THE POLITICAL REGROUPING OF THE ROMANIAN NOMENKLATURA

DURING THE 1989 REVOLUTION

RALUCA GROSESCU

INTRODUCTION

The present study is an analysis of the political regrouping of the former Romanian
communist elite during the 1989 Revolution. The purpose of the research is to show that,
although the revolutionary events appeared to be a break-up of the old social and political
hierarchies, the former communist elite preserved an important degree of political power and
succeeded in dominating the decision-making process within the provisional political
institutions created in the very moment of the revolution. The analysis focuses on the
modality and scale of the political survival of the former members of Nomenklatura during
the Romanian Revolution.
The first objective of this research is to identify the communist actors who in December
1989 participated in the establishment of the new structures of political power and to measure
the extent of their reproduction in the provisional institutions: the Committee of the National
Salvation Front (CFSN), the Provisional Council for National Unity (CPUN) and the
Provisional Government led by Petre Roman. The second objective of the analysis is to
evaluate from what categories of the Nomenklatura these elites came from in order to
understand if, and how, the former Communist Partys networks functioned in the elite
recruitment process.
This study has two main sections. The first one will provide a theoretical framework
concerning the concepts of Nomenklatura and the hypothesis on the post-communist
destination of the Nomenklatura. The second one will present and interpret data on the
reproduction of the communist elites during the 1989 revolution and will illustrate, through
the example of the Romanian governments, the dynamic of this phenomenon during the first
ten years of transition.
1. THEORETICAL BACKGROUND

The approach of this subject requires the clarification of two theoretical concepts that will
be used in the present study. First, I shall focus on a tight definition of the concept of
Nomenklatura, in order to ascertain an inferior boundary of this political group in
relationship to the real political power held by its members. Second, considering that, in
contrast with what happened in other European Socialist countries, the ambiguous and
contradictory character of the December 1989 revolution generated a particular destiny of the
Romanian Nomenklatura immediately after the communism breakdown, I shall focus on the
analysis of certain hypothesises concerning the mobility and the conversion of the
communist elites in Eastern Europe.
1.1. Towards a definition of the Nomenklatura
The set of lists containing the decision-making positions of the communist society,
such as they were established by the high authorities of the Party, as well as the persons who
occupied these positions at various moments constitutes the Nomenklatura1. The Party,
through its cadres department within the Central Committee, used to manage these positions
at the national level. It used to update regularly the positions contained by the lists as well as
their holders. The same phenomenon occurred at regional and local level. According to the
1

Mihail Vozlenski, Nomenklatura , Doubleday & Company Inc., Garden City, New York, 1984, p. 75

echelon of the Party body that controlled the appointment in these positions, we can
distinguish a national Nomenklatura, a regional and a local one.
The system of the Nomenklatura did not apply only to the Party organization, but also
to all superior directions existing in the state institutions and economical, administrative, and
cultural units with managerial autonomy. This context demands a classification of the
Nomenklatura along a horizontal axis according to the fields of activity. The literature
regarding this subject refers generally to five categories: political, economic, cultural, social
and the international affairs Nomenklatura2.
A) The Political Nomenklatura is by far the most far-reaching and the most
important, because it concerns several apparatus such the Party, the army officers body, the
political police and the state administration. Therefore it can be divided in four smaller
categories, according to the apparatus it represents.
A.1) The Party Nomenklatura includes the Communist Party officials: from the
members of the Political Bureau and the Secretariat of the Central Committee, to the
apparatchiks working in the state enterprises. It concerns all organizations and institutions of
the Party: committees, commissions, academies, institutes, publications, etc. Its members
were generally very faithful to the cause of the Party because their positions and privileges
were the direct result of the existence of the Communist Party itself. Although certain
scholars created a special category of mass organization Nomenklatura, which included tradeunions and so-called social organizations, I consider that these represented only Party
satellites which had as "supreme purpose to put into practice, in the best way possible, the
clear-sighted policy of the communist Party3. This is why, in this paper, leaders of mass
organizations are included in the Party Nomenklatura category.
B.2.) The Army and the Political Police Nomenklatura included the superior officers
body of the two institutions. These were essential categories for the functioning of the
communist society because they held the coercive means that ensured the supremacy of the
Party. In the studies concerning the post-communist fate of the former Nomenklatura, these
two categories are not generally research subjects as they are considered to be "too sensitive"
or "hostile to any cooperation4.
C.3.) The State Nomenklatura includes the legislative, executive and judicial
institutions such as the Parliament, the Government, the local administration, the Public
Prosecutions Office and the Supreme Court of Justice. Except for the Parliament, which is
considered to be merely a legitimizing instrument for the Party's decisions, all the other
institutions imply a technocratic experience. This is why, after the consolidation of the
communist regime, the professional criteria, amended by a higher education diploma,
prevailed in the recruitment of these categories' members. Their management and legal
competence, confirmed by field experience made them sometimes aware of the decline of the
principles of organization in communist administration. This led sometimes to the emergence
2

Jacek Wasilewski, La Nomenklatura, vers quel destin social?, Revue dtudes comparatives Est-Ouest,
4/1994, p. 33-46, Petr Mateju, Blanka Rehakova, Une rvolution pour qui? Analyse slective de modles de
mobilit intergnrationnelle entre 1989 et 1992, Revue dtudes comparatives Est-Ouest, 4/1994, p. 33-46,
Gyl Eyal, Ivan Szeleny, Eleonor Townsley, Making Capitalism without capitalists: The New Ruling Elites in
Eastern Europe, Verso Books (Romanian Edition: Omega Press 2001), Szonia Szelenyi, Equality by Design.
The Grand Experience of Destratification in Socialist Hungary, Stanford University Press, Stanford, California,
1998
3
Thomas Lowit, Le Parti polymorphe en Europe de lEst , dans Revue Franaise de Science Politique, vol.
29, n4-6/1979, p. 822
4

Szonia Szelenyi, Equality by Design. The Grand Experience of Destratidication in Socialist Hungary,
Stanford University Press, Stanford, California, 1998, p. 109

of a tacit conflict between the Party Nomenklatura, which was anxious to impose at all costs
a theoretical model, and the State Nomenklatura, which was forced to put into practice
unrealistic plans.
As the State monopoly over the set of economic resources constitutes a second charter
of the communist societies, the Party, through its staff, has to watch over the nationalization
of resources and the planning processes. This is where the Economic Nomenklatura (B),
including the general management of the state-owned enterprises, banks, and farms, exercises
its role. As the individuals occupying the decision-making positions within the state
institutions, this leading Nomenklatura must manage the contradictions between the
theoretical plans and their practical application. In order not to endanger its social positions
and material privileges, the Nomenklatura sees itself often forced to exaggerate the turnovers,
to hide the real production reports, to reduce products quality in favour of the quantity
imposed by the main plan. It is thus under the pressure of a paradoxical choice between
maintaining its privileges and the contradictions characteristic to a planned economy.
C. The Cultural and Scientific Nomenklatura includes generally the individuals
with a higher education diploma who posses a certain cultural background, necessary in the
execution of their duties and who look after the ideological health of the society. It can be
found in such cultural and educational institutions as: the media, the publishing houses, the
national academies, the Universities Education Offices, the research centres, the theatres,
etc.
D. The International Affairs Nomenklatura constitutes a special category, although
its members could be classified as belonging to the political or economic Nomenklatura. It
includes the group of individuals that occupy much sought positions abroad: ambassadors,
delegation members to the international organizations, the trade representatives, etc.
Compared with the other members of the Nomenklatura, these individuals are familiarized
with the daily life in other countries, have access to much more information regarding the
international affairs, the worldwide social and political models and to critical studies
regarding the Marxist ideology and the functioning structure of the communist states. In the
fulfilment of their duties, these individuals are generally prepared for negotiation processes,
and are thus more open minded. They enjoy a cultural and technocratic capital superior to
that of other members of the Nomenklatura. These make them more aware of their countrys
systems lacks.
The scope of the present study includes only the national Nomenklatura, meaning the
decision-making positions directly controlled by the superior Communist Party bodies: the
National Council, the Central Committee, the Political Bureau and the Secretariat of the
Central Committee. In the case of the Party Nomenklatura, this level stops at secretaries of
regional districts and members of the Central Committees of Youth Unions. A special
category of the Party Nomenklatura is comprised of the teachers of the Party Academy
Stefan Gheorghiu and of the contributors to the main Partys publications. The positions
within the state apparatus have as lower limit the position of department director or section
chief within a ministry. As for the administrative hierarchy, the official list goes as far as
city mayors and members of the Popular Councils. The army generals are also taken into
account, given that the Partys First Secretary directly approved their appointment. At
cultural level, the members of the Romanian Academy and the chief-editors of the national
mass-media are taken into consideration, as their selection depended exclusively on the
decision of the Political Bureau. General managers of state-enterprises and banks are consider
to be the national economic Nomenklatura. I must stress out the fact that the current study
does not take into account the political police the Securitate since this institution
represents a distinct part of the Nomenklatura that proves to be very difficult to uncover and
analyze.

1.2. The Reproduction and the conversion of the communist elites

Two distinct theoretical points of view dominated the literature concerning the reproduction
and the conversion of the communist elites during the transition to capitalism. The first one,
formulated by Elemer Hankiss5 in Hungary and Jadwiga Staniszkis6 in Poland, at the end of
the 1980s, during the decline period of the ancient regime, sustained the hypothesis of a
general and deliberated reproduction of the Nomenklatura by the conversion of the social
(political) capital into the economic one. According to these authors, the conversion process
was scrupulously prepared by certain categories of the communist elite, who adopted
economic reforms which allowed the creation of satellite private companies functioning in
close co-operation with the state enterprises. These companies, owned by managers of state
economic unities or communist party leaders, became channels of capital transfer from the
state property to the private one. The process would have permitted the communist elites to
gain a dominating position within the future strata of entrepreneurs.
Later, the predictions launched by Hankiss and Staniszkis were infirmed in countries
like Hungary and Poland, but they proved their veracity in the Russian case. In 1993 a crossnational comparative study of elite recruitment in post-communist Eastern Europe was
conducted in Russia, Poland, Slovakia and Hungary, by scholars from United States and
several East European countries, coordinated by Ivan Szeleny and Donald Treiman7. Its
results did not confirm the hypothesis of a massive reproduction of the Nomenklatura within
the post-communist power structures. The study revealed the real presence of this group in
the new political and economical elite, but it also showed that the ascension of an important
part of the ancient elite was stopped in 1989. The main conclusion of their analysis was that,
excepting Russia, there was more circulation than reproduction in East European elites.
Relying on the same social mobility survey, the American sociologists Gil Eyal, Ivan
Szeleny and Eleonor Townsley8 formulated a second theoretical point of view, according to
which the post-communist Central European societies are dominated by the cultural capital
and not by the social (political) one. The 1989 revolutions generated the depreciation of the
political capital together with the disappearance or debasement of the communist parties. The
ancient Nomenklatura did not succeed in transforming itself into a strong bourgeoisie who
could dominate and rule the society. In fact, the new Central European elites are formed by
people who converted their cultural capital into a political or economical one.
We can observe that both analyses mentioned above are in fact theories of
reproduction by conversion, phenomenon which occurs whenever social groups are not
able to assume their ancient positions anymore, or do not have the interest to do it, so they
opt for new public roles in other fields of activity. In contrast with the reproduction by
conversion, we can also talk about a simple reproduction which occurs whenever the
ancient elites maintain the same positions after the change of a social system.
All the researches mentioned above analyse the evolution of elites in Poland,
Hungary, Russia and Czech Republic, countries which became real laboratories for the
studies of the transition. If Bulgaria was co-opted latter in several cross-national comparative
surveys, Romania was left apart, being considered an atypical case of post-communist
evolution9. In this context, I believe that an examination of the two hypotheses (reproduction
5

Elemer Hankiss, East European Alternatives, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1990

Jadwiga Staniszkis, The Dynamics of the Breakthrough in Eastern Europe, University of California Press,
Berkeley-Los Angeles-Oxford, 1991
7
The results and interpretations of this survey were published in a special edition of Theory and Society , n.
24/1995, dedicated to the circulation and reproduction of elites in Eastern Europe.
8
Gyl Eyal, Ivan Szeleny, Eleonor Townsley, Making Capitalism without capitalists: The New Ruling Elites in
Eastern Europe, Verso Books 1999, (Romanian Edition: Omega Press 2001)
9
There is only in 2002 that Romania was co-opted in a cross-national comparative survey concerning the
Eastern European political elite. European Political Elites in Comparison: The Long Road to Convergence
6

/ circulation of elites) in the Romanian case might identify certain characteristics of the
beginning of the transition in this country.
2. METHODOLOGY AND SOURCES

At the level of the methodological reflection it is necessary to stress that this

investigation it is not based on an elite social mobility inquiry, as it was used in Szelenyis
studies. Such a survey was not conducted in Romania until now. The methodological
approach applied in this work is similar with that used by David Lane and Cameron Ross10 in
their analysis concerning the conversion of the Russian communist elite. Using crossreferential sources, the pre-1989 professional trajectories of the present political elite were
reconstituted, in order to identify the decision-making positions they occupied during the
communist regime. Both approaches (Szeleny and Lane) aimed to determine the numerical
weight of Nomenklatura within the new structures of political and economical powers,
leaving apart the evaluation and the interpretation of its decisional weight. Considering that
the numerical proportion by itself can lead to distorted interpretations, this paper tries to draw
some conclusions about the range of power detained by the ex-Nomenklatura in the political
context.
In order to obtain the numerical weight of the Nomenklatura within the postcommunist elite a database containing the entire population of the main institutions born by
revolution was set up (the Committee of the National Salvation Front - CFSN, the Provisional
Council for National Unity - CPUN, and the Provisional Government led by Petre Roman).
To reconstitute if, and which decision-making positions these individuals occupied during the
ancient regime, two distinct types of sources were used. The first one, The Pyramid of
Power. Romanian Politicians between 1944 and 1989 11, a complete and valuable whos who
dictionary of political leaders, compiled by Gheorghe Crisan, contains over 5.000
professional careers of the communist national elite: members of the apparatus of the Central
Committee of the Communist Party (Central Committee secretaries, members of the Political
Bureau, members and deputy members of Central Committee), members of The Great
National Assembly, the State Council and the Government (Ministers, State Secretary,
deputy ministers), the army generals body, the direction of the local political bodies
(departments secretaries), the superior direction of certain mass organizations, the members
of the Romanian Academy, ambassadors and diplomats.
The second category of sources includes a whos who type dictionary of postcommunist political personalities: Protagonists of the Public Life: December 1989
December 1994, published by the national press agency, Rompress in 1995. This book
contains biographical information about people who occupied political leading positions after
the communist breakdown12. Additional sources like newspapers and internet sites were also
used.

(EUROELITE), coordinated by Heinrich Best (Jena University) and Maurizio Cotta (Siena University) , had
for purpose to identify and interpret the similarities and differences in the personal characteristics and in the
patterns of recruitment and career in European representative elites. The Romanian team participating in this
survey was coordinated by Dr. Laurentiu Stefan, President of the Romanian Society of Political Science.
10
David Lane & Cameron Ross: The Transformation from Communism to Capitalism: Ruling Elites from
Gorbachev to Yelzin, Palgrave, 1998, Russian Political Elites 1991-1995: Recruitment and Renewal in
International Politics, Vol: 34, June 1997
11
Gheorghe Crisan: Piramida puterii. Oameni politici si de stat din Romania 1944-1989 (The pyramid of
power. Romanian Politicians from 1944 to 1989), ProHistoria, Bucarest, 2001
12
Protagonisti ai vietii publice: Decembrie 1989 Decembrie 1994 (Protagonists of the Public Life:
December 1989 December 1994), Bucharest, Rompress, 1995

In order to determine the decisional weight of the Nomenklatura within the new
political elite, the present paper makes a qualitative analysis of the influence exerted by the
former communist elite in the political structures mentioned above.
3. CONTEXT AND CHARACTER OF ROMANIAN REVOLUTION

Considering that political regrouping of the former Romanian Nomenklatura was

favoured by certain particularities of the December 1989 Revolution, it is important to
deconstruct the exceptionalism of this social and political movement.
First of all, it is necessary to stress that a strong opposition against Nicolae
Ceausescu's dictatorial regime never took root in Romania. Conditioned by the excessive
authoritarianism of the communist regime, but also by the absence of a participative political
culture, the protests against the communism always maintained an individual character.
Additionally, the demands of the few strikes, which took place between 1977 and 1987, had
for primary objectives the economic changes. The national - communist doctrine seduced
most of Romanian humanist intelligentsia, which joined and supported the party's
liberalization policy between 1965 1975. Afterwards they had difficulties in recognizing
their error and mobilizing their energies in a protesting movement. Although the notorious
adversaries of the regime, Doina Cornea, Laszlo Tokes, Ana Blandiana, Mircea Dinescu, etc.,
enjoyed an extraordinary reputation, at least in Bucharest, they did not have the experience
and the calibre of an opponent like Vaclav Havel and were not prepared to assume political
responsibilities in case of a possible fall of the dictatorship. The Romanian revolution did not
manage to impose new political personalities. Only the Democratic Forum created in
Timisoara by individuals not involved in political life before 1989 would have been able to
replace the Communist Party and the Nomenklatura. On the other hand, this city was not the
capital and did not have any media resources to legitimize its position at the national level. In
the absence of a strong anticommunist elite, the fall of the Ceausescu regime generated a
profound void of power in the first days of the popular uprising in December '89.
Secondly, at the time of the revolution, there were two types of Nomenklatura
members in Romania. First of all, there was an active, in-office Nomenklatura, faithful to the
Ceausescu regime and a marginalized one, pushed aside from the political life, belonging
mostly to the former Stalinist elite of Gheorghiu Dej, but which had opted in time for the
reformist ideas promoted by Mihail Gorbatchev. The latter constituted a sort of passive
dissidence to the dictatorship of Ceausescu, without nevertheless having questioned the
foundations of the communist system. Although it had not the scope of the reforming teams
imposed to power in Poland or Hungary, it possessed the necessary prestige to take over the
political power in the potential case of Ceausescu's fall.
Thirdly, Romania is the only State within the Warsaw Pact in which the passage from
the communist system to democracy was achieved through a bloody revolution. It must be
added that these events unfolded unexpectedly over a severely short period of time. The
Nomenklatura close to Nicolae Ceausescu was not able to engage negotiations in the Polish
or Hungarian manner. Using violence against the masses it signed its own sentence to
political and social exclusion. Most of the members of the Executive Political Committee
were called in court for committing genocide, sent to prison and as a result lost all political
rights. Although later they were amnestied by president Iliescu, they remained compromised
and could not regain an honourable place in the post-communist history. The Nomenklatura
close to Nicolae Ceausescu initially suffered a social displacement, leaving free the political
scene to other less damaged actors, but who, through their experience and contacts would
have been able to stop the violent actions of the Army and the Securitate.

It is also necessary to stress that the Romanian revolution had a limited popular
participation and geographic scope. It was only in Timisoara that the revolution enflamed the
entire city, most of the inhabitants going out in the street from 18 till 22 December. In
Bucharest and in the other cities of Transylvania only a minority of the population
participated to the events of the 21st of December. Although the revolution developed on a
larger scale on the 22nd of December, in most of the towns of Moldavia and Muntenia, the
inhabitants remained passive. The rural environment, which in Romania represented more
than half of the population, was not affected by the revolutionary turmoil.
4. THE POLITICAL REGROUPING OF THE ROMANIAN NOMENKLATURA DURING
THE REVOLUTION

In this context the first new structures of political power were established. The National
Salvation Front (FSN) was the first "provisional organ of state power" and its main purpose
was supposed to be the stabilization of the situation and the organization of free elections13.
This organization was constituted on December 22, after the flight of Nicolae Ceausescu, on
the initiative of nine persons gathered in a room of the Central Committee of the Communist
Party14. These persons were mostly former members of Nomenklatura marginalized by the
personal dictatorship of Ceausescu. Table 1 indicates their membership to the former power
structures or their dissidence towards the communist system. The same table provides
information concerning decision-making positions occupied by the founders of the FSN
before 1989.
FOUNDATORS OF THE NATIONAL SALVATION FRONT
NR.

NAME

NOMENKLATURA
MEMBER

OPPOSANT/
DISIDENT

1.

Silviu BRUCAN

Yes

Yes

2.

Alexandru
BARLADEANU

Yes

Yes

3.

13

Ion ILIESCU

Yes

Yes

FUNCTION WITHIN THE NOMENKLATURA

Deputy in the Great National Assembly Representing the
County of Ploiesti (1952-1956)
Assistant Chief Editor of the Partys newspaper Scanteia
(1944-1956)
Ambassador in the USA (1956-1959)
UN Permanent Representative of Romania (1959-1961)
Vice-President of the Romanian Radio and Television (19611966)
Minister of Foreign Trade (1948-1953)
Vice-President of the State Committee of Economic Planning
(1953-1956)
Member of the Central Committee of the Communist Party
(1955-1969)
Vice-President of the Romanian Government. In charge with
the economical problems (1956-1966)
President of the National Council of the Scientific Research
(1966-1698)
Permanent Representative of Romania to CAER
Member and First Secretary of the Central Committee of the
Working Youths Union (1949; 1954)
Minister for Youths Problems (1967-1971)
Secretary for propaganda within the Central Committee of the

The Official Statement of the Council of the National Salvation Front, towards the country, Romania Libera,
23rd December 1989
14
The constitution of the National Salvation Front was filmed by Adrian Sarbu and the video document became
public at the beginning of the 90s.

4.

Nicolae
MILITARU

Yes

No

5.

Gh. Stefan GUSE

No

No

6.

Dumitru
APOSTOIU
Gelu
Voican
VOICULESCU

Yes

No

No

Yes

7.

Romanian Communist Party (1971)

Substitute Member and Member of the Central Committee of
the Romanian Communist Party (1965-1984)
Member of the Executive Political Committee (CPEx) (19691979)
Deputy in the Great National Assembly (Representing the
counties of Bucuresti, Ilfov, Iasi, Vrancea, Cluj) (1957-1961,
1965-1985)
Vice-president of the Timis County Council (1971-1974)
President of the Iasi County Council (1974-1979)
President of the Waters National Council (1979-1984)
Director of the Technical Publishing House - Bucuresti (19841989)
Substitute member of the Central Committee (1974-1984)
Deputy in the Great National Assembly (1969)
Deputy Minister of Industrial Constructions (1978-1984)
General. Chief of the Staff (1986-1989)
Member of the Central Committee (1987-1989)
Secretary of the Presidential Team. Secretary of the State
Council (1982-1989)
-

8.
9.

Petre ROMAN
Mihail LUPOI

non
non

Non
Non

TABLE 1
As shown in Table 1, six persons among the nine founders of the National Salvation
Front belong to the former Party Nomenklatura. There are two dissidents (Silviu Brucan and
Alexandru Barladeanu), two individuals marginalized by Ceausescu without having officially
taken position against him (Ion Iliescu, Nicolae Militaru), a general directly involved in the
retaliation against the revolutionaries in Timisoara (Stefan Guse) and the presidential
secretary of Nicolae Ceausescu ( Dumitru Apostoiu). Among the other three, only one was
known as an opponent of the regime, Gelu Voican Voiculescu, arrested repeatedly by
Securitate in the 1980s. As for Petre Roman, son of an important leader of the Romanian
Communist Party, he did not try to build a career within the Party, but he had the advantage
to know most of the leaders, for whom he remained the son of Walter Roman. The last one,
Mihai Lupoi, captain and architect within the Army, was marginalized soon after the
December events.
The group of nine decides on the constitution of a Council of the National Salvation
Front (CFSN) and most of its members are registered automatically, without being
consulted15. The evening of December 22 Ion Iliescu presents in front of the cameras of the
Romanian television the 39 founding members of the CFSN and the political manifesto of the
new power body. Several groups of people coexist within this organism. Members of
marginalized Nomenklatura are placed together with close relations of the dethroned dictator,
dissident intellectuals and unknown persons who will soon emerged as adventurers. The first
to appear on this list are well-known opponents of the communist regime: Doina Cornea, Ana
Blandiana, Mircea Dinescu, Laszlo Tokes, etc. Among the 39 founding members of the
CFSN, 28 % are former high-ranking servants from the Party Nomenklatura: 11 persons
occupied decision-making positions in the Communist Party apparatus between 1945-1989.
Most were marginalized in time or became opponents of the Ceausescu's regime (Dan Desliu,
Corneliu Manescu, Alexandru Barladeanu, Silviu Brucan, Dan Martian, general Voinea,
15

Doina Cornea, Scrisori deschise si alte texte (Open Letters and other texts), Bucarest, Humanitas, 1991, p.
89

Domokos Geza, Ion Iliescu, Dumitru Mazilu)16. Others, less numerous, remained faithful to
the dictator, being involved in the retaliations against revolutionaries in December 1989 (GH.
Stefan Guse, Victor Athanasie Stanculescu).
With regard to the other programs conceived during the revolutions of 1989, the
political statement of the FSN - "Official Statement to the Country " - is prudent and
moderate. Although it considers the rejection of the unique party, the organization of free
elections, the drawing-up of a new Constitution and the separation of powers within the
State17, it does not make any reference whatsoever to the freedom of association, the freedom
of mass-media, private property, market economy, capitalism or privatization. The Official
Statement only intends to convey an anti-Ceausescu character to the popular uprising and
ignores every reference to its anti-communist character. It speaks of "the elimination of the
clan Ceausescu" and about the "dissolution of all the structures of power of the clan
Ceausescu"18, but no line of the Statement contains the words "communist party". As the
political analyst Stelian Tanase stresses, the political program of the FSN enrolls "within the
limits of a glasnost and of a Romanian perestroika. The Hungarian and Polish communists
and, under certain aspects, the reformers around Gorbatchev, had already expressed more
radical ideas"19.
The CFSN begins the next days by ruling by decrees. Arguing that a political
structure has to eradicate the confusion and the violence, the council operated as a legislative
and executive organ at the same time, charged with the defense, the appointments, the laws
and the preparation of a new constitution. On December 27, the second decree of the CFSN
announced officially the constitution, the organization and the functioning of the Council of
the National Salvation Front. Among the 145 members, representatives of all the
administrative departments of Romania, 39 % are the former Nomenklatura members.
Furthermore, among the 11 members of the Executive Bureau, six former civil servants of
Nomenklatura controlled key positions, as president or vice-presidents. 54 % of the new hard
core of power used to belong to the former Nomenklatura. Table 2 presents the composition
of the CFSN Executive Bureau and indicates, as the case may be, the membership of its
members to the former Nomenklatura.
TABLE 2
It is necessary nevertheless to stress that the CFSN remains a heterogeneous group,
inside of which a small group formed by former officials of the party administration becomes
the most important20. The dissident intellectuals of the Ceausescu regime (as Doina Cornea or
Ion Caramitru), although they were well known to the public opinion, had not the experience
of the administrative management in order to influence, in one way or another, the current
events. It is within this context that the group formed around Silviu Brucan and Ion Iliescu
became the most influential. It gathered people of the same generation, experienced in the
State and party administration and with more contacts within the administration structures.
Thus, only a small number of individuals (surrounding Brucan and Iliescu) has a real role in
the council, communicating with the prefectures officials or making sure of the support of the
Army or the Home Office due to the reunification of old friends21.
16

List of founding members of the CFSN, Romania Libera, December 27th, 1989
The Official Statement toward the country
18
The Official Statement toward the country
17

19

Stelian Tanase, Miracolul revolutiei (The miracle of the revolution), Bucarest Humanitas, 1999, p.

357
20
Andrei Stoiciu, Les lites politiques roumaines. 1989-1999, (Romanian Political Elite. 1989-1999),
Unpublished PhD Thesis within the Institute of Political Science, Paris, 2001, manuscript, p. 27
21
Andrei Stoiciu, Les lites politiques roumaines. 1989-1999, (Romanian Political Elite. 1989-1999),
Unpublished PhD Thesis within the Institute of Political Science, Paris, 2001, manuscript, p. 28

On January 3, 1990, Ion Iliescu announced publicly that the National Salvation Front,
although it is not constituted as a political party, would however participate to the elections of
April as a civil mass organization. This decision generated a protest wave in certain circles of
Romanian intellectuals, because the National Salvation Front exceeded its political status and
its initial privileges. As Ion Iliescu and Silviu Brucan had announced a few days before, the
FSN had to remain a temporary body, whose only purpose was to insure the transition
towards the democracy and the multi-party system. Several members of the CFSN, among
which Doina Cornea, Ana Blandiana, Mircea Dinescu expressed their dissension towards Ion
Iliescu's statement. Nevertheless, being certain of the support of the CFSN members recruited
in the territory, Iliescu demanded the council's vote regarding his initiative. On January 23,
approved with a majority of 128 votes, (5 abstinences and 8 votes against) the proposition of
Ion Iliescu becomes legitimate and official. The FSN would participate to elections as a civil
organization, "of high democratic concentration"22. The only individuals to oppose or to
abstain in the case of this initiative are all dissidents or adversaries of the communist regime.
Following this decision, several members of the CFSN (Doina Cornea, Ana
Blandiana, Dumitru Mazilu, Magda Cirneci) handed their designations, clarifying that they
could not accept the fight for power that the FSN had embarked on. Doina Cornea denounced
the fact that this political body, whose only legitimacy had been to fill a void of power, used
its temporary mandate as an instrument of manipulation in order to settle down in a durable
way at the head of the State23.
Under the pressure of the historic parties re-established the first days after Ceausescu's
fall and following several anticommunist demonstrations in the most important cities of
Romania, on February 1, 1990, the FSN decided on its transformation in political party under the name of Party of the National Salvation Front ( FSN) - and the constitution of a
temporary Parliament, The Provisional Council of National Union ( CPUN ).
The CPUN had to assure the participation to power of the main political parties acting
on Romania's political stage. It must be noted that the leaders of the National Salvation Front
negotiated the constitution of the CPUN in their favor. They imposed as essential condition
the association in an equal way of the Front and parties. The latter, very numerous, would be
represented in the CPUN each by an equal number of delegates. Only the FSN (transformed
into political party) would receive half of the total seats.
According to a decree issued by the CFSN, the statuses of the Provisional Council of
National Union were established. This temporary parliament counted 263 members; 112
members belonged to FSN, 112 representatives to the political parties, 36 to the national
minorities, 3 to the Association of the Former Political Prisoners (AFDP) and one seat was
reserved to the president. The most important political representatives of parties (Liberal,
Peasant, Social-Democrat and that of the Hungarian minority) greeted this decision even
though it allowed access to power to the representatives of ghosts-parties, with a short-term
existence and completly unknown members. The long list of the parties having
representatives in the CPUN (36 of which only 3 survived ten years later) increased the
confusion and to contributed to the strength and the visibility of the FSN.
Seemingly, by the constitution of the CPUN, the historic parties obtained a big
success, because the multi-party system was officially recognized by the Iliescu team. In fact,
this could also be understood as a defeat because, accepting that the attribution of almost 50
% (112 on 263) seats of the temporary parliament to the FSN, the historic parties facilitated
Iliescu's team control over this new institution.
Only 31 % of the 255 members of the CPUN had previously had any experience in
public service within the state or the party apparatus. The others, that is 69 %, found
22
23

Adevrul, January 24th, 1990

Romania Libera, January 24th, 1990

themselves for the first time in a public office of representation. Nevertheless, some key
positions in the Executive Bureau of the CPUN remained occupied by the former
Nomenklatura members. Table 3 presented the composition of this Executive Bureau and
indicates, as the case may be, the membership of its members to the former Nomenklatura.
TABLE 3
In spite of the presence of the historic political parties in the temporary parliament, 42
% of the seats on the CPUN Executive Bureau remained controlled by the former
Nomenklatura members. The percentage is however smaller with regard to the Executive
Bureau of the CFSN.
Without being dominated by former high-ranking communist officials, the Council of
the National Salvation Front and the Temporary Council of National Union - the first two
political institutions of the transition from socialism to capitalism in Romania - were
characterized by the presence of an important communist constituent. The CFSN, creation of
former dissident Nomenklatura, was the institutionalized instrument by which this group of
marginalized communists in the late years of the communism managed to secure its role and
political survival in the post-revolutionary history. The CPUN, constituted under the pressure
of the traditional historic parties (PNL, PNTCD, PSDR), was the institutionalized instrument
by which multi-party system in Romania stood out after 40 years of absence. The
negotiations among the leaders of the historic parties and those of the CFSN had as effect
CPUN's appearance and looked like a tardy and deformed echo of the Round Tables that took
place in Poland and Hungary. By presenting the cooperation and negotiations model as a
national consensus and by offering to the public an image of wide representativeness
accompanied with an obvious disorganization, the CPUN allowed the Iliescu group to stand
out as the most coherent and the most serious. This hypothesis deserves our attention
especially since most of the other political parties members of the CPUN would disappear
soon after from the public life.
The third temporary body of political power stemming from December 89 events, is
the temporary government lead by Petre Roman.
On December 26, the first decree of the CFSN appointed Petre Roman, lecturer to the
Polytechnic Institute of Bucharest and participant to the anticommunist demonstrations on
December 21, as Prime Minister of the future government. From December 26, by several
decrees, the CFSN constitutes the Roman government, which included a majority (64,5 %) of
former members of the Nomenklatura (see table 4).
TABLE 4
The temporary government enforced by the FSN in January, 1990 was an institution
formed mostly of former Nomenklatura members (64,5 %). 20 out of 31 Ministers were a
part of the former communist elite. Four categories can be distinguished. The most numerous
and the least known by public opinion were the many second generation technocrats who had
occupied the responsibility positions within the state apparatus and not within the Party and
who were marginalized in time by Nicolae Ceausescu: Nicolae Stefan, Adrian Georgescu,
Gheorghe Caranfil, Ioan Chesa, Victor Murea, Nicolae M. Nicolae, Corneliu Burada, Dan
Enachescu, Sergiu Celac. Technocrats who also followed a career in the party and kept their
positions within the state apparatus until 1989 form a second category: Teofil Pop and
Nicolae Dicu, Stelian Pintelie, Ioan Folea. Except for Sergiu Celac, who hadn't worked
previously in a ministry (being the official translator of the presidential team) and who
becomes the Minister of Foreign Affairs, the others had experience in an important public
office within the ministry which they ended up managing (Minister, vice-minister or
department director). A third category included the civil servants of the party, marginalized
by Nicolae Ceausescu in the '80s: Nicolae Militaru, Constantin Popescu, Mircea Angelescu,

Mihail Draganescu. Among them, Nicolae Militaru and Mihail Draganescu had occupied
positions in the first level of power, the others being connected to the organizations of the
communist youth. The last category includes Nomenklatura members directly involved in
December '89 retaliation. Victor Athanasie Stanculescu and Mihai Chitac managed the
defence and internal affairs ministries. It is necessary nevertheless to stress that certain
adversaries or dissidents of the CP were a part of the temporary government. They are
however less than expected (Plesu, Soicescu, Voiculescu, Sora) and their ministries had no
strategic or economic importance. All the State key ministries were managed by former
Nomenklatura members: Internal Affairs, Defense, Foreign Affairs, Economy, Justice,
Petroleum, Heavy industry, Transport, Post Offices and Telecommunications.
To reach a conclusion concerning the reproduction of the former communist elites in the
provisional political institutions born by revolution, a comparative evaluation of their
numerical proportion in the three institutions analyzed above is necessary (Table 5).
INSTITUTION
CFSN
Executive Bureau of CFSN
CPUN
Executive Bureau of CPUN
Provisional Government

FORMER MEMBERS OF
NOMENKLATURA (%)
39
54,5
31
42,10
64,5
TABLE 5

As the percentages indicate it, the communist component is high in all institutions,
especially in the context of a violent regime termination. The Executive Bureau of the
Committee of the National Salvation Front, as well as the Provisional Government are
dominated by the former Nomenklaturas members. Although their numerical proportion
diminishes in the Provisional Parliament, the former communist elites still preserve many
decision-making positions within this institution, such as president, vice-presidents, secretary
general, and member of the Executive Bureau.
Concerning the categories of Nomenklatura which had the tendency to reproduce
itself immediately after the revolution, it is interesting to observe that in the legislative
institutions (CFSN and CPUN) most of the members belong to the Party Nomenklatura,
while in the Executive the majority is formed by former technocrats who did not follow a
career within the Party administration. It is also interesting to observe that several generals
involved in the repression of the revolution are members of the three institutions. Relying
officially on a technocratic experience, all these appointments are in the same time a strategy
of political regrouping of the former Nomenklatura. Participating to the Romanian
Revolution and to the creation of the first structures of political power, the communist elites
regrouped around Ion Iliescu and Silviu Brucan affirmed their rupture with the Ceausescus
regime and legitimized their continuity on the post-communist political scene.
5. THE REPRODUCTION OF THE FORMER NOMENKLATURA WITHIN THE
ROMANIAN GOVERNMENTS: 1990 2000

In Romania, like in other East European countries, the reproduction and conversion of
the former communist elites can be registered during the entire period of transition. The
present chapter tries to evaluate, through the example of the Romanian governments, the
dynamic of the numerical proportion of the Nomenklatura in the post-communist elite during
the first ten years of transition. Table 6 indicates the percentages of the former Nomenklatura
members who became after 1990 ministers in the Romanian governments: (1 = Provisional
Government; 2 = Roman Government; 3 = Stolojan Government; 4 = Vacaroiu Government;

5 = Ciorbea Government; 6 = Vasile Government; 7 = Isarescu Government; 8 = Nastase

Government).
Numerical proportion of the Nomenklatura in the Romanian
governments: 1990-2000
70

64,5

Percentages

60
50

44,2

42,9

40

36,4

30

21,4

20
10

7,9

8,7

6,9

0
1

Governments

TABLE 6
The numerical proportion of the Nomenklatura is almost constant in the first three
governments that succeeded the elections of June 1990 and it registers an important
diminution between 1996 and 1999 when the democratic right parties come to power. One
would have expected that this lowering continues in 2000, at least from biological raisons
(aging, death). The percentage of the Nomenklatura in the government led by Adrian Nastase
does not confirm this hypotesis and indicates an increase of the numerical proportion. The
results show that most of the communist elites which continued their political career after
1989 were promoted and appointed in function by the successor parties of the National
Salvation Front: the Democrat Party and the present Social Democrat Party. None of the
ministers appointed by the democratic right wing parties was member of the former
Nomenklatura. It is also important to stress that the Democrat Party did not regroup high rank
officials of the Communist Party, but only technocrats belonging to the Economic or Foreign
Affairs Nomenklatura. As for the Social Democrat Party, it recuperated all categories of the
communist elite, including members of the Central Committee and Political Bureau of the
Party.
CONCLUSIONS

The process of political regrouping of the Romanian Nomenklatura presents several

particularities generated by the special character of the December 1989 Revolution.
The apparent solidity of the Romanian communist regime determined the active, in
office Nomenklatura, to remain faithful to Ceausescus dictatorship till its last moment of
survival. The sudden and violent character of the Revolution did not permit to Nicolae
Ceausescus elite to engage negotiations in the Polish or Hungarian manner. The political
paralysis of the regime made it accomplice to the repressions initiated by the dictator, fact
that generated its social and political debasement. Only the army generals body who decided
the retreat of the troops and the cessation of the retaliations could manage a political survival
during the Revolution.
The passive, marginalized Nomenklatura, regrouped around Ion Iliescu and Silviu
Brucan took advantage of the void of power generated by Nicolae Ceausescus flight,
affirmed its rupture with the ancient regime and succeeded in legitimizing its continuity on
the political scene.

The numerical proportion of the Nomenklatura in the provisional political institutions

is high, especially in the context of a violent bloody revolution. The former communist elites
dominated the Executive Bureau of the National Salvation Front, as well as the provisional
government led by Petre Roman. Although the percentages diminish in the case of the
Provisional Council of National Unity, most of the decision-making positions within this
institution are occupied by former communist elites. The phenomenon maintained its validity
in the first ten years of transition. Although the former elites did not represent the majority in
the Romanian governments between 1990 and 2000, it is important to stress that they
occupied positions within ministries of strategic importance such as: Defence, Interior
Affairs, Foreign Affairs, Justice and Economy. Romania it is also the only former communist
country from Central Europe where two prime-ministers (Nicolae Vacaroiu and Theodor
Stolojan) belonged to the ancient elite, and where a high rank official of the Communist Party
was elected three times as the President of the Republic. It is also important to say that the
reproduction of the Romanian Nomenklatura was facilitated by the popular support accorded
to the elites regrouped around Ion Iliescu. His charisma as well as his discourse charmed the
majority of the Romanian population who proved to be insensitive to the idea of lustration or
political justice.
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