probate proceedings for
the settlement of estate are within the ambit of either the RTC or MTC depending on the net worth of the
estate. By arguing that the allegation seeking such appointment as administratrix ousted the RTC of its
jurisdiction, both public and private respondents confuses jurisdiction with venue. Section 2 of Rule 4 as
revised by Circular 13-95[8] provides that actions involving title to property shall be tried in the province
where the property is located, in this case, - Batangas. The mere fact that petitioners deceased husband
resides in Quezon City at the time of his death affects only the venue but not the jurisdiction of the Court. [9]
Second, the cases cited[10] by private respondents are not at point as they involve settlement of
estate where the probate court was asked to resolve questions of ownership of certain properties. In the
present suit, no settlement of estate is involved, but merely an allegation seeking appointment as estate
administratrix which does not necessarily involve settlement of estate that would have invited the exercise of
the limited jurisdiction of a probate court. The above allegation is not even a jurisdictional fact which must be
stated in an action for reconveyance. The Court therefore, should have at least, proceeded with the
reconveyance suit rather than dismiss the entire case.
Third, jurisprudential rulings that a probate court cannot generally decide questions of ownership or title
to property[11] is not applicable in this case, because: there is no settlement of estate involved and the RTC of
Batangas was not acting as a probate court. It should be clarified that whether a particular matter should be
resolved by the RTC in the exercise of its general jurisdiction or its limited probate jurisdiction, is not a
jurisdictional issue but a mere question of procedure. [12] Moreover, the instant action for reconveyance does
not even invoke the limited jurisdiction of a probate court. [13] Considering that the RTC has jurisdiction,
whether it be on the reconveyance suit or as to the appointment of an administratrix, it was improper for
respondent judge to dismiss the whole complaint for alleged lack of jurisdiction.
Finally, judges should not dismiss with precipitate haste, complaints or petitions filed before them, just so
they can comply with their administrative duty to dispose cases within 90 days at the expense of their judicial
responsibility.
WHEREFORE, the Resolutions dated June 14, 1995 and November 14, 1995 of the RTC of Batangas are
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The trial court is ordered to immediately proceed with the disposition of the case
in accordance with this Decision.
SO ORDERED.
RULE 73
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 159507
April 19, 2006
ANICETO G. SALUDO, JR., Petitioner,
vs.
AMERICAN EXPRESS INTERNATIONAL, INC., and/or IAN T. FISH and DOMINIC
MASCRINAS, Respondents.
DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:

23

Before the Court is the Petition for Review on Certiorari filed by Aniceto G. Saludo, Jr. seeking to reverse and
set aside the Decision1 dated May 22, 2003 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 69553. The assailed
decision directed the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Maasin City, Southern Leyte, Branch 25 thereof, to vacate
and set aside its Orders dated September 10, 2001 and January 2, 2002 in Civil Case No. R-3172, and
enjoined the presiding judge2 thereof from conducting further proceedings in said case, except to dismiss the
complaint filed therewith on ground of improper venue. The petition also seeks to reverse and set aside the
appellate court's Resolution dated August 14, 2003 denying the motion for reconsideration of the assailed
decision.
The factual and procedural antecedents are as follows:
Aniceto G. Saludo, Jr. filed a complaint for damages against the American Express International, Inc. (AMEX)
and/or its officers Ian T. Fish, Vice-President and Country Manager, and Dominic Mascrinas, Head of
Operations, with the RTC of Maasin City, Southern Leyte. The case was raffled to Branch 25 of the said court.
The complaint alleged, inter alia, that plaintiff (herein petitioner Saludo) "is a Filipino citizen, of legal age, and
a member of the House of Representatives and a resident of Ichon, Macrohon, Southern Leyte, Philippines."
On the other hand, defendant (herein respondent AMEX, Inc.) "is a corporation doing business in the
Philippines and engaged in providing credit and other credit facilities and allied services with office address at
4th floor, ACE Building, Rada Street, Legaspi Village, Makati City." The other defendants (herein respondents
Fish and Mascrinas) are officers of respondent AMEX, and may be served with summons and other court
processes at their office address.
The complaint's cause of action stemmed from the alleged wrongful dishonor of petitioner Saludo's AMEX
credit card and the supplementary card issued to his daughter. The first dishonor happened when petitioner
Saludo's daughter used her supplementary credit card to pay her purchases in the United States some time in
April 2000. The second dishonor occurred when petitioner Saludo used his principal credit card to pay his
account at the Hotel Okawa in Tokyo, Japan while he was there with other delegates from the Philippines to
attend the Congressional Recognition in honor of Mr. Hiroshi Tanaka.
The dishonor of these AMEX credit cards were allegedly unjustified as they resulted from respondents'
unilateral act of suspending petitioner Saludo's account for his failure to pay its balance covering the period
of March 2000. Petitioner Saludo denied having received the corresponding statement of account. Further, he
was allegedly wrongfully charged for late payment in June 2000. Subsequently, his credit card and its
supplementary cards were canceled by respondents on July 20, 2000.
Petitioner Saludo claimed that he suffered great inconvenience, wounded feelings, mental anguish,
embarrassment, humiliation and besmirched political and professional standing as a result of respondents'
acts which were committed in gross and evident bad faith, and in wanton, reckless and oppressive manner.
He thus prayed that respondents be adjudged to pay him, jointly and severally, actual, moral and exemplary
damages, and attorney's fees.
In their answer, respondents specifically denied the allegations in the complaint. Further, they raised the
affirmative defenses of lack of cause of action and improper venue. On the latter, respondents averred that
the complaint should be dismissed on the ground that venue was improperly laid because none of the parties
was a resident of Leyte. They alleged that respondents were not residents of Southern Leyte. Moreover,
notwithstanding the claim in his complaint, petitioner Saludo was not allegedly a resident thereof as
evidenced by the fact that his community tax certificate, which was presented when he executed the
complaint's verification and certification of non-forum shopping, was issued at Pasay City. To buttress their
contention, respondents pointed out that petitioner Saludo's complaint was prepared in Pasay City and signed
by a lawyer of the said city. Respondents prayed for the dismissal of the complaint a quo.
Thereafter, respondents filed an Opposition to Ex-Parte Motion (to Set Case for Pre-Trial) and Motion for
Preliminary Hearing (on Affirmative Defense of Improper Venue) to which petitioner Saludo filed his
Comments and/or Objections to the Affirmative Defense of Improper Venue. He asserted that any allegation
refuting his residency in Southern Leyte was baseless and unfounded considering that he was the
congressman of the lone district thereof at the time of the filing of his complaint. He urged the court a quo to
take judicial notice of this particular fact. As a member of Congress, he possessed all the qualifications
prescribed by the Constitution including that of being a resident of his district. He was also a member of the

24

Integrated Bar of the Philippines-Southern Leyte Chapter, and has been such ever since his admission to the
Bar. His community tax certificate was issued at Pasay City only because he has an office thereat and the
office messenger obtained the same in the said city. In any event, the community tax certificate is not
determinative of one's residence.
In the Order dated September 10, 2001, the court a quo denied the affirmative defenses interposed by
respondents. It found the allegations of the complaint sufficient to constitute a cause of action against
respondents. The court a quo likewise denied respondents' affirmative defense that venue was improperly
laid. It reasoned, thus:
x x x [T]he fact alone that the plaintiff at the time he filed the complaint was and still is, the incumbent
Congressman of the Lone District of Southern Leyte with residence at Ichon, Macrohon, Southern Leyte, is
enough to dispell any and all doubts about his actual residence. As a high-ranking government official of the
province, his residence there can be taken judicial notice of. As such his personal, actual and physical
habitation or his actual residence or place of abode can never be in some other place but in Ichon, Macrohon,
Southern Leyte. It is correctly stated by the plaintiff, citing the case of Core v. Core, 100 Phil. 321 that,
"residence, for purposes of fixing venue of an action, is synonymous with domicile. This is defined as the
permanent home, the place to which, whenever absent for business or pleasure, one intends to return, and
depends on the facts and circumstances, in the sense that they disclose intent. A person can have but one
domicile at a time. A man can have but one domicile for one and the same purpose at any time, but he may
have numerous places of residence. Venue could be at place of his residence. (Masa v. Mison, 200 SCRA 715
[1991])3
Respondents sought the reconsideration thereof but the court a quo denied the same in the Order dated
January 2, 2002. They then filed with the appellate court a petition for certiorari and prohibition alleging
grave abuse of discretion on the part of the presiding judge of the court a quo in issuing the September 10,
2001 and January 2, 2002 Orders. Upon respondents' posting of a bond, the appellate court issued on March
14, 2002 a temporary restraining order which enjoined the presiding judge of the court a quo from conducting
further proceedings in Civil Case No. R-3172.
On May 22, 2003, the appellate court rendered the assailed decision granting respondents' petition for
certiorari as it found that venue was improperly laid. It directed the court a quo to vacate and set aside its
Orders dated September 10, 2001 and January 2, 2002, and enjoined the presiding judge thereof from further
proceeding in the case, except to dismiss the complaint.
The appellate court explained that the action filed by petitioner Saludo against respondents is governed by
Section 2, Rule 4 of the Rules of Court. The said rule on venue of personal actions basically provides that
personal actions may be commenced and tried where plaintiff or any of the principal plaintiffs resides, or
where defendant or any of the principal defendants resides, at the election of plaintiff.
Venue was improperly laid in the court a quo, according to the appellate court, because not one of the parties
was a resident of Southern Leyte. Specifically, it declared that petitioner Saludo was not a resident thereof.
The appellate court pronounced that, for purposes of venue, the residence of a person is his personal, actual
or physical habitation, or his actual residence or place of abode, which may not necessarily be his legal
residence or domicile provided he resides therein with continuity and consistency. 4
The appellate court quoted the following discussion in Koh v. Court of Appeals 5 where the Court distinguished
the terms "residence" and "domicile" in this wise:
x x x [T]he term domicile is not exactly synonymous in legal contemplation with the term residence, for it is
[an] established principle in Conflict of Laws that domicile refers to the relatively more permanent abode of a
person while residence applies to a temporary stay of a person in a given place. In fact, this distinction is very
well emphasized in those cases where the Domiciliary Theory must necessarily supplant the Nationality
Theory in cases involving stateless persons.
xxxx
"There is a difference between domicile and residence. Residence is used to indicate a place of abode,
whether permanent or temporary; domicile denotes a fixed permanent residence to which when absent, one
has the intention of returning. A man may have a residence in one place and a domicile in another. Residence
is not domicile, but domicile is residence coupled with intention to remain for an unlimited time. A man can

25

have but one domicile for one and the same purpose at any time, but he may have numerous places of
residence. His place of residence generally is his place of domicile, but is not by any means, necessarily so
since no length of residence without intention of remaining will constitute domicile." 6 (Italicized for emphasis)
In holding that petitioner Saludo is not a resident of Maasin City, Southern Leyte, the appellate court referred
to his community tax certificate, as indicated in his complaint's verification and certification of non-forum
shopping, which was issued at Pasay City. Similarly, it referred to the same community tax certificate, as
indicated in his complaint for deportation filed against respondents Fish and Mascrinas. Under Republic Act
No. 7160,7 the community tax certificate shall be paid in the place of residence of the individual, or in the
place where the principal office of the juridical entity is located. 8 It also pointed out that petitioner Saludo's
law office, which was also representing him in the present case, is in Pasay City. The foregoing circumstances
were considered by the appellate court as judicial admissions of petitioner Saludo which are conclusive upon
him and no longer required proof.
The appellate court chided the court a quo for stating that as incumbent congressman of the lone district of
Southern Leyte, judicial notice could be taken of the fact of petitioner Saludo's residence thereat. No evidence
had yet been adduced that petitioner Saludo was then the congressman of Southern Leyte and actual
resident of Ichon, Macrohon of the said province.
The appellate court held that, based on his complaint, petitioner Saludo was actually residing in Pasay City. It
faulted him for filing his complaint with the court a quo when the said venue is inconvenient to the parties to
the case. It opined that under the rules, the possible choices of venue are Pasay City or Makati City, or any
place in the National Capital Judicial Region, at the option of petitioner Saludo.
It stressed that while the choice of venue is given to plaintiff, said choice is not left to his caprice and cannot
deprive a defendant of the rights conferred upon him by the Rules of Court. 9 Further, fundamental in the law
governing venue of actions that the situs for bringing real and personal civil actions is fixed by the rules to
attain the greatest possible convenience to the party litigants by taking into consideration the maximum
accessibility to them - i.e., to both plaintiff and defendant, not only to one or the other - of the courts of
justice.10
The appellate court concluded that the court a quo should have given due course to respondents' affirmative
defense of improper venue in order to avoid any suspicion that petitioner Saludo's motive in filing his
complaint with the court a quo was only to vex and unduly inconvenience respondents or even to wield
influence in the outcome of the case, petitioner Saludo being a powerful and influential figure in the said
province. The latter circumstance could be regarded as a "specie of forum shopping" akin to that in Investors
Finance Corp. v. Ebarle11 where the Court mentioned that the filing of the civil action before the court in
Pagadian City "was a specie of forum shopping" considering that plaintiff therein was an influential person in
the locality.
The decretal portion of the assailed Decision dated May 22, 2003 of the appellate court reads:
UPON THE VIEW WE TAKE OF THIS CASE, THUS, the challenged orders must be, as they hereby are, VACATED
and SET ASIDE and the respondent judge, or any one acting in his place or stead, is instructed and enjoined
to desist from further proceeding in the case, except to dismiss it. The temporary restraining order earlier
issued is hereby converted into a writ of preliminary injunction, upon the posting this time by petitioners
[herein respondents], within five (5) days from receipt of this decision, of a bond in the amount of Five Million
Pesos (P5,000,000.00), to answer for all damages that private respondent [herein petitioner] may sustain by
reason of the issuance of such injunction should the Court finally decide that petitioners are not entitled
thereto. Private respondent, if he so minded, may refile his case for damages before the Regional Trial Court
of Makati City or Pasay City, or any of the Regional Trial Courts of the National Capital Judicial Region. Without
costs.
SO ORDERED.12
Petitioner Saludo sought the reconsideration of the said decision but the appellate court, in the Resolution
dated August 14, 2003, denied his motion for reconsideration. Hence, he filed the instant petition for review
with the Court alleging that:

26

The Court of Appeals, (Special Fourth Division), in promulgating the afore-mentioned Decision and Resolution,
has decided a question of substance in a way probably not in accord with law or with applicable decisions of
this Honorable Court.
(a) the Court of Appeals erred in not taking judicial notice of the undisputed fact that herein petitioner is the
incumbent congressman of the lone district of Southern Leyte and as such, he is a residence (sic) of said
district;
(b) the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing the complaint on the basis of improper venue due to the alleged
judicial admission of herein petitioner;
(c) the Court of Appeals in dismissing the complaint ignored applicable decisions of this Honorable Court;
and1avvphil.net
(d) the Court of Appeals erred in deciding that herein petitioner violated the rules on venue, and even
speculated that herein petitioner's motive in filing the complaint in Maasin City was only to vex the
respondents.13
In gist, the sole substantive issue for the Court's resolution is whether the appellate court committed
reversible error in holding that venue was improperly laid in the court a quo in Civil Case No. R-3172 because
not one of the parties, including petitioner Saludo, as plaintiff therein, was a resident of Southern Leyte at the
time of filing of the complaint.
The petition is meritorious.
Petitioner Saludo's complaint for damages against respondents before the court a quo is a personal action. As
such, it is governed by Section 2, Rule 4 of the Rules of Courts which reads:
SEC. 2. Venue of personal actions. - All other actions may be commenced and tried where the plaintiff or any
of the principal plaintiffs resides, or where the defendant or any of the principal defendants resides, or in the
case of a non-resident defendant where he may be found, at the election of the plaintiff.
The choice of venue for personal actions cognizable by the RTC is given to plaintiff but not to plaintiff's
caprice because the matter is regulated by the Rules of Court. 14 The rule on venue, like other procedural
rules, is designed to insure a just and orderly administration of justice, or the impartial and evenhanded
determination of every action and proceeding. 15 The option of plaintiff in personal actions cognizable by the
RTC is either the place where defendant resides or may be found, or the place where plaintiff resides. If
plaintiff opts for the latter, he is limited to that place. 16
Following this rule, petitioner Saludo, as plaintiff, had opted to file his complaint with the court a quo which is
in Maasin City, Southern Leyte. He alleged in his complaint that he was a member of the House of
Representatives and a resident of Ichon, Macrohon, Southern Leyte to comply with the residency requirement
of the rule.
However, the appellate court, adopting respondents' theory, made the finding that petitioner Saludo was not
a resident of Southern Leyte at the time of the filing of his complaint. It hinged the said finding mainly on the
fact that petitioner Saludo's community tax certificate, indicated in his complaint's verification and
certification of non-forum shopping, was issued at Pasay City. That his law office is in Pasay City was also
taken by the appellate court as negating petitioner Saludo's claim of residence in Southern Leyte.
The appellate court committed reversible error in finding that petitioner Saludo was not a resident of
Southern Leyte at the time of the filing of his complaint, and consequently holding that venue was improperly
laid in the court a quo. In Dangwa Transportation Co., Inc. v. Sarmiento, 17 the Court had the occasion to
explain at length the meaning of the term "resides" for purposes of venue, thus:
In Koh v. Court of Appeals, we explained that the term "resides" as employed in the rule on venue on personal
actions filed with the courts of first instance means the place of abode, whether permanent or temporary, of
the plaintiff or the defendant, as distinguished from "domicile" which denotes a fixed permanent residence to
which, when absent, one has the intention of returning.
"It is fundamental in the law governing venue of actions (Rule 4 of the Rules of Court) that the situs for
bringing real and personal civil actions are fixed by the rules to attain the greatest convenience possible to
the parties-litigants by taking into consideration the maximum accessibility to them of the courts of justice. It
is, likewise, undeniable that the term domicile is not exactly synonymous in legal contemplation with the
term residence, for it is an established principle in Conflict of Laws that domicile refers to the relatively more
permanent abode of a person while residence applies to a temporary stay of a person in a given place. In

27

fact, this distinction is very well emphasized in those cases where the Domiciliary Theory must necessarily
supplant the Nationality Theory in cases involving stateless persons.
"This Court held in the case of Uytengsu v. Republic, 50 O.G. 4781, October, 1954, reversing its previous
stand in Larena v. Ferrer, 61 Phil. 36, and Nuval v. Guray, 52 Phil. 645, that 'There is a difference between domicile and residence. Residence is used to indicate a place of abode,
whether permanent or temporary; domicile denotes a fixed permanent residence to which when absent, one
has the intention of returning. A man may have a residence in one place and a domicile in another. Residence
is not domicile, but domicile is residence coupled with the intention to remain for an unlimited time. A man
can have but one domicile for one and the same purpose at any time, but he may have numerous places of
residence. His place of residence generally is his place of domicile, but is not by any means, necessarily so
since no length of residence without intention of remaining will constitute domicile.' (Italicized for emphasis)
"We note that the law on venue in Courts of First Instance (Section 2, of Rule 4, Rules of Court) in referring to
the parties utilizes the words 'resides or may be found,' and not 'is domiciled,' thus:
'Sec. 2(b) Personal actions - All other actions may be commenced and tried where the defendant or any of the
defendants resides or may be found, or where the plaintiff or any of the plaintiffs resides, at the election of
the plaintiff.' (Italicized for emphasis)
"Applying the foregoing observation to the present case, We are fully convinced that private respondent
Coloma's protestations of domicile in San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte, based on his manifested intention to return
there after the retirement of his wife from government service to justify his bringing of an action for damages
against petitioner in the C.F.I. of Ilocos Norte, is entirely of no moment since what is of paramount importance
is where he actually resided or where he may be found at the time he brought the action, to comply
substantially with the requirements of Sec. 2(b) of Rule 4, Rules of Court, on venue of personal actions." (Koh
v. Court of Appeals, supra, pp. 304-305.)
The same construction of the word "resides" as used in Section 1, Rule 73, of the Revised Rules of Court, was
enunciated in Fule v. Court of Appeals, et al. (G.R. No. L-40502) and Fule v. Hon. Ernani C. Pao, et al. (G.R.
No. L-42670), decided on November 29, 1976. Thus, this Court, in the aforecited cases, stated:
"2. But, the far-ranging question is this: What does the term 'resides' mean? Does it refer to the actual
residence or domicile of the decedent at the time of his death? We lay down the doctrinal rule that the term
'resides' connotes ex vi termini 'actual residence' as distinguished from 'legal residence or domicile.' This
term 'resides,' like the terms 'residing' and 'residence' is elastic and should be interpreted in the light of the
object or purposes of the statute or rule in which it is employed. In the application of venue statutes and rules
- Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules of Court is of such nature - residence rather than domicile is the
significant factor. Even where the statute uses the word 'domicile' still it is construed as meaning residence
and not domicile in the technical sense. Some cases make a distinction between the terms 'residence' and
'domicile' but as generally used in statutes fixing venue, the terms are synonymous, and convey the same
meaning as the term 'inhabitant.' In other words, 'resides' should be viewed or understood in its popular
sense, meaning, the personal, actual or physical habitation of a person, actual residence or place of abode. It
signifies physical presence in a place and actual stay thereat. In this popular sense, the term means merely
residence, that is, personal residence, not legal residence or domicile. Residence simply requires bodily
presence as an inhabitant in a given place, while domicile requires bodily presence in that place and also an
intention to make it one's domicile. No particular length of time of residence is required though; however, the
residence must be more than temporary."18
There is no dispute that petitioner Saludo was the congressman or the representative of the lone district of
Southern Leyte at the time of filing of his complaint with the court a quo. Even the appellate court admits this
fact as it states that "it may be conceded that private respondent ever so often travels to Maasin City,
Southern Leyte, because he is its representative in the lower house." 19
As a member of the House of Representatives, petitioner Saludo was correctly deemed by the court a quo as
possessing the requirements for the said position,20 including that he was then a resident of the district which
he was representing, i.e., Southern Leyte. Significantly, for purposes of election law, the term "residence" is
synonymous with "domicile," thus:

28

x x x [T]he Court held that "domicile" and "residence" are synonymous. The term "residence," as used in the
election law, imports not only an intention to reside in a fixed place but also personal presence in that place,
coupled with conduct indicative of such intention. "Domicile" denotes a fixed permanent residence to which
when absent for business or pleasure, or for like reasons, one intends to return. x x x 21
It can be readily gleaned that the definition of "residence" for purposes of election law is more stringent in
that it is equated with the term "domicile." Hence, for the said purpose, the term "residence" imports "not
only an intention to reside in a fixed place but also personal presence in that place, coupled with conduct
indicative of such intention."22 When parsed, therefore, the term "residence" requires two elements: (1)
intention to reside in the particular place; and (2) personal or physical presence in that place, coupled with
conduct indicative of such intention. As the Court elucidated, "the place where a party actually or
constructively has a permanent home, where he, no matter where he may be found at any given time,
eventually intends to return and remain, i.e., his domicile, is that to which the Constitution refers when it
speaks of residence for the purposes of election law."23
On the other hand, for purposes of venue, the less technical definition of "residence" is adopted. Thus, it is
understood to mean as "the personal, actual or physical habitation of a person, actual residence or place of
abode. It signifies physical presence in a place and actual stay thereat. In this popular sense, the term means
merely residence, that is, personal residence, not legal residence or domicile. Residence simply requires
bodily presence as an inhabitant in a given place, while domicile requires bodily presence in that place and
also an intention to make it one's domicile."24
Since petitioner Saludo, as congressman or the lone representative of the district of Southern Leyte, had his
residence (or domicile) therein as the term is construed in relation to election laws, necessarily, he is also
deemed to have had his residence therein for purposes of venue for filing personal actions. Put in another
manner, Southern Leyte, as the domicile of petitioner Saludo, was also his residence, as the term is
understood in its popular sense. This is because "residence is not domicile, but domicile is residence coupled
with the intention to remain for an unlimited time."
Reliance by the appellate court on Koh v. Court of Appeals 25 is misplaced. Contrary to its holding,26 the facts of
the present case are not similar to the facts therein. In Koh, the complaint was filed with the Court of First
Instance in San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte by plaintiff who admitted that he was a resident of Kamias, Quezon City.
Save for the fact that he grew up in San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte and that he manifested the intent to return
there after retirement, plaintiff therein had not established that he was actually a resident therein at the time
of the filing of his complaint. Neither did he establish that he had his domicile therein because although he
manifested the intent to go back there after retirement, the element of personal presence in that place was
lacking. To reiterate, domicile or residence, as the terms are taken as synonyms, imports "not only an
intention to reside in a fixed place but also personal presence in that place, coupled with conduct indicative of
such intention."27
In contrast, petitioner Saludo was the congressman or representative of Southern Leyte at the time of filing of
his complaint with the court a quo. Absent any evidence to the contrary, he is deemed to possess the
qualifications for the said position, including that he was a resident therein. And following the definition of the
term "residence" for purposes of election law, petitioner Saludo not only had the intention to reside in
Southern Leyte, but he also had personal presence therein, coupled with conduct indicative of such intention.
The latter element, or his bodily presence as an inhabitant in Southern Leyte, was sufficient for petitioner
Saludo to be considered a resident therein for purposes of venue.
The following ratiocination of the court a quo is apt:
Residence in civil law is a material fact, referring to the physical presence of a person in a place. A person can
have two or more residences, such as a country residence and a city residence. (Quetulio v. Ruiz, S.C. Off.
Gaz. 156, Commentaries and Jurisprudence in Civil Law, Vol. 1, page 211, Tolentino). Residence is acquired by
living in a place; on the other hand, domicile can exist without actually living in the place. The important
thing for domicile is that, once residence has been established in one place, there be an intention to stay
there permanently, even if residence is also established in some other place.
Thus, if a person lives with his family habitually in Quezon City, he would have his domicile in Quezon City. If
he also has a house for vacation purposes in the City of Baguio, and another house in connection with his

29

business in the City of Manila, he would have residence in all three places (Tolentino, Commentaries and
Jurisprudence on Civil Law, Vol. 1, Page 212, 1990 Edition) so that one[']s legal residence or domicile can also
be his actual, personal or physical residence or habitation or place of abode if he stays there with intention to
stay there permanently.
In the instant case, since plaintiff has a house in Makati City for the purpose of exercising his profession or
doing business and also a house in Ichon, Macrohon, Southern Leyte, for doing business and/or for election or
political purposes where he also lives or stays physically, personally and actually then he can have residences
in these two places. Because it would then be preposterous to acknowledge and recognize plaintiff Aniceto G.
Saludo, Jr. as congressman of Southern Leyte without also recognizing him as actually, personally and
physically residing thereat, when such residence is required by law. 28
The fact then that petitioner Saludo's community tax certificate was issued at Pasay City is of no moment
because granting arguendo that he could be considered a resident therein, the same does not preclude his
having a residence in Southern Leyte for purposes of venue. A man can have but one domicile for one and
the same purpose at any time, but he may have numerous places of residence. 29
That petitioner Saludo was the congressman or representative of the lone district of Southern Leyte at the
time of the filing of his complaint was admitted as a fact by the court a quo. In this connection, it
consequently held that, as such, petitioner Saludo's residence in Southern Leyte, the district he was the
representing, could be taken judicial notice of. The court a quo cannot be faulted for doing so because courts
are allowed "to take judicial notice of matters which are of public knowledge, or are capable of
unquestionable demonstration, or ought to be known to judges because of their judicial functions."

30

Courts

are likewise bound to take judicial notice, without the introduction of evidence, of the law in force in the
Philippines, 31 including its Constitution.
The concept of "facts of common knowledge" in the context of judicial notice has been explained as those
facts that are "so commonly known in the community as to make it unprofitable to require proof, and so
certainly known to as to make it indisputable among reasonable men."

32

Moreover, "though usually facts of

'common knowledge' will be generally known throughout the country, it is sufficient as a basis for judicial
notice that they be known in the local community where the trial court sits."

33

Certainly, the fact of petitioner

Saludo being the duly elected representative of Southern Leyte at the time could be properly taken judicial
notice of by the court a quo, the same being a matter of common knowledge in the community where it sits.
Further, petitioner Saludo's residence in Southern Leyte could likewise be properly taken judicial notice of by
the court a quo. It is bound to know that, under the Constitution, one of the qualifications of a congressman
or representative to the House of Representatives is having a residence in the district in which he shall be
elected.
In fine, petitioner Saludo's act of filing his complaint with the court a quo cannot be characterized as a
"specie of forum-shopping" or capricious on his part because, under the rules, as plaintiff, he is precisely
given this option.
Finally, respondents' claim that the instant petition for review was not properly verified by petitioner Saludo
deserves scant consideration.
Section 4, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court reads:
Sec. 4. Verification. - Except when otherwise specifically required by law or rule, pleadings need not be under
oath, verified or accompanied by affidavit.
A pleading is verified by an affidavit that the affiant has read the pleading and that the allegations therein are
true and correct of his personal knowledge or based on authentic records.
A pleading required to be verified which contains a verification based on "information and belief," or upon
"knowledge, information and belief," or lacks proper verification, shall be treated as an unsigned pleading.
Petitioner Saludo's verification and certification of non-forum shopping states that he has "read the contents
thereof [referring to the petition] and the same are true and correct of my own personal knowledge and belief
and on the basis of the records at hand." The same clearly constitutes substantial compliance with the above
requirements of the Rules of Court.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated May 22, 2003 and Resolution
dated August 14, 2003 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 69553 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The

30

Orders dated September 10, 2001 and January 2, 2002 of the Regional Trial Court of Maasin City, Southern
Leyte, Branch 25 thereof, in Civil Case No. R-3172 are REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.

SECOND DIVISION

EMILIA FIGURACION-GERILLA,
Petitioner,
Present:

-versus-

G.R. No. 154322

PUNO, J., Chairperson,

SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,
CORONA,
AZCUNA and
GARCIA, JJ.
CAROLINA VDA. DE FIGURACION,*
ELENA FIGURACION-ANCHETA,*
HILARIA A. FIGURACION, FELIPA
FIGURACION-MANUEL, QUINTIN
FIGURACION and
MARY FIGURACION-GINEZ,
Respondents. Promulgated:
August 22, 2006

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
DECISION
CORONA, J.:
In this petition for review on certiorari, [1] petitioner Emilia Figuracion-Gerilla challenges the
decision[2] and resolution[3] of the Court of Appeals (CA) affirming the decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of Urdaneta City, Pangasinan, Branch 49, which dismissed her complaint for partition. The properties involved
are two parcels of land which belonged to her late father, Leandro Figuracion.
The facts of the case follow.[4]

31

Spouses Leandro and respondent Carolina Figuracion (now both deceased) had six children: petitioner
and

respondents

Elena Figuracion-Ancheta (now

deceased), Hilaria Figuracion, Felipa Figuracion-

Manuel, Quintin Figuracion and Mary Figuracion-Ginez.

On August 23, 1955, Leandro executed a deed of quitclaim over his real properties in favor of
his six children. When he died in 1958, he left behind two parcels of land: (1) Lot 2299 of the Cadastral
Survey of Urdaneta consisting of 7,547 square meters with Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 4221-P in the
name of Leandro Figuracion, married to Carolina Adviento and (2) Lot 705 of the Cadastral Survey
of Urdaneta with an area of 2,900 sq. m. with TCT No. 4220-P also in the name of Leandro Figuracion,
married to Carolina Adviento. Leandro had inherited both lots from his deceased parents,[5] as evidenced by
Original Certificate of Title (OCT) Nos. 16731 and 16610, respectively, issued by the Register of Deeds of the
Province of Pangasinan.
Leandro sold a portion of Lot 2299 to Lazaro Adviento, as a result of which TCT No. 4221-P was
cancelled and TCT No. 101331 was issued to LazaroAdviento, married to Rosenda Sagueped as owner of
the 162 sq. m. and Leandro Figuracion, married to Carolina Adviento as owner of 7,385 sq. m. This lot
continued to be in the name of Leandro in Tax Declaration No. 616 for the year 1985.
What gave rise to the complaint for partition, however, was a dispute between petitioner and her
sister, respondent Mary, over the eastern half of Lot 707 of the Cadastral Survey of Urdaneta with an area of
3,164 sq. m.
Lot 707 belonged to Eulalio Adviento, as evidenced by OCT No. 15867 issued on February 9,
1916. When Adviento died, his two daughters, Agripina Adviento(his daughter by his first wife) and
respondent Carolina (his daughter by his second wife), succeeded him to it. On November 28,
1961, Agripina executed a quitclaim in favor of petitioner over the one-half eastern portion of Lot
707. Agripina died on July 28, 1963, single and without any issue. Before her half-sisters death, however,
respondent Carolina adjudicated unto herself, via affidavit under Rule 74 of the Rules of Court, the entire Lot
707 which she later sold to respondents Felipa and Hilaria. The latter two immediately had OCT No. 15867
cancelled, on December 11, 1962. A new title, TCT No. 42244, was then issued in the names
of Felipa and Hilaria for Lot 707.
In February 1971, petitioner and her family went to the United States where they stayed for ten
years. Returning in 1981,[6] she built a house made of strong materials on the eastern half-portion of Lot 707.
She continued paying her share of the realty taxes thereon.
It was sometime later that this dispute erupted. Petitioner sought the extrajudicial partition of all
properties held in common by her and respondents. On May 23, 1994, petitioner filed a complaint in the RTC
of Urdaneta City, Branch 49, for partition, annulment of documents, reconveyance, quieting of title and
damages against respondents, praying, among others, for: (1) the partition of Lots 2299 and 705; (2)
the nullification of the affidavit of self-adjudication executed by respondent Carolina over Lot 707, the deed of
absolute sale in favor of respondents Felipa and Hilaria, and TCT No. 42244; (3) a declaration that petitioner
was the owner of one-half of Lot 707 and (4) damages. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. U-5826.
On the other hand, respondents took the position that Leandros estate should first undergo
settlement proceedings before partition among the heirs could take place. And they claimed that an
accounting of expenses chargeable to the estate was necessary for such settlement.
On June 26, 1997,[7] the RTC[8] rendered judgment nullifying Carolinas affidavit of self-adjudication and
deed of absolute sale of Lot 707. It also declared Lots 2299 and 705 as exclusive properties
of Leandro Figuracion and therefore part of his estate. The RTC, however, dismissed the complaint for
partition, reconveyanceand damages on the ground that it could not grant the reliefs prayed for by petitioner
without any (prior) settlement proceedings wherein the transfer of title of the properties should first
be effected.
On appeal, the CA upheld the dismissal of petitioners action for partition for being premature. The CA
reversed the decision, however, with respect to the nullification of the self-adjudication and the deed of
sale. Upholding the validity of the affidavit of self-adjudication and deed of sale as to Carolinas one-half pro-

32

indiviso share, it instead partitioned Lot 707. Dissatisfied, respondents elevated the CA decision to this Court
in G.R. No. 151334, entitled Carolina vda. de Figuracion, et al. v. Emilia Figuracion-Gerilla.[9]
The issue for our consideration is whether or not there needs to be a prior settlement
of Leandros intestate estate (that is, an accounting of the income of Lots 2299 and 705, the payment of
expenses, liabilities and taxes, plus compliance with other legal requirements, etc.) before the properties can
be partitioned or distributed.
Respondents claim that: (1) the properties constituting Leandros estate cannot be partitioned before
his estate is settled and (2) there should be an accounting before anything else, considering that they
(respondents) had to spend for the maintenance of the deceased Leandro Figuracion and his wife in their final
years, which support was supposed to come from the income of the properties. Among other things,
respondents apparently wanted petitioner to share in the expenses incurred for the care of their parents
during the ten years she stayed in the United States, before she could get her part of the estate while
petitioner apparently wanted her gross share, without first contributing to the expenses.
In any event, there appears to be a complication with respect to the partition of Lot 705. The
records refer to a case entitled Figuracion, et al. v. Alejocurrently pending in the CA. The records, however,
give no clue or information regarding what exactly this case is all about. Whatever the issues may be, suffice
it to say that partition is premature when ownership of the lot is still in dispute. [10]
Petitioner faces a different problem with respect to Lot 2299. Section 1, Rule 69 of the Rules of Court
provides:
SECTION 1. Complaint in action for partition of real estate. A person having the right to compel the
partition of real estate may do so as provided in this Rule, setting forth in his complaint the nature and extent
of his title and an adequate description of the real estate of which partition is demanded and joining as
defendants all other persons interested in the property.
The right to an inheritance is transmitted immediately to the heirs by operation of law, at the moment
of death of the decedent. There is no doubt that, as one of the heirs of Leandro Figuracion, petitioner has a
legal interest in Lot 2299. But can she compel partition at this stage?
There are two ways by which partition can take place under Rule 69: by agreement under Section
2[11] and through commissioners when such agreement cannot be reached, under Sections 3 to 6. [12]
Neither method specifies a procedure for determining expenses chargeable to the decedents estate.
While Section 8 of Rule 69 provides that there shall be an accounting of the real propertys income (rentals
and profits) in the course of an action for partition, [13] there is no provision for the accounting of expenses for
which property belonging to the decedents estate may be answerable, such as funeral expenses, inheritance
taxes and similar expenses enumerated under Section 1, Rule 90 of the Rules of Court.
In a situation where there remains an issue as to the expenses chargeable to the estate, partition is
inappropriate. While petitioner points out that the estate is allegedly without any debt and she and
respondents are Leandro Figuracions only legal heirs, she does not dispute the finding of the CA that certain
expenses including those related to her fathers final illness and burial have not been properly settled.
[14]

Thus, the heirs (petitioner and respondents) have to submit their fathers estate to settlement because

the determination of these expenses cannot be done in an action for partition.

In estate settlement proceedings, there is a proper procedure for the accounting of all expenses for
which the estate must answer. If it is any consolation at all to petitioner, the heirs or distributees of the
properties may take possession thereof even before the settlement of accounts, as long as they first file a
bond conditioned on the payment of the estates obligations.[15]
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED. The Court of Appeals decision and resolution in CA-G.R.
CV No. 58290 are AFFIRMED in so far as theissue of the partition of Lots 2299 and 705 is concerned.
But with respect to Lot 707, we make no ruling on the validity of Carolina vda. de Figuracions affidavit
of

self-adjudication

and

deed

of

sale

in

favor

of Felipa andHilaria Figuracion in

view

of

the

fact

that Carolina vda. de Figuracion, et al. v. Emilia Figuracion-Gerilla (G.R. No. 151334) is still pending in this
Division.

33

Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

[G.R. No. 128314. May 29, 2002]

RODOLFO V. JAO, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and PERICO V. JAO, respondents.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
Rodolfo and Perico Jao were the only sons of the spouses Ignacio Jao Tayag and Andrea V. Jao, who died
intestate in 1988 and 1989, respectively. The decedents left real estate, cash, shares of stock and other
personal properties.
On April 17, 1991, Perico instituted a petition for issuance of letters of administration before the Regional
Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 99, over the estate of his parents, docketed as Special Proceedings No. Q91-8507.[1] Pending the appointment of a regular administrator, Perico moved that he be appointed as special
administrator. He alleged that his brother, Rodolfo, was gradually dissipating the assets of the estate. More
particularly, Rodolfo was receiving rentals from real properties without rendering any accounting, and forcibly
opening vaults belonging to their deceased parents and disposing of the cash and valuables therein.
Rodolfo moved for the dismissal of the petition on the ground of improper venue. [2] He argued that the
deceased spouses did not reside in Quezon City either during their lifetime or at the time of their deaths. The
decedents actual residence was in Angeles City, Pampanga, where his late mother used to run and operate a
bakery. As the health of his parents deteriorated due to old age, they stayed in Rodolfos residence at 61
Scout

Gandia

Street,

Quezon

City,

solely for

the

purpose

of obtaining

medical

treatment

and

hospitalization. Rodolfo submitted documentary evidence previously executed by the decedents, consisting
of income tax returns, voters affidavits, statements of assets and liabilities, real estate tax payments, motor
vehicle registration and passports, all indicating that their permanent residence was in Angeles City,
Pampanga.
In his opposition,[3] Perico countered that their deceased parents actually resided in Rodolfos house in
Quezon City at the time of their deaths. As a matter of fact, it was conclusively declared in their death
certificates that their last residence before they died was at 61 Scout Gandia Street, Quezon City. [4] Rodolfo
himself even supplied the entry appearing on the death certificate of their mother, Andrea, and affixed his
own signature on the said document.
Rodolfo filed a rejoinder, stating that he gave the information regarding the decedents residence on the
death certificates in good faith and through honest mistake. He gave his residence only as reference,
considering that their parents were treated in their late years at the Medical City General Hospital in
Mandaluyong, Metro Manila. Their stay in his house was merely transitory, in the same way that they were
taken at different times for the same purpose to Pericos residence at Legaspi Towers in Roxas
Boulevard. The death certificates could not, therefore, be deemed conclusive evidence of the decedents
residence in light of the other documents showing otherwise. [5]
The court required the parties to submit their respective nominees for the position. [6] Both failed to
comply, whereupon the trial court ordered that the petition be archived. [7]
Subsequently, Perico moved that the intestate proceedings be revived. [8] After the parties submitted the
names of their respective nominees, the trial court designated Justice Carlos L. Sundiam as special
administrator of the estate of Ignacio Jao Tayag and Andrea Jao.[9]
On April 6, 1994, the motion to dismiss filed by petitioner Rodolfo was denied, to wit:

34

A mere perusal of the death certificates of the spouses issued separately in 1988 and 1989, respectively,
confirm the fact that Quezon City was the last place of residence of the decedents. Surprisingly, the entries
appearing on the death certificate of Andrea V. Jao were supplied by movant, Rodolfo V. Jao, whose signature
appears in said document. Movant, therefore, cannot disown his own representation by taking an
inconsistent position other than his own admission. xxx xxx xxx.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing consideration, this court DENIES for lack of merit movants motion to
dismiss.
SO ORDERED.[10]
Rodolfo filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals, which was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No.
35908. On December 11, 1996, the Court of Appeals rendered the assailed decision, the dispositive portion
of which reads:
WHEREFORE, no error, much less any grave abuse of discretion of the court a quo having been shown, the
petition for certiorari is hereby DISMISSED. The questioned order of the respondent Judge is affirmed in toto.
SO ORDERED.[11]
Rodolfos motion for reconsideration was denied by the Court of Appeals in the assailed resolution dated
February 17, 1997.[12] Hence, this petition for review, anchored on the following grounds:
I
RESPONDENT COURT HAD DECIDED A QUESTION OF SUBSTANCE IN A WAY NOT IN ACCORD WITH THE LAW
AND IS DIRECTLY CONTRADICTORY TO THE APPLICABLE DECISION ALREADY RENDERED BY THIS HONORABLE
COURT.
II
RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN DISREGARDING THE RULING OF THIS HONORABLE COURT IN THE CASE
OF EUSEBIO VS. EUSEBIO, 100 PHILS. 593, WHICH CLEARLY INTERPRETED WHAT IS MEANT BY RESIDENCE IN
SEC. 1 OF RULE 73 OF THE RULES OF COURT.
III
RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT PHYSICAL PRESENCE IN A PLACE AT THE TIME OF DEATH IS
DETERMINATIVE OF DECEDENTS RESIDENCE RATHER THAN THE INTENTION OF THE DECEDENTS TO
ESTABLISH THEIR PERMANENT RESIDENCE IN ANOTHER PLACE.
IV
RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN APPLYING BY ANALOGY THE RESIDENCE CONTEMPLATED IN SEC. 2 OF RULE 4
FOR THE PURPOSE OF SERVING SUMMONS TO A DEFENDANT IN A PERSONAL ACTION TO THE RESIDENCE
CONTEMPLATED IN SEC. 1 OF RULE 73 FOR THE PURPOSE OF DETERMINING VENUE IN THE SETTLEMENT OF
THE ESTATE OF A DECEASED.
V
RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN GIVING MORE WEIGHT TO THE ENTRY OF PETITIONER AND PRIVATE
RESPONDENT IN THE RESPECTIVE DEATH CERTIFICATES OF THE DECEDENTS RATHER THAN THE
OVERWHELMING EVIDENCE SHOWING THE CLEAR INTENTION OF THE DECEDENTS TO ESTABLISH THEIR
PERMANENT RESIDENCE IN ANGELES CITY.

35

VI
RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN APPLYING THE PRINCIPLE OF ESTOPPEL AS AGAINST PETITIONER WHICH CAN
NOT BE MORE PERSUASIVE THAN THE CLEAR INTENTION OF THE DECEDENTS THEMSELVES TO ESTABLISH
PERMANENT RESIDENCE IN ANGELES CITY.
VII
RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING THE PETITION FOR CERTIORARI DESPITE THE CLEAR ABUSE OF
DISCRETION ON THE PART OF THE TRIAL COURT IN INSISTING TO TAKE COGNIZANCE OF SP. PROCEEDING NO.
Q-91-8507.[13]
The main issue before us is: where should the settlement proceedings be had --- in Pampanga, where
the decedents had their permanent residence, or in Quezon City, where they actually stayed before their
demise?
Rule 73, Section 1 of the Rules of Court states:
Where estate of deceased persons be settled. If the decedent is an inhabitant of the Philippines at the time
of his death, whether a citizen or an alien, his will shall be proved, or letters of administration granted, and
his estate settled, in the Court of First Instance in the province in which he resides at the time of his
death, and if he is an inhabitant of a foreign country, the Court of First Instance of any province in which he
had estate. The court first taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a decedent shall exercise
jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts. The jurisdiction assumed by a court, so far as it depends on
the place of residence of the decedent, or of the location of his estate, shall not be contested in a suit or
proceeding, except in an appeal from that court, in the original case, or when the want of jurisdiction appears
on the record. (underscoring ours)
Clearly, the estate of an inhabitant of the Philippines shall be settled or letters of administration granted
in the proper court located in the province where the decedent resides at the time of his death.
Petitioner Rodolfo invokes our ruling in the case of Eusebio v. Eusebio, et al.,[14] where we held that
the situs of settlement proceedings shall be the place where the decedent had his permanent residence or
domicile at the time of death. In determining residence at the time of death, the following factors must be
considered, namely, the decedent had: (a) capacity to choose and freedom of choice; (b) physical presence at
the place chosen; and (c) intention to stay therein permanently. [15] While it appears that the decedents in this
case chose to be physically present in Quezon City for medical convenience, petitioner avers that they never
adopted Quezon City as their permanent residence.
The contention lacks merit.
The facts in Eusebio were different from those in the case at bar. The decedent therein, Andres Eusebio,
passed away while in the process of transferring his personal belongings to a house in Quezon City. He was
then suffering from a heart ailment and was advised by his doctor/son to purchase a Quezon City residence,
which was nearer to his doctor. While he was able to acquire a house in Quezon City, Eusebio died even
before he could move therein. In said case, we ruled that Eusebio retained his domicile --- and hence,
residence --- in San Fernando, Pampanga. It cannot be said that Eusebio changed his residence because,
strictly speaking, his physical presence in Quezon City was just temporary.
In the case at bar, there is substantial proof that the decedents have transferred to petitioners Quezon
City residence. Petitioner failed to sufficiently refute respondents assertion that their elderly parents stayed
in his house for some three to four years before they died in the late 1980s.
Furthermore, the decedents respective death certificates state that they were both residents of Quezon
City at the time of their demise. Significantly, it was petitioner himself who filled up his late mothers death
certificate. To our mind, this unqualifiedly shows that at that time, at least, petitioner recognized his

36

deceased mothers residence to be Quezon City. Moreover, petitioner failed to contest the entry in Ignacios
death certificate, accomplished a year earlier by respondent.
The recitals in the death certificates, which are admissible in evidence, were thus properly considered
and presumed to be correct by the court a quo. We agree with the appellate courts observation that since
the death certificates were accomplished even before petitioner and respondent quarreled over their
inheritance, they may be relied upon to reflect the true situation at the time of their parents death.
The death certificates thus prevailed as proofs of the decedents residence at the time of death, over
the numerous documentary evidence presented by petitioner. To be sure, the documents presented by
petitioner pertained not to residence at the time of death, as required by the Rules of Court, but
to permanent residence or domicile. In Garcia-Fule v. Court of Appeals,[16] we held:
xxx xxx xxx the term resides connotes ex vi termini actual residence as distinguished from legal
residence or domicile. This term resides, like the terms residing and residence, is elastic and should
be interpreted in the light of the object or purpose of the statute or rule in which it is employed. In the
application of venue statutes and rules Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules of Court is of such nature
residence rather than domicile is the significant factor. Even where the statute uses the word domicile still
it is construed as meaning residence and not domicile in the technical sense. Some cases make a distinction
between the terms residence and domicile but as generally used in statutes fixing venue, the terms are
synonymous, and convey the same meaning as the term inhabitant. In other words, resides should be
viewed or understood in its popular sense, meaning, the personal, actual or physical habitation of a person,
actual residence or place of abode. It signifies physical presence in a place and actual stay thereat. In this
popular sense, the term means merely residence, that is, personal residence, not legal residence or
domicile. Residence simply requires bodily presence as an inhabitant in a given place, while domicile
requires bodily presence in that place and also an intention to make it ones domicile. No particular length of
time of residence is required though; however, the residence must be more than temporary. [17]
Both the settlement court and the Court of Appeals found that the decedents have been living with
petitioner at the time of their deaths and for some time prior thereto. We find this conclusion to be
substantiated by the evidence on record. A close perusal of the challenged decision shows that, contrary to
petitioners assertion, the court below considered not only the decedents physical presence in Quezon City,
but also other factors indicating that the decedents stay therein was more than temporary. In the absence of
any substantial showing that the lower courts factual findings stemmed from an erroneous apprehension of
the evidence presented, the same must be held to be conclusive and binding upon this Court.
Petitioner strains to differentiate between the venue provisions found in Rule 4, Section 2, [18] on ordinary
civil actions, and Rule 73, Section 1, which applies specifically to settlement proceedings. He argues that
while venue in the former understandably refers to actual physical residence for the purpose of serving
summons, it is the permanent residence of the decedent which is significant in Rule 73, Section 1. Petitioner
insists that venue for the settlement of estates can only refer to permanent residence or domicile because it
is the place where the records of the properties are kept and where most of the decedents properties are
located.
Petitioners argument fails to persuade.
It does not necessarily follow that the records of a persons properties are kept in the place where he
permanently resides. Neither can it be presumed that a persons properties can be found mostly in the place
where he establishes his domicile. It may be that he has his domicile in a place different from that where he
keeps his records, or where he maintains extensive personal and business interests. No generalizations can
thus be formulated on the matter, as the question of where to keep records or retain properties is entirely
dependent upon an individuals choice and peculiarities.
At any rate, petitioner is obviously splitting straws when he differentiates between venue in ordinary civil
actions and venue in special proceedings. In Raymond v. Court of Appeals[19] and Bejer v. Court of Appeals,
[20]

we ruled that venue for ordinary civil actions and that for special proceedings have one and the same

37

meaning. As thus defined, residence, in the context of venue provisions, means nothing more than a
persons actual residence or place of abode, provided he resides therein with continuity and consistency. [21] All
told, the lower court and the Court of Appeals correctly held that venue for the settlement of the decedents
intestate estate was properly laid in the Quezon City court.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is DENIED, and the decision of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. SP No. 35908 is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 95574 August 16, 1991

HADJI WAHIDA MUSA, HADJI SALMA MUSA, RIZAL MUSA and BASSER MUSA, petitioners,
vs.
HON. COROCOY D. MOSON, in his capacity as Presiding Judge, Shari'a District Court, Fifth Shari'a
District, Cotabato City and HADJI JAHARA ABDURAHIM, respondents.
Randolph C. Parcasio for petitioners.
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:p
Questions of jurisdiction of the Shari'a District Court, and of venue, in an intestate proceeding are herein
raised.
Involved is the intestate estate of the late Jamiri Musa, a Muslim, who passed away on 31 December 1987. He
had six (6) wives, three (3) of whom he later divorced, and twenty three (23) children. He had extensive real
and personal properties located in the provinces of Maguindanao, Davao del Sur and Davao Oriental.
Petitioners, Hadji WAHIDA Musa and Hadji SALMA Musa, are among those he divorced, while private
respondent Hadji Jalai a ABDURAHIM is one of the three (3) surviving widows, RIZAL Musa and BASSER Musa
are two (2) of his sons.
On 7 July 1989, Respondent ABDURAHIM filed a "Joint Petition for the Administration and Settlement of the
Inestate Estate of the Late Jamiri Musa and Liquidation of Conjugal Partnership," before the Shari'a District
Court, Fifth Sharia's District, with station at Cotabato City (SDC Spec. Proceedings No. 89-19) (the Intestate
Case). That Court embraces the province of Maguindanao within its jurisdiction but not the provinces of
Davao del Sur and Oriental.
The Petition averred that the decedent Jamiri Musa a resident of Linao, Upi, Maguindanao, left various
properties located in the provinces of Maguindanao (184 hectares), Davao del Sur (61 hectares), and Davao
Oriental (207 hectares). Aside from the settlement of the vast estate, also prayed for was the liquidation of
the conjugal partnership assets of the decedent and ABDURAHIM and the segregation and turn-over to the
latter of her one-half (1/2) share.
Appearing as oppositors were: Petitioners WAHIDA and SALMA, the divorced wives, who also claim to be
widows of the deceased: RIZAL, Putih Musa, and Erum Musa, children of WAHIDA with the decedent; and
BASSER, another son. They alleged that venues was improperly said and that the properties of the decedent
located outside Aguinaldo were beyond the jurisdiction of the Shari'a District. Court, Fifth Shari'a District.
Finding the Joint Petition to be sufficient in form and substance, Respondent Judge issued the Order of
Publication on 1 July 1989 and initially set the case for hearing on 18 September 1989.
All interested parties were duly represented during the hearing on said date where petitioners, through
counsel, manifested their desire to have the case amicably settled, Respondent Judo "in the interest of peace
and harmony among the heirs of the deceased Jamiri Musa," appointed the following as Special
Administrators: ABDURAHIM, for all properties situated in Maguindanao; RIZAL. for all properties situated in
Davao Oriental; and BASSER. for all properties situated in Davao del Sul.
However, on 4 October 1989, ABDURAHIM, in her manifestation and Motion to Cite for Contempt," accused
BASSER, among others, of having allegedly fired upon the house of her son in-law in Maguindanao on 21
September 1989.
Whereupon, on 13 October 1989, an "Opposition to Petition for Administration and Liquidation of Conjugal
Partnership" was filed by Petitioners, alleging that ABDURAHIM was never legally married to the decedent

38

and, as such, there was "nothing to support her claim" of having had a conjugal partnership with the latter;
and that venue was improperly laid. Petitioners also asked that RIZAL be issued Letters of Administration
instead.
In her Reply, filed on 25 October 1989, ABDURAHIM averred that, her marriage to the decedent was admitted
by the latter in various Deeds of Sale he had signed, which were presented as documentary evidence. Since
there was no amicable settlement reached, hearings on the Joint Petition were conducted, commencing on 27
December 1989.
On 16 May 1990, Respondent Judge, issued an Order appointing ABDURAHIM as Regular Administratrix upon
the finding that she was legally married to the decedent. Petitioners moved for reconsideration.
In the interim, Respondent Judge issued an Amended Order, dated 4 June 1990, incorporating the testimonies
of the two (2) other witnesses presented by Petitioners, which were omitted in the Order, dated 16 May 1990.
Otherwise, the appointment of ABDURAHIM as Regular Administratrix was maintained.
On 10 August 1990, Petitioners filed a "Motion for Reconsideration With Motion to Dismiss," raising once
again, mainly the questions of venue and of jurisdiction of the respondent Court over the real properties of
the decedent situated in the provinces of Davao del Sur and Davao Oriental.
Respondent Judge denied both Motions and upheld the Court's jurisdiction in his Order, dated 22 August
1990. Hence, the elevation of the instant Petition for Prohibition before this Court seeking to enjoin
respondent Judge Corocoy D. Moson, presiding over the Shari'a District Court, Fifth Shari'a District, from
further taking action on the "Joint Petition ."
Petitioners take the position that Respondent Judge should have dismissed the Intestate Case for lack of
jurisdiction and for improper venue. Private respondent maintains the contrary.
We rule against Petitioners.
Pres. Decree No. 1083, otherwise known as the Code of Muslim Personal Laws of the Philippines, explicitly
provides that exclusive original jurisdiction, in matters of settlement of the estate of deceased Muslims,
belong to Shari'a District Courts. Thus:
Art. 143. Original Jurisdiction.The Shari'a District Court shall have exclusive original jurisdictionover:
xxx xxx xxx
(b) All cases involving disposition, distribution and settlement of the estate of deceased Muslims, probate of
wills, issuance of letters of administration or appointment of administrators or executors regardless of the
nature or the aggregate value of the property. (Chapter 1, Title I, Book IV, par. (b), (Emphasis supplied).
Since the disposition, distribution and settlement of the estate of a deceased Muslim is, in fact, involved
herein, the Joint Petition was correctly filed before the Shari'a District Court, Fifth Shari'a District.
In invoking improper venue, however, petitioners call attention to the Rules of Court mandating that:
Sec. 1. Where estate of deceased persons settled.If the decedent is an inhabitant of the Philippines at the
time of his death, whether a citizen or an alien, his will shall be proved, or letters of administration granted,
and his estate settled, in the Court of First Instance in the province in which he resides at the time of his
death, and if he is an inhabitant of a foreign country, the Court of First Instance of any province in which he
had estate. The court first taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a decedent, shall exercise
jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts. The jurisdiction assumed by a court, so far as it depends on
the place of residence of the decedent, or of the location his estate, shall not be contested in a suit or
proceeding, except in an appeal from that court, in the original case, or when the want of jurisdiction appears
on the record. (Rule 73). (Emphasis supplied).
It is then claimed that since the residence of the decedent at the time of his death was actually in Davao City,
not Maguindanao, as averred by ABDUHARIM, the proceeding is beyond the jurisdiction of the Shari'a District
Court, Fifth Shari'a District, and that venue is more properly laid in Davao City before the Regional Trial Court
since there are no Shari'a District Courts therein.
At this juncture, it should be recalled that the residence of the deceased in an estate proceeding is not an
element of jurisdiction over the subject matter but merely of venue. The law of jurisdiction confers upon
Courts of First Instance (now Regional Trial Courts) jurisdiction over all probate cases independently of the
place of residence of the deceased (In the matter of the intestate estate of Kaw Singco, 74 Phil. 239 [1943]).
To all appearances, the decedent was a resident of both Linao, Upi, Maguindanao, and Davao City. In fact, in
various Deeds of Sale presented as evidence by the parties, the decedent alternately stated his place of
residence as either Linao, Upi,Maguindanao which is the residence of ABDURAHIM, or Davao City, where
Petitioners reside. As this Court held in Uytengsu v. Republic, 95 Phil. 890 (1954), "a man can have but one

39

domicile for one and the same purpose at any time, but he may have numerous places of residence." Venue,
therefore, ordinarily could be at either place of the decedent's residence, i.e., Maguindanao or Davao City,
but for the provisions of the Muslim Code vesting exclusive original jurisdiction, in matters of disposition and
settlement of estates of deceased Muslims, in Shari'a District Courts (supra).
But petitioners also contend that the Shari'a District Court, Fifth Shari'a District, presided over by respondent
Judge, has no territorial jurisdiction over properties of the decedent situated in the provinces of Davao del Sur
and Davao Oriental, citing as statutory authority therefor the Code of Muslim Personal Laws, which provides:
Art. 138. Shari'a judicial districts.Five special judicial districts, each to have one Shari'a District Court
presided over by one judge, are constituted as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
(e) The Fifth Shari'a District, the Provinces of Maguindanao, North Cotabato and Sultan Kudarat, and the City
of Cotabato.
Indeed, Davao del Sur and Davao Oriental are not comprised within the Fifth Shari'a District. In fact, those
provinces are outside the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao created by Republic Act No. 6734, its
Organic Act. But as stated in that law, "the Shari'a District Court and the Shari'a Circuit Courts created under
existing laws shall continue to function as provided therein." (Art. IX, Sec. 13).
Additionally, the same Organic Act explicitly provides;
(4) Except in cases of successional rights, the regular courts shall acquire jurisdiction over controversies
involving real property outside the area of autonomy. (Art. IX, Section 17[4]). (Emphasis supplied)
Since the subject intestate proceeding concerns successional rights, coupled with the fact that the decedent
was also a resident of Linao, Upi, Maguindanao, owning real estate property located in that province, venue
has been properly laid with the Shari'a District Court, Fifth Shari'a District, winch is vested with territorial
jurisdiction over Maguindanao, notwithstanding the location in different provinces of the other real properties of the decedent.
A contrary ruling would only result in multiplicity of suits, to the detriment of the expeditious settlement of
estate proceedings (See Ngo Bun Tiong v. Sayo, 30 June 1988,163 SCRA 237 [1988]). Besides, the judgment
that may be rendered by the Shari'a District Court, Fifth Shari'a District, may be executed in other provinces
where the rest of the real estate is situated.
When an action covers various parcels of land situated in different provinces, venue may be laid in the Court
of First Instance of any of said provinces, and the judgment rendered therein may be executed in other
provinces where the rest of the real estate is situated (National Bank v. Barreto, 52 Phil. 818 [1929]; Monte
Piedad v. Rodrigo, 56 Phil. 310 [1931]; El Hogar Filipino v. Seva ,57 Phil. 573 [L-1932]; Bank of P.I. v. Green, 57
Phil. 712 [1932]).
The Rules of Court likewise provide that the Court first taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a
decedent, shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other Courts(Rule 73, sec. 1). There should be no
impediment to the application of said Rules as they apply suppletorily to the Code of Muslim Personal Laws,
there being nothing inconsistent with the provisions of the latter statute (Article 187 of said Code).
And while Rule 73 provides that "the jurisdiction assumed by a court, so far as it depends on the place of
residence of the decedent, or of the location of his estate, shall not be contested in a suit or proceeding
except in an appeal from that court, in the original case, or when the want of jurisdiction appears on the
record," we have taken cognizance of this Petition for Prohibition considering that the jurisdiction of a Shari'a
District Court, a relatively new Court in our judicial system, has been challenged.
WHEREFORE, this Petition for Prohibition is DENIED, and the case hereby REMANDED to the Shari'a District
Court, Fifth Shari'a District, for continuation of the intestate proceedings. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
RULE 74
THIRD DIVISION

SPOUSES GORGONIO BENATIRO

G.R. No. 161220

and COLUMBA CUYOS-BENATIRO

40

substituted by their heirs, namely:

Isabelita, Renato, Rosadelia and
Gorgonio, Jr., surnamed Benatiro, and
SPOUSES RENATO C. BENATIRO and

Present:

ROSIE M. BENATIRO,
Respondents,
YNARES-SANTIAGO,
- versus -

Chairperson,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,

HEIRS OF EVARISTO CUYOS,

namely: Gloria Cuyos-Talian,
Patrocenia Cuyos-Mijares,
Numeriano Cuyos, and Enrique Cuyos,
represented by their attorney-in-fact,
Salud Cuyos,

CHICO-NAZARIO
NACHURA, and
REYES, JJ.

Promulgated:
Respondents.

July 30, 2008

x----------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:

Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court filed by petitioners seeking to
annul the Decision[1] dated July 18, 2003 of the Court of Appeals (CA) and its Resolution [2] dated November 13,
2003 denying petitioners motion for reconsideration issued in CA-G.R. SP No. 65630.[3]
Spouses Evaristo Cuyos and Agatona Arrogante Cuyos were
namely: Francisco, Victoria, Columba,

Lope, Salud,

blessed

Gloria, Patrocenia, Numeriano,

with
and

nine

children,

Enrique. On August

28,

1966, Evaristo died leaving six parcels of land located in Tapilon, Daanbantayan, Cebu covered by Tax Declaration (TD)
Nos. 000725, 000728, 000729, 000730, 000731, 000732, all under the name of Agatona Arrogante.
On July 13, 1971, one of the heirs, Gloria Cuyos-Talian (respondent Gloria) represented by Atty. Victor
Elliot Lepiten (Atty. Lepiten), filed before the Court of First Instance (CFI) now Regional Trial Court (RTC), Cebu, Branch XI,
a petition[4] for Letters of Administration, docketed as Special Proceeding (SP) No. 24-BN entitled In the Matter of the
Intestate Estate of Evaristo Cuyos, Gloria Cuyos-Talian, petitioner. The petition was opposed by Glorias brother,
Francisco, who was represented by Atty. Jesus Yray (Atty. Yray).
In the hearing held on January 30, 1973, both parties together with their respective counsels appeared. Both
counsels manifested that the parties had come to an agreement to settle their case. The trial court on even date issued
an Order[5] appointing Gloria as administratrix of the estate. The dispositive portion reads:
WHEREFORE, letters of administration of the estate of the late Evaristo Cuyos and including the undivided half
accruing to his spouse Agatona Arrogante who recently died is hereby issued in favor of Mrs. Gloria Cuyos Talian who
may qualify as such administratrix after posting a nominal bond of P1,000.00.[6]

41

Subsequently, in the Order[7] dated December 12, 1975, the CFI stated that when the Intestate Estate hearing
was called on that date, respondent Gloria and her brother, oppositorFrancisco, together with their respective
counsels, appeared; that Atty. Yray, Franciscos counsel, manifested that the parties had come to an agreement to settle
the case amicably; that both counsels suggested that the Clerk of Court, Atty. Andres C. Taneo (Atty. Taneo), be
appointed to act as Commissioner to effect the agreement of the parties and to prepare the project of partition for the
approval of the court. In the same Order, the Court of First Instance (CFI) appointed Atty. Taneo and ordered him to
make a project of partition within 30 days from December 12, 1975 for submission and approval of the court.
In his Commissioner's Report[8] dated July 29, 1976, Atty. Taneo stated that he issued subpoenae supplemented
by

telegrams

to

all

the

heirs

to

cause

their appearance

on

February

28

and

29,

1976

in Tapilon, Daanbantayan, Cebu, where the properties are located, for a conference or meeting to arrive at an
agreement; that out of the nine heirs, only respondents Gloria, Salud and Enrique Cuyos failed to attend; that per return
of the service, these three heirs could not be located in their respective given addresses; that since some of the heirs
present resided outside the province of Cebu, they decided to go ahead with the scheduled meeting.
Atty. Taneo declared in his Report that the heirs who were present:
1.
Agreed to consider all income of the properties of the estate during the time that Francisco Cuyos,
one of the heirs, was administering the properties of the estate (without appointment from the Court) as having been
properly and duly accounted for.
2.
Agreed to consider all income of the properties of the estate during the administration of Gloria Cuyos Talian,
3.
4.

(duly appointed by the Court) also one of the heirs as having been properly and duly accounted for.
Agreed to consider all motions filed in this proceedings demanding an accounting from Francisco Cuyos and
Gloria Cuyos Talian, as having been withdrawn.
Agreed not to partition the properties of the estate but instead agreed to first sell it for the sum
of P40,000.00 subject to the condition that should any of the heirs would be in a position to buy the properties of the

5.

estate, the rest of the eight (8) heirs will just receive only Four Thousand Pesos (P4,000.00) each.
Agreed to equally divide the administration expenses to be deducted from their respective share of P4,000.00.
[9]

The Report further stated that Columba Cuyos-Benatiro (Columba), one of the heirs, informed all those present in the
conference of her desire to buy the properties of the estate,to which everybody present agreed, and considered her the
buyer. Atty. Taneo explained that the delay in the submission of the Report was due to the request of respondent Gloria
that she be given enough time to make some consultations on what was already agreed upon by the majority of the
heirs; that it was only on July 11, 1976 that the letter of respondent Gloria was handed to Atty. Taneo, with the
information that respondent Gloria was amenable to what had been agreed upon, provided she be given the sum
of P5,570.00 as her share of the estate, since one of properties of the estate was mortgaged to her in order to defray
their father's hospitalization.
Quoting the Commissioners Report, the CFI issued the assailed Order[10] dated December 16, 1976,
the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, finding the terms and conditions agreed upon by the heirs to be in order, the same
being not contrary to law, said compromise agreement as embodied in the report of the commissioner is hereby
approved. The Court hereby orders the Administratrix to execute the deed of sale covering all the properties of the
estate in favor of Columba Cuyos Benatiro after the payment to her of the sum ofP36,000.00. The said sum of money
shall remain in custodia legis, but after all the claims and administration expenses and the estate taxes shall have been
paid for, the remainder shall, upon order of the Court, be divided equally among the heirs. [11]
The CFI disapproved the claim of respondent Gloria for the sum of P5,570.00, as the same had been allegedly
disregarded by the heirs present during the conference.
In an Order[12] dated January 11, 1978, the CFI appointed Lope Cuyos (Cuyos) as the new administrator of the
estate, purportedly on the basis of the motion to relieve respondent Gloria, as it appeared that she was already residing
in Central Luzon and her absence was detrimental to the early termination of the proceedings.
On May 25, 1979, administrator Cuyos executed a Deed of Absolute Sale[13] over the six parcels of land
constituting the intestate estate of the late Evaristo Cuyos in favor ofColumba for a consideration of the sum
of P36,000.00.
Sometime in February 1998, the heirs of Evaristo Cuyos, namely: Gloria Cuyos-Talian, Patrocenia CuyosMijares, Numeriano Cuyos and

Enrique Cuyos,

represented

by

their

attorney-in-

fact, Salud Cuyos (respondents), allegedly learned that Tax Declaration Nos. 000725, 000728, 000729, 000730, 000731

42

and 000732, which were all in the name of their late mother Agatona Arrogante, were canceled and new Tax
Declaration Nos., namely, 20-14129, 20-14130, 20-141131, 20-14132, 2014133 and 20-14134, were issued
in Columbas name; and that later on, Original Certificates of Titles covering the estate of Evaristo Cuyos were issued in
favor of Columba; that some of these parcels of land were subsequently transferred tothe names of
spouses Renato C. Benatiro and

Rosie

M. Benatiro,

son

and

daughter-in-law,

respectively,

of

petitioners Gorgonio and Columba, for which transfer certificates of title were subsequently issued; that they
subsequently discovered the existence of the assailed CFI Order dated December 16, 1976 and the Deed of Absolute
Sale dated May 25, 1979.
Respondents filed a complaint against petitioner Gorgonio Benatiro before the Commission on the Settlement of
Land Problems (COSLAP) of the Department of Justice, which on June 13, 2000 dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction.
[14]

Salud Cuyos brought the matter for conciliation and mediation at the barangay level, but was unsuccessful.[15]
On July 16, 2001, Salud Cuyos, for herself and in representation[16] of the other heirs of Evaristo Cuyos, namely:
Gloria, Patrocenia, Numeriano,[17] and Enrique, filed with the CA a petition for annulment of the Order dated December 16,
1976 of the CFI of Cebu, Branch XI, in SP No. 24-BN under Rule 47 of the Rules of Court. They alleged that the CFI Order
dated December 16, 1976 was null and void and of no effect, the same being based on a Commissioner's Report, which
was patently false and irregular; that such report practically deprived them of due process in claiming their share of their
father's estate; that Patrocenia Cuyos-Mijares executed an affidavit, as well as the unnotarized statement of
Gloria stating that no meeting ever took place for the purpose of discussing how to dispose of the estate of their parents
and that they never received any payment from the supposed sale of their share in the inheritance; that the report was
done in close confederacy with their co-heir Columba, who stood to be benefited by the Commissioner's
recommendation, should the same be approved by the probate court; that since the report was a falsity, any order
proceeding therefrom was invalid; that the issuance of the certificates of titles in favor of respondents were tainted with
fraud and irregularity, since the CFI which issued the assailed order did not appear to have been furnished a copy of the
Deed of Absolute Sale; that the CFI was not incustodia legis of the consideration of the sale, as directed in its Order so
that it could divide the remainder of the consideration equally among the heirs after paying all the administration
expenses and estate taxes; that the intestate case had not yet been terminated as the last order found relative to the
case was the appointment of Lope as administrator vice Gloria; that they never received their corresponding share in the
inheritance; and that the act of petitioners in manifest connivance with administrator Lope amounted to a denial of their
right to the property without due process of law, thus, clearly showing that extrinsic fraud caused them to be deprived of
their property.
Herein petitioners contend that respondents' allegation that they discovered the assailed order dated December
16, 1976 only in February 1998 was preposterous, as respondents were represented by counsel in the intestate
proceedings; thus, notice of Order to counsel was notice to client; that this was only a ploy so that they could claim that
they filed the petition for annulment within the statutory period of four (4) years; that they have been in possession of
the six parcels of land since May 25, 1979 when the same was sold to them pursuant to the assailed Order in the
intestate proceedings; that no extrinsic fraud attended the issuance of the assailed order; that Numeriano executed an
affidavit in which he attested to having received his share of the sale proceeds on May 18, 1988; that respondents
were estopped from assailing the Order dated December 16, 1976, as it had already attained the status of
finality.
On July 18, 2003, the CA granted the petition and annulled the CFI order, the dispositive portion of which reads:
FOR ALL THE FOREGOING REASONS, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED. Accordingly, the Order issued by
the Court of First Instance of Cebu Branch XI dated December 16, 1976 as well as the Certificates of Title issued in the
name of Columba Cuyos-Benatiro and the subsequent transfer of these Titles in the name of spouses Renato and
Rosie Benatiro are hereby ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. Further, SP Proc. Case No. 24-BN is hereby ordered reopened and
proceedings thereon be continued.[18]
The CA declared that the ultimate fact that was needed to be established was the veracity and truthfulness of the
Commissioners Report, which was used by the trial court as its basisfor issuing the assailed Order. The CA held that to

43

arrive at an agreement, there was a need for all the concerned parties to be present in the conference; however, such was
not the scenario since in their separate sworn statements, the compulsory heirs of the decedent attested to the fact that no
meeting or conference ever happened among them; that although under Section 3(m), Rule 133 on the Rules of Evidence,
there is a presumption of regularity in the performance of an official duty, the same may be contradicted and overcome by
other evidence to prove the contrary.

The CA noted some particulars that led it to conclude that the conference was not held accordingly, to wit: (1) the
Commissioners Report never mentioned the names of the heirs who were present in the alleged conference but only the
names of those who were absent, when the names of those who were present were equally essential, if not even more
important, than the names of those who were absent; (2) the Report also failed to include any proof of conformity to the
agreement from the attendees, such as letting them sign the report to signify their consent as regards the agreed
mechanisms for the estates settlement; (3) there was lack or absence of physical evidence attached to the report
indicating that the respondents were indeed properly notified about the scheduled conference. The CA then concluded
that due to the absence of the respondents' consent, the legal existence of the compromise agreement did not stand on a
firm ground.

The CA further observed that although it appeared that notice of the report was given to Atty. Lepiten and
Atty. Yray, lawyers of Gloria and Francisco Cuyos, respectively, the same cannot be taken as notice to the other heirs
of Evaristo Cuyos; that a lawyers authority to compromise cannot be simply presumed, since what was required was the
special authority to compromise on behalf of his client; that a compromise agreement entered into by a person not duly
authorized to do so by the principal is void and has no legal effect, citing Quiban v.Butalid;[19] that being a void compromise
agreement, the assailed Order had no legal effect.
Thus, the CA ruled that the Certificates of Titles obtained by herein petitioners were procured fraudulently; that the
initial transfer of the properties to Columba Cuyos-Benatiro by virtue of a Deed of Absolute Sale executed by
Lope Cuyos was clearly defective, since the compromise agreement which served as the basis of the Deed of Absolute Sale
was void and had no legal effect.
The CA elaborated that there was no showing that Columba paid the sum of P36,000.00 to the administrator as
consideration for the sale, except for the testimony of NumerianoCuyos admitting that he received his share of the
proceeds but without indicating the exact amount that he received; that even so, such alleged payment was incomplete
and was not in compliance with the trial courts order for the administratix to execute the deed of sale covering all
properties of the estate in favor of Columba Cuyos-Benatiro after the payment to theadministratrix of the sum
of P36,000.00; that said sum of money shall remain in custodia legis, but after all the claims and administration
expenses and the estate taxes shall have been paid for, the remainder shall, upon order of the Court, be divided equally
among the heirs.
Moreover, the CA found that the copy of the Deed of Sale was not even furnished the trial court nor was said
money placed under custodia legis as agreed upon; that the Certification dated December 9, 1998 issued by the Clerk of
Court of Cebu indicated that the case had not yet been terminated and that the last Order in the special proceeding was
the appointment of Lope Cuyos as the new administrator of the estate; thus, the transfer of the parcels of land, which
included the execution of the Deed of Absolute Sale, cancellation of Tax Declarations and the issuance of new
Tax Declarations and Transfer Certificates of Title, all in favor of petitioners, were tainted with fraud. Consequently, the CA
concluded that the compromise agreement, the certificates of title and the transfers made by petitioners through fraud
cannot be made a legal basis of their ownership over the properties, since to do so would result in enriching them at the
expense of the respondents; and that it was also evident that the fraud attendant in this case was one of extrinsic
fraud, since respondents were denied the opportunity to fully litigate their case because of the scheme utilized by
petitioners to assert their claim.
Hence, herein petition raising the following issues:

44

Whether or not annulment of order under Rule 47 of the Rules of Court was a proper remedy where the aggrieved
party had other appropriate remedies, such as new trial, appeal, or petition for relief, which they failed to take through
their own fault.
Whether or not the Court of Appeals misapprehended the facts when it annulled the 24 year old Commissioner's
Report of the Clerk of Court - an official act which enjoys a strong presumption of regularity -based merely on belated
allegations of irregularities in the performance of said official act.
Whether or not upon the facts as found by the Court of Appeals in this case, extrinsic fraud existed which is a
sufficient ground to annul the lower court's order under Rule 47 of the Rules of Court.

[20]

Subsequent to the filing of their petition, petitioners filed a Manifestation that they were in possession of affidavits
of waiver and desistance executed by the heirs of LopeCuyos[21] and respondent Patrocenia Cuyos-Mijares[22] on February
17, 2004 and December 17, 2004, respectively. In both affidavits, the affiants stated that they had no more interest in
prosecuting/defending the case involving the settlement of the estate, since the subject estate properties had been
bought by their late sister Columba, and they had already received their share of the purchase price. Another heir,
respondent Numeriano Cuyos, had

also

earlier

executed

an

Affidavit[23] dated December

13,

2001, stating

that the subject estate was sold toColumba and that she had already received her share of the purchase price on May
18, 1988. In addition, Numeriano had issued a certification[24] dated May 18, 1988, which was not refuted by any of the
parties, that he had already received P4,000.00 in payment of his share, which could be the reason why he refused to
sign the Special Power of Attorney supposedly in favor of Salud Cuyos for the filing of the petition with the CA.
The issue for resolution is whether the CA committed a reversible error in annulling the CFI Order
dated December 16, 1976, which approved the Commissioners Report embodying the alleged compromise agreement
entered into by the heirs of Evaristo and Agatona Arrogante Cuyos.
We rule in the negative.
The remedy of annulment of judgment is extraordinary in character[25] and will not so easily and readily lend itself to
abuse by parties aggrieved by final judgments. Sections 1 and 2 of Rule 47 impose strict conditions for recourse to it, viz.:
Section 1. Coverage. This Rule shall govern the annulment by the Court of Appeals of judgments or final
orders and resolutions in civil actions of Regional Trial Courts for which the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition
for relief or other appropriate remedies are no longer available through no fault of the petitioner.
Section 2. Grounds for annulment. The annulment may be based only on the grounds of extrinsic fraud and
lack of jurisdiction.
Extrinsic fraud shall not be a valid ground if it was availed of, or could have been availed of, in a motion for new
trial or petition for relief.
Although Section 2 of Rule 47 of the Rules of Court provides that annulment of a final judgment or order of an RTC
may be based "only on the grounds of extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction," jurisprudence recognizes denial of due
process as additional .ground therefor.[26]
An action to annul a final judgment on the ground of fraud will lie only if the fraud is extrinsic or collateral in
character.[27] Extrinsic fraud exists when there is a fraudulent act committed by the prevailing party outside of the trial of
the case, whereby the defeated party was prevented from presenting fully his side of the case by fraud or deception
practiced on him by the prevailing party. [28] Fraud is regarded as extrinsic where it prevents a party from having a trial or
from presenting his entire case to the court, or where it operates upon matters pertaining not to the judgment itself but to
the manner in which it is procured. The overriding consideration when extrinsic fraud is alleged is that the fraudulent
scheme of the prevailing litigant prevented a party from having his day in court. [29]
While we find that the CA correctly annulled the CFI Order dated December 16, 1976, we find that it should be
annulled not on the ground of extrinsic fraud, as there is no sufficient evidence to hold Atty. Taneo or any of the heirs guilty
of fraud, but on the ground that the assailed order is void for lack of due process.

45

Clerk of Court Taneo was appointed to act as Commissioner to effect the agreement of the heirs and to prepare the
project of partition for submission and approval of the court. Thus, it was incumbent upon Atty. Taneo to set a time and
place for the first meeting of the heirs. In his Commissioners Report, Atty. Taneo stated that he caused the appearance of
all the heirs of Evaristo Cuyos and Agatona Arrogante Cuyos in the place, where the subject properties were located for
settlement, by sending them subpoenae supplemented by telegrams for them to attend the conference scheduled
on February 28 to 29, 1976. It was also alleged that out of the nine heirs, only six attended the conference; however, as
the CA aptly found, the Commissioner did not state the names of those present, but only those heirs who failed to attend
the conference, namely: respondents Gloria, Salud and Enrique who, as stated in the Report, based on the return of service,
could not be located in their respective given addresses.
However, there is nothing in the records that would establish that the alleged subpoenae, supplemented by
telegrams, for the heirs to appear in the scheduled conference were indeed sent to the heirs. In fact,
respondent Patrocenia Cuyos-Mijares, one of the heirs, who was presumably present in the conference, as she was not
mentioned as among those absent, had executed an affidavit[30] dated December 8, 1998 attesting, to the fact that she was
not called to a meeting nor was there any telegram or notice of any meeting received by her. WhilePatrocenia had
executed on December 17, 2004 an Affidavit of Waiver and Desistance[31] regarding this case, it was only for the reason that
the subject estate properties had been bought by their late sister Columba, and that she had already received her
corresponding share of the purchase price, but there was nothing in the affidavit that retracted her previous statement that
she was not called to a meeting. Respondent Gloria also made an unnotarized statement[32] that there was no meeting
held. Thus, the veracity of Atty. Taneos holding of a conference with the heirs was doubtful.
Moreover, there was no evidence showing that the heirs indeed convened for the purpose of arriving at an
agreement regarding the estate properties, since they were not even required to sign anything to show their
attendance of the alleged meeting. In fact, the Commissioner's Report, which embodied the alleged agreement of the
heirs, did not bear the signatures of the alleged attendees to show their consent and conformity thereto.
It bears stressing that the purpose of the conference was for the heirs to arrive at a compromise agreement over
the estate of Evaristo Cuyos. Thus, it was imperative that all the heirs must be present in the conference and be heard to
afford them the opportunity to protect their interests. Considering that no separate instrument of conveyance was
executed among the heirs embodying their alleged agreement, it was necessary that the Report be signed by the heirs to
prove that a conference among the heirs was indeed held, and that they conformed to the agreement stated in the Report.
Petitioners point out that the Commissioner was an officer of the court and a disinterested party and that, under
Rule 133, Section 3(m) of the Rules on Evidence, there is a presumption that official duty has been regularly performed.
While, under the general rule, it is to be presumed that everything done by an officer in connection with the
performance of an official act in the line of his duty was legally done, such presumption may be overcome by evidence to
the contrary. We find the instances mentioned by the CA, such as absence of the names of the persons present in the
conference, absence of the signatures of the heirs in the Commissioner's Report, as well as absence of evidence showing
that respondents were notified of the conference, to be competent proofs of irregularity that rebut the presumption.
Thus, we find no reversible error committed by the CA in ruling that the

conference was not held accordingly and

in annulling the assailed order of the CFI.

Petitioners attached a Certification[33] dated August 7, 2003 issued by the Officer In Charge (OIC), Branch Clerk of
Court of the RTC, Branch 11, to show that copies of the Commissioners Report were sent to all the heirs, except Salud and
Enrique, as well as to Attys. Lepiten and Yray as enumerated in the Notice found at the lower portion of the Report with
the accompanying registry receipts.[34]
In Cua v. Vargas,[35] in which the issue was whether heirs were deemed constructively notified of and bound by an
extra-judicial settlement and partition of the estate, regardless of their failure to participate therein, when the extra-judicial
settlement and partition has been duly published, we held:

46

The procedure outlined in Section 1 of Rule 74 is an ex parte proceeding. The rule plainly states,
however, that persons who do not participate or had no notice of an extrajudicial settlement will not be
bound thereby. It contemplates a notice that has been sent out or issued before any deed of settlement
and/or partition is agreed upon (i.e., a notice calling all interested parties to participate in the said deed of
extrajudicial settlement and partition), and not after such an agreement has already been executed as
what happened in the instant case with the publication of the first deed of extrajudicial settlement among
heirs.
The publication of the settlement does not constitute constructive notice to the heirs who had no knowledge or
did not take part in it because the same was notice after the fact of execution. The requirement of publication is geared
for the protection of creditors and was never intended to deprive heirs of their lawful participation in the decedent's
estate. In this connection, the records of the present case confirm that respondents never signed either of the settlement
documents, having discovered their existence only shortly before the filing of the present complaint. Following Rule 74,
these extrajudicial settlements do not bind respondents, and the partition made without their knowledge and consent is
invalid insofar as they are concerned[36] (Emphasis supplied)
Applying the above-mentioned case by analogy, what matters is whether the heirs were indeed notified before
the compromise agreement was arrived at, which was not established, and not whether they were notified of the
Commissioner's Report embodying the alleged agreement afterwards.
We also find nothing in the records that would show that the heirs were called to a hearing to validate the
Report. The CFI adopted and approved the Report despite the absence of the signatures of all the heirs showing
conformity thereto. The CFI adopted the Report despite the statement therein that only six out of the nine heirs
attended the conference, thus,effectively depriving the other heirs of their chance to be heard. The CFI's action was
tantamount to a violation of the constitutional guarantee that no person shall be deprived of property without due process
of law. We find that the assailed Order dated December 16, 1976, which approved a void Commissioner's Report, is a void
judgment for lack of due process.
We are not persuaded by petitioners contentions that all the parties in the intestate estate proceedings in the
trial court were duly represented by respective counsels, namely, Atty.Lepiten for petitioners-heirs and Atty. Yray for
the oppositors-heirs; that when the heirs agreed to settle the case amicably, they manifested such intention through
their lawyers, as stated in the Order dated January 30, 1973; that an heir in the settlement of the estate of a deceased
person need not hire his own lawyer, because his interest in the estate is represented by the judicial administrator who
retains the services of a counsel; that a judicial administrator is the legal representative not only of the estate but also of
the heirs, legatees, and creditors whose interest he represents; that when the trial court issued the assailed Order dated
December 16, 1976 approving the Commissioner's Report, the parties lawyers were duly served said copies of the Order
on December 21, 1976 as shown by the Certification [37] dated August 7, 2003 of the RTC OIC, Clerk of Court; that notices
to lawyers should be considered notices to the clients, since, if a party is represented by counsel, service of notices of
orders and pleadings shall be made upon the lawyer; that upon receipt of such order by counsels, any one of the
respondents could have taken the appropriate remedy such as a motion for reconsideration, a motion for new trial or a
petition for relief under Rule 38 at the proper time,but they failed to do so without giving any cogent reason for such
failure.
While the trial court's order approving the Commissioners Report was received by Attys. Yray and Lepiten, they
were the lawyers of Gloria and Francisco, respectively, but not the lawyers of the other heirs. As can be seen from the
pleadings filed before the probate court, Atty. Lepiten was Glorias counsel when she filed her Petition for letters
of administration,while Atty. Yray was Franciscos lawyer when he filed his opposition to the petition for letters of
administration and his Motion to Order administrarix Gloria to render an accounting and for the partition of the
estate. Thus, the other heirs who were not represented by counsel were not given any notice of the judgment approving
the compromise. It was only sometime in February 1998 that respondents learned that the tax declarations covering the
parcels of land, which were all in the name of their late mother Agatona Arrogante, were canceled; and new Tax

47

Declarations were issued in Columbas name, and Original Certificates of Titles were subsequently issued in favor
of Columba. Thus, they could not have taken an appeal or other remedies.
Considering that the assailed Order is a void judgment for lack of due process of law, it is no judgment at all. It
cannot be the source of any right or of any obligation.[38]
In Nazareno v. Court of Appeals,[39] we stated the consequences of a void judgment, thus:
A void judgment never acquires finality. Hence, while admittedly, the petitioner in the case at bar failed to
appeal timely the aforementioned decision of the Municipal Trial Court of Naic, Cavite, it cannot be deemed to have
become final and executory. In contemplation of law, that void decision is deemed non-existent. Thus, there was no
effective or operative judgment to appeal from. In Metropolitan Waterworks & Sewerage System vs. Sison, this Court
held that:
x x x [A] void judgment is not entitled to the respect accorded to a valid judgment, but may be entirely
disregarded or declared inoperative by any tribunal in which effect is sought to be given to it. It is attended by none of the
consequences of a valid adjudication. It has no legal or binding effect or efficacy for any purpose or at any place. It cannot
affect, impair or create rights. It is not entitled to enforcement and is, ordinarily, no protection to those who seek to
enforce. All proceedings founded on the void judgment are themselves regarded as invalid. In other words, a void
judgment is regarded as a nullity, and the situation is the same as it would be if there were no judgment. It, accordingly,
leaves the parties litigants in the same position they were in before the trial.
Thus, a void judgment is no judgment at all. It cannot be the source of any right nor of any obligation. All acts
performed pursuant to it and all claims emanating from it have no legal effect. Hence, it can never become final and any
writ of execution based on it is void: "x x x it may be said to be a lawless thing which can be treated as an outlaw and
slain at sight, or ignored wherever and whenever it exhibits its head.[40](Emphasis supplied)
The CFI's order being null and void, it may be assailed anytime, collaterally or in a direct action or by resisting
such judgment or final order in any action or proceeding whenever it is invoked, unless barred by laches.
[41]

Consequently, the compromise agreement and the Order approving it must be declared null and void and set aside.
We find no merit in petitioners' claim that respondents are barred from assailing the judgment after the lapse of

24 years from its finality on ground of laches and estoppel.

Section 3, Rule 47 of the Rules of Court provides that an action for annulment of judgment based on extrinsic
fraud must be filed within four years from its discovery and, if based on lack of jurisdiction, before it is barred
by laches or estoppel.
The principle of laches or "stale demands" ordains that the failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and unexplained
length of time, to do that which by exercising due diligence could or should have been done earlier, or the negligence or
omission to assert a right within a reasonable time, warrants a presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has
abandoned it or declined to assert it.[42]
There is no absolute rule as to what constitutes laches or staleness of demand; each case is to be determined
according to its particular circumstances.[43] The question of laches is addressed to the sound discretion of the court and,
being an equitable doctrine, its application is controlled by equitable considerations. It cannot be used to defeat justice or
perpetrate fraud and injustice. It is the better rule that courts, under the principle of equity, will not be guided or bound
strictly by the statute of limitations or the doctrine of laches when to be so, a manifest wrong or injustice would result.[44]
In this case, respondents learned of the assailed order only sometime in February 1998 and filed the petition for
annulment of judgment in 2001. Moreover, we find that respondents' right to due process is the paramount consideration
in annulling the assailed order. It bears stressing that an action to declare the nullity of a void judgment does not
prescribe.[45]
Finally, considering that the assailed CFI judgment is void, it has no legal and binding effect, force or efficacy for
any purpose. In contemplation of law, it is non-existent. Hence,the execution of the Deed of Sale by Lope in favor

48

of Columba pursuant to said void judgment, the issuance of titles pursuant to said Deed of Sale, and the subsequent
transfers are voidab initio. No reversible error was thus committed by the CA in annulling the judgment.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the Decision dated July 18, 2003 and Resolution dated November
13, 2003 of the Court of Appeals are AFFIRMED. The Regional Trial Court, Branch XI, Cebu and the Heirs
of Evaristo Cuyos are DIRECTED to proceed with SP Proceedings Case No. 24-BN for the settlement of the Estate
of EvaristoCuyos.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 115181. March 31, 2000]
MARIA SOCORRO AVELINO, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, ANGELINA AVELINO, SHARON
AVELINO, ANTONIO AVELINO, JR., TRACY AVELINO, PATRICK MICHAEL AVELINO and MARK
ANTHONY AVELINO, respondents. Sdaa miso
RESOLUTION
QUISUMBING, J.:
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated February 16, 1994
in CA-G.R. SP No. 31574 as well as its Resolution dated April 28, 1994 denying petitioner's Motion for
Reconsideration. The assailed Decision affirmed the Order of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch
78, in Sp. Proc. No. Q-91-10441 converting petitioner's petition for the issuance of letters of administration to
an action for judicial partition.
Petitioner Maria Socorro Avelino is a daughter and compulsory heir of the late Antonio Avelino, Sr., and his
first wife private respondent Angelina Avelino.
The other private respondents, Sharon, Antonio Jr., Tracy, Patrick and Mark Anthony all surnamed Avelino are
likewise compulsory heirs of Avelino, Sr. Sharon, an American, is the second wife of Avelino, Sr. The other
private respondents are siblings of petitioner Ma. Socorro.
The records reveal that on October 24, 1991, Ma. Socorro filed before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City,
Branch 78, docketed as SP Proc. No. Q-91-10441, a petition for the issuance of letters of administration of the
estate of Antonio Avelino, Sr., who died intestate on April 10, 1989. She asked that she be appointed the
administrator of the estate.
On December 3, 1992, Angelina, and the siblings filed their opposition by filing a motion to convert the said
judicial proceedings to an action for judicial partition which petitioner duly opposed.
On February 16, 1993, public respondent judge issued the assailed Order which reads:
"Acting on the Motion to Convert Proceedings to Action for Judicial Partition, considering that the petitioner is
the only heir not amenable to a simple partition, and all the other compulsory heirs manifested their desire
for an expeditious settlement of the estate of the deceased Antonio Avelino, Sr., the same is granted.
"WHEREFORE, the petition is converted into judicial partition of the estate of deceased Antonio Avelino, Sr.
The parties are directed to submit a complete inventory of all the real and personal properties left by the
deceased. Set the hearing of the judicial partition on APRIL 13, 1993, at 8:30 o'clock in the morning. Notify all
the parties and their counsel of this assignment.
"SO ORDERED."[1]
On March 17, 1993, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied in an Order dated June 16,
1993.
On July 23, 1993, Ma. Socorro filed before the Court of Appeals, a petition for certiorari, prohibition,
and mandamus alleging grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of
the trial court, in granting private respondents' motion to convert the judicial proceeding for the issuance of
letters of administration to an action for judicial partition. Her petition was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No.
31574. Sdaad
On February 18, 1994, the respondent appellate court rendered the assailed decision, stating that the
"petition is DENIED DUE COURSE" and accordingly dismissed."[2]
On March 1, 1994, petitioner duly moved for reconsideration, but it was denied on April 28, 1994.
Hence, this petition. Petitioner assigns the following errors:

49

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN UPHOLDING THE LOWER COURT'S FINDING THAT PARTITION IS PROPER
UNDER THE PREMISES.
ADMINISTRATION SHOULD BE THE PROPER REMEDY PENDING THE DETERMINATION OF THE CHARACTER AND
EXTENT OF THE DECEDENT'S ESTATE.[3]
For resolution, we find that given the circumstances in this case, the sole issue here is whether respondent
appellate court committed an error of law and gravely abused its discretion in upholding the trial court's
finding that a partition is proper.
Petitioner submits that: First, no partition of the estate is possible in the instant case as no determination has
yet been made of the character and extent of the decedent's estate. She points to the Court's ruling
in Arcilles v. Montejo, 26 SCRA 197 (1969), where we held that when the existence of other properties of the
decedent is a matter still to be reckoned with, administration proceedings are the proper mode of resolving
the same.[4] In addition, petitioner contends that the estate is in danger of being depleted for want of an
administrator to manage and attend to it.
Second, petitioner insists that the Rules of Court does not provide for conversion of a motion for the issuance
of letters of administration to an action for judicial partition. The conversion of the motion was, thus,
procedurally inappropriate and should be struck down for lack of legal basis.
When a person dies intestate, or, if testate, failed to name an executor in his will or the executor so named is
incompetent, or refuses the trust, or fails to furnish the bond required by the Rules of Court, then the
decedent's estate shall be judicially administered and the competent court shall appoint a qualified
administrator in the order established in Section 6 of Rule 78. [5] The exceptions to this rule are found in
Sections 1 and 2 of Rule 74[6] which provide:
"SECTION 1. Extrajudicial settlement by agreement between heirs. - If the decedent left no will and no debts
and the heirs are all of age or the minors are represented by their judicial or legal representatives duly
authorized for the purpose, the parties may, without securing letters of administration, divide the estate
among themselves as they see fit by means of a public instrument filed in the office of the register of deeds,
and should they disagree, they may do so in an ordinary action of partition.. Scs daad
"SEC. 2. Summary settlement of estates of small value.- Whenever the gross value of the estate of a
deceased person, whether he died testate or intestate, does not exceed ten thousand pesos, and that fact if
made to appear to the Regional Trial Court having jurisdiction of the estate by the petition of an interested
person and upon hearing, which shall be held not less than one (1) month nor more than three (3) months
from the date of the last publication of a notice which shall be published once a week for three (3)
consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation in the province, and after such other notice to
interested persons as the court may direct, the court may proceed summarily, without the appointment of an
executor or administrator, and without delay, to grant, if proper, allowance of the will, if any there be, to
determine who are the persons legally entitled to participate in the estate and to apportion and divide it
among them after the payment of such debts of the estate as the court shall then find to be due; and such
persons, in their own right, if they are lawful age and legal capacity, or by their guardians or trustees legally
appointed and qualified, if otherwise, shall thereupon be entitled to receive and enter into the possession of
the portions of the estate so awarded to them respectively. The court shall make such order as may be just
respecting the costs of the proceedings, and all orders and judgments made or rendered in the course thereof
shall be recorded in the office of the clerk, and the order of partition or award, if it involves real estate, shall
be recorded in the proper register's office."
The heirs succeed immediately to all of the rights and properties of the deceased at the moment of the
latter's death.[7] Section 1, Rule 74 of the Rules of Court, allows heirs to divide the estate among themselves
without need of delay and risks of being dissipated. When a person dies without leaving pending obligations,
his heirs, are not required to submit the property for judicial administration, nor apply for the appointment of
an administrator by the court.[8]
We note that the Court of Appeals found that in this case "the decedent left no debts and the heirs and
legatees are all of age."[9] With this finding, it is our view that Section 1, Rule 74 of the Rules of Court should
apply.

50

In a last-ditch effort to justify the need for an administrator, petitioner insists that there is nothing to partition
yet, as the nature and character of the estate have yet to be determined. We find, however, that a complete
inventory of the estate may be done during the partition proceedings, especially since the estate has no
debts. Hence, the Court of Appeals committed no reversible error when it ruled that the lower court did not
err in converting petitioner's action for letters of administration into an action for judicial partition. Sup rema
Nor can we sustain petitioner's argument that the order of the trial court converting an action for letters of
administration to one for judicial partition has no basis in the Rules of Court, hence procedurally infirm. The
basis for the trial court's order is Section 1, Rule 74 of the Rules of Court. It provides that in cases where the
heirs disagree as to the partition of the estate and no extrajudicial settlement is possible, then an ordinary
action for partition may be resorted to, as in this case. We have held that where the more expeditious remedy
of partition is available to the heirs, then the heirs or the majority of them may not be compelled to submit to
administration proceedings.[10] The trial court appropriately converted petitioner's action for letters of
administration into a suit for judicial partition, upon motion of the private respondents. No reversible error
may be attributed to the Court of Appeals when it found the trial court's action procedurally in order.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit, and the assailed decision and resolution of the Court
of Appeals is CA-G.R. SP No. 31574 are AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. 112260. June 30, 1997]
JOVITA YAP ANCOG, and GREGORIO YAP, JR., petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, ROSARIO DIEZ, and
CARIDAD YAP, respondents.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
This is a petition for review of the decision [1] of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. CV-19650, affirming
the dismissal by the Regional Trial Court[2] of Bohol of an action for partition of a parcel of land which
petitioners had filed.
The land, with improvements thereon, was formerly the conjugal property of the spouses Gregorio Yap
and Rosario Diez. In 1946, Gregorio Yap died, leaving his wife, private respondent Rosario Diez, and children,
petitioners Jovita Yap Ancog and Gregorio Yap, Jr., and private respondent Caridad Yap as his heirs.
In 1954 and again 1958, Rosario Diez obtained loans from the Bank of Calape, secured by a mortgage on
the disputed land, which was annotated on its Original Certificate of Title No. 622. When Rosario Diez applied
again for a loan to the bank, offering the land in question as security, the banks lawyer, Atty. Narciso de la
Serna, suggested that she submit an extrajudicial settlement covering the disputed land as a means of
facilitating the approval of her application. The suggestion was accepted and on April 4, 1961, Atty. de la
Serna prepared an extrajudicial settlement, which the heirs, with the exception of petitioner Gregorio Yap, Jr.,
then only 15 years old, signed. The document was notarized by Atty. de la Serna on April 12, 1961. As a
result, OCT No. 622 was cancelled and Transfer Certificate of Title No. 3447 (T-2411) was issued on April 13,
1961. On April 14, 1961, upon the execution of a real estate mortgage on the land, the loan was approved by
the bank.
Rosario Diez exercised rights of ownership over the land. In 1985, she brought an ejectment suit against
petitioner Jovita Yap Ancogs husband and son to evict them from the ground floor of the house built on the
land for failure to pay rent. Shortly thereafter, petitioner Jovita Ancog learned that private respondent Rosario
Diez had offered the land for sale.
Petitioner Ancog immediately informed her younger brother, petitioner Gregorio Yap, Jr., who was living in
Davao, of their mothers plan to sell the land. On June 6, 1985, they filed this action for partition in the
Regional Trial Court of Bohol where it was docketed as Civil Case No. 3094. As private respondent Caridad
Yap was unwilling to join in the action against their mother, Caridad was impleaded as a defendant.

51

Petitioners alleged that the extrajudicial instrument was simulated and therefore void. They claimed that
in signing the instrument they did not really intend to convey their interests in the property to their mother,
but only to enable her to obtain a loan on the security of the land to cover expenses for Caridads school fees
and for household repairs.
At the pre-trial conference, the parties stipulated:
1.

That the parcel of land in question originally belonged to the conjugal partnership of spouses Gregorio

Yap and Rosario Diez Yap;

2.
That Gregorio Yap, Jr. is the legitimate child of spouses Gregorio Yap and Rosario Diez Yap;
3.
That Gregorio Yap is not a party in the execution of the Extra Judicial Settlement of the Estate dated
April 4, 1961;
4.
That all the encumbrances found in TCT No. (3447) T-2411 which is now marked as Exh. C for the
plaintiffs and Exh. 2 for the defendants as Entry No. 6719, 6720, 11561 and 11562 are admitted by the
plaintiffs subject to the condition that the Extra Judicial Settlement of Estate dated April 4, 1961, was made
by the parties that the same was only for the purpose of securing a loan with the Philippine National Bank. [3]
The trial court rendered judgment dismissing petitioners action. It dismissed petitioners claim that the
extrajudicial settlement was simulated and held it was voluntarily signed by the parties. Observing that even
without the need of having title in her name Rosario Diez was able to obtain a loan using the land in question
as collateral, the court held that the extrajudicial settlement could not have been simulated for the purpose
of enabling her to obtain another loan. Petitioners failed to overcome the presumptive validity of the
extrajudicial settlement as a public instrument.
The court instead found that petitioner Ancog had waived her right to the land, as shown by the fact that
on February 28, 1975,[4] petitioners husband, Ildefonso Ancog, leased the property from private respondent
Diez. Furthermore, when the spouses Ancog applied for a loan to the Development Bank of the Philippines
using the land in question as collateral, they accepted an appointment from Rosario Diez as the latters
attorney-in-fact.[5]
The court also found that the action for partition had already prescribed. The registration of the land
under private respondent Rosario Diezs name amounted to a repudiation of the co-ownership. Therefore,
petitioners had ten (10) years from April 13, 1961 within which to bring an action to recover their share in the
property. While it is true that petitioner Gregorio Yap, Jr. was a minor at the time the extrajudicial settlement
was executed, his claim, according to the court, was barred by laches.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals upheld the validity of the extrajudicial settlement and sustained the trial
courts dismissal of the case. The appellate court emphasized that the extrajudicial settlement could not
have been simulated in order to obtain a loan, as the new loan was merely in addition to a previous one
which private respondent Diez had been able to obtain even without an extrajudicial settlement. Neither did
petitioners adduce evidence to prove that an extrajudicial settlement was indeed required in order to obtain
the additional loan. The appellate court held that considering petitioner Jovita Yap Ancogs educational
attainment (Master of Arts and Bachelor of Laws), it was improbable that she would sign the settlement if she
did not mean it to be such. Hence, this petition. Petitioners contend that the Court of Appeals erred:

I.

IN SUSTAINING THE TRIAL COURT RULING THAT THE CONTESTED EXTRAJUDICIAL SETTLEMENT (EXHIBIT B)

II.

IS NOT A SIMULATED ONE;

IN BLOATING THE EDUCATIONAL BACKGROUND OF PETITIONER JOVITA YAP ANCOG AND USING THE SAME AS

III.
IV.

ARGUMENT AGAINST HER CLAIM THAT SAID EXHIBIT B WAS INDEED A SIMULATED DOCUMENT;
IN SUSTAINING THE TRIAL COURTS RULING THAT PETITIONERS ACTION FOR PARTITION HAS PRESCRIBED;
IN RULING THAT PETITIONER GREGORIO YAP, JR., ONE OF THE CO-OWNERS OF THE LITIGATED PROPERTY,
HAD LOST HIS RIGHTS TO THE PROPERTY THROUGH PRESCRIPTION OR LACHES.
We hold that both the trial court and the Court of Appeals correctly acted in upholding the extrajudicial
settlement but erred in ruling that petitioner Gregorio Yap, Jr. was barred by laches from recovering his share
in the property in question.

52

To begin with, it is settled that the findings of facts of the Court of Appeals are conclusive upon the
parties and are not reviewable by this Court when they are an affirmation of the findings of the trial court. [6] In
this case, the trial court and the Court of Appeals found no evidence to show that the extrajudicial settlement
was required to enable private respondent Rosario Diez to obtain a loan from the Bank of Calape. Petitioners
merely claimed that the extrajudicial settlement was demanded by the bank.
To the contrary, that the heirs (Jovita Yap Ancog and Caridad Yap) meant the extrajudicial settlement to
be fully effective is shown by the fact that Rosario Diez performed acts of dominion over the entire land,
beginning with its registration, without any objection from them. Instead, petitioner Jovita Ancog agreed to
lease the land from her mother, private respondent Rosario Diez, and accepted from her a special power of
attorney to use the land in question as collateral for a loan she was applying from the DBP. Indeed, it was
private respondent Diez who paid the loan of the Ancogs in order to secure the release of the property from
mortgage.
Petitioner Jovita Yap Ancog contends that she could not have waived her share in the land because she is
landless. For that matter, private respondent Caridad Yap is also landless, but she signed the agreement.
[7]

She testified that she did so out of filial devotion to her mother.
Thus, what the record of this case reveals is the intention of Jovita Ancog and Caridad Yap to cede their

interest in the land to their mother Rosario Diez. It is immaterial that they had been initially motivated by a
desire to acquire a loan. Under Art. 1082 of the Civil Code,[8] every act which is intended to put an end to
indivision among co-heirs is deemed to be a partition even though it should purport to be a sale, an
exchange, or any other transaction.
We hold, however, that the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that the claim of petitioner Gregorio Yap, Jr.
was barred by laches. In accordance with Rule 74, 1 [9] of the Rules of Court, as he did not take part in the
partition, he is not bound by the settlement.[10] It is uncontroverted that, at the time the extrajudicial
settlement was executed, Gregorio Yap, Jr. was a minor. For this reason, he was not included or even
informed of the partition.
Instead, the registration of the land in Rosario Diezs name created an implied trust in his favor by
analogy to Art. 1451 of the Civil Code, which provides:
When land passes by succession to any person and he causes the legal title to be put in the name of another,
a trust is established by implication of law for the benefit of the true owner.
In the case of OLaco v. Co Cho Chit,[11] Art. 1451 was held as creating a resulting trust, which is founded
on the presumed intention of the parties. As a general rule, it arises where such may be reasonably
presumed to be the intention of the parties, as determined from the facts and circumstances existing at the
time of the transaction out of which it is sought to be established. [12] In this case, the records disclose that the
intention of the parties to the extrajudicial settlement was to establish a trust in favor of petitioner Yap, Jr. to
the extent of his share. Rosario Diez testified that she did not claim the entire property, [13] while Atty. de la
Serna added that the partition only involved the shares of the three participants. [14]
A cestui que trust may make a claim under a resulting trust within 10 years from the time the trust is
repudiated.[15] Although the registration of the land in private respondent Diezs name operated as a
constructive notice of her claim of ownership, it cannot be taken as an act of repudiation adverse to
petitioner Gregorio Yap, Jr.s claim, whose share in the property was precisely not included by the parties in
the partition. Indeed, it has not been shown whether he had been informed of her exclusive claim over the
entire property before 1985 when he was notified by petitioner Jovita Yap Ancog of their mothers plan to sell
the property.[16]
This Court has ruled that for prescription to run in favor of the trustee, the trust must be repudiated by
unequivocal

acts

made

known

to

the cestui

que

trust and

proved

by

clear

and

conclusive

evidence. Furthermore, the rule that the prescriptive period should be counted from the date of issuance of
the Torrens certificate of title applies only to the remedy of reconveyance under the Property Registration
Decree.[17] Since the action brought by petitioner Yap to claim his share was brought shortly after he was

53

informed by Jovita Ancog of their mothers effort to sell the property, Gregorio Yap, Jr.s claim cannot be
considered barred either by prescription or by laches.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that this case is
REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court for the determination of the claim of petitioner Gregorio Yap, Jr.
SO ORDERED.

[G.R. No. 118680. March 5, 2001]

MARIA ELENA RODRIGUEZ PEDROSA, petitioner, vs. THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS, JOSE, CARMEN,
MERCEDES & RAMON, all surnamed RODRIGUEZ, ROSALINA RODRIGUEZ, CHAN LUNG FAI, MATEO
TAN TE, TE ENG SUY, LORETA TE, VICTORIO S. DETALIA, JEROME DEIPARINE, PETRONILO S.
DETALIA,

HUBERT

CHIU

YULO,

PATERIO

N.

LAO,

LORENSITA

M.

PADILLA,

IMMACULATE

CONCEPCION COLLEGE AND LILIAN EXPRESS, INC. and TIO TUAN, respondents.
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
This petition assails the decision of the Court of Appeals dated May 23, 1994 which affirmed the
judgment of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 15, of Ozamiz City in Civil Case No. OZ-1397.
The facts of this case are as follows:
On April 8, 1946, the spouses Miguel Rodriguez and Rosalina J. de Rodriguez initiated proceedings before
the CFI of Ozamiz City for the legal adoption of herein petitioner, Maria Elena Rodriguez Pedrosa. On August
1, 1946, the CFI granted the petition and declared petitioner Pedrosa the adopted child of Miguel and
Rosalina.
On April 29, 1972, Miguel died intestate. Thereafter, petitioner and Rosalina entered into an extrajudicial
settlement of Miguels estate, adjudicating between themselves in equal proportion the estate of Miguel.
On November 21, 1972, private respondents filed an action to annul the adoption of petitioner before the
CFI of Ozamiz City, with petitioner and herein respondent Rosalina as defendants docketed as OZ 349.
On August 28, 1974, the CFI denied the petition and upheld the validity of the adoption. Thereafter, the
private respondents appealed said decision to the Court of Appeals.
On March 11, 1983, while said appeal was pending, the Rodriguezes entered into an extrajudicial
settlement with respondent Rosalina for the partition of the estate of Miguel and of another sister,
Pilar. Rosalina acted as the representative of the heirs of Miguel Rodriguez. Pilar had no heirs except his
brothers and sisters.
The Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement and Partition covered fourteen parcels of land covering a total area
of 224,883 square meters. These properties were divided among Jose, Carmen, Mercedes, Ramon and the
heirs of Miguel, represented solely by Rosalina. The heirs of Miguel were given 226 square meters of parcel
2, and 9,567 square meters and 24,457 square meters of parcels 7 and 9, respectively. [1]The total land area
allocated to the heirs of Miguel was 34,250 square meters.
Armed with the Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement and Partition, respondents Rodriguezes were able to
secure new Transfer Certificates of Title (TCTs) and were able to transfer some parcels to the other
respondents herein.[2]
Lots 504-A-6, 504-B-3 and 504-C-4, portions of Parcel 3, designated as Lot 504, were transferred to
respondents Chuan Lung Fai,[3] but not included in the Deed of Settlement and Partition, were transferred to
respondent Lilian Express, Inc. and are now registered under TCT No. T-11337. Parcel 6, Lot 560, was
subdivided among Ramon, Jose, Carmen and Mercedes and was designated as Lots 560-A, 560-B, 560-C, 560D and 560-E. Lot 560-A covering 500 square meters was transferred to respondent Victorino Detall [4] and was
subsequently transferred to Jerome Deiparine who registered it under his name under TCT No. T-10706. Lot
560-B with 500 square meters was transferred to respondent Petronilo Detalla [5] and was later transferred to
respondent Hubert Chiu Yulo who registered it under his name under TCT No. T-11305. Lot 560-C was

54

transferred and registered under the name of respondent Paterio Lao with TCT No. T-10206. Lot 560-D was
sold to and subsequently registered in the name of Lorensita M. Padilla under TCT No. T-10207. The
remaining portion, Lot 560-E consisting of 43,608 square meters was bought by respondent Immaculate
Concepcion College and was registered in its name under TCT No. T-10208. [6]
On June 19, 1986, the parties in the appeal which sought to annul the adoption of petitioner Pedrosa filed
a joint Motion to Dismiss. On June 25, 1986, the Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal but upheld the
validity of the adoption of petitioner.
Thereafter, petitioner sent her daughter, Loreto Jocelyn, to claim their share of the properties from the
Rodriguezes. The latter refused saying that Maria Elena and Loreto were not heirs since they were not their
blood relatives.
Petitioner, then, filed a complaint to annul the 1983 partition. The said complaint was filed on January 28,
1987. Said complaint was later amended on March 25, 1987 to include the allegation that earnest efforts
toward a compromise were made between the plaintiffs and the defendants, but the same failed. [7]
The Regional Trial Court dismissed the complaint.
Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals. The appellate court affirmed the decision of the trial
court. Its ruling was premised on the following grounds:[8]
1)

that the participation of Rosalina has already estopped her from questioning the validity of the partition,
and since she is already estopped, it naturally follows that Maria Elena, her successor-in-interest, is likewise

2)

estopped, applying Article 1439 of the Civil Code;

that the appeal of Maria Elena and her claim that the partition is null and void is weakened by her

inconsistent claim that the partition would have been alright had she been given a more equitable share;
3) the action is essentially an action for rescission and had been filed late considering that it was filed beyond
the 4 year period provided for in Article 1100 of the Civil Code; [9]
4)
that fraud and/or bad faith was never established.
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which was denied by the Court of Appeals in a Resolution
dated December 20, 1994.[10]
Hence, this petition wherein the petitioner asserts that the following errors were allegedly committed by
the Court of Appeals in I.

FINDING THAT THE EXTRAJUDICIAL SETTLEMENT AND PARTITION ENTERED INTO BY DEFENDANT
JUREDINI AND DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS RODRIGUEZES WAS VALID AND BINDING UPON THE PLAINTIFF-

II.

APPELLANT WHO DID NOT PARTICIPATE IN SAID TRANSACTION

CONCLUDING THAT THE CLAIM OF PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT HAVE ALREADY PRESCRIBED TWO (2) YEARS
AFTER PUBLICATION OF THE EXTRAJUDICIAL SETTLEMENT AND PARTITION IN THE NEWSPAPER OF GENERAL

CIRCULATION
III. ...CONCLUDING THAT THE CLAIM OF PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT IS BARRED OR ESTOPPED IN FILING THIS CASE
(sic) IN VIEW OF THE DISMISSAL OF THE APPEAL IN CIVIL CASE NO. OZ 349 INTERPOSED BY HEREIN
DEFENDANTS-APPELLEES WHO WERE THEN PLAINTIFFS-APPELLANTS IN AC[C]-G.R. NO. SP-00208
IV. SUSTAINING THE DEFENDANT-APPELLEES CLAIM THAT AS THEY HAVE NOT AS YET RECOGNIZED
PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT AS AN ADOPTED DAUGHTER OF MIGUEL RODRIGUEZ IT WAS NOT NECESSARY FOR
V.

THEM TO HAVE HER PARTICIPATE IN THE EXTRAJUDICIAL SETTLEMENT, EXHIBITS S AND I

CONCLUDING THAT THE PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT HAD NOT CONCLUSIVELY SHOWN THAT MIGUEL
RODRIGUEZ WAS A CO-OWNER OF THE LANDS SOLD AND HENCE IT FOLLOWS THAT SHE HAS NO RIGHT OF

REDEMPTION OF THOSE LANDS

VI. FINDING THAT PORTION OF LOTS NOS. 504 AND 560 SOLD TO THE OTHER DEFENDANTSAPPELLEES
WERE CLEAN AND FREE FROM ENCUMBRANCES OR ANY FLAWS HENCE WERE VALID
VII. FINDING THAT THE PLANTIFFAPPELLANT NEVER APPEARED IN COURT TO TESTIFY OR REBUT THE
ASSERTIONS OF THE DEFENDANTSAPPELLANTS THAT THERE WAS A VALID PARTITION
VIII. AWARDING PLAINTIFFAPPELLANT DAMAGES FOR THE INCOME OF HER SHARE IN THE PROPERTIES IN
QUESTION[11]

55

In sum, the issues to be resolved in our view are (1) whether or not the complaint for annulment of the
Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement and Partition had already prescribed; (2) whether or not said deed is valid;
and (3) whether or not the petitioner is entitled to recover the lots which had already been transferred to the
respondent buyers.
Petitioner argues that the complaint for annulment of the extrajudicial partition has not yet prescribed
since the prescriptive period which should be applied is four years following the case of Beltran vs. Ayson, 4
SCRA 69 (1962). She also avers that Sec. 4, Rule 74 which provides for a two-year prescriptive period needs
two requirements. One, the party assailing the partition must have been given notice, and two, the party
assailing the partition must have participated therein. Petitioner insists these requirements are not present in
her case,[12] since she did not participate in the Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement and Partition. She
cites Villaluz vs. Neme, 7 SCRA 27, 30 (1963), where we held that a deed of extrajudicial partition executed
without including some of the heirs, who had no knowledge and consent to the same, is fraudulent. She
asserts that she is an adoptive daughter and thus an heir of Miguel. [13]
Petitioner also contends that the respondent buyers were buyers in bad faith since they failed to exercise
the necessary due diligence required before purchasing the lots in question. [14] In the alternative, petitioner
wants to redeem the said lots as a co-owner of respondent Rodriguezes under the provisions of Article 1620
of the New Civil Code.[15]
Lastly, petitioner asserts that she will suffer lesion if the partition would be allowed. She asks for the
rescission of the said partitioning under Articles 165-175 of the Civil Code. [16]
Respondents, in response, claim that the action of petitioner had already prescribed. In addition, they
argue that petitioner, Maria Elena, and Rosalina already have their shares in the estate of Miguel Rodriguez
reflected in the compromise agreement they entered into with the respondent Rodriguezes in AC- G.R. SP
00208. Finally, respondents aver that the non-participation of Maria Elena in the extrajudicial partition was
understandable since her status as an adopted child was then under litigation. In any case, they assert that
the shares of Miguels heirs were adequately protected in the said partition. [17]
Section 4, Rule 74[18] provides for a two year prescriptive period (1) to persons who have participated or
taken part or had notice of the extrajudicial partition, and in addition (2) when the provisions of Section 1 [19] of
Rule 74 have been strictly complied with, i.e., that all the persons or heirs of the decedent have taken part in
the extrajudicial settlement or are represented by themselves or through guardians. [20]
Petitioner, as the records confirm, did not participate in the extrajudicial partition. Patently then, the twoyear prescriptive period is not applicable in her case.
The applicable prescriptive period here is four (4) years as provided in Gerona vs. De Guzman, 11 SCRA
153 (1964), which held that:
[The action to annul] a deed of extrajudicial settlement upon the ground of fraud...may be filed within four
years from the discovery of the fraud. Such discovery is deemed to have taken place when said instrument
was filed with the Register of Deeds and new certificates of title were issued in the name of respondents
exclusively.[21]
Considering that the complaint of the petitioner was filed on January 28, 1987, or three years and ten
months after the questioned extrajudicial settlement dated March 11, 1983, was executed, we hold that her
action against the respondents on the basis of fraud has not yet prescribed.
Section 1 of Rule 74 of the Rules of Court is the applicable rule on publication of extrajudicial
settlement. It states:
The fact of the extrajudicial settlement or administration shall be published in a newspaper of general
circulation in the manner provided in the next succeeding section; but no extrajudicial settlement shall be
binding upon any person who has not participated therein or had no notice thereof. [22]
Under said provision, without the participation of all persons involved in the proceedings, the
extrajudicial settlement cannot be binding on said persons. The rule contemplates a notice which must be

56

sent out or issued before the Deed of Settlement and/or Partition is agreed upon, i.e., a notice calling all
interested parties to participate in the said deed of extrajudicial settlement and partition, not after, which was
when publication was done in the instant case. Following Rule 74 and the ruling in Beltran vs. Ayson, since
Maria Elena did not participate in the said partition, the settlement is not binding on her.
The provision of Section 4, Rule 74 will also not apply when the deed of extrajudicial partition is sought to
be annulled on the ground of fraud. A deed of extrajudicial partition executed without including some of the
heirs, who had no knowledge of and consent to the same, is fraudulent and vicious. [23] Maria Elena is an heir
of Miguel together with her adopting mother, Rosalina. Being the lone descendant of Miguel, she excludes
the collateral relatives of Miguel from participating in his estate, following the provisions of Article 1003 of the
Civil Code.[24] The private respondent Rodriguezes cannot claim that they were not aware of Maria Elenas
adoption since they even filed an action to annul the decree of adoption. Neither can they claim that their
actions were valid since the adoption of Maria Elena was still being questioned at the time they executed the
deed of partition. The complaint seeking to annul the adoption was filed only twenty six (26) years after the
decree of adoption, patently a much delayed response to prevent Maria Elena from inheriting from her
adoptive parents. The decree of adoption was valid and existing. With this factual setting, it is patent that
private respondents executed the deed of partition in bad faith with intent to defraud Maria Elena.
In the case of Segura vs. Segura, the Court held:
This section [referring to section 4, Rule 74] provides in gist that a person who has been deprived of his lawful
participation in the estate of the decedent, whether as heir or as creditor, must assert his claim within two
years after the extrajudicial or summary settlement of such estate under Sections 1 and 2 respectively of the
same Rule 74. Thereafter, he will be precluded from doing so as the right will have prescribed.
It is clear that Section 1 of Rule 74 does not apply to the partition in question which was null and void as far
as the plaintiffs were concerned. The rule covers only valid partitions. The partition in the present case was
invalid because it excluded six of the nine heirs who were entitled to equal shares in the partitioned
property. Under the rule, no extrajudicial settlement shall be binding upon any person who has not
participated therein or had no notice thereof. As the partition was a total nullity and did not affect the
excluded heirs, it was not correct for the trial court to hold that their right to challenge the partition had
prescribed after two years from its execution in 1941.[25]
To say that Maria Elena was represented by Rosalina in the partitioning is imprecise. Maria Elena, the
adopted child, was no longer a minor at the time Miguel died. Rosalina, only represented her own interests
and not those of Maria Elena. Since Miguel predeceased Pilar, a sister, his estate automatically vested to his
child and widow, in equal shares. Respondent Rodriguezes interests did not include Miguels estate but only
Pilars estate.
Could petitioner still redeem the properties from buyers? Given the circumstances in this case, we are
constrained to hold that this is not the proper forum to decide this issue. The properties sought to be
recovered by the petitioner are now all registered under the name of third parties. Well settled is the doctrine
that a Torrens Title cannot be collaterally attacked. The validity of the title can only be raised in an action
expressly instituted for such purpose.[26]
Petitioner asks for the award of damages. No receipts, agreements or any other documentary evidence
was presented to justify such claim for damages. Actual damages, to be recoverable, must be proved with a
reasonable degree of certainty. Courts cannot simply rely on speculation, conjecture or guesswork in
determining the fact and amount of damages. [27] The same is true for moral damages. These cannot be
awarded in the absence of any factual basis. [28] The unsubstantiated testimony of Loreto Jocelyn Pedrosa is
hearsay and has no probative value. It is settled in jurisprudence that damages may not be awarded on the
basis of hearsay evidence.[29] Nonetheless, the failure of the petitioner to substantiate her claims for damages
does not mean that she will be totally deprived of any damages. Under the law, nominal damages are
awarded, so that a plaintiffs right, which has been invaded or violated by defendants may be vindicated and
recognized.[30]

57

Considering that (1) technically, petitioner sustained injury but which, unfortunately, was not adequately
and properly proved, (2) petitioner was unlawfully deprived of her legal participation in the partition of the
estate of Miguel, her adoptive father, (3) respondents had transferred portions of the properties involved to
third parties, and (4) this case has dragged on for more than a decade, we find it reasonable to grant in
petitioners favor nominal damages in recognition of the existence of a technical injury. [31] The amount to be
awarded as such damages should at least commensurate to the injury sustained by the petitioner considering
the concept and purpose of said damages. [32] Such award is given in view of the peculiar circumstances cited
and the special reasons extant in this case. [33] Thus, the grant of ONE HUNDRED THOUSAND (P100,000.00)
PESOS to petitioner as damages is proper in view of the technical injury she has suffered.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement and Partition executed by private
respondents on March 11, 1983 is declared invalid. The amount of P100,000.00 is hereby awarded to
petitioner as damages to be paid by private respondents, who are also ordered to pay the costs.
SO ORDERED.

[G.R. No. 138971. June 6, 2001]

PHILIPPINE

ECONOMIC

ZONE

AUTHORITY

(PEZA), petitioner, vs. HON.

RUMOLDO

R.

FERNANDEZ,

Regional Trial Court of Lapu-Lapu City (Branch 54); and the Heirs of the Deceased Spouses JUAN
CUIZON and FLORENTINA RAPAYA, respondents.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
An action for reconveyance of land, an equitable remedy recognized under our land registration laws, is
subject to the applicable rules on prescription. Moreover, the right to pursue such reivindicatory action may
be defeated when the property sought to be recovered has been conveyed to an innocent purchaser for
value.
The Case
Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking to set
aside the June 8, 1999 Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-GR SP No. 47575. In the said Decision,
the CA sustained the January 12, 1998[2] and the March 31, 1998[3] Orders of the Regional Trial Court of LapuLapu City (Branch 54) in Civil Case No. 4534-L, which denied petitioners Motion to Dismiss and Motion for
Reconsideration, respectively. The dispositive portion of the CA Decision reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, [there being] no abuse of discretion committed by respondent court, the instant petition is
hereby DISMISSED.
The Facts
The subject of the present controversy is Lot No. 4673 of the Opon Cadastre situated in Lapu-Lapu City,
covered by Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. RO-2537 (May 19, 1982) and registered in the names of
Florentina Rapaya, Victorino Cuizon, Isidro Cuizon, Ursula Cuizon, Benito Lozano, Isabel Lozano, Pelagia
Lozano, Augusto Lozano, Valeriano Ybaez, Jesus Ybaez, Numeriano Ybaez, Martino Ybaez, Eutiquio
Patalinghug, Celedonio Patalinghug, Santiago Patalinghug and Silvino Patalinghug. The lot has an area of
11,345 square meters, more or less.

58

On May 15, 1982, Jorgea Igot-Soroo, Frisca Booc and Felix Cuizon executed an Extrajudicial Partition, in
which they declared themselves as the only surviving heirs of the registered owners of the aforesaid
lot. Consequently, they were issued TCT No. 12467 on July 8, 1982.
Considering that the said lot was among the objects of expropriation proceedings docketed as Civil Case
No 510-L and pending before it, Branch XVI of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Lapu-Lapu City rendered a
partial Decision on August 11, 1982. In that Decision, the RTC approved the Compromise Agreement entered
into between the Export Processing Zone Authority (EPZA) and the new registered owners of Lot No. 4673;
namely, Jorgea Igot-Soroo, Frisca Booc and Felix Cuizon. In accordance with the approved Compromise
Agreement, EPZA would pay P68,070 as just compensation for the expropriation of the subject property,
which was to be used for an export processing zone to be established in Lapu-Lapu City.
As a consequence of the RTC Decision, petitioner acquired title over Lot No. 4673 and the corresponding
Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 12788 issued by the Register of Deeds of Lapu-Lapu City on October 13,
1982.
On July 29, 1996, private respondents filed with the RTC of Lapu-Lapu City a Complaint for Nullity of
Documents, Redemption and Damages against petitioner and Jorgea-Igot Soroo et al. Docketed as Civil
Case No. 4534-L, the Complaint alleged that herein private respondents had been excluded from the
extrajudicial settlement of the estate. It likewise sought the nullification of several documents, including TCT
No. 12788 dated October 13, 1992, issued in the name of herein petitioner.
On February 17, 1997, petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss the Complaint on the ground of
prescription. This Motion was denied by respondent judge in the Order dated January 12, 1998. A Motion for
Reconsideration thereof was likewise denied in the Order dated March 31, 1998.
On April 30, 1998, petitioner elevated the matter to the Court of Appeals through a Petition for
Certiorari. As earlier noted, the CA dismissed the Petition.
Hence, this recourse.[4]
The CA Ruling
In denying the Petition, the CA ratiocinated as follows:
Civil Case No. 4534-L although instituted in the guise of a complaint for Nullity of Documents, Redemption
and Damages is in effect an action for reconveyance of the property to plaintiffs of a portion which rightfully
belong to them. It would be against good reason and conscience not to hold that defendants, Francisca
Frisca Booc, heirs of deceased Jorg[e]a Igot-Soronio and heirs of Felix Cuizon committed a breach of trust
which enabled them to execute a Deed of Extrajudicial Partition[,] Special Power of Attorney and Deed of
Absolute Sale in favor of EPZA to the prejudice of the plaintiffs as their co-heirs. Therefore, in an action like
this case, the private respondents may be ordered to make reconveyance of the property to the person
rightfully entitled to it.
It is undeniable that defendants defrauded plaintiffs by falsely representing that they were the only heirs of
deceased Juan Cuizon and Florentina Rapaya, succeeded in having the original title cancelled and enabling
them to appropriate the land in favor of EPZA and a new one issued in the name of the latter (EPZA). This
way of acquiring title create[s] what is called constructive trust in favor of the defrauded party and grants
the latter the right to vindicate [itself] x x x regardless of the lapse of time. Thus, it has been held that if a
person obtain(s) a legal title to the property by fraud or concealment, courts of equity will impress upon the
title a so called trust in favor of the defrauded party. In fact, it has long been held that a co-heir who
through fraud, succeeds in obtaining a certificate of title in his name to the prejudice of his co-heirs, is
deemed to hold the land in trust for the latter. The excluded heirs action is imprescriptible.
And if the action involve(s) the declaration of the nullity or inexistence of a void or inexistent contract which
became

the

basis

for

the

fraudulent

registration

of

the

subject

property,

then

the

action

is

imprescriptible. This finds codal support in Article 1410 of the Civil Code, which declares that the action or
defense for the declaration of the inexistence of a void contract does not prescribe.

59

As to the constructive notice rule alleged by the petitioner, (the) Supreme Court in the case of Juan vs.
Zuniga, citing Sevilla vs. Angeles, has this to say:
'While this ruling is correct as applied to ordinary actions by recovery of real property which is covered by a
torrens title upon the theory that its registration under our registration system has the effect of constructive
notice to the whole world, the same cannot be applied x x x when the purpose of the action is to compel a
trustee to convey the property registered in his name for the benefit of the cestui que trust. In other words,
the defense of prescription cannot be set up in an action whose purpose is to recover property held by a
person for the benefit of another.
The Issues
Petitioner interposes the following issues for the consideration of this Court:
I
Whether or not the appellate court erred in not holding that private respondents claim against expropriated
property had prescribed.
II
Whether or not the appellate court erred in not holding that reconveyance does not lie against the
expropriated property.[5]
The Courts Ruling
The Petition is meritorious.
First Issue: Prescription
Petitioner avers that private respondents claim against the subject property has already prescribed,
because the two-year period within which an unduly excluded heir may seek a new settlement of the estate
had already lapsed by the time private respondents filed their action with the trial court. Petitioner further
argues that private respondents received constructive notice in view of the registration of the extrajudicial
partition with the Registry of Deeds. According to petitioner, the two-year period commenced from July 8,
1982, the date of inscription of the extrajudicial settlement on OCT No. 2537.
The pertinent provisions of Section 4, Rule 74 of the Rules of Court, are reproduced for easy reference, as
follows:
Section 4. Liability of distributees and estate. - If it shall appear at any time within two (2) years
after the settlement and distribution of an estate in accordance with the provisions of either of the first
two sections of this rule, that an heir or other person has been unduly deprived of his lawful
participation in the estate, such heir or such other person may compel the settlement of the
estate in the courts in the manner hereinafter provided for the purpose of satisfying such lawful
participation. And if within the same time of two (2) years, it shall appear that there are debts outstanding
against the estate which have not been paid, or that an heir or other person has been unduly deprived of his
lawful participation payable in money, the court having jurisdiction of the estate may, by order for that
purpose, after hearing, settle the amount of such debts or lawful participation and order how much and in
what manner each distributee shall contribute in the payment thereof, and may issue execution, if
circumstances require, against the bond provided in the preceding section or against the real estate
belonging to the deceased, or both. Such bond and such real estate shall remain charged with a liability to

60

creditors, heirs, or other persons for the full period of two (2) years after such distribution, notwithstanding
any transfers of real estate that may have been made. (Emphasis supplied)
A perusal of the foregoing provision will show that persons unduly deprived of their lawful participation in
a settlement may assert their claim only within the two-year period after the settlement and distribution of
the estate. This prescription period does not apply, however, to those who had no part in or had no notice of
the settlement. Section 4, Rule 74 of the Rules of Court, is not meant to be a statute of
limitations. Moreover, by no reason or logic can one contend that an extrajudicial partition, being merely
an ex parte proceeding, would affect third persons who had no knowledge thereof. [6] Be that as it may, it
cannot be denied, either, that by its registration in the manner provided by law, a transaction may be known
actually or constructively.
In the present case, private respondents are deemed to have been constructively notified of the
extrajudicial settlement by reason of its registration and annotation in the certificate of title over the subject
lot. From the time of registration, private respondents had two (2) years or until July 8, 1984, within which to
file their objections or to demand the appropriate settlement of the estate.
On the matter of constructive notice vis--vis prescription of an action to contest an extrajudicial
partition, a leading authority on land registration elucidates as follows:
While it may be true that an extrajudicial partition is an ex parte proceeding, yet after its
registration under the Torrens system and the annotation on the new certificate of title of the contingent
liability of the estate for a period of two years as prescribed in Rule 74, Section 4, of the Rules of Court, by
operation of law a constructive notice is deemed made to all the world, so that upon the
expiration of said period all third persons should be barred [from going] after the particular
property, except where title thereto still remains in the names of the alleged heirs who executed the
partition tainted with fraud, or their transferees who may not qualify as innocent purchasers for value. If the
liability of the registered property should extend indefinitely beyond that period, then such constructive
notice which binds the whole world by virtue of registration would be meaningless and illusory. x x
x.[7] (Emphasis supplied)
The only exception to the above-mentioned prescription is when the title remains in the hands of the
heirs who have fraudulently caused the partition of the subject property or in those of their transferees who
cannot be considered innocent purchasers for value.
In this regard, title to the property in the present case was no longer in the name of the allegedly
fraudulent heirs, but already in that of an innocent purchaser for value the government. Moreover, the
government is presumed to have acted in good faith in the acquisition of the lot, considering that title thereto
was obtained through a Compromise Agreement judicially approved in proper expropriation proceedings.
Even assuming that there was in fact fraud on the part of the other heirs, private respondents may
proceed only against the defrauding heirs, not against petitioner which had no participation in or knowledge
of the alleged fraud. The fact that the co-heirs title to the property was fraudulently secured cannot
prejudice the rights of petitioner which, absent any showing that it had knowledge or participation in the
irregularity, is considered a purchaser in good faith and for value. [8]
The remedy of an owner alleged to have been prejudiced or fraudulently deprived of property that was
subsequently sold to an innocent purchaser for value is an action for damages against the person or persons
who perpetrated the fraud.[9]
Second Issue: Limitations on Reconveyance
The law recognizes the right of a person, who, by adjudication or confirmation of title obtained by actual
fraud, is deprived of an estate or an interest therein. [10] Although a review of the decree of registration is no
longer possible after the one-year period from its entry expires, still available is an equitable remedy to

61

compel the reconveyance of property to those who may have been wrongfully deprived of it. [11] This equitable
remedy afforded by law is not without limitations, however.
An action for reconveyance resulting from fraud prescribes four years from the discovery of the fraud;
such discovery is deemed to have taken place upon the issuance of the certificate of title over the
property. Registration of real property is considered a constructive notice to all persons and, thus, the fouryear period shall be counted therefrom.[12] Clearly then, private respondents action for reconveyance based
on fraud has already prescribed, considering that title to said property had been issued way back on August
11, 1982, while the reivindicatory suit was instituted only on July 29, 1996.
Even an action for reconveyance based on an implied or a constructive trust would have already
prescribed just the same, because such action prescribes ten (10) years from the alleged fraudulent
registration or date of issuance of the certificate of title over the property.[13] The imprescriptibility of an
action for reconveyance based on implied or constructive trust applies only when the plaintiff or the person
enforcing the trust is in possession of the property. In effect, the action for reconveyance is an action to quiet
the property title, which does not prescribe.[14] Undisputedly, private respondents are not in possession of the
disputed property. In fact, they do not even claim to be in possession of it, even if to do so would enable
them to justify the imprescriptibility of their action.
Accordingly, the CA Decisions reliance on Juan v. Zuiga,[15] as regards the imprescriptibility of an action
for reconveyance based on implied or constructive trust, is utterly misplaced in the light of the foregoing
rulings of the Court declaring a ten-year period of prescription for such action. Moreover, the principle
enunciated therein has no application to the instant case, considering that the supposed trustee herein has
effectively repudiated the so-called trust by directly performing an act of ownership; that is, by conveying
the property to the government through expropriation. An action to compel, for the benefit of the cestui que
trust, the conveyance of property registered in the trustees name does not prescribe unless the trustee
repudiates the trust.[16] Thus, private respondents cannot invoke the imprescriptibility of their action for
reconveyance, irrespective of their basis for it.
Finally, it must be remembered that reconveyance is a remedy of those whose property has been
wrongfully or erroneously registered in the name of another. Such recourse, however, cannot be availed of
once the property has passed to an innocent purchaser for value. For an action for reconveyance to prosper,
the property should not have passed into the hands of an innocent purchaser for value.[17]
Indubitably, we find that the property has already been conveyed to the government in appropriate
expropriation proceedings, the regularity or validity of which has not been questioned. Petitioner should,
therefore, enjoy the security afforded to innocent third persons under our registration laws. Equally
important, its title to the property must be rightfully preserved.
Hence, private respondents action to recover the subject property from the government cannot be
maintained, not only because of the prescription of the action, but on account of the protection given to
innocent purchasers for value granted under our land registration laws. Indeed, the inevitable consequences
of the Torrens system of land registration must be upheld in order to give stability to it and provide finality to
land disputes.
This ruling notwithstanding, private respondents are not without recourse. They may sue for damages
their co-heirs who have allegedly perpetrated fraud in Civil Case No. 4534-L pending before the RTC. The
right and the extent of damages to be awarded to private respondents shall be determined by the trial court,
subject to the evidence duly established during the proceedings.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby GRANTED and the

assailed

Decision

of

the

Court

of

Appeals REVERSED. The Orders of the Regional Trial Court of Lapu-Lapu City (Branch 54) in Civil Case No.
4534-L, dated January 12, 1998 and March 31, 1998, are SET ASIDE and the said Civil Case, as against
petitioner, is DISMISSED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.

62

SECOND DIVISION

DELFIN TAN,

G.R. No. 153820

Petitioner,
Present:
*

- versus

ERLINDA C. BENOLIRAO,
ANDREW C. BENOLIRAO,
ROMANO C. BENOLIRAO,
DION C. BENOLIRAO,
SPS. REYNALDO TANINGCO
and NORMA D. BENOLIRAO,
EVELYN T. MONREAL, and
ANN KARINA TANINGCO,
Respondents.

QUISUMBING, J.,
CARPIO-MORALES,
**
NACHURA,
BRION, and
ABAD, JJ.

Promulgated:
October 16, 2009

x-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- x

DECISION

BRION, J.:

Is an annotation made pursuant to Section 4, Rule 74 of the Rules of Court (Rules) on a certificate of
title covering real property considered an encumbrance on the property? We resolve this question in the
petition for review on certiorari[1] filed by Delfin Tan (Tan) to assail the decision of the Court of Appeals (CA)
in CA-G.R. CV No. 52033[2] and the decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC)[3] that commonly declared the
forfeiture of his P200,000.00 down payment as proper, pursuant to the terms of his contract with the
respondents.
THE ANTECEDENTS
The facts are not disputed. Spouses Lamberto and Erlinda Benolirao and the Spouses Reynaldo and
Norma Taningco were the co-owners of a 689-square meter parcel of land (property) located in Tagaytay City
and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 26423. On October 6, 1992, the co-owners executed a
Deed of Conditional Sale over the property in favor of Tan for the price of P1,378,000.00. The deed stated:

63

a)

An initial down-payment of TWO HUNDRED (P200,000.00) THOUSAND PESOS, Philippine Currency, upon
signing of this contract; then the remaining balance of ONE MILLION ONE HUNDRED SEVENTY EIGHT
THOUSAND (P1,178,000.00) PESOS, shall be payable within a period of one hundred fifty (150) days from
date hereof without interest;

b)

That for any reason, BUYER fails to pay the remaining balance within above mentioned period, the BUYER
shall have a grace period of sixty (60) days within which to make the payment, provided that there shall be
an interest of 15% per annum on the balance amount due from the SELLERS;

c)

That should in case (sic) the BUYER fails to comply with the terms and conditions within the above stated
grace period, then the SELLERS shall have the right to forfeit the down payment, and to rescind this
conditional sale without need of judicial action;

d)

That in case, BUYER have complied with the terms and conditions of this contract, then the SELLERS shall
execute and deliver to the BUYER the appropriate Deed of Absolute Sale;

Pursuant to the Deed of Conditional Sale, Tan issued and delivered to the co-owners/vendors
Metrobank Check No. 904407 for P200,000.00 as down payment for the property, for which the vendors
issued a corresponding receipt.
On November 6, 1992, Lamberto Benolirao died intestate. Erlinda Benolirao (his widow and one of the
vendors of the property) and her children, as heirs of the deceased, executed an extrajudicial settlement of
Lambertos estate on January 20, 1993. On the basis of the extrajudicial settlement, a new certificate of title
over the property, TCT No. 27335, was issued on March 26, 1993 in the names of the Spouses Reynaldo and
Norma Taningco and Erlinda Benolirao and her children. Pursuant to Section 4, Rule 74 of the Rules, the
following annotation was made on TCT No. 27335:
x x x any liability to credirots (sic), excluded heirs and other persons having right to the property, for a
period of two (2) years, with respect only to the share of Erlinda, Andrew, Romano and Dion, all surnamed
Benolirao
As stated in the Deed of Conditional Sale, Tan had until March 15, 1993 to pay the balance of the
purchase price. By agreement of the parties, this period was extended by two months, so Tan had until May
15, 1993 to pay the balance. Tan failed to pay and asked for another extension, which the vendors again
granted. Notwithstanding this second extension, Tan still failed to pay the remaining balance due on May 21,
1993. The vendors thus wrote him a letter demanding payment of the balance of the purchase price within
five (5) days from notice; otherwise, they would declare the rescission of the conditional sale and the
forfeiture of his down payment based on the terms of the contract.
Tan refused to comply with the vendors demand and instead wrote them a letter (dated May 28,
1993) claiming that the annotation on the title, made pursuant to Section 4, Rule 74 of the Rules, constituted
an encumbrance on the property that would prevent the vendors from delivering a clean title to him. Thus,
he alleged that he could no longer be required to pay the balance of the purchase price and demanded the
return of his down payment.

64

When the vendors refused to refund the down payment, Tan, through counsel, sent another demand
letter to the vendors on June 18, 1993. The vendors still refused to heed Tans demand, prompting Tan to file
on June 19, 1993 a complaint with the RTC of Pasay City for specific performance against the vendors,
including Andrew Benolirao, Romano Benolirao, Dion Benolirao as heirs of Lamberto Benolirao, together with
Evelyn Monreal and Ann Karina Taningco (collectively, therespondents). In his complaint, Tan alleged that
there was a novation of the Deed of Conditional Sale done without his consent since the annotation on the
title created an encumbrance over the property. Tan prayed for the refund of the down payment and the
rescission of the contract.
On August 9, 1993, Tan amended his Complaint, contending that if the respondents insist on forfeiting
the down payment, he would be willing to pay the balance of the purchase price provided there is reformation
of the Deed of Conditional Sale. In the meantime, Tan caused the annotation on the title of a notice of lis
pendens.
On August 21, 1993, the respondents executed a Deed of Absolute Sale over the property in favor of
Hector de Guzman (de Guzman) for the price ofP689,000.00.
Thereafter, the respondents moved for the cancellation of the notice of lis pendens on the ground that
it was inappropriate since the case that Tan filed was a personal action which did not involve either title to, or
possession of, real property. The RTC issued an order dated October 22, 1993 granting the respondents
motion to cancel the lis pendens annotation on the title.
Meanwhile, based on the Deed of Absolute Sale in his favor, de Guzman registered the property and
TCT No. 28104 was issued in his name. Tan then filed a motion to carry over the lis pendens annotation to TCT
No. 28104 registered in de Guzmans name, but the RTC denied the motion.
On September 8, 1995, after due proceedings, the RTC rendered judgment ruling that the respondents
forfeiture of Tans down payment was proper in accordance with the terms and conditions of the contract
between the parties.[4] The RTC ordered Tan to pay the respondents the amount of P30,000.00,
plusP1,000.00 per court appearance, as attorneys fees, and to pay the cost of suit.
On appeal, the CA dismissed the petition and affirmed the ruling of the trial court in toto. Hence, the
present petition.
THE ISSUES
Tan argues that the CA erred in affirming the RTCs ruling to cancel the lis pendens annotation on TCT
No. 27335. Due to the unauthorized novation of the agreement, Tan presented before the trial court two
alternative remedies in his complaint either the rescission of the contract and the return of the down
payment, or the reformation of the contract to adjust the payment period, so that Tan will pay the remaining
balance of the purchase price only after the lapse of the required two-year encumbrance on the title. Tan
posits that the CA erroneously disregarded the alternative remedy of reformation of contract when it affirmed
the removal of the lis pendens annotation on the title.
Tan further contends that the CA erred when it recognized the validity of the forfeiture of the down
payment in favor of the vendors. While admitting that the Deed of Conditional Sale contained a forfeiture
clause, he insists that this clause applies only if the failure to pay the balance of the purchase price was
through his own fault or negligence. In the present case, Tan claims that he was justified in refusing to pay
the balance price since the vendors would not have been able to comply with their obligation to deliver a
clean title covering the property.
Lastly, Tan maintains that the CA erred in ordering him to pay the respondents P30,000.00,
plus P1,000.00 per court appearance as attorneys fees, since he filed the foregoing action in good faith,
believing that he is in the right.

65

The respondents, on the other hand, assert that the petition should be dismissed for raising pure
questions of fact, in contravention of the provisions of Rule 45 of the Rules which provides that only questions
of law can be raised in petitions for review on certiorari.
THE COURTS RULING
The petition is granted.

No new issues can be raised in the Memorandum

At the onset, we note that Tan raised the following additional assignment of errors in his
Memorandum: (a) the CA erred in holding that the petitioner could seek reformation of the Deed of
Conditional Sale only if he paid the balance of the purchase price and if the vendors refused to execute the
deed of absolute sale; and (b) the CA erred in holding that the petitioner was estopped from asking for the
reformation of the contract or for specific performance.
The Courts September 27, 2004 Resolution expressly stated that No new issues may be raised by a
party in his/its Memorandum. Explaining the reason for this rule, we said that:
The raising of additional issues in a memorandum before the Supreme Court is irregular, because said
memorandum is supposed to be in support merely of the position taken by the party concerned in his
petition, and the raising of new issues amounts to the filing of a petition beyond the reglementary period. The
purpose of this rule is to provide all parties to a case a fair opportunity to be heard. No new points of law,
theories, issues or arguments may be raised by a party in the Memorandum for the reason that to permit
these would be offensive to the basic rules of fair play, justice and due process. [5]
Tan contravened the Courts explicit instructions by raising these additional errors. Hence, we
disregard them and focus instead on the issues previously raised in the petition and properly included in the
Memorandum.
Petition raises a question of law
Contrary to the respondents claim, the issue raised in the present petition defined in the opening
paragraph of this Decision is a pure question of law. Hence, the petition and the issue it presents are
properly cognizable by this Court.
Lis pendens annotation not proper in personal actions

Section 14, Rule 13 of the Rules enumerates the instances when a notice of lis pendens can be validly
annotated on the title to real property:
Sec. 14. Notice of lis pendens.
In an action affecting the title or the right of possession of real property, the plaintiff and the
defendant, when affirmative relief is claimed in his answer, may record in the office of the registry of deeds of
the province in which the property is situated a notice of the pendency of the action. Said notice shall contain
the names of the parties and the object of the action or defense, and a description of the property in that
province affected thereby. Only from the time of filing such notice for record shall a purchaser, or
encumbrancer of the property affected thereby, be deemed to have constructive notice of the pendency of
the action, and only of its pendency against the parties designated by their real names.

66

The notice of lis pendens hereinabove mentioned may be cancelled only upon order of the court, after
proper showing that the notice is for the purpose of molesting the adverse party, or that it is not necessary to
protect the rights of the party who caused it to be recorded.

The litigation subject of the notice of lis pendens must directly involve a specific property which is
necessarily affected by the judgment.[6]
Tans complaint prayed for either the rescission or the reformation of the Deed of Conditional
Sale. While the Deed does have real property for its object, we find that Tans complaint is an in
personam action, as Tan asked the court to compel the respondents to do something either to rescind the
contract and return the down payment, or to reform the contract by extending the period given to pay the
remaining balance of the purchase price. Either way, Tan wants to enforce his personal rights against the
respondents, not against the property subject of the Deed. As we explained in Domagas v. Jensen:[7]
The settled rule is that the aim and object of an action determine its character. Whether a proceeding
is in rem, or in personam, or quasi in rem for that matter, is determined by its nature and purpose, and by
these only. A proceeding in personam is a proceeding to enforce personal rights and obligations brought
against the person and is based on the jurisdiction of the person, although it may involve his right to, or the
exercise of ownership of, specific property, or seek to compel him to control or dispose of it in accordance
with the mandate of the court. The purpose of a proceeding in personam is to impose, through the judgment
of a court, some responsibility or liability directly upon the person of the defendant. Of this character are suits
to compel a defendant to specifically perform some act or actions to fasten a pecuniary liability on him.
Furthermore, as will be explained in detail below, the contract between the parties was merely a
contract to sell where the vendors retained title and ownership to the property until Tan had fully paid the
purchase price. Since Tan had no claim of ownership or title to the property yet, he obviously had no right to
ask for the annotation of a lis pendens notice on the title of the property.

Contract is a mere contract to sell

A contract is what the law defines it to be, taking into consideration its essential elements, and not
what the contracting parties call it.[8] Article 1485 of the Civil Code defines a contract of sale as follows:
Art. 1458. By the contract of sale one of the contracting parties obligates himself to transfer the ownership
and to deliver a determinate thing, and the other to pay therefor a price certain in money or its equivalent.
A contract of sale may be absolute or conditional.
The very essence of a contract of sale is the transfer of ownership in exchange for a price paid or
promised.[9]
In contrast, a contract to sell is defined as a bilateral contract whereby the prospective seller,
while expressly reserving the ownership of the property despite delivery thereof to the prospective
buyer, binds himself to sell the property exclusively to the prospective buyer upon fulfillment of the
condition agreed, i.e., full payment of the purchase price.[10] A contract to sell may not even be considered as
a conditional contract of sale where the seller may likewise reserve title to the property subject of the
sale until the fulfillment of a suspensive condition, because in a conditional contract of sale, the
first element of consent is present, although it is conditioned upon the happening of a contingent event
which may or may not occur.[11]
x

In the present case, the true nature of the contract is revealed by paragraph D thereof, which states:
x
x

67

d)

That in case, BUYER has complied with the terms and conditions of this contract, then the SELLERS shall
execute and deliver to the BUYER the appropriate Deed of Absolute Sale;

Jurisprudence has established that where the seller promises to execute a deed of absolute sale upon
the completion by the buyer of the payment of the price, the contract is only a contract to sell. [12] Thus, while
the contract is denominated as a Deed of Conditional Sale, the presence of the above-quoted provision
identifies the contract as being a mere contract to sell.

A Section 4, Rule 74 annotation is an encumbrance on the property

While Tan admits that he refused to pay the balance of the purchase price, he claims that he had valid
reason to do so the sudden appearance of an annotation on the title pursuant to Section 4, Rule 74 of the
Rules, which Tan considered an encumbrance on the property.
We find Tans argument meritorious.
The annotation placed on TCT No. 27335, the new title issued to reflect the extrajudicial partition of
Lamberto Benoliraos estate among his heirs, states:

x x x any liability to credirots (sic), excluded heirs and other persons having right to the property, for a
period of two (2) years, with respect only to the share of Erlinda, Andrew, Romano and Dion, all
surnamed Benolirao [Emphasis supplied.]
This annotation was placed on the title pursuant to Section 4, Rule 74 of the Rules, which reads:
Sec. 4. Liability of distributees and estate. - If it shall appear at any time within two (2) years after the
settlement and distribution of an estate in accordance with the provisions of either of the first two sections of
this rule, that an heir or other person has been unduly deprived of his lawful participation in the estate, such
heir or such other person may compel the settlement of the estate in the courts in the manner hereinafter
provided for the purpose of satisfying such lawful participation. And if within the same time of two (2)
years, it shall appear that there are debts outstanding against the estate which have not been
paid, or that an heir or other person has been unduly deprived of his lawful participation payable
in money, the court having jurisdiction of the estate may, by order for that purpose, after
hearing, settle the amount of such debts or lawful participation and order how much and in what
manner each distributee shall contribute in the payment thereof, and may issue execution, if
circumstances require, against the bond provided in the preceding section or against the real
estate belonging to the deceased, or both. Such bond and such real estate shall remain charged with a
liability to creditors, heirs, or other persons for the full period of two (2) years after such distribution,
notwithstanding any transfers of real estate that may have been made. [Emphasis supplied.]
Senator Vicente Francisco discusses this provision in his book The Revised Rules of Court in the
Philippines,[13] where he states:
The provision of Section 4, Rule 74 prescribes the procedure to be followed if within two years after an
extrajudicial partition or summary distribution is made, an heir or other person appears to have been

68

deprived of his lawful participation in the estate, or some outstanding debts which have not been paid are
discovered. When the lawful participation of the heir is not payable in money, because, for
instance, he is entitled to a part of the real property that has been partitioned, there can be no
other procedure than to cancel the partition so made and make a new division, unless, of
course, the heir agrees to be paid the value of his participation with interest. But in case the lawful
participation of the heir consists in his share in personal property of money left by the decedent, or in case
unpaid debts are discovered within the said period of two years, the procedure is not to cancel the partition,
nor to appoint an administrator to re-assemble the assets, as was allowed under the old Code, but the court,
after hearing, shall fix the amount of such debts or lawful participation in proportion to or to the extent of the
assets they have respectively received and, if circumstances require, it may issue execution against the real
estate belonging to the decedent, or both. The present procedure is more expedient and less expensive in
that it dispenses with the appointment of an administrator and does not disturb the possession enjoyed by
the distributees.[14] [Emphasis supplied.]
An annotation is placed on new certificates of title issued pursuant to the distribution and partition of
a decedents real properties to warn third persons on the possible interests of excluded heirs or unpaid
creditors in these properties. The annotation, therefore, creates a legal encumbrance or lien on the
real property in favor of the excluded heirs or creditors. Where a buyer purchases the real
property despite the annotation, he must be ready for the possibility that the title could be
subject to the rights of excluded parties. The cancellation of the sale would be the logical consequence
where: (a) the annotation clearly appears on the title, warning all would-be buyers; (b) the sale unlawfully
interferes with the rights of heirs; and (c) the rightful heirs bring an action to question the transfer within the
two-year period provided by law.
As we held in Vda. de Francisco v. Carreon:[15]
And Section 4, Rule 74 xxx expressly authorizes the court to give to every heir his lawful participation
in the real estate notwithstanding any transfers of such real estate and to issue execution thereon. All this
implies that, when within the amendatory period the realty has been alienated, the court in redividing it among the heirs has the authority to direct cancellation of such alienation in the same
estate proceedings, whenever it becomes necessary to do so. To require the institution of a separate
action for such annulment would run counter to the letter of the above rule and the spirit of these summary
settlements. [Emphasis supplied.]
Similarly, in Sps. Domingo v. Roces,[16] we said:
The foregoing rule clearly covers transfers of real property to any person, as long as the deprived heir
or creditor vindicates his rights within two years from the date of the settlement and distribution of estate.
Contrary to petitioners contention, the effects of this provision are not limited to the heirs or
original distributees of the estate properties, but shall affect anytransferee of the properties.
[Emphasis supplied.]
Indeed, in David v. Malay,[17] although the title of the property had already been registered in the name
of the third party buyers, we cancelled the sale and ordered the reconveyance of the property to the estate of
the deceased for proper disposal among his rightful heirs.
By the time Tans obligation to pay the balance of the purchase price arose on May 21, 1993 (on
account of the extensions granted by the respondents), a new certificate of title covering the property had
already been issued on March 26, 1993, which contained the encumbrance on the property; the encumbrance
would remain so attached until the expiration of the two-year period. Clearly, at this time, the vendors could

69

no longer compel Tan to pay the balance of the purchase since considering they themselves could not fulfill
their obligation to transfer a clean title over the property to Tan.

Contract to sell is not rescinded but terminated

What then happens to the contract?
We have held in numerous cases[18] that the remedy of rescission under Article 1191 cannot apply to
mere contracts to sell. We explained the reason for this inSantos v. Court of Appeals,[19] where we said:
[I]n a contract to sell, title remains with the vendor and does not pass on to the vendee until the purchase
price is paid in full. Thus, in a contract to sell, the payment of the purchase price is a positive suspensive
condition. Failure to pay the price agreed upon is not a mere breach, casual or serious, but a
situation that prevents the obligation of the vendor to convey title from acquiring an obligatory
force. This is entirely different from the situation in a contract of sale, where non-payment of the price is a
negative resolutory condition. The effects in law are not identical. In a contract of sale, the vendor has lost
ownership of the thing sold and cannot recover it, unless the contract of sale is rescinded and set aside. In a
contract to sell, however, the vendor remains the owner for as long as the vendee has not
complied fully with the condition of paying the purchase price. If the vendor should eject the vendee
for failure to meet the condition precedent, he is enforcing the contract and not rescinding it. x x x Article
1592 speaks of non-payment of the purchase price as a resolutory condition. It does not apply to a contract
to sell. As to Article 1191, it is subordinated to the provisions of Article 1592 when applied to sales of
immovable property. Neither provision is applicable [to a contract to sell]. [Emphasis supplied.]

We, therefore, hold that the contract to sell was terminated when the vendors could no longer legally
compel Tan to pay the balance of the purchase price as a result of the legal encumbrance which attached to
the title of the property. Since Tans refusal to pay was due to the supervening event of a legal encumbrance
on the property and not through his own fault or negligence, we find and so hold that the forfeiture of Tans
down payment was clearly unwarranted.

Award of Attorneys fees

As evident from our previous discussion, Tan had a valid reason for refusing to pay the balance of the
purchase price for the property. Consequently, there is no basis for the award of attorneys fees in favor of the
respondents.
On the other hand, we award attorneys fees in favor of Tan, since he was compelled to litigate due to
the respondents refusal to return his down payment despite the fact that they could no longer comply with
their obligation under the contract to sell, i.e., to convey a clean title. Given the facts of this case, we find the
award ofP50,000.00 as attorneys fees proper.

Monetary award is subject to legal interest

Undoubtedly, Tan made a clear and unequivocal demand on the vendors to return his down payment
as early as May 28, 1993. Pursuant to

70

our definitive ruling in Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,[20] we hold that the vendors should
return the P200,000.00 down payment to Tan, subject to the legal interest of 6% per annum computed
from May 28, 1993, the date of the first demand letter.
Furthermore, after a judgment has become final and executory, the rate of legal interest, whether the
obligation was in the form of a loan or forbearance of money or otherwise, shall be 12% per annum from such
finality until its satisfaction. Accordingly, the principal obligation of P200,000.00 shall bear 6% interest from
the date of first demand or from May 28, 1993. From the date the liability for the principal obligation and
attorneys fees has become final and executory, an annual interest of 12% shall be imposed on these
obligations until their final satisfaction, this interim period being deemed to be by then an equivalent to a
forbearance of credit.

WHEREFORE,

premises

considered,

we

hereby GRANT the

petition

and,

accordingly, ANNUL and SET ASIDE the May 30, 2002 decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
52033. Another judgment is rendered declaring the Deed of Conditional Sale terminated and ordering the
respondents to return theP200,000.00 down payment to petitioner Delfin Tan, subject to legal interest of 6%
per annum, computed from May 28, 1993. The respondents are also ordered to pay, jointly and severally,
petitioner Delfin Tan the amount of P50,000.00 as and by way of attorneys fees. Once this decision becomes
final and executory, respondents are ordered to pay interest at 12% per annum on the principal obligation as
well as the attorneys fees, until full payment of these amounts. Costs against the respondents.

SO ORDERED.

71