People vs.

Cayat
Equal Protection Requisites of a Valid Classification Bar from Drinking
Gin
In 1937, there exists a law (Act 1639) which bars native non-Christians from
drinking gin or any other liquor outside of their customary alcoholic drinks.
Cayat, a native of the Cordillera, was caught with an A-1-1 gin in violation of
this Act. He was then charged and sentenced to pay P5.00 and to be
imprisoned in case of insolvency. Cayat admitted his guilt but he challenged
the constitutionality of the said Act. He averred, among others, that it
violated his right to equal protection afforded by the constitution. He said
this an attempt to treat them with discrimination or mark them as inferior or
less capable race and less entitled will meet with their instant challenge.
The law sought to distinguish and classify native non-Christians from
Christians.
ISSUE: Whether or not the said Act violates the equal protection clause.
HELD: The SC ruled that Act 1639 is valid for it met the requisites of a
reasonable classification. The SC emphasized that it is not enough that the
members of a group have the characteristics that distinguish them from
others. The classification must, as an indispensable requisite, not be
arbitrary. The requisites to be complied with are;
(1) must rest on substantial distinctions;
(2) must be germane to the purposes of the law;
(3) must not be limited to existing conditions only; and
(4) must apply equally to all members of the same class.
Act No. 1639 satisfies these requirements. The classification rests on real or
substantial, not merely imaginary or whimsical, distinctions. It is not based

upon accident of birth or parentage. The law, then, does not seek to mark
the non-Christian tribes as an inferior or less capable race. On the
contrary, all measures thus far adopted in the promotion of the public policy
towards them rest upon a recognition of their inherent right to equality in the
enjoyment of those privileges now enjoyed by their Christian brothers. But as
there can be no true equality before the law, if there is, in fact, no equality in
education, the government has endeavored, by appropriate measures, to
raise their culture and civilization and secure for them the benefits of their
progress, with the ultimate end in view of placing them with their Christian
brothers on the basis of true equality.

International School Alliance of Educators vs Quisumbing

FACTS: Petitioners work under private respondent International School. The
school hires both local and foreign hires. Foreign hires are granted with more
benefits and higher salary. Respondent says this is because of dislocation
factor and limited tenure. Petitioners contested the difference in salary rates
between foreign and local hires. They claim that it is discriminatory to
Filipinos and it constitutes racial discrimination.
HELD: There is violation of equal protection. Equal pay for equal work,
persons who work with substantially equal qualifications, skillsm effort, and
responsibility under similar conditions should be paid similar salaries. If an
employer accords the same rank and position, the presumption is that they
perform equal work. Here, both groups have similar functions which they
perform under similar conditions. There is no evidence that foreign hires
perform 25% more efficient than local hires. The dislocation factor and
tenure are properly accorded by the benefits they received.

Himagan vs. People

Equal Protection Suspension of PNP Members Charged with Grave
Felonies

Himagan is a policeman assigned in Camp Catititgan, Davao City. He was

charged for the murder of Benjamin Machitar Jr and for the attempted
murder of Benjamins younger brother, Barnabe. Pursuant to Sec 47 of RA
6975, Himagan was placed into suspension pending the murder case. The
law provides that Upon the filing of a complaint or information sufficient in
form and substance against a member of the PNP for grave felonies where
the penalty imposed by law is six (6) years and one (1) day or more, the
court shall immediately suspend the accused from office until the case is
terminated. Such case shall be subject to continuous trial and shall be
terminated within ninety (90) days from arraignment of the accused.
Himagan assailed the suspension averring that Sec 42 of PD 807 of the Civil
Service Decree, that his suspension should be limited to ninety (90) days. He
claims that an imposition of preventive suspension of over 90 days is
contrary to the Civil Service Law and would be a violation of his
constitutional right to equal protection of laws.

ISSUE: Whether or not Sec 47, RA 6975 violates equal protection guaranteed
by the Constitution.

HELD: The language of the first sentence of Sec 47 of RA 6975 is clear, plain
and free from ambiguity. It gives no other meaning than that the suspension
from office of the member of the PNP charged with grave offense where the
penalty is six years and one day or more shall last until the termination of
the case. The suspension cannot be lifted before the termination of the case.

The second sentence of the same Section providing that the trial must be
terminated within ninety (90) days from arraignment does not qualify or limit
the first sentence. The two can stand independently of each other. The first
refers to the period of suspension. The second deals with the time from
within which the trial should be finished.

The reason why members of the PNP are treated differently from the other
classes of persons charged criminally or administratively insofar as the
application of the rule on preventive suspension is concerned is that
policemen carry weapons and the badge of the law which can be used to
harass or intimidate witnesses against them, as succinctly brought out in the
legislative discussions.

If a suspended policeman criminally charged with a serious offense is

reinstated to his post while his case is pending, his victim and the witnesses
against him are obviously exposed to constant threat and thus easily cowed
to silence by the mere fact that the accused is in uniform and armed. the
imposition of preventive suspension for over 90 days under Sec 47 of RA
6975 does not violate the suspended policemans constitutional right to
equal protection of the laws.

Philippine Association of Services Exporters Inc v Drilon

Facts:
The petitioner, Philippine Association of Service Exporters, Inc. (PASEI, for
short), a firm "engaged principally in the recruitment of Filipino workers,
male and female, for overseas placement," challenges the Constitutional
validity of Department Order No. 1, Series of 1988, of the Department of
Labor and Employment, in the character of "GUIDELINES GOVERNING THE
TEMPORARY SUSPENSION OF DEPLOYMENT OF FILIPINO DOMESTIC AND
HOUSEHOLD WORKERS," in this petition for certiorari and prohibition.
Specifically, the measure is assailed for "discrimination against males or
females;" that it "does not apply to all Filipino workers but only to domestic
helpers and females with similar skills;" and that it is violative of the right to
travel. It is held likewise to be an invalid exercise of the lawmaking power,
police power being legislative, and not executive, in character.
On May 25, 1988, the Solicitor General, on behalf of the respondents
Secretary of Labor and Administrator of the Philippine Overseas Employment
Administration, filed a Comment informing the Court that on March 8, 1988,
the respondent Labor Secretary lifted the deployment ban in the states of
Iraq, Jordan, Qatar, Canada, Hongkong, United States, Italy, Norway, Austria,

and Switzerland. * In submitting the validity of the challenged "guidelines,"

the Solicitor General invokes the police power of the Philippine State.
Issue:
Whether or not the Department Order 1, series of 1988, of the Department of
Labor and Employment valid.
Held:
"The police power of the State ... is a power coextensive with self- protection,
and it is not inaptly termed the "law of overwhelming necessity." It may be
said to be that inherent and plenary power in the State which enables it to
prohibit all things hurtful to the comfort, safety, and welfare of society."
The consequence the deployment ban has on the right to travel does not
impair the right. The right to travel is subject, among other things, to the
requirements of "public safety," "as may be provided by law." Department
Order No. 1 is a valid implementation of the Labor Code, in particular, its
basic policy to "afford protection to labor," pursuant to the respondent
Department of Labor's rule-making authority vested in it by the Labor Code.
The petitioner assumes that it is unreasonable simply because of its impact
on the right to travel, but as we have stated, the right itself is not absolute.
The disputed Order is a valid qualification thereto.
Neither is there merit in the contention that Department Order No. 1
constitutes an invalid exercise of legislative power. It is true that police
power is the domain of the legislature, but it does not mean that such an
authority may not be lawfully delegated. As we have mentioned, the Labor
Code itself vests the Department of Labor and Employment with rulemaking
powers in the enforcement whereof.

Farinas vs Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 147387, December 10, 2003

(Public Officer, Difference between appointive officials and elective officials)
Facts: Section 14 of Republic Act No. 9006 (The Fair Election Act), insofar as it
expressly repeals Section 67 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881 (The Omnibus
Election Code) which provides:
SEC. 67. Candidates holding elective office. Any elective official, whether
national or local, running for any office other than the one which he is
holding in a permanent capacity, except for President and Vice-President,
shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his office upon the filing of his
certificate of candidacy.
The petitioners assert that Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006 violates the equal
protection clause of the Constitution because it repeals Section 67 only of
the Omnibus Election Code, leaving intact Section 66 thereof which imposes
a similar limitation to appointive officials, thus:

SEC. 66.Candidates holding appointive office or position. Any person

holding a public appointive office or position, including active members of
the Armed Forces of the Philippines, and officers and employees in
government-owned or controlled corporations, shall be considered ipso facto
resigned from his office upon the filing of his certificate of candidacy.
Respondents contends that there is no violation of the equal protection
clause of the Constitution. Section 67 pertains to elective officials while
Section 66 pertains to appointive officials. A substantial distinction exists
between these two sets of officials; elective officials occupy their office by
virtue of their mandate based upon the popular will, while the appointive
officials are not elected by popular will. Equal protection simply requires that
all persons or things similarly situated are treated alike, both as to rights
conferred and responsibilities imposed.
Issue: WON the repeal of Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code pertaining
to elective officials gives undue benefit to such officials as against the
appointive ones.

Held: No. Substantial distinctions clearly exist between elective officials and
appointive officials. The former occupy their office by virtue of the mandate
of the electorate. They are elected to an office for a definite term and may
be removed therefrom only upon stringent conditions.On the other hand,
appointive officials hold their office by virtue of their designation thereto by
an appointing authority. Some appointive officials hold their office in a
permanent capacity and are entitled to security of tenure while others serve
at the pleasure of the appointing authority.
Another substantial distinction between the two sets of officials is that under
Section 55, Chapter 8, Title I, Subsection A. Civil Service Commission, Book V
of the Administrative Code of 1987 (Executive Order No. 292), appointive

officials, as officers and employees in the civil service, are strictly prohibited
from engaging in any partisan political activity or take part in any election
except to vote. Under the same provision, elective officials, or officers or
employees holding political offices, are obviously expressly allowed to take
part in political and electoral activities.
Moreover, it is not within the power of the Court to pass upon or look into the
wisdom of this classification. Hence, equal protection is not infringed

People vs Jalosjos
Facts: The accused-appellant, Romeo Jalosjos, is a full-fledged member of
Congress who is confined at the national penitentiary while his conviction for
statutory rape and acts of lasciviousness is pending appeal. The accusedappellant filed a motion asking that he be allowed to fully discharge the
duties of a Congressman, including attendance at legislative sessions and
committee meetings despite his having been convicted in the first instance
of a non-bailable offense on the basis of popular sovereignty and the need
for his constituents to be represented

Issue: Whether or not accused-appellant should be allowed to discharge

mandate as member of House of Representatives
Held: Election is the expression of the sovereign power of the people.
However, inspite of its importance, the privileges and rights arising from
having been elected may be enlarged or restricted by law.
The immunity from arrest or detention of Senators and members of the
House of Representatives arises from a provision of the Constitution. The
privilege has always been granted in a restrictive sense. The provision
granting an exemption as a special privilege cannot be extended beyond the
ordinary meaning of its terms. It may not be extended by intendment,
implication or equitable considerations.
The accused-appellant has not given any reason why he should be exempted
from the operation of Sec. 11, Art. VI of the Constitution. The members of
Congress cannot compel absent members to attend sessions if the reason for
the absence is a legitimate one. The confinement of a Congressman charged
with a crime punishable by imprisonment of more than six years is not
merely authorized by law, it has constitutional foundations. To allow accusedappellant to attend congressional sessions and committee meetings for 5
days or more in a week will virtually make him a free man with all the
privileges appurtenant to his position. Such an aberrant situation not only
elevates accused-appellants status to that of a special class, it also would be
a mockery of the purposes of the correction system.
Abakada Guru vs Purisima
FACTS:
Republic Act No. 9335 was enacted to optimize the revenue-generation
capability and collection of the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) and the
Bureau of Customs (BOC). It provides a system of rewards and sanctions
through the creation of Rewards and Incentives Fund (Fund) and a Revenue

Performance Evaluation Board (Board) to BIR and BOC officials and

employees if they exceed their revenue targets. It covers all officials and
employees of the BIR and the BOC with at least six months of service,
regardless of employment status.
Petitioners, invoking their right as taxpayers, filed this petition challenging
the constitutionality of RA 9335, a tax reform legislation. They contend that
the limiting the scope of the system of rewards and incentives only to
officials and employees of the BIR and the BOC violates the constitutional
guarantee of equal protection. There is no valid basis for classification or
distinction as to why such a system should not apply to officials and
employees of all other government agencies.
Respondent contends that the allegation that the reward system will breed
mercenaries is mere speculation and does not suffice to invalidate the law.
Seen in conjunction with the declared objective of RA 9335, the law validly
classifies the BIR and the BOC because the functions they perform are
distinct from those of the other government agencies and instrumentalities.
ISSUE:
Whether or Not there is a violation of equal protection clause.
HELD:
Equality protection is equality among equals, not similarity of treatment of
persons who are classified based on substantial differences in relation to the
object to be accomplished. When things or persons are different in fact or
circumstance, they may be treated in law differently.
The Constitution does not require that things which are different in fact be
treated in law as though they were the same. The equal protection clause
does not forbid discrimination as to things that are different. It does not
prohibit legislation which is limited either in the object to which it is directed.

The equal protection clause recognizes a valid classification, that is, a

classification that has a reasonable foundation or rational basis and not
arbitrary.22 With respect to RA 9335, its expressed public policy is the
optimization of the revenue-generation capability and collection of the BIR
and the BOC.23 Since the subject of the law is the revenue- generation
capability and collection of the BIR and the BOC, the incentives and/or
sanctions provided in the law should logically pertain to the said agencies.
Moreover, the law concerns only the BIR and the BOC because they have the
common distinct primary function of generating revenues for the national
government through the collection of taxes, customs duties, fees and
charges.
Both the BIR and the BOC are bureaus under the DOF. They principally
perform the special function of being the instrumentalities through which the
State exercises one of its great inherent functions taxation. Indubitably,
such substantial distinction is germane and intimately related to the purpose
of the law. Hence, the classification and treatment accorded to the BIR and
the BOC under RA 9335 fully satisfy the demands of equal protection.