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34%
Byron James
33%
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agreement, and at the initial outset of [the]
disagreement lawyers were engaged by [Carroll's]
side. We don't feel that there is anything left for us
to go forward with. We tried many times to try and
settle that part; and there was no desire to do that
reasonably, so I don't see [how] there is any way to
come to an agreement right now.
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have a 33 percent shareholder. There will be those
times when they have to concur and they have to
agree and we know that's not going to happen when
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See also Ji v. Palmer, 333 N.J. Super. 451, 46364 (App. Div. 2000) (limiting our review to the
record that existed before the motion judge).
We then decide "whether the motion
judge's application of the law was correct." Atl.
Mut. Ins. Co. v. Hillside Bottling Co., 387 N.J.
Super. 224, 231 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 189
N.J. 104 (2006). In this regard, "[w]e review the
law de novo and owe no deference to the trial
court . . . if [it has] wrongly interpreted a statute."
Zabilowicz v. Kelsey, 200 N.J. 507, 512 (2009).
"The practical effect . . . is that neither
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the motion court nor an appellate court can
ignore the elements of the cause of action or the
evidential standard governing the cause of
action." Bhagat, supra, 217 N.J. at 38.
The only terms that define the nature
and quality of conduct by a member that justifies
judicial expulsion under subsection (b)(3)(c) are
found in the statutory language itself, i.e., the
member's conduct must "relat[e] to the limited
liability company business," and it must "make[]
it not reasonably practicable to carry on the
business with the member as a member."
N.J.S.A. 42:2B-24(b)(3)(c). The distinctions
between subsection (a) and (c) are obvious, and
those differences provide as overarching
framework that guides our interpretation.
As Judge Klein noted, the conduct that
permits a judicial expulsion of a member under
subsection (c) is "more liberal and much
broader" than that required under subsection (a).
A member could be expelled under subsection
(a) only if his conduct was "wrongful" and
actually harmed the LLC in a "adverse[] and
material[]" manner. N.J.S.A. 42:2B-24(b)(3)(a).
Subsection (c) on the other hand does
not require proof that the member committed
any wrongful conduct whatsoever. Additionally,
instead of requiring proof of a past event
adverse and material harm to the LLC
subsection (c) is
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navigating around any such deadlock; (6) whether,
due to the company's financial position, there is still
a business to operate; and (7) whether continuing
the company is financially feasible.
[Ibid. (citations omitted).]
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CLERK
DIVISION
OF
THE
APPELLATE
-------Footnotes:
The LLCA has since been repealed. See L.
2012, c. 50, (effective March 18, 2013) (enacting the
Revised Uniform Limited Liability Company Act
(the RULLCA), making the RULLCA applicable to
all LLCs formed after the legislation's effective date,
and replacing the LLCA with the RULLCA as to all
existing LLCs as of March 1, 2014). The provisions
at issue here remained essentially unchanged in the
RULLCA. See N.J.S.A. 42:2C-46.
1.
4.
6.
The parties disputed the import of
plaintiff's profit and loss statement showing revenue
and expenses from the LLC's formation until June
2010. Plaintiff claimed the LLC lost money during
that time.
7.
Plaintiff's contention that Carroll failed to
raise certain aspects of his appellate argument before
Judge Klein lacks sufficient merit to warrant
discussion. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E).
--------
5.
By a stipulation of dismissal with
prejudice entered on August 23, 2010, the parties
agreed to dismiss Carroll's counterclaim and thirdparty complaint.
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