(SUNY Series in Contemporary French Thought) Jean-Luc Nancy-The Creation of The World or Globalization (SUNY Series in Contemporary French Thought) - State University of New York Press (2007)

Jean-Luc Nancy
THE C R E A T I O N OF THE W O R L D
or
Globalization
Translated and with an Introduction by

Francois Raffoul and David Pettigrew
STATE UNIVERSITY OF N E W YORK PRESS
T H E C R E A T I O N OF T H E W O R L D
or
Globalization
S U N Y SERIES IN CONTEMPORARY FRENCH THOUGHT
David Pettigrew and Francois Raffoul, editors
Sabanci Universitesi
3010100796340
M2>3
Published by
STATE UNIVERSITY OF NEW YORK PRESS
ALBANY
2007 State University of New York
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Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Nancy,Jean-Luc.
[La creation du monde ou la mondialisation. English]
The creation of the world or globalization / Jean-Luc Nancy ; translated and introduction
by Francois Raffoul, David Pettigrew.
p. cm. (Suny series in contemporary French thought)
Includes bibliographical references and index.
ISBN-13:978-0-7914-7025-1 (hardcover : alk. paper)
ISBN-13: 978-0-7914-7026-8 (pbk.: alk. paper)
1. Globalization-Philosophy. 2. Political sciencePhilosophy. 3. Teleology. I. Tide.
B2430.N363C7413 2007
303.48'201dc22
2006013428
10
9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1
Contents
Translators' A c k n o w l e d g m e n t s
Translators' Introduction
vii
1
Author's Prefatory N o t e to the English Language Edition
27
Author's Prefatory N o t e to the French Language Edition
29
I.
31
Urbi et Orbi
II. O f C r e a t i o n
57
I I I . C r e a t i o n as D e n a t u r a t i o n : M e t a p h y s i c a l T e c h n o l o g y
75
IV. C o m p l e m e n t s
91
Notes
113
Index
127
Translators' Acknowledgments
W e w o u l d like to t h a n k J a n e B u n k e r , e d i t o r - i n - c h i e f o f S U N Y Press, for h e r

s u p p o r t o f this project from its earliest stages.
W e also w o u l d like to express o u r appreciation for t h e s u p p o r t provided
b y a C o n n e c t i c u t State University R e s e a r c h G r a n t and for the research-reas
signed t i m e provided b y D o n n a j e a n Fredeen, D e a n o f the School o f Arts and
Sciences o f S o u t h e r n C o n n e c t i c u t State University ( S C S U ) . W e also t h a n k J.
Philip Smith, f o r m e r I n t e r i m President, a n d Ellen Beatty, Associate Vice Presi
d e n t for A c a d e m i c Affairs, o f S C S U for their s u p p o r t o f the translation project
from its i n c e p t i o n . T h a n k s to Troy P a d d o c k , Associate Professor o f History at
S C S U , for his assistance w i t h o u r research regarding Carl Schmitt.
At Louisiana State University, w e are especially grateful to J o h n Castore for
his assistance w i t h t h e preface, a n d t o Troy M e l l o n for h e r careful review o f t h e
final manuscript.
W e t h a n k C a t h y Leblanc, Professor o f English at the Universite de Lille 3, as
well as Pierre J a c e r m e , Professor E m e r i t u s o f Lettres Superieures at lycee H e n r i
IV for their advice c o n c e r n i n g key translation questions.
For all o f h e r s u p p o r t o u r appreciation goes to M e l i d a Badilla C a r m o n a .
Finally, w e w o u l d like to express o u r gratitude to Professor J e a n - L u c
N a n c y for his generosity and help c o n c e r n i n g the translation.
vu
i
T h e thinking of the w o r l d developed in Tlie Creation of the World o r Globalization'
unfolds in a play b e t w e e n t w o terms that are apparendy synonymous, o r used
interchangeably, namely, globalisation and mondialisation. N a n c y addresses, in his
prefatory n o t e to the English edition o f the text, this linguistic particularity found
in the French language, w h i c h possesses t w o terms for designating the p h e n o m e
n o n k n o w n in English simply as "globalization"; these terms,globalisation and mon
dialisation, are rendered here as globalization and world-forming, respectively. As a
matter o f fact, the t e r m globalization, as N a n c y notes, "has already established itself
in the areas o f the world that use English for contemporary
information
e x c h a n g e " (CW, 27), whereas "mondialisation" does n o t allow itself to b e translated

as easily and w o u l d even be, according to Nancy, untranslatable. If the two terms
seem, at first glance, to b e indistinguishable, converging in the designation o f the
same p h e n o m e n o n , that is, the unification of all parts of the world, in fact they
reveal two quite distinct, if n o t opposite, meanings. At stake in this distinction is
n o t h i n g less than two possible destinies o f o u r humanity, of o u r time. O n the o n e
hand, there is the uniformity produced by a global economical and technological
l o g i c N a n c y specifies, "a global injustice against the background of general
equivalence" (CW, 54)leading toward the opposite of an inhabitable world, to
" t h e u n - w o r l d " [immonde]. And, o n the o t h e r hand, there is the possibility o f an
authentic world-forming, that is, of a m a k i n g of the world and o f a making sense that
N a n c y will call, for reasons w e will clarify later, a "creation" of the world.This cre
ation of the world means, as he makes clear, "immediately, w i t h o u t delay, r e o p e n
ing each possible struggle for a world, that is, for w h a t must form the contrary" o f
globality (ibid.).
Tlie Creation of the World o r
Globalization
It is this contrast in m e a n i n g that N a n c y endeavors to reveal in order to

o p e n the possibility of a world. F r o m the b e g i n n i n g , h e emphasizes that the
global or globality is a p h e n o m e n o n that is m o r e abstract than the worldly o r
world-forming; h e refers to globality as a "totality grasped as a whole," an "indis
tinct totality," while the world, the worldly, w o r l d - f o r m i n g calls to m i n d rather
a "process in expansion," in reference to the w o r l d o f h u m a n s , o f culture, a n d o f
nations in a differentiated set. In the final analysis, w h a t interests Nancy, in this
distinction b e t w e e n " w o r l d - f o r m i n g " a n d "globalization," is that w o r l d - f o r m i n g
maintains a crucial reference to the world's h o r i z o n , as a space of h u m a n rela
tions, as a space o f m e a n i n g held in c o m m o n , a space of significations o r of p o s
sible significance. O n the o t h e r hand, globalization is a process that indicates an
"enclosure in the undifferentiated sphere o f a unitotality" (CW, 28) that is p e r
fectly accessible and transparent for a mastery w i t h o u t remainder. Therefore, it is
n o t insignificant that the t e r m mondialisation remains untranslatable, w h i l e g l o b
alization tends to the integral translatability of all meanings and all p h e n o m e n a .
N a n c y will therefore have a tendency to oppose these t w o terms, to m a r k their
contrast, going as far as to suggest that globalization, far from b e i n g a b e c o m i n g world, w o u l d lead, rather, to a proliferation o f the u n - w o r l d . A t the b e g i n n i n g
of the b o o k , N a n c y questions w h e t h e r the p h e n o m e n o n o f globalization leads
to the giving b i r t h of a w o r l d o r t o its contrary. Further, w i t h i n the essay " Urbi
et orbi" h e discusses globalization as " t h e suppression o f all w o r l d - f o r m i n g o f the
world," as " a n u n p r e c e d e n t e d geopolitical, e c o n o m i c , a n d ecological catastro
p h e " (CW, 5 0 ) . T h e question, henceforth, b e c o m e s the following: " H o w are w e
to conceive of, precisely, a world w h e r e w e only find a globe, an astral universe,
or an earth w i t h o u t sky . . . ?" (CW, 47).
N a n c y begins w i t h the following fact: the w o r l d destroys itself. H e r e it is
n o t a matter, h e clarifies, o f hyperbole, fear, o r anxiety, o r s o m e t h i n g cata
strophic; or o f a hypothesis for reflection. N o , it is, according to Nancy, a fact,
indeed the fact from w h i c h his reflection originates. " T h e fact that t h e w o r l d is
destroying itself is n o t a hypothesis: it is, in a sense, the fact from w h i c h any
t h i n k i n g o f the w o r l d follows" ( C W , 35). T h e t h o u g h t o f t h e world, o f t h e
b e i n g - w o r l d o f the world, is thus rendered possible, paradoxically, w h e n the
w o r l d destroys itself or is in t h e process o f destroying itself. In effect, it is "thanks
t o " the event o f globalizationfor Nancy, the suppression o f the w o r l d t h a t
the w o r l d is in the position to appear as such. Globalization destroys the w o r l d
and thus makes possible the e m e r g e n c e of the question relating to its being.
T h i s is w h y N a n c y begins his t h o u g h t o f t h e w o r l d w i t h an analysis o f global
ization, that is, the destruction o f t h e world.
N o t i n g briefly the features o f this destruction, N a n c y highlights the shift
in m e a n i n g of t h e papal formulation "urbi et orbi," w h i c h has c o m e to m e a n , in
ordinary language, " e v e r y w h e r e a n d anywhere." T h i s " e v e r y w h e r e a n d a n y
w h e r e " consecrates t h e disintegration o f t h e w o r l d , because it is n o l o n g e r p o s
sible, since this disintegration, to f o r m an o r b o f t h e world. T h e orb o f t h e
w o r l d dissolves in t h e n o n - p l a c e o f global multiplicity. T h i s is an extension that
leads to the indistinctness o f t h e parts o f the world, as for instance, the u r b a n in
relation to t h e rural. N a n c y calls this hyperbolic a c c u m u l a t i o n "agglomeration,"
in t h e sense o f t h e c o n g l o m e r a t e , o f t h e piling up, o f w h i c h the " b a d infinite"
(CW, 47) dismantles the w o r l d :
This network cast upon the planetand already around it, in the orbital
band of satellites along with their debrisdeforms the orbis as much as the
urbs. The agglomeration invades and erodes what used to be thought of as globe
and which is nothing more now than its double, glomus. In such a glomus, we
see the conjunction of an indefinite growth of techno-science, of a correla
tive exponential growth of populations, of a worsening of inequalities of all
sorts within these populationseconomic, biological and culturaland of a
dissipation of the certainties, images and identities of what the world was with
its parts and humanity with its characteristics. (CW, 3334)
T h e a c c u m u l a t i o n o f globalization is a c o n c e n t r a t i o n o f wealth that never
occurs w i t h o u t t h e exclusion o f a m a r g i n that is rejected i n t o misery. N a n c y
thus notes t h e correlation o f t h e process o f technological a n d e c o n o m i c p l a n
etary d o m i n a t i o n w i t h t h e disintegration o f t h e w o r l d , that is, the disintegra
tion o f t h e " c o n v e r g e n c e o f k n o w l e d g e , ethics, and social w e l l - b e i n g " ( C W ,
34). E v e r y t h i n g h a p p e n s as if accessing t h e planetary, the c o v e r i n g o f t h e w o r l d
in all its totality, m a d e t h e w o r l d at t h e same t i m e disappear, as the m e a n i n g o f
t h e totalizing m o v e m e n t also disappears. T h e access to totality, in t h e sense o f
t h e global a n d o f t h e planetary, is at t h e same t i m e t h e disappearing o f the
w o r l d . It is also, N a n c y emphasizes, t h e e n d o f t h e o r i e n t a t i o n a n d o f the sense
(of t h e w o r l d ) . Globality does n o t o p e n a p a t h , a way, o r a direction, a possi
bility; rather, it furiously t u r n s o n itself a n d exacerbates itself as the blind t e c h
nological a n d e c o n o m i c a l exploitation, o n its absence o f perspective a n d o r i
e n t a t i o n . In short, " T h e w o r l d has lost its capacity to f o r m a w o r l d [/aire
monde]" (ibid.). T h e p r o f o u n d nihiHsm o f t h e logic o f globalization is h e r e
revealed for, as N a n c y c o n c l u d e s , " e v e r y t h i n g takes place as if the w o r l d
affected a n d p e r m e a t e d itself w i t h a d e a t h drive that s o o n w o u l d have n o t h
i n g else to destroy t h a n t h e w o r l d itself" (ibid.).
T h u s , w h a t appears in this t o o b r i e f recapitulation is, o n the o n e h a n d , the
a n t i n o m y b e t w e e n the global a n d t h e worldly (which allows for a differentiat
i n g o f t h e t h o u g h t o f w o r l d - f o r m i n g in opposition to globalization), b u t also,
Globalization
above all, the role that the appearance o f the n o t h i n g that plays in the world,
4
in its event as in its destruction o r in its destruction as event. It is therefore a

question for us o f b r i n g i n g forth this " n o t h i n g o f the world," w h o s e character
istics N a n c y reveals, for o n e senses that it is in this n o t h i n g that the cross-des
tinies o f globalization and w o r l d - f o r m i n g are at stake, as well as the question o f
c o n t e m p o r a r y nihilism; a nihilism w h o s e hard k n o t will have b e e n fractured by
the n o t h i n g o f the ex nihilo o f the creation o f the world.
At first, N a n c y begins t o r e c o n s t r u c t the historic e m e r g e n c e o f the q u e s
tion of the w o r l d , that is, the way in w h i c h the w o r l d is b e c o m i n g a p r o p e r
philosophical question, t h r o u g h a process that he calls t h e " b e c o m i n g - w o r l d
of t h e w o r l d " (CW, 4 1 ) . T h e w o r l d as p r o b l e m a n d as t h e p r o p e r site o f h u m a n
existence was covered, obscured, by t h e classical figures o f o n t o - t h e o l o g y a n d
representational t h i n k i n g , all t h e w h i l e , paradoxically and silently, u n d e r m i n
ing o n t o - t h e o l o g y from w i t h i n . T h e w o r l d , w r i t e s N a n c y in a striking passage,
was o r has f o r m e d " t h e self-deconstruction that u n d e r m i n e s from w i t h i n
o n t o - t h e o l o g y " (ibid.).
N a n c y begins by n o t i n g that t h e w o r l d emerges as w o r l d w h e n it c o m e s
5
o u t of representation, w h e n it frees itself o f t h e so-called w o r l d v i e w o r Weltan

schauung. T h e representation of the w o r l d , in effect, implies a vantage p o i n t ,
therefore a position that is outside o f t h e world, from w h e r e t h e w o r l d may be
able to b e seen and represented. S u c h a representation reduces and, thus, n e u
tralizes the world. T h i s is w h y N a n c y insists o n t h e fact that t h e w o r l d emerges
as w o r l d against the b a c k g r o u n d o f a historical withdrawal o f the representa
tion o f the world. S u c h a representation supposes a cosmotheoros, that is to say, a
subject-of-the-world representing the w o r l d in front o f itself as an object. It
supposes, o n t h e o t h e r hand, t h e representation o f a principle and of an e n d o f
t h e world, the w o r l d e n d i n g in such a view; it devotes itself, in the end, to the
reduction o f t h e w o r l d to the status o f an object, a w o r l d regarded as " o b j e c
tive." However, it is from all these features that the w o r l d escapes: " T h e w o r l d
is n o longer conceived of as a representation
T h e w o r l d is thus outside r e p
resentation, outside its representation and of a w o r l d o f representation, and this

is how, n o d o u b t , o n e reaches the m o s t c o n t e m p o r a r y d e t e r m i n a t i o n of t h e
w o r l d " (CW, 43). A subject-of-the-world
keeps the w o r l d in its gaze, its sight, in
such a way that the world is thus represented as "a w o r l d d e p e n d e n t o n the gaze
o f a s u b j e c t - o f - t h e - w o r l d " (CW, 40). As for this subject, it is, of course, n o t of
this world, n o r any l o n g e r " i n " the world, in the sense o f b e i n g - i n - t h e - w o r l d :
it is n o t worldly. Positioning itself outside t h e world, it gains, so to speak, a t h e
ological status. H e r e o n e can see t h e d e p e n d e n c y o f the representation o f the
w o r l d o n o n t o - t h e o l o g y . T h e w o r l d is thus missed, passed over, in its represen
tation, by onto-theology, and o n t o - t h e o l o g y reveals itself in the positioning a
subject: " E v e n w i t h o u t a religious representation, such a subject, implicit o r
explicit, perpetuates the position o f t h e creating, organizing, and addressing
G o d (if n o t the addressee) o f t h e w o r l d " (CW, 40). A n d in fact, the w o r l d o u t
side o f its representation "is above all a w o r l d w i t h o u t a G o d capable o f b e i n g
t h e subject o f its representation" (CW, 43).
A s e c o n d characteristic o f t h e o b s c u r i n g o f the w o r l d is thus o n t o - t h e o l
ogy, o r w h a t N a n c y calls " t h e great transcendent accounts o f rationalism" (CW,
41). N a n c y w o u l d even identify " w o r l d - f o r m i n g , " that is, the i m m a n e n t s t r u c
ture of the w o r l d t h e fact that t h e w o r l d only refers to itself and never to
a n o t h e r w o r l d (postulate o f o n t o - t h e o l o g y ) a s a " d e t h e o l o g i z a t i o n " (CW, 51).
T h i s will be, in effect, a leitmotif in Nancy's t h o u g h t o f the world: t h e w o r l d is
an absolute i m m a n e n c e ; w e will r e t u r n to this.
II
For Nancy, t h e w o r l d emerges as a p r o p e r philosophical problem against t h e
b a c k g r o u n d o f a withdrawal o f onto-theology, and its p u t t i n g into play as an
absolute existence is correlative to t h e disappearance o f G o d . B e c o m i n g - w o r l d
is thus the inverse o f "theologization." In effect, w h a t used to stand in the way
of, o r obstruct, a t h o u g h t o f the w o r l d (as absolute i m m a n e n c e and value) was
t h e division o f the totality o f b e i n g according to the tripartite n a t u r e - m a n - G o d .
G o d , for Nancy, a m o u n t s to this: a n o t h e r w o r l d placed n e x t to this world, o t h e r
than this w o r l d . " [ F ] o r a G o d distinct from t h e world w o u l d b e a n o t h e r w o r l d "
(CW, 44-45).'' G o d is w h a t is outside the world. It is to that extent that the s u b
j e c t o f representation was b o u n d to theism. N o w , the first proposition o f an
authentic t h o u g h t o f the w o r l d is that t h e w o r l d never refers to a n o t h e r world.
C o n c e r n i n g t h e limits o r t h e b o u n d a r i e s o f the world, N a n c y states, " [ T h e
world] never crosses over these edges to occupy a place overlooking itself" (CW,
43). A n d , if o n e "leaves this world," it is n o t to attain a n o t h e r world; it is simply
n o longer b e i n g - m - t h e - w o r l d , n o longer b e i n g in a world, n o longer having a
world. To that extent, "this w o r l d " is the only world. T h u s , to die is to leave the
world, as world, and n o l o n g e r to leave this w o r l d for a n o t h e r world.To n o longer
b e is to n o l o n g e r b e in the w o r l d . T h i s is w h y a w o r l d does n o t get crossed over
(it does n o t have an outside), rather, it is traversed: from b e g i n n i n g to end, from
o n e edge to another, b u t never in order to access an outside o r a beyond, site o f
t h e divine.This is w h y the expression " t h e sense o r m e a n i n g o f the world [le sens
7
du monde]," the tide o f o n e o f Nancy's major w o r k s , cannot signify the sense of

the world as objective genitive, an encompassing o f the world as totality o n the
basis o f an external overview (following t h e formula ofWittgenstein, according
Hie Creation of the World o r
Globalization
t o w h i c h " t h e m e a n i n g of the w o r l d must be situated outside the w o r l d " ) , but,

rather, a subjective genitive, p r o d u c e d from the internal references o f the world
("Thus the m e a n i n g o f the w o r l d does n o t occur as a reference to s o m e t h i n g
external to the w o r l d " [CW, 4 3 ] ) . T h e world only refers to itself, and its m e a n
ing does n o t c o m e from the outside, it "circulates," N a n c y tells us, " b e t w e e n all
those w h o stand in it, each time singular and singularly sharing a same possibil
ity that none of them, any place or any God outside of this world, accomplishes" (ibid;
o u r emphasis). It is in this sense that the w o r l d is n o t o f t h e order of a substance,
a support, or a basis: the world does n o t presuppose itself; it exists as an e x t e n
sion of itself, as gap from itself, w i t h o u t g r o u n d o r against the b a c k g r o u n d of
nothing." T h u s , let us specify that w h e n N a n c y speaks o f m e a n i n g , he does n o t
i n t e n d by this t e r m the same thing as "signification," in the sense o f an a c c o m
plished given m e a n i n g , b u t rather the o p e n i n g o f the possibility of the p r o d u c
9
tion o f significance. M e a n i n g is n o t given, it is to b e invented, to be created,

that is to say, as w e will see, o u t o f n o t h i n g , ex nihilo . . .
As w e can see, N a n c y ' s t h o u g h t w i t h respect t o t h e w o r l d is a t h o u g h t
o f a n absolute i m m a n e n c e in o p p o s i t i o n to the t r a d i t i o n o f t r a n s c e n d e n c e
(position o f an o t h e r w o r l d ) . A n d nevertheless, N a n c y shows that t h e w o r l d ,
the q u e s t i o n o f t h e b e i n g - w o r l d o f t h e w o r l d , o p e r a t e s w i t h i n o n t o - t h e o l ogy; h e shows that such o n t o - t h e o l o g y self-deconstructs a n d c o n f i r m s , in
spite o f itself, t h e u n i t y o f t h e w o r l d a n d its radical i m m a n e n c e . H e i n d e e d
w r i t e s that t h e classical t h i n k i n g w i t h respect to G o d " q u e s t i o n e d t h e b e i n g w o r l d o f t h e w o r l d " (CW, 41). H e states it very clearly: in classical o n t o - t h e
ology, in the e n d it was a m a t t e r o f n o t h i n g else t h a n t h e w o r l d . In fact, N a n c y
continues, " t h e r e is n o n e e d of a p r o l o n g e d study to n o t i c e that, already in the
m o s t classical metaphysical representations o f that G o d , n o t h i n g else was at
stake, in t h e e n d , t h a n the w o r l d itself, in itself, a n d for itself" ( i b i d . ) . W h a t , in
effect, did t h e classical transcendences o f o n t o - t h e o l o g y provide an a c c o u n t
of? T h e w o r l d . T h e y provided its i m m a n e n t structure, supplied "a reason i n t e r
nal t o the general order o f t h i n g s " (CW, 44). G o d is effectively t h e G o d of the
ii'orld, H e is t h e subject o f the w o r l d , o f its fabrication, o f its m a i n t e n a n c e , and
o f its destination. O f the w o r l d , G o d was t h e creator, t h e organizer. In this
sense, for Nancy, o n t o - t h e o l o g y w o u l d elaborate n o t h i n g o t h e r than " t h e
i m m a n e n t relation o f the w o r l d to itself" (CW, 41). Is it a c o i n c i d e n c e that in
p h i l o s o p h y the "vertical" theological t r a n s c e n d e n c e b e c a m e replaced w i t h
K a n t by a " h o r i z o n t a l " t r a n s c e n d e n c e that is n o t h i n g o t h e r than the h o r i z o n
and structure o f the w o r l d itself? In K a n t , w e see to t h e position of t h e w o r l d
as transcendental, that is, t h e very place for w h a t appears and happens, or, as
N a n c y writes, the w o r l d appears in Kant's p h i l o s o p h y as " t h e place, d i m e n s i o n ,
and actuality o f t h o u g h t : t h e s p a c e - t i m e o f m e a n i n g and t r u t h " (ibid.), a n d n o
l o n g e r simply as an object o f vision (for t h e subject). T h e r e f o r e , N a n c y will
locate a " b e c o m i n g - w o r l d o f the world," as h e refers to it, in those classical fig
ures o f o n t o - t h e o l o g y that are t h e " c o n t i n u a l c r e a t i o n " o f Descartes ( m a i n t e
n a n c e o f t h e w o r l d ) , t h e Dieu sive natura o f Spinoza ( G o d as t h e w o r l d ) , etc.
( N a n c y also includes in this list Malebranche's "vision in G o d " and Leibniz's
" m o n a d o f m o n a d s , " internal logic o f t h e world.) In each instance, it is a q u e s
tion o f t h e w o r l d , o f its t r u t h and its m e a n i n g . It is to this e x t e n t that the q u e s
tion o f the w o r l d will have f o r m e d t h e self-deconstruction that u n d e r m i n e s
o n t o - t h e o l o g y a n d that t h e g o d o f metaphysics has m e r g e d w i t h t h e w o r l d ,
i n d e e d has b e c o m e t h e w o r l d .
T h i s g o d o f metaphysics has b e c o m e the w o r l d in t h e sense that t h e G o d
o f o n t o - t h e o l o g y has b e e n "progressively stripped of the divine attributes o f an
i n d e p e n d e n t existence, and only retained those o f the existence o f the w o r l d
considered in its i m m a n e n c e " (CW, 44), w h i c h a m o u n t s to saying that t h e s u b
j e c t o f the w o r l d (God) disappears in o r d e r for the w o r l d to appear as subject.
In o t h e r words, t h e b e c o m i n g - w o r l d o f t h e w o r l d signifies that the w o r l d loses
its status as object (of vision) in order to reach the status o f subject (previously
o c c u p i e d by G o d as i n d e p e n d e n t existence). H e n c e f o r t h , there is n o t h i n g b u t
the ( i m m a n e n t ) w o r l d as subject o f itself. T h a t is to say, for Nancy, the w o r l d is
10
always a relation to itself. T h i s relation to itself, as w e n o t e d above, does n o t

p r o c e e d from a g r o u n d o r a basis; it is an extension o f itself, relating to itself
from the p r o p e r extension o f t h e world. N a n c y writes:
The God of onto-theology has produced itself (or deconstructed itself) as sub
ject of the world, that is, as world-subject. In so doing, it suppressed itself as
God-Supreme-Being and transformed itself, losing itself therein, in the exis
tence for-itself of the world without an outside (neither outside of the world
nor a world from the outside). (CW, 44)
G o d thus disappears, b u t H e disappears in the world, w h i c h immediately m e a n s
that w e can n o l o n g e r speak meaningfully in terms o f b e i n g within the w o r l d
[dans-le-monde]
in t h e sense o f w h a t is c o n t a i n e d w i t h i n s o m e t h i n g else, b u t
only in terms o f being-i'/z-the-world [au-monde]. T h e preposition "an"
"in,"
explains Nancy, represents, in French, w h a t n o w encapsulates t h e entire p r o b

l e m o f the world. T h i s shift from " w i t h i n " to " i n " indicates the radical i m m a
n e n c e o f the world: e v e r y t h i n g n o w takes place in the world, that is t o say, r i g h t
at the w o r l d , a meme t h e world, as N a n c y often writes. It is a m a t t e r for us o f
advancing in this p r o p e r t h o u g h t o f the w o r l d that deploys itself from t h e
detheologization that w e have only t o o briefly discussed. N a n c y proceeds t o
expose the principal characteristics o f t h e b e i n g - w o r l d o f t h e world.
The Creation of the World o r
Globalization
T h e first characteristic o f the w o r l d is thus its radical i m m a n e n c e . T h e

w o r l d n o l o n g e r refers to a transcendence, to a beyond, to a g o d outside the
w o r l d and distinct from the world; in short, the w o r l d n o longer refers to
a n o t h e r world: N a n c y writes, " W h o e v e r speaks o f ' t h e w o r l d ' r e n o u n c e s any
appeal to ' a n o t h e r w o r l d ' o r a ' b e y o n d - t h e - w o r l d ' [ontre-nwnde]" (CW, 3 7 ) . T h i s
is why, in this original t h o u g h t o f the world, it is n o t a m a t t e r o f a seculariza
tion o f the theological: the w o r l d occurs outside o f t h e theological scenario. It
is n o longer possible, in effect, to measure t h e m e a n i n g o f the world by refer
r i n g it to an external and transcendent m o d e l . T h e i m m a n e n c e o f the w o r l d
signifies, in the first place, that there is n o m o d e l for the world, since the w o r l d
is n o longer r e d u c e d to o r adjusted to a representation o r to a principle: t h e
world is an-archic. W i t h o u t an e x t e r i o r principle, it therefore can only refer to
itself, a n d its m e a n i n g only arises from itself. It is absolutely free from all refer
ence to an exterior: this is w h y the world's i m m a n e n c e is ab-solute, detached,
w i t h o u t c o n n e c t i o n . N a n c y thus speaks of " t h e " world, "absolutely"; this a b s o lutization of the world b e i n g o n e o f the senses o f w h a t w e refer to as " w o r l d forming." T h e w o r l d is an absolute, since it is n o l o n g e r relative to a n o t h e r
world. T h e sense o f the w o r l d manifests this i m m a n e n c e , because the sense o f
the w o r l d is referred to a making-sense, w h i c h is the w o r l d as such: the w o r l d
makes sense of itself by itself. T h e m e a n i n g is never a reference to an outside
world, b u t only refers to itself, such a self-reference b e i n g the world. T h u s ,
N a n c y w r i t e s , " O n e could say that w o r l d h o o d is t h e symbolization
of the world,
the way in w h i c h t h e w o r l d symbolizes in itself w i t h itself, in w h i c h it articu

lates itself by m a k i n g a circulation o f m e a n i n g possible w i t h o u t reference to
a n o t h e r w o r l d " (CW, 53).
T h e w o r l d manifests, therefore, an absolute i m m a n e n c e . T h e w o r l d is
absolute, b u t nonetheless finite. It is finite, since, as w e will see, it c o m e s from
n o t h i n g in o r d e r to r e t u r n to n o t h i n g , a n d it is only itself a g r o w t h of/from
n o t h i n g . T h e i m m a n e n c e o f the w o r l d is therefore the c o n j u n c t i o n o f a finit u d e a n d of an absolute; it is an absolute finitude. T h i s absolute finitude takes
the f o r m o f an excess.
T h e world, n o longer b e i n g a representation o r a vision, manifests its m o d e
of b e i n g as an excess w i t h regard to this vision. T h e w o r l d exceeds its r e p r e
sentation; it leaves it, a n d it appears outside this m o d e l , excessive, eccentric, a n d
singular. Excess of a p u r e event, f o u n d e d o n n o t h i n g , outside representation, the
w o r l d escapes from all h o r i z o n s o f calculability (in opposition to the logic o f
e c o n o m i c a n d technologic globalization). A w o r l d in excess has therefore the
m o d e o f b e i n g o f an unpredictable event a n d for that reason c a n n o t b e the m a t
ter o f a choice b e t w e e n possibilities. It w o u l d b e rather, "a violent decision
w i t h o u t appeal, because it decides b e t w e e n all a n d n o t h i n g o r , m o r e precisely,
it makes b e i n g s o m e t h i n g in the place of nothing" (CW, 59; o u r emphasis). T h u s ,
it is a question o f a decision for, " w h a t is in n o way given in advance, b u t w h i c h
constitutes the e r u p t i o n o f the new, that is unpredictable because w i t h o u t face,
and thus t h e ' b e g i n n i n g o f a series o f p h e n o m e n a ' by w h i c h K a n t defines free
d o m in its relation to t h e w o r l d " (ibid.).
A c c o r d i n g t o t h e very structure o f any event, the w o r l d occurs in t h e
incalculable, resistant to identity, a c c o r d i n g to w h a t D e r r i d a refers to as t h e
possibility o f t h e impossible. For D e r r i d a , t h e impossible, w h i c h h e w r i t e s as
im-possible for reasons that will appear below, is possible a n d takes place as i m
possible. In fact, t h e im-possible is, a c c o r d i n g t o D e r r i d a , w h i c h N a n c y fol
lows, t h e very structure o f t h e event. T h e impossible, in this c o n t e x t , does n o t
m e a n that w h i c h is n o t simply possible, a n d therefore w i t h o u t effect. T h e
impossible, o r t h e im-possible, m e a n s : that w h i c h happens outside t h e c o n d i
tions o f possibility offered in advance b y a subject representation, outside t h e
transcendental c o n d i t i o n s o f possibility, w h i c h , for Nancy, actually r e n d e r
impossible t h e subject o f this e x p e r i e n c e o f the w o r l d . W e n e e d to h o l d
t o g e t h e r the following t w o statements: Tlie transcendental
makes
experience
impossible: the im-possible is the possibility of experience. The: w o r l d arrives as such

an im-possible. D e r r i d a often w r i t e s that an event o r an invention is only p o s
sible as im-possible. T h i s is w h y N a n c y will specify, " O u r question
thus
b e c o m e s clearly t h e q u e s t i o n o f t h e impossible e x p e r i e n c e o r the e x p e r i e n c e

o f t h e impossible: an e x p e r i e n c e r e m o v e d from t h e conditions o f possibility o f
a finite k n o w l e d g e , a n d w h i c h is nevertheless an e x p e r i e n c e " (CW, 65). T h i s
e x p e r i e n c e is t h e e x p e r i e n c e o f t h e excess w i t h respect t o t h e conditions o f
anticipating possibilities. E x p e r i e n c e takes place in the excess o f t h e i m - p o s s i
ble as t h e structure o f t h e event.
T h e w o r l d is thus excessive, e x c e e d i n g the conditions o f possibility o f r e p
resentation and o f t h e transcendental, b u t , nevertheless, establishing a p r o p e r
s t a n c e . T h e w o r l d is w i t h o u t foundation ( w i t h o u t representation), b u t it m a i n
tains a stance in this n o t h i n g : T h e w o r l d "[i]s essentially, n o t the representation
o f a universe (cosmos) n o r that o f a h e r e b e l o w (a degraded world, if n o t c o n
d e m n e d by Christianity), b u t t h e excessbeyond any representation o f an ethos
o r a habitusof
a stance by w h i c h t h e w o r l d holds itself b y itself, configures
itself a n d exposes itself, refers to itself w i t h o u t referring to any given principle

n o r to any assigned e n d (CW, 47). T h i s stance referred to in this passage b y
N a n c y is an ethos and a habitus; it is also a praxis.
N a n c y explains that t h e world, if it does n o t w a n t to be a land of exile o r
a vale o f tears, o r simply t h e u n - w o r l d [immonde] that it is b e c o m i n g today, m u s t
b e t h e place o f a possible habitation. A b o v e all, t h e w o r l d is a place. M o r e p r e
cisely, it is the place o f a possible taking-place, w h e r e there is "a g e n u i n e place,
Globalization
o n e in w h i c h things can genuinely take place (in this w o r l d ) " (CW, 42). T h e
w o r l d is the place of any taking-place, o f any possible taking-place, the place
w h e r e "there is r o o m for everyone [tout le monde]" (ibid.). N a n c y insists o n this
dimensionality o f the world: t h e w o r l d "is n o w h e r e " ; it is, rather, " t h e o p e n i n g
of s p a c e - t i m e " (CW, 73), a " s p a t i o - t e m p o r a l dis-positing dispersion," w h e r e
everything can take-place, if it is the case that " w h a t takes place takes place in
a w o r l d and by way of that w o r l d " (CW, 42). T h e w o r l d is t h e place and the
d i m e n s i o n o f a possibility to inhabit, to coexist. T h e w o r l d "is only for those
w h o inhabit it" (ibid.). It is a place for a p r o p e r taking-place and dwelling,
because to take-place is n o t to simply o c c u r b u t to properly arrive and h a p p e n .
T h i s properness indicates here t h e ethical d i m e n s i o n o f the world, an originary
ethics o f b e i n g - o f - t h e - w o r l d . T h i n k i n g together t h e stance o f the w o r l d and
the originary sense of ethos as dwelling, N a n c y explains that t h e world is an
ethos, a habitus, and a place o f dwelling. It is also a praxis: the sense o f t h e w o r l d
is n o t given a p r i o r i , and o u r coexistence in the w o r l d is n o t given either, n o r
is it able to rely o n any substantial basis. N o t able t o rely o n any given, the
w o r l d can thus only rely o n itself. T h a t is t o say, t h e w o r l d suddenly appears
from n o t h i n g . . . from itself. T h e sense o f the world, n o t given, is to create,
because "[t]he withdrawal of any given thus forms the heart o f a t h i n k i n g o f
c r e a t i o n " (CW, 69). T h e world, resting o n n o t h i n g , is to invent in an original
praxis o f m e a n i n g ; " m e a n i n g is always in praxis" (CW, 54), N a n c y clarifies. It is
never established as a given, it is never fulfilled o r achieved; it is to b e m a d e and
enacted. B e i n g itself, as it is always " b e i n g w i t h o u t given," has t h e m e a n i n g o f
an act, o f a m a k i n g .
Ill
T h i s m a k i n g (sense) from nothing given is a creation ex nihilo, c o m i n g
from
n o t h i n g , and m e a n i n g , e m e r g i n g from n o t h i n g , allows the w o r l d to appear as a

n o t h i n g - o f - g i v e n and as w i t h o u t - r e a s o n . N a n c y poses, in recalling Heidegger's
Principle of Reason, that, " n e i t h e r reason n o r g r o u n d sustains t h e w o r l d " (CW,
120, n . 2 0 ) . T h e world, n o t g r o u n d e d o n any principle, is zfact; it is only a fact
(even if it is a singular fact, n o t b e i n g itself a fact within t h e world). It is n o t
founded in reason, o r in G o d . It is the fact o f a "mystery," N a n c y writes, t h e
mystery o f an accidental, errant o r w a n d e r i n g existence (according to W i t t g e n
stein, w h a t is mystical is the fact that t h e w o r l d is). T h e w o r l d is n e i t h e r n e c e s
sary n o r c o n t i n g e n t , if c o n t i n g e n c y is defined in relation to necessity. R a t h e r , it
w o u l d b e b e y o n d o r before necessity a n d o f contingency, an absolute fact. It is
possible to free the facticity o f t h e w o r l d from t h e necessity-contingency c o n -
10
ceptual couple by c o n s i d e r i n g this fact o f the w o r l d " w i t h o u t referring it to a
cause (neither efficient n o r final)" (CW, 4 5 ) . T h e world is a fact w i t h o u t cause
and w i t h o u t reason, it is "a fact w i t h o u t reason o r end, and it is o u r fact" (ibid.).
W e are thus called, in this t h o u g h t o f the w o r l d as absolute i m m a n e n c e , to take
o n this facticity w i t h o u t reason o f t h e w o r l d , as well as its non-sense, o r rather
that its sense only lies in such a fact: " T o t h i n k it is to t h i n k this factuality, w h i c h
implies n o t referring it to a m e a n i n g capable o f appropriating it, b u t to placing
in it, in its t r u t h as a fact, all possible m e a n i n g " (ibid.). T h e w o r l d is a signifi
cance w i t h o u t a f o u n d a t i o n in reason, or, as N a n c y writes suggestively, a " r e s
o n a n c e w i t h o u t r e a s o n " (CW, 4 7 ) . T h e w o r l d is w i t h o u t reason, and is to itself
its entire possible reason.
T h i s facticity o f t h e w o r l d is its a b a n d o n m e n t , a b a n d o n m e n t by and a b a n
d o n m e n t to. N a n c y refers to this a b a n d o n m e n t o f the w o r l d as its poverty. T h e
w o r l d is never a possession, b u t an a b a n d o n m e n t : the w o r l d is poor. T h i s
poverty ( w h i c h is n o t misery b u t t h e b e i n g - a b a n d o n e d as s u c h ) " is d u e t o the
n o t h i n g that t h e w o r l d manifests: c o m i n g from n o t h i n g , resting o n n o t h i n g ,
g o i n g to n o t h i n g ,
12
the w o r l d is, writes N a n c y in an striking passage,"the n o t h
ing itself, if o n e can speak in this way, o r rather nothing g r o w i n g [croissant] as

something" (CW, 51). N o t i n g t h e etymological links b e t w e e n g r o w i n g [croissant],
b e i n g b o r n [nattre], to g r o w [croitre], cresco, and creo, N a n c y introduces at this
stage t h e m o t i f o f creation; to g r o w a n d to create: the m o v e m e n t of the world.
" I n creation, a g r o w t h grows from n o t h i n g and this n o t h i n g takes care o f itself,
cultivates its g r o w t h " (ibid.).Thus, in this sense, poverty grows.
T h e creation o f w h i c h N a n c y speaks, that is, the creation of the w o r l d
(which is a subjective genitive), o u g h t t o b e u n d e r s t o o d in a radical n o n t h e o logical sense. It w o u l d even b e , in its c o n t e n t and its logic, a nontheological
n o t i o n , if it is the case that creating can only b e ex nihilo, e m e r g e n c e from n o t h
ing, and n o t from G o d ("creation is a motif, o r a concept, that w e must grasp
outside o f its theological concept," N a n c y insists [CW, 50]). Because the w o r l d
rests o n n o t h i n g , it exists ex nihilo, in a creation o f itself. C r e a t i o n lies entirely
in t h e ex nihilo a n d n o t in the position of a theism, against w h i c h N a n c y p r o
claims, n o t simply an a-theism, b u t an " a b s e n t h e i s m " (ibid.). God is absent in the
creation of the world and disappears in the world. C r e a t i o n is n o l o n g e r referred to
theology, b u t to t h e ex nihilo," w h i c h for its part is referred to a veritable mate
rialism, if it is the case that t h e "ex nihilo is the g e n u i n e formulation o f a radical
materialism, that is to say, precisely without roots" (CW, 5 1 ; o u r emphasis).
N a n c y engages this m o t i f o f creation to t h e exact extent that he takes leave
w i t h all reference to a given in his t h o u g h t o f the world: n o t h i n g is given, all is
to b e invented, t o b e created: " T h e w o r l d is created from n o t h i n g : this does n o t
m e a n fabricated w i t h n o t h i n g by a particularly ingenious producer. It m e a n s
11
Globalization
instead n o t fabricated, p r o d u c e d by n o p r o d u c e r " ( C W , 51). T h u s , N a n c y

expresses that creation, in his t h o u g h t , is " t h e exact o p p o s i t e " (ibid.) o f p r o
d u c t i o n , w h i c h supposes a given, a project, a n d a p r o d u c e r . C r e a t i o n is w i t h
o u t a transcendent creator (creation w h e r e t h e creator collapses a n d disap
pears, according to the logic o f the a u t o - d e c o n s t r u c t i o n o f Christianity that
w e analyzed a b o v e ) , " a creation i m m a n e n t to itself, a creation of itself, a n d
from itself: " I f the w o r l d is the g r o w t h of/from n o t h i n g a n expression o f a
formidable a m b i g u i t y i t is because it only d e p e n d s o n itself, w h i l e this ' s e l f
is given from n o w h e r e b u t from itself" (ibid.).The w o r l d is created from n o t h
ing, that is to say, as n o t h i n g , n o t in the sense o f n o t h i n g n e s s , b u t in t h e sense
o f n o t h i n g given a n d n o t h i n g o f reason. T h e w o r l d emerges from n o t h i n g , is
w i t h o u t p r e c o n d i t i o n , w i t h o u t m o d e l s , w i t h o u t given principle a n d e n d .
C o m i n g from n o t h i n g signifies: the presentation o f n o t h i n g , n o t in t h e sense
o f a p h e n o m e n o l o g y o f the u n a p p a r e n t o r o f negative theology, b u t in t h e
sense w h e r e " t h a t nothing gives itself a n d that nothing shows itselfand that this
is." ( C W , 1 2 3 , n . 2 4 ) .
T h e creation of the w o r l d is thus that praxis o f m e a n i n g a n d o f dwelling,
w h e r e there is a p r o p e r taking place, a n d it is such a creation o f the w o r l d as an
unpredictable appearance, as an e r u p t i o n o f t h e new, as absolute b e g i n n i n g , as
dis-positing openness (the ex of ex nihilo as differance), as selfhood a n d coexis
tence ( c o - or w i t h are " i n t r i c a t e " in t h e ex) that N a n c y gives us to t h i n k a b o u t
5
in these pages, w o r l d - f o r m i n g as an alternative to globalization.' It is a m a t t e r

o f affirming a n d o f willing the world, a w o r l d w i t h o u t foundation o r founded
o n n o t h i n g , w i t h o u t reason, w i t h o u t e n d , w i t h o u t a u t h o r a n d w i t h o u t subject,
b e y o n d representation: the only possibility of c o m i n g o u t o f the u n - w o r l d .
IV
T h e third part o f Tlie Creation of the World o r Globalization
o p e n s the question
o f w h a t o n e m i g h t call the undecidability of b e g i n n i n g s . O n e b e g i n n i n g w i t h

w h i c h N a n c y is c o n c e r n e d in this text is the b e g i n n i n g o f philosophy itself. O n
Nancy's account, philosophy begins from itself a n d evolves as a " t e c h n o l o g y o f
logos!'"' W i t h this se//"-beginning, N a n c y suggests that there is a " d e n a t u r a t i o n "
o f history. A natural history is i n t e r r u p t e d , c o r r u p t e d , o r " d e n a t u r e d " b y a p h i
losophy that N a n c y understands as a t e c h n o l o g y o f logos, a t e c h n o l o g y that
engenders metaphysics." T h i s self-beginning paradoxically arises o u t o f the
withdrawal o f b e g i n n i n g : the withdrawal
of beginning, Nancy
explains,
"belongs to s e l f - b e g i n n i n g . T h e b e g i n n i n g remains u n g r o u n d e d " (CW, 80).To

that extent, t h e self-beginning is w i t h o u t principles o r ends, and h u m a n s are
12
h e n c e f o r t h fabricated t h r o u g h such technology, if t e c h n o l o g y is to be u n d e r
stood "as t h e planetary d o m i n a t i o n o f the absence o f b e g i n n i n g and end." T h e
t e c h n o l o g y o f logos thus reveals t h e d e n a t u r a t i o n o f history, o f the h u m a n b e i n g
and o f life itself. Life, N a n c y insists, is n o l o n g e r p u r e o r bare, b u t rather p r o
d u c e d according to technology. O n Nancy's account, life b e c o m e s techne, and
politics t h e m a n a g e m e n t o f ecotechnology.
Nancy's text, t h e n , addresses t h e b e g i n n i n g o f philosophy as a t e c h n o l o g y
o f logos that denatures history and h u m a n life. E v e n w h e n it claims to b e the
o t h e r o f all techne, even w h e n it appeals to s o m e ideality o r naturalness, p h i l o s
o p h y is irreducibly an original techne. A n d it is n o accident, as N a n c y reminds
us, that philosophy from its i n c e p t i o n has presented itself from the outset "as a
dialogue w i t h technologies o r their m e t a - t e c h n o l o g i c a l interpellation: b e g i n
n i n g w i t h Sophistry, and m o d e l i n g itself o n mathematics, the arts o f t h e c o b
bler, t h e c a r p e n t e r o r in general" (CW, 89). As w e will see, N a n c y associates this
self-beginning o f philosophy w i t h t h e p h e n o m e n o n k n o w n as "globalization,"
t h e planetary d o m i n a t i o n o f t h e process o f d e n a t u r a t i o n b r o u g h t a b o u t t h r o u g h
technology. N a n c y reveals t h e convergence o f technology, metaphysics, and
globalization, emphasizing that "metaphysics, as such, is essentially historical,
accomplishes itself [s'acheve] in the f o r m o f technology," and that " t e c h n o l o g y
must b e u n d e r s t o o d as t h e planetary d o m i n a t i o n of the absence o f b e g i n n i n g
and end, o r o f t h e w i t h d r a w a l o f any initial o r final givenof
any phusis o r o f
any muthos" (CW, 81). T h e use o f t h e t e r m ^ m a t u r a t i o n w o u l d imply, it seems,

an originary state o f nature that w o u l d have b e e n rfe-natured; an original state
to w h i c h o n e w o u l d have to r e t u r n in o r d e r to restore one's p r o p e r nature.
However, as m u c h as such a reading m i g h t s e e m to be e n c o u r a g e d b y the t e r m
denaturation, Nancy's i n t e n t is to reveal d e n a t u r a t i o n as such, that is, the w i t h
drawal o f principles and ends, t h e n o t h i n g o f origins. S u c h a withdrawal has
also a n o t h e r n a m e : technology.'*
T h e resource o f t h e undecidability a n d groundlessness o f b e g i n n i n g s is
that another b e g i n n i n g , that is to say, o t h e r beginnings, w o u l d b e possible. In fact,
for Nancy, t h e b e g i n n i n g s o f p h i l o s o p h y can o n l y be w r i t t e n as plural, o r even
as "singular plural." T h i s plurality ensues from t h e absence o f g r o u n d . T h i s is
w h y h e asks: "Is it possible to make history, to begin again a h i s t o r y o r History
itself-on the basis o f its n o n - f o u n d a t i o n ? " (ibid.). It is this possibility that the
third section o f Tlie Creation of the World explores: n o t a particular b e g i n n i n g o r
a p r o p e r b e g i n n i n g as an alternative to philosophy's self-beginning, b u t the very
fact and possibility o f o t h e r beginnings. W h i l e the first b e g i n n i n g involves the
denaturation o f philosophy and the m o v e m e n t o f globalization, N a n c y gives
t h o u g h t to a n o t h e r event o f creation, a n o t h e r distinctly different b e g i n n i n g that,
in contrast w i t h globalization, w o u l d be an authentic "world-forming." As w e
13
Globalization
saw, the world that emerges in such an event o f creation is n o t the world as an
object, b u t rather a world that is indissociable from events of m e a n i n g . It is an
issue, thus, of revealing the undecidability of beginnings so as to give t h o u g h t to
the fact o f singular plural beginnings, a fact that as w e will see constitutes the
task and c o n t e n t of justice.
In the section of the text e n t i d e d " C r e a t i o n as D e n a t u r a t i o n : M e t a p h y s i
cal Technology," N a n c y addresses the constitutive aporia o f philosophy's b e g i n
nings. N a n c y suggests that the seed of t h e b e g i n n i n g is c o n t a m i n a t e d and d e n a
tures the philosophical project. H e writes:
Philosophy begins as the self-productive technology of its name, of its dis
course, and of its discipline. It engenders or it fabricates its own concept or its
own Idea for itself at the same time that it invents or constructs these instru
mental and ideal realities that are the "concept" and the "Idea." In this oper
ation, the best known and most prominent feature is the differentiation of
itself from what is called "sophistry": with respect to this technology of logos,
philosophy defines itself and constitutes itself as that tecline that is at the same
time different from any other techne because it states first, or finally, its truth.
In that very way, it invents itself also in its difference from any other knowl
edge, any other discipline, or any other science. With respect to this major dif
ference, its self-institution is the key. (CW, 77; our emphasis)
As self-inaugural, philosophy is unable to give t h o u g h t to its o w n b e g i n
ning, since this self-beginning o p e n s an aporia. E i t h e r it w o u l d posit a position
from w h i c h it evolved (in w h i c h case it w o u l d n o t have b e g u n from itself) or
it proposes itself as an accident o f the West, in w h i c h case, as N a n c y asserts, it
has n o necessity (cf. C W , ibid.).
N a n c y unfolds further aporias i n h e r e n t in t h e relation b e t w e e n p h i l o s o
p h y and history." O n the o n e h a n d , p h i l o s o p h y betrays history, h e asserts,
since h i s t o r y i f left u n t o itselfwould b e s o m e t h i n g w i t h o u t b e g i n n i n g
and w i t h o u t e n d . N a n c y w r i t e s , " T h e r e is thus a betrayal o f t h e p r i n c i p l e o f
history a n d o f t h e w o r l d in t h e p h i l o s o p h i c a l self-constitution a n d s e l f - b e g i n
n i n g " (CW, 7 9 ) . As a 5e/f-beginning that conceives o f its o w n e n d s , p h i l o s o
p h y c o r r u p t s t h e natural history o f t h e w o r l d a n d natural history m u s t b e
e x c l u d e d from its a c c o u n t .
O n the o t h e r hand, N a n c y suggests that philosophy reveals history, he writes:
It is precisely by defining itself as an autonomous process and thus as history
(philosophy is history and makes history as soon as Plato refers to its proper .
provenance in Anaxagoras, Parmenides, and Socrates) that philosophy unveils
14
the problematic order of an auto-constitution that must appropriate itself (that
is to say, auto-constitute itself) through the mediation of its own temporal and
genealogical difference along which the auto- alters itself primordially as
much as it identiBes itself. (CW, 79-80)
T h e aporia o r chiasm, as N a n c y refers to it, opens a space o f uncertainty, inside

and outside o f history, a chronological time of history and a mythical time out
side o f history. In o t h e r w o r d s , t h e self-constituted d u r a t i o n carries its c h r o n o
logical time, and that w h i c h falls outside o f this time is left to the n o n p h i l o sophical, o r the mythical.
F o r N a n c y , as w e saw, a history that has b e g u n itself from itself is d e p r i v e d
o f g r o u n d , c o n s t i t u t i n g t h e aporia o f a b e g i n n i n g w i t h o u t reason and f o u n d a tion:Yet, paradoxically, this w i t h d r a w a l o f g r o u n d is t h e very g r o u n d of t h e h i s
tory that has b e g u n from itself. "Is it possible o r n o t to assume t h e n o n - f o u n
dation o f t h e West as the reason for its o w n history? A n d since this history
b e c o m e s t h e history o f t h e w o r l d : is it possible o r n o t to assume the n o n - f o u n
dation o f t h e history o f t h e world? T h i s m e a n s : is it possible t o make history,
t o begin again a h i s t o r y o r H i s t o r y itself-on the basis o f its n o n - f o u n d a
t i o n ? " (CW, 81). It is this lack o f g r o u n d , this r e - b e g i n n i n g and thus this u n d e cidable, that N a n c y reveals as h e writes, " I n this way, p h i l o s o p h y always insti
tutes itself in a m i x t u r e o f decision a n d indecision w i t h respect to its o w n
subject; and ' d e c o n s t r u c t i o n ' in s u m is c o n g e n i t a l for it since it constructs itself
o n t h e u n d e r s t a n d i n g that it m u s t b e a n t e r i o r to its edifice and even to its o w n
p l a n " (CW, 83).
T h e b e g i n n i n g o n w h i c h N a n c y d w e l l s w h i c h is n e i t h e r the only o n e
n o r t h e last o n e i s that o f philosophy as a t e c h n o l o g y oElogos. It is this absence
o f b e g i n n i n g and " e x h a u s t i o n o f e n d s " that constitutes the " d e n a t u r a t i o n " o f
history and o f m e a n i n g .
H i s t o r y is d e n a t u r e d t o t h e e x t e n t that it n o l o n g e r has a natural b e g i n
n i n g o r an e n d . " T r u t h t h e t r u t h o f p h i l o s o p h y and o f h i s t o r y c a n d o
n o t h i n g else, h e n c e f o r t h , t h a n o p e n o n t o t h e abyss of its o w n b e g i n n i n g , o r
o f its o w n absence o f b e g i n n i n g , e n d , a n d g r o u n d " (CW, 8 2 ) . T h e r e is c o n s e q u e n d y n o e n d , n o b e g i n n i n g , n o future, a n d n o possible a n t i c i p a t i o n .
have
been
thought
through
to
such
an
extent
that
they
20
have
Ends
been
" e x h a u s t e d " in t h e process. It is perhaps in t h e obsession o f p h i l o s o p h y w i t h

t h e p r o b l e m a t i c o f ends that t h e e n d loses any significance, as metaphysics
accomplishes itself b y w i e l d i n g technology. N a n c y explains as m u c h in his
i n t e r v i e w r e c o r d e d in t h e film Der Ister w h e n h e states that technology, l a c k
i n g its o w n e n d , infinitely strives for an e n d , thereby erasing t h e m e a n i n g o f
2
e n d as s u c h . '
15
Globalization
V
O n the basis of this b e g i n n i n g w i t h o u t principles o r ends, and its attendant
technology o f logos, h u m a n s are themselves expressed or fabricated in t e c h n o
logical m o d e s . " T h e r e is a m o v e m e n t that is c o n t e m p o r a r y to h u m a n b e i n g s
technology as h u m a n , quite simply, Homo fiber,
p r o d u c e r and conceiver o f
Homo sapiens, technician of itself" (CW, 86). As history is d e n a t u r e d by a t e c h

nology o f logos, so is the h u m a n being, as can be seen particularly in the c o n
t e m p o r a r y ethos of biopolitics and b i o p o w e r .
N a n c y states that the expression biopolitics designates the order o f a p o l i
tics devoted to the m a n a g i n g a n d c o n t r o l o f life. Nancy's text draws, in this
respect, o n Tlie History of Sexuality
Volume I: An Introduction, by M i c h e l F o u
c a u l t . - Foucault w r i t e s o f t h e focus o n the b o d y in t h e seventeenth century, a

focus o n the discipline and " e x t o r t i o n " o f t h e b o d y "as a m a c h i n e , " and o n t h e
biological processes (HS, 1 3 9 ) . T h e s e t w o foci constitute a "biopolitics of the pop
ulation," a " b i p o l a r t e c h n o l o g y a n a t o m i c a n d b i o l o g i c a l " w h o s e " h i g h e s t
function was perhaps n o l o n g e r to kill b u t to invest life t h r o u g h and t h r o u g h "
(HS, 139). Further, for Foucault, this " b i o p o w e r " was an i m p o r t a n t p r e c u r s o r
to t h e d e v e l o p m e n t o f industrial capitalism, w h i c h " w o u l d n o t have b e e n p o s
sible w i t h o u t t h e controlled insertion o f bodies i n t o t h e m a c h i n e r y o f p r o
d u c t i o n and t h e adjustment o f t h e p h e n o m e n a o f p o p u l a t i o n to e c o n o m i c
processes" (HS, 141).These bioprocesses a n d c o n d i t i o n s w e r e facilitated by t h e
d e v e l o p m e n t o f socializing institutions, " ( t h e family a n d t h e army, schools and
the police, individual m e d i c i n e , and t h e administration o f collective b o d i e s ) "
(HS, 1 4 1 ) . T h e s e institutional t e c h n i q u e s c u l m i n a t e in the c o n j u n c t i o n o f b i o
logical and political existence. Politics and power, as biopolitics and b i o p o w e r ,
p e r m e a t e , control, and transform every level and aspect o f lived e x p e r i e n c e . It
is this idea o f t h e p e r m e a t i o n and control o f life by t h e technologies o f b i o p o l
itics and p o w e r that N a n c y discusses.
N a n c y states that, except for the n e e d for further investigations into t h e
p r e m o d e r n forms o f biopolitics, h e has " n o t h i n g to add to this [Foucault's] his
torical thesis" (CW, 93). H e asserts, in c o n c e r t w i t h Foucault, that "natural life"
is " h e n c e f o r t h inseparable from a set o f conditions that are referred to as ' t e c h
nological' and w h i c h constitute w h a t must rather b e n a m e d ecotechnology w h e r e
any k i n d o f ' n a t u r e ' develops for us (and by us). . . . It is in this c o n t e x t that a
'biopolitics' is possible, since it is defined by a technological m a n a g e m e n t o f
life" (CW, 94). It is clear that for the m o s t part N a n c y shares Foucault's t h i n k
i n g in this c o n t e x t , i n c l u d i n g the view that "politics (still assigned to the State)
progressively takes for its object the controlled m a n a g e m e n t o f natural life."'
However, N a n c y challenges Foucault in the sense that h e asks w h e t h e r it is s i m -
16
ply the case that "life" is t h e object o f a controlling power. F o r Nancy, "life"
does n o t offer a sufficiendy philosophical problematic. "I believe it necessary
h o w e v e r to ask if'life' truly constitutes t h e object (real o r imaginary, is n o t the
issue n o w ) o f these p o w e r s , o r if it is n o t rather is a destinal figure ('race' o r 'the
h u m a n worker') that c o m e s to substitute for the classical figures o f sovereignty.
T h e r e d u c t i o n o f these figures to 'life' is n o t sufficient to g r o u n d their political
a n d affective p o w e r " (CW, 9 4 ) .
23
N o n e t h e l e s s , N a n c y emphasizes that, " w h a t forms a world today is exacdy

the c o n j u n c t i o n o f an u n l i m i t e d process o f e c o - t e c h n o l o g i c a l enframing and o f
a vanishing o f t h e possibilities o f forms o f life a n d / o r o f c o m m o n g r o u n d "
(CW, 95).
M i c h a e l H a r d t and A n t o n i o N e g r i also address Foucault's w o r k in a s i m i
lar vein, in their b o o k Empire. H a r d t and N e g r i e c h o Nancy's treatment o f F o u
cault's philosophy a n d his critical t h i n k i n g o f t h e sovereign state o f e x c e p t i o n
from w h i c h the w o r l d is controlled. Significandy, w h a t is " c r e a t e d " from this
sovereign position o f t h e E m p i r e is a " c o n t r o l that extends t h r o u g h o u t the
depths o f t h e consciousnesses a n d bodies o f the p o p u l a t i o n a n d at the same
t i m e across the entirety o f social relations" (E, 24). H e n c e , it can b e said that the
sovereign creation o f life as techne by biopolitics is a w o r k of death. ( N a n c y
speaks i n this regard o f a "total destruction [biological, ecological, ethological
e n g i n e e r i n g ] " [CW, 89].) H a r d t a n d N e g r i state that w i t h biopolitics " p o w e r is
n o w exercised t h r o u g h m a c h i n e s that direcdy organize t h e brains (in c o m m u
nication systems, m o n i t o r e d activities, etc.) towards a state o f a u t o n o m o u s
alienation from t h e sense o f life and t h e desire for creativity" (E, 2 3 ) .
24
Follow
i n g t h e section in Tlie Creation of the World that addresses biopolitics, N a n c y

addresses t h e "sovereign" position from w h i c h the eco-technological enfram
i n g o f h u m a n life operates.
VI
Nancy's problematic w i t h respect to the question o f sovereignty is developed
in t h e section o f t h e text entitled "JBc Nihilo Summum
( O f Sovereignty)." In that
chapter, N a n c y endeavors to d r a w t h e c o n t o u r s of sovereignty, c o n t o u r s that

are, as h e puts it, o u t l i n e d " a r o u n d a hollow." S u c h a sovereignty, w h i c h he c o n
trasts w i t h d o m i n a t i o n a n d mastery, w o u l d b e an "anti-sovereignty," a k i n d o f
"negative sovereignty," o r a "sovereignty w i t h o u t sovereignty." T h a t negative
sovereignty is i n d e e d m a r k e d by a hollow, a h o l l o w that marks the absence o f
any theological foundation, t h e withdrawal o f substantiality and subjectivity
o n e thinks here o f his earlier w o r k o n Tlie Retreat of the Politicalin t h e very
17

institution of sovereignty.
25
Globalization
It also marks the n o t h i n g from w h i c h , ex nihilo, sov
ereignty is exercised, as it is n o l o n g e r f o u n d e d o n a n y t h i n g b u t itself a n d its

o w n creation, its o w n self-institution. "Instituting sovereignty," N a n c y insists,
" c a n n o t b e itself instituted. B e t t e r still, there is n o t , in a general way, an insti
t u t e d sovereignty: contradictio in adjecto" (CW, 1 0 7 ) . T h e sovereign, thus, "is the
existent w h o depends o n nothing." Indeed, N a n c y contrasts an atheological
sovereignty from traditional theologico-political sovereignty, stressing that the
sovereign has n o substantiality whatsoever, that it is based o n n o t h i n g : its exer
cise "supposes that n o t h i n g either precedes it o r supercedes it, that n o a u t h o r
ity o r instituting force has b e e n exercised before it. Sovereignty is the e n d o f
any political t h e o l o g y " (CW, 99). T h e sovereign is n o t h i n g except for w h a t it
creates. T h e invention of sovereignty is n o t " t h e secularized transcription o f a
political theology b u t the creation o f an atheological assumption," N a n c y
writes evocatively.
Because o f this d e t a c h m e n t from any g r o u n d , sovereignty is to be t h o u g h t
o f in terms of the exception to the law o f w h i c h Carl S c h m i t t spoke. " T h e same
c o n d i t i o n that ensures that sovereignty receive its c o n c e p t also deprives it o f its
power: that is, the absence o f s u p e r i o r o r foundational authority. For the sover
eign a u t h o r i t y m u s t be essentially o c c u p i e d w i t h f o u n d i n g itself o r w i t h over
c o m i n g itself in o r d e r to legislate p r i o r to or in excess o f any law. In a rigorous
sense, the sovereign foundation is infinite, o r rather sovereignty is never
founded. It w o u l d , rather, b e defined by the absence o f foundation o r p r e s u p
p o s i t i o n " (CW, 103). This is w h y the exercise o f sovereignty takes place entirely
u n d e r the c o n d i t i o n of the "state o f e x c e p t i o n " w h e r e laws are suspended,
betraying the fundamental illegitimacy o f sovereignty as the c o n d i t i o n o f legit
imacy having to legitimize itself. It is the exceptional position o f sovereignty as
a source o f law, control, and poweritself outside the l a w , " p r i o r to o r in excess
of any law"-that holds Nancy's attention. H e seeks to interrogate the n o n substantial source from w h i c h the sovereign operates, w h e t h e r a medieval
suzerain, an early m o d e r n sovereign, o r a singular existence, as a site from w h i c h
2
the creation o f a w o r l d could ensue. ''

N a n c y undertakes a historical and philosophical analysis o f the sovereign's
situation of e x c e p t i o n from w h i c h a "sovereign" operates, by d r a w i n g a dis
tinction
b e t w e e n a suzerain and a sovereign.The suzerain in the medieval w o r l d
was connected to a lineagefrom G o d to t h e eldest (even o n e w h o is deceased)

to the suzerain. T h e sovereign, o n Nancy's account, is detached, free to create
the law and free to rule from above. It is absolute in t h e sense that it has n o
relation, n o measure and n o equivalence to a n y t h i n g o r anyone.
T h i s p r o b l e m a t i c o f such an e x c e p t i o n a l sovereignty is also central to
M i c h a e l H a r d t a n d A n t o n i o N e g r i ' s Empire. F o r H a r d t and N e g r i , t h e t r a n -
18
s c e n d e n t sovereign is an a m o r p h o u s " E m p i r e " that has n o b o u n d a r i e s , limits,
o r particular t e r r i t o r i e s . T h e y assert that t h e r e is n o c e n t e r for the E m p i r e .
T h e E m p i r e "suspends history a n d t h e r e b y fixes t h e states o f affairs for e t e r
n i t y " (E, xiv).
Nancy's t r e a t m e n t (as well as that o f H a r d t and N e g r i ) o f sovereignty is also
e c h o e d in t h e w o r k o f G i o r g i o A g a m b e n w h o has focused o n the e x c e p t i o n o f
21
t h e sovereign in Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life.
A g a m b e n , in p a r
ticular, reminds us o f the crucial link b e t w e e n the c o n c e p t o f t h e state o f e x c e p

tion and the political t h e o r y o f t h e n o t e d G e r m a n j u r i s t Carl Schmitt. F o r it
was S c h m i t t w h o , in his text Political Tlieology, explicitly equated the sovereign
w i t h the state o f e x c e p t i o n , stating that the "Sovereign is he w h o decides o n
t h e exception.'"* For A g a m b e n , this state o f e x c e p t i o n means that t h e sovereign
p o w e r operates, as it w e r e , outside o f o r above the law. It is the only and
absolute law, as A g a m b e n explains: " T h e state of e x c e p t i o n is n o t a special k i n d
o f law (like the law o f war); rather, insofar as it is a suspension o f the juridical
o r d e r itself, it defines law's threshold o r limit c o n c e p t " (SE, 4).
T h i s c o n t e m p o r a r y discussion a b o u t "sovereignty" b e t w e e n Nancy, A g a m
b e n , a n d N e g r i and H a r d t , does n o t s p r i n g from s o m e arcane historical i n t e r
est b u t o u t o f a concernful e n g a g e m e n t w i t h Schmitt's corpus and the sover
eign excesses that it seems to have justified and enabled. A g a m b e n shows, for
example, that, following Schmitt's w o r k s in the 1920s and early 1930s, " t h e
Nazis spoke o p e n l y o f a gewollte Ausnahmezustand,
a 'willed state of exception,"
for t h e p u r p o s e o f establishing t h e N a t i o n a l Socialist S t a t e ' " (SE, 3). In Tlie

Concept of the Political, S c h m i t t defines politics in terms o f a conflict b e t w e e n
2 J
friend and enemy, o r t h e " f r i e n d - e n e m y constellation," as h e d u b b e d it. ' In the

same text, S c h m i t t speculates that t h e f r i e n d - e n e m y distinction can be applied
to a domestic c o n t e x t , in w h i c h the g o v e r n m e n t w o u l d identify its o w n p e o
ple, o r s o m e g r o u p o f its citizens, as t h e e n e m y (CP, 32). H e p r o p o u n d s that
"[e]very state provides, therefore, s o m e k i n d o f formula for the declaration o f
an internal e n e m y " (CP, 46). In Legality and Legitimacy, Schmitt thematizes, in a
matter-of-fact m a n n e r , that the p r i m a r y effect o f the legal possession of p o w e r
lies in t h e " p r o p e r use o f t h e extraordinary powers in the state o f exception."
30
T h e state o f e x c e p t i o n o f w h i c h S c h m i t t spoke, and that the Nazis wielded, was

provided and legitimized b y Article 4 8 o f t h e W e i m a r C o n s t i t u t i o n . Article 48
(Measures d u r i n g the disturbance o f security and order) provides that
the President can utilize the necessary measures to restore public security and
order, if necessary with the aid of armed force. For this purpose he may pro
visionally suspend, in whole or in part, the basic rights established in Articles
114,115,117,118, 123, 124,153. (LL, 103)
19
Globalization
T h e "basic rights" established in Articles 114, 115, 117, 118, 123, 124, 153
included such matters as personal freedoms, domicilic sovereignty, freedom o f
expression, peaceful assembly, a n d others. Schmitt's theoretical reservations
a b o u t the viability o f parliamentary d e m o c r a c y and e m p h a t i c legitimation o f
the state o f e x c e p t i o n played all t o o well into t h e hands o f A d o l p h H i d e r . In
fact, H i n d e n b u r g used Article 48 to suspend civil liberties after the February
27, 1933, R e i c h s t a g fire. H i d e r t h e n m o v e d to tighten his grip o n power.
31
Hitler outlawed his m a i n political opposition and p u s h e d b o t h the Enabling

Acts (March 2 3 , 1933) and the N u r e m b e r g Laws t h r o u g h parliament. T h u s ,
t h r o u g h legal means and parliamentary procedures Hitler m a n e u v e r e d himself
i n t o a "state o f e x c e p t i o n " provided by Article 48 and so t h o r o u g h l y t h e m a tized by Schmitt, thus assuming absolute power.
T h e e n g a g e m e n t by Nancy, A g a m b e n , a n d H a r d t and N e g r i o f Carl
Schmitt's c o n c e p t o f the political and his f o r m u l a t i o n o f a state o f e x c e p t i o n ,
that is to say, a state o f e x c e p t i o n by w h i c h a g o v e r n m e n t declares its o w n cit
izens to be t h e e n e m y and assumes e m e r g e n c y p o w e r s and takes action to
eliminate the threat,
32
can also be read against the b a c k g r o u n d o f Jacques D e r -
rida's seminal essay, " T h e Force o f Law."
33
F o r it is in this text that D e r r i d a
addresses, a m o n g o t h e r topics, S c h m i t t a n d his relation t o N a t i o n a l Socialism.

It is also in this text that D e r r i d a raises the question o f t h e ethics o f d e c o n struction and its relation to responsibility and justice. N a n c y ' s e n g a g e m e n t of
the question o f t h e exceptional sovereign stands against this backdrop, w h i l e
he provides his o w n interpretation. His i n t e n t i o n is, in t h e e n d , to explore t h e
undecidable resources o f the position and t h e action o f t h e sovereign. N a n c y
explores the e x t e n t to w h i c h the position o f the sovereign o r t h e subject o f
the sovereign could be the p e o p l e , as in the case o f a participatory democracy.
H e writes:
The sovereign people possesses nothing less and nothing more than the
absolute monarch: namely, the very exercise of sovereignty.
This exercise is nothing other than the establishment of the State and of
its law, or of the law that makes a State. It supposes that nothing either pre
cedes it or supercedes it, that no authority or instituting force has been exer
cised before it. (CW, 99; our emphasis)
It is this resource o f t h e sovereign (with t h e p r o m i s e o f t h e sovereignty
of t h e people) that N a n c y ' s project offers for further q u e s t i o n i n g . N a n c y
emphasizes that t h e sovereign is related o n l y to itself a n d creates itself a l o n g
w i t h any of its institutions. H e w r i t e s , " T h e sovereign does n o t find a sover
eignty that is given: it m u s t c o n s t i t u t e it and thus c o n s t i t u t e itself as sover-
20
e i g n " ( C W , 100) F o r N a n c y , t h e n , t h e sovereign is thus in a state o f exception,
w h e t h e r m o n a r c h , p e o p l e , o r singularity.
T h r o u g h his analysis, N a n c y seeks to approach t h e very possibility o f sov
ereignty as t h e nonsubstantial place from w h i c h a n o t h e r b e g i n n i n g , a n o t h e r
creation, a n o t h e r w o r l d (or a w o r l d anew) could ensue. In Tlie Creation of the
World, N a n c y advances u p o n his proposition in Tlie Sense of the World that the
loss o f t h e theological sovereign o p e n s the possibility of a n e w sense o f politics,
and raises t h e q u e s t i o n o f h o w t h e sense o f b e i n g - i n - c o m m o n can m a k e itself
"sovereign in a n e w w a y " (SW, 9 1 ) . T h i s n e w way could b e formulated as fol
lows: T h e sovereign is based o n n o t h i n g : " n o finality, n o o r d e r o f p r o d u c t i o n o r
subjection, w h e t h e r it c o n c e r n s the agent o r t h e patient o r the cause o r the
effect. D e p e n d e n t o n n o t h i n g , it is entirely delivered over to itself, insofar as
precisely, the "itself" n e i t h e r precedes n o r founds it b u t is the nothing, the very
t h i n g from w h i c h it is s u s p e n d e d " (CW, 103).
Nancy's t h i n k i n g w i t h respect to this possibility o f a n e w sense o f politics
and justice is further developed in t h e c o n c l u d i n g section o f the b o o k , e n t i d e d
"Cosmos
Basileus" a tide that implies that a w o r l d o r cosmos issues its o w n
m e a n i n g from its o w n a u t o - c o n s t i t u t e d and therefore u n g r o u n d e d sovereignty.
VII
N a n c y insists t h a t t h e w o r l d is subject to n o authority, arising ex nihilo. H e
also marks that t h e u n i t y o f t h e w o r l d r e m a i n s diverse, m u l t i p l e . In this
respect, h e is able to claim that, " T h e s h a r i n g o u t [partage] o f t h e w o r l d is t h e
l a w o f t h e w o r l d . T h e w o r l d d o e s n o t have any o t h e r law, it is n o t s u b m i t t e d
to any a u t h o r i t y , it does n o t have any s o v e r e i g n " ( C W , 109). T h e law o f t h e
w o r l d is thus s h a r i n g , a n d this d i s t r i b u t i o n , r e p a r t i t i o n , o r a t t r i b u t i o n i n h e r
e n t in s h a r i n g o p e n s t h e q u e s t i o n a n d space o f j u s t i c e , t h e p r o p e r o r a p p r o
p r i a t e a t t r i b u t i o n t o e a c h . " T e r r i t o r i a l place, n o u r i s h m e n t , a d e l i m i t a t i o n o f
rights a n d duties: t o e a c h a n d each t i m e as a p p r o p r i a t e . " Justice is c o - e x t e n
sive w i t h t h e s h a r i n g o f t h e w o r l d a n d t h e a p p r o p r i a t e p a r t o f each s i n g u
larity (justice designates w h a t m u s t b e r e n d e r e d , restituted, r e t u r n e d , given
i n r e t u r n t o each singular existent). N o w , this s h a r i n g , j u s t like t h e w o r l d , is
n o t given. Similarly, j u s t i c e is n o t given, b u t to create; t h e r e lies t h e struggle
for j u s t i c e .
N a n c y had already emphasized in Tlie Inoperative Community
that m e a n i n g
is a n d can only b e as shared o u t . However, as inoperative as the c o m m u n i t y may

be, t h e t e r m community itself still suggested a c o h e r e n c e (the " c o m m o n " ) that
N a n c y a t t e m p t e d to deconstruct. H e n c e t h e c u r r e n t text, Tlie Creation of the
21
Globalization
World, shifts from the vocabulary o f " c o m m u n i t y " to a t h i n k i n g o f the w o r l d in

t e r m s o f the singularity o f creation as w o r l d - f o r m i n g .
Yet there are crucial elements in the Inoperative Community
i n Tlie Creation of the World o r Globalization.
that are present
In Tlie Inoperative Community,
if
using the t e r m community, N a n c y was challenging the i m m a n e n c e o f c o m

monality, o r o f a c o m m u n i t y of essence, as he t e r m e d it. To address this threat
o f i m m a n e n c e , associated w i t h the threat o f totalitarianism, N a n c y has recourse
to Heidegger's Mitsein, b e i n g - w i t h , and being-toward-death, as a m o d e o f finitude
that is expressed in Dasein's radical singularity. For Nancy, w h a t b e i n g - w i t h a n d
b e i n g - t o w a r d - d e a t h reveal is a sharing [portage] of singular existences. " T h e
sharing itself is n o t a c o m m u n i o n . . . n o r even a c o m m u n i c a t i o n as this is
u n d e r s t o o d to exist b e t w e e n subjects. B u t these singular beings are themselves
constituted by sharing, they are distributed a n d placed, o r rather spaced, by the
sharing that makes t h e m others" (IC, 25).
For Nancy, in Tlte Inoperative Community, c o m m u n i t y is composed of singular
existences that "share" their singularity in their being toward death.
"Community"
he writes, "does not sublate thefinitude it exposes. Community itself, in sum, is nothing but
this exposition" (IC, 26). Such finite singularities are exposed to each other. C o m
munity is the co-sovereignty of singular beings. T h e exposition of singularity is
w h a t is " c o m m u n i c a t e d " (IC, 29). B u t this communication is not, N a n c y insists, a
b o n d . Singularities are given w i t h o u t c o m m u n i o n and w i t h o u t b o n d (ibid.).
For Nancy, this m u t u a l exposure o f the singularities is an undecidable t e n
sion from w h i c h t h e struggle for t h e creation o f w o r l d m u s t u n f o l d . T h a t s t r u g
gle, in its singularity and the infinitely finite e n a c t m e n t o f possible beginnings,
is n o t h i n g less than, for Nancy, the c o n d i t i o n and definition o f justice.
To create the world means: immediately, without delay, reopening each pos
sible struggle for a world, that is, for what must form the contrary of a global
injustice against the background of general equivalence. But this means to
conduct this struggle precisely in the name of the fact that this world is com
ing out of nothing, that there is nothing before it and that it is without mod
els, without principle and without given end, and that it is precisely what
forms the justice and the meaning of a world. (CW, 5455)
T h e suppression o f such a creation o f m e a n i n g , o f " e a c h possible struggle
for a world," w o u l d constitute injustice. This openness to n e w beginnings, n e w
creations, n e w worlds, is contrasted by N a n c y w i t h the " u n w o r l d " of the t e c h
nology wielded by metaphysics and globalization. N a n c y thematizes a w o r l d
that is always already u n d e r f o r m a t i o n a n d concludes that justice w o u l d b e a
w o r l d that is constituted by this inexhaustible creation o f m e a n i n g .
22
In an a t t e m p t to o p p o s e t h e e m p i r i c m a c h i n e o f eco-technology, t h e n ,
N a n c y offers the sovereignty o f t h e world. N a n c y suggests that the sovereignty
o f t h e worldCosmos Basileusreveals
t h e excess o f life w i t h respect to c o n
trolled m a n a g e m e n t . B u t w h a t is ultimately at stake w i t h this sovereign w o r l d

in opposition to the control of b i o - p o w e r is justice. For Nancy, the creation o f
t h e w o r l d (as a subjective genitive) is literally the w o r k o f justice. As w o r l d forming, the w o r l d is justice-in-act. T h i s justice is a justice that is appropriate,
a justice that is d u e . W h a t is appropriate to singularities in their being? T h e ulti
m a t e measure o f appropriateness is exposure o f singularities to o n e another.
N a n c y writes:
But existence is nothing other than being exposed: expulsed from its simple
self-identity and from its pure position, exposed to the event, to creation, thus
to the outside, to exteriority, to multiplicity, to alterity, and to alteration. (In a
sense, certainly, this is nothing other than being exposed to being itself, to its
own "being" and also, consequendy, being exposed as being: exposition as the
essence of being.) (CW, 110)
Justice h a p p e n s i n t h e singular-plural expositions o f existences
and
remains an inappropriable that is shared o u t by each b u t irreducible to a p a r

ticular o r a w h o l e . N a n c y asserts in this respect that "[jjustice r e n d e r e d to the
singular plural is n o t simply a d e m u l t i p l i e d o r diffracted justice. It is n o t a
u n i q u e justice i n t e r p r e t e d a c c o r d i n g to perspectives o r subjectivitiesand
nonetheless it remains t h e same justice, equal for all a l t h o u g h irreducible and
insubstitutable from o n e to the o t h e r " (CW, 6 1 ) . T h i s is an infinite justice, c o n
sequently, w h i c h m u s t b e r e n d e r e d b o t h t o t h e p r o p r i e t y o f each a n d t h e
i m p r o p r i e t y c o m m o n to all: r e n d e r e d to b i r t h and to d e a t h , w h i c h h o l d
b e t w e e n t h e m t h e infinity o f m e a n i n g . T h e w o r l d w o u l d b e t h e justice o f each
creation for m e a n i n g . Justice w o u l d b e a w o r l d constituted by this i n e x
haustible creation o f m e a n i n g . T h i s does n o t m e a n , however, that justice o r
m e a n i n g c a n n o t b e achieved, b u t m e a n s that each time it is enacted and each
t i m e it remains to b e created o r re-created.
In his essay " T h e Force o f Law," D e r r i d a suggested that deconstruction
responds to a sense o f responsibility w i t h o u t limits and is always "already
engaged by this infinite d e m a n d of justice . . ." (FL, 19). D e r r i d a is c o n c e r n e d
w i t h the aporia o f law, an aporia w h e r e b y t h e establishment of a law, that is to say
t h e exercise o f the right to m a k e law, abrogates the next act o f lawmaking. A n d
the subsequent act must o v e r c o m e the previous (FL, 36). T h e act of l a w m a k i n g
always involves an o t h e r and cuts w i t h violence against the other. B u t for D e r
rida deconstruction allows us to recognize the instability and undecidability in
23
Globalization
the law and justice that renders it always " t o c o m e , " a " t o c o m e " that w o u l d
imply o n g o i n g interpretation and re-creation.
For Nancy, this freedom of a sovereign creation of m e a n i n g is at its core
radically undecidable. H e writes o f " t h e insatiable a n d infinitely finite exercise
that is the b e i n g in act o f m e a n i n g b r o u g h t forth in the w o r l d [mis an monde]"
(CW, 55). It is the measure o f t h e resources o f Nancy's philosophical w o r k that
the text explores the dimensions o f this undecidability o f creations, o f such
"infinitely finite" beginnings. S u c h is the resource o f the undecidable: any
b e g i n n i n g could n o t be the only b e g i n n i n g o r the last. N a n c y opens a space of
interrogation b e t w e e n at least t w o beginnings: o n the o n e hand, the self-begin
n i n g o f philosophy that denatures history and h u m a n i t y (globalization), and, o n
the o t h e r hand, the possibility o f o t h e r beginnings that enact the w o r l d o f j u s
tice t h r o u g h the plurality o f b e g i n n i n g s . Nancy's articulation of the u n d e c i d
ability o f beginnings opens a space for t h e reflection o n a b e g i n n i n g that w o u l d
lead to the creation of a w o r l d s y n o n y m o u s w i t h justice.
As a b o o k , Tlie Creation of the World o r Globalization
enacts the singular and
plural beginnings that N a n c y associates w i t h justice. T h e b o o k is i n d e e d o r g a

nized a r o u n d separate sections in w h i c h N a n c y himself begins again, a nouveau,
w i t h each discussion.The plural b e g i n n i n g s in the text,"LMn et Orfc/',""Of C r e
ation," " C r e a t i o n as D e n a t u r a t i o n : Metaphysical Technology," " N o t e o n the
T e r m Biopolitics','"Ex
Nihilo Suminum
( O f Sovereignty)," a n d "Cosmos
Basileus"
each enact a performative portrayal o f singular plural beginnings. Section I

("Urbi et Orbi"), for example, evokes t h e beginnings o f t h e Christian world, o n
the o n e hand, and a Marxist worldview, o n the other, as N a n c y speculates o n
these dimensions o f the b e c o m i n g - w o r l d o f the world. T h e creation p o r t e n d e d
by M a r x was a w o r l d that is n o t b e y o n d the w o r l d b u t a w o r l d " i n fact," i n s o
far as it is created "each time," a w o r l d that is outside of representation and
w i t h o u t G o d , as discussed earlier.
And if our world is neither necessary nor contingent, or if it is both at

once, what does that mean? More generally, how does one disentangle oneself
from this conceptual couple? Perhaps by considering a fact without referring it
to a cause (neither efficient nor final).The world is such a fact: it may well be
that it is the only fact of this kind (if it is the case that the other facts take place
within the world). It is a fact without reason or end, and it is our fact. (CW, 45)
As n o t e d earlier, w h a t is central to t h e singularity o f t h e plural b e g i n n i n g s
is that the beginnings o r creations c o m e from a n o t h i n g that arises, as h e
emphasizes, " w i t h o u t - r e a s o n " a n d grows " o f / f r o m n o t h i n g " : in this first sec
tion, w h a t is at stake is n o t seizing t h e m e a n s of p r o d u c t i o n w i t h M a r x b u t the
24
creation of t h e w o r l d . T h i s straggle for creation is, N a n c y writes, "precisely what
forms the justice a n d t h e m e a n i n g o f a w o r l d " (CW, 55).
Following this b e g i n n i n g o f the t e x t , " Urbi et Orbi" N a n c y begins again in
t h e second section, " O f Creation," w i t h an e n g a g e m e n t w i t h Kant, t h r o u g h
Lyotard, o f t h e relation o f j u d g m e n t to beginnings and ends. M o r e precisely,
N a n c y is c o n c e r n e d w i t h t h e j u d g m e n t a b o u t ends, a b o u t w h a t is never a c t u
ally given in advance, b u t constitutes the e r u p t i o n o f t h e n e w and t h e u n p r e
dictable. F o r Nancy, Kant's Critique of Judgment presents us w i t h yet a n o t h e r c r e
ation paradigm and is intrinsic to t h e philosophical project: its birth certificate:
" T h e j u d g m e n t a b o u t ends o r a b o u t t h e end, a b o u t a destination o r a b o u t a
m e a n i n g o f t h e w o r l d is t h e e n g a g e m e n t o f a philosophy (or a b o u t w h a t o n e
calls a "life") ever since an e n d is n o t given: this is the birth certificate o f p h i
losophy and o f o u r so-called ' W e s t e r n ' o r ' m o d e r n ' history" (CW, 59).
Reflective j u d g m e n t , for its part, is considered by N a n c y as a m o d e in
w h i c h a w o r l d is n o t c o n s t r u c t e d b u t created. Reflective j u d g m e n t is the j u d g
m e n t o f a particular for w h i c h n o c o n c e p t exists. B u t m o r e i m p o r t a n t than the
claim that the universal is n o t given in t h e reflective j u d g m e n t , is the r e c o g n i
tion that w h a t is actually missing is n o t t h e c o n c e p t o f a reality, b u t t h e very
existence o f that reality as given. T h e issue is thus n o t to construct, b u t to c r e
ate. N a n c y w r i t e s :
The "Idea," to use this Kantian-Lyotardian lexicon, is no longer a concept
used in an analogical or symbolic mode outside of the limits of possible expe
rience or of given intuition. It is no longer a concept without intuition, han
dled by virtue of something that substitutes for a sensible given: it becomes
itself the creation of its own scheme, that is to say, of a novel reality, which is
the form/matter of a world of ends. (CW, 62)
N a n c y thus appropriates this discourse o f reflective j u d g m e n t insofar it points
to t h e creation o f t h e w o r l d , u n d e r n o concept, w h e t h e r already given o r to
construct. H e n c e , h e seeks to articulate a third form o f j u d g m e n t that w o u l d
b e a creation o u t o f t h e n o t h i n g (ex nihilo), a " j u d g m e n t o f a reason to w h i c h
is given in advance n e i t h e r end(s) n o r m e a n s , n o r a n y t h i n g that constitutes
w h a t e v e r k i n d of'causality k n o w n to u s ' " (CW, 66). Ultimately, N a n c y evokes
a j u d g m e n t a b o u t ends w i t h o u t any given criteria, b u t w h i c h is by itself the
ethos and praxis o f its o w n finality. S u c h an e x p e r i e n c e , as N a n c y calls it, w o u l d
b e an e x p e r i e n c e r e m o v e d from conditions o f possibility, and h e n c e t h e i m p o s , sibility o f e x p e r i e n c e o r e x p e r i e n c e o f t h e impossible o f w h i c h D e r r i d a speaks.
As N a n c y asserts, in the book's o t h e r " b e g i n n i n g s " such " C r e a t i o n as D e n a t uration: Metaphysical Technology," "Ex
25
Nihilo Suuimum
( O f Sovereignty)," o r
Globalization
"Cosmos Basileus," w e are in a time in w h i c h ends have b e e n exhausted, and it is

for us to decide, to b e g i n again. W e e n c o u n t e r the position o f the undecidability o f beginnings, as the singular plural existences of the world, stand in relation
to creation as "sovereign."We b e l o n g to the world, b u t in an ecstatic and singu
lar plural manner, described suggestively by Giorgio A g a m b e n as a state o f
"ecstasy belonging, " the "topological structure of the state o f e x c e p t i o n " (SE,
35). S u c h a "topological structure" entails, for A g a m b e n "being-outside
and yet
34
belonging" (SE, 3 5 ) . Perhaps this topological structure articulates the sharing-out

o f singular plural existences that is central to Nancy's t h i n k i n g of the w o r l d as
justice. Such is the possibility that J e a n - L u c Nancy's Tlie Creation of the World o r
Globalization, invites us to think.
26
Author's Prefatory Note

to the English Language Edition
N o t e on the Untranslatable
Mondialisation
It is n o t w i t h o u t paradox that in m a n y languages the French t e r m
mondialisa-
tion is quite difficult to translate, a n d that perhaps this difficulty makes it almost
"untranslatable" in t h e sense that the t e r m has acquired in t h e recent Vocabulaire
europeen des philosophies.This
difficulty lies in t h e fact that the English t e r m glob
alization has already established itself in t h e areas o f the w o r l d that use English
for c o n t e m p o r a r y i n f o r m a t i o n e x c h a n g e ( w h i c h is n o t necessarily symbolic
e x c h a n g e ) . T h e r e are therefore at least t w o terms (this b e i n g said w i t h o u t b e i n g
able to take into a c c o u n t a considerable n u m b e r o f languages, w h i c h w o u l d
i n t r o d u c e a s u p p l e m e n t a r y p e r s p e c t i v e w h i c h o f course w o u l d b e impossi
b l e ) t w o terms to designate t h e p h e n o m e n o n that understands itself o r seeks
to b e u n d e r s t o o d as a unification o r as a c o m m o n assumption o f the totality o f
t h e parts o f t h e w o r l d in a general n e t w o r k (if n o t a system) o f c o m m u n i c a
tion, c o m m e r c i a l exchange, juridical o r political reference points (if n o t values),
and finally o f practices, forms, and procedures o f all kinds linked to m a n y
aspects o f ordinary existence.
T h e French language has used the w o r d mondialisation since the middle o f
t h e twentieth c e n t u r y w h i c h seems to m e slighdy before the t e r m globalization
appeared in English. T h e reasons for this neologism should b e studied for their
o w n sake. W h a t e v e r those reasons may b e , the c o n n o t a t i o n o f the t e r m mondial
isation gives it a m o r e concrete tonality than that of globalisation, w h i c h desig
nates, in French, a m o r e abstract process leading to a m o r e c o m p a c t result: the
"global" evokes t h e n o t i o n o f a totality as a w h o l e , in an indistinct integrality.
27
Globalization
T h u s , there has b e e n in the English globalization the idea o f an integrated total

ity, appearing for example w i t h the "global village" o f M c L u h a n , w h i l e mondial
isation w o u l d rather evoke an e x p a n d i n g process t h r o u g h o u t the expanse o f the
world of h u m a n beings, cultures, and nations.
T h e usage o f either t e r m , o r t h e search for an English translation that
w o u l d keep the semantics o f " w o r l d " ' are n o t w i t h o u t a real theoretical i n t e r
est: the w o r d mondialisation, by k e e p i n g t h e h o r i z o n o f a " w o r l d " as a space o f
possible m e a n i n g for the w h o l e o f h u m a n relations (or as a space o f possible
significance) gives a different indication t h a n that o f an enclosure in t h e undif
ferentiated sphere o f a unitotality. In reality, each o f t h e terms carries w i t h it an
interpretation o f the process, o r a w a g e r o n its m e a n i n g a n d future. T h i s also
means that it is understandable that mondialisation preserves s o m e t h i n g u n t r a n s
latable while globalization has already translated everything in a global i d i o m .
J e a n - L u c Nancy, D e c e m b e r 2 0 0 4
28
Author's Prefatory Note

to the French Language Edition
" T h e creation o f t h e w o r l d or globalization": the c o n j u n c t i o n must be u n d e r

stood simultaneously a n d alternatively in its disjunctive, substitutive, o r c o n
j u n c t i v e senses.
A c c o r d i n g to t h e first sense: b e t w e e n t h e creation o f t h e w o r l d or global
ization, o n e m u s t choose, since o n e implies t h e exclusion o f t h e other.
A c c o r d i n g to t h e s e c o n d sense: t h e creation of t h e world, in o t h e r words
globalization, t h e f o r m e r m u s t b e u n d e r s t o o d as the latter.
A c c o r d i n g t o t h e third sense: t h e creation o f the w o r l d o r globalization,
o n e o r t h e o t h e r indifferendy, leads us to a similar result ( w h i c h remains t o b e
determined).
T h e c o m b i n a t i o n o f these three senses a m o u n t s to raising t h e same q u e s
tion: can w h a t is called "globalization" give rise to a world, o r to its contrary?
Since it is n o t an issue o f prophesizing n o r of controlling the future, the
question is, rather, h o w to give ourselves (open ourselves) in order to l o o k
ahead o f ourselves, w h e r e n o t h i n g is visible, w i t h eyes guided by those t w o
t e r m s w h o s e m e a n i n g evades u s " c r e a t i o n " (up to this p o i n t limited to t h e o
logical mystery), " w o r l d - f o r m i n g " [mondialisation] (up to this p o i n t limited to
e c o n o m i c a n d technological matters, generally called "globalization").
29
Urbi et Orbi
Urbi et orbi: this formulation d r a w n from papal b e n e d i c t i o n has c o m e to m e a n

" e v e r y w h e r e a n d a n y w h e r e " in ordinary language. R a t h e r than a m e r e shift in
m e a n i n g , this is a g e n u i n e disintegration. T h i s disintegration is n o t simply d u e
to t h e dissolution o f t h e religious Christian b o n d that (more o r less) held the
"Western w o r l d t o g e t h e r until a r o u n d t h e m i d d l e o f a t w e n t i e t h c e n t u r y to
w h i c h t h e n i n e t e e n t h c e n t u r y effectively relinquished its certainties (history,
science, c o n q u e r i n g h u m a n i t y w h e t h e r this t o o k place w i t h o r against ves
tiges o f Christianity). It is d u e to t h e fact that it is n o l o n g e r possible to i d e n
tify either a city that w o u l d b e " T h e C i t y " a s R o m e was for so l o n g o r an
o r b that w o u l d provide the c o n t o u r o f a w o r l d e x t e n d e d a r o u n d this city. E v e n
worse, it is n o l o n g e r possible to identify either the city o r the o r b o f the w o r l d
in general. T h e city spreads a n d extends all t h e way to the p o i n t w h e r e , w h i l e
it tends to cover t h e entire o r b o f the planet, it loses its properties as a city, and,
o f course w i t h t h e m , those properties that w o u l d allow it to be distinguished
from a "country." T h a t w h i c h extends in this way is n o l o n g e r properly
" u r b a n " e i t h e r from t h e perspective o f urbanism o r from that of u r b a n i t y
b u t megapolitical, m e t r o p o l i t a n , o r co-urbational, o r else caught in the loose
n e t o f w h a t is called t h e " u r b a n n e t w o r k . " In such a n e t w o r k , the city crowds,
the hyperbolic a c c u m u l a t i o n o f c o n s t r u c t i o n projects (with their c o n c o m i t a n t
demolition) and o f exchanges (of m o v e m e n t s , products, and
information)
spread, and t h e inequality and apartheid c o n c e r n i n g the access to the u r b a n

milieu (assuming that it is a dwelling, comfort, and culture), o r these exclusions
from the city that for a l o n g t i m e has p r o d u c e d its o w n rejections and outcasts,
accumulate proportionally. T h e result can only be u n d e r s t o o d in terms o f w h a t
is called an agglomeration, w i t h its senses o f c o n g l o m e r a t i o n , o f piling up, w i t h
the sense o f a c c u m u l a t i o n that, o n the o n e h a n d , simply concentrates (in a few
n e i g h b o r h o o d s , in a few houses, s o m e t i m e s in a few protected mini-cities) the
w e l l - b e i n g that used to b e u r b a n o r civil, w h i l e o n the o t h e r hand, proliferates
w h a t bears t h e quite simple a n d unmerciful n a m e of misery.
T h i s n e t w o r k cast u p o n the p l a n e t a n d already a r o u n d it, in t h e orbital
b a n d o f satellites along w i t h their d e b r i s d e f o r m s the orbis as m u c h as the urbs.
T h e agglomeration invades and erodes w h a t used to b e t h o u g h t o f as globe and
33
Globalization
w h i c h is n o t h i n g m o r e n o w than its double, glomus. In such a glomus, w e see the

c o n j u n c t i o n o f an indefinite g r o w t h of t e c h n o - s c i e n c e , o f a correlative e x p o
nential g r o w t h of populations, o f a w o r s e n i n g o f inequalities o f all sorts w i t h i n
these p o p u l a t i o n s e c o n o m i c , biological, a n d c u l t u r a l a n d o f a dissipation o f
t h e certainties, images, a n d identities o f w h a t the w o r l d was w i t h its parts a n d
h u m a n i t y w i t h its characteristics.
T h e civilization that has represented the universal a n d reasonalso k n o w n
as t h e W e s t c a n n o t even e n c o u n t e r a n d recognize any l o n g e r the relativity o f
its n o r m s a n d the d o u b t o n its o w n certainty: this was already its situation t w o
centuries ago. (Hegel w r o t e in 1802: " [ T ] h e increasing range o f acquaintance
w i t h alien peoples u n d e r the pressure o f natural necessity; as, for example,
b e c o m i n g acquainted w i t h a n e w c o n t i n e n t , h a d this skeptical effect u p o n the
dogmatic c o m m o n sense o f the E u r o p e a n s d o w n to that time, and u p o n their
indubitable certainty a b o u t a mass o f concepts c o n c e r n i n g right a n d truth.")
T h i s skepticism, in w h i c h H e g e l saw the fecundity o f t h e destabilization o f

dogmatisms today, n o l o n g e r harbors the resource of a future w h o s e dialectic
w o u l d advance reason farther, ahead or forward, toward a t r u t h a n d a m e a n i n g
o f the world. O n the contrary, it is in the same stroke that the confidence in
historical progress weakened, the convergence of k n o w l e d g e , ethics, a n d social
w e l l - b e i n g dissipated, and the d o m i n a t i o n o f an e m p i r e m a d e u p o f t e c h n o
logical p o w e r a n d p u r e e c o n o m i c reason asserted itself.
T h e West has c o m e to encompass the world, a n d i n this m o v e m e n t it dis
appears as w h a t was supposed to o r i e n t the course o f this world. For all that,
up until now, o n e c a n n o t say that any o t h e r configuration o f the w o r l d or any
o t h e r philosophy o f the universal a n d o f reason have challenged that course.
E v e n w h e n , a n d perhaps especially w h e n o n e d e m a n d s a recourse to the "spir
itual," unless it is to the " r e v o l u t i o n " (is it so different?), the d e m a n d betrays
itself as an e m p t y wish, having lost all pretense o f effective capacity, or else as a
shameful escapeand even w h e n it does n o t appear as a s u p p l e m e n t a r y m e a n s
of exploiting the conditions created by t h e e c o n o m i c a n d technological
exploitation. (To take w h a t is "positive" o f t h e West a n d to infuse it w i t h s o m e
t h i n g n e w " v a l u e s " o n the basis of an African, Buddhist, Islamic,Taoist, p e r
haps supra-Christian o r s u p r a - c o m m u n i s t soul, such has b e e n for a l o n g time
the sterile t h e m e of m a n y a dissertation . . . ) .
T h e world has lost its capacity to "form a w o r l d " [faire monde]: it seems only
to have gained that capacity o f proliferating, to the extent o f its means, the " u n 2
w o r l d " [immonde], which, until now, a n d whatever o n e m a y think of retrospective

illusions, has never in history impacted the totality of the orb to such an extent.
In the end, everything takes place as if the world affected and permeated itself w i t h
a death drive that soon w o u l d have n o t h i n g else to destroy than the world itself.
34
Urbi et Orbi
It is n o t a question o f " w e i g h i n g i n " for o r leaning toward either the
destruction o r t h e salvation. For w e d o n o t even k n o w w h a t either can signify:
n e i t h e r w h a t a n o t h e r civilization o r a n o t h e r savagery arising o u t o f the ruins
o f t h e West m i g h t be, n o r w h a t could b e "safe/saved" w h e n there is n o space
outside o f t h e e p i d e m i c (in this respect, A I D S is an exemplary case, as are c e r
tain epizootic diseases o n a n o t h e r level: t h e scale o f t h e world, o f its t e c h n o l o
gies and o f its habitus, brings t h e terror o f t h e plagues o f t h e past to i n c o m
mensurable heights).
T h e fact that t h e w o r l d is destroying itself is n o t a hypothesis: it is in a sense
the fact from w h i c h any t h i n k i n g o f t h e w o r l d follows, to t h e point, however,
that w e d o n o t exacdy k n o w w h a t " t o destroy" means, n o r w h i c h w o r l d is
destroying itself. Perhaps only o n e t h i n g remains, that is to say, o n e t h o u g h t
w i t h s o m e certainty: w h a t is taking place is really h a p p e n i n g , w h i c h m e a n s that
it happens a n d h a p p e n s t o us in this way m o r e than a history, even m o r e than
an event. It is as if b e i n g itselfin w h a t e v e r sense o n e understands it, as exis
tence o r as substancesurprised us from an u n n a m a b l e b e y o n d . It is, in fact,
the ambivalence o f the u n n a m a b l e that makes us anxious: a b e y o n d for w h i c h
n o alterity can give us t h e slightest analogy.
It is thus n o t only a question o f b e i n g ready for the e v e n t a l t h o u g h this
is also a necessary c o n d i t i o n o f t h o u g h t , today as always. It is a question o f o w n
ing u p to t h e present, i n c l u d i n g its very w i t h h o l d i n g o f t h e event, including its
strange absence o f presence: w e m u s t ask a n e w w h a t the w o r l d wants o f us, and
w h a t w e w a n t o f it, e v e r y w h e r e , in all senses, urbi et orbi, all over the w o r l d and
3
for t h e w h o l e w o r l d , w i t h o u t (the) capital o f t h e w o r l d b u t w i t h t h e richness

o f t h e world.
Let us b e g i n w i t h a lengthy citation to w h i c h w e must give o u r sustained
attention:
In history up to the present it is certainly an empirical fact that separate indi
viduals have, with the broadening of their activity into world-historical activ
ity, become more and more enslaved under a power alien to them (a pressure
which they have conceived of as a dirty trick on the part of the so-called
world spirit [Weltgeist], etc.), a power which has become more and more enor
mous and, in the last instance, turns out to be the world market. But it is just
as empirically established that, by the overthrow of the existing state of soci
ety by the communist revolution (of which more below) and the abolition of
private property which is identical with it, this power, which so baffles the
German theoreticians, will be dissolved; and that then the liberation of each
single individual will be accomplished in the measure in which history
becomes transformed into world history. From the above it is clear that the
35
Globalization
real intellectual wealth of the individual depends entirely on the wealth of his
real connections. Only then will the separate individuals be liberated from the
various national and local barriers, be brought into practical connection with
the material and intellectual production of the whole world and be put in a
position to acquire the capacity to enjoy this all-sided production of the
whole earth (the creation of man).
T h i s text from The German Ideology dates from the time that is considered, n o t
w i t h o u t reason, as that o f the " e a r l y " M a r x : h e nevertheless formulates w h a t was
his conviction to the e n d according to w h i c h " c o m m u n i s m " is n o t h i n g o t h e r
than the actual m o v e m e n t o f w o r l d history insofar as it b e c o m e s global a n d
thus renders possible, a n d perhaps necessary, the passage to consciousness a n d
enjoyment o f h u m a n creation in its entirety by all h u m a n beings. H u m a n
beings w o u l d henceforth b e freed from w h a t limited the relation in w h i c h they
mutually p r o d u c e themselves as spirit a n d as body. In o t h e r words, it was his
conviction that h u m a n i t y is defined b y the fact that it produces itself as a
whole-not in general, b u t according to t h e c o n c r e t e existence of each, a n d
n o t in the e n d only h u m a n s , b u t w i t h t h e m the rest o f nature. This, for M a r x ,
is t h e world: that o f the m a r k e t m e t a m o r p h o s i n g itself o r revolutionalizing itself
in reciprocal a n d m u t u a l creation. W h a t M a r x will define later as "individual
property," that is to say, neither private n o r collective, will have to b e precisely
the property o r t h e p r o p e r o f each as b o t h created a n d creator w i t h i n this shar
ing o f "real relations."
T h u s , for M a r x , globalization a n d t h e d o m i n a t i o n o f capital converge in a
revolution that inverts the direction [sens] o f d o m i n a t i o n b u t w h i c h can d o
so precisely because the global d e v e l o p m e n t o f the m a r k e t t h e i n s t r u m e n t
and the field o f play of capitalcreates in a n d o f itself the possibility o f reveal
ing the real c o n n e c t i o n b e t w e e n existences as their real sense. T h e c o m m o d i t y
form, w h i c h is the fetishized f o r m o f value, must dissolve itself, sublimate or
destroy itselfin any case revolutionize itself, w h a t e v e r its exact c o n c e p t i n
its t r u e form, w h i c h is n o t only t h e creation o f value b u t value as creation.Transcribed in terms closer to o u r c u r r e n t linguistic usage (if w e retain t h e distinc
tion
of senses b e t w e e n "globalization" [globalisation]
[mondialisation]a
and "world-forming"
distinction that s o m e t i m e s in France in particular e n c o m
passes t w o usages o f the same w o r d mondialisationthese
semantic c o m p l e x i
ties are the indicators of w h a t is at stake): globalization makes w o r l d - f o r m i n g

possible, by way o f a reversal o f global d o m i n a t i o n consisting in the e x t o r t i o n
of w o r k , that is, of its value, therefore o f value, absolutely. B u t if globalization
has thus a necessitythe necessity that M a r x designated as the "historical p e r
f o r m a n c e " o f capital a n d that consists in n o t h i n g o t h e r than t h e creation by the
36
Urbi et Orbi
m a r k e t o f the global d i m e n s i o n as s u c h i t is because, t h r o u g h t h e i n t e r d e p e n
d e n c e of the e x c h a n g e o f value in its m e r c h a n d i s e - f o r m ( w h i c h is t h e form o f
general equivalency, m o n e y ) , the i n t e r c o n n e c t i o n o f everyone in the p r o d u c
tion o f h u m a n i t y as such c o m e s i n t o view.
If I m a y focus even m o r e o n this p o i n t : c o m m e r c e engenders c o m m u n i
cation, w h i c h requires c o m m u n i t y , c o m m u n i s m . O r : h u m a n beings create the
w o r l d , w h i c h p r o d u c e s t h e h u m a n , w h i c h creates itself as absolute value and
e n j o y m e n t [jouissance] o f that value.
C o n s e q u e n d y , the " c o m m u n i s t r e v o l u t i o n " is n o t h i n g o t h e r than the
accession o f this global c o n n e c t i o n to consciousness and t h r o u g h it t h e libera
tion o f value as t h e real value o f o u r c o m m o n p r o d u c t i o n . It is t h e b e c o m i n g conscious and t h e mastery in act o f t h e self-production o f h u m a n beings in the
twofold sense o f t h e p r o d u c t i o n o f h u m a n quality ("total humanity," free p r o
d u c e r o f freedom itself) and o f t h e p r o d u c t i o n o f each by the others, all by each
a n d each by all ("total humanity," as circulation o f value freed from equivalence,
circulation o f t h e value that responds to t h e h u m a n b e i n g itself, each time sin
gular, and perhaps also t o others, o r t o all o t h e r existents as singular).
Certainly, each o f t h e determinative concepts o f this interpretation o f the
history o f the w o r l d appears to us today as w h a t w e k n o w to b e its fragility:
process, consciousness, t h e possibility o f u n c o v e r i n g a value a n d an end in itself.
W e could n o t e that these concepts are n o t those u p o n w h i c h M a r x constructs
his a r g u m e n t explicidy: they rather s u b t e n d his a r g u m e n t . B u t w h a t diminishes
their role also reveals their u n c o n t r o l l e d and h i d d e n presence. W h a t e v e r the
case, s o m e t h i n g remains nonetheless, in spite o f everything, s o m e t h i n g resists
a n d insists: there remains, o n t h e o n e h a n d , precisely w h a t happens to us and
sweeps over us b y t h e n a m e o f "globalization," namely, the exponential g r o w t h
o f the globality (dare w e say glomicity) o f the m a r k e t o f the circulation of
everything in t h e f o r m of c o m m o d i t y a n d w i t h it of t h e increasingly c o n
centrated i n t e r d e p e n d e n c e that ceaselessly weakens independencies a n d sover
eignties, thus w e a k e n i n g an entire o r d e r o f representations o f b e l o n g i n g
( r e o p e n i n g t h e question o f the " p r o p e r " and o f "identity"); a n d there remains,
o n t h e o t h e r h a n d , t h e fact that t h e e x p e r i e n c e u n d e r g o n e since M a r x has
increasingly b e e n the e x p e r i e n c e that t h e place o f m e a n i n g , o f value, and o f
t r u t h is t h e world. W h o e v e r speaks o f " t h e w o r l d " r e n o u n c e s any appeal to
" a n o t h e r w o r l d " o r a " b e y o n d - t h e - w o r l d " [outre-monde]. " W o r l d - f o r m i n g " also
m e a n s , as it does in this text from M a r x , that it is in " t h i s " world, o r as " t h i s "
world'and thus as the world, absolutelythat w h a t M a r x calls p r o d u c t i o n
a n d / o r the creation o f humanity, is b e i n g played o u t / '
O u r difference w i t h h i m nonetheless reappears o n this very point: w i t h
h i m , " h u m a n " implicidy remains a teleological o r eschatological t e r m , if w e
37
The Creation of the World or
Globalization
understand by that a logic w h e r e t h e telos a n d / o r the eschaton take the position

and the role o f an a c c o m p l i s h m e n t w i t h o u t remainder. For M a r x , the h u m a n
being, as source and a c c o m p l i s h m e n t o f value in itself, c o m e s at the e n d o f his
tory w h e n it produces itself: the source must therefore e n d entirely spread o u t
and accomplished. For us, o n the contrary, " t h e h u m a n b e i n g " is reduced to a
given principle, relatively abstract ("person," "dignity") and as such distinct
from an actual creation. In t r u t h , it is t h e figure o f " t h e h u m a n b e i n g " and w i t h
it the configuration o f " h u m a n i s m " that are erased o r blurred w h i l e w e have, at
the same time, the m o s t compelling reasons n o t to replace t h e m w i t h (the fig
ures of) " t h e o v e r m a n " o r " G o d . "
It is, however, n o t certain that w i t h M a r x the teleo-eschatological logic is
so stricdy geared toward the a c c o m p l i s h m e n t of a final value. In a sense, it is
even the d e t e r m i n a t i o n o f such a finality that remains lacking in M a r x (if the
absence o f a finality is a lack at all . . . ) a n d this is perhaps w h a t p r o d u c e d all
sorts o f m y t h - p r o d u c i n g interpretations. In Marx's entire text, n o t h i n g d e t e r
mines, in the end, any a c c o m p l i s h m e n t except as, essentially o p e n a n d w i t h o u t
end, a freedom ("free labor") and a "private p r o p e r t y " (that w h i c h is p r o p e r to
each in the exchange o f all). B u t w h a t , since M a r x , has nonetheless r e m a i n e d
unresolved [en souffrance]and w e k n o w w h a t "suffering" m e a n s hereis p r e
cisely the grasping o f a concrete w o r l d that w o u l d be, properly speaking, the
w o r l d of the p r o p e r freedom and singularity o f each a n d o f all w i t h o u t claim
to a w o r l d b e y o n d - t h e - w o r l d or to a surplus-property (in a n o t h e r capital).
Q u i t e to the contrary, the w o r l d w h i c h , for M a r x , could be the space o f the
play of freedom and o f its c o m m o n / s i n g u l a r a p p r o p r i a t i o n t h e infinity in act
o f p r o p e r e n d s o n l y appears to us as a bad infinite, if n o t as the i m m i n e n c e o f
a finishing that w o u l d be the implosion o f t h e w o r l d and o f all of us in it.
A t this point, it is necessary to clarify the nature o f absolute value in itself:
the o n e that M a r x designates as " v a l u e " p u r e and simple, n o t a use-value o f
w h i c h exchange-value
exploitation.
is t h e p h e n o m e n a l
mask and social e x t o r t i o n
or
M u c h attention is usually given to " c o m m o d i t y fetish," the c o n c e p t a n d / o r

representation o f w h i c h are certainly i m p o r t a n t ; b u t this also risks fetishizing
this "fetishism" and risks m a k i n g it the o p e n secret o f c o m m o d i t y . N o w w e
must distinguish t w o perspectives: the first is that o f the p h e n o m e n a l i t y o f value
(of " m e a n i n g " o r o f " t h e h u m a n " ) , a p h e n o m e n a l i t y that t h e "fetish" can m a k e
us forget (by r e d u c i n g it to a religious mystification)" that it probably pertains
to a general law according to w h i c h value o r m e a n i n g can o n l y be ( r e p r e
sented,' even if n o t stricdy speaking "fetishized." T h e o t h e r perspectivethe
only o n e I will consider hereis the o n e that m u s t consider value as such, t h e
" t h i n g in itself" b e h i n d the p h e n o m e n o n . '
38
Urbi et Orbi
Absolute value is, in fact, h u m a n i t y i n c o r p o r a t e d in the p r o d u c t t h r o u g h
w o r k as h u m a n w o r k . It is thus h u m a n i t y p r o d u c i n g itself by p r o d u c i n g
objects (or, I will r e t u r n to this, creating itself by p r o d u c i n g ) . " B u t w h a t is
h u m a n i t y ? W h a t is t h e w o r l d as t h e p r o d u c t of human beings, a n d w h a t is t h e
h u m a n b e i n g insofar as it is in the world a n d as it works this world? W h a t is the
"spiritual r i c h n e s s " o f w h i c h M a r x speaks, w h i c h is n o t h i n g o t h e r than t h e
value o r m e a n i n g o f h u m a n labor as h u m a n , that is t o say, also, "free," b u t free
to t h e e x t e n t that it is t o itself its o w n e n d a n d that therefore it is n e i t h e r value
m e a s u r e d a c c o r d i n g t o its use n o r value giving itself as general equivalency (/(
too is its own end, b u t abstract a n d formal, a finality for itself...)?
that is n e i t h e r
finalized
W h a t is a value
n o r simply equivalent t o itself? W h a t is a " h u m a n
v a l u e " toward w h i c h t h e w o r k refers, o r w h o s e trace it bears, w i t h o u t h o w

ever signifying it and w i t h o u t c o v e r i n g it w i t h a mystical veil? (This question,
w e n o t e , a m o u n t s to asking: W h a t is h u m a n value considered at a level b e y o n d
t h e reach o f " h u m a n i s m " ? ) . '
Perhaps by c o n s i d e r i n g its inverted figures o n e can approach this value. O n

S e p t e m b e r 1 1 , 2 0 0 1 , w e witnessed t h e collision, in the s y m p t o m and symbol o f
the clash, b e t w e e n t h e U n i t e d States (summarized in t h e n a m e , heavy w i t h
m e a n i n g , o f " W o r l d Trade C e n t e r " ) and Islamic fanaticism, t w o
figures
of
absolute value that are a l s o n o t s u r p r i s i n g l y t w o figures o f m o n o t h e i s m . O n

t h e o n e hand, the G o d w h o s e n a m e is inscribed o n the dollar, and o n the other,
t h e G o d in w h o s e n a m e o n e declares a " h o l y war." O f course, b o t h G o d s are
instrumentalized. B u t I neglect here t h e e x a m i n a t i o n o f the instrumental logic
that is latent, at least, i n every religion. It remains that these t w o figures p r o c e e d
from t h e same u n i q u e G o d (or from t h e same O n e taken as G o d ) and expose
t h e enigmatic sameness o f t h e O n e that is, n o d o u b t , always self-destructive: b u t
self-destruction is a c c o m p a n i e d b y self-exaltation and an over-essentialization.
Let us keep in m i n d in any case that these t w o figures present absolute value
as ail-powerfulness and as all-presence o f this ail-powerfulness. Value is therefore
first itself instrumentalized therein: it serves the reproduction o f its o w n power,
indefinitely, t h r o u g h spiritual o r m o n e t a r y capitalization.Value has value t h r o u g h
this endless autistic process, and this infinite has n o o t h e r act than the r e p r o d u c
tion o f its potentiality (thus in b o t h senses o f t h e word, p o w e r and potentiality).
T h e "bad infinite," following Hegel, is i n d e e d the o n e that cannot be actual." O n
the contrary, the e n j o y m e n t o f w h i c h M a r x speaks, implies, as for any enjoy
m e n t , its actuality, that is to say, also the finite inscription o f its infinity. It is n o t
p o w e r that wills power, n o r presence that insists in itself, b u t the suspension o f
. will, the withdrawal, if n o t the fault, that marks enjoyment as enjoyment o f a
t r u t h o r of a sense, o f a "spiritual w e a l t h " o r a " b e a t i t u d e " in Spinoza's sense (that
is to say, as an exercise, as t h e act o f a relation to the totality o f m e a n i n g or truth).
39
Globalization
P o w e r founds itself o n itself as if o n a reason that is always sufficient w i t h

respect to its exercise, even if destructive and self-destructive. E n j o y m e n t does
n o t give an a c c o u n t of itself. It is in this actuality w i t h o u t reason or e n d (no
d o u b t the "free labor" o f w h i c h M a r x spoke) that value can b e i n c o m m e n s u
rable, unable to b e evaluated, to the p o i n t o f n o l o n g e r b e i n g a " v a l u e " and
b e c o m i n g w h a t t h e G e r m a n calls Wiirde, b e y o n d the Wert, and w h i c h w e trans
late as "dignity."
T h e question posed by the world in formation is this o n e : h o w to d o justice
to the infinite in act, of w h i c h infinite potentiality is the exact reverse?
W h e n the bad infinite appears to b e clearly w i t h o u t end, completely
u n b o u n d (having rid itself o f its teleological h u m a n i s m ) , t h e n this question
imposes itself, stark and blinding.To reverse an infinite i n t o another, and p o t e n
tiality into act, is w h a t M a r x calls "revolution." It is necessary, in the end, that
the w o r l d has absolute value for itselfor else that it has n o value whatsoever,
as t h e two forms o f all-powerfulness, w h i c h have n o t h i n g b u t c o n t e m p t for the
world, indicate. It is in the e n d necessary that the infinite reason that gives an
a c c o u n t o f itself allows the actual w i t h o u t - r e a s o n (or actual existence) to
a p p e a r o r that it liquidates itself in its disastrously i n t e r m i n a b l e process.
O n e may assume that the p r o b l e m o f t h e a p p r e h e n d i n g o f the w o r l d (of
its absolute value) is posed in the following way: the w o r l d takes place, it h a p
pens, and everything seems as if w e did n o t k n o w h o w to a p p r e h e n d it. It is o u r
p r o d u c t i o n and o u r alienation. It is n o t an accident if, since M a r x , the " w o r l d "
and t h e " w o r l d l y " [le mondial] have r e m a i n e d u n c e r t a i n d e t e r m i n a t i o n s , overly
suspended b e t w e e n the finite a n d t h e infinite, b e t w e e n a n e w and f o r m e r
world, b e t w e e n this world and an o t h e r : in short, o n e may assume that the
" w o r l d " has fallen short o f w h a t it should be, o f w h a t it can be, perhaps of w h a t
it already is, in s o m e way that w e have n o t yet d e t e r m i n e d . A n d it is probably
d u e as well to the fact that " t h e w o r l d " has b e e n secondary to the c o n c e p t of
a w o r l d " v i e w " (it was n o accident that a Weltanschauung played by accident a
major political and ideological role in Nazism). It is as if there was an intimate
c o n n e c t i o n b e t w e e n capitalistic d e v e l o p m e n t and the capitalization o f views o r
pictures o f t h e w o r l d (nature + history + progress + consciousness, etc.all
" v i e w s " gathered in a picture w h o s e c o m p o s i t i o n h e n c e f o r t h is b l u r r e d and
runs o n the canvas).
A w o r l d "viewed," a represented w o r l d , is a w o r l d d e p e n d e n t o n the gaze
of a subject o f t h e w o r l d [sujet du monde].A
subject o f the w o r l d (that is to say
as well a subject o f history) c a n n o t itself b e w i t h i n the w o r l d [etre dans le monde].

Even w i t h o u t a religious representation, such a subject, implicit o r explicit, p e r
petuates the position of the creating, organizing, a n d addressing G o d (if n o t the
addressee) of the world.
40
Urbi et Orbi
A n d yet, remarkably, there is n o n e e d o f a prolonged study to notice that,
already in the most classical metaphysical representations o f that G o d , n o t h i n g
else was at stake, in t h e end, than the world itself, in itself and for itself. In m o r e
than o n e respect, it is legitimate to say that the great transcendent accounts of
rationalism elaborated n o t h i n g else than the i m m a n e n t relation o f the world to
itself: they questioned the b e i n g - w o r l d o f the world. I only ask, in passing, that
o n e reflect o n the sense of "continual creation" in Descartes, o n that of Spinoza's
Dens sive natura, o n the "vision in G o d " in Malebranche o r o n the " m o n a d o f
m o n a d s " w i t h Leibniz. It w o u l d n o t b e inaccurate to say that the question o f the
w o r l d t h a t is to say, the question o f the necessity and m e a n i n g o f the w o r l d
will have formed the self-deconstruction that u n d e r m i n e s from within o n t o - t h e 1 1
ology. ' It is such a m o v e m e n t that m a d e possible, after Kant w h o was the first to
explicidy confront t h e world as such (and, in sum, did n o t h i n g else), n o t only the
entry o f the w o r l d into t h o u g h t (as an object o f vision), b u t its emergence as the
place, the dimension and actuality, o f thought: the space-time of m e a n i n g and
truth. In this respect, Marx's insistence o n the w o r l d a n insistence that e m p h a
sizes b o t h the " w o r l d w i d e " (coexistence) and the "worldly" (immanence)is
itself a decisive advance o f t h e self-deconstructive gesture. (In this respect, and
however paradoxical it may seem, it is indeed in Husserl and Heidegger that it
continued, and as well as, albeit differendy, in Bergson and Wittgenstein.)
In any case, t h e decisive feature o f t h e b e c o m i n g - w o r l d o f t h e w o r l d , as it
w e r e o r else, o f t h e b e c o m i n g - w o r l d o f t h e w h o l e that was formerly a r t i c u
lated a n d divided as t h e n a t u r e - w o r l d - G o d triadis the feature
through
w h i c h t h e w o r l d resolutely and absolutely distances itself from any status as

object in o r d e r to t e n d toward b e i n g itself t h e "subject" o f its o w n " w o r l d h o o d " o r " w o r l d - f o r m i n g . " B u t b e i n g a subject in general m e a n s having to
become oneself...
In o r d e r t o grasp o n c e m o r e w h a t is at stake in the question of the w o r l d
as it presents itself to us in this way, let us consider the question o f the c o n c e p t
in its simplest form: W h a t is a world? O r w h a t does " w o r l d " mean?
Briefly, I w o u l d say first: a w o r l d is a totality o f m e a n i n g . If I speak o f
"Debussy's world," o f " t h e hospital world," o r o f t h e " f o u r t h world," o n e grasps
immediately that o n e is speaking o f a totality, to w h i c h a certain meaningful
c o n t e n t o r a certain value system properly belongs in the order o f k n o w l e d g e
o r t h o u g h t as well as in that o f afFectivity and participation. B e l o n g i n g to such
a totality consists in sharing this c o n t e n t a n d this tonality in the sense o f " b e i n g
farniliar w i t h it," as o n e says; that is to say, o f a p p r e h e n d i n g its codes and texts,
precisely w h e n their reference points, signs, codes, and texts are neither explicit
n o r exposed as such. A world: o n e finds oneself in it [s'y trouve] and o n e is
familiar w i t h it [s'y retroiwe]; o n e can b e in it w i t h " e v e r y o n e " ["tout \e monde"],
41
Globalization
as w e say in French. A world is precisely that in w h i c h there is r o o m for every

o n e : b u t a genuine place, o n e in w h i c h things can genuinely take place (in this
world). O t h e r w i s e , this is n o t a " w o r l d " : it is a " g l o b e " o r a " g l o m e , " it is a "land
o f exile" a n d a "vale o f tears."
F r o m this brief characterization a few implications follow.
First, a w o r l d is n o t a unity o f the objective o r external order: a w o r l d is
never in front o f m e , o r else it is n o t m y world. B u t if it is absolutely other, I
w o u l d n o t even know, o r barely, that it is a world. (For instance, for m e , a few
fragments
of Hittite art d o n o t even suggest the world o f that art.) As s o o n as a
w o r l d appears to m e as a world, I already share s o m e t h i n g o f it: I share a part

o f its i n n e r resonances. Perhaps this t e r m resonance is capable o f suggesting the
issue at hand: a w o r l d is a space in w h i c h a certain tonality resonates. B u t that
tonality is n o t h i n g o t h e r than the totality of resonances that the elements, the
m o m e n t s , a n d the places o f this w o r l d e c h o , m o d u l a t e , a n d modalize. T h i s is
h o w I can recognize a short passage from B a c h o r fromVarese-but also a frag
m e n t from Proust, a drawing from Matisse, o r a C h i n e s e landscape.
(It can b e n o t e d , provisionally, that it is n o accident that art provides the
m o s t telling examples: a w o r l d perhaps always, at least potentially, shares the
unity p r o p e r to the w o r k o f art. T h a t is, unless it is the opposite, o r rather, unless
the reciprocity b e t w e e n " w o r l d " a n d " a r t " is constitutive of b o t h . T h i s also c o n
cerns the Marxist s " e n j o y m e n t " o f universal humanity.)
It follows from this that a w o r l d is a w o r l d only for those w h o inhabit it.
To inhabit is necessarily to inhabit a w o r l d , that is to say, to have there m u c h
m o r e than a place of sojourn: its place, in the strong sense o f the t e r m , as that
w h i c h allows s o m e t h i n g to properly take place. To take place is to properly
arrive a n d h a p p e n [arriver]; it is n o t to " a l m o s t " arrive and h a p p e n and it is n o t
only " a n ordinary occurrence." It is to arrive a n d h a p p e n as p r o p e r a n d to p r o p
erly arrive a n d h a p p e n to a subject. W h a t takes place takes place in a w o r l d a n d
by way o f that world. A w o r l d is the c o m m o n place o f a totality o f places: o f
presences and dispositions for possible events.
Presence and disposition: s o j o u r n and c o m p o r t m e n t , these are the senses
of the t w o G r e e k words ethos a n d ethos, w h i c h c o n t a m i n a t e each o t h e r in t h e
m o t i f of a stand, a "self-standing" that is at t h e r o o t o f all ethics. In a different
m a n n e r yet oddly analogous, the Latin t e r m s habitare a n d habitus c o m e from the
same habere, w h i c h m e a n s first " s t a n d i n g " and "self-standing," to o c c u p y a place,
and from this to possess and to have (habitudo h a d m e a n t a " m a n n e r o f relating
to . . . " ) . It is a having w i t h a sense o f being: it is a m a n n e r o f b e i n g there a n d
of standing in it. A w o r l d is an ethos, a habitus and an inhabiting: it is w h a t holds
to itself a n d in itself, following to its p r o p e r m o d e . It is a n e t w o r k of the selfreference o f this stance. In this way it resembles a s u b j e c t a n d in a way, w i t h -
42
Urbi et Orbi
o u t a d o u b t , w h a t is called a subject is each time by itself a world. B u t the m e a
sure o r the m a n n e r o f a w o r l d is n o t that o f a subject if the latter must p r e s u p
pose itself as substance o r as p r i o r s u p p o r t o f its self-reference.The w o r l d does
n o t presuppose itself: it is only coextensive to its extension as world, to the
spacing o f its places b e t w e e n w h i c h its resonances reverberate. (If a subject s u p
poses itself, it subjects itself to its supposition. It can thus only presuppose itself
as n o t subjected t o any supposition. It is still, n o d o u b t , a presupposition: thus,
precisely, w e can say as well that t h e w o r l d presupposes itself as n o t subjected
to a n y t h i n g other, a n d that is the destiny o f t h e so-called " m o d e r n " world. W e
could thus say that it presupposes itself only, b u t necessarily, as its o w n revolu
tion: t h e way it turns o n itself a n d / o r turns against itself.)
T h u s , t h e m e a n i n g o f the w o r l d does n o t o c c u r as a reference t o s o m e
t h i n g external to t h e world. It seems that m e a n i n g always refers to s o m e t h i n g
15
o t h e r than w h a t it is a m a t t e r o f giving a m e a n i n g to (as the m e a n i n g [sens] o f

the knife is in t h e c u t t i n g a n d n o t in t h e knife). B u t t h o u g h t in terms o f a
world, m e a n i n g refers to n o t h i n g o t h e r t h a n to t h e possibility o f the m e a n i n g
o f this world, to the p r o p e r m o d e o f its stance [tenue] insofar as it circulates
b e t w e e n all those w h o stand in it [s'y tiennent], each time singular and singu
larly sharing a same possibility that n o n e o f t h e m , any place o r any G o d o u t
side o f this world, accomplishes.
T h e stance o f a w o r l d is t h e e x p e r i e n c e it makes o f itself. E x p e r i e n c e (the
experiri) consists in traversing to the e n d : a w o r l d is traversed from o n e edge to
the other, a n d n o t h i n g else. It never crosses over these edges to occupy a place
overlooking itself. T i m e has passed since o n e was able to represent the figure of
a coswotheoros, an observer o f a world. A n d if this time has passed, it is because
the w o r l d is n o l o n g e r conceived o f as a representation. A representation o f the
w o r l d , a worldview, m e a n s t h e assigning o f a principle a n d an e n d to t h e world.
T h i s a m o u n t s to saying that a w o r l d v i e w is i n d e e d the e n d o f the w o r l d as
viewed, digested, absorbed, a n d dissolved in this vision. T h e N a z i
Weltanschau
ung a t t e m p t e d to answer to absence o f a cosmotheoros. A n d this is also w h y H e i

degger in 1 9 3 8 , t u r n i n g against this N a z i s m , exposed the e n d o f the age o f the
Weltbilderimages
o r pictures o f t h e world."'
T h e w o r l d is thus outside representation, outside its representation and o f

a w o r l d o f representation, a n d this is how, n o d o u b t , o n e reaches t h e most c o n
t e m p o r a r y d e t e r m i n a t i o n o f the w o r l d . Already w i t h M a r x , there was an exit
from representation that was prescribed by t h e w o r l d as t h e unfolding o f a p r o
d u c t i o n o f m e n b y themselves (even if, w i t h M a r x , this p r o d u c t i o n retains fea
tures o f representation).
A w o r l d outside o f representation is above aE a w o r l d w i t h o u t a G o d capa
ble o f b e i n g t h e subject o f its representation (and thus of its fabrication, o f its
43
Globalization
m a i n t e n a n c e and destination). B u t already, as I indicated, the G o d o f m e t a

physics m e r g e d into a world. M o r e precisely, t h e " G o d " o f o n t o - t h e o l o g y was
progressively stripped of the divine attributes o f an i n d e p e n d e n t existence a n d
only retained those of the existence of the w o r l d considered in its i m m a n e n c e ,
that is to say, also in the undecidable a m p h i b o l o g y o f an existence as necessary
as it is contingent. Let us recall, for instance, Spinoza's G o d , t h e " i m m a n e n t
cause of the world," or Leibniz's G o d , w h i c h created " t h e best o f all possible
worlds," that is to say, was limited to b e i n g a reason internal to t h e general order
o f things. T h e G o d o f o n t o - t h e o l o g y has p r o d u c e d itself (or deconstructed
itself) as subject o f the world, that is, as world-subject. In so d o i n g , it suppressed
itself as G o d - S u p r e m e - B e i n g and transformed itself, losing itself therein, in the
existence for-itself o f the w o r l d w i t h o u t an outside (neither outside of t h e
w o r l d n o r a world from the o u t s i d e ) . T h e speculative Weltgeist m o c k e d by M a r x
b e c o m e s a n d b e c o m e s w i t h M a r x himselfWelt-Geist
o r Geist-Welt:
no
l o n g e r "spirit o f w o r l d " b u t rather world-spirit o r spirit-world.

F r o m this very fact, the existence o f the w o r l d was at stake as absolute exis
tence: its necessity o r its contingency, its totality o r incompleteness, b e c a m e t h e
inadequate terms o f a problem, a p r o b l e m that God's disappearance transformed
completely. Correlatively, b e i n g " i n " [dans] the w o r l d could n o longer follow a
container topology, any m o r e than the w o r l d itself was found " w i t h i n " s o m e
t h i n g o t h e r than itself. This is h o w b e i n g - w i t h i n - t h e - w o r l d
has b e c o m e b e i n g - i n - t h e - w o r l d [etre-au-monde].Thi$
[etre-dans-le-monde]
preposition an [in] r e p r e
sents, in French, w h a t encapsulates the p r o b l e m of the world.

To b e m o r e precise, o n e should add: " w o r l d - f o r m i n g " [mondialisation] was
preceded
by
a "world-becoming"
[mondanisation].
This
means
that
the
" w o r l d l y " w o r l d o f Christianity, t h e w o r l d as created and fallen, removed from

salvation and called to self-transfiguration, had to b e c o m e t h e site o f b e i n g
a n d / o r beings as a w h o l e , r e d u c i n g the o t h e r w o r l d therein. B u t , as w e will see,
it is from the feature o f " c r e a t i o n " that an inscription is thus transmitted to t h e
global w o r l d w h i l e the internal d e m a n d o f a transfiguration is transferred to
the " w o r l d l y " world. For the m o m e n t , w e could say: w o r l d - b e c o m i n g engages
a displacement o f value, and w o r l d - f o r m i n g a displacement o f p r o d u c t i o n . B u t
n e i t h e r aspect of the process is a m e r e "secularization" o f the theological: it is
c o m p l e t e displacement o f the stakes. T h e w o r l d does n o t replay the roles o f t h e
theological script for its o w n p u r p o s e : it displaces everything in a n o t h e r script,
w h i c h precisely lacks a scene that is given or laid o u t in a d v a n c e . "
This brief metaphysical excursus only has a very specific function here:
that o f s h o w i n g that " t h e world," in o u r philosophical tradition, has c o m e t o b e
identified firsdy w i t h the totality o f beings that l o n g e r refers logically to any
o t h e r b e i n g (to n o o t h e r world: for a G o d distinct from the w o r l d w o u l d be
44
Urbi et Orbi
a n o t h e r world), and secondly, identified w i t h the question, enigma o r the m y s
tery o f the raison d'etre o f such a totality. If it is necessary w i t h o u t b e i n g the
effect o f a superior reason (or will), w h a t is that necessity? B u t if it is n o t n e c e s
sitated by anything, isn't it t h e n c o n t i n g e n t ? a n d in this case w h e r e does the
fortuitous errancy o f this existence go?
A n d if o u r w o r l d is neither necessary n o r contingent, o r if it is b o t h at once,
1
w h a t does that mean? M o r e generally, h o w does o n e disentangle oneself from

this conceptual couple? Perhaps b y considering a fact w i t h o u t referring it to a
cause (neither efficient n o r final).The w o r l d is such a fact: it may well be that it
is t h e only fact o f this k i n d (if it is the case that the o t h e r facts take place w i t h i n
the world). It is a fact w i t h o u t reason or end, and it is o u r fact.To think it, is to
think this factuality, w h i c h implies n o t referring it to a m e a n i n g capable o f
appropriating it, b u t to placing in it, in its t r u t h as a fact, all possible m e a n i n g .
Marx's text cited earlier can b e replaced w i t h i n the h o r i z o n of this p r o b
lematics in several ways. It is first possible to see in these lines the reflection o f
a sort o f inverted o n t o - t h e o l o g y , w h e r e t h e i m m a n e n t cause o f a world exist
i n g in itself eternally (like t h e m a t t e r of/from w h i c h it is m a d e : o n e should l o o k
h e r e at Marx's studies o n E p i c u r e a n materialism) is the p r o d u c t i o n o f h u m a n
ity itself represented as t h e final and total a c c o m p l i s h m e n t o f self-production
(total m a n w o u l d almost b e the accomplished self-production o f m a t t e r as the
c o n d i t i o n and force o f p r o d u c t i o n ) . B u t it is also possibleand it is even in
s o m e respect necessaryto interpret it differendy: indeed, if the p r o d u c t i o n o f
total h u m a n i t y t h a t is, global humanity, o r the p r o d u c t i o n o f the h u m a n i z e d
w o r l d i s n o t h i n g o t h e r t h a n t h e p r o d u c t i o n o f the "sphere o f freedom," a
freedom that has n o o t h e r exercise t h a n t h e " e n j o y m e n t o f the m u l t i m o r p h i c
p r o d u c t i o n o f the entire world," t h e n this final p r o d u c t i o n d e t e r m i n e s n o g e n
u i n e end, n o r telos o r eschaton. It is i n d e e d n o t d e t e r m i n e d by the self-concep
t i o n o f h u m a n i t y and o f world, b u t rather by a b e y o n d o f p r o d u c t i o n itself, here
named "enjoyment."
E n j o y m e n t i n w h a t e v e r way o n e wants to understand it, and w h e t h e r
o n e stresses a sexual c o n n o t a t i o n (by b o r r o w i n g from a Lacanian problematic
o f t h e "real," if y o u will, s o m e t h i n g I d o n o t w a n t to explore further here) o r
by stressing the S p i n o z i s t i joy, o r mystical " u n i o n " (are these t w o senses that
different? It is n o t certain . . . ) e n j o y m e n t , therefore, is w h a t (if it " i s " and if it
1
is " s o m e t h i n g " ) " maintains itself b e y o n d either having o r b e i n g in the same

way that it unfolds b e y o n d o r before activity and passivity.
B y identifying this e n j o y m e n t o f the global p r o d u c t i o n o f humanity, M a r x
. indicates an excess w i t h respect t o p r o d u c t i o n as well as w i t h respect to p o s
session (and this is perhaps that very t h i n g w h i c h h e tried to call later " i n d i
vidual property," o n c e again, n e i t h e r private n o r collective). N o t e a troubling
45
Globalization
circumstance-that such an excess o f e n j o y m e n t (and e n j o y m e n t is excessive or

it is n o t enjoyment) constitutes s o m e t h i n g like the exact parallel o f profit that
is the law o f capital, b u t a parallel that inverts the sign o f surplus-production.
This is the case in the sense that the e x t o r t i o n o f surplus-value profits from the
value created by t h e w o r k to deposit it in the a c c o u n t o f t h e a c c u m u l a t i o n in
general equivalency (according to t h e law of an indefinite addition, the p r i n c i
ple o f w h i c h is also excessive, b u t an excess w h o s e raison d'etre is accumulation,
t h e e n d / g o a l b e i n g to indefinitely r e p r o d u c e t h e cycle o f p r o d u c t i o n and alien
ation). In that sense e n j o y m e n t w o u l d b e shared a p p r o p r i a t i o n o r appropriat
ing s h a r i n g o f w h a t c a n n o t be accumulated o r w h a t is n o t equivalent, that is,
o f value itself (or o f meaning) in t h e singularity o f its creation. B u t sharing sin
gularity (always plural) means to configure a w o r l d , a quantity of possible
worlds in the world. T h i s configuration (features, tones, m o d e s , contacts, etc.)
allows the singularities to expose themselves.
T h e e x t o r t i o n o r the exposition o f each to the others: the most i m p o r t a n t
is n o t to say, " H e r e is the decisive alternative!" (which w e already k n o w ) . W h a t
matters is to be able to think h o w t h e proximity o f the two " e x - , " o r this twofold
excess is produced, h o w the same w o r l d is divided in this way.
In a way, profit and e n j o y m e n t thus placed back to back behave like t w o
sides of the infinite: o n the o n e h a n d , the infinite that H e g e l called "bad," the
infinite o f the i n t e r m i n a b l e g r o w t h o f accumulation, t h e cycle of investment,
o f exploitation and reinvestment (one could say that it is the cycle of infinite
wealth as it b e g a n w h e n the w o r l d , b e c o m i n g precapitalistic, c a m e o u t o f t h e
order in w h i c h wealth was a c c u m u l a t e d for its shine rather than for its r e p r o
duction),
19
o n the o t h e r h a n d the actual infinite, t h e o n e by w h i c h a finite exis
tence accedes, as finite, to the infinite o f a m e a n i n g o r o f a value that is its m o s t

p r o p e r m e a n i n g and value.
I d o n o t at all find it unreasonable to say that this perspective, w h i c h can
s e e m perfecdy abstract o r idealistic, distant from harsh reality, is precisely w h a t
w o u l d be capable o f diagnosing that w h i c h secredy drives o u r w o r l d insofar as
it seems surrendered to an infinitely u n r u l y unleashing o f appetites o f enjoy
m e n t : s o m e m o v e d by t h e drive o f e x p o n e n t i a l accumulation, others provoked
by t h e strategies of p r o d u c t i o n that are subjugated to this drive. U n d e r the
u n r u l y unleashing o f the bad infinite (an u n r u l y unleashing r i g h d y called
" d e r e g u l a t i o n " in
free-market
thinking!) that regulates itself according to the
indefinite as such, there is a secret desire for t h e actual infinite: a desire for
absolute value. N o w it is manifestit is even w h a t c u r r e n t times render each
day m o r e manifestthat n o abstract value, n o equivalence n o r any given r e p
resentation o f h u m a n beings o r of w o r l d (or o f a n o t h e r world), can satisfy this
expectation. O n e does n o t enjoy the h u m a n b e i n g of h u m a n i s m , or, if y o u p r e -
46
Urbi et Orbi
fer, the h u m a n b e i n g o f h u m a n i s m does n o t have j o y : it is par excellence the
h u m a n w i t h o u t joy, it does n o t even k n o w tragic j o y (let us say, in o n e w o r d ,
the j o y o f k n o w i n g oneself to be finite) and it k n o w s n e i t h e r the mystical j o y
(that o f effusion) n o r t h e Spinozist and Nietzschean j o y (let us say, the o n e o f
k n o w i n g oneself hie et nunc infinite and eternal).
H o w can this b e considered in an actual relation w i t h t h e world, o r rather
w i t h w h a t happens to us as a dissipation o f the w o r l d in t h e bad infinite o f a
"globalization" in a centrifugal spiral b e h a v i n g like the e x p a n d i n g universe
described by astrophysics, all t h e w h i l e d o i n g n o t h i n g else than circumscribing
the earth m o r e and m o r e in a h o r i z o n w i t h o u t o p e n i n g o r exit? H o w are w e
to conceive of, precisely, a w o r l d w h e r e w e only find a globe, an astral universe,
o r an earth w i t h o u t sky (or, to cite R i m b a u d and reversing h i m , a sea w i t h o u t
a sun)?
It at least supposes o n e f o u n d i n g c o n d i t i o n . T h i s c o n d i t i o n is n o t h i n g
else t h a n t h e following: it is a m a t t e r o f b e i n g able to take c o m p l e t e l y a n d
seriously i n t o a c c o u n t t h e d e t e r m i n a t i o n o f world, in a way that has perhaps
never taken place in o u r h i s t o r y b u t for w h i c h o u r history today w o u l d
offer t h e possibility.
If t h e world, essentially, is n o t the representation of a universe (cosmos) n o r
that o f a here b e l o w (a humiliated world, if n o t c o n d e m n e d by Christianity),
b u t t h e excessbeyond any representation o f an ethos o r o f a habitusof
stance by w h i c h the w o r l d stands by itself, configures itself, and exposes itself

in itself, relates to itself w i t h o u t referring to any given principle o r to any d e t e r
m i n e d end, t h e n o n e must address t h e principle o f such an absence o f p r i n c i
ple direcdy. T h i s m u s t b e n a m e d t h e " w i t h o u t - r e a s o n " o f the world, o r its
absence of g r o u n d . It is n o t a n e w idea to say that the w o r l d is " w i t h o u t rea
s o n " o r that it is exclusively and entirely its o w n reason. W e k n o w quite well
that it is found in Angelus Silesius ("the rose grows w i t h o u t reason"), b u t o n e
does n o t always n o t i c e h o w it w o r k s w i t h i n all the great formulations o f the
m o s t classical rationalism, i n c l u d i n g and especially w h e n they are trying to find
and posit a " p r i n c i p l e o f r e a s o n " for all things.
211
If I say that this t h o u g h t w o r k s w i t h i n t h e consciousness a n d the u n c o n

scious o f the West, I m e a n that it is i n d e e d an actual w o r k , transformative and
productive o f valuea value that capital is n o t able, in spite of everything, to
c o m m o d i t y w i t h o u t remainder: t h e value o f the world, or m o r e precisely the
value o f "world," the value o f b e i n g - w o r l d and o f b e i n g - i n - t h e - w o r l d as sig
nificance o r as a resonance w i t h o u t reason.
B u t if capital is n o t able t o absorb all significance in the c o m m o d i t y ,
a l t h o u g h it aims at n o t h i n g other, that is perhaps also because it does n o t
entirely c o m e from the c o m m o d i t y alone: w h a t precedes capital is wealth as
47
Globalization
glitter, the wealth that does n o t p r o d u c e m o r e wealth, b u t w h i c h produces its

o w n splendor and its o w n o p u l e n c e as t h e g l o w o f a m e a n i n g i n w h i c h the
w o r l d is w r a p p e d (but also blinded and suffocated by its glitterat the same
time that such glitter is captured by the hierarchy). Capital converts the glitter
into an accumulation that produces a wealth that is defined by its o w n (re)productivity: in this way, it transforms t h e brilliance into t h e indefinite process of
a m e a n i n g that is always to c o m e o r always lost, and s y n o n y m o u s w i t h e n r i c h
m e n t . O n e could say that wealth loses in p o w e r o f m e a n i n g w h a t it gains as
p o w e r o f accumulation. O n e should never forget that t h e w o r d wealth o r i g i
nally designated the order o f p o w e r and greatness, t h e o r d e r o f magnificence in
the n o b l e sense o f the t e r m :
21
t h e so-called g r a n d e u r o f the soul, perhaps its
glory and exaltation. O n e can also recall that it is n o accident if the signs o f this
spiritual greatness, in the beginnings of the proto-capitalist West, shift from
wealth to Christian o r philosophical poverty.
In this inversion o f signs and in the h e n c e f o r t h i n t e r m i n a b l y ambivalent
relation that t h e West maintains w i t h m o n e y (and c o m m e r c e , finance, etc.), it is
n o t only the b e g i n n i n g o f the capitalist transformation o f society that is at stake.
It is also the m o r e secret, and tricky m o v e m e n t by w h i c h , in capital, a change
in t h e nature of " w e a l t h " is a c c o m p a n i e d by placing g r a n d e u r in reserve (in
secret), that is, by placing value in t h e " v a l o r o u s " sense o f the w o r d . Value
b e c o m e s b o t h the r e m a i n d e r and the excess o f capital, o r t h e foreign b o d y that
weakens and u n d e r m i n e s it from w i t h i n , as t h e o t h e r o f its "political economy,"
like the s u p e r - e c o n o m y o r a n - e c o n o m y that m u s t reveal its gap a n d its violent
d e m a n d there. It is that absolute value o f v a l u e , " and n o t h i n g else, that erupts
a n e w in Marx's w o r k .
(But this is also why, far from s u b m i t t i n g history, culture and t h e h u m a n
ity o f h u m a n beings to an e c o n o m i c causality, and " s u p e r s t r u c t u r e " to "infra
structure," M a r x analyzes, o n t h e contrary, the way in w h i c h t h e transforma
tions of v a l u e t h a t is to say, t h e transformations o f t h e evaluation o f value (or
of sense, o r o f t r u t h ) m a k e e c o n o m i c a n d social transformations possible, etc.
In t h e transformations o f t h e evaluation o f value, w h i c h are t h e transforma
tions o f the p r o d u c t i o n o f the ways o f life, t h e technological and cultural
processes are inextricably j o i n e d a n d in reciprocal relation. M a r x did n o t
reverse t h e supposed " H e g e l i a n " history from an ideal d e t e r m i n a t i o n to a
material d e t e r m i n a t i o n : he suppressed all d e t e r m i n a t i o n s e x c e p t that o f t h e
p r o d u c t i o n o f h u m a n i t y b y itself, a p r o d u c t i o n that is itself precisely d e t e r
m i n e d by n o t h i n g other.)
Today, wealth as a quantity that can b e capitalized is identical to the infi
nite poverty of the calculable quantities of the market. B u t that same m a r k e t
also produces a g r o w i n g o r d e r o f symbolic w e a l t h w e a l t h o f k n o w l e d g e and
48
Urbi et Orbi
significance such as those w h i c h , despite their submission to c o m m o d i t i e s ,
m a d e the greatest culture o f m o d e r n times, and such as those w h i c h seem to
b e invented today as a giant productivity that disseminates sense (symbols, signs,
m o d e s , schemes, r h y t h m s , figures, sketches, codes for all gains a n d losses, in all
senses, if I may say so). It could well b e that capitaland perhaps its o w n c a p
ital, its head and reserve, t h e primitive a c c u m u l a t i o n o f its o w n senseappears
in its insignificance a n d disseminates in a novel significance, violendy dissemi
n a t i n g all signification in order to d e m a n d the forcing o r breaching o f a sense
yet to b e invented: t h e sense o f a w o r l d that w o u l d b e c o m e rich from itself,
w i t h o u t any reason either sacred o r cumulative.
T h u s , w e propose a hypothesis w i t h respect to an internal displacement o f
t e c h n o l o g y and capital that w o u l d m a k e an inversion o f signs possible: the
insignificant equivalence reversed into an egalitarian, singular, and c o m m o n sig
nificance. T h e " p r o d u c t i o n o f v a l u e " b e c o m e s the "creation o f meaning." T h i s
hypothesis is fragile, b u t perhaps it is a m a t t e r o f grasping it, n o t as an a t t e m p t
at a description, b u t as a will to act. H o w e v e r , such an inversion o f signs w o u l d
n o t remain a simple formal inversion, if t h e "signs" were t h e indexes o f an eval
uation: it w o u l d b e a m a t t e r o f a general reevaluation, o f an Umwertung
on
w h i c h M a r x and N i e t z s c h e w o u l d finally concur. O n the o t h e r hand, such a

possibility m u s t n o t b e t h e object o f a p r o g r a m m a t i c and certain calculation.
S u c h certainty o f a p r e d i c t i o n w o u l d i m m e d i a t e l y render t h e Utmuertimg ster
ile and w o u l d p r e d e t e r m i n e its projects, its representations and, w h y n o t , its
party w i t h its operatives
It must b e a possibility o f the impossible (accord
ing to a logic used often by D e r r i d a ) , it m u s t k n o w itself as such, that is to say,

k n o w that it happens also in t h e incalculable a n d t h e unassignable. T h i s does
n o t m e a n that t h e possibility o f the impossible remains formal o r constitutes a
transcendental w i t h n o relevance to any experience. It must devote itself to
b e i n g actual, b u t the a i m o f actuality m u s t take i n t o account, at the same time,
a boundless leap outside o f the calculable and controllable reality. After all, the
transcendental is also, always, that w h i c h constitutes conditions o f possibility o f
e x p e r i e n c e , w h i l e at t h e same time rendering impossible the subject of that experi
ence as itself an empirical subject. W i l l i n g the world, b u t n o t willing a subject o f
the w o r l d (neither substance n o r a u t h o r n o r master), is the only way to escape
t h e u n - w o r l d . A n d t h e materialism o f actualityof the concrete life o f h u m a n
b e i n g s m u s t here conceive o f m a t t e r as impenetrable, namely as the i m p e n e
trability o f the t r u t h o f t h e world, t h e " m e a n i n g o f the w o r l d " b e i n g t h e p a s
sion o f this t r u t h .
It w o u l d thus b e a m a t t e r o f p r o d u c i n g a n d / o r o f allowing for a wealth to
b e given that w o u l d b e e n r i c h e d only b y t h e splendor o f such a m e a n i n g and
that, in this way, w o u l d also b e "poverty," if this w o r d does indeed designate
49
Globatization
since the b e g i n n i n g o f the W e s t n o t by a c c i d e n t n o t the misery resulting

from spoliation, b u t the ethos (and also the pathos), the value o f w h i c h does n o t
derive from o w n e r s h i p (of s o m e t h i n g o r o f oneself) b u t in a b a n d o n m e n t .
Poverty, o r the b e i n g - a b a n d o n e d i n all the c o m p l e x ambivalence o f these t w o
senses: a b a n d o n e d by and a b a n d o n e d to. ( O n e c o u l d s h o w t h e e m e r g e n c e o f a
triple figure o f poverty in this sense: p h i l o s o p h i c a l - G r e e k , Jewish, o r R o m a n . )
T h e three aspects o f wealth w o u l d be: glitter, capital, dissemination, and
they w o u l d constitute three m o m e n t s o f the b o d y : the glorious and hieratic
b o d y o f the G o d s , the w o r k i n g b o d y subjugated to the speculative spirit, the
b o d y exposed to contact w i t h all bodies: a w o r l d o f bodies, a w o r l d o f senses, a
world of b e i n g - i H - t h e - w o r l d . B u t it goes w i t h o u t saying that these m o m e n t s d o
n o t simply succeed each o t h e r like so m a n y stages of a process, o r like the ages
o f t h e world. It is their coexistence a n d their conflict that needs to be t h o u g h t .
W h a t is m o s t troubling a b o u t the m o d e r n e n i g m a f o r specifically this is
w h a t constitutes the m o d e r n and w h i c h makes it, for t h e last three centuries,
an e n i g m a for itself, w h i c h even defines the m o d e r n as s u c h an enigma, w i t h
o u t any n e e d to speak of the " p o s t m o d e r n " i s that t h e w i t h o u t - r e a s o n c o u l d
take the f o r m b o t h o f capital a n d o f the mystical rose that represents the
absolute value o f t h e " w i t h o u t - r e a s o n . " O n e could almost be t e m p t e d , even
b e y o n d the wildest imaginations o f today's free m a r k e t capitalists, to present t h e
rose as t h e ultimate revelation o f the secret o f capitala revelation that p r o
j e c t e d , it is true, until the indefinable e n d o f p e r p e t u a l reinvestment. O t h e r s
w o u l d be t e m p t e d a n d w e all are today, m o r e o r less-to reveal, o n the c o n
trary, that the secret o f the rose and o f capital t o g e t h e r occurs like an u n p r e c e
d e n t e d geopolitical, e c o n o m i c , a n d ecological catastrophe, globalization as the
suppression o f all w o r l d - f o r m i n g o f the world.
It is in all respects n o t only reasonable, b u t also required by the v i g o r a n d
r i g o r of t h o u g h t , to avoid recourse to representations: t h e future is precisely
w h a t exceeds representation. A n d w e have learned that w e m u s t grasp the
w o r l d o n c e m o r e outside of representation.
N o w , in o r d e r to distance such t h i n k i n g o f the w o r l d from representation,
there is n o better way than this o n e : to grasp t h e " w o r l d " o n c e m o r e according
to o n e of its constant motifs in t h e W e s t e r n t r a d i t i o n t o the e x t e n t that it is
also the tradition o f m o n o t h e i s m n a m e l y , t h e m o t i f o f creation.
To appropriate this motif, I m u s t take a preliminary precaution, b u t in an
elliptical m a n n e r . " C r e a t i o n " is a motif, o r a c o n c e p t , that w e m u s t grasp o u t
side o f its theological c o n t e x t . Let m e indicate h o w this can be d o n e s c h e m a t
ically: as I have previously suggested, it is theology itself that has stripped itself
o f a G o d distinct from the w o r l d . A t the e n d o f m o n o t h e i s m , there is w o r l d
w i t h o u t G o d , that is to say, w i t h o u t a n o t h e r world, b u t w e still n e e d to reflect
50
Urbi et Orbi
o n w h a t this means, for w e k n o w n o t h i n g o f it, n o truth, n e i t h e r "theistic" n o r
23
"atheistic"let us say, provisionally, as an initial attempt, that it is absentheistic.
If " c r e a t i o n " m e a n s anything, it is t h e exact opposite of any f o r m o f p r o

d u c t i o n in t h e sense o f a fabrication that supposes a given, a project, a n d a p r o
ducer. T h e idea o f creation, such as has b e e n elaborated by the m o s t diverse a n d
at t h e same t i m e m o s t c o n v e r g e n t t h o u g h t s , i n c l u d i n g t h e mystics o f t h e three
m o n o t h e i s m s b u t also t h e c o m p l e x systems o f all great metaphysics, is above all
t h e idea o f t h e ex nihilo (and I d o n o t e x e m p t M a r x from this, to the contrary:
w h i l e his u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f Christian creation is only instrumental, for h i m
value is precisely created . . . ) . T h e w o r l d is created from n o t h i n g : this does n o t
m e a n fabricated w i t h n o t h i n g b y a particularly ingenious producer. It m e a n s
instead that it is n o t fabricated, p r o d u c e d by n o producer, a n d n o t even c o m
i n g o u t of n o t h i n g (like a miraculous apparition), b u t in a quite strict m a n n e r
and m o r e challenging for t h o u g h t : the n o t h i n g itself, if o n e can speak in this
way, o r rather nothing g r o w i n g [croissant] as something (I say " g r o w i n g " for it is
t h e sense o f crescoto b e b o r n , to g r o w f r o m w h i c h c o m e s creo: to m a k e
s o m e t h i n g m e r g e a n d cultivate a g r o w t h ) . In creation, a g r o w t h grows from
n o t h i n g a n d this n o t h i n g takes care o f itself, cultivates its g r o w t h .
T h e ex nihilo is t h e g e n u i n e formulation o f a radical materialism, that is to
say, precisely, w i t h o u t roots.
T h u s , w e can n o w clarify w h a t w e said earlier: if t h e w o r l d - b e c o m i n g
(detheologization) displaces v a l u e m a k e s it i m m a n e n t b e f o r e w o r l d - f o r m
i n g displaces t h e p r o d u c t i o n o f v a l u e m a k i n g it universalthe t w o t o g e t h e r
displace " c r e a t i o n " i n t o t h e " w i t h o u t - r e a s o n " o f the world. A n d this displace
m e n t is n o t a transposition, a " s e c u l a r i z a t i o n " o f t h e o n t o - t h e o l o g i c a l o r m e t a
physical-Christian s c h e m e : it is, rather, its d e c o n s t r u c t i o n a n d e m p t y i n g o u t ,
a n d it o p e n s o n t o a n o t h e r s p a c e o f place a n d o f r i s k w h i c h w e have j u s t
b e g u n to enter.
If t h e w o r l d is the g r o w t h of/from n o t h i n g [croissance de rien]an expres
sion of a formidable a m b i g u i t y i t is because it only depends o n itself, w h i l e
this "self" is given from n o w h e r e b u t from itself. B u t it is also because it is the
g r o w t h of/from n o t h i n g o t h e r than n o t h i n g , a n o t h i n g that obviously is n o t a
p u r e a n d simple nothingness, o n the basis o f w h i c h n o g r o w t h could b e c o n
ceived, b u t w h i c h is t h e w i t h o u t - r e a s o n [rien de raison] o f the world. In this
sense, t h e " c r e a t i o n " o f the w o r l d is in n o way a representation that is o p p o s e d
to t h e representation o f an eternity o f t h e m a t t e r of t h e world. In t r u t h , n o n e
o f these things, creation o r eternal matter, are representations, a n d this is w h y
they are n o t o p p o s i t e s . T h e eternity o f m a t t e r only means that there is n o t h i n g
outside the world, n o o t h e r world, a n d n o space-time that w o u l d n o t b e that
o f " o u r " world. T h i s eternity is t h e eternity o f space-time, absolutely. C r e a t i o n
51
Globalization
is t h e g r o w t h w i t h o u t reason of such a space-time. T h e t w o concepts c o r r e

s p o n d to each o t h e r at the exact limit o f metaphysics a n d physics: and this limit
is n o t o n e that separates two worlds, b u t o n e that shares o u t the indefiniteness
o f t h e universe (or the indefiniteness o f its expansion, as c o n t e m p o r a r y c o s
m o l o g y has it) and the infinity o f its m e a n i n g .
By writing that " t h e sense of the world must he outside the world,"
24
Wittgenstein simultaneously stated two things: that the world in itself does n o t
constitute an i m m a n e n c e of meaning, but that, since there is n o other world, the
"outside" of the world must b e open "within i t " b u t open in a way that n o other
world could be posited there. This is also w h y Wittgenstein writes further: "It is
n o t how things are in the world that is mystical, b u t that it exists" (TLP 6.44, 88).
T h e m e a n i n g o f this fact is the m e a n i n g that the w i t h o u t - r e a s o n makes
possible. N o w , this means that it is m e a n i n g in the strongest and most active
sense of the t e r m : n o t a given signification (such as that o f a creating G o d o r
that o f an accomplished h u m a n i t y ) , b u t m e a n i n g , absolutely, as possibility of
transmission from o n e place to another, from the o n e w h o sends to the o n e
w h o receives, and from o n e e l e m e n t to another, a reference that forms at t h e
same time a direction, an address, a value, o r a meaningful c o n t e n t . Such a c o n
tent constitutes t h e stance of a world: its ethos a n d its habitus. Clearly, neither
m e a n i n g as direction [sens] n o r m e a n i n g [sens] as c o n t e n t is given. T h e y are to
be invented each time: w e m i g h t as well say to be created, that is, to create from
n o t h i n g and to b r i n g forth that very w i t h o u t - r e a s o n that sustains, drives, a n d
forms the statements that are genuinely creative o f m e a n i n g , such as in science,
politics, esthetics, and ethics: o n all these registers, w e are dealing w i t h multiple
aspects and styles o f w h a t w e could call the habitus o f the m e a n i n g o f the world.
(I limit myself to speaking of " s t a t e m e n t s " to remain close to the sphere w h e r e
w e situate m e a n i n g m o s t c o m m o n l y ; o n e should also think o f gestures, actions,
passions, and formalities, etc. . . . Solidarity, love, music, cybernetics are also
m e a n i n g in act.)
T h i s does n o t at all m e a n that a n y t h i n g makes sense in j u s t any way: that
w o u l d b e precisely the capitalist version o f the w i t h o u t - r e a s o n , w h i c h estab
lishes the general equivalence o f all forms of m e a n i n g in an infinite uniformity.
It signifies o n the contrary that the creation o f m e a n i n g , and w i t h it the enjoy
m e n t of sense (which is n o t foreign, o n e should n o t e , to the e n j o y m e n t of
senses) requires its forms, its inventions o f forms and the forms of its exchange.
W o r l d h o o d , in this regard, is the f o r m o f forms that itself d e m a n d s to be c r e
ated, that is n o t only p r o d u c e d in the absence o f any given, b u t held infinitely
b e y o n d any possible given: in a sense, t h e n , it is never inscribed in a represen
tation, and nonetheless always at w o r k and in circulation in the forms that are
b e i n g invented.
52
Urbi et Orbi
O n e could say that w o r l d h o o d is the symbolization
of the world, the way in
w h i c h the world symbolizes in itself w i t h itself, in w h i c h it articulates itself by

m a k i n g a circulation o f m e a n i n g possible w i t h o u t reference to a n o t h e r world.
O u r task today is n o t h i n g less than t h e task o f creating a form or a s y m
bolization o f t h e w o r l d . T h i s seems to us to b e the greatest risk that h u m a n i t y
has had to confront. B u t it m a y well b e that it has already d o n e so several times,
perhaps even that t h e w o r l d itself has already d o n e so several times. T h i s is n e i
ther an abstract n o r purely a formal t a s k w h e t h e r this w o r d is taken esthetically o r logically. It is t h e extremely c o n c r e t e a n d d e t e r m i n e d taska task that
can only b e a s t r u g g l e o f p o s i n g the following question to each gesture, each
c o n d u c t , each habitus a n d each ethos: H o w d o y o u engage the world? H o w d o
you involve yourself w i t h t h e e n j o y m e n t o f the w o r l d as such, a n d n o t w i t h the
appropriation o f a quantity o f equivalence? H o w d o y o u give form to a differ
ence o f values that w o u l d n o t b e a difference o f wealth in terms o f general
equivalence, b u t rather a difference o f singularities in w h i c h alone the passage
o f a m e a n i n g in general a n d the p u t t i n g i n t o play of w h a t w e call a w o r l d can
take place?
However, as I m e n t i o n e d , this task is a struggle. In a sense, it is a struggle
o f t h e West against itself, o f capital against itself. It is a struggle b e t w e e n t w o
infinites, o r b e t w e e n e x t o r t i o n a n d exposition. It is the struggle o f t h o u g h t , very
precisely concrete a n d d e m a n d i n g , in w h i c h w e are engaged by the disappear
ance o f o u r representations o f the abolishing o r o v e r c o m i n g of capital. It
d e m a n d s that w e o p e n o r discern in capital a n o t h e r type o r a n o t h e r k i n d of a
flaw t h a n w h a t w e u n d e r s t o o d t o b e i n s u r m o u n t a b l e contradictions, and that
capital was able to o v e r c o m e , thus o v e r c o m i n g also o u r representations. W e
m u s t consider capital in t e r m s o f its h e i g h t a n d p o w e r i n terms o f its " w e a l t h "
and "fortune."
T h e m o m e n t has c o m e to expose capital to t h e absence o f reason, for
w h i c h capital provides t h e fullest d e v e l o p m e n t : a n d this m o m e n t c o m e s from
capital itself, b u t it is n o l o n g e r a m o m e n t o f a "crisis" that can b e solved in
t h e course o f t h e process. It is a different k i n d o f m o m e n t to w h i c h w e m u s t
give t h o u g h t .
B u t such t h i n k i n g is n o t only theoretical: n o w as in the past, it is practi
cally manifest a n d necessaryin the sense o f the necessity a n d manifestedness
o f t h e w o r l d t h a t the struggle is straightaway and definitively a m a t t e r o f c o n
crete equality a n d actual justice. In this sense, Marx's d e m a n d is n o t obsolete.
T h e " t h i n k i n g " o f w h i c h w e are speaking is necessarily involved b o t h in the
q u e s t i o n i n g o f t h e "sense o f the w o r l d "
23
a n d in i m m e d i a t e , political, e c o n o m i c ,
and symbolic acts. B u t t h e difference b e t w e e n Marx's revolution a n d the o n e

in w h i c h w e are perhaps u n d e r w a y w i t h o u t o u r k n o w l e d g e a n d o f w h i c h a
53
Globalization
thousand revolts, a thousand rages, a thousand creations o f signs are the flashing
indicatorscould b e sketched provisionally in the following way: by c o n c e i v
ing o f itself as a reversal o f the relation o f p r o d u c t i o n , Marx's revolution p r e s u p
posed that this reversal was equivalent to a conversion o f the m e a n i n g o f p r o
d u c t i o n (and the restitution o f created value to its creator). W h a t w e have b e g u n
to learn is that it is also a matter o f creating the m e a n i n g o r the value o f the
reversal itself. O n l y perhaps this creation will have the p o w e r o f the reversal.
Further, w h e n M a r x w r o t e that philosophers c o n t e n t e d themselves w i t h
interpreting t h e world, a n d that it was h e n c e f o r t h a m a t t e r o f c h a n g i n g it, h e
specified n o t h i n g w i t h respect to the relations that the transformation e n t e r
tains w i t h the prevailing interpretations: D o t h e f o r m e r suspend the latter? D o
the latter d e t e r m i n e , o n the contrary, the former? O r e k e isn't it a m a t t e r o f
transforming the relation b e t w e e n t h e m , a n d o f u n d e r s t a n d i n g (that is to say, o f
enacting) that m e a n i n g is always in praxis, a l t h o u g h n o practice is limited to
enacting a t h e o r y a n d although n o t h e o r y is able to diminish practice? B u t the
gap b e t w e e n the t w o is necessary to w h a t is called praxis, that is to say, meaning
2
at work [au travail], o r even truth in the work [a l'ceuvre]. ''

This gap is n o t the gap b e t w e e n a n interpretive philosophy a n d a transfor
mative action, n o r is it the gap b e t w e e n a regulative Utopia a n d a resigned p r a c
tice, n o r t h e gap b e t w e e n a f o u n d i n g m y t h a n d the v i o l e n c e that s o u g h t to
incarnate it. Indeed, u n d e r the three
figuresinterpretation,
Utopia, o r m y t h
b e n e a t h their differences, the possibility o f a c o r r e s p o n d e n c e o f t r u t h to a form,

o r o f a c o m i n g into presence o f an accomplished m e a n i n g remains p r e s u p
posed. B u t the issue, o n the contrary, is t o b e attentive to t h e gap o f m e a n i n g
w i t h itself, a gap that constitutes it o r that is its truth. S u c h a gap always places
m e a n i n g in excess o r in deficiency w i t h respect to its o w n w o r k .
In excess o r in deficiency w i t h respect to its w o r k does n o t m e a n outside
o f all labor, b u t m e a n s a labor w h o s e principle is n o t d e t e r m i n e d by a goal o f
mastery (domination, usefulness, appropriation), b u t exceeds all submission to
an e n d t h a t is, also exposes itself to r e m a i n i n g w i t h o u t e n d . H e r e it is art that
indicates the stakes: the w o r k of art is always also a m e a n i n g at w o r k b e y o n d
the w o r k [a I'oeuvre au-dela de I'ceuure], as well as a w o r k w o r k i n g a n d o p e n i n g
b e y o n d any m e a n i n g that is either given o r to b e given. B u t t h e o p e n i n g w i t h
o u t finality is never a w o r k n o r any p r o d u c t : it is the e n j o y m e n t o f w h i c h M a r x
spoke, as e n j o y m e n t by h u m a n beings o f w h a t opens their h u m a n i t y b e y o n d all
h u m a n i s m . (This w o r k is n o t w i t h o u t labor, any m o r e than this e n j o y m e n t is
w i t h o u t suffering.)
To create the world means: immediately, w i t h o u t delay, r e o p e n i n g each p o s
sible struggle for a w o r l d , that is, for w h a t m u s t form t h e contrary o f a global
injustice against the b a c k g r o u n d o f general equivalence. B u t this means to c o n -
54
Urbi et Orbi
d u c t this struggle precisely in the n a m e o f t h e fact that this world is c o m i n g o u t
o f n o t h i n g , that there is n o t h i n g before it and that it is w i t h o u t models, w i t h
o u t principle and w i t h o u t given end, and that it is precisely what forms the j u s
tice and the m e a n i n g o f a world.
O n c e again, t o create as a struggle, w h i c h w h i l e strugglingconsequendy,
by seeking power, by finding forcesdoes n o t seek t h e exercise o f p o w e r n o r
p r o p e r t y w h e t h e r collective o r individual, b u t seeks itself and its agitation,
itself a n d the effervescence o f its t h o u g h t in act, itself and its creation o f forms
and signs, itself and its c o n t a g i o u s c o m m u n i c a t i o n as propagation o f an enjoy
m e n t that, in t u r n , w o u l d n o t b e a satisfaction acquired in a signification o f the
w o r l d , b u t t h e insatiable a n d infinitely finite exercise that is t h e b e i n g in act o f
m e a n i n g b r o u g h t forth in the w o r l d [mis an monde].
55
II
1
T h e text that begins here, a n d w h i c h first was given as an h o m a g e to Lyotard,
links u p w i t h t h e e x c h a n g e that t o o k place w i t h h i m t w e n t y years ago.' A t the
time, t h e issue was a question o f j u d g m e n t , and m o r e precisely: a j u d g m e n t
a b o u t ends, c o n s e q u e n t l y t h e secret o r explicit decision that necessarily s u b
tends a philosophical gesture, a n d w h i c h constitutes its ethos, t h e decision a b o u t
w h a t mattersfor e x a m p l e "a world!' a w o r l d " w o r t h y of t h e n a m e " c a n n o t
b e a choice b e t w e e n possibilities, b u t only a n d each t i m e a decision a b o u t w h a t
is n e i t h e r real n o r possible: a decision a b o u t w h a t is in n o way given in advance,
b u t w h i c h constitutes t h e e r u p t i o n o f t h e new, that is unpredictable because it
is w i t h o u t face, a n d thus t h e " b e g i n n i n g o f a series of appearances" by w h i c h
K a n t defines freedom in its relation to t h e world.
S u c h a decision is a b o u t t h e neither-real-nor-possible, thus, n e i t h e r given
n o r representable, b u t i n s o m e way necessary and i m p e r i o u s (like Kantian free
d o m in its relation t o t h e l a w that it is itself), and consequently it is a violent
decision w i t h o u t appeal, for it decides [tranche] b e t w e e n all and n o t h i n g o r
m o r e e x a c d y it m a k e s s o m e t h i n g b e in place o f n o t h i n g [elle fait etre quelque
chose an lieu de rien], a n d this s o m e t h i n g is everything, for freedom c a n n o t b e
divided, as K a n t k n e w as well, n e i t h e r freedom n o r its object o r effect. T h e
j u d g m e n t a b o u t ends o r a b o u t t h e e n d , a b o u t a destination, o r a b o u t a m e a n
i n g o f t h e world, is t h e e n g a g e m e n t o f a p h i l o s o p h y (or a b o u t w h a t o n e calls
a "life") ever since an e n d is n o t given: this is t h e b i r t h certificate o f p h i l o s o
p h y a n d o f o u r so-called " W e s t e r n " o r " m o d e r n " history. In this sense, it is t h e
certificate o f a day o f w r a t h in w h i c h t h e tension and the decisiveness o f a
(first, last) j u d g m e n t are unleashed, a j u d g m e n t that only d e p e n d s o n itself. T h i s
1
is t h e dies irae o f w h i c h Lyotard speaks in his Tlie Confession of Augustine
and
in t e r m s o f A u g u s t i n e a n d Isaie, as t h e day in w h i c h t h e heavens will b e

e n v e l o p e d as in a volumen, folded u p o n t h e light of signs a n d o p e n i n g to the
dark opacity before creation o r after its annihilation, o r even w i t h d r a w n
from
t h e w o r l d as t h e precise m o m e n t a n d place o f its creation a n d decision: s p a c e ' t i m e outside o f space and t i m e . A n d thus also dies ilia: that day, that illustrious
day, m o s t remarkable because it is r e m o v e d from all days, t h e day of e n d as the
day o f infinity.
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Globalization
W e should derive the following from Lyotard's interest in w h a t K a n t calls

"reflective" j u d g m e n t , a j u d g m e n t for w h i c h " t h e universal is n o t g i v e n "
Kant's proposition for w h a t exceeds the limits o f the mathematico-physical
object o f " d e t e r m i n a n t " j u d g m e n t a n d of the transcendental schematism, w h i c h
b e c o m e s for Lyotard the general proposition o f " p o s t - m o d e r n i t y " : if t h e u n i
versal is n o t given, this does n o t m e a n that it needs to be d r e a m t o r " m i m i c
k e d " (the weak version of the philosophy o f the "as if," a m o r e o r less latent
formulation o f so-called " v a l u e " philosophies), it m e a n s that it is to b e invented.
In o t h e r words, it seems i m p o r t a n t n o t to simply pose a " j u d g m e n t w i t h o u t c r i
teria" (another expression from Lyotard), itself defined as a j u d g m e n t " m a x i
mizing concepts outside of any k n o w l e d g e o f reality" (and thus in the first place
the c o n c e p t of final e n d o r of destination o f the w o r l d a n d o f h u m a n beings).
B u t o n e needs to understand also that k n o w l e d g e is lacking here, n o t because
of an intrinsic deficiency o f h u m a n u n d e r s t a n d i n g (a finitude relative to the
m o d e l o f an intellectus intuitivus) b u t because o f the absence, p u r e and simple, of
"reality," w h i c h is effectively n o t given (the absolute finitude o f a Dasein w h o
puts into play n o t h i n g less than t h e i n f i n i t e m e a n i n g o f being).
In o t h e r words, the j u d g m e n t w i t h o u t criteria is n o t only (or perhaps n o t
at all) an analogical and approximate, symbolic and n o n s c h e m a t i c m o d e of
d e t e r m i n a n t j u d g m e n t . It is n e i t h e r its extension, n o r its projection, n o r its fig
uration. Perhaps even, in the end, the t e r m judgment
contains an ambiguity in
its false s y m m e t r y o r its apparent continuity. For whereas t h e first proceeds b y

construction, o r schematic presentation, that is to say by the d e p e n d e n c e o f a
c o n c e p t o n an intuition, w h i c h defines the conditions o f a possible experience,
the second is placed b e f o r e o r p r o v o k e d b y s o m e t h i n g that c a n n o t b e c o n
structed, w h i c h corresponds to an absence o f intuition. T h i s absence of i n t u
ition forms the Kantian c o n d i t i o n o f the " a b s o l u t e " object, the o n e that c a n n o t
be an object, that is, the subject o f principles and ends ("God," o r n o w m a n , in
any case the rational subject, w h i c h b e c o m e s the precise t e r m of the n o n i n t u itable subject of sufficient reasons and final ends). T h e inconstructible o f an
absence o f i n t u i t i o n w h i c h m o r e o v e r produces an absence o f c o n c e p t if those
of "first cause" and "final e n d " are thereby w e a k e n e d in their very s t r u c t u r e
defines the necessity, n o t o f c o n s t r u c t i n g in the v o i d ( w h i c h has n o m e a n i n g ,
except b y simulacrum) b u t o f letting a void e m e r g e , o r to m a k e w i t h this void
w h a t is at issue, namely the end, w h i c h is henceforth the issue o f such a praxis
rather than a stricdy intellectual j u d g m e n t .
To say it in a w o r d : n o t to construct b u t to create.
(Here I allow myself a brief digression: to e n c o u n t e r the inconstructible in
the Kantian sense, this is also a n d at the very least is w h a t " t o d e c o n s t r u c t "
means, a w o r d that is n o w t o o often used by the doxa to m e a n d e m o l i t i o n a n d
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Of Creation
nihilism. Yet, t h r o u g h Husserl, H e i d e g g e r , and D e r r i d a , this w o r d o r i g i n a l l y
Abbau and n o t Zerstdrungwould
have rather led us toward w h a t is n e i t h e r
c o n s t r u c t e d n o r constructible, b u t is set b a c k from the structure, its e m p t y

space, and w h i c h makes it w o r k , o r even that w h i c h pervades it.
Lyotard stated at that t i m e that the j u d g m e n t a b o u t ends should b e freed
from
Kant's unitary teleology, that o f t h e reign o f a "reasonable humanity."
Aware o f the fact that t h e substitution o f plurality for unity alone simply risked
displacing an u n c h a n g e d structure toward t h e r e n e w e d c o n t e n t that h e n a m e d
" t h e h o r i z o n o f a manifold o r o f a diversity," h e rushed to add that the final p l u
rality i m p o s e d w i t h it t h e irreducibility o f singularitieswhich h e u n d e r s t o o d
in t h e sense o f t h e Wittgenstein's "language g a m e s " a n d that the universal
c o m i n g t o s u p p l e m e n t a " n o n g i v e n " universal could only b e the prescription
o f " o b s e r v i n g t h e singular justice o f each game."
In o t h e r words, w h a t is necessary is a w o r l d that w o u l d only be the w o r l d
o f singularities, w i t h o u t their plurality c o n s t r u c t e d as a unitotality. B u t w h a t is
thus necessary is a world.
A n exigency appears here that will have constantlywe can be certain o f
i t i n h a b i t e d o u r t h o u g h t s and that always accompanies in various ways a c o n
c e r n that in the e n d is c o m m o n t o o u r absence o f c o m m u n i t y , perhaps to o u r
refusal o f c o m m u n i t y and o f a c o m m u n i t a r i a n destination: h o w to d o justice,
n o t only to t h e w h o l e o f existence, b u t to all existences, taken together b u t dis
tinctly and in a discontinuous way, n o t as t h e totality of their differences, and
differendsprecisely n o t t h a t b u t as these differences together, coexisting o r
c o - a p p e a r i n g , held t o g e t h e r as m u l t i p l e a n d thus together in a multiple way,
if o n e can p u t it this way, o r as multiple together, if w e can state it even less a d e
quately . . . a n d held by a co- that is n o t a principle, o r that is a principle o r
archi-principle o f spacing in t h e principle itself. (Twenty-five years ago, Lyotard
3
already w r o t e : " W e w o u l d love multiplicities o f principles .. .")
To d o justice to t h e multiplicity and to the coexistence o f singularities, to

multiply thus, and infinitely singularize the ends, such is o n e of the concerns left
to us by that time w h i c h as " p o s t " could well be a first time, a time suspended
in the preexistence o f a n o t h e r time, a n o t h e r b e g i n n i n g and a n o t h e r e n d .
Justice r e n d e r e d t o t h e singular plural is n o t simply a demultiplied o r dif
fracted justice. It is n o t a u n i q u e justice i n t e r p r e t e d according to perspectives
o r subjectivitiesand nonetheless it remains t h e same justice, equal for all
a l t h o u g h irreducible and insubstitutable from o n e to the other. ( O n e o f the
secrets o r o n e o f the m o s t powerful resources held in history for t h e last t w o
centuries, o r since Christianity is h i d d e n here: the equality o f persons in the
incommensurability o f singularities.) T h i s justice is thus, to take up a t h e m e that
is also f o u n d in Augustine's Confessions, w i t h o u t c o m m o n measure: b u t its
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Globalization
incommensurability is indeed the only u n i t w i t h w h i c h w e will have to m e a

sure the j u d g m e n t a b o u t ends. T h i s implies t w o c o n j o i n e d considerations: o n
the o n e hand, the e n d o r t h e ends will b e i n c o m m e n s u r a b l e to any d e t e r m i
nant aim of a goal, o f an objective, o f any a c c o m p l i s h m e n t , a n d o n the o t h e r
hand, h u m a n " c o m m u n i t y " (perhaps also the b e i n g - t o g e t h e r o f all beings) will
have n o o t h e r c o m m o n measure t h a n that excess o f the i n c o m m e n s u r a b l e . In
o t h e r words, w h a t Kant called "reasonable humanity," instead o f b e i n g the t a n
gential approximation of a given rationality (as, for instance, in Utopias a n d their
models o f mechanical equilibrium), o r instead of simply consisting in the c o n
version o f this postulated unity into a diffraction o f singularities, will have to
conceive o f its o w n rationality as the i n c o m m e n s u r a b i l i t y o f R e a s o n in itself,
o r t o itself.
Such a j u d g m e n t a b o u t ends can n e i t h e r b e simply defined as a m a n n e r o f
extrapolation from the d e t e r m i n a n t j u d g m e n t n o r as an extension of concepts
outside o f the conditions o f k n o w l e d g e , u n d e r the Kantian c o n d i t i o n o f a
"solely reflective" usage. A t this point, it b e c o m e s n o d o u b t necessary to t h i n k
that whereas K a n t understands this usage according to a strategic p r u d e n c e
toward the metaphysical Schu>armerei,we m u s t t h i n k it also in terms o f an active
and productive invention o f ends. W e could also formulate this as follows: the
Kantian order of postulation instead o f constituting a simple s u p p l e m e n t of r e p
resentation to the harshness o f the m o r a l law that is s u p e r i m p o s e d o n a finite
k n o w l e d g e , must constitute by itself the praxis of the relation to ends.
W e can therefore think that the " m a x i m i z a t i o n o f c o n c e p t s " o f w h i c h
Lyotard spoke m u s t b e taken b e y o n d itself, w h i l e at the same time taken liter
ally: the maximum
carried to t h e e x t r e m e , b u t here precisely the e x t r e m e is n o t
determinable a n d the maximum
behaves like an infinite extension o r an excess.
In the m o v e m e n t o f this excess, the " c o n c e p t " that was " m a x i m i z e d " wavers
and changes its nature o r status: this is h o w t h e j u d g m e n t o f the sublime
behaves w h e n " t h e c o n c e p t of the large n u m b e r is transformed into t h e Idea of
an absolute o r actual infinite.""
T h e "Idea," to use this Kantian-Lyotardian lexicon, is n o longer a concept

used in an analogical o r symbolic m o d e outside o f the limits of possible e x p e r i
ence or of given intuition. It is n o longer a c o n c e p t w i t h o u t intuition, handled
by virtue of s o m e t h i n g that substitutes for a sensible given: it becomes itself the
creation of its o w n scheme, that is to say, o f a novel reality, w h i c h is the f o r m / m a t
ter of a world of ends. A t the same time, and according to the requirements m e n
tioned beforehand, this scheme must b e that of a multiple universal, namely, the
scheme o f a differend or of a general o r absolute incommensurability.
(In parentheses, w e shall n o t e t h e following: t h e schematism o f s u c h a
w o r l d o f ends c o u l d very well c o r r e s p o n d to w h a t K a n t calls "nature." I n d e e d ,
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Of Creation
if t h e c o n c e r n o f the first Critique is t h e r e d u c t i o n o f the natural sensible m u l
tiplicity in favor o f an objectivity of e x p e r i e n c e , t h e c o n c e r n o f t h e third Cri
tique is to d o justice, in a reflective m o d e , t o that sensible excess w i t h respect
to t h e object that is c o n s t i t u t e d by t h e v e r t i g i n o u s a n d irreducible prolifera
tion
o f t h e " e m p i r i c a l l a w s " o f nature. N o w , this proliferation, w h e r e t h e
u n d e r s t a n d i n g risks losing itself, c o r r e s p o n d s to n o t h i n g else t h a n to the q u e s

tion o f ends: To w h a t e n d is there such a multiplicity o f empirical principles?
[A question that is specified especially in these: To w h a t e n d t h e "formative
force" o f life? A n d to w h a t e n d t h e p r o d u c t i o n a n d progress o f h u m a n c u l
ture?] Nature, w i t h K a n t , n o l o n g e r constitutes a given o r d e r a n d b e c o m e s t h e
o r d e r o r always possible d i s o r d e r o f an e n i g m a o f ends. B e t w e e n the first
a n d t h e third Critique, t h e s e c o n d will have f o r m e d t h e m o r a l j u d g m e n t a
j u d g m e n t c o n c e r n i n g action regulated by a formal universalityaccording to
w h a t could n o t for K a n t have t h e constituting o r constructive nature o f a
s c h e m e , b u t w h i c h , u n d e r t h e n a m e o f type, nonetheless presents t h e analogi
cal regulation o f a nature [the m o r a l reign as a s e c o n d n a t u r e ] . T h r o u g h this
entire reevaluation o f nature, it is a m a t t e r o f only this: H o w can w e t h i n k the
undiscoverable unity, t h e m o t i o n , i n t e n t i o n , o r destination o f this o r d e r o f
things that carries naturally w i t h i n it t h e n o n n a t u r a l b e i n g o f ends? T h e q u e s
tion o f n a t u r e has thus i n d e e d b e c o m e that o f a universe n o l o n g e r sustained
b y t h e creative a n d o r g a n i z i n g action o f a P r o v i d e n c e , and, consequendy, that
o f a finality n o l o n g e r g u i d e d by t h e agency o r i n d e x o f an e n d : n e i t h e r o f one
e n d n o r o f an end in general . . . )
W e thus n e e d to l o o k for a j u d g m e n t ruled by such a schematism, o n c e
again, neither d e t e r m i n a n t (or presenting) n o r reflective (or representing as if)
and, in o t h e r w o r d s , n e i t h e r mathematical n o r aesthetic (in the first sense o f
t e r m according to Kant) a n d c o n s e q u e n d y perhaps b o t h ethical a n d aesthetic
(in t h e s e c o n d sense o f t h e t e r m ) , b u t t h e n j u s t as m u c h n e i t h e r ethical n o r aes
thetic in any usual sense o f these terms.
To that end, w e n e e d to start again from that w i t h w h i c h j u d g i n g is c o n
c e r n e d : the ends, b u t m o r e precisely those ends that are distinct from b o t h the
m e r e absence o f e n d (that is to say, mathematics) a n d the intentional e n d (the
technological e n d , that is, that o f art in general, even if " w i t h o u t e n d s " t o that
extent, w e n e e d to stand outside o f art itself, as art itself d e m a n d s , w h i c h is
never "artistic" in the last analysis). Perhaps w e have, t h e n , n o o t h e r c o n c e p t o f
" e n d " than those that I j u s t m e n t i o n e d , a n d perhaps o u r question engages a
r u p t u r e w i t h any k i n d o f e n d as an e n d that is sought after, that is, also as an
e n d represented a n d executed by t h e effect of this self-moving representation
(namely, in K a n t the e n d o f a Will) a n d at the same time as an e n d p r o d u c e d
from a cause a n d m o r e broadly from t h e effect o f a c o n c o u r s e o f causes: formal
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Globalization
cause, efficient cause, material cause, a n d final cause, this last o n e essentially
encapsulating causality p e r s e w h i c h , w e n o t e in passing, also means for A r i s 5
t o d e the G o o d as final e n d . In this sense, o u r question is t h r o u g h and t h r o u g h

the question o f the G o o d in a w o r l d w i t h o u t e n d o r w i t h o u t singular ends . . .
R e a d i n g Kant m o r e closely, w e can say that w e find ourselves, in reality,
dealing w i t h an e l e m e n t already m e n t i o n e d briefly, the "formative p o w e r " o f
6
nature that K a n t describes as possessing an " i m p e n e t r a b l e property," and w h i c h

"has n o t h i n g analogous to any causality k n o w n to us. " T h e reflective j u d g m e n t
can only add to it a "distant analogy" w i t h o u r technological finality and causal
ity. ( O n e can certainly n o t e that K a n t speaks here o f life, n o t o f nature in g e n
eral. B u t w e could s h o w that the first holds for t h e second: the Kantian dis
tinction
is n o t b e t w e e n an inorganic nature and an organic nature [then, o n
a n o t h e r level, a culture], but b e t w e e n an o r d e r o f the conditions o f the u n d e r

standing and an order of the expectations o f reason. W i t h respect to the s e c o n d
order, " n a t u r e " is from t h e outset entirely regulated by an "internal finality" that
life exposes and that h u m a n i t y brings to a paroxysm.)
N o w w h a t can clearly be seen in this "formative p o w e r " w i t h a u n i q u e
causality is that the thesis o f a creation o f t h e w o r l d is r e n d e r e d inadmissible
by t h e destitution o f a G o d - p r i n c i p l e o f t h e w o r l d , b u t at t h e same
time
revived o r m a d e m o r e acute by contrast by the d e m a n d t o t h i n k a w o r l d

w h o s e reason and end, p r o v e n a n c e and destination, are n o l o n g e r given; a n d
yet, w e n e e d to t h i n k o f it as w o r l d , that is, as a totality o f m e a n i n g , at least
hypothetical o r asymptotic-or as a totality o f a m e a n i n g that is in itself plural
a n d always singular.
Such an e n d that w o u l d exclude the intentional end, o r a final cause that
w o u l d include the formal cause, o r substance itself, and w o u l d t e n d to identify
w i t h the absence o f e n d w o u l d a m o u n t in Aristotle's t h o u g h t to an e m p t y t a u
7
tology: " w h y a t h i n g is itself." B u t from the void o f tautology since Kant, the
reality o f a n e w world, o r a n e w reality o f t h e w o r l d perhaps emerges. For the
pure and simple absence of e n d c o n f o r m s to the mathematical scheme, o r to
that o f the constructible object. B u t here w e are speaking o f the i n c o n structible, that is to say, o f existence, w h o s e inconstructibility, indeterminacy, and
nonobjectiveness ultimately constitute for K a n t t h e definition of existence."
Existence as such is precisely w h a t c a n n o t be presented as an object w i t h i n
the conditions o f possible e x p e r i e n c e . As t h e first t w o "Analogies o f E x p e r i
e n c e " demonstrate, the substance changes in time, b u t it is n o m o r e b o r n there
than it dies there. T h e substantia phaenomenon
is clearly coextensive to time and
space, w h i c h b o t h f o r m the unfolding o f t h e p h e n o m e n o n . K a n t recalls the

principle, Gigni de nihilo nihil, in nihilum nil posse reverti'' T h i s principle explic
itly states the negation o f a creation. A n d it is also this principle that, w h i l e
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Of Creation
m a i n t a i n i n g t h e object w i t h i n the conditions o f possible experience, that is, as
m e c h a n i s m , excludes in an impossible e x p e r i e n c e any consideration o f the e n d
o f things as well as t h e provenance o f their existence as such.
O u r question thus b e c o m e s clearly t h e question o f t h e impossible e x p e r i
ence o r t h e e x p e r i e n c e o f t h e impossible: an e x p e r i e n c e removed from the
conditions o f possibility o f a finite k n o w l e d g e , and w h i c h is nevertheless an
experience. T h e j u d g m e n t a b o u t ends w i t h o u t given c r i t e r i a a n d w h i c h
makes by itself, in act, t h e ethos and praxis o f this "finality" in all respects singu
laris t h e " e x p e r i e n c e " in question. In a sense, philosophy after K a n t was c o n
tinuously the t h o u g h t o f an e x p e r i e n c e o f the impossible, that is, an e x p e r i e n c e
o f t h e intuitus originarius, o r t h e originary p e n e t r a t i o n by w h i c h there is a world,
existences, their "reasons," and their " e n d s . " T h e p r o b l e m was as follows:
With
out giving up on the strict critical delimitation of metaphysics, how can we reopen and
inaugurate anew the essence of the metaphysical capacity and demands, and therefore of
the discerning of reasons and ends?
O n t h e o t h e r h a n d , w h a t is " i m p o s s i b l e " a c c o r d i n g to t h e K a n t i a n c o n
text o f a d e l i m i t i n g "possible," tracing t h e circumference o f t h e n o n o r i g i n a r y
u n d e r s t a n d i n g (not creative o f its object, o r rather constructive o f its object,
b u t n o t creative o f t h e t h i n g , n o r c o n s e q u e n t l y o f t h e p r o v e n a n c e - a n d - e n d o f
t h e w o r l d ) , is also w h a t has c h a n g e d , since Descartes and especially since L e i b
niz, from t h e status o f t h e real t o t h e status o f t h e possible, n o w u n d e r s t o o d
n o t as delimiting, b u t r a t h e r as t h e u n l i m i t i n g m o d e o f o p e n n e s s and activity.
T h e w o r l d is a possibility before b e i n g a reality, reversing the perspective from
t h e given to t h e giving, from the result to t h e p r o v e n a n c e ( w i t h o u t forgetting,
however, that there is n o l o n g e r a g i v e r ) . T h e "best o f all possible w o r l d s " is an
expression that refers above all to t h e activity by w h i c h this w o r l d is d r a w n (or
10
draws itself) from t h e i m m e n s i t y o f possibilities. T h e t h i n k i n g that i n a u g u

rates plural m o n a d i c singularity is t h e o n e that transforms (but w i t h Descartes
and Spinoza) t h e r e g i m e o f t h o u g h t o f t h e p r o v e n a n c e - a n d - e n d o f the w o r l d :
from creation as a result o f an a c c o m p l i s h e d divine action, o n e shifts to c r e
ation as, in s u m , an u n c e a s i n g activity and actuality o f this w o r l d in its s i n g u
larity (singularity o f singularities). O n e sense o f the w o r d (creation as a state
o f affairs o f t h e given world) yields to a n o t h e r (creation as b r i n g i n g forth [mise
au monde] a w o r l d a n active sense that is n o t h i n g else t h a n t h e first sense o f
creatio). H e n c e , even t h e creature that was t h e finite image o f its creator" and
consequently
was b o u n d
to
represent
(interpret, figure)
creation,
itself
b e c o m e s a potential creator as subject o f possibilities and subject o f ends, as

. b e i n g o f distance a n d o f its o w n distance, o r still (or at the same time) c o n
fronts " c r e a t i o n " o r i g i n a n d e n d a s t h e i n c o m m e n s u r a b l e and impossible
o f its e x p e r i e n c e .
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Globalization
B u t that very fact, that there is in the w o r l d either t h e agency o r the p o w e r

or at least the question a n d / o r e x p e r i e n c e o f its o w n creation, is henceforth
given w i t h the world a n d as its very w o r l d l i n e s s w h i c h ,
from
created,
b e c o m e s creativeeven in the e n d as its w o r l d h o o d . T h e c u r r e n t state o f affairs

is that there is in t h e w o r l d o r even as the w o r l d ( u n d e r the n a m e " h u m a n i t y "
o r u n d e r o t h e r words, "history," "technology," "art," "existence") a p u t t i n g into
play o f its provenance a n d e n d , o f its being-possible a n d thus o f its b e i n g a n d
o f b e i n g in general, a n d that this p u t t i n g i n t o play itself b e the entire discernible
necessity in place o f a b e i n g necessarily situated above a n d b e y o n d the w o r l d .
12
Consequently, w h a t indirecdy appears as a n e w problematic o f " c r e a t i o n "

is t h e question o f a j u d g m e n t a b o u t ends that w o u l d n o t b e only a j u d g m e n t
extrapolated b e y o n d the limits o f t h e u n d e r s t a n d i n g , b u t also, o r rather, the
j u d g m e n t of a reason to w h i c h is given in advance n e i t h e r end(s) n o r means,
n o r anything that constitutes w h a t e v e r k i n d o f "causality k n o w n to us." T h e
j u d g m e n t a b o u t the "ends o f all t h i n g s " m u s t b e c o n c e r n e d w i t h a c o n d i t i o n
of b e i n g that w o u l d n o t d e p e n d o n causality o r finality, n o r c o n s e q u e n d y o n
mechanical consecution o r subjective i n t e n t i o n . By destituting the creating
G o d a n d the ens swnunimsufficient
reason o f t h e w o r l d K a n t also makes
clear that the reason o f the w o r l d pertains to a productive causality. H e opens

implicitly a n d outside o f theology a n e w question o f " c r e a t i o n " . . .
A t the same time, a second g u i d i n g indication is given to us: w h a t excludes
the ex nihilo from the Kantian u n d e r s t a n d i n g is the necessary p e r m a n e n c e o f
the u n i q u e p h e n o m e n a l substance in w h i c h changes o c c u r by way of causality.
B u t the uniqueness o f this substance is itself t h e correlation o f the "principle of
p r o d u c t i o n " (second Analogy) o f all p h e n o m e n a . N o w , w h a t w e have said thus
far forces us to posit that the principle, n o t o f all p h e n o m e n a b u t o f the totality
of p h e n o m e n a a n d o f p h e n o m e n a l i t y itself, o r the ontological principle o f the
p h e n o m e n a l i t y of the t h i n g in itself, precisely c a n n o t b e a principle o f p r o d u c
tion; it must b e that w h i c h appears indirecdy as a "creation," that is to say, a
provenance w i t h o u t p r o d u c t i o n . It is n e i t h e r procession n o r providence, n o r
project, a provenance w i t h o u t a pro-, p r o t o t y p e , o r p r o m o t e r o r else a pro- that
is nihil in the very p r o p e r t y o f pro-venance.
C o n s e q u e n d y , a n d even if w e still k n o w n o t h i n g o f such a "principle o f
creation," it could well b e that w h a t p r o d u c t i o n connects a p r i o r i as a n d in the
uniqueness o f a substance finds itself o n the contrary dispersed by c r e a t i o n
and n o less a p r i o r i i n an essential plurality o f substances: in a multiplicity o f
existences w h o s e singularity, each time, is precisely h o m o l o g o u s to existence, if
existence is i n d e e d that w h i c h detaches itself o r distinguishes itself absolutely
(what stands o u t in all t h e senses o f the expression), a n d n o t that w h i c h can b e
p r o d u c e d by s o m e t h i n g else.
13
66
Of Creation
In this sense, an existence is necessarily a finite cut o n (or in, o r o u t o f . . . )
t h e indefinite (or infinite as interminable) p e r m a n e n c e , in the same way that it
is t h e n o n p h e n o m e n a l u n d e r n e a t h (or in, o r o u t o f . . . ) the p h e n o m e n a l o f the
same p e r m a n e n c e . B u t this finitude is precisely w h a t constitutes the real and
absolute infinite o r t h e act o f this existence: and in this infinite it engages its
most proper end.
At least in t w o ways, conjoined and c o - i m p l i c a t e d o n e that pertains to the
provenance and destination o f t h e world, and o n e that concerns the plurality o f
subjectsthe Lyotardian question o f a j u d g m e n t a b o u t ends w i t h o u t given end
and w i t h o u t i d e o l o g i c a l unity, the question o f an e n d ad infinitum thus leads
toward a question that it seems inevitable to call the question o f "creation."
2
However, this needs to b e further clarified.
First, I only use t h e w o r d creation here in a preliminary o r provisional way,
reserving the h o p e o f b e i n g able to transform it. In t h e end, this w o r d c a n n o t
suffice for it is o v e r d e t e r m i n e d w i t h a n d overused by m o n o t h e i s m , although it
also indicates in this entire philosophical c o n t e x t the w e a r i n g o u t [usure] o f
m o n o t h e i s m itself (we will r e t u r n to this), and even if, furthermore, I d o n o t
k n o w w h a t w o r d c o u l d replace it, unless it is n o t a m a t t e r o f replacing it b u t o f
allowing it to b e erased in t h e existing o f existence.
T h r o u g h all t h e significations t h a t are associated w i t h it, t h e w o r d cre
ation refers, o n t h e o n e h a n d , to m o n o t h e i s t i c t h e o l o g i e s , " and, o n t h e o t h e r
h a n d , t o t h e intellectual m o n t a g e o f t h e idea o f a p r o d u c t i o n from n o t h i n g ,
a m o n t a g e so often a n d so vigorously d e n o u n c e d b y t h e adversaries o f
5
m o n o t h e i s m . ' T h e n o t h i n g o r n o t h i n g n e s s used as a m a t e r i a l cause supposes

in fact a p r o d i g i o u s efficient cause ( w h e r e t h e o l o g y seems t o yield to m a g i c ) ,
a n d supposes m o r e o v e r that t h e a g e n t o f this efficiency is itself a p r e e x i s t i n g
subject, w i t h its r e p r e s e n t a t i o n o f a final cause a n d o f a formal cause, unless
t h e latter preexists, for its p a r t , w h i c h w o u l d a c c e n t u a t e t h e c o n t r a d i c t i o n s .
Stated i n this way, in effect, that is, at least a c c o r d i n g t o t h e m o s t o r d i n a r y
t h e o l o g i c a l doxa, " c r e a t i o n " is t h e m o s t disastrous o f c o n c e p t s . ( O r else it is
necessary to state that t h e nihil s u b s u m e s t h e four causes t o g e t h e r , a n d w i t h
t h e m their subject: it o n l y r e m a i n s t h e n , a c c o r d i n g to all appearances, a w o r d
w i t h o u t a c o n c e p t . . .)
Further, o n e could s h o w that the intrinsic difficulties o f this n o t i o n have
led to t h e m o s t powerful and m o s t s u b d e theological and philosophical e l a b o
rations in all the great classical t h o u g h t s , in particular w i t h respect to the free-
67
Globalization
d o m of the creator in relation to o r in its creation, o r else c o n c e r n i n g its m o t i v e

o r absence o f m o t i v e and certainly o f its i n t e n t i o n o r o f its expectation (glory,
power, love . . . ) .
H o w e v e r , it h a p p e n s , a n d certainly it is n o accident, that t h e thinkers o f
the three m o n o t h e i s m s p a r t i c u l a r l y t h e J e w i s h , C h r i s t i a n a n d Islamic m y s
t i c s " h a v e d e v e l o p e d a t h i n k i n g , o r perhaps w e s h o u l d say an e x p e r i e n c e o f
t h o u g h t that is q u i t e different, a n d that o n e can find in t h e w o r k o f H e g e l
and Schelling a m o n g o t h e r s , a n d also certainly, albeit secretly, in H e i d e g g e r ,
b u t o n e , as I have suggested,-that was first implicit i n K a n t . N o w in this g r a n d
tradition, w h i c h is also, if o n e considers it full scope, a t h i n k i n g o f B e i n g (of
the B e i n g o f beings as a w h o l e ) o n t h e basis o f a m o n o t h e i s m in all o f its
forms a n d ultimate c o n s e q u e n c e s (the G r e e k t h i n k i n g o f B e i n g o n t h e basis
of w h i c h there is logos o f B e i n g , a l o n g w i t h t h e J e w i s h t h i n k i n g o f existence
o n t h e basis o f w h i c h there is an e x p e r i e n c e o f existence: a b l e n d i n g that
forms the strange " w i t h " o f o u r G r e e k - J e w c o n d i t i o n ) , o n e will find a
twofold simultaneous m o v e m e n t :
O n the o n e hand, the creator necessarily disappears in the very midst o f its
act, and w i t h this disappearance a decisive episode o f the entire m o v e m e n t
that I have sometimes n a m e d t h e " d e c o n s t r u c t i o n o f C h r i s t i a n i t y "
17
occurs,
a m o v e m e n t that is n o t h i n g b u t the m o s t intrinsic a n d p r o p e r m o v e m e n t of

m o n o t h e i s m as the integral absenting of G o d in t h e unity that reduces it in
and w h e r e it dissolves;
O n the o t h e r hand, and correlatively, B e i n g falls completely outside o f any

presupposed position and integrally displaces itself i n t o a transitivity by
w h i c h it is, and is only, in any existence, t h e infinitive o f a " t o exist," and the
conjugation o f this verb (Being is n o t the basis the existent, o r its cause, b u t
it " i s " it o r it "exists" it).
In this twofold m o v e m e n t , o n the o n e hand, the m o d e l o f causal p r o d u c
tion according to given ends has b e e n clearly delineated a n d classified in terms

of the object, representation, i n t e n t i o n and will. O n t h e o t h e r h a n d , t h e n o n m o d e l o r model-less-ness o f b e i n g w i t h o u t g i v e n w i t h o u t universal given,
w i t h o u t agent given and w i t h o u t presupposed o r desired ends, that is to say,
w i t h o u t o r w i t h n o t h i n g given, w i t h o u t o r w i t h n o gift givenhas revealed its
i n c o m m e n s u r a b l e real and will have challenged t h e j u d g m e n t that Kant, in fact,
advanced in his way, implicidy inscribing the enigma o f creation.
Being without given can only be u n d e r s t o o d w i t h t h e active sense o f the verb
18
" t o be," indeed, a transitive sense: " t o be," n o t as a substance or as a substrate,

even less as a result o r p r o d u c t , n o r as a state, n o r as a property, even less, if it is
68
Of Creation
possible, w i t h a simple function o f a copula. T h i s is t h e case because " t h e w o r l d
is" forms a c o m p l e t e proposition w i t h o u t the attribute o f its subject, b u t as an
act, and thus equivalent to "a doing," a l t h o u g h n o t c o n f o r m i n g t o any o f the
k n o w n m o d e s o f " d o i n g " (neither as a p r o d u c i n g n o r e n g e n d e r i n g n o r p r o v i d
i n g a m o d e l , n o r f o u n d i n g , in s u m , a " d o i n g " n e i t h e r d o n e n o r to b e d o n e . . . ) .
A transitive "being," w h o s e historical senses o f t h e terms used for the idea o f
" c r e a t i o n " only give vague approximations (bara, t h e H e b r e w t e r m reserved for
that divine act, kitzo, the G r e e k t e r m that signifies " t o plant," " d r a w from the
wild state," " t o establish," t h e Latin t e r m creo, the transitive f o r m o f cresco " t o
grow," thus " t o cultivate," to "care f o r " ) . "
T h i s being is i n c o m m e n s u r a b l e to any given as to any operation that s u p
poses a given p u t i n t o play (and an a g e n t - o p e r a t o r ) . Its substance is equal to its
operation, b u t its o p e r a t i o n does n o t operate any m o r e than it lets the . . . noth
ing b e o r m a k e (itself), a n o t h i n g , that is, as w e know, res, the t h i n g itself. This
b e i n g is n o t n o t h i n g , it is (transitively) nothing. It transits nothing into something,
or rather nothing transits itself into something.
T h i s t h e m e cuts short any t h o u g h t o f w h a t e v e r w o u l d remain b u r i e d at
t h e heart o f b e i n g o r at the very b o t t o m o f it. T h e r e is n o t h i n g w i t h d r a w n in
t h e i n n e r m o s t depths o f t h e origin, nothing but the nothing of origin. C o n s e quendy, the o r i g i n c a n n o t b e lost o r lacking, t h e w o r l d is lacking n o t h i n g ,
because the b e i n g o f t h e w o r l d is t h e t h i n g p e r m e a t e d by t h e n o t h i n g . Perhaps
this should b e decisively separated from any t h o u g h t o f the p h e n o m e n o n
(appearance/disappearance, p r e s e n c e / a b s e n c e ) , w i t h o u t for that m a t t e r a p p r o
priating the secret o f presence " i n itself": there is n o longer a t h i n g in itself o r
a p h e n o m e n o n b u t rather the transitivity o f b e i n g - n o t h i n g .
20
Is this n o t , in the
e n d , w h a t N i e t z s c h e h a d b e e n t h e first o n e to understand?
T h e withdrawal o f any given thus forms the heart o f a t h i n k i n g o f creation.
This is also w h a t distinguishes it from m y t h , for w h i c h , in a general manner,
there is s o m e t h i n g given, s o m e t h i n g primordial and w h i c h precedes it, w h i c h
constitutes p r e c e d e n c e itself, and the provenance from it. M o n o t h e i s m is n o
l o n g e r the regime o f t h e foundational m y t h , b u t o n e o f a history o f election and
o f destination: the u n i q u e G o d is absolutely n o t the r e u n i o n o r the s u b s u m p tion (nor t h e "spiritualization") o f multiple G o d s u n d e r a principle (a u n i q u e
principle figures very often at the foundation o f t h e mythological world).
O n e needs to state the following: " p o l y t h e i s m " and " m o n o t h e i s m " are n o t
related to each o t h e r like a multiplicity t o unity. In the first case, there are Gods,
that is, presences o f absence (because t h e absolutely general law o f any presence
is its multiplicity). In t h e s e c o n d case, there is atheism, o r the absenting o f pres
ence. T h e " G o d s " are n o l o n g e r a n y t h i n g b u t "places" w h e r e this absenting
arrives (to b e b o r n , to die, to feel, to enjoy, to suffer, to think, t o b e g i n and end).
69
Tlie Creadon of the World o r
Globalization
M o n o - t h e i s m o r a-theism is thus a c o m p l e t e m e t a m o r p h o s i s of divinity

and o r i g i n . N o t h i n g is given any longer, except that alone w h i c h is still given
(for t h e world of m y t h does n o t completely disappear, j u s t as the Babylonian
myths of t h e "creation of the w o r l d " infuse the " B o o k o f G e n e r a t i o n " o r " B o o k
o f Genesis"). It is the gift offered by the u n i q u e G o d , b u t if this gift is still given
from o n e side (this is creation as a state, t h e w o r l d received by m a n ) , it c a n n o t
b e r e d u c e d to that state: it is m o r e properly giving, it is t h e very act of gift a n d
in this act the singular history according to w h i c h t h e h u m a n b e i n g a n d w i t h
it all "creatures"is a p a r t n e r m o r e t h a n a simple recipient o f divine action (for
to receive the gift is part of the gift itself) is engaged.
In its p r o f o u n d truth, creation is thus n o t h i n g that pertains to a p r o d u c t i o n
o r fashioning o f the g r o u n d ; it is t h r o u g h and t h r o u g h the mobilization o f an
act a n d this act is that o f a relation b e t w e e n t w o actors o r agents, G o d and his
creature, c o n s e q u e n d y each o f t h e m singular. C r e a t i o n " m a k e s " w i t h " n o t h i n g , "
because it makes n o t h i n g that is the o r d e r o f a substrate: w h a t it " m a k e s " is his
tory and relation, and in this sense it is n o t h i n g n o r c o m e s from anything. It is
thus n o t a question any l o n g e r o f a " m a k i n g " b u t o f a "being," b u t only in the
sense that this being is nothing but the meaning of history or of the relation in which it
is engaged.
T h i s is w h y the m o s t n o t e d mystical version o f creation, that of the tsimtsoum o f t h e Lurianic kabala
21
states that the " n o t h i n g " of creation is the o n e
that opens in G o d w h e n G o d withdraws in it (and in s u m from it) in the act o f

creating. G o d annihilates itself [s'aneantit] as a "self" o r as a distinct b e i n g in
o r d e r to " w i t h d r a w " in its a c t w h i c h makes the o p e n i n g of the world.
C r e a t i o n forms, then, a nodal p o i n t in a " d e c o n s t r u c t i o n o f m o n o t h e i s m , "
insofar as such a d e c o n s t r u c t i o n proceeds from m o n o t h e i s m itself, and perhaps
is its m o s t active resource. T h e u n i q u e G o d , w h o s e unicity is the correlate o f
the creating act, c a n n o t precede its creation any m o r e that it can subsist above
it o r apart from it in s o m e way. It merges w i t h it: m e r g i n g w i t h it, it withdraws
in it, and w i t h d r a w i n g there it empties itself there, e m p t y i n g itself it is n o t h i n g
o t h e r than the o p e n i n g o f this void. O n l y the o p e n i n g is divine, b u t the divine
is n o t h i n g m o r e than the o p e n i n g .
T h e o p e n i n g is n e i t h e r t h e f o u n d a t i o n n o r t h e o r i g i n . N o r is t h e o p e n
i n g any l o n g e r a sort o f receptacle o r an extension p r i o r to things o f the w o r l d .
T h e o p e n i n g o f t h e w o r l d is w h a t o p e n s a l o n g such things and a m o n g t h e m ,
that w h i c h separates t h e m in their profuse singularity a n d w h i c h relates t h e m
to each o t h e r in their coexistence. T h e o p e n o r t h e " n o t h i n g " weaves the c o appearance o f existences w i t h o u t referring t h e m to s o m e o t h e r o r i g i n a r y o r
foundational unity. As Gerard Granel w r i t e s , " T h e o p e n needs the closed o r
even is a m o d e o f t h e closed, a c o n c r e t e expression o f t h e essential
70
finitude
Of Creation
that any form o f b e i n g m o d u l a t e s . . . it is at t h e Closed that t h e O p e n itself
opens, w o u n d s itself, a n d only in this w a y is o p e n . " " B u t t h e " f i n i t u d e " in
q u e s t i o n h e r e must, in t h e same m o v e m e n t , b e u n d e r s t o o d as t h e e n d in w h i c h
o r toward w h i c h t h e o p e n infinitely o p e n s itself: an e n d indefinitely multiplied
by a n d in every existing t h i n g in the w o r l d . T h e " w o r l d " itself is o n l y the u n a s
signable totality o f m e a n i n g o f all these ends that are o p e n b e t w e e n themselves
and t h e infinite.
T h e w o r l d o f m y t h , a n d o f polytheism, is the w o r l d o f given presupposi
tion. O n t o - t h e o l o g y t h e suspension o f m y t h i s , o n the contrary, the order
of posited presupposition: actively posited as t h e affirmation o f t h e u n i q u e G o d
a n d / o r as thesis o f B e i n g . Insofar as it is n o t given, b u t posited, t h e p r e s u p p o
sition also contains t h e principle o f its o w n deposition, since it c a n n o t p r e s u p
pose a n y t h i n g like a cause (nor thus therefore like an end) o r like a p r o d u c t i o n ,
w i t h o u t also e x t e n d i n g , correlatively, t h e limits o f t h e world. T h e presupposi
tion b e c o m e s there infinite o r null, a n d this simple statement contains the
entire p r o g r a m of o n t o - t h e o l o g y w i t h respect to t h e g r o u n d and w i t h respect
to t h e a u t o - d e c o n s t r u c t i o n o f this g r o u n d , that is, w i t h respect to its access to
t h e inconstructible. In o t h e r words, if nihilism corresponds to t h e accomplish
m e n t o f o n t o - t h e o l o g y according to t h e logic o f a " b a d " infinite of p r e s u p p o
sition, o n the o t h e r h a n d , a t h i n k i n g o f " c r e a t i o n " constitutes the exact reverse
of nihilism, c o n f o r m i n g to t h e logic o f a null presupposition ( w h i c h is equiva
lent as well to a " g o o d " infinite, o r actual infinite).
T h e ex niliilo contains n o t h i n g m o r e , b u t n o t h i n g less, than the e x - o f e x
istence that is n e i t h e r p r o d u c e d n o r constructed b u t only existing [etante] (or, if
o n e prefers, etee, " m a d e " from t h e m a k i n g constituted by the transitivity o f
being). A n d this ex nihilo fractures the deepest core of nihOism from w i t h i n .
N e i t h e r given n o r posited, t h e w o r l d is only present: the present o f the p r e
sent o f the day in w h i c h it exists, dies ///a. T h a t illustrious and infinitely distant
day, that day o f the e n d a n d o f the j u d g m e n t , is also the day o f all days, the today
o f each here. This presence neither differs n o r is derived from any o t h e r p r e
supposed presence, any m o r e than from an absence that w o u l d b e the negative
o f a presence: ex niliilo m e a n s that it is the nihil that opens a n d that disposes itself
as t h e space o f all presence (or even as o n e will see, o f all the presences).
In a sense, this presence does differ at all (it differs from n o t h i n g and it does
n o t differ from a n y t h i n g w h i c h is): the o n t o logical difference is null, a n d this is
certainly w h a t t h e proposition, according to w h i c h B e i n g is the B e i n g o f beings
and n o t h i n g other, m e a n s . B e i n g is: that t h e b e i n g exists.This is how, for e x a m pie, W i t t g e n s t e i n understands the m e a n i n g o f " c r e a t i o n " w h e n h e says that the
w o r d describes the e x p e r i e n c e that I have w h e n "I U'onder about the existence of
the tiw/rf."
23
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Globalization
" That the b e i n g is" can b e u n d e r s t o o d as the fiat o f creation. B u t this " t h a t "
conflates the indicative, the subjunctive, and t h e imperative: thus, the transitiv
ity o f the verb " t o b e " is m o d a l i z e d . T h e fact o f b e i n g is identical to t h e desire
for b e i n g and to the obligation o f b e i n g ; o r being, b y b e i n g , desires itself a n d
obliges itself. B u t in the absence o f any subject o f a desire, o r o f an order, this
means that the fiatthe
fact of the fiaterases
in itself the difference o f a
necessity a n d of a contingency, as well as that of a possible and o f a real. Since

n o t h i n g produces the being, there is neither c o n t i n g e n c y n o r necessity o f its
being, j u s t as t h e question o f the " f r e e d o m " o f a " c r e a t o r " disappears in the
identity o f freedom a n d o f necessity required by creation ex nihilo. T h e nullity
of t h e ontological difference is also t h e nullity o f t h e difference b e t w e e n n e c e s
sity a n d c o n t i n g e n c y a n d / o r freedom o r even b e t w e e n the " i s " a n d the " o u g h t "
of being.
Derrida's differance is t h e articulation o f t h e nullity o f the ontological dif
ference: it attempts to t h i n k that " b e i n g " is n o t h i n g o t h e r than the " e x " o f exis
1
tence. T h i s articulation is t h o u g h t as that o f a Self-presence that differs itself. *

B u t the "self" resolves itself in nihil as s o o n as the presupposition is deposed
(and deposes i t s e l f . . . ) : the itself/self [se/soi] is the presupposition par excellence
or absolutely, a n d it is n o t h i n g o t h e r (it is the presupposition w i t h its obligatory
corollary, the postposition o f an e n d , of a final cause o f the world). T h e supposed
(or the subject) b e c o m e s thus null o r infinite: it is itself the nihil and the ex-; it
is t h e ex nihilo.The
entire b e i n g - t o - s e l f o f the b e i n g o f t h e world, a n d its pres
e n c e consists in it. T h i s presence is n e i t h e r that o f a given present [Gegenwartigkeit, Vorhandenheit], n o r that o f a "self presenting." It is praes-entia, b e i n g
always-ahead-of-itself, stepping out of itself ex-nihilo. O n e should n o t understand
differance as a sort o f p e r m a n e n t flight o f an asymptotic a n d unattainable self (a
representation t o o frequent a n d t o o linked to a sort o f desire exhausting itself
in the infinite) b u t rather as t h e generating structure p r o p e r to t h e ex nihilo.
N o t h i n g presents itself-which
also m e a n s n o t even a n o t h i n g , n o r the
n o t h i n g present themselves: this is the e n d o f negative theology as well as the

e n d of a p h e n o m e n o l o g y in general, albeit that o f the u n a p p a r e n t . T h e present
does n o t present itself, and it is n o less exposed. It is n o t h i n g o t h e r than that,
and that is w h a t it falls to us to t h i n k henceforth.
In the B e i n g o r in the presence o f "creation," the infinite as n o t h i n g (in
finite = n o thing) passes into the finite. This is n o t an individuation o r a singularization, it is n o t a process o f p r o d u c t i o n o r o f generation a n d it is n o t a
dialectical m e d i a t i o n . T h e infinite is finite: it does n o t c o m e o u t o f itself ad extra
it is rather hollowed " i n itself" (in nothing) from its o w n withdrawal w h i c h also
constitutes its o p e n i n g in w h i c h finite singularities dispose themselves. This
o p e n i n g as n o t h i n g , w h i c h n e i t h e r presents n o r gives itself, is o p e n e d r i g h t at
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Of Creation
the same level o f [a mime] t h e finite singularities as their b e i n g together o r their
b e i n g - w i t h , a n d constitutes the disposition o f the world.
As its n a m e indicates, rf/s-position is a gap, a n d its m o d e l is m o r e spatial
than t e m p o r a l . R a t h e r t h a n t h e infinite delay o f a differance to itself in the sense
o f a differing from itself, o r else as finitude itselfthat is to say, the absolute
ness-of this delay (and not its finishing), it is the infinitely finite spacing o f the
singularities that constitute the event o f B e i n g o r the event o f "being." B u t
stricdy speaking, there is n e i t h e r b e i n g n o r event: n o t h i n g comes from n o r
c o m e s forth if n o t h i n g is presupposed. T h e r e are existences, their styles, their
c o m i n g s a n d goings . . .
A c c o r d i n g t o this archi-spatiality o f disposition, w h i c h is also the spa
ciousness o f the o p e n i n g , w h a t is at stake is n o t a provenance o f B e i n g (nor a
b e i n g o f provenance o r o f origin), b u t a spacing o f presences. T h e s e presences
are necessarily p l u r a l . T h e y d o n o t c o m e from the dispersion o f a presence: they
are existing, b u t less in t h e sense o f an ekstasis from an i m m a n e n t "self" ( e m a
nation, generation, expression, etc.) than as disposed together a n d exposed to
each other. T h e i r coexistence is an essential d i m e n s i o n o f their presences at the
edges o f w h i c h t h e o p e n i n g opens. T h e co- is implicated in the ex-: n o t h i n g
exists unless with, since, n o t h i n g exists unless ex nihilo. T h e first feature o f the
creation o f t h e w o r l d is that it creates t h e with o f all things: that is to say the
world, namely, t h e nihil as that w h i c h opens [ouvre] a n d forms [ceuvre] t h e world.
C o e x i s t e n c e is n e i t h e r given n o r constructed. T h e r e is n o schematizing
subject a n d n o p r i o r gift.
25
N o r , consequently, is it "self-giving": a u n i q u e pres
ence, w i t h o u t d o u b t , w o u l d give itself (it w o u l d a m o u n t to t h e same thing, p e r

haps, b e i n g t h e cause o f itself, to b e causa sui like G o d ) . B u t coexistence is the
gift and t h e h o l d i n g back j u s t as it is the subject a n d the thing, presence and
absence, p l e n i t u d e a n d void. C o e x i s t e n c e is that w h i c h coheres w i t h o u t b e i n g
" o n e " a n d w i t h o u t b e i n g sustained by a n y t h i n g else, o r rather by b e i n g sus
tained b y n o t h i n g : b y t h e nothing o f t h e co- that is i n d e e d n o t h i n g b u t t h e i n b e t w e e n o r the w i t h o f t h e b e i n g - t o g e t h e r o f singularities. T h a t n o t h i n g - w i t h
is t h e n o n - c a u s e o f t h e w o r l d , material, efficient, formal, a n d final. This means
b o t h that the w o r l d is simply there (it is o r it permeates its "there," its spacing)
and that it is t h e coexistence that it does n o t contain b u t that o n the contrary
" m a k e s " it.
T h a t the world is there means that it is n o w h e r e since it is the o p e n i n g o f
space-time.That it is coexistence means that its o p e n i n g opens it in all the senses,
partes extra partes, spatio-temporal dis-positing dispersion, and b e t w e e n space and
2
. time just as the o n e in the other, a m a n n e r identical to its proper distention. ''
Such is the Auseinandertreten
of w h i c h Heidegger speaks, and w h o s e division o r
decision opens, in Heidegger's vocabulary, the belongingness to B e - i n g .
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27
Globalization
T h e separation, the stepping-out-of-one-another, is at the same time, Entscheidung, decision: it is to the decision o f Being, the decision o f n o t h i n g into
being or to being, that responds, o n the o n e hand, the disposition o r the (diffrac
tion o f the world that is (that makes) the world, and, o n the o t h e r hand, the d e c i
sion of existence by w h i c h a "subject" comes to the world. " C o r n i n g to the
w o r l d " means birth and death, e m e r g i n g from n o t h i n g and going to nothing,
w h i c h are the relation to the world or the relation-world, the sharing o f its m e a n
ing and the w h o l e of existence as an ensemble o r partition o f singular decisions.
It is for us to decide for ourselves.
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Ill
Creation as Denaturation:
Metaphysical Technology
1
Philosophy begins from itself: this is a p e r m a n e n t a x i o m for it, w h i c h is implicit
o r explicit in t h e w o r k o f all philosophers, except, perhaps, for M a r x w h i c h
remains t o b e d e t e r m i n e d i f w e can assume M a r x is i n d e e d a philosopher,
w h i c h also remains to b e d e t e r m i n e d ; in any case, the assertion holds, clearly,
from Plato to H e i d e g g e r . Philosophy can represent to itself w h a t precedes its
o w n b e g i n n i n g as an early stage (an infancy, t h e very beginnings o f reason), o r
else as simply an e x t e r i o r i t y (a mythical w o r l d foreign to that of logos). In any
case, this properly philosophical initiative belongs to philosophy itself. In a c o r
relative a n d identical way, philosophy gives itself its o w n n a m e : n o t only does
it baptize itself, b y i n a u g u r a t i n g itself a n d in order to inaugurate itself, w i t h the
n a m e philo-sophia, b u t it is philosophy itself that forges this w o r d , the first o f all
the termini technici that it w o u l d forge in t h e course o f history (and it tells itself
the history, o r t h e legend o f this linguistic initiative).
Philosophy begins as t h e self-productive technology o f its o w n n a m e , its
discourse, a n d its discipline. It engenders o r it fabricates its o w n c o n c e p t o r its
o w n Idea for itself at t h e same t i m e that it invents o r constructs these instru
m e n t a l a n d ideal realities o f the " c o n c e p t " a n d t h e "Idea." In this operation, the
best k n o w n a n d m o s t p r o m i n e n t feature is the differentiation o f itself from
w h a t is called "sophistry": w i t h respect t o this technology o f logos, philosophy
defines itself a n d constitutes itself as that techne that is at the same time differ
e n t from any o t h e r techne because it speaks first, o r finally, the t r u t h about it. In
that very way, it invents itself also in its difference from any o t h e r k n o w l e d g e ,
any o t h e r discipline, o r any o t h e r s c i e n c e . W i t h respect to this major difference,
its self-institution is t h e key.
In o r d e r t o conceive o f its o w n provenance, philosophy m u s t choose o n e
o f t h e following alternatives: either it represents its provenance as the p r o d u c t
o f a c o n t i n u o u s progression o f humanity, o r it represents it as an accident w i t h
o u t conditions o r reasons. In either case, philosophy is deficient o r lacking w i t h
respect to its tasks. In the first case, it m u s t retroactively project a s c h e m e o f
g r o w t h o r progress p r i o r to the b i r t h o f philosophy that raises t w o difficulties:
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Globalization
first, s o m e t h i n g o f philosophy must b e presupposed p r i o r to it, and in that case,

philosophy w o u l d n o t have b e g u n from itself; second, this s c h e m e must also b e
e x t e n d e d ahead o f it and as the s c h e m e o f b o t h its o w n history and history in
general, w h i c h has n o t failed to provoke, in the history o f philosophy, w e l l k n o w n questions o n the n o t i o n of "progress" in general (that is to say, in the
final analysis c o n c e r n i n g a supposed naturality a n d / o r c o n c e r n i n g its scientificity: thus c o n c e r n i n g the constitution o f its p r o p e r techne). B u t in t h e sec
o n d casewith the thesis o f the accident that considers t h e West t o be an acci
dent, according to the formulation so often repeated, a n d w h i c h can either refer
to a happy accident, " t h e miracle o f Greece," o r else an u n h a p p y accident, a
metaphysical decline from the fleeting d a w n o f t h e m e a n i n g o f B e i n g , w h i l e
r e m a i n i n g subject to the same s c h e m e o f accident a n d c o n t i n g e n c y i n this
case philosophy fails to confer the least necessity to its techne, and it can fur
t h e r m o r e n o t tolerate an appeal to it, in a m o r e o r less explicit m a n n e r , to a cat
egory as inconsistent and as unphilosophical as w h a t is previously designated by
the expression " t h e miracle o f Greece." W e will say that this expression is n o t
philosophical b u t purely, and weakly, ideological. Still, it w o u l d be necessary to
k n o w w h a t is m e a n t by "ideology," that is, h o w w e distinguish it from p h i l o s
o p h y : this leads us b a c k to the first formulations o f the p r o b l e m .
B y willing itself auto-initiating a n d thus auto-finite o r auto-finalizedand
by willing itself auto- in a general way, in b e i n g and in only b e i n g able to b e the
will of the auto- in the t w o meanings o f the genitivephilosophy betrays a n d
reveals the history o f a same m o v e m e n t , if o n e can, at least, try to understand
by " h i s t o r y " in a provisional way, the reality o f a m o v e m e n t a n d o f a t e m p o r a l
ity that w o u l d n o t b e split b e t w e e n teleological necessity and blind accidentality a n d closed o n its o w n discontinuity. (Isn't the entire p r o b l e m for history
today to resolve this antinomy?)
Philosophy betrays history, because history, if it designates anything, desig
nates above all n o n b e g i n n i n g and n o n c o m p l e t i o n by itself. If s o m e t h i n g such
as a process-by-itself, speaking absolutely, is given s o m e w h e r e o r in s o m e way,
it excludes, in principle, any history: n o t h i n g can h a p p e n to it except its o w n
reduction as a process i n t o a result. (This is exacdy t h e p o i n t a r o u n d w h i c h o n e
can debate the w e l l - k n o w n m o d e l o f " H e g e l i a n h i s t o r y " indefinitely: the p o i n t
is to k n o w w h e t h e r the process is absorbed in the result, o r w h e t h e r the result
is n o t , rather and w i t h o u t reserve, t h e process itself w i t h o u t final result. O n e
will say as m u c h , and a fortiori, o f a Marxist history leading to the activity o f a
"free labor," the p r o d u c t i o n o f a result as an infinite p r o d u c t i o n . . . )
History is the order o f w h a t locates the o r i g i n and t h e e n d elsewhere, in
a n o t h e r timethat is to say, in time itself, since it is n o t h i n g b u t t h e alterity and
the alteration o f the same, o r o f the same altering itself. H i s t o r y is n o t "nature,"
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Creation as Denaturation
if " n a t u r e " has its o r i g i n and e n d in itself (supposing that nature exists or rather
that it still exists in a history that precisely locates elsewhere, w i t h o u t end, the
very naturality o f any nature: as if that history i n c l u d e d henceforth the natura
naturans o f any natura naturata and, c o n s e q u e n d y also its natura denaturans). H i s
tory is t h e infinite deferral o f any nature, and this is why, from n o w o n , t h e fol
l o w i n g question occurs to us: Was there ever "nature," since there was history,
a n d thus an indefinite deferral o f any nature? Was there ever a "prehistory," n o t
only in t h e sense o f a h u m a n prehistory, a n t e r i o r to a history conceived and
archived as such (the history c o n t e m p o r a n e o u s w i t h philosophy), b u t in the
sense o f a n o n h u m a n prehistory, a n d even p r i o r to life, a history o f the w o r l d
o r o f t h e Universe that had n o t already b e e n always already historical in s o m e
way? T h i s question leads to at least t w o others: that o f k n o w i n g w h e t h e r there
can b e s o m e " p o s t h i s t o r y " in w h a t e v e r sense, and second, that o f k n o w i n g
w h e t h e r it is possible, in a parallel and basically coessential o r c o d e t e r m i n e d
m a n n e r , o f designating a p r e - a n d / o r a post philosophy . . .
W i t h o u t claiming t o confront these questions as such, here and now, w e
will agree perhaps there c a n n o t n o t b e in s o m e fashion a "history o f the world,"
if t h e w o r l d turns o u t n o t to have in itself its origin and its end, and that even
if, and especially if any " o u t s i d e " o f t h e w o r l d must b e t h o u g h t as nothing, and
even if, and especially if, the m e a n i n g o f the world is n o t h i n g o t h e r than the
w o r l d itself in its o r i g i n a r y and final relation w i t h an infinite deferral o f the o r i
gin and t h e e n d in that nothing o f w h i c h it w o u l d b e the e x p a n s i o n t h a t is to
say, the g r o w t h o r the creation (it is t h e same word) o r even . . . the history.
T h e r e is thus a betrayal o f t h e principle o f history and o f the world in the
philosophical self-constitution and self-beginning. T h i s betrayal reveals itself by
the fact that philosophy m u s t relinquish the task of t h i n k i n g a history o f the
w o r l d if it is c o m m i t t e d to a s c h e m e o f a p r o p e r e m e r g e n c e : for t h e n it excludes
t h i n k i n g that t h e w o r l d outside o f philosophy can b e c o n n e c t e d in any way to
philosophical history. It is in a sense w h a t , in the philosophical foundation, the
division omuthos a n d logos signifies: this division \partage] is h o m o l o g o u s , in the
w o r k o f all t h e philosophers from Plato t o Heidegger, w i t h t h e s c h e m e o f selfconstitution and its aporias, a m o n g w h i c h that o f history is t h e m o s t i m p o r t a n t .
B u t philosophy, at t h e same t i m e (if it is the same time, if it is n o t an o t h e r
time
o f a n o t h e r history that w o u l d r e m a i n to be written) reveals history.
Indeed, the self-designation o f philosophy as self-foundation,
self-beginning,
and 5e/f-completion, belongs to t h e same operation, w h i c h also consists in p r o b lematizing from the outset (and again at the same time) any structure and any
process that is anfo-constitutive and d//fo-referential. It is precisely b y defining
itself as an a u t o n o m o u s process a n d thus as history (philosophy is history a n d
makes history as s o o n as Plato refers to its p r o p e r provenance in Anaxagoras,
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Globalization
Parmenides, a n d Socrates) that philosophy unveils t h e problematic order o f an

a u t o - c o n s t i t u t i o n that must appropriate itself (that is to say, a u t o - c o n s t i t u t e
itself) t h r o u g h the m e d i a t i o n o f its o w n temporal a n d genealogical difference
along w h i c h the auto- alters itself primordially as m u c h as it identifies itself. B u t ,
at t h e same time, it is outside o f this history that the possibility o f an a u t o - c o n
stitution was designated: in an order o f phusis as t h e o r d e r o f that w h i c h is for
itself the gift a n d the i m m e d i a t e genesis o f its o w n nomos, its o w n techne, a n d
its o w n logos. B u t t h e logos, properly speaking, forms itself from that w h i c h it
has to conquer, mediately, diz-logically, o r dia-lectically, a phusis that is n o t given
to it (or if o n e prefers a phusis that it gives itself only by immediately dividing
from itself, dia-lectically a n d thus historically).
A remarkable chiasm occurs in w h i c h t h e " a u t o " a n d the "alio," the " b y
itself" a n d the " b y the other," c o n t i n u o u s l y e x c h a n g e their places. T h i s chiasm
is t h e very e m e r g e n c e o f philosophy, o f t h e W e s t , a n d o f history. Instantaneously,
and at the same time, t w o times are inaugurated: the chronical or chronological t i m e
of history a n d the achronical o r anachronical time of an outside o f history. B u t the
first, the time of autochronic, in s u m , is the time o f difference o r as difference,
w h i l e the second as h e t e r o c h r o n i c (its time outside o f time) will b e the time
(or t h e space) o f given n o n d e f e r r e d identity. Philosophy constitutes this spacet i m e as that o f t h e muthos.
T h e following paradoxes result: at t h e same time the space-time o f t h e
muthos falls outside o f history and b e c o m e s the first time o r t h e p r e h i s t o r y o f
history, h e n c e f o r t h perfectly p r o b l e m a t i c since it is b o t h inside a n d outside
historicity. N o w , this p r o b l e m is n o t h i n g b u t the p r o b l e m o f t h e historicity o f
p h i l o s o p h y itself, a n d o f the impossibility o f t h i n k i n g its o w n b e g i n n i n g : the
p r o p e r b e g i n n i n g o f the a u t o - b e g i n n i n g . In a parallel m a n n e r , by designating
and instituting itself, p h i l o s o p h y designates an o t h e r i t s other, its proper
o t h e r a r e g i m e o f m e a n i n g a n d o f t r u t h : a r e g i m e o f a//o-constitution w h e r e
the t r u t h is given, b u t n o t to b e c o n q u e r e d . In w h a t p h i l o s o p h y baptizes as
muthos, t r u t h is given from an " o u t s i d e " that is n o t a past a n d that is n o t t h e
process o f an (auto) p r o d u c t i o n , w h i c h is i m m e m o r i a l a n d c o n s e q u e n d y
always present, b u t is a presence, w h i c h escapes from t h e instantaneous insta
bility o f the philosophical present. P h i l o s o p h y is the destabilization, t h e sus
pension, a n d t h e dissolution o f the mythical present. T h i s is w h y its obsessive
fear b e c o m e s t h e present a n d t h e presence of time, o r rather its absence,
namely, chronical t i m e . B u t in this w a y p h i l o s o p h y conceals its o w n presence,
and its o w n c o m i n g to presence.
T h e withdrawal of the b e g i n n i n g belongs to t h e self-beginning. T h e
1
b e g i n n i n g remains u n g r o u n d e d . T h e question o p e n e d by philosophy in its his

tory a n d as history, the question o p e n e d by philosophical historicity as an
80
essentially auto-constitutive d i m e n s i o n o f philosophy, is the following: Is it o r
is it n o t possible to assume the n o n f o u n d a t i o n o f the b e g i n n i n g as the r e a s o n
thus as the g r o u n d o f t h e historical process itself? B u t this question is o b v i
ously n o t h i n g o t h e r than the foEowing: Is it possible o r n o t to assume the n o n foundation o f t h e West as the reason for its o w n history? A n d since this history
b e c o m e s t h e history o f the w o r l d : is it possible o r n o t to assume t h e n o n f o u n
dation o f t h e history o f t h e world? T h i s means: Is it possible to make history, to
begin again a h i s t o r y o r H i s t o r y itself-on t h e basis o f its n o n f o u n d a t i o n ? Is it
possible to assume b o t h t h e absence o f t h e a u t o - c o n s t i t u t i o n (thus a relation to
t h e prephilosophical o t h e r t h a n t h e entirely problematic relation t o t h e lost and
desired exteriority o f phusis and tnuthos) and t h e absence o f a u t o - c o m p l e t i o n
(thus the e n d o f teleologies, theologies, a n d messianisms)?
2
S u c h a question is that o f metaphysics and technology. If metaphysics, as such,
itself essentiaEy historical, accomplishes itself in t h e form o f technology, and if
t e c h n o l o g y m u s t be u n d e r s t o o d as t h e planetary d o m i n a t i o n o f the absence o f
b e g i n n i n g and end, o r o f t h e w i t h d r a w a l o f any initial o r final givenof
phusis o r o f any muthoshow
any
can o n e conceive o f this process and thus c o n
ceive o f history e x c e p t according to the exhausted t h e m e s o f progress a n d / o r

o f decline, o f the fortunate a n d / o r u n f o r t u n a t e accident?
T h e c o m p l e t i o n o f metaphysicsits end and its plenitudehappens
in his
tory insofar as it is precisely the a c c o m p l i s h m e n t o f t h e historical possibility

itself, o r the a c c o m p l i s h m e n t o f t h e " m e a n i n g o f history" as it has b e e n r e c o g
nized at least since Nietzsche, b u t perhaps also, in a m o r e c o m p l e x manner,
since H e g e l himself, a n d in the way in w h i c h Husserl and H e i d e g g e r have
a t t e m p t e d to grasp it as p r o b l e m and as resource at t h e same time.
T h e historical possibility, properly speaking, as it was p r o d u c e d in its course
by philosophy (or metaphysics: t h e possibility o f a metaphysical history a n d a
metaphysics o f history) is t h e possibility that a process w o u l d c o m p l e t e the real
ization o f a reason, o f a g r o u n d , and o f a rationality. It is thus the possibility that
t h e historical process functions as a natural process. Metaphysical history is his
t o r y t h o u g h t as physics: as a "natural history," to use this old expression in w h i c h
precisely " h i s t o r y " did n o t yet have t h e m e a n i n g o f a process, b u t o f a "coUect i o n . " T h e t r u t h o f this history was that in t h e end, it d e n i e d itself as history by
. b e c o m i n g nature (again).
In this elaboration, that w h i c h is exhausted is the bringing to completion.
W h e t h e r the t e r m is n a m e d presence, subject, Supreme Being, o r total humanity,
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Globalization
in each case the capacity of assumption and absorption of a terminus ad quern is

exhausted. Very precisely, w h a t is exhausted is n o t h i n g o t h e r than the exhausting
itself in an end (teleology). Now, it is this exhaustion (accomplishment, maturation)
that philosophy had constituted as a history after having remodeled according to
Christian salvation, itself understood as a temporal process, the anamnesic m o v e
m e n t of the Platonic u-topia or of the ec-topia.What is exhausted is thus the pres
ence of a terminal present of history, a presence that w o u l d n o longer be praesentia, being-ahead-of-itself, but only b e equal to itself, in itself indifferent.
T h a t the exhaustion is e x h a u s t e d t h a t natural history breaks d o w n a n d is
denaturedis w h a t is s h o w n by the r u p t u r e that philosophy carries o u t by, in,
o r o n itself: a historical r u p t u r e o f its history, w h i c h H e i d e g g e r called the " e n d
o f p h i l o s o p h y " to indicate the d e p t h a n d seriousness o f that w h i c h in history
thus happens to History, and by virtue o f w h i c h a "history o f b e i n g " or a " d e s tinality"
o f its "sendings," perhaps even the e n d o f the these sendings t h e m

2
selves, can only, at least, be denatured. B u t this denaturation
is w h a t requires us to
consider the e x t e n t to w h i c h , at w h a t d e p t h p r o p e r l y w i t h o u t g r o u n d h i s
tory is n o t and c a n n o t be a u t o - g e n e r a t i n g o r autotelic, the e x t e n t t o w h i c h , t h e n ,
it c a n n o t r e t u r n to itself o r in itself, o r reabsorb itself in any " e n d o f history." It
requires us, o n the contrary, to see finally, as if before us, the difference and the
alteration o f t h e auto that metaphysics, w h i l e p r o d u c i n g it, first endeavored to
cover or deny.
Consequently, if o u r expectation o f the future is henceforth deprived of
anticipation, o f representation, and o f concept, it must n o less, like a Kantian
j u d g m e n t w i t h o u t concept, form a postulation of t r u t h ( a n d / o r o f universal) as
a n o n - g i v e n truth: " d e n a t u r a t i o n " must itself b e postulated as t h e " r e a s o n " o f the
process, of that history w h o s e form is also that of an errancy. N o n - g i v e n , n e i
ther as seed n o r as c o m p l e t i o n w h i c h also means, always, n o n - m y t h o l o g i c a l
truth is first, as such, o p e n and o p e n to itself: it is the structure and the substance
of an e n c o u n t e r w i t h itself, awaiting a n d / o r loyalty toward itself, toward the self
that is n o t given. In this sense, t r u t h empties itself o f all presentable contents
( w h e t h e r o n e thinks o f it in a sacral m o d e o r in m o d e o f positive k n o w l e d g e ) .
B u t this void is the void of the exhaustion o f w h i c h I have spoken: truth is
e m p t y o r rather emptied of any " c o n t e n t , " of the plethora o r the saturation of a
completion, e m p t i e d of the plethora and therefore o p e n in itself and o n itself.
This means, above all, that it is o p e n o n the question o f its o w n historic
ity. T r u t h t h e t r u t h o f philosophy and o f historycan d o n o t h i n g else, h e n c e
forth, than o p e n o n t o the abyss o f its o w n b e g i n n i n g , o r o f its o w n absence o f
b e g i n n i n g , e n d and g r o u n d .
T h e historical gesturethat is, b o t h t h e theoretical gesture w i t h respect to
"history," o f its concept, and the practical, active gesture in o u r time, in order to
82
appropriate this time, in o r d e r to ereignen a n o t h e r story [chronique] o f the
w o r l d t h i s gesture b e c o m e s t h e n necessarily " d e c o n s t r u c t i o n . " To " d e c o n
struct" m e a n s to disassemble w h a t has built u p o n t h e beginnings in order to
expose that w h i c h b u r r o w s b e n e a t h t h e m . It is therefore the same t h i n g to
destabilize (not destroy) the structure o f the philosophical (or metaphysical) tra
dition and to destabilize the historical a u t o - p o s i t i o n i n g of that tradition. W h a t
was built, from w h a t b e g i n n i n g s a n d h o w these beginnings are d e t e r m i n e d as
s u c h a n d still a n d perhaps above all, as I w o u l d like to show, w h a t is the p r o v e
n a n c e o f these beginnings? " D e c o n s t r u c t i o n " perhaps m e a n s n o t h i n g other,
ultimately, t h a n t h e following: it happens h e n c e f o r t h that philosophy c a n n o t
u n d e r s t a n d itself apart from the question o f its p r o p e r historicityand n o
longer only in t h e sense of its internal historicity, b u t also in the sense o f its
external provenance, b u t also in a way such that the external provenance and
internal p r o d u c t i o n are inextricably tied. (This is w h y it can only involve edges,
extremities, ends, o r limits o f philosophy w i t h o u t , clearly, any a c c o m p l i s h m e n t
o r c o m p l e t i o n . W h a t else is, ultimately, at issue w i t h H e i d e g g e r and w i t h D e r rida [who, in part despite Heidegger, opens again this d i m e n s i o n o f d e c o n
struction] if n o t t h e following: that philosophy c a n n o t r e t u r n to itself n o r in
itself as its autology requires, except by e x c e e d i n g its a u t o n o m y and thus its o w n
history in every respect?)
T h e beginnings o f philosophy: the w o r d must be w r i t t e n as plural, for it is
n o t possible to n a m e only o n e , b u t n e i t h e r is it possible to n a m e n o n e . (To d e s
ignate only o n e b e g i n n i n g w o u l d n o d o u b t already submit to the metaphysical
3
denial o f alteration). P h i l o s o p h y certainly b e g a n as such and it stated that it

began: n o d o u b t it never stated itself w i t h o u t stating also that it begins and that
it begins itself again. B u t t h e subject, w h i c h it wants to be, o f this inauguration,
u n d o e s itself o r destitutes itself, as w e saw, in the very gesture o f its i n a u g u r a
tion. In this way, philosophy always institutes itself in a m i x t u r e o f decision and
indecision w i t h respect to its o w n subject; and " d e c o n s t r u c t i o n " in s u m is c o n
genital for it since it constructs itself o n t h e u n d e r s t a n d i n g that it m u s t be a n t e
r i o r to its edifice and even to its o w n plan.
T h i s m i x t u r e o f decision and i n d e c i s i o n o r the decision o f positing itself
w i t h o u t a decision b e i n g reached a b o u t itself o r a b o u t the immediately infinite
mobilization o f this d e c i s i o n c a n b e analyzed in a m o r e precise m a n n e r . By
b e g i n n i n g , philosophy prescribed to itself as its most p r o p e r law b o t h an i m p o s
sible amanesis (in t h e i m m e m o r i a l ) o f its o w n origin, and a blind perspective o n
the t r u t h it awaits, to w h i c h it tends o r seeks. O n the o n e hand, philosophy p r e sents itself as b e i n g w i t h o u t b e g i n n i n g o r b e g i n n i n g by itself ( w h o c o m e s to
free t h e prisoner from t h e cave?), and, o n t h e o t h e r hand, t r u t h absents itself in
the obscurity o r in t h e blinding light o f w h a t must c o m e , insofar precisely as it
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Globalization
must c o m e w i t h o u t ever arriving, like the last step, never reached o r secured,
w h i c h passes b e y o n d the dialectical ascension, a n d w h i c h does n o t b e l o n g to
the chronological time o f succession a n d o f a c c o m p l i s h m e n t .
T h e double postulation o f a r e t u r n to the i m m e m o r i a l a n d an advance to
w h a t does n o t c o m e designates w h a t w e call "metaphysics": a metaphysics that
is said to b e " e n d e d , " only in o r d e r to say that it exhausts that w h i c h claims to
c o m p l e t e b o t h its retrospection a n d prospection. B o t h m u s t b e incapable o f
ending: they m u s t b e the very i n c o m p l e t i o n c o n f o r m i n g to the essence o f p h i
losophy, w h i c h turns o u t also to b e indissociable from its history, its e x t e n d e d
i m m o b i l i t y (metaphysics) into the absenting o f its o r i g i n a n d its end.
It follows from these premises that t w o claims must b e set forth in the same
m o m e n t : metaphysics is w i t h o u t b e g i n n i n g o r e n d , a n d metaphysics begins a n d
ends. It perhaps does n o t cease to b e g i n a n d to e n d , t h e " w i t h o u t - b e g i n n i n g o r - e n d . " It is in this sense that it is finite, in t h e structural a n d n o n d i a c h r o n i c
sense: it is finite in that it articulates a non-given o f m e a n i n g o r o f s o m e m e a n
ing (a " n o n - g i v e n " that constitutes, n o d o u b t , the " v o i d " o f its truth: o n t o l o g i cal finitude is w h a t opens o n the v o i d b u t it is b e i n g that is o p e n e d by this
very o p e n i n g , b e i n g insofar as it is n o t b u t opens itself i n / a s space-time). S t r u c
tural finitude deconstructs historical endings [finitions] (for example, such fig
ures as rationalism, empiricism, o r criticism, a n d the figure o f o n t o - t h e o l o g y , o r
even the
figurative
figure
labeled as " o n t o - t y p o l o g y " by Lacoue-Labarthe).
Similarly, w i t h an unlimited scope, metaphysics itself always begins, has b e g u n ,

and begins again, as Abbau o f w h a t is gebaut (and that always has t h e character
o f b e i n g a t e m p l e o r a palace, o f a residence a n d o f a m o n u m e n t , thus also an
empire o r enterprise).
F r o m the outset, o r even ahead o f itself, in a history u n d e r w a y before its
h i s t o r y b e t w e e n the twelfth a n d n i n e t e e n t h c e n t u r y before o u r e r a p h i l o s
o p h y was the d e c o n s t r u c t i o n o f t h e edifices o f a w o r l d that s h o o k the m y t h o religious w o r l d o f given m e a n i n g , a n d o f full a n d present t r u t h . T h e unsettling
o f this w o r l d was the c o n d i t i o n , perhaps already the b e g i n n i n g , o f philosophy,
of history, a n d of t h e " W e s t e r n accident": a n d if o n e looks back toward w h a t
m a d e this accident possible, o n e will presumably have to t h i n k even m o r e so
that it was hardly an " a c c i d e n t " i n t h e ordinary sense (and perhaps hardly
" W e s t e r n " in the ordinary s e n s e t h e " W e s t " having already p r e c e d e d itself,
and having b e e n dispersed in the a n t e r i o r history o f t h e world, j u s t as, today, it
succeeds itself, disseminated in a b e c o m i n g - w o r l d
[devenir-monde]).
In the w o r l d w h e r e philosophy is b o r n , a w o r l d w i t h i n w h i c h a n u m b e r
of d e t e r m i n a t e
technologies
were
developed
(iron, w r i t i n g ,
commercial
a c c o u n t i n g t o w h i c h w e will r e t u r n ) , tragedy begins as f o r m i n g b o t h the last

testimony o f cult a n d of sacrifice, a n d as t h e first attestation o f a flight o f m e a n -
84
ing and o f t h e abyss o f t r u t h : frankly, it is in this way that the terms o r the c o n
cepts, o r t h e questions o f m e a n i n g and o f t r u t h are p r o d u c e d . T h e four c o n d i
tions o f philosophy identified by B a d i o u , w h i c h I m e n t i o n here for their clar
ity, and w h o s e n a m e s and n o t i o n s are also p r o d u c e d in this m o m e n t p o l i t i c s ,
science, art, and l o v e c o m p o s e a four-part multiplication o f this flight and of
this o p e n i n g . I will n o t dwell o n the four dispositions o f w h a t o n e could call
the inaugural flight [echappee] o f t h e West: w e see w i t h o u t difficulty h o w each is
structured by this fleeing into absens (to b o r r o w a w o r d from Blanchot). Poli
tics, science, love, and art are four structures o f t h e impossible. A t t h e same time,
w h a t the four have in c o m m o n is a n o t h e r transversal d i m e n s i o n of t h e flight:
namely, the i n c o m m e n s u r a b i l i t y b e t w e e n the four " c o n d i t i o n s " (an i n c o m
mensurability that was u n k n o w n or, from t h e outset, r e d u c e d in a m y t h i c o - r e l i gious world). P h i l o s o p h y is t h e c o m m o n site o f this incommensurability: it
articulates flight o r absence as t h e general r e g i m e o f the i n c o m m e n s u r a b l e .
W h a t was later called metaphysics is thus p r o d u c e d as the articulation o f that
incommensurability: t h e very i n c o m m e n s u r a b i l i t y of b e i n g in-itself, of b e i n g
w h i c h ex-ists to itself, o r that o f t h e atelic and anarchic (this w o r d in m e m o r y
o f R e i n e r Schiirmann) principles and ends.
T h a t metaphysics t o o k place is n o t only a given fact (de facto in the history
o f a p e o p l e , it takes place at a given m o m e n t , in the M e d i t e r r a n e a n space and
it is in this sense t h e factum rationis empiricum o f p h i l o s o p h y n o t w i t h o u t an
O r i e n t a l analogon, w h i c h is given at t h e same time, constituted by B u d d h i s m or
Confucianism, an analogy that w o u l d n e e d a l o n g discussion) b u t still it is this
very thing, this event that constitutes metaphysics. For it h a p p e n e d , it appeared
as a flight, as a d e p a r t u r e : namely, the flight o f the G o d s (a flight for w h i c h in
the West m o n o t h e i s m is the first n a m e , in itself already pregnant w i t h the
" d e a t h o f G o d " a n d o n e could add, w h a t did Plato d o if n o t weave together
tragedy and m o n o t h e i s m j u s t before Hellenistic Judaism, and t h e n Christianity
c o m p l e t e d the w o r k ? ) . T h i s flight is n o t simply an absenting, a leavetaking, o r a
suppression, n e i t h e r is it an Aujliebung in t h e twofold Hegelian sense. It is above
all a m a r k i n g : a trace o f an absence, a subtraction, to b o r r o w from B a d i o u ; a
withdrawal, t o b o r r o w from H e i d e g g e r ; an inscription, in the case o f D e r r i d a .
T h a t is to say, the flight o f t h e G o d s traces o r initiates an o p e n i n g o f an
u n p r e c e d e n t e d m e a n i n g : in t h e same gesture, m e a n i n g is in flight as past and as
to c o m e b u t in the same stroke, " m e a n i n g , " is precisely and absolutely, t h e idea
o r the question o f m e a n i n g (and o f a t r u t h that responds to it).''
If metaphysics begins as a science o f principles and ends, this is because
principles and ends are crossed out [banes], if I can use the a m p h i b o l o g y allowed
by slang, crossed o u t a n d g o n e [rayes et partis] (slang also suggests split [failles]),
o r else, in a m o r e elaborate m a n n e r , divided from and in themselves, and thus
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Globalization
"inscribed." It is only from the m o m e n t they are crossed out that they appear as
such as "principles" and as " e n d s " : subtracted from their very agency (from the
foundation and realization o f temples, empires, and lines o f succession), o p e n as
questions o f m e a n i n g .
3
N o w , this subtractionthis s u b t r a c t i o n / a d d i t i o n o f m e a n i n g that constitutes
philosophy from s o m e w h e r e (in any case, it happens s o m e w h e r e , in the c o n
tingency o f a place and o f a p e r i o d , o r o f several places and several periods) o r
by s o m e force (whose very o c c u r r e n c e is c o n t i n g e n t : n o t h i n g d e t e r m i n e s the
necessity o f w h a t takes place, a l t h o u g h it does take place, potentially, at the scale
o f h u m a n i t y and t h e world).
T h i s force, in all respects, is that o f technology. B e h i n d w h a t will b e c o m e , in
a very precise sense that w e will n e e d to analyze, techno-logy, there is a w h o l e
range o f techniques, like that o f iron followed by that o f c o m m e r c e (including
b o t h a c c o u n t i n g a n d shipping), w r i t i n g , and u r b a n p l a n n i n g . W i t h this m o m e n t
in t h e history o f technologies, there is a s o m e t h i n g like a threshold that is
crossed. T h e r e is a m o v e m e n t that is c o n t e m p o r a r y to h u m a n b e i n g s t e c h
nology as h u m a n , quite simply Homo faber, p r o d u c e r and conceiver o f Homo
sapiens, technician o f itselfa m o v e m e n t that from the outset proceeds by s u b
traction o r by e m p t y i n g o u t (from t h e loss o f the oestrus, for example, until
stone carving and wall painting) b u t w h i c h , until t h e n , presents itself first as a
m o d e o f behavior and adaptation, as the m a n a g e m e n t o f subsistence conditions
for an animal deficient in given conditions. T h i s m o v e m e n t , w h i c h will always
already have b e g u n w i t h " h u m a n s , " and w h i c h c o n s e q u e n d y t h r o u g h h u m a n s ,
in h u m a n s , and before h u m a n s c o m e s from " n a t u r e " itself, this very m o v e m e n t
takes o n a n o t h e r form: instead o f e n s u r i n g subsistence, it creates n e w conditions
for h u m a n s , o r even produces a strange "surplus-subsistence" [sursistance] in
nature or outside o f it. T h e p r o d u c t i o n o f m e a n s o f subsistence distinguishes
already the N e o l i t h i c e p o c h : n o w b e t w e e n t h e t e n t h and seventh c e n t u r y
before o u r era o n the arc o f Asia M i n o r o n e could say that a production of ends
appears as such. B u t h o w could w e n o t see this p r o d u c t i o n o f ends e m e r g e
silendy, secredyfrom p r o d u c t i o n that is itself n o t p r o d u c e d from nature o r
5
from the world, o r from the animal o r from m a n w i t h i n it. C o n s e q u e n d y from

w h a t will w e have to n a m e history o f t h e world?
W i t h this b e c o m i n g h u m a n , this m o v e m e n t appears to itself as its o w n
principle and its o w n e n d . T h a t is to say, properly w i t h o u t principle and w i t h
o u t e n d since it proceeds from an initial d e t a c h m e n t , w h i c h o n e can n a m e
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" h u m a n c o n d i t i o n " a n d w h o s e p e r m a n e n c e involves an e x t r e m e instability and
mutability o f w h a t has thus b e e n detached (contingency forms thus the n e c e s
sity o f this " h i s t o r y " ) . A n d w h i c h is w h a t w e can call, feigning to believe that
there w o u l d have b e e n first a p u r e and stable " n a t u r e " : denaturation. A n d o n e
could t h e n say that " h u m a n i t y " is the indexical n a m e o f t h e indefinite and infi
nite t e r m o f t h e h u m a n denaturation.
It is in d e n a t u r a t i o n that s o m e t h i n g like the representation of a " n a t u r e "
can b e p r o d u c e d o r o f an autotelic o r d e r and thus n o n t e c h n o l o g i c a l order that
poses t h e n at t h e same time t h e e x t r e m e difficulty o f conceiving h o w d e n a t u
ration arises from nature and in nature ( h o w t h e deficient animal can b e p o s
sible, t h e animal w i t h o u t set conditions). It is thus also there that comes forth,
o n the o n e hand, a specific t e c h n o l o g y o f interrogation peri phuseos o r de natura
rerum at t h e same time as a t h i n k i n g o f t h e n o n n a t u r a l o r i g i n of nature in the
f o r m o f a "creation ex nihilo!' In these different ways, metaphysics constitutes
from t h e outset t h e q u e s t i o n i n g o f d e n a t u r a t i o n as such, in o t h e r words, o f the
escape from principles a n d ends, o r o f B e i n g as n o t h i n g that is.
S u c h a q u e s t i o n i n g is m a d e possible, i n d e e d inevitable, as soon as a d e n a
t u r i n g event t o o k place: such is t h e event that w e n a m e "technology," w i t h p h i
losophy, w h i c h is itself the self-referential and self-reflective r e g i m e o f that
event. T h i s event is part o f a w o r l d , n o t only in t h e sense that the world, before
any " h i s t o r y " has always already b e e n its possibility (which therefore can b e said
to b e n e i t h e r necessary o r c o n t i n g e n t : any m o r e o r less that the w o r l d itself).
To say that there was s o m e t h i n g like a naturephusis o r natura, here o n e
should n o t follow Heidegger's distinction b e t w e e n these names, as if h e w e r e
m a r k i n g the distance o f a m o r e " n a t u r a l " nature, o n e that w o u l d n o t have har
b o r e d t h e possibility o f h u m a n t e c h n o l o g y i s only possible if o n e contrasts
this nature w i t h a n o n - n a t u r e . In o t h e r words the very m o t i f o f " n a t u r e " is by
itself " d e n a t u r i n g . " T h e "physics" o f t h e Presocratic Ionian is the t e c h n o l o g y o f
m a n i p u l a t i o n o f t h e object " n a t u r e " that emerges w h e n t h e mytho-religious
o r d e r is disassembled: such a physics is a t e c h n o l o g y o f crossed-out ends, and
crossed-out principles.
T h e n a m e o f metaphysics, w h i c h appears t h e n by accident, is in n o way, in
the end, accidental. It was already a n n o u n c e d in the technological apparatus
that p r o d u c e d " n a t u r e " as an object o f b o t h theoretical and practical m a n i p u
lation, w h i l e seeing to it that " t e c h n o l o g y " clearly b e c o m e s a principle and an
e n d for itself-as is t h e case in c o m m e r c e , in w r i t i n g or in t h e very p r o d u c t i o n
o f principles and ends. T h i s m o v e m e n t is necessarily a becoming since precisely
- w h a t is at issue is w h a t is n o t given and since technology in general is the
k n o w - h o w w i t h respect to w h a t is n o t already m a d e : w i t h technology, history
is contrasted w i t h nature. B u t it is j u s t as necessary that this b e c o m i n g n o t f o r m
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a meaning, either progressive or regressive. T h e obsession w i t h m e a n i n g , w h i c h

nonetheless will have d e t e r m i n e d an entire section o f metaphysics, is only t h e
r e c u r r e n t effect o f a mytho-religious "physics" seeking to r e c o n q u e r itself in
spite o f metaphysics or t h r o u g h it. T h i s is w h y metaphysics is continually in the
radical ambivalence o f an o p e n i n g and o f a closure o r in the difficult topology
that allows a closure by an o p e n i n g and an o p e n i n g by a closure.
If there is a " m e a n i n g " o f the w o r l d according to technology, it can only
b e measured b y an i n c o m m e n s u r a b l e standard of the non-necessity and of t h e
nonnaturality o f t h e w o r l d (that is to say, o f t h e totality o f possible signifyingness), w h i c h also implies its nonhistoricity in the metaphysical and t h e o - t e l e o logical sense o f the w o r d history. S u c h a m e a n i n g , such an absence and such an
"absentheism" are quite precisely those o f the technological event itself.
T h e r e is thus a p r e c o n d i t i o n that makes the logical a n d philosophical c o n
ditions of the W e s t e r n accident possible. T h i s p r e c o n d i t i o n is indissociably his
torical, technological, and t r a n s c e n d e n t a l w h i c h also m e a n s necessary as the
reason o f philosophy as metaphysics, and nevertheless c o n t i n g e n t because there
is n o sufficient reason o f this reason-if n o t t h e general a n d congenital ( c o n
natural) denaturation o f nature that always already harbors, w i t h o u t necessity
and w i t h o u t contingency.just as the universe itself is n e i t h e r necessary n o r c o n
tingent, the possibility o f technological m a n .
(Rousseau, it seems, is the foremost thinkertherefore also the m o s t p r o b
lematic'-of this infinitely twisted d e n a t u r i n g inscription in nature itself, w h i c h
is also the inscription o f t h e flight o f t h e gods.) Politics, science, art, and love (a
fourfold that, u p o n reflection, is very Rousseauian) each respond, w i t h m u t u a l
incommensurability, to the technological c o n d i t i o n in its state of metaphysical
a u t o n o m i z a t i o n . E a c h is structured by t h e unassignable character o f its o w n
principle and end, each is a t e c h n o l o g y o r a technological configuration, o r
rather each opens o n t o an indefinite chain o f technological transformations.
T h i s fourfold is as c o n d i t i o n e d as c o n d i t i o n i n g w i t h respect to philosophy.
( O n e could also articulate each o f the four by s h o w i n g that each serves as
an e n d for the o t h e r three, in a way that the structure remains always o p e n and
c a n n o t be totalized and that, in addition, each " e n d " is i n c o m m e n s u r a b l e w i t h
the others w h i l e f o r m i n g simultaneously the telos and the limits o f the others.)
B u t this is also, o r first, w h y philosophy as such begins: it begins as a tech
nology of m e a n i n g a n d / o r of t r u t h . In this sense, it is n o t at all a prolongation
o f the mytho-religious world, n o r its o v e r c o m i n g by progress, n o r its Aufliebnng,
n o r its decline o r its loss: it is the technological reinscription o f " n a t u r e " and o f
the "gods." W h e n m e a n i n g is d e n a t u r e d o r d e m y t h i f i e d t r u t h emerges as
such: it is a matter o f c o n s t r u c t i n g m e a n i n g (the principle and e n d of B e i n g as.
such) o r else p u n c t u a t i n g absence [absens] and, finally, w i t h the t w o always i m p l i -
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cated in any metaphysical c o n s t r u c t i o n a n d d e c o n s t r u c t i o n w o r t h y o f the
n a m e . It is n o t a surprise that sophistry, at a given m o m e n t , b e c o m e s the c o r
relation a n d c o u n t e r p o i n t o f a technological c o m p l e x (once again c o m m e r c e ,
law, u r b a n planning, c i t y i n Asia M i n o r d u r i n g the time o f t h e pre-Socratics).
It is n o t only a t e c h n o l o g y o f logos, w h i c h is invented and organized along w i t h
o t h e r technologies. W i t h t h e very c o n c e p t o f logos, reaching from the o r d e r o f
discourse to that o f verifying autonomy, it is a technology that manages p r o
d u c t i o n , n o l o n g e r o f subsistence, n o r even o f a surplus subsistence, b u t of
m e a n i n g itself. It is in this sense that I therefore n a m e metaphysics a teclmo-logy:
the flight into a verifying a u t o n o m y o f technology, o r o f "denaturation." B u t
this a u t o n o m y repeats in an infinite abyss, all o f the constitutive aporias o f the
auto- in general.
O n e should thus w o n d e r w h e t h e r this explains w h y philosophy w i t h
Socrates was presented straightaway as a dialogue w i t h technologies o r their
m e t a - t e c h n o l o g i c a l interpellation: b e g i n n i n g w i t h Sophistry, a n d m o d e l i n g
itself o n mathematics, t h e arts o f t h e cobbler, carpenter, o r in general. Similarly
o n e will recall that A r i s t o d e considered that philosophy could only h a p p e n
6
b e y o n d t h e satisfaction of t h e necessity o f subsistence: as if it itself was the

o p e n i n g o f a n o t h e r genre o f satisfaction, b u t in a continuity o r in an analogy
o f the technological posture. (We can also consider the wonder that Aristode
designates in t h e same passage [and after Plato] as the b e g i n n i n g o f philosophy
designates n o t h i n g o t h e r than t h e t e c h n o l o g y p r o p e r to a n o n - k n o w i n g : n o t
i g n o r a n c e w a i t i n g for a teacher, n o r i n e x p e r i e n c e in the process o f b e i n g initi
a t e d w h i c h are b o t h modalities o f t h e mytho-religious w o r l d b u t
the
k n o w l e d g e that articulates itself, first, o n its o w n abyss.)

O n e could also c o n s i d e r a n d I c a n n o t dwell o n it as w o u l d b e n e c e s
s a r y t h e possibility, i n d e e d the necessity o f d e t e r m i n i n g the history o f t e c h
nologies u p to o u r time w i t h o u t giving it a n o t h e r m e a n i n g in its fundamental
c o n t i n g e n c y t h a n t h e indefinite relation o f technology to itself a n d to the
escape o f its denaturation. O n e w o u l d have to examine, in this respect, the s u c
cession o f technologies o f t h e i m m e d i a t e s u p p l e m e n t a t i o n o f the h u m a n b o d y
(tools, arms, clothing), o f the p r o d u c t i o n o f subsistence (agriculture, animal
husbandry), o f e x c h a n g e (money, w r i t i n g ) , t h e n , w i t h a n o t h e r t u r n , o f m e a n i n g
and t r u t h (sophistical, philosophical), o f wealth as such, o f p r o d u c t i o n itself
(capital, labor), o f society (democracy) a n d finally, o f nature itself, or o f its c o m
plete denaturation, w h e t h e r by m u t a t i o n o r by total destruction (biological,
ecological, ethological engineering) . B u t w h a t w o u l d t h e n give the t o n e and
t h e direction o f this series, its principle a n d its e n d , nonetheless w i t h o u t p r i n
ciple or e n d , w o u l d b e t h e "architechnology," the p r o - d u c t i o n o f the pro-ducer,
o r t h e ex-position o f the exposed, t h e " n a t u r e " o f m a n as the denaturation in
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h i m o f the w h o l e o f "nature," w h a t w e call today t h e "symbolic," in o t h e r words

the o p e n i n g o f an e m p t y space w h e r e t h e infinite " c r e a t i o n " o f the w o r l d is
(re)playedunless the possibility arises that the symbolic is barred there a n d
disappears there a n d w i t h it h u m a n i t y itself.
T h e event o f t e c h n o l o g y t h a t is t o say, for us, for a l o n g time, history a n d
metaphysics as h i s t o r y w o u l d thus have a m e a n i n g in a sense that w o u l d b e
n e i t h e r directional n o r significant: b u t i n t h e sense that w e say that " s o m e o n e
has business sense," for example, o r "a musical sense," o r in general w h e n o n e
"has a sense" o f this o r that technology, in that sense, t h e n , this w o u l d b e t h e
sense of principles a n d ends (of b e i n g as such o r o f existence) there, w h e r e ,
quite precisely n e i t h e r end, n o r principles, n o r b e i n g are given o r available, a n d
w h e r e existence exposes itself, lacking sense, m a k i n g this lack its very t r u t h .
Metaphysics is t h e n a m e o f this sense: t h e savoir-faire o f denaturation, o r o f t h e
infinitization o f ends. This implies above all n o t a k n o w l e d g e , b u t a n ethos: logos
itself as ethos, that is to say, the t e c h n o l o g y o r the art o f standing in and abiding
in t h e escape o f the absence. T h e art o f standing, o r w h a t p e r m i t s in general h a v
ing o r maintaining a standing in, including, a n d especially, w h e r e there is n o
l o n g e r any s u p p o r t o r firm basis for w h a t e v e r stance there is.
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IV
Complements
1
A N o t e on the Term:
Biopolitics
W e have heard quite a bit in recent years a b o u t t h e t e r m biopolitics. T h i s w o r d

was created by Foucault. It has b e e n used by several theoreticians in various
senses. T h e variety o f these senses and a certain general i n d e t e r m i n a t i o n o f the
t e r m require a clarification.
In particular, t h e use o f similar t e r m s such as " b i o e t h i c s " furthers the c o n
fusion since " b i o e t h i c s " is c o n c e r n e d w i t h the m o r a l decisions m a d e w h e n
confronted by t h e n e w possibilities o f biological technology (or of " b i o t e c h
nology") a n d does n o t claim to designate an ethics generally restricted to the
1
bios. "Biopolitics," o n t h e contrary, seeks to indicate the order o f a politics g e n

erally d e t e r m i n e d b y life and devoted to its m a i n t e n a n c e and control. W h a t is
m e a n t b y biopolitics, in principle, is n o t "a politics a b o u t life o r living" b u t ,
rather, "life d e t e r m i n i n g politics," o r else " t h e sphere o f politics coextensive
w i t h the sphere o f life."
F o r F o u c a u l t , i n a m o r e n a r r o w way, t h e w o r d designated t h e fact that,

from t h e e i g h t e e n t h c e n t u r y o n , t h e c o n t r o l o f t h e c o n d i t i o n s o f h u m a n life
b e c a m e an expressly political affair (health, n u t r i t i o n , d e m o g r a p h i c s , e x p o

sure t o natural a n d t e c h n o l o g i c a l d a n g e r s , etc.). U n t i l that time, p o w e r h a d
little interest in this a n d h a d o t h e r objects for its exercise: first a n d foremost,
t e r r i t o r y . I have n o t h i n g t o a d d t o this historical thesis, w h i c h is certainly
i m p o r t a n t , e x c e p t t h a t it seems t o m e that it w o u l d r e q u i r e a m o r e precise
e x a m i n a t i o n o f w h a t t h e biopolitical p r e o c c u p a t i o n s w e r e before t h e m o d
e r n era (there was a politics o f w h e a t in R o m e a n d a politics o f b i r t h in
A t h e n s , for e x a m p l e ) .
Foucault considered that totalitarian politicsNazi first, socialist as w e l l
w e r e biopolitics because they w e r e devoted, rather than to t h e d o m i n a t i o n o f
their adversaries, to t h e mastery o f a p o p u l a t i o n , of a "race," o r o f a " p e o p l e "
defined according to n o r m s o f health, o r productive vitality, etc. (Foucault ranks
everything u n d e r a very general category o f "racism.") H e r e I will n o t e n t e r
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into the precise examination o f these theses. I believe it necessary, however, to

ask if "life" truly constitutes t h e object (real o r imaginary, is n o t t h e issue n o w )
of these powers, o r if it is n o t rather a destinal figure ("race" o r " t h e h u m a n
w o r k e r " ) that c o m e s to substitute for the classical figures o f sovereignty. T h e
reduction of these figures to "life" is n o t sufficient to g r o u n d their political and
affective power.
A c c o r d i n g to t h e e x t e n s i o n r e c e n d y given to t h e c o n c e p t , o r r a t h e r
a c c o r d i n g to that w h i c h is in reality a c h a n g i n g o f t h e c o n c e p t u n d e r t h e
same w o r d , it seems o n e m u s t u n d e r s t a n d t h e following: politics (still assigned
to t h e State) progressively takes for its object t h e c o n t r o l l e d m a n a g e m e n t o f
natural life.
However, it is clear that so-called "natural life," from its p r o d u c t i o n to its
conservation, its needs, and its representations, w h e t h e r h u m a n , animal, vegetal,
or viral, is henceforth inseparable from a set o f conditions that are referred to
as "technological," and w h i c h constitute w h a t must rather b e n a m e d ecotechnol
ogy w h e r e any k i n d o f n a t u r e " develops for us (and by u s ) . T h a t life is precisely
the life that is n o longer simply "life" if o n e understands it as a u t o - m a i n t a i n i n g
and auto-affecting.What is revealed, rather, w i t h ecotechnology, is t h e infinitely
problematic character o f any " a u t o " in general. It is in this c o n t e x t that a
"biopolitics" is possible, since it is defined b y a technological m a n a g e m e n t o f
life. This supposes that existence thus m a n a g e d is n o longer, tendentiously, an
existence that engages anything else t h a n its r e p r o d u c t i o n and its m a i n t e n a n c e
t h r o u g h finalities that remain t h e secrets o f power, unless they are simply blind
or purposeless finalities o f the eco-technological totality in m o t i o n .
T h u s biosor life as a " f o r m o f life," as the e n g a g e m e n t o f a m e a n i n g o r
of a " b e i n g " m e r g e s w i t h zoe, bare life, a l t h o u g h such life has, in fact, already
b e c o m e techne.
Politics is thus implicidy n o t h i n g o t h e r t h a n the a u t o - m a n a g e m e n t o f
ecotechnology, t h e only form o f possible " a u t o " - n o m y that precisely n o l o n g e r
has recourse to any heretofore possible forms o f a politics: n e i t h e r t h e self1
f o u n d i n g "sovereignty,"' since it is n o l o n g e r a m a t t e r o f founding, n o r t h e " d i s

cussion c o n c e r n i n g the j u s t i c e " o f an Aristotelian polis, since there is n o l o n g e r
a polis, n o r even the contestation o r t h e differend, since living and p o w e r g o in
the same direction according to an asymptomatic consensus a n d devoid o f
finality, o r o f truth.
T h e t e r m biopolitics in fact designates neither life (as the f o r m of life) n o r
politics (as a f o r m o f coexistence). A n d w e can certainly a d m i t that in fact w e
are n o l o n g e r in a position t o use either o f these t e r m s in any o f their ordinary
senses. B o t h are, rather, henceforth subject to w h a t carries t h e m together into
ecotechnology.
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B u t t h e n t h e d a n g e r o f t h e w o r d is revealed in that it seems t o a u t h o
rize t w o forms o f i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s , b o t h o f w h i c h surreptitiously m a i n t a i n an
u n u s u a l sense o f t h e t e r m . O n e can a t t e m p t to t h i n k that this life, r e d u c e d
to an absence o f f o r m o t h e r t h a n its m a n a g e m e n t m o t i v a t e d b y an e c o n o m i c
a n d social p o w e r that o n l y seeks its m a i n t e n a n c e , finds itself dialectically
delivered to an absence o f ends t h r o u g h w h i c h it w o u l d find itself as t h o u g h
in its n a s c e n t state, e x p o s e d to t h e absence o f t h e m e a n i n g o f its bare c o n
tingency, such that it w o u l d b e therefore capable o f r e c l a i m i n g as its o w n
i n v e n t i o n : an indefinite b i r t h , sliding b y its v e r y e r r a n c y a n d b y its absence
o f justification o u t s i d e o f t h e d o m i n a t i o n that m a n i p u l a t e s it. T h e f o r m o f
life w o u l d b e t h e furtive play o f an elegant w i t h d r a w a l from t h e g r i n d i n g
m a c h i n e . O n e can t h i n k o n t h e c o n t r a r y that t h e c o n t r o l thus revealed o f a
t e c h n o l o g i c a l p r o d u c t i o n o f life places fife in t h e state o f p r o d u c i n g itself as
a whole, and of reappropriating the exteriority of domination in a c o m m o n
a u t o - p r o d u c t i o n o r a u t o - c r e a t i o n w h o s e vitality reabsorbs a n d accomplishes,
in itself, any politics.
In o n e way o r another, b y an emphasis u p o n life itself o r politics r e a p p r o priated in c o m m o n , w h a t is p u t i n t o play again is the twofold dialectical p o s tulation b y w h i c h , o n t h e o n e h a n d , an e x t r e m e figure (previously k n o w n as
t h e proletariat) is revealedthe bareness o f w h i c h establishes its t r u t h - c h a r a c
t e r w h i l e , o n t h e o t h e r h a n d , t h e p o w e r reappropriated by the living c o m
m u n i t y effectuates t h e n e g a t i o n o f political separation. T h i s figuration and this
negation have h a u n t e d the Western consciousness ever since the invention o f
d e m o c r a c y p u t an e n d to politics f o u n d e d o n figures o f identification. B u t it is
clearly insufficient to seek a n e w figure ( w h e t h e r figureless, a n o n y m o u s , and
stripped of identity), o r to r e n d e r dialectical t h e negation o f the identificatory
pole. T h e s e t w o motifs, o p p o s e d o r conjoined, can give m o m e n t u m , perhaps,
to necessary strugglesand there are n u m e r o u s . B u t they c a n n o t address the
p r o b l e m o p e n e d by democracy, that is to say, a p r o b l e m posed by e c o t e c h n o l ogy that d e m a n d s , o r that produces, the absence o f separable figure and the
absence o f identifiable end: because until this p o i n t it was b e t w e e n figures and
ends, b e t w e e n p h e n o m e n a l i z a t i o n o f a teleology and a teleology o f a p h e n o m enalization, that any part o f life a n d / o r o f politics, o f m e a n i n g o f life, o r o f f o r m
of politics, has operated.
It is n o t a q u e s t i o n h e r e o f d e v e l o p i n g this clarification further. At least
it s h o u l d serve to s h o w that w h a t forms a world today is exactly t h e c o n j u n c
tion o f an u n l i m i t e d process o f an e c o - t e c h n o l o g i c a l enframing and o f a v a n
ishing o f t h e possibilities o f forms o f life a n d / o r o f c o m m o n g r o u n d . T h e
" w o r l d " in these c o n d i t i o n s , o r " w o r l d - f o r m i n g , " is only t h e precise f o r m o f
this p r o b l e m .
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2
Ex Nihilo
Sumimim
( O f Sovereignty)
Sovereignty designates, first, the summit.'' For the pleasure o f language, let us
refer to es souvereinites des monts, a twelfth-century translation o f in summits
mon-
tium (in the Latin Vulgate bible, cited by La C u r n e ) . T h e s u m m i t towers over

and dominates. (Summus, supremus, superanus a r e i n sumlinguistic cousins.)
O n e has said "a large t o w e r that is master and sovereign o f the d o o r of t h e casd e " (Ibid.).The fate o f the w o r d in language pertains to the attribution o f d o m
ination to the s u m m i t and, consequendy, to the analogical parallel b e t w e e n
height and p o w e r (to w h i c h o n e can add the implication o f value o r excel
lence).This parallel is itself d o u b l e d in the origin o f the summa, w h i c h pertains
to the fact that the s u m o f t h e addition was inscribed o n the summa linea, since
the R o m a n s calculated from the base t o t h e height.
It follows as well from this history that sovereignty is n o t first o f all t h e
quality o f b e i n g at the s u m m i t b u t t h e s u m m i t itself (a t e r m that has a b o t a n i
cal sense as well as academic), t h e s u m m i t , t h e sovereign: it does n o t have t h e
sense o f an attribute b u t that of the substance o f a subject w h o s e b e i n g consists
in height.
T h e highest dominates properly only according to the military sense i n d i
cated by the example of the "large t o w e r " : from o n h i g h it is easier to survey
and strike w h a t is below. S u m m i t s have always b e e n places o f fortresses and
citadels. B u t t h e n warlike d o m i n a t i o n immediately involves elevation and alti
t u d e raised to the sky, standing o u t against the sky, and p e n e t r a t i n g i n t o it. T h e
sovereign c o m m u n i c a t e s w i t h the e l e m e n t detached from the earth, freed from
gravity. In t h e same way the chief o r the head (the captain, the capital o r capitol) rises above the g r o u n d by virtue o f the erect stance o f the b o d y o f the
biped w h o s e straight stance (haughty carriage) casts the gaze into t h e distance,
separates t h e hands from the feet, distances the sense o f smell from t h e soil and
from its genitals. B u t the sovereign is m o r e than a chief: the chief extends and
completes a b o d y ; the sovereign rises above the body.
T h e sovereign is at the height because t h e h e i g h t separates t h e top from
the b o t t o m and frees the f o r m e r from t h e humility o f t h e latter: from t h e
h u m u s , from the back b e n t from w o r k i n g the earth, from laying d o w n in sleep,
from malady o r death, and from extended
things in general. E x t e n s i o n holds
everything at the same level, b u t the t h i n g that is n o t e x t e n d e d , w h a t l o o m s

over extensions and inspects it, is t h e thinking thing and the subject o f the g e n
eral g o v e r n m e n t o f things. In t h e place o f a sensibility o f t h e near, t h r o u g h
t o u c h , smell and taste, it makes the organs o f distance, sight and hearing, p r e -
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vail. T h e sovereign is n o t c o n t e n t to react to w h a t surrounds a n d neighbors it;
it gathers i n f o r m a t i o n a b o u t messages a n d dispositions from distant realities
w i t h the aim o f b e i n g able to i m p o s e its law o n t h e m . ( T h e e m b l e m s o f the
sovereign are the eagle a n d t h e sun.)
T h e sovereign is elevated because h e i g h t separates. T h e separation ensures
t h e distinction a n d t h e distinction ensures t h e differentiation o f levels necessary
to establish a hierarchy that is less a sacred c o m m a n d m e n t than t h e sacred char
acter o f a c o m m a n d m e n t , o r o f g o v e r n m e n t as such: its separate, discrete, secret,
and w i t h d r a w n nature. Its withdrawal gathers it in itself b y r e m o v i n g it from
the d e p e n d e n c y o f things pressed against each other, entangled in t h e action
and reactions o f the others. T h e sovereign is separated from this d e p e n d e n c e
and this endless e x c h a n g e o f m e a n s a n d ends. It is itself neither a means n o r an
e n d . It is o f a n o t h e r order, o f an o r d e r that indexes any horizontality, its t h i c k
ness a n d its c o n n e c t i o n s , o n a p e r p e n d i c u l a r verticality.The sovereign does n o t
only t o w e r over: it is transversal.
As summit (summum, supremus), the sovereign is n o t only elevated: it is the
highest. Its n a m e is a superlative: literally w h a t raises itself above from below, and
w h a t is n o longer comparable o r relative. It is n o longer in relation, it is absolution.
T h e sovereign is t h e highest, it is t h e extremity o f elevation: it is the m o s t
high. T h e M o s t H i g h is t h e o n e w h o s e h e i g h t is n o longer relative, a n d even
n o t relative to lesser heights. It is H e i g h t itself, all h e i g h t a n d n o t h i n g b u t height
(grammatically, it is in fact w h a t w e call an absolute superlative) . T h e M o s t H i g h
does n o t allow m e a s u r e m e n t . It escapes observation w h i l e at the same time it
is inaccessible to scaling. It does n o t exactly pertain to the opposition b e t w e e n
t h e t o p a n d the b o t t o m b u t rather t o t h e difference b e t w e e n t h e h e i g h t and
w h a t has n e i t h e r h e i g h t n o r d e p t h (altus has b o t h senses).The M o s t H i g h is the
Inequivalent itself. It is n o t equivalent to any k i n d o f equivalence or inequiva
lence. It is, to t h e contrary, o n its basis alone that s o m e t h i n g like the register o f
equivalence o r inequivalence can b e posited.
T h e M o s t H i g h is the o n e o r that toward w h i c h the head itself c a n n o t t u r n
w i t h o u t t o p p l i n g i m m e d i a t e l y off t h e axis that attaches it to the body. It ceases
t h e n to b e the head. E i t h e r it loses itself in t h e h e i g h t o r it falls back into the
equivalence o f t h e b o d y w i t h itself.
T h e M o s t H i g h can only p r o d u c e o n e thing: vertigo. T h e vertigo is that
w h i c h takes h o l d at the s u m m i t . Vertex is a n o t h e r n a m e for the s u m m i t . It is the
p o i n t w h e r e the vertical is at its peak: it returns there (vertere) o n itself, n o longer
having r o o m to g o h i g h e r since it is t h e highest possible elevation.Vertigo is the
.affect o f the s u m m i t . It is the apprehension o f t h e incommensurability b e t w e e n
t h e horizontal a n d t h e vertical, b e t w e e n the base and t h e s u m m i t . It is the ver
tigo o f the absolute insofar as it is w i t h o u t any relations: in the absence o f the
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slightest relation it can only t u r n o n itself. B u t it is in this sense that the sover
eign must d e t e r m i n e any establishment o f relations o r their regulations.
T h e sovereign has h a d a certain t w i n in language a n d in t h o u g h t : the
s u z e r a i n . T h e t w o terms have at times shared o r e x c h a n g e d their significations.
T h e y also have t h e same root in t h e sus, the dessus, a n d the au-dessus.They
are
t w o forms of the superior. However, in the e n d , the sovereign is i n c o m m e n s u

rable w i t h the suzerain.This is precisely t h e m e a n i n g o f t h e transition from feu
dalism to the m o d e r n political age.
T h e suzerain occupies a certain height w i t h i n an ordered system. T h e
suzerain has the vassal (originally the servant) b e n e a t h it.Vassal a n d suzerain are
b o u n d to each o t h e r by a reciprocal o a t h o f allegiance a n d assistance. T h e o a t h
pledges fidelity, that is to say, loyalty. T h e feudal o r d e r w h i c h involves t h e
r e g i m e o f the fiefrests
o n the loyalty pledged b e t w e e n vassals a n d suzerains.
T h i s loyalty is exercised in b o t h directions, a n d w i t h i n t h e fief, w h i c h is the

d o m a i n over w h i c h the lordship rules, w h i c h , at first, is the a u t h o r i t y o f the
elder (senior).
T h e elder is n o t the highest: t h e succession o f ages depends o n nature, it
does n o t d e f i n e n o t exacdy o r entirelya difference in the same way that
height does. T h e elder is always b e h i n d o n e older still, even if the dead father.
T h e right is thus an ancestral o n e : it is n o t conferred according to t h e absolute
ness o f height in itself. T h i s is w h y there are several heights o f lordship, a n d the
sire (the o t h e r n a m e for lord) can b e d u k e o r marquis, simple k n i g h t o r b a r o n .
H e r e , the b o n d , the manifold o f b o n d s that founds the fiefs a n d the vassalages,
takes p r e c e d e n c e over p o w e r ; it gives it its raison d'etre. In a certain m a n n e r ,
p o w e r is here b o u n d from the outset.
In t h e case o f sovereignty, o n t h e contrary, it is p o w e r that founds a n d
forms the b o n d . T h e b o n d is n o t o n e o f loyalty b u t authority, in the precise
sense that the sovereign is the a u t h o r o f the law, whereas loyalty supposes a law
that precedes it.
T h e feudal order is itself subordinated to an a u t h o r i t y that surpasses any
suzerain: that o f the only lord that merits the tide in an absolute sense, O u r
Lord, the All-Mighty, the creator a n d r e d e e m e r o f t h e world. N o d o u b t , his
torically, the feudal order was nevertheless the source o f the conditions o f a
duality of p o w e r s t e m p o r a l a n d s p i r i t u a l w h i c h opens the way to an a u t o n
o m y o f t h e first. B u t the feudal o r d e r only b e c o m e s properly a u t o n o m o u s w i t h
the principle (this is i n d e e d the right t e r m : it is the province o f the Prince) o f
sovereignty. T h e sovereign is n o t a suzerain a m o n g others; it is freed from any
b o n d . Therefore, it n o longer has vassals, only subjects.
( O n this a c c o u n t the entire w o r l d will b e c o m e subject a n d the lowest vas
sals will n o l o n g e r have servants b e n e a t h t h e m , servants attached to the glebe.
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T h e r e will n o l o n g e r b e an e m i n e n t p r o p e r t y o f t h e glebe, b u t o n the contrary
the subjects will all b e c o m e proprietors. W i t h respect to the p r o p r i e t o r in the
modern
sense, the suzerain disappears w i t h o u t b e c o m i n g sovereign. T h e
suzerain has authority, b u t it is n o t d u e to its property. It does n o t have to give

it a law b u t has only to enjoy it, o r if this w o r d is t o o noble, to profit from it.)
T h e subject o f t h e sovereign can b e u n d e r s t o o d in t w o ways: as t h e o n e
w h o is s u b j e c t e d t o t h e a u t h o r i t y o f t h e sovereign, o r as t h e o n e w h o c r e
ates a n d a u t h o r i z e s this a u t h o r i t y . T h i s a m p h i b o l o g y leads in a c o n t i n u o u s
m a n n e r from m o n a r c h y t o d e m o c r a c y . T h e sovereign p e o p l e possess n o t h i n g
less a n d n o t h i n g m o r e t h a n t h e absolute m o n a r c h : namely, t h e v e r y exercise
o f sovereignty.
T h i s exercise is n o t h i n g o t h e r than t h e establishment o f the State and of
its law, o r o f t h e law that makes a State. It supposes that n o t h i n g either precedes
it o r supercedes it, that n o a u t h o r i t y o r instituting force has b e e n exercised
before it. Sovereignty is the e n d o f any political theology: if it b o r r o w s the fig
ure o f divine law it does so precisely to m o d e l this figure o n t h e features o f the
sovereign. T h e s e features are defined b y t h e following a m p h i b o l o g y : it is the
subject o f t h e exercise to w h i c h it is subjected.
W h e r e divine a u t h o r i t y operated b e t w e e n creator and creaturfrthat is to
say, t h r o u g h an absolute difference in nature, b u t w h e r e the creature c a m e from
t h e act o f the c r e a t o r t h e r e , t h e difference disappears in favor of an e x c e p
tional identity, w h i c h is precisely that o f t h e sovereign. W h a t e v e r its concrete
d e t e r m i n a t i o n may b e (republic o f a prince, o f a council, o r a people), sover
eignty must b e identical to itself in its institution and its exercise. It has n o o u t
side to precede, found, o r duplicate.
T h e sovereign is a relation t o itself (to itself as to t h e law), a n d it is o n l y
that (while t h e c r e a t o r is essentially o n l y a relation to t h e o t h e r , a n d the
b o n d o f loyalty also d e p e n d s o n this relation). A twofold c o n s e q u e n c e fol
lows from this:
T h e first c o n c e r n s t h e so called m o t i f o f "secularization": w i t h o u t w i s h i n g

to e n t e r i n t o t h e i m m e n s e debate a r o u n d this c o n c e p t , I suggest simply here
that m o d e r n sovereignty (sovereignty as a m o d e r n concept, the o n e that is
attributed expressly to J e a n Bodin* a n d also anticipated in the w o r k o f
Machiavelli) is n o t the secularization o f a divine sovereignty, precisely
because divine sovereignty contains, by definition, the s u p r e m e reason and
p o w e r that m o d e r n sovereignty is assigned w i t h giving;
T h e second c o n s e q u e n c e consists in referring to the sovereign the constitu

tive problematic o f t h e relation to self o r o f a u t o position in general: t h e self
o f a relation to self c a n n o t be given p r i o r to this relation itself, since it is the
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relation chat makes the self (self m e a n s relation to self and there is n o case in
w h i c h there is a subject of self). The
sovereign does n o t find a sovereignty
that is given: it m u s t constitute it a n d thus constitute itself as sovereign.

Each of these implications contain, in turn, several others, and in particular:
F r o m the first, it is necessary to c o n c l u d e that G o d , o r t h e divine, in g e n

eral, can in n o way b e "secularized," since "secularity" designates the o r d e r
external t o divinity, w h i c h can only b e u n d e r s t o o d in a r e g i m e o f distinc
tion (either m o r t a l / i m m o r t a l , o r c e n t u r y / e t e r n i t y , o r w o r l d / k i n g d o m o f
G o d ) ; it means either that politics can never absorb religion if religion has a
p r o p e r consistency o r that there is n o a u t o n o m o u s religion and that it is
always the i n s t r u m e n t o f a politics that t h r o u g h it gives itself the ultimate
agency of authority and o f legitimacy (perhaps that m u s t yet be stated o t h
erwise, by distinguishing religion as always political in o n e way o r another,
and t h e relation to the divine that should be n a m e d otherwise, a p o i n t that
I leave o p e n here).
F r o m w h a t precedes, o n e will c o n c l u d e also that the possibility o f the dis

tinctions thus presented pertains to the W e s t e r n - m o n o t h e i s t i c articulation o f
the " d i v i n e " : in w h a t is called " p o l y t h e i s m " there is n o separation o f politics
a n d religion (in a sense o n e could say there is n e i t h e r o n e n o r the other);
for m o n o t h e i s m , o n the contrary, there is a tension b e t w e e n the separation
o f the two and the effacement o f the o n e by the other.
F r o m the second implication, o n e will c o n c l u d e that sovereignty can only

b e defined as an institution (in the active and transitive sense of the t e r m ,
a n d here precisely as an institution o f self)an infinite institution that n e v
ertheless includes w i t h i n it the i m p e r i o u s necessity o f the finite m o m e n t o f
its institution (this time in the conjunctive senses o f t h e instituting and t h e
instituted): there is thus an intimate contradiction o f sovereignty and,
t h r o u g h it, o f m o d e r n politics, (that is, atheological), w h i c h is perhaps also,
as I j u s t suggested, politics p u r e and simple.
T h e sovereignty o f the p e o p l e designates very clearly, in Rousseau's w o r k ,
the m o s t radical state o f the sovereign contradiction: in distinction from t h e

m o n a r c h w h o could h i d e b e h i n d a divine reference, h o w e v e r formal it may b e ,
as sovereign the people must b e u n d e r s t o o d as t h e subject o r the b o d y that
forms itself: such is the object o f t h e contract that b e c o m e s , in R o u s s e a u , in
addition to a pact o f security, t h e very institution o f the contractors and their
body, in o t h e r words, h u m a n i t y itself as it is stated in The Social Contract.'' T h e
sovereign p e o p l e are a people w h o constitute themselves as subjects in all senses
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of t h e w o r d : namely, as the self-relation o f each in the relations o f all to the o t h
ers and as the subjection o f all to this relation. B u t since the relation to self is
infinite, the people is also infinitely lacking to, o r in excess o f itself.
In this sense, t h e m o d e r n political question could be r e d u c e d to the q u e s
tion o f sovereignty: D o e s n ' t it define the political impasse par excellence as the
impasse o f subjectivity? A n d , if that is t h e case, can w e either conceive o f a n o n subjective sovereignty o r conceive o f a nonsovereign politics? O r rather, must
w e t h i n k o f t h e t w o things together?
Sovereignty itself, as a s u m m i t , poses t h e p r o b l e m o f the nature o f the s u m
mit. W h a t is its relation to t h e base and w h a t results from it for its p r o p e r c o n
stitution? D o e s t h e s u m m i t rest o n the base, does it lean o n it, o r does it detach
from it and accede to a n o t h e r ontological sphere?
Is t h e s u m m i t t h e region, tangential to t h e sky, w h e r e elevation takes place,
reverses the ascent i n t o a descent and, thus r e t u r n i n g u p o n itself, attaches its
h e i g h t t o t h e soil, giving it thus b o t h its e q u i l i b r i u m and its dimension? O r is
it t h e p o i n t w h e r e t h e elevation b e c o m e s absolute, cutting itself from the soil
and from the base and indicating a completely different agency that relates less
to w h a t it overhangs than to t h e fact that n o t h i n g hangs over it?
In t h e first hypothesis, t h e s u m m i t subsumes and assumes the base that,
after all, is its base, the foundation and the seat o f its o w n being. B u t in this
sense, t h e highest is never t h e M o s t H i g h , never the absolute height. It is always
situated at a relative altitude, and, finally, n o d o u b t it is always, at b o t t o m , primus
inter partes. T h i s also implies that this s u m m i t is in an essential relation w i t h a
b o t t o m , w h i c h is also a g r o u n d , a seat, a place, and an assurance that is also a
resource and a capital o f authority, o f legitimacy, a n d o f the p o w e r of execution.
A n d since I have s p o k e n o f capital: In this acceptation, is the s u m m i t the
same as capital? O r m o r e exacdy, does capital proceed from that structure
according to w h i c h t h e s u m m i t accumulates and enables the resources o f the
base, as well as its p r o d u c t i o n s from the place w h e r e they d o n o t simply r e p r o
d u c e t h e base itself? To w h a t e x t e n t is c a p i t a l w h i c h I understand clearly here
in the Marxist senselinked to sovereignty? To w h a t extent is the n o n t h e o logical a u t o n o m y o f t h e State substantially linked to the accumulationalso
n o n t h e o l o g i c a l o f wealth, that is to say, o f t h e riches that n o l o n g e r shine for
a sacred glory b u t for itself and for its o w n p r o d u c t i o n ? W i t h capital, in any
case, it is clear that the s u m m i t accomplishes an accumulation of a mass, a sum,
and that this mass m u s t n o t cease to g r o w : t h e capital is sovereign in t h e sense
that it only serves itself. T h e w o r d capital defines wealth as sovereign: it is dis
tinguished
from
the wealth that serves t h e needs o f necessity, and from the
wealth that serves n o p u r p o s e except to c o n c e n t r a t e (and that dispenses and

that disperses) a h i e r o p h a n t i c eclat. H e r e w e find the reason for t h e c o u p l i n g o f
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the sovereign m o d e r n state and capital: the a u t o finality, w h i c h also presents

itself as a finality w i t h o u t end, o r in t h e a u t o p r i n c e d o m that gives itself its o w n
investiture.
In t h e s e c o n d hypothesis, sovereignty is essentially different from mastery,
according to the way o f t h i n k i n g that was, t o t h e p o i n t o f paroxysm, that o f
Bataille. Mastery may very well only serve itself b u t it is still a service: it s u b
mits to its project, o r to the project that it is. T h e master is himself the project
o f subjecting the slave to himself, and, t h r o u g h t h e slave, o f assuring a m e a n s o f
existence, w h i c h forms the o r d e r to w h i c h the slave has submitted from t h e
outset. T h e master is submitted to this submission, w h i c h is, in t h e last account,
submission to means geared to an e n d w h o s e final dignity remains obscure:
W h y m u s t existence maintain itself (as if it b e l o n g e d to these things w h o s e
b e i n g seems constituted by an inert persistence)?
U n d e r these conditions the sovereign is the o n e w h o d e t a c h e d itself from
mastery and its fundamental servility. It is n o t that the sovereign r e n o u n c e s
mastery, at least n o t as a g o o d that it w o u l d a b a n d o n for a s u p e r i o r g o o d . T h e
sovereign does n o t weigh o r calculate mastery according to s o m e scale o f val
ues. It stands exclusively and straightaway at the h e i g h t o f absolute value.
This height is thus altitude in itself, elevation that has ascended to t h e s u m
m i t w i t h o u t t h e ascension representing any process o f accumulation or c o n
quest, any progression toward an e n d . In t r u t h , it c a n n o t even b e a question o f
ascending to the s u m m i t . It is a d e t a c h e d s u m m i t , w i t h o u t any contact w i t h t h e
outside o f t h e w h o l e structure built u p o n the base: a n d since this outside is
n o t h i n g , and there can be n o question o f access, o r an access that can be i m m e
diately e x p e r i e n c e d as a p e n e t r a t i o n into n o t h i n g , sovereignty turns o u t stricdy
to b e that nothing itself. (As w e know, Bataille was given to write, "sovereignty
is N O T H I N G , " w h e r e the capital letters are m e a n t to raise an infinite irony in
the face o f any effort to capitalize t h e absolute sovereign.)
N o t b e i n g anything [rien] or, even m o r e precisely, b e i n g nothing, sovereignty
is nonetheless s o m e thing: it is that very particular thing that nothing [rien] is. N o t
" t h e nothing," as if it was an entity, and specifically, the entity o f a negation o f
b e i n g . T h a t is w h a t is called,"nothingness" ["le neant"]. Nothingness is n o t n o t h
ing [rien]: it is that w h i c h b e i n g turns into as soon as it is posited for itself and as
unilateral. W h e t h e r o n e considers, w i t h Hegel, that b e i n g pure and simple is pure
abstraction, o r o n e thinks w i t h H e i d e g g e r that being, o r to be, cannot be s o m e
thing that is an entity, o n e must resolve to think of b e i n g as its o w n effacement
that negates it and, while negating it, allows for the spacing o f the concrete. T h e r e
is n o ontology w i t h o u t the dialectic o r the paradox of a meontology.
O n the o t h e r h a n d , nothing [rien] is the t h i n g itself, res: the first sense o f
" n o t h i n g " is " s o m e thing"(for example, w e still say today: " I t is n o t possible to
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think n o t h i n g a b o u t s o m e t h i n g w e k n o w n o t h i n g about," w h e r e w e clearly
hear " s o m e t h i n g " ) . If nothing has slid, t h r o u g h the negation " n o . . . t h i n g "
["ne . . . rien"] to a privative sense.it is by k e e p i n g t h e sense o f " t h e t h i n g " : " o n e
m u s t t h i n k n o t h i n g " signifies " o n e m u s t t h i n k n o thing," thus, " n o t a thing, n o t
a single thing." Nothing is t h e t h i n g t e n d i n g toward its p u r e and simple b e i n g
o f a thing, consequently also toward t h e m o s t c o m m o n b e i n g o f something a n d
thus toward the vanishing, m o m e n t a r y quality o f t h e smallest a m o u n t of b e i n g ness [etantite].
T h a t w h i c h is n o t h i n g is w h a t subsists this side o f o r b e y o n d subsistence,
o f substance a n d o f subject. It is w h a t realizes o r reifies existence right w h e r e
it is d e t a c h e d from its o w n position: r i g h t w h e r e it exceeds the stance, t h e sta
tion, a n d t h e stability o f beings.This p o i n t is its contact w i t h t h e b e i n g that p e r
meates it: it is the p o i n t o f cancellation o f the ontological difference. B u t this dif
ference is cancelled only t h r o u g h b e i n g infinitely sharpened. It is thus the p o i n t
w h e r e existence exists as t h e e n g a g i n g o f its very being. H e i d e g g e r names it
Dasein: b e i n g t h e " t h e r e , " b e i n g that "there," w h i c h is the very p o i n t w h e r e t h e
entity itself opens b e i n g .
T h e sovereign is t h e existent w h o d e p e n d s u p o n n o t h i n g n o finality, n o
o r d e r o f p r o d u c t i o n o r subjection, w h e t h e r it c o n c e r n s the agent o r the patient
o r t h e cause o r the effect. D e p e n d e n t u p o n n o t h i n g , it is entirely delivered over
to itself, insofar as precisely, t h e "itself" n e i t h e r precedes n o r founds it b u t is the
nothing, the very t h i n g from w h i c h it is suspended.
Nothing as a s u m m i t , acme, o r h e i g h t o f existence: separated from the exis
tent itself.
Sovereignty essentially eludes the sovereign.
If sovereignty did n o t elude it, the sovereign w o u l d in n o way [en rien] b e
sovereign.
T h e same c o n d i t i o n that ensures that sovereignty receive its concept also
deprives it o f its p o w e r : that is, the absence o f superior o r foundational a u t h o r
ity. For t h e sovereign authority must b e essentially occupied w i t h founding itself
o r w i t h o v e r c o m i n g itself in order to legislate p r i o r to o r in excess o f any law.
In a rigorous sense, the sovereign foundation is infinite, o r rather, sovereignty is
never founded. It w o u l d , rather, b e defined by the absence o f foundation o r p r e
supposition: neither in Athens n o r in R o m e was there a p u r e absence o f p r e
supposition p r i o r to the law. S o m e t h i n g o f the divine o r of destiny remains.
O n that basis, if t h e sovereign exercises its power, it is entirely o n the c o n
dition o f the "state o f e x c e p t i o n " w h e r e laws are suspended. T h e fundamental
illegitimacy that is in this case the c o n d i t i o n o f legitimacy m u s t legitimize itself.
T h a t can b e u n d e r s t o o d in t e r m s o f w h a t Carl Schmitt calls "political t h e o l
ogy," given that this theology, nevertheless, is in n o way theological, o r it only
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retains from theology an atheological idea o f all-powerfulness. O n e e n c o u n t e r s

again the debate o n secularization, w h e r e w e could say that S c h m i t t conserves
t h e attributes o f G o d w i t h o u t its p e r s o n , w h i l e B l u m e n b e r g proposes to t h i n k
that w i t h o u t the p e r s o n the attributes also change their change.
W h a t t h e n is the all-powerfulness o f t h e people? T h i s is the question. A n d
perhaps it is absolutely necessary for d e m o c r a c y to be able to envisage this q u e s
tion w h i l e maintaining the principle o f the nothing o f sovereignty. B e i n g n o t h
ing, o r b e i n g founded o n nothing, does n o t m e a n b e i n g powerless [ne rien pouvoir]: it means to found and measure p o w e r by that nothing w h i c h is the very thing
o f the reality of the people: its nature as nonfoundational, nontranscendent (at
least in the usual sense), nonsacred, nonnatural etc. Res publico, summa
resnihil.
If sovereignty is n o t a substance that is given, it is because it is the reality

that the people must give themselves, insofar as it is n o t , itself, a substance o r a
given subject. A people are always their o w n invention. B u t it can also invent
itself by giving itself a sovereign and by giving itself to a sovereign or even by
giving the sovereignty to itself. In each case the people d e t e r m i n e themselves
differendy and d e t e r m i n e the very sense o f the w o r d people differendy: assem
bled people, subjected people, insurgent p e o p l e o r rather: people as a body,
p e o p l e as a group, p e o p l e in secession. C o n s t i t u t i n g sovereignty, alienating sov
ereignty, revolutionary sovereignty. It is always a m a t t e r o f the combinatory, o f
t h e intersection or t h e disjunction of these agencies: and, consequently, of w h a t
remains b e t w e e n t h e m as the e m p t y space o f sovereignty "itself."
As the highest, the absolutely high, the sovereign detaches itself from the
b o t t o m . T h e r e is n o l o n g e r a relation to the b o t t o m . T h e sovereign does n o t
even l o o k from top to b o t t o m . It does n o t b e h o o v e it to descend n o r c o n d e s c e n d . T h e sovereign only has a relation w i t h w h a t is n o t the b o t t o m as the c o r
relate o f the top, following the measure o f a scale, b u t rather t h e d e p t h , t h e c o r
relate o f the elevated according to the boundlessness [demesure] o f the absolute:
t h e d e p t h and t h e altitude are equally d e t a c h e d (ab-solute).
T h e sovereign a n d the f o u n d e r are correlates and conjoined as t w o
absolutes or two sides o r m o m e n t s o f the same absolute. T h e o n e w h o founds
is sovereign (this is the dynastic, imperial, familial, hierarchical, and h i e r o p h a n tic aspect)the line o f the furrow b y w h i c h R o m u l u s consecrates the s o i l
a n d t h e o n e w h o is sovereign founds (this is the princely, singular, decisive
aspect that seizes o p p o r t u n i t i e s t h e strike o f the sword b r o u g h t by R o m u l u s
to R e m u s ) .
T h e ambiguity of sovereign violence is b e t w e e n these t w o blades, of the
p l o w or o f the sword, o r in the fact that the same blade can serve b o t h p u r
poses. B u t it lies equally in the fact that t h e foundation is w i t h o u t g r o u n d , and
that the furrow w h e r e o n e lays the first stone is also a gaping gash.
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Today, however, w e are n o t in this ambiguity: w e are n o t able to grasp a
f o u n d i n g violence (or w h a t could b e the p r o l o n g a t i o n o f it: a war that o n e
could call " j u s t " w h e t h e r it b e a foreign w a r b e t w e e n established sover
eigntiesor a civil w a r i n order to retake o r refound a sovereignty).Violence
has b e c o m e unilateral. It appears t h e n , and sovereignty w i t h it, as p u r e violence,
straightaway and definitively deprived o f legitimacy, openly installing its illegit
imacy in t h e guise o f p o w e r . T h a t this violence is increasingly realized as a v i o
lence o f capital m e a n s that t h e sum is installed in the place o f the summit, and
h e n c e t h e infinity o f the a c c u m u l a t i o n in t h e place of the absolute in act. T h e
c o u p l i n g o f the sovereign state a n d capital enters into dehiscence. Self-founda
tion a n d self-accumulation b e c o m e h e t e r o n o m o u s . Capital n o longer has a
n e e d o f t h e State (or in a limited way), and t h e State n o l o n g e r k n o w s o n w h a t
to f o u n d itself o r w h a t it founds.
In a parallel way, capital n o l o n g e r needs bordersat least m a n y o f t h e m ,
and that w h i c h replaces t h e borders is o f the o r d e r of a delimitation o f "zones,"
w h i c h are o f a different order. W i t h t h e border, w i t h the territory and w i t h the
nation-state, local constraints, subjections forbidding access to the p r o d u c t i o n
o f h u m a n i t y by itself a n d subservience to particular sovereignties disappear. B u t
the marks o f sovereign d e t e r m i n a t i o n are also effaced: a circumscription that
permits the inscription o f a s u m m i t . T h e r e is n o w o r l d s u m m i t : o r w o u l d it be
necessary, rather, to conceive o f the w o r l d itself, n o t according to a renewed
sovereignty b u t in place o f any sovereignty?
Posed in M a r x i a n t e r m s , t h e q u e s t i o n is o f k n o w i n g if, how, and w h e n the
process o f capital m a k e s necessary a n d possible, n o t the restoration o f statebased sovereignty, b u t t h e reclamation o f sovereignty at its roots, w h i c h is noth
ing a n d in this nothing t h e t h i n g itself, w h i c h is precisely n o t a root b u t the
s u m m i t , the inverted radicality o f t h e u n c o m p r o m i s i n g , inconsistent, and
absolutely resistant s u m m i t : t h e s u m m i t as ex nihilo, w h e n c e a w o r l d can
e m e r g e o r its contrary.
O r perhaps it is a q u e s t i o n i n o t h e r terms o r by slightly shifting the p r o b
l e m o f separating politics from sovereignty.
T h a t is to say that it w o u l d b e a question t h e n o f assuming that "politics"
n o l o n g e r designates the assumption o f a subject o r in a subject ( w h e t h e r i n d i
vidual o r collective, w h e t h e r conceived as a natural organic unity, or as a spiri
tual entity, as an Idea, o r as a Destiny), b u t designates the order of the subjectless regulation o f t h e relation b e t w e e n subjects: as individual as collective or
c o m m u n i t a r i a n subjects, groups o f different kinds, families o f different sorts,
interest groups, w h e t h e r labor o r leisure, local o r moral affinities, etc. T h e m a i n
a x i o m here w o u l d b e that these groupings are n o t subsumable u n d e r a sole
c o m m o n b e i n g o f s u p e r i o r rank.
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T h e political order w o u l d define its regulation by an equality and b y a j u s

tice that w o u l d n o t postulate an assumption o f a subject. In that sense politics
w o u l d b e subjectless: n o t that it does n o t require agents, b u t it w o u l d n o t claim
t o f o r m by itself a place o f identity o r a r e t u r n to the self. It w o u l d , o n t h e c o n
trary, define a space w i t h o u t r e t u r n to t h e identical.
O n e needs to consider the following:
1. T h e invention o f sovereignty has decidedly n o t b e e n the secularized tran
scription o f a political theology b u t the creation of a n atheological a s s u m p
tion (echoing, to b e sure, s o m e t h i n g o f the G r e e k polis a n d of the R o m a n
R e p u b l i c , b u t w i t h o u t the resource o f a religion o f t h e polis a n d w i t h o u t
slaveryand in a generally atheistic a n d capitalistic c o n t e x t ) : this assumption
postulated b o t h , w i t h o u t k n o w i n g it, the institution o f t h e State (self-stabil
ity) and the dissolution o f that State (or apparatus) in a c o m m u n i t y a c o n
tradictory postulation w h o s e dissolution w e are dealing w i t h ;
2 . T h e current situation is that o f having to reinvent politics otherwise, by
reconsidering it o n the basis o f its double withdrawal, in t h e m a n a g e m e n t of
"civil society" (itself issued from a dehiscence o f the civitas) a n d / o r in the
assumption o f a c o m m o n b e i n g (destinal a n d ontological sense o f "politics").
N e i t h e r o f these withdrawals guarantees a politics: b u t they p r o d u c e , o n
the o n e hand, management"
that manages n o t h i n g , a n d o n the o t h e r hand, the
paranoia o f identity, w h i c h demolishes all identities. It follows that t h e twofold

withdrawal traces the c o n t o u r s o f w h a t remains to b e : an agency that regulates
the organization o f the c o m m o n w i t h o u t t h e assumption o f a c o m m o n s u b
stance o r subjectivity.
T h e difficulty is o f conceiving o f politics w i t h o u t a subject: n o t w i t h o u t
a u t h o r i t y o r d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g p o w e r b u t w i t h o u t a self that reaps, in the end,
the benefits o f its action. T h e difficulty is as simple as it is daunting: namely, that
power, w i t h o u t w h i c h it is poindess to speak o f politics, is only exercised against
its will. T h i s is the p r o b l e m o f equality in w h i c h political m o d e r n i t y consists
and sovereignty itself, as s o o n as it defines a s u m m i t that is n o t measured by any
given height. Liberty a n d fraternity, together, could represent this absence o f
given height (of foundation, o f father). T h e sovereign c a n n o t b e a fatheror
else t h e father must b e the very p e r s o n o f t h e n o t h i n g ( n o t h i n g o r " n o o n e "
["personne"] is the same " t h i n g " ) . "
At this p o i n t the perspective is reversed: the " p e r s o n o f the n o t h i n g " ( w h o
c a n n o t t h e n b e either a p u r e nothingness o r " n o o n e " ) o r t h e "nonsubjective
a g e n c y " (which nevertheless c a n n o t b e an object).This is w h a t outlines exactly,
a r o u n d a hollow, the c o n t o u r s o f sovereignty. To separate politics from sover-
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eignty poses a p r o b l e m , a p r o b l e m w h o s e schema is that o f an antisovereignty,
of a negative sovereignty, o f a sovereignty w i t h o u t sovereignty: in sum, the
schema o f sovereignty itself, o r t h e schema o f t h e "very h i g h " w i t h o u t altitude
n o r vantage p o i n t .
It is n o t sufficient, indeed, to designate politics as a regulatory organ o f j u s
tice and o f equality b e t w e e n the u n e q u a l and h e t e r o g e n e o u s spheres o f c o m
m o n existence (accepting that " c o m m o n existence" is a pleonasm). It is still
necessary that this vanishing fine, o r infinite perspective ("justice and equal
ity"), trace a recognizable figure, n o t as a face b u t as a tracing o f m e a n i n g . H o w
can there b e a m e a n i n g that is transversal o r transcendent t o all spheres of
m e a n i n g , a t r u t h o f all meanings, in s u m , and w h i c h , nevertheless, does n o t
assume a subject, a substance, or, in the end, a T r u t h ? T h e creation o f such a
m e a n i n g t h e constituting, instituting, legislating gesture, a gesture that is
always b o t h foundational a n d revolutionaryis the p r o p e r c o n c e r n of sover
eignty. It is t h e c o n c e r n , therefore, o f that w h i c h carries in itself, o f necessity, its
own emptying.
Post-Scriptum
F r o m w h a t p r e c e d e s , it m u s t follow that i n s t i t u t i n g sovereignty c a n n o t be
itself instituted. B e t t e r still, t h e r e is n o t , in a general way, an i n s t i t u t e d sov
ereignty: contradictio in adjecto.The
s u m m i t bases itself as m u c h as it " s u m m i t s
itself." S o v e r e i g n t y takes place i n t h o u g h t as t h o u g h t . H e g e l u n d e r s t o o d this

b y w r i t i n g that o n l y p h i l o s o p h y c o n t e m p l a t e s t h e majesty o f t h e sovereign.
12
T h a t m e a n s that t h e exercise o f sovereignty is t h e exercise o f t h o u g h t , at least

if t h o u g h t is u n d e r s t o o d as t h e act o f reason in its m o s t o n t o l o g i c a l a n d n o n gnosological sense (reason as ratio, a m e a s u r e o f t h e i m m e a s u r a b l e s u m m i t ) .
Precisely w h e n t h e sovereign w a s a k i n g , royalty had t o be t h o u g h t as such
in o r d e r to b e royal ( t h o u g h t : s y m b o l i z e d , r e p r e s e n t e d , e x p e r i e n c e d , h o n
o r e d , a n d this t o t h e h e a r t o f its b e i n g - n o t h i n g ) . T h e d e c a p i t a t i o n o f t h e k i n g
signifies t h e laying b a r e o f t h e t h o u g h t o f sovereignty: its message p r o c l a i m e d
in all t h e heads. T h i s implies that its exercise is t h e same exercise o f that
w h i c h w e call " c i t i z e n s h i p " o r "politics." Q u i t e plainly, it c a n n o t m a k e
p h i l o s o p h e r s , as specialists o f a k i n d o f discourse, i n t o e x c e p t i o n a l citizens:
that m e a n s , o n t h e contrary, that political t h i n k i n g in act, o r t h e political act,
t h a t is, t h e t h i n k i n g act, is at stake i n t h e actual actions o f all citizens, a n d o f
e v e r y o n e , a n d that e v e r y o n e m u s t have access to t h e c o n d i t i o n s o f this
t h o u g h t in act. B u t t h a t refers necessarily also t o t h e u n i q u e p r o x i m i t y o f
p h i l o s o p h e r s w i t h politics, from P l a t o t o H e g e l , to M a r x , a n d to H e i d e g g e r
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himself: this p r o x i m i t y defines t h e indistinct z o n e w h e r e k n o w l e d g e can will

itself all powerful b u t w h e r e , in a s y m m e t r i c a l m a n n e r , t h e sovereign p o w e r
addresses its o w n t h i n k i n g to itself.
P.-S.
T h e apolitical f o r m o f c o n t e m p o r a r y politics (the passage to t h e limit o f t h e

State) has already b e e n n a m e d " E m p i r e " several rimes (just as imperialism has
b e e n linked to the d e v e l o p m e n t o f capitalism, a n d n o t only in t h e c o n t e m p o
rary age b u t ever since the precapitalism o f Antiquity). E m p i r e does n o t pertain
to sovereignty: it pertains to d o m i n a t i o n . T h e master is n o t the sovereign. T h e
sovereign does n o t legitimize itself: it imposes itself in t h e n a m e o f a r i g h t that
is already given a n d posited (the r i g h t o f the pater familias,
t h e right o f the
mighty, dynastic right, right o f c o n q u e s t ) . Sovereignty, if it must b e t h o u g h t ,

must b e contrasted w i t h empire. T h a t is to say, precisely w h e r e the right is n o t
given, a situation that perhaps properly defines right: w h a t remains r i g h t as a
fact, relation to a given fact as m a k i n g right. Sovereignty supposes a funda
m e n t a l contestation o f any r i g h t acquired in this m a n n e r . Force c a n n o t m a k e
right: this is Rousseau's a x i o m o f w h i c h w e are all persuaded, b u t w h i c h implies
that the p r o p e r force o f right poses a particular p r o b l e m . T h e "reverse o f
e m p i r e " does n o t designate the project o f a destruction o f the E m p i r e as was
the case in t h e past for the destruction o f t h e State (assuming that w e have
entered into an era o f Empire) b u t t h e necessity o f t h i n k i n g b o t h o n e a n d the
other: that w h i c h could b e p r o p e r to the f o r m " E m p i r e " w h i l e t h e f o r m " S o v
ereign state" does n o t admit the reverse.'
P.-S.
A fragment. O n the o n e h a n d the sovereignty o f the State, as State, dislocates

and fragments itself-without so m u c h as i m p r e g n a t i n g t h e w h o l e , contrary to
the totalitarian desire. In this sense it is b r o k e n , d e c o m p o s e d , a n d does n o t
k n o w h o w to grasp t h e idea, n o r t h e resource o f its o w n instituting force. O n
the o t h e r hand, t h e same process shows that sovereignty, in its essence as sum
mit is necessarily detached as extremity a n d as p o i n t that is i n c o m m e n s u r a b l e
to a base a n d to a n edifice. In fact, the s u m m i t c a n n o t b e c o n n e c t e d to the e d i
fice. In this sense sovereignty is a fragment in a m o r e essential m a n n e r : it is a
fragment that is n o t totalized o n itself, a fragment in principled subtraction, a
principle o f subtraction and n o t imposition o r foundation. In this respect, it is
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certain that sovereignty c o n c e r n s t h e e x c e p t i o n to w h i c h Carl Schmitt links it
by definition. B u t it is a question precisely o f t h i n k i n g the exception: it is n o t
only w h a t gives itself outside o f right, outside o f t h e institution. It is also w h a t
does n o t give itself at all: that w h i c h is n o t a b r u t e fact, a given that prevents a
passage to the limit o f right, b u t that w i t h d r a w s from any given. It could be said
that t h e e x c e p t i o n exempts itself.The difficulty w i t h Schmitt is perhaps that he
sutures in silence this e x e m p t i o n o f t h e e x c e p t i o n , o r the p r o p e r logic o f the
absence o f foundation (and as w e know, h e was able to retrieve that operation
w i t h the n a m e o f "der
Fiihrer").
P.-S.
A n d if sovereignty was t h e revolt o f the people?
3
Cosmos
Basileus
T h e unity of a w o r l d is n o t o n e : it is m a d e o f a diversity, including disparity and

o p p o s i t i o n . " It is m a d e o f it, w h i c h is to say that it is n o t added it to it and does
n o t reduce it. T h e u n i t y o f a w o r l d is n o t h i n g o t h e r than its diversity, and its
diversity is, in t u r n , a diversity o f worlds. A w o r l d is a multiplicity o f worlds, the
w o r l d is a multiplicity o f worlds, and its unity is the sharing o u t \partage] and
the m u t u a l exposure in this w o r l d o f all its worlds.
T h e sharing o u t o f t h e w o r l d is t h e law o f the world. T h e w o r l d does n o t
have any o t h e r law, it is n o t s u b m i t t e d to any authority, it does n o t have any
sovereign. Cosmos/Nomos.
Its s u p r e m e law is in it as the multiple and m o b i l e
line o f t h e sharing o u t that it is. Nomos is t h e distribution, t h e repartition, and

t h e attribution o f t h e parts. Territorial place, n o u r i s h m e n t , a delimitation o f
rights and duties: to each and each time as appropriate.
B u t appropriate in w h a t s e n s e ? T h e d e t e r m i n a t i o n o f appropriatenessthe
law o f t h e law, absolute justiceis n o w h e r e b u t in the sharing itself and in the
exceptional singularity o f each, o f each case, according to this sharing. In any
case, this sharing is n o t given, and " e a c h " is n o t given (that w h i c h is the unity
o f each part, the o c c u r r e n c e o f its case, t h e configuration o f each world). It is
. n o t an accomplished d i s t r i b u t i o n . T h e w o r l d is n o t given. It is itself the gift.The
w o r l d is its o w n creation (this is w h a t " c r e a t i o n " means). Its sharing is at every
m o m e n t p u t i n t o play: universe in expansion, illimitation o f individuals, and
109
Globalization
infinite d e m a n d o f justice. T h i s is why, for us, cosmos basileus replaces Pindar's

nomos basileus, the k i n g d o m o f a given law.
"Justice" designates w h a t must b e rendered (as o n e says in French, rendre jus
tice). Justice must b e restituted, returned, given in return to each singular existent:
that w h i c h must b e accorded to it in return o f the gift that it itself is. A n d that
entails also that w e d o not k n o w exacdy (one does n o t k n o w an juste as, again, o n e
says in French) w h o o r w h a t is a "singular existent," neither w h e n c e n o r whither.
By virtue of the gift and the incessant sharing of the world o n e does n o t k n o w
w h e r e the sharing of a stone or o f a person begins o r ends. T h e delineation is
always wider and the same time m o r e narrow than o n e believes w h e n o n e grasps
it (or rather o n e grasps quite well, as long as o n e is attentive to w h a t extent the
c o n t o u r is trembling mobile and fleeting). Each existent belongs to m o r e groups,
masses, networks, o r complexes than o n e first recognizes, and each also detaches
from t h e m and from itself, infinitely. Each opens and closes o n m o r e worlds and
in it, as outside of it, hollowing o u t the outside inside and reciprocally.
W h a t is appropriate is thus defined b y t h e measure p r o p e r to each existent
and to the infinite, indefinitely o p e n , circulating a n d transforming c o m m u n i t y
(or c o m m u n i c a t i o n , c o n t a g i o n , contact) o f all existences b e t w e e n t h e m .
This is n o t a twofold appropriateness. It is the same, for c o m m u n i t y is n o t
added to the existent. T h e existent does n o t have its o w n consistency and s u b
sistence b y itself: b u t it has it as the sharing o f c o m m u n i t y . C o m m u n i t y ( w h i c h
also has n o t h i n g subsistent by itself, w h i c h is contact, j u x t a p o s i t i o n , porosity,
osmosis, frictions, attraction a n d repulsion, etc.) is cosubstantial w i t h the exis
tent: to each a n d to all, to each as to all, to each insofar as all. T h i s is, to trans
late in a certain language, the "mystical b o d y " o f the w o r l d , o r in a n o t h e r l a n
guage, the reciprocal action o f t h e parts o f the world. B u t in all the cases, it is
coexistence by w h i c h existence itself a n d a world in general are defined.
Coexistence remains at an equal distance b e t w e e n j u x t a p o s i t i o n and i n t e
gration. Coexistence does n o t h a p p e n to existence from w i t h o u t , it does n o t
add itself to it a n d o n e c a n n o t subtract it from it: it is existence.
Existence is n o t m a d e alone, if o n e can say it that way. It is Being that is
alone, at least in all o f the ordinary senses that o n e can give to being. B u t exis
tence is n o t h i n g o t h e r than b e i n g exposed: expulsed from its simple self-iden
tity and from its p u r e position, exposed to t h e event, to creation, thus to the
outside, to exteriority, to multiplicity, to alterity, a n d to alteration. (In a sense,
certainly, this is n o t h i n g o t h e r than b e i n g exposed to b e i n g itself, to its o w n
" b e i n g " and also, consequendy, b e i n g exposed as b e i n g : exposition as the
essence of being.)
Justice is thus the r e t u r n to each existent its d u e according to its u n i q u e
creation, singular in its coexistence w i t h all o t h e r creations. T h e t w o measures
110
Complements
are n o t separate: the singular p r o p e r t y exists according to t h e singular line that
j o i n s it to the o t h e r properties. W h a t distinguishes is also w h a t connects " w i t h "
and "together."
Justice must b e r e n d e r e d to t h e line o f the proper, to its cut each time
a p p r o p r i a t e a cut that does n o t c u t a n d that does n o t rise from a b a c k g r o u n d ,
b u t a c o m m o n c u t that in o n e stroke separates and makes contact, a coexistence
w h o s e indefinite i n t e r t w i n i n g is the sole g r o u n d o n w h i c h the " f o r m " o f exis
tence rises.There is t h e n n o g r o u n d : there is only the " w i t h , " proximity a n d its
spacing, t h e strange familiarity o f all t h e worlds in the world.
For each its m o s t appropriate h o r i z o n is also its proximity w i t h the o t h e r
h o r i z o n : that o f t h e coexistent, o f all the coexistents, o f coexisting totality. B u t
" p r o x i m i t y " is n o t strong e n o u g h if o n e does n o t understand that all the h o r i
zons are the sides o f t h e same cut, o f t h e same sinuous a n d instantaneous line
that is that o f the w o r l d (its unity). T h i s line is n o t p r o p e r to any existent, a n d
even less to an o t h e r k i n d o f substance that w o u l d l o o m over t h e world: it is
t h e c o m m o n impropriety, t h e n o n b e l o n g i n g a n d the n o n d e p e n d e n c e , the
absolute errancy o f t h e creation o f t h e world.
Justice m u s t therefore b e rendered b o t h to the singular absoluteness o f the
p r o p e r a n d to the absolute i m p r o p r i e t y o f t h e c o m m u n i t y o f existents. It must
be rendered the same t o each: such is the play (or the sense) o f the world.
T h i s is an infinite justice, consequently, w h i c h must b e rendered b o t h to
t h e p r o p r i e t y o f each a n d t h e i m p r o p r i e t y c o m m o n to all: rendered to birth a n d
to death, w h i c h h o l d b e t w e e n t h e m t h e infinity o f m e a n i n g . O r rather: it m u s t
b e rendered to b i r t h a n d t o death, w h i c h are, o n e w i t h the o t h e r a n d o n e into
t h e o t h e r (or o n e t h r o u g h t h e o t h e r ) , t h e infinite overflowing o f m e a n i n g , a n d
therefore of justice. T h i s is a b i r t h and death a b o u t w h i c h it is appropriatethis
is t h e strict justice o f t r u t h t o say n o t h i n g , b u t a b o u t w h i c h true speech d e s
perately seeks t h e p r o p e r words.
T h i s infinite justice is visible n o w h e r e . O n the contrary, an unbearable
injustice is unleashed e v e r y w h e r e : the earth trembles, the viruses infect, m e n are
criminals, liars, a n d executioners.
Justice c a n n o t b e r e m o v e d from the mire o r fog of injustice, any m o r e than
it can b e projected as a s u p r e m e conversion o f injustice. It is intrinsic to infi
nite justice that it m u s t collide brutally w i t h injustice. B u t h o w a n d w h y it is
intrinsic to it, o n e c a n n o t explain. T h i s n o l o n g e r pertains to interrogations o n
reason o r pertains to t h e d e m a n d s o f m e a n i n g . It is intrinsic to the infinity o f
justice a n d to the u n i n t e r r u p t e d creation of the world: in such a way that infin ity is never in any w a y called to accomplish itself, n o t even (above all) as an infi
nite r e t u r n o f self i n t o self. B i r t h a n d death, sharing and coexistence b e l o n g to
t h e infinite. T h e infinite, as it were, appears and disappears, divides itself a n d
111
Globalization
coexists: it is the m o v e m e n t , t h e agitation o f t h e general diversity o f the worlds,

w h i c h m a k e t h e w o r l d (and w h i c h " u n m a k e " it as well).
T h i s is w h y justice, is always alsoand perhaps firstthe d e m a n d for j u s
tice: the complaint a n d protestation against injustice, t h e call that cries o u t for
justice, a n d the breath that exhausts itself for it. T h e law o f justice is this u n a p
peasable tension toward justice itself. Similarly, the law o f the w o r l d is an infi
nite tension toward the w o r l d itself. T h e s e t w o laws are n o t only h o m o l o g o u s ;
they are t h e same a n d u n i q u e law o f absolute sharing (one could say: the law
o f t h e Absolute as sharing.)
Justice does n o t c o m e from the outside (what outside?) to hover above t h e
world, to repair o r accomplish it. It is given w i t h t h e w o r l d , in it a n d as t h e very
law o f its givenness. T h e r e is n o sovereign, n o t e m p l e n o r tablet o f t h e law,
w h i c h is n o t stricdy speaking the w o r l d itself, t h e severe, inextricable, a n d
unachievable line o f its h o r i z o n . O n e could b e t e m p t e d to say: there is a justice
for t h e world, a n d there is a w o r l d for justice. B u t these finalities o r these r e c
iprocal intentions will express w h a t is at stake very poorly. T h e w o r l d is to itself
the s u p r e m e law o f its justice: n o t t h e given w o r l d " s u c h as it is," b u t rather t h e
fact that the w o r l d happens, a properly i n c o n g r u e n t c o n g r u e n c e . T h e only task
o f justice is thus to create a w o r l d tirelessly, the space o f an unappeasable a n d
always u n s e t d e d sovereignty o f m e a n i n g .
112
Notes
1. Jean-Luc Nancy, Tlie Creation of the World or Globalization, trans. Francois Raffoul and David Pettigrew (Albany: State University of N e w York Press, 2007). Hereafter
cited as CW, followed by the page number.
2. Following the proposed alternative by Nancy: "can what is called 'globalization'
give rise to a world, or to its contrary?" (CW, 29).
3. Nancy will add in a note farther in the text that the term globalization could just
as easily be referred to as "agglomerization" (CW, 118, n.5), in reference to the glomus. As
for the concept of the "bad infinite," which Nancy borrows from Hegel, it signifies in this
context that the infinite "is indeed the one that cannot be actual" (CW, 39), that is, the
bad infinite "of a 'globalization' in spiral" (CW, 47), which Nancy contrasts with the actual
infinite of the finite being (CW, 71). Let us simply indicate that the infinite in action sig
nifies for Nancy the world itself as "absolute value," that is to say, as the existence of the
world put into play as "absolute existence" (CW, 44) so much so that it is necessary "in
the end, that the world has absolute value for itself" (CW, 40).
4. Nancy evokes on several occasions globalization as an event that "sweeps" over
us, which comes to us from an unspeakable elsewhere, and which, through a weakening
of "independencies and sovereignties" and of "representations of belonging" that makes
itself (CW, 37), opening the possibility of a questioning of the proper and of identity.
The world as such gives itself to vision in this weakening, because it is nothing other
than the putting-into-play of a possible habitation.
5. He writes, for example, "the future is precisely what exceeds representation. And
we have learned that it is a matter for us of reconceiving the world outside of repre
sentation" (CW, 50).
6. Nancy also clarifies:"At the end of monotheism, there is the world without God,
that is to say, without another world" (CW, 50; our emphasis).
113
Notes
7. Jean-Luc Nancy. Tlie Sense of the World, trans. Jeffrey Librett (Minneapolis: Uni
versity of Minnesota Press, 1997). Henceforth cited as SW followed by the page number.
8. Nancy thus will specify that the world is a dimensionality without origin,
founded on nothing, an "archi-spariality" or a "spaciousness of the opening" without a
provenance of being but that is a "spacing of presences" (always plural and singular)
(CW, 73).
9. O n the difference between sense and signification, see the opening pages of Tlie
Sense of the World.
10. The decisive characteristic of the becoming-world of the world, explains
Nancy, "is the feature through which the world resolutely and absolutely distances itself
from any status as object in order to tend toward being itself the 'subject' of its own
'worldhood'or 'world-forming.' But being a subject in general means having to
become oneselP' (CW, 41).
11. O n poverty, see the recent edition and translation by Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe
and Ana Samardzija of the Heidegger lecture on June 27,1945, La pauvrete [DieArnmt]
(Strasbourg: Presses universitaires de Strasbourg, 2004).
12. In the following chapter, " O f Creation," Nancy will analyze the expression "to
come to the world": "That 'coming to the world' means birth and death, emerging from
nothing and going to nothing" {CW, 74).
13. "If'creation" means anything, it is the exact opposite of any form of production
in the sense of a fabrication which supposes a given, a project, and a producer. The idea
of creation, such as it has been elaborated in the most diverse and most convergent
thoughts . . . above all means the idea of the ex nihilo" (CW, 51).
14. "The 'nothing' of creation is what opens in God when God withdraws in it
(and in sum from it) in the act of creating. God annihilates itself [s'aneantit] as a "self" or
as a distinct being in order to "withdraw" in its actwhich makes the opening of the
world" (CW, 70). Also, a few lines farther: "The unique God, whose unicity is the cor
relate of the creating act, cannot precede its creation, any more that it can subsist above
it or apart from it in some way. It merges with it: merging with it, it withdraws in it and
withdrawing there it empties itself there, emptying itself it is nothing other than the
opening of this void. Only the opening is divine, but the divine is nothing more than
the opening" (ibid.).
15. However, it is important to stress that Nancy refuses to simply oppose two dif
ferent fates of the world as if they represented different levels of existence. This is the
sense of the "ex" just mentioned. As he explains in his reading of Marx, "Extortion or
the exposure of each through the others [exposition des wis par les atttres]: the most impor
tant is not to say,'here is the decisive alternative!' (which we already know). What mat
ters is to be able to think how this proximity of the two 'ex-' or this twofold excess is
produced, how the same world is divided in this way. (CW, 46; our emphasis). Also,"What
is most troubling about the modern enigmafor specifically this is what constitutes the
modern and which makes it, for the last three centuries, an enigma for itself, which even
114
Notes
defines the modern as such an enigma, without any need to speak of the "postmod
ern"is that the without-reason could take the form both of capital and of the mysti
cal rose which represents the absolute value of the "without-reason" (CW, 50).
16. Nancy explains that, "Philosophy begins from itself: this is a permanent axiom
for it, which is implicit or explicit in the work of all philosophers" (CW, 77).
17. The movement of history is in and of itself the withdrawal of nature and naturality. Nancy thus explains that"[h]istory is not'nature,' if'nature' has its origin and end
in itself (supposing that nature exists or rather that it still exists in a history which pre
cisely locates elsewhere, without end, the very naturality of any nature: as if that history
included henceforth the natura naturans of any natura naturata and, consequendy also its
natura denaturans.) History is the infinite deferral of any nature and this is why, from now
on, the following question occurs to us: was there ever 'nature,' since there was history,
and thus an indefinite deferral of any nature?" (CW, 79).
18. "With the becoming human," he explains, "this movement appears to itself as
its own principle and its own end. That is to say, properly without principle and with
out end since it proceeds from an initial detachment, which one can name 'human con
dition' and whose permanence involves an extreme instability and mutability of what
has thus been detached (contingency forms thus the necessity of this 'history'). And that
is what we can call, feigning to believe that there would have been first a pure and sta
ble 'nature': denaturathn. And one could then say that 'humanity' is the indexical name
of the indefinite and infinite term of the human denaturation" (CW, 87).
19. For instance, with respect to what we might call the aporia of the subject, Nancy
shows how, in the self-inauguration of philosophy, the subject that philosophy "wants to
be, of this inauguration, undoes itself or destitutes itself... in the very gesture of its inau
guration" (CW, 83).
20. Nancy explains that "our expectation of the future is henceforth deprived of
anticipation, of representation, and of concept" (CW, 82).
21. Der Ister.A film by David Barison and Daniel Ross, 2004.
22. Michel Foucault, History of Sexuality Volume I: An Introduction, trans. Robert
Hurley (New York:Vintage Books, 1980). Henceforth cited as HS followed by the page
number.
23. It would in fact be more a matter of an "ecotechnology" insofar as natural life
has become indissociable from a series of technological conditions. Farther on, he would
clarify his reservations with respect to the motif of life, explaining that life is an "insuf
ficient" notion to designate the managed, regulated, or deregulated totality intended in
the notion of bio-politics, and that "'world' would be a more precise notion: a 'world'
as the reverse of a 'cosmos,' and as concern (mourning and awaiting) for a 'totality of
meaning'" (CW, 125, n.13).
24. This problematic is reminiscent of Foucault's treatment in Technologies of the Self
of "technologies of power" and of "technologies of self." In this seminar, Foucault speaks
of these two technologies in particular as "technologies of domination" (TS, 18).
115
Notes
25. For instance, Nancy insists that politics cannot be thought in terms of subjec
tivity. Rather, it would be a matter of showing how sovereignty "no longer designates
the assumption of a subject or in a subject,"but instead,"the order of the subjecdess reg
ulation of the relation between subjects." O n this between, farther on he evokes the
"empty space of sovereignty," itself to be understood as the nonsubstantial between of
sharing, a sovereignty structured in that sharing of the world (CW, 104).
26. In Tlie Inoperative Community, trans. Peter Connor, Lisa Garbus, Michael Hol
land, and Simona Sawhney (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1991), hence
forth cited as IC followed by the page number, Nancy cites Bataille's comment that
"Sovereignty is N O T H I N G . " Sovereignty is an exposure to an excess, a transcendence.
Nancy emphasizes that such an excess "does not present itself and does not let itself be
appropriated (or simulated)" (IC, 18). Nancy speaks of the limits of Bataille's thought, a
thought that was perhaps trapped in a circle between communism and fascism. Nancy
seeks to conceive of sovereignty in terms of singular existences.These singular existences
are sovereign in their difference; a sovereign difference that is shared. Nancy addresses
the work of George Bataille as a forerunner to the thinking of a community that exists
in a destabilizing excess of itself. Such a community would exceed totalization. In the
Inoperative Community, Nancy credits Bataille with being the first to experience the
inability to regain any immanence in the "outside of itselF' of a lost communion (IC,
9). Such a community communicates ecstasis. However, Nancy is circumspect about
Bataille's thinking with respect to the poles of community (communism) and ecstasis
(fascism). He writes that Bataille "gave up the task of thinking community properly
speaking" (IC, 25).
27. Giorgio Agamben, Homo Sacer. Sovereign Power and Bare Life, trans. Daniel
Heller-Roazen (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998) and State of Exception, trans.
Kevin Attell (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005).
28. Carl Schmitt, Political Tlieology: Four Chapters on the Concept of Sovereignty, trans.
George Schwab (Cambridge: The M I T Press, 1985), 1. O n page 2 of the same text,
Schmitt continues, "The decision on the exception is a decision in the true sense of the
word." Schmitt's point is that the sovereign is the sovereign only insofar as it makes this
decision. Without this power, there is no real power. Henceforth cited as PT followed
by the page number.
29. Carl Schmitt, Tlie Concept of the Political, trans. George Schwab (Chicago: Uni
versity of Chicago Press, 1996), 36. Henceforth cited as CP followed by the page num
ber.
30. Carl Schmitt, Legality and Legitimacy, trans. Jeffrey Seitzer (Durham: Duke Uni
versity Press, 2004), 35. Henceforth cited as LL followed by the page number.
31. Hajo Holburn, A History of Modern Germany. 1840-1945
1969), p. 724.
(New York: Knopf,
32. Hardt and Negri speak in Empire of a "control that extends throughout the
depths of the consciousnesses and bodies of the populationand at the same time across
116
Notes
the entirety of social relations," and Agamben specifies that the state of exception has
become "the dominant paradigm of government in contemporary politics" (SE, 2).
33. Jacques Derrida,"The Force of Law," in Deconstmction and the Possibility of Jus
tice, ed. D. Cornell, M. Rosenfeld, and D. Carlson (New York: Routledge, 1992), 30.
Henceforth cited as FL followed by the page number.
34. O n page 35 of SE, Agamben asserts that Carl Schmitt's theory of sovereignty
depends first on his norion of the state of exception. There is for Nancy as well a pri
macy of the state of exception from which the singular plural existences create the
world.
Author's Prefatory N o t e to the English Language Edition

l . T N . W e have chosen to render mondialisation (which in French is the word used
for what the English-speaking world knows as globalization) as "world-forming," in order
to maintain the reference to "world" that Nancy seeks to emphasize in contrast to
"global," as well as in order to retain the sense of a creation of meaning that is inherent
in Nancy's notion of world. Hence the term world-forming will contrast with globaliza
tion following Nancy's intention in this book.
Urbi et
Orbi
A first version of this text was written for a lecture given in Bordeaux, in March 2001,
in the context of the cultural event "Mutations" organized by the association Arc-enreve and by Nadia Tazzi.
1. GeorgWilhelm Friedrich Hegel, "Relationship of Skepticism to Philosophy,
Exposition of Its Different Modifications and Comparison to the Latest Form with the
Ancient One," in Between Kant and Hegel. Texts in the Development of Post-Kantian Ideal
ism, ed. and trans. George di Giovanni and H. S. Harris (Albany: State University of New
York Press, 1985), 333.
2. T N . The term inimonde is used ordinarily in French to mean "base," "vile," or
"foul," but Nancy plays here with the literal sense of the term, which we have kept and
rendered accordingly as un-world.
3.TN. Nancy plays here on the term "capital(e)": capital as monetary concept and
capital as a city.
4. Karl Marx, Tlic German Ideology, in Tlie Marx-Engels Reader, ed. Robert C.Tucker
(New York: W.W. Norton, 1978), 163-64. Henceforth cited as M E R followed by the
page number. Translation slighdy modified. (The German term translated by "creation"
is indeed its corresponding Schopfung: one could study in Marx the usages of this term
and its relation with value in itself, that is to say, with work in itself, as well as its differ
ence and its relation with the Produktion that pertains to the interdependency of work.)
117
Notes
5. "Globalization" is the term that is most generally used outside of France. Its crit
ical sense could also be rendered, following what I have indicated with respect to glo
mus, by agglomerization [agglomerisation] ...
6.This also means that "Marx has not yet been received," as Derrida says in Specters
of Marx:Tlie State of the Debt, Tlie Work of Mourning, and the New International, trans. Peggy
Kamuf (New York: Roudedge, 1994), 174. A minimally rigorous reading of Marx,
whether from Derrida or another (Michel Henry for instance, or Etienne Balibar, or
Andre Tosel, or Jacques Bidet, among others), confirms this observation. But we must
add two remarks: on the one hand, doesn't the history of the world today, under the
guise of "globalization," produce as its own necessity the scheme of an entirely different
"reception" of Marx, and, on the other hand, isn't the fact of not yet being received and
never being completely received, the reason that the force of a thought goes beyond
itself and its proper name?
7. The clearest text is perhaps that of "Marginal Notes on Adolphe Wagner's
'Lehrbitch der politischen Okonomie'" in Vol. 24 in Tlie Collected Works of Karl Marx and
Frederick Engels, 50 volumes (NewYork: International Publishers, London: Lawrence and
Wishart Ltd., 1975-), 531 and particularly the section "Derivation of the Concept of
Value."
8. "Mysterious" and "mystical," are words that Marx uses with respect to fetishism.
Cf. Capital, I, I section, 4. M E R , 319-20.
9. N o doubt the problem does not end there, any more than the more general
question of phenomenality.The nonphenomenal and yet actual presence remains a motif
to explore. But I cannot dwell on it here.
10. This is, clearly, a provisional image. But it is a matter of at least indicating that
the reality of value is not simply economic, or, in a more complex way, that the reality
of economy is not economic in the simple mercantile sense, perhaps even that the real
ity of the market is n o t . . . , etc. In any case, the reality of the phenomenon is no more
here than elsewhere identifiable as a "pure phenomenon." O n this "phenomenological"
complexity and its implications in the relation "use-value-exchange-value," I refer the
reader to Jacques Derrida, Specters of Marx, chapter 5, "apparition of the inapparent: the
phenomenological 'conjuring trick,'" particularly p. 160:"[O]ne would have to say that
the phantasmagoria began before the said exchange-value, at the threshold of the value
of value in general... ." O n the reality of the economy one can reread Michel Henry,
Marx: A Philosophy of Human Reality, trans. Kathleen McLaughlin (Bloomington: Indi
ana University Press, 1983), chapter 7, "The Reality of Economic Reality" (even if to
disagree with his interpretation of "living reality"); as for the reality of the relation of
"expression" in which value is constituted and on the nature of "concept" or the "con
tent of thought," one can look up the work by Pierre Macherey ("A propos du processus
d'exposition du 'Capital'"), in Lire le Capital (PUF, Paris 1996). At the intersection
between these diverse approaches, one will find at least one common point: the charac
ter of a value "in itself," which precisely is not a "thing in itself" but the actuality of a
praxis that has "value" by itself absolutely and in the materiality or the complex corpo-
118
Notes
reality of the transformation in which it expresses itself, gives itself, and creates itself.
Reconsidering here the famed "epistemological break" of Althusser, I am wondering if
one should not understand, under the guise of "epistemology" that was then in usage,
that it was not a matter of elaborating anew, against an idealism of value, a practical
thought of value, which first meant: against a humanism that presupposed "human
value," a thought presupposing the insufficiency of the concept of "man" faced with the
absolute value of a "creation of man." See Louis Althusser, "Marxism and Humanism,"
in For Marx, trans. Ben Brewster (New York:Verso, 1990).
11. N o doubt it is possible, and perhaps necessary, to understand "value" in Marx
according to what Louis Gernet explains of the "The Mythical Idea ofValue in Greece,"
in Tlie Anthropology of Ancient Greece, trans. John Hamilton SJ, and Blaise Nagy (Balti
more: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1981), on the condition that we understand well
that "mythical" designates here the reality of the "virtue of symbols" (178). Namely: the
value of the valorous ones who measure themselves in the athletic agon, recompensed
by a "prize" the material reality of which, a "pricey" object, does not have "value" as a
monetary currency would, but as an offering (royal and divine) given to the one who
shows his or her worth as the most valorous: wealth here is not capitalized (that would
be hubris) but it makes the brilliance of what "shows its worth" shine in gold, which we
might risk translating into a "to produce oneself"produce what? Nothing other than
a valorous man, or the value of a man. But this happens, Gernet tells us, before the
invention of currency, and competition does not yield to commerce, if we can say it in
this way. However, Gernet does note that continuities are maintained between "mythi
cal value" and "monetary value," and we know that on this point much could be added
(in particular from psychoanalysis). H o w can we articulate with precision the relation I
am sketching here between Marx and the "mythical" world, between abstract value and
symbolic value (in the strong, active and ostensive sense of the word)? This is what needs
to be elaborated.
12. As we can understand, this remark means that Heidegger's concern with respect
to humanism hardly differs from Marx's with reference to "total man."
13. GeorgWilhelm Friedrich Hegel, Tlie Enq'dopedia of Philosophical Sciences, trans.
Gustav Emil Mueller (New York: Philosophical Library, 1959), 94, 125. The "good"
infinite, infinite in act, is that which is identical to the finite in which it actualizes itself.
14. One will find numerous indications in Paul Clavier's Le concept de monde (Paris:
PUF, 2000), a perspective however quite different from mine.
15. T N . Nancy plays on the polysemy of the word sens, which includes: meaning,
direction, and in this particular case function or even usage.
16. See the final page of Martin Heidegger, "The Age of the World Picture," in Tlie
Question ConcerningTcchnology and Other Essays, trans.William Lovitt (New York: Harper,
1977), 153.
17.With respect to "secularization" and to the necessity of opposing to that model
the model-less thought of another (il)legitimation of the modern world, I can only
119
Notes
refer to Hans Blumenberg, who seems to me to be the unavoidable point of departure
in this matter.
18. O n this question, see Jean-Luc Nancy, L' "il y a" du rapport sexuel (Paris: Galilee,
2001).
19. See supra, p. 119, n . l l , relative to the "mythical value" analysed by Gernet. Let
us clarify the following: it does not matter whether the archeo-philological deduction
of such an operation be exact or not, from the perspective of empirical knowledge. O n e
cannot moreover ignore that phenomena of precapitalization have preceded capitalism,
nor in general that wealth as power has always accompanied wealth as brilliance, just as
religion as domination has always accompanied sacred symbolism. What matters is that
capitalism forces us to seek the value of value, whose extensive form it deploys so exacdy
that it renders all the more insistent its absence of intensive form (an absence that we
interpret as a loss, which remains certainly insufficient, as would any thought of loss).
Capitalism exposes the inverted form of an absolute and singular value through general
equivalence. What can the reversal of this inversion, or "revolution," mean in Marx's
terms?
20.1 will limit myself to mentioning here, Martin Heidegger, Tlie Principle of Rea
son, trans. Reginald Lilly (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1991). In reality, it is
a matter of commenting upon, or better, of extending and taking farther that thought
according to which the "principle of sufficient reason" becomes an imperious demand
of reason when it becomes sensible, if not intelligible, that neither reason nor ground
sustains the world.
21. This was the sense of the word in French, and the German kept the two senses
of reich /Reich. One can note an analogous displacement of the sense of fortune.
22. In German, it is still this Wiirde, which one translates by "dignity" (in Kant, for
instance), but which belongs to the semantic group of Wert,"value."
23. "Absentheism": an absent God and an absence in place of God, but also the
absence from work as liberation from servitude or as the sabbatical rest of the creating
God (Genesis II: 23), the rest of the one who nevertheless does not know fatigue
(Koran L, 38), vacancy of the vacant . . . (One also called the landowners who never
appear on their land "absentheists"!)
24. Ludwig Wittgenstein, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, trans. D. F. Pears and B. F.
McGuinness (New York: Roudedge, 2001), 6.41, 86. Henceforth cited asTLP followed
by the page number.
25. In the sense that a world is itself a space of meaning, see Jean-Luc Nancy, Tlie
Sense of the World.
26.This is the moment to note many analogies or places of encounter between this
work and the work of Antonio Negri in Kairos.Alma Venus, multitude, trans. Judith Revel
(Paris: Calmann-Levy, 2001), a book that I was only able to read after this text was
120
Notes
already written. In particular, the motif of creation plays an important role in Negri
(although he does not refer to its theological provenance, nonetheless apparent). But if
there is more than one disagreement, the point where I am most in disagreement with
him is the following: for him, "meaning" seems to be posited as something obvious, and
its nature not questioned. It seems to me, on the contrary, that everything here requires
that we rethink the meaning of meaning, including as common sense (or sense of the
common), or rather as such. But if meaning is always of the common and in common,
it does not follow that the "common" makes immediate sense: it has to produce itself
(thus think itself) as suchas "meaning-in-common," which means forms, languages,
arts, celebrations, philosophies, etc. One must therefore think the works in which mean
ing creates itself in a determined way, even if its creation largely exceeds the closed space
of the works. And we must think how these works communicate meaningwhich is
not "their" meaning.
O f Creation
1. La Faculte dejuger (collectif), (Paris: Minuit, 1985).
2. Jean-Francois Lyotard, Tiie Confession of Augustine, trans. Richard Beardsworth
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2000), 37.
3. Jean-Francois Lyotard, Libidinal Economy, trans. Iain Hamilton Grant (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1993), 255.
4. Jean-Francois Lyotard, Lessons on the Analytic of the Sublime, trans. Elizabeth R o t tenberg (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1994), 114.
5. Richard McKeon, ed., Aristode, Metaphysics, A, 2, 1013 b 25, in Tlie Basic Works
ofAristotle (New York: R a n d o m House, 1941), 753.
6. Immanuel Kant, Tlie Critique ofJudgment, trans, James Meredith Creed (Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1982), % 65,19-24
7. Richard McKeon, ed. Metaphysics, Z, 17,1041 a 10-25, in Tlie Basic Works of Aris
totle (New York: Random House, 1941), 810.
8. Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, trans. Norman Kemp Smith (New York:
St. Martin's Press, 1965), 210.
9. Ibid., 215.
10. In this respect, Spinoza represents, ahead of his time, a conjunction of this "pos
sible" and of the "real," a way of gathering the "giving" and the "doing," which more
over suppresses at the same time the difficulties and aporias linked to a "God" and to a
"creation," a creation that Kant analyzed and critiqued. This is why one saw, following
Kant, a flurry of Spinozisms. However, the Spinozist's substance still keeps at a distance,
or neutralizes, it seems to me, the question of the "generosity" of the world as I wish to
indicate it here (more than one Spinozist, I know, will disagree with me . . . ) .
121
Notes
11. It is important to mention briefly that it is precisely this status of the image of
the creator (status of man but also in some respect of the universe and/or nature) that
will have made possible, or even necessary, the transformation we are speaking of here.
In other words, this transformation comes from the fact that creation is not first pro
duction (we will get to this later) but expression, exposition, or extraneation of "itself."
With Leibniz, it consists in the "continual outflashings of the divinity." Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, Monadology, in Leibniz: Discourse on Metapliysics, Corrrespondence with
Arnauld, Monadology, trans. George Montgomery (La Salle, IL: Open Court, 1980), % 47,
261.
12.This is also the reason why it is possible and desirable to show that the Kantian
revolution in its entirety rests on nothing other than a question of creation, at the same
time recognized and rejected by Kant himself (the great book by Gehrard Kriiger on
Kant's morals includes more than an indication on this issue).
13. We recognize here a corollary of Kant's thesis on being, which "is not a real
predicate." Not being a predicate, being is the subject of existence and as such it "is" noth
ing other than existence.
14. Of which it is a common feature quite independent from their well-known dif
ferences.
15. All the necessary arguments are in particular present and often repeated by
Valery (see his Cahiers, passim).
16. But also in more than one spiritual meditation, neither properly mystical nor
properly speculative, such as that of Simone Weil, to give a modern example.
17. See "La deconstruction du christianisine" a very succinct sketch of this theme p u b
lished in Etudes philosophiques 2 (1998), and the indications already given in Being Sin
gular Plural, trans. Robert Richardson and Anne O'Byrne (Stanford: Stanford University
Press, 2000), and then in La Pensee derobee (Paris: Galilee, 2001).
18. As Heidegger invites us to think in Wliat is Philosophy, trans. William Kluback
and Jean T.Wilde (Albany: N C U P Inc., ,1956). Being is not simply an intransitive verb:
it speaks intransitivity itself, but it speaks it in such a way that it must be heard in "the
transitive sense" (49).
19.1 will reserve a precise examination of the philological and theological history
of the vocabulary of creation for another occasion. Let us recall here that the mystical
rose (see above page 47) grows [croit] without reason.
20. A displacement of the thought of desire also results from this: see L' "il y a" du
rapport sexuel.
21. I will not address the references that would be necessary, with respect to the
Kabbalah (in particular the studies from Gershom Scholem) as well as other interpreta
tions, whether Christian or Muslim, of "creation," and I will not draw upon Schelling's
analyses: all this, clearly, remains in the background.
22. Gerard Grand, Etudes (Paris: Galilee, 1995), 126 and 132.
122
Notes
23. Ludwig Wittgenstein, "A Lecture on Ethics," Tlie Philosophical Review LXXIV,
no. 1 (1965): 8.
24. Jean-Luc Marion, for his part, attempts to refer this difference to a "difference
without compare [sans egale]" that would be prior [en deca] to any temporality and in the
simultaneity of a "call" and a "responsal." Jean-Luc Marion, Being Given: Toward a Phe
nomenology of Givenness, trans. Jeffrey L. Kosky (Stanford: Stanford University Press,
2002), 295. This powerful and eloquent proposition does not emerge yet out of a "selfgiving" (and of a "self-showing") of the phenomenon, whereas I propose here, simply,
that nothing gives itself and that nothing shows itselfand that is what is.
25.The aporia of the gift, according to Derrida, is that it "must not even be what
it has to be, namely, a gift" (Given Time: Counterfeit Money, trans. Peggy Kamuf [Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1992], 69), since itcannot wish to give nor will itself as gift
without suppressing its own generosity and gratuity. The gift is nothing, or gives noth
ing. This is the sense that one must give to the "this is nothing" that a giver says after
he/she is thanked.
26. Contemporary astrophysics and cosmology do not cease, in this respect, to
nourish thought and questioning.
27. Martin Heidegger, Contributions to Philosophy (From Enowning), trans. Parvis
Emad and Kenneth Maly (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1999), 61. We can
recall that creation, in Babylonians myths where the monotheistic narrations find their
sources, is first of all a separation, for instance of sky and earth, or of earth and water. To
create is not to posit, but to separate.
Creation as Denaturation: Metaphysical Technology

This text, presented in Fribourg-en-Brisgau in 2000 at the Congress of the Deutsche
Gesellschoft fiir phanomenologische Forschung, reconsiders and also revises selections of a
presentation devoted to Alan Badiou's polemical relation to Heideggerian historicity (or
historicality) and is forthcoming in the proceedings of the Colloquium devoted to Alain
Badiou,"La pensee forte" organized in October 1999 in Bordeaux.
1. Martin Heidegger, Nietzsche, vol. II, trans. P. Klossowski (Paris: Gallimard, 1971),
381 (sec. ix "being").
2. O n this word and its motif, this work recalls here (as well as through mutual tex
tual communication) the work of Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe in Poetique de I'histoire
(Paris: Galilee, 2002).
3. In truth it would be necessary to undertake a work specifically devoted to the way
in which philosophy envisions or refuses to envision its own beginnings: from Plato to Hei degger it excludes the anthropological investigation of its provenance, and the self-engen
dering, whatever it is called (logos or thaumazein), institutes itself and reflects itself. It is as if
philosophy had to be a second nature, rather than the technology of denatured truth . . .
123
Notes
4. "Meaning" as question, tension, and intentionality, as passion too, and passion for
truth, proceeds from the absence of given meaning, or what Bernard Sriegler caUed,"the
originary disorientation" in Technics and Time I: Tlie Fault of Epimethiis (Stanford: Stan
ford University Press, 1998).
5. Serge Margel, Logique de la nature (Paris: Galilee, 2000).
6. Richard McKeon, ed., Metaphysics A, 982 b22, in Tlie BasicWorks of Aristotle (New
York: Random House, 1941), 692.
Complements
l . T h e word biopolitics can also assume the following meaning today: "an ethicosocio-political reflection on the problems posed by biological technoscience," with an
emphasis at times on "political power interested the biotechnological possibilities." . . .
Thus to limit ourselves to a few recent examples in the volume Biopolitik, directed by
Christian Geyer (Frankfurt-am-Main: Surkamp), as in no. 1 of Mif/f/ttirfes, "Biopolitique
et Biopouvoir" (Exils, 2000), which opens discussions on the concept itself.
2. N o doubt one also encounters more narrow usages of the word. But I consider
here the usages that claim to be the most properly philosophical and to engage with this
term propositions that fundamentally reevaluate each of the terms that compose it. I do
not seek to classify these usages under names or works: I am only characterizing ten
dencies.
3. Human life was what was at issue for Foucault. We see without difficulty that
vegetable and animal life followed a parallel destiny at the same time (breeding, care,
etc). In any case, that destiny began long ago ever since the beginnings of cultivation and
breeding. Certainly, there is henceforth a mutation in this technological continuum: the
question is precisely of learning to understand it.
4. O n the condition of not confusing, as is often the case, between "sovereignty"
and "domination."
5. See below note 13 on page 125.
6. An early version of Ex Nihilo Sumnium was presented at a colloquium entided
"Sovereignty" at the Regional center of literature at Montpellier, Castries chateau, July
2001.
7. Dictionnaire historique de I'ancien langage franfais: on Glossaire de la langue francaise
(Paris: Niort, 1875-1882).
8. T N . See Jean Bodin, On Sovereignty: Four Chapters From Six Books of the Com
monwealth, ed. and trans. Julian H. Franklin (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1992).
9. T N . Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Tlie Social Contract, trans. Maurice Cranston (Lon
don: Penguin Books, 1968).
124
Notes
10.TN. In English in the original.
11. T N . Nancy plays here on the twofold sense of the word persomie in French,
which means either person or no one.
12. Hegel, Philosophy of Right 281, trans. T. M. Knox (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 1967). "Hence the majesty of the monarch is a topic for thoughtful treatment by
philosophy alone, since every method of inquiry, other than the speculative method of
the infinite Idea which is purely self-grounded, annuls the nature of majesty altogether."
(186)
13. This determination is similar to those that Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri
suggest with their concept of "Empire": absence of borders, suspension of history, social
integration [see Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, Empire (Cambridge: Harvard Uni
versity Press, 2001)]. In brief, it would be a question of a Moebius strip, each side of
which passes incessandy into the other. That is not sufficient reason, to my mind, to
make of this "Empire" "the biopolitical nature of the new paradigm of power" (E, 23),
because power does not sets itself up there as such in the same way as in the State, and
because "life" is a quite insufficient notion to designate such a managed regulated or
deregulated totality. The "world" would be a more precise notion: a "world" as the
reverse of a "cosmos," and as concern (mourning and awaiting) for a "totality of mean
ing."
14.TN. An earlier version of this essay appeared in Being Singular Plural. Professor
Nancy has revised the text and a new translation has been provided of the entire essay.
125
Index
Agglomeration, 33
Derrida, Jacques, 49, 61, 72, 83, 85
Aristotle, 64, 89
Descartes, Rene, 4 1 , 65
a-theism, 70
detheologization, 51
rfi'5-position, 73
bad infinite, 38,39, 40,46, 47, 71

Bataille, Georges, 102
ecotechnology, 94-95
becoming-world, 4 1 , 84
Ent-scheidung, 74
Bergson, Henri, 41
experience, 37, 43, 49, 60, 62-66, 71; of

the'impossible, 65; of thought, 68
biopolirics, 93-94, and bioethics, 93, as

technological management of life, 94
bios, 93,94
Foucault, Michel, 93
capital, 3 6 , 3 8 , 4 6 , 47-50, 5 3 , 1 0 1 ; vio

lence of, 105
German Ideology, Tlie, 36

globalization, 27,36,37,47; and creation
"commodity fetish," 38
of the world, 29; as exponential growth
Cosmos basileus, 110
of globality, 37; and global idiom, 28;
creation, 50, 6 6 , 7 0 , 7 2 , 7 9 , 1 0 9 ; as denat-
and glomus, 34; as understood by Marx,
uration, 74, 82, 87; enigma of, 68; and
36; as notion of totality, 27; as suppres
the ex nihilo, 5 1 , 7 0 , 7 2 - 7 3 , 87; of

humanity, 37; of meaning, 49,107;
sion of world-forming, 50
God, 38-40, 60,64, 66,69,100,104;
and monotheism, 50, 67,70; and
absenting of, 68; and causa stii, 73; cre
value, 36, 75; as a non-theological
ating, 52; "death of," 8; as merged with
notion, 50; as distinct from produc
the world, metaphysical representations
tion, 51; as withdrawal of the given,
of, 41; and "secularity," 100; unique,
69; of the world, 29, 90, 111
70-71; and the world, 43; 44,50
"deconstruction," 83
Hegel, George Wilhelm Friedrich, 34,
denaturation, 87, 89; of natural history, 82
39, 46, 48, 68,78, 81, 85,102,107
127
Index
Heidegger, Martin, 4 1 , 43, 61, 68, 73,
81-83, 85, 87,102-103,107
history, 78; as denatured, 82; as exhausted,
82; as the infinite deferral of nature,
79; and philosophy, 78-79; "of the
world," 79
humanity, 33-34,36-37, 39, 42, 48,
52-54, 61, 64, 66, 77, 81, 86-87, 90,
100,105; as "total humanity," 37; as
producing itself, 37,39, 45; as reason
able, 61-62
Husserl, Edmund, 4 1 , 61, 81
judgment, 59; about ends, 59, 62-63,
66-67; "reflective," 60, 62-64; without
criteria, 60
justice, 40, 53-55, 61, 63, 94,106-107,
110-111; absolute, 109; as demand
for, 112; as infinite, 111; and injustice,
111; as rendered, 61,110-111; and the
unsetded sovereignty of meaning, 112
and history, 78-79, 81-82; Kant's con

cept of, 62-64; as nature-world-God
triad, 41
Nietzsche, Friedrich, 47, 49, 69, 81
Nomos, 80,109
Nomos basileus, 110
nothing, the, 5 1 , 67, 69, 72,103
and nothingness, 51, 57,102, 106; as
the open, 70
onto-theology, 41, 4 4 , 7 1 , 84; inverted,
45; the God of, 44
"overman," the, 38
Parmenides, 80
philosophy, 77; beginnings of, 83; and
history, 78; and the dissolution of the
mythical present, 80; as revelation of
history, 79; as self-instituting, 77; as
technology of logos, 77
phusis, 80, 81,87
Plato, 77, 79, 82, 85, 89,107
Kant, Immanuel, 41, 59-64, 65-66,68,

82
power, 34, 39-40, 48, 53-55, 66, 68,

93-96, 98-99,103-106; of nature, 64;
sovereign, 108; techno-logical, 34
Leibniz, Gottfried Wilhelm, 4 1 , 44, 65

Logos, 77,79, 80, 89, 90; of being, 68
Lyotard, Jean-Francois, 59-62, 67
Rousseau, Jean-Jacques, 88,100,108
Malebranche, Nicolas, 41
McLuhan, Marshall, 28
Marx, Karl, 36-39, 45,48, 51, 53-54,107
metaphysics, 85, 87, 88; as history, 90; as a
science of principles and ends, 85; as a
techno-logy, 89
mondialisation, 27-28; as untranslatable,
27. See also world-forming
monotheism, 39, 50-51, 67-69, 85, 100;
deconstruction of, 70
muthos, 79-81
nature, 36, 40, 64, 86, 94, 98; and denaturation, 87-90; "empirical laws of," 63;
reflective judgment, 60, 62-64
Schmitt, Carl, 103,109

Schiirmann, Reiner, 85
sharing [partage], 36, 4 1 , 4 3 , 4 6 , 7 4 , 1 0 9 ,
111; absolute, 112; singularities, 46; of
the world, 110
Socrates, 80, 89
sovereign, 96, 97,99,102, 104,106,108;
as author of the law, 98; as existent
dependent on nothing, 103; at the
height of absolute value, 102; as
incommensurable with the suzerain,
98; as self constituting, 100; and the
state of exception, 103
sovereignty, 96, as nothing, 102; of the
people, 100; and state of exception,
128
Index
103; as summit, 97,101; and suzerain,
98
Spinoza, Baruch, 39, 4 1 , 44, 65
suzerain, 98, 99
teclm'e, 77, 78, 80, 94
techno-science, 34
technology, 49, 66,77, 8 1 , 84, 87; and
"biotechnology," 93; event of, 90; of
logos, 89; as tcchno-logy, 86, 88-89
tragedy, 84
value, 27,34, 3 6 - 3 8 , 4 0 - 4 1 , 44, 47-54,
96,102; and absolute value, 37-39;
and dignity, 40; and surplus-value, 46;
and value-philosophies, 60
Wittgenstein, Ludwig, 4 1 , 52, 61,71
world, the, 28, 34-35, 4 0 - 4 1 , 47, 55,73;
as absentheistic, 51; and art, 42; and
the being-world of the world, 41; and

"beyond-the-world" [oiitre-monde], 37;
as creation of the world, 29, 37, 54,
109; as destroying itself, 35; as gift,
109; as an inhabiting, 42; "mystical
body of," 110; of singularities, 61; as
outside representation, 43,50; as
space-time of meaning and truth, 41;
and subject-of-the-world, 40, 49; as
totality of meaning, 41; and the
worldly, 40; and world-becoming, 4 1 ,
44, 51; and world-history, 36; as with
out God, 43,50
world-forming [inondialisation], 29,
36-37, 4 1 , 44, 5 0 - 5 1 , 95; and the
un-world, 34; and world-becoming
[mondaiiisation], 44; and worldhood,
41
zoi, 94
129

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Jean-Luc Nancy

Translated and with an Introduction by

STATE UNIVERSITY OF N E W YORK PRESS

S U N Y SERIES IN CONTEMPORARY FRENCH THOUGHT

David Pettigrew and Francois Raffoul, editors

For information, address

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Author's Prefatory N o t e to the English Language Edition

Author's Prefatory N o t e to the French Language Edition

W e w o u l d like to t h a n k J a n e B u n k e r , e d i t o r - i n - c h i e f o f S U N Y Press, for h e r

e x c h a n g e " (CW, 27), whereas "mondialisation" does n o t allow itself to b e translated

Tlie Creation of the World o r

It is this contrast in m e a n i n g that N a n c y endeavors to reveal in order to

Tlie Creation of the World o r

in its event as in its destruction o r in its destruction as event. It is therefore a

o u t of representation, w h e n it frees itself o f t h e so-called w o r l d v i e w o r Weltan

resentation, outside its representation and of a w o r l d o f representation, and this

keeps the w o r l d in its gaze, its sight, in

du monde]," the tide o f o n e o f Nancy's major w o r k s , cannot signify the sense of

Hie Creation of the World o r

t o w h i c h " t h e m e a n i n g of the w o r l d must be situated outside the w o r l d " ) , but,

tion o f significance. M e a n i n g is n o t given, it is to b e invented, to be created,

always a relation to itself. T h i s relation to itself, as w e n o t e d above, does n o t

only in terms o f being-i'/z-the-world [au-monde]. T h e preposition "an"

explains Nancy, represents, in French, w h a t n o w encapsulates t h e entire p r o b

The Creation of the World o r

T h e first characteristic o f the w o r l d is thus its radical i m m a n e n c e . T h e

the way in w h i c h t h e w o r l d symbolizes in itself w i t h itself, in w h i c h it articu

impossible: the im-possible is the possibility of experience. The: w o r l d arrives as such

b e c o m e s clearly t h e q u e s t i o n o f t h e impossible e x p e r i e n c e o r the e x p e r i e n c e

a stance by w h i c h t h e w o r l d holds itself b y itself, configures

itself a n d exposes itself, refers to itself w i t h o u t referring to any given principle

The Creation of the World o r

n o t h i n g , and m e a n i n g , e m e r g i n g from n o t h i n g , allows the w o r l d to appear as a

the w o r l d is, writes N a n c y in an striking passage,"the n o t h

ing itself, if o n e can speak in this way, o r rather nothing g r o w i n g [croissant] as

The Creation of the World o r

instead n o t fabricated, p r o d u c e d by n o p r o d u c e r " ( C W , 51). T h u s , N a n c y

in these pages, w o r l d - f o r m i n g as an alternative to globalization.' It is a m a t t e r

o f w h a t o n e m i g h t call the undecidability of b e g i n n i n g s . O n e b e g i n n i n g w i t h

"belongs to s e l f - b e g i n n i n g . T h e b e g i n n i n g remains u n g r o u n d e d " (CW, 80).To

any muthos" (CW, 81). T h e use o f t h e t e r m ^ m a t u r a t i o n w o u l d imply, it seems,

The Creation of the World o r

T h e aporia o r chiasm, as N a n c y refers to it, opens a space o f uncertainty, inside

" e x h a u s t e d " in t h e process. It is perhaps in t h e obsession o f p h i l o s o p h y w i t h

The Creation of the World o r

Homo sapiens, technician of itself" (CW, 86). As history is d e n a t u r e d by a t e c h

c a u l t . - Foucault w r i t e s o f t h e focus o n the b o d y in t h e seventeenth century, a

N o n e t h e l e s s , N a n c y emphasizes that, " w h a t forms a world today is exacdy

i n g t h e section in Tlie Creation of the World that addresses biopolitics, N a n c y

chapter, N a n c y endeavors to d r a w t h e c o n t o u r s of sovereignty, c o n t o u r s that

The Creation of the World o r

It also marks the n o t h i n g from w h i c h , ex nihilo, sov

ereignty is exercised, as it is n o l o n g e r f o u n d e d o n a n y t h i n g b u t itself a n d its

the creation o f a w o r l d could ensue. ''

b e t w e e n a suzerain and a sovereign.The suzerain in the medieval w o r l d

was connected to a lineagefrom G o d to t h e eldest (even o n e w h o is deceased)

t h e sovereign in Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life.

ticular, reminds us o f the crucial link b e t w e e n the c o n c e p t o f t h e state o f e x c e p

a 'willed state of exception,"

for t h e p u r p o s e o f establishing t h e N a t i o n a l Socialist S t a t e ' " (SE, 3). In Tlie

friend and enemy, o r t h e " f r i e n d - e n e m y constellation," as h e d u b b e d it. ' In the

T h e state o f e x c e p t i o n o f w h i c h S c h m i t t spoke, and that the Nazis wielded, was