Republic

SUPREME
Manila

of

the

Philippines
COURT

FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 81969 September 26, 1988
JOCELYN
RULONA-AL
AWADHI, petitioner,
vs.
HON. ABDULMAJID J. ASTIH, District Judge of the Fourth
Sharia
Judicial
District
Court
and
NABIL
ALAWADHI, respondents.
Citizens Legal Assistance Office for petitioner.
Talib Umpar for private respondent.

GRIO-AQUINO, J.:
A petition for review on certiorari was filed by Jocelyn Rulona-Al
Awadhi, assailing the order dated January 12, 1988 of the Sharia
Judicial District Court of Marawi City which denied her motion to
dismiss Special Proceedings No. 011-87, entitled "Nabil Al-Awadhi,
Petitioner, vs. Jocelyn Rulonba, Respondent" for custody and
guardianship of their minor children named Abdul Wahab Nabil, 5
years old, Adare Nabil, 3 years old, and Sabihab Al Abdullah Nabil,
6 months old.
The petitioner and the private respondent were married in Kuwait
on August 1, 1981. The petitioner is a Filipino nurse and a Roman
Catholic. Her husband, the private respondent is a Kuwaiti
student. The petitioner resides with her children in Sta. Cruz,
Calape, Bohol, while the private respondent resides at 49-7
Pamaong Street, Tagbiliran City.

On or about August 25, 1987, she filed an action for support and
guardianship of her three (3) minor children (who are in her
custody) in the Regional Trial Court, Branch 2, in Tagbilaran City
(Civil Case No. 4170, entitled "Jocelyn Rulona-Al Awadhi Petitioner,
vs. Nabil Al-Awadhi Defendant"). Upon her motion, she was
appointed the children's guardian by order of the court dated
August 25, 1987 (Annex B, p. 20, Rollo). The defendant, her
husband filed in the same court a motion to be allowed to
exercise joint parental authority over their children (Annex C, p.
21, Rollo). However, without waiting for the action of the
Tagbilaran Court, he filed on November 4, 1987 a petition for
custody and guardianship of their minor children in the Fourth
Sharia District Court in Marawi City (Annex A, p. 10, Rollo). It was
docketed therein as Special Proceeding No. 011-87.
After having been summoned, the petitioner filed a motion to
dismiss the petition on the grounds that: (1) the court has no
jurisdiction over the subject of the petition, nor over the parties,
least of all, herself; (2) there is another action pending between
the same parties for the same cause; and (3) improper venue
(Annex B, p. 45, Rollo).
In its order dated November 20, 1987, the Sharia District Court
denied her motion to dismiss (Annex C, p. 23, Rollo). Its order was
based on Section 13 of the Special Rules of Procedure in the
Sharia Courts which provides:
Section 13. Pleadings and Motions Disallowed. The
court shall not allow the filing of the following
pleadings, petitions or motions, to wit:
(a) Motion to dismiss or to quash;
(b) Motion for a bill of particulars;
(c) Motion for extension of time to file pleadings or any
other paper;

(d) Motion to declare defendant in default;

(e) Reply, third party complaints, or intervention;
(f) Petition for certiorari, mandamus, or prohibition
against any interlocutory order issued by the court;
(g) Petition for relief from judgment;
(h) Motion for new trial or re-opening of trial; and
(i) Any dilatory motion for postponement.
Petitioner's motion for reconsideration of that order (Annex D, p.
24, Rollo) was also denied by the court on January 12, 1988.
Hence, this petition for review raising only the legal issue of
jurisdiction, or lack of it, of the respondent Sharia District Court
over the parties and the subject matter of the case. Only the
Sharia District Judge filed a Comment on the petition; the private
respondent did not.
Article 13, Title II of the Code of Muslim Personal Laws of the
Philippines (PD 1083) provides:
BOOK TWO
TITLE II
Chapter One
APPLICABILITY CLAUSE
Art. 13. Application (1) The provisions of this Title
shall apply to marriage and divorce wherein both
parties are Muslims, or wherein only the male party is a
Muslim, and the marriage is solemnized in accordance
with Muslim law or this Code in any part of the
Philippines.

(2) In case of a marriage between a Muslim and nonMuslim, solemnized not in accordance with Muslim law
or this Code, the Civil Code of the Philippines shall
apply.
(3) Subject to the provisions of the preceding
paragraphs, the essential requisites and legal
impediments to marriage, divorce, paternity and
filiation, guardianship and custody of minors, support
and maintenance, claims for customary dower (mahr),
betrothal, breach of contract to marry, solemnization
and registration of marriage and divorce, rights and
obligations between husband and wife, parental
authority, and the property relations between husband
and wife shall be governed by this Code and other
applicable Muslim laws. (Emphasis supplied.)
In view of the following admitted facts:
(1) That the plaintiff husband in Spl. Proc. No. 011-87 is not a
Philippine Muslim but a Kuwaiti national;
(2) That he resides at 49-7 Pamaong Extension, Tagbilaran City,
Bohol, not in Marawi City where the Sharia court sits;
(3) That the defendant wife (herein petitioner Jocelyn Rulona) is a
Filipino citizen and a non- Muslim (a Roman Catholic Christian);
(4) That their Muslim marriage was not solemnized in any part of
the Philippines, for they were married in Kuwait (Annex A, par. 2,
p. 40, Rollo); and
(5) That they do not reside within the Fourth Sharia District,
embracing the provinces of Lanao del Norte and Lanao del Sur,
and the cities of Iligan and Marawi (Art. 138-d, P.D. No. 1083), for
both of them reside in the province of Bohol; it should have been
self-evident to the Fourth Sharia District Court that it had no
jurisdiction over the spouses of their marriage, nor over the

custody and guardianship of their children (Art. 143, P.D. No.

1083).
The Regional Trial Court, Branch II, at Tagbilaran City which had
assumed jurisdiction over petitioner's complaint for support and
guardianship of her children on August 25, 1987 (p. 19, Rollo),
may not be divested of its jurisdiction over the parties (the
husband having voluntarily submitted to its jurisdiction by filing a
motion therein for joint custody of his children) by the Fourth
Sharia District Court in Marawi City by the husband's filing therein
three (3) months later his own petition for custody and
guardianship of his children (p.10, Rollo). The rule is that once a
court has assumed jurisdiction of a case, its jurisdiction shall
continue until the case is finished. It may not be ousted from its
jurisdiction by a co-equal court (People vs. Layno, 111 SCRA 20;
Denila vs. Bellosillo, 64 SCRA 63; Lat vs. PLDT, 67 SCRA 425; and
People vs. Ocaya, 83 SCRA 218).
Moreover, Article 3 of the Muslim Code (P.D. No. 1083 expressly
provides:
Art. 3. Conflict of provisions ...
(3) The provisions of this Code shall be applicable only
to Muslims and nothing herein shall be construed to
operate to the prejudice of a Non-Muslim.
The application of the Muslim Code to the Christian wife will be
prejudicial to her.
The Code of Muslim Personal Laws was promulgated to fulfill "the
aspiration of the Filipino Muslims to have their system of laws
enforced in their communities" (Exec. Order No. 442, Dec. 23,
1974). Those communities are found in the ten (10) Mindanao
provinces and six (6) cities comprised within the five (5) Sharia
judicial districts which were created under Article 138 of the
Muslim Code. As neither the petitioner nor the private respondent
and their children live in or are members of those communities,

they do not come within the ambit of the Sharia courts'

jurisdiction.
Instead of invoking a procedural technicality, the respondent
court should have recognized its lack of jurisdiction over the
parties and promptly dismissed the action, for, without
jurisdiction, all its proceedings would be, as they were, a futile
and invalid exercise. A summary rule prohibiting the filing of a
motion to dismiss should not be a bar to the dismissal of the
action for lack of jurisdiction when the jurisdictional infirmity is
patent on the face of the complaint itself, in view of the
fundamental procedural doctrine that the jurisdiction of a court
may be challenged at anytime and at any stage of the action
(Tijam vs. Sibonghanoy, 23 SCRA 29, 35-36; Crisostomo vs. Court
of Appeals, 32 SCRA 54; Zulueta vs. Pan American World Airways,
Inc., 49 SCRA 1, 6; Nueva Vizcaya Chamber of Commerce vs.
Court of Appeals, 97 SCRA 856).
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is granted. All the
proceedings in special Proceeding No. 011-87 of the Fourth Sharia
District Court at Marawi City are annulled and the petition therein
is dismissed. Costs against the private respondent.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, Cruz, Gancayco and Medialdea, JJ., concur.
FIRST DIVISION
MOCARAL MACAWIAG,
Petitioner,

G.R. No. 159210

Present:

-versusJUDGE RASAD BALINDONG

PANGANIBAN, C.J.,
Chairperson,
YNARES-SANTIAGO
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,

and
SORAIDA
A. CALLEJO, SR., and
MACAWIAG,
CHICO-NAZARIO, JJ.
Respond
ents.
Promulgated:
September 20, 2006
x-------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:

This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised

Rules of Court for the nullification of the Decision [1] of the Sharia
District Court, Fourth Sharia Judicial District, Marawi City and its
Order[2] denying the motion for reconsideration of the said
decision. The assailed decision reversed the Decision [3] of the
Fourth Sharia Circuit Court, Fourth Sharia Judicial District, Iligan
City, declaring that the house and lot with an area of 300 square
meters located at Mahayahay, Iligan City is not a part of the fixed
dower given to Soraida Macawiag, herein private respondent, and
directing her to pay attorneys fees in the amount of P40,000.00.
The factual and procedural antecedents are as follows:
Private respondent Soraida Macawiag and Pangampong
Macawiag contracted marriage on May 27, 1987, solemnized by
Imam Macmod Ganzo. Private respondent claims that before the
celebration of their marriage, the representatives of the bride and
bridegroom agreed and the solemnizing officer announced, that
the customary dower (mahr)[4] was P20,000.00 in cash, one head
of live carabao, and house and lot consisting of 300 square
meters located at Mahayahay, Iligan City, covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-28, 147(a.f.). However, despite the
oral and written declaration that the subject house and lot was
a mahr, Mocaral M. Macawiag, herein petitioner, and her children,
refused to recognize it as such, without valid and lawful ground.
Hence, on October 27, 1998, private respondent filed an
action (dawa)[5] against Mocaral M. Macawiag and her children,
for claim, declaration, change of name, and issuance of new
duplicate certificate of title of mahr with damages and attorneys

fees, before the Fourth Sharia Circuit Court, Fourth Sharia

Judicial District, Iligan City. Private respondent prayed that:
1. The said house and lot is Mahr property and
absolutely owned by and both possession and name be
transferred to the Moddai (plaintiff) and her children;
2. The name appeared (sic) in the certificate of
title of said house and lot be changed from Sarimanoc
Macawiag to the Moddais name and her children;
3. The Register of Deeds of Iligan City be ordered
to issue duplicate certificate of title while still in the
name of Sarimanoc Macawiag, and new Transfer
Certificate of Title in the name of the new owner, the
Moddai and her children;
4. That the Moddaalai (defendant) shall be
ordered to pay moral damages of P5,000.00, exemplary
damages of P5,000.00, attorneys fee of P20,000.00,
plus P500.00 per appearances (sic) in the court in the
total amount of at least P30,500.00 and compensatory
damages as maybe (sic) proved in the course of the
trial plus cost;
And such other reliefs and remedies as are just
and equitable on the premises.[6]
Prior to the filing of the dawa, Pangampong Macawiag
executed an affidavit of loss of the title covering the subject
house and lot. The Register of Deeds of Iligan City thereafter
issued a new duplicate certificate of title.
In their Answer,[7] petitioner and her children admitted the
fact of marriage between private respondent and Pangampong
Macawiag. However,
they
denied
that
the mahr consists

of P20,000.00 cash, one head of live carabao and the house and
lot subject matter of the present controversy. They alleged
instead that the dowry in consideration of their marriage was cash
in the amount of P5,000.00. They, likewise, averred that the title
to the house and lot had not been lost; rather, it was in the
possession of Antonio Camama, having been used as collateral for
a loan of P500,000.00. Moreover, out of theP500,000.00
loan, P400,000.00 was given to Pangampong Macawiag which he
used to buy a vehicle and merchandise and subject to the
condition that the amortization would be paid. Since Pangampong
Macawiag failed to pay, petitioner took possession of the vehicle.
During the hearing before the Sharia Circuit Court, private
respondent presented the following witnesses: Imam Mahmod
Ganzo, who testified that before he solemnized the marriage, he
asked the representatives of the parties if the mahr had been
agreed upon, and the mother of the bride and the bridegroom
said that per agreement, the mahr consists of the P20,000.00
cash, the head of a live carabao, and the subject house and lot;
[8]
Pangampong Macawiag, who confirmed the above testimony
and further testified that his marriage to private respondent was
duly registered with the Office of the Sharia Circuit Court
Registrar which also specified the amount of mahr under Registry
No. 98-137, and that his father Sarimanoc Macawiag specified in
writing that the house and lot had been set aside as his mahr;
[9]
Diora Dimacaling, the mother of the private respondent who
witnessed the celebration of the marriage between Pangampong
Macawiag and private respondent, and corroborated the
testimonies of the two witnesses;[10] and private respondent
herself who likewise confirmed the testimonies of the first three
witnesses.[11]

When she testified, petitioner denied that it was announced

during the celebration of the marriage that the mahr included the
subject house and lot, and that it was mortgaged to Antonio
Camama who now possessed the title to the property. [12] Antonio
Camama testified that the subject house and lot was mortgaged
to him, subject to the condition that if Sarimanoc Macawiag and
petitioner could not comply with the agreement, the mortgage
would be considered as a sale. In view of the non-fulfillment of
the agreement, a Deed of Absolute Sale was executed by
Sarimanoc Macawiag in his (Antonios) favor. He stated that
Pangampong Macawiag knew of such transaction, and that the
transfer certificate of title covering the subject house and lot was
in his possession.[13] Tocod Macawiag, Papiel Macawiag, Disimban
Didato, and Tadmera Gandamato testified that there was no
house and lot mentioned as part of the dowry. [14]
On April 13, 2000, the Fourth Sharia Circuit Court rendered
a decision[15] in favor of petitioner and her children. The fallo of
the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the house and lot with an area of
300 square meters located at Mahayahay, Iligan City,
registered in the name of the deceased Sarimanok
Macawiag under Transfer Certificate of Title TCT No. T28, 147 (a.f.) is not a part of the fixed dower (mahr
musama) given to Soraida A. Macawiag, herein plaintiff,
in connection with her marriage to Pangampong
Macawiag.
Plaintiff
is
hereby
directed
to
pay
defendants P40,000.00 in attorneys fees and the cost
of this proceedings.

SO ORDERED.[16]

In finding that the subject house and lot was not part of
private respondents mahr, the Circuit Court ruled that, in the first
place, she never acted as owner of the house and lot allegedly
given to her as dowry. Even if there was a fixed dowry, it never
included the house and lot under litigation, which happens to be
registered under the name of Sarimanoc Macawiag. Moreover,
the Circuit Court observed that private respondents claim that
the subject house and lot was part of her fixed dowry had not
been annotated on the title to the property despite the lapse of
considerable length of time.[17]
Aggrieved, private respondent appealed to the Sharia
District Court, which, on March 14, 2003, reversed the decision of
the Fourth Sharia Circuit Court. The fallo reads:
WHEREFORE, the assailed judgment is REVERSED
and another one entered:
(1) DECLARING plaintiff Soraida Abbas Macawiag
the exclusive owner of the house and lot, situated at
Bo. Mahayahay, Iligan City, with an area of 300 square
meters, more or less covered by TCT No. T-28,147 (a.f.)
which is still in the name of the late Sarimanoc
Macawiag, being her mahr;
(2) ORDERING defendants jointly and severally to
pay
plaintiff
(1) P25,000.00
as
attorneys
fees; P10,000.00 as litigation expenses; and the costs
of suit.
SO ORDERED.[18]

The Sharia District Court ruled that one of the essential

requisites of a marriage contract is the stipulation of customary
dower (mahr) duly witnessed by two competent persons. It is
both an inalienable and imprescriptible right which the wife can
demand from her husband. It is inalienable in the sense that
even if not expressly stated in the contract of marriage, is
nevertheless due to the wife and is not lost through prescription.
[19]
It further held that the positive testimonies of the witnesses for
private respondent should prevail over the negative testimonies
of petitioner and her children. The court gave credence to the
testimony of the Imam, belonging as he does to the group of the
learned (the ulama). Lastly, the district court found that even if
the property was used as collateral for a loan by the late
Sarimanoc Macawiag, private respondent can still recover the
same since the transaction involving her property is null and void
(insofar as the private respondent is concerned). [20]
Petitioner now comes before this Court in this special civil
action for certiorari, on the sole ground of whether
JUDGE BALINDONG ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE
OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OF JURISDICTION
OR EXCESS IN THE EXERCISE THEREOF WHEN HE
REVERSED THE DECISION OF THE SHARIA CIRCUIT
COURT
AND
DENIED
THE
MOTION
FOR
[21]
RECONSIDERATION.

Petitioner insists that the ruling of the Court in People v.

Bundang[22] is not applicable in this case, since as against the
positive declaration of the prosecution witnesses and the
statements of the accused, the former ordinarily deserves more

credence than the latter. In such case, mere preponderance of

evidence will suffice.[23]

Petitioner alleges that the Sharia Circuit Court already

weighed the testimonial and documentary evidence, and found
preponderance of evidence in favor of petitioner; as such, this
ruling should have been respected and upheld by the Sharia
District Court. Petitioner questions the credibility of the
testimonies of Pangampong Macawiag and private respondent, as
their testimonies are false. [24] Petitioner likewise questions the
authenticity of the Deed of Donation signed by Sarimanoc
Macawiag involving the subject house and lot [25] and the two (2)
sets of Certificates of Marriage and Municipal Forms (Nos. 97-31
and 98-131) registered with the Civil Registrar. Petitioner,
likewise, questions the findings of the Sharia District Court on the
credibility of Imam Ganzo.[26]
In her Comment,[27] private respondent contends that the
petition was filed out of time; it, likewise, violates the principle of
hierarchy of courts since it should have been filed before the CA.
[28]
Moreover, private respondent points out that petitioner is not
assailing the very jurisdiction of the Sharia District Court, but
only its findings of facts; this is a ground for an appeal and not a
petition forcertiorari.[29] Lastly, private respondent claims that
petitioner is trying to mislead the Court by including in her
petition annexes/documents which were not appreciated and
passed upon by the Sharia Circuit Court. [30]
Petitioner counters that the petition was timely filed
because she received the order denying her motion for
reconsideration on May 29, 2003; thus, she had sixty (60) days
therefrom or until July 29, 2003. Before the period expired, she
filed a motion for extension of fifteen (15) days or until August 13,
2003 within which to file the petition. Having filed the petition

on August 12, 2003, it is within the requested period of extension,

and thus filed on time. Petitioner, likewise, claims that the rule on
hierarchy of courts was not violated, in view of the rule on finality
of decision set forth in P.D. No. 1083. [31] As to the questioned
documents presented before this Court, petitioner admits that
they were not presented during the hearing before the Sharia
Circuit Court.[32]
The parties submitted their respective Memoranda where
they reiterated their earlier arguments.
The petition is dismissed.

The decision sought to be reviewed was rendered by the

Sharia District Court which is thus governed primarily by special
laws. Republic Act (Rep. Act) No. 6734, An Act Providing for the
Organic Act For the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao, as
amended by Rep. Act No. 9054 or the New Organic Law for the
Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao, provides:
The Sharia Appellate Court shall:
xxxx
b) Exercise exclusive appellate jurisdiction over
all cases tried in the Sharia District Courts as
established by law.[33]
While the Supreme Court en banc authorized the creation of
the Sharia Appellate Court, it has not yet been organized; in any
case, it should begin with the appointments of the Presiding
Justice and two Associate Justices. Consequently, aggrieved

parties can come up only to this Court in view of the rule set forth
in Article 145 of Presidential Decree No. 1083, viz:
Article 145. Finality of decisions. The decisions
of the Sharia District Courts whether on appeal from
the Sharia Circuit Court or not shall be final. Nothing
herein contained shall affect the original and appellate
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court as provided in the
Constitution.

The original and appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court

as provided in the Constitution is not altered. Specifically, this
refers to the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court over
petitions
forcertiorari, prohibition,
mandamus,
quo
warranto, and habeas corpus.[34] It likewise refers to the power of
the Supreme Court to review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on
appeal or certiorari, as the law or the Rules of Court may provide,
final judgments and orders of lower courts in all cases in which
the jurisdiction of any lower court is in issue [35] and all cases in
which only an error or question of law is involved. [36]
In fine, the decisions of the Sharia District Courts may reach
the Supreme Court by way of special civil action under Rule 65 of
the Rules of Court if there is a question of jurisdiction, or petition
for review on certiorari as a mode of appeal under Rule 45.
From the circumstances surrounding the present case, as
well as the allegations set forth in the petition, the remedy
available to petitioner is a petition for review on certiorari under
Rule 45 and not a petition for certiorari under Rule 65.

Indeed, when a court, tribunal, or officer has jurisdiction over

the person and the subject matter of the dispute, the decision on
all other questions arising in the case is an exercise of that
jurisdiction. Consequently, all errors committed in the exercise of
said jurisdiction are merely errors of judgment. Under prevailing
procedural rules and jurisprudence, errors of judgment are not
proper subjects of a special civil action for certiorari.[37]
The well-settled rule is that certiorari is not available where
the aggrieved partys remedy of appeal is plain, speedy and
adequate in the ordinary course,
the reason being
that certiorari cannot co-exist with an appeal or any other
adequate remedy. The existence and availability of the right to
appeal are antithetical to the availment of the special civil action
for certiorari. These two remedies are mutually exclusive.
[38]
Consequently, when petitioner filed her petition in this Court,
the decision of the Sharia District Court was already final and
executory.
In view of the foregoing, as much as we want to review the
merits of the petition, we are constrained by the procedural lapse
which this Court cannot ignore. When a decision becomes final
and executory, the court loses jurisdiction over the case and not
even an appellate court would have the power to review a
judgment that has acquired finality. Otherwise, there would be no
end to litigation and would set to naught the main role of courts of
justice which is to assist in the enforcement of the rule of law and
the maintenance of peace and order by settling justiciable
controversies with finality.[39]Moreover, the complaint filed before
the Sharia Circuit Court included as defendants the children of
Mocaral Macawiag, who are the heirs of the late Sarimanoc

Macawiag. On the other hand, the present petition was filed only
by Mocaral Macawiag without the inclusion of the other
parties. Considering that the other heirs of Sarimanoc are
indispensable parties who had not been impleaded below, the
Court is further prevented from previewing the merits of the
case.
Admittedly, in accordance with the liberal spirit pervading
the Rules of Court and in the interest of justice, this Court has the
discretion to treat a petition for certiorari as having been filed
under Rule 45,[40] but not when the petition is filed well beyond
the reglementary period for filing a petition for review and without
offering any reason therefor.[41]
The Court ruled in Sebastian v. Morales[42] that:
Under Rule 1, Section 6 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, liberal construction of the rules is the
controlling principle to effect substantial justice. Thus,
litigations should, as much as possible, be decided on
their merits and not on technicalities. This does not
mean, however, that procedural rules are to be ignored
or disdained at will to suit the convenience of a
party. Procedural law has its own rationale in the
orderly administration of justice, namely, to ensure the
effective enforcement of substantive rights by providing
for a system that obviates arbitrariness, caprice,
despotism, or whimsicality in the settlement of
disputes. Hence, it is a mistake to suppose that
substantive law and procedural law are contradictory to
each other, or as often suggested, that enforcement of
procedural rules should never be permitted if it would
result in prejudice to the substantive rights of the
litigants.

Litigation is not a game of technicalities, but

every case must be prosecuted in accordance with the
prescribed procedure so that issues may be properly
presented and justly resolved. Hence, rules of
procedure must be faithfully followed except only when
for persuasive reasons, they may be relaxed to relieve a
litigant of an injustice not commensurate with his
failure
to
comply
with
the
prescribed
procedure. Concomitant to a liberal application of the
rules of procedure should be an effort on the part of the
party invoking liberality to explain his failure to abide
by the rules.[43]

The fact that petitioner used the Rule 65 modality as a

substitute for a lost appeal is made plain by the following:
First. While the petition was filed within the 60-day period for
filing a petition for certiorari, it was nevertheless filed beyond the
15-day period for filing a petition for review. As earlier stated,
petitioner received the order denying her motion for
reconsideration on May 29, 2003. She thus had until June 13,
2003 within which to file the petition, but instead of doing so, filed
on July 24, 2003, a motion for extension of time [44] to file petition
for certiorari. The Court granted the motion in a Resolution
dated September 1, 2003. Thus, on August 12, 2003, which is
within the extension period, petitioner filed the instant petition.
Second. The petition makes specious allegations of grave
abuse of discretion but questions the credibility of witnesses and
the authenticity of documents that were either presented during
the trial of the case before the Sharia Circuit Court or submitted
for the first time before this Court. In short, petitioner seeks the
review of the factual findings of the courts below. Admittedly, the

Court has, in previous cases, reviewed the factual findings of the

Sharia District Court.[45] However, the petitioners in these cases
came before this Court via petition for review on certiorari under
Rule 45, not an original action forcertiorari as in the present case.
In a petition for certiorari, the jurisdiction of the appellate
court is narrow in scope. It is limited to resolving only errors of
jurisdiction. It is not to stray at will and resolve questions or
issues beyond its competence, such as an error of judgment
which is defined as one in which the court or quasi-judicial body
may commit in the exercise of its jurisdiction; an error of
jurisdiction is one where the acts complained of were issued
without or in excess of jurisdiction. [46] Indeed, judicial review does
not go as far as to examine and assess the evidence of the parties
and to weigh the probative value thereof. [47] An examination of
these issues would require the elevation of the records below,
which cannot be done in the present case.
IN LIGHT OF
hereby DISMISSED.

THE

FOREGOING,

the

petition

SO ORDERED.
ROMEO J. CALLEJO, SR.
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:

ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN
Chief Justice
Chairperson

is

CONSUELO
YNARES-SANTIAGO
MARTINEZ
Associate Justice

MA.

ALICIA

AUSTRIA-

Associate Justice

MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, it is

hereby certified that the conclusions in the above decision were
reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer
of the opinion of the Courts Division.

ARTEMIO
PANGANIBAN
Chief Justice
Republic of the Philippines
Supreme Court
Manila
SECOND DIVISION

V.

ATTY.
D. ZAMORANOS,

MARIETTA G.R. No. 193902

Petitioner,

- versus PEOPLE
OF
THE PHILIPPINES and
SAMSON R. PACASUM, SR.,
Respondents.
x------------------------------------------------ G.R. No. 193908
--x
ATTY.
D. ZAMORANOS,

MARIETTA
Petitioner,

- versus G.R. No. 194075

SAMSON R. PACASUM, SR.,
Respondent.
x-------------------------------------------------x
SAMSON R. PACASUM, SR.,
Petition
er,

Present:
CARPIO, J.,
Chairperson,
NACHURA,
PERALTA,
ABAD, and
MENDOZA, JJ.
Promulgated:

- versus June 1, 2011

ATTY.
MARIETTA
ZAMORANOS,

D.

Responde
nt.
x---------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION
NACHURA, J.:

These are three (3) consolidated petitions for review

on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the
Decision[1] dated July 30, 2010 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CAG.R. SP No. 03525-MIN, dismissing the petition for certiorari filed
by petitioner Atty. Marietta D. Zamoranos (Zamoranos) in G.R.
No. 193902, thus, affirming the Order[2] of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), Branch 6, Lanao del Norte, in Criminal Case No. 06-12305
for Bigamy filed by petitioner Samson R. Pacasum, Sr. in G.R. No.
194075.
Before anything else, we disentangle the facts.
On May 3, 1982, Zamoranos wed Jesus de Guzman, a Muslim
convert, in Islamic rites. Prior thereto, Zamoranos was a Roman
Catholic who had converted to Islam on April 28, 1982.
Subsequently, on July 30, 1982, the two wed again, this time, in
civil rites before Judge Perfecto Laguio (Laguio) of the
RTC, Quezon City.
A little after a year, on December 18, 1983, Zamoranos and
De Guzman obtained a divorce by talaq. The dissolution of their
marriage
was
st
confirmed by the Sharia Circuit District Court, 1 Circuit, 3rd

District, Isabela, Basilan, which issued a Decree of Divorce on June

18, 1992, as follows:

DECREE OF DIVORCE
This is a case for divorce filed by the herein
complainant Marietta (Mariam) D. Zamoranos de
Guzman against her husband, the herein respondent,
on the ground that the wife, herein complainant, was
previously given by her husband the authority to
exercise Talaq, as provided for and, in accordance with
Presidential Decree No. 1083, otherwise known as the
Code of Muslim Personal Laws of the Philippines.
When this case was called for hearing[,] both
parties appeared and herein respondent, Jesus
(Mohamad) de Guzman[,] interposes no objection to
confirm their divorce, which they have freely entered
into on December 18, 1983.
This Court, after evaluating the testimonies of
the herein parties is fully convinced that both the
complainant and the respondent have been duly
converted to the faith of Islam prior to their Muslim
wedding and finding that there is no more possibility of
reconciliation by and between them, hereby issues this
decree of divorce.
WHEREFORE, premises considered and pursuant
to the provisions of the Code of Muslim Personal Laws
of the Philippines, this petition is hereby granted.
Consequently, the marriage between Marietta (Mariam)
D. Zamoranos de Guzman and Jesus (Mohamad) de
Guzman is hereby confirmed dissolved.
Issued this 18th day of June,
Isabela, Basilan Province, Philippines.

1992,

at

(signed)
HON.
KAUDRI L. JAINUL
Pre
siding Judge

[3]

Now it came to pass that Zamoranos married anew on

December 20, 1989. As she had previously done in her first
nuptial to De Guzman, Zamoranos wed Samson Pacasum, Sr.
(Pacasum), her subordinate at the Bureau of Customs where she
worked, under Islamic rites in Balo-i, Lanao del Norte. Thereafter,
on December 28, 1992, in order to strengthen the ties of their
marriage, Zamoranos and Pacasum renewed their marriage vows
in a civil ceremony before Judge Valerio Salazar of the
RTC, Iligan City. However, unlike in Zamoranos first marriage to
De Guzman, the union between her and Pacasum was blessed
with progeny, namely: Samson, Sr., Sam Jean, and Sam Joon.
Despite their three children, the relationship between
Zamoranos and Pacasum turned sour and, in 1998, the two
were de facto separated. The volatile relationship of Zamoranos
and Pacasum escalated into a bitter battle for custody of their
minor children. Eventually, on October 18, 1999, Zamoranos and
Pacasum arrived at a compromise agreement which vested
primary custody of the children in the former, with the latter
retaining visitorial rights thereto.
As it turned out, the agreement rankled on Pacasum. He filed
a flurry of cases against Zamoranos, to wit:
1.
Petition for Annulment of Marriage filed on March 31,
2003 before the RTC, Branch 2, Iligan City, docketed as Civil Case
No. 6249. Subsequently, on May 31, 2004, Pacasum amended the
petition into one for Declaration of a Void Marriage, alleging,

among other things, that: (a) Zamoranos, at the time of her

marriage to Pacasum, was already previously married to De
Guzman on July 30, 1982; (b) Zamoranos first marriage,
solemnized before the RTC, Quezon City, presided over by Judge
Laguio, subsisted at the time of the celebration of Zamoranos and
Pacasums marriage; (c) Zamoranos and Pacasums marriage was
bigamous and void ab initio; and (d) thus, Zamoranos, as the
guilty spouse, should forfeit: (i) custody of her minor children to
their father, who should have sole and exclusive custody; (ii) her
share in the community property in favor of the children; and (iii)
her inheritance from Pacasum by testate or intestate succession.
2.
Criminal complaint for Bigamy under Article 349 of the
Revised Penal Code (RPC), filed on October 25, 2004.
3.
Separate administrative cases for Zamoranos
dismissal from service and disbarment before the Civil Service
Commission (CSC), the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and the
Bureau of Finance Revenue Integrity Protection Service,
respectively. Parenthetically, the administrative cases were
dismissed in due course. However, as of the date of the assailed
CA Decision, Pacasums appeal from the CSCs dismissal of the
administrative case was still pending resolution.
Quite ironically, soon after amending his petition in Civil
Case No. 6249, Pacasum contracted a second marriage with
Catherine Ang Dignos on July 18, 2004.[4]
Meanwhile, on the criminal litigation front, the Office of the
City Prosecutor, through Prosecutor Leonor Quiones, issued a
resolution dated February 2, 2005, finding prima facie evidence to
hold Zamoranos liable for Bigamy.[5] Consequently, on February
22, 2006, an Information for Bigamy was filed against Zamoranos
before the RTC, Branch 6, Iligan City, docketed as Criminal Case
No. 06-12305.[6]

Zamoranos filed a motion for reconsideration of the City

Prosecutors February 2, 2005 resolution. As a result, the
proceedings before the RTC, Branch 6, Iligan City, were
temporarily suspended. On April 29, 2005, the City Prosecutor of
Ozamis City, the acting City Prosecutor of Iligan City at the time,
issued
a
resolution
granting
Zamoranos
motion
for
reconsideration and dismissing the charge of Bigamy against
Zamoranos.[7]
Not unexpectedly, Pacasum moved for reconsideration of the
April 29, 2005 resolution of the City Prosecutor, which was denied
in a resolution dated August 15, 2005. [8] Posthaste, Pacasum filed
a Petition for Review before the Office of the Secretary of Justice,
assailing the dismissal of his criminal complaint for Bigamy
against Zamoranos.[9]
In yet another turn of events, the Secretary of Justice, on
February 7, 2006, issued a resolution granting Pacasums Petition
for Review and reversed the February 2, 2005 and April 29, 2005
resolutions of the City Prosecutor.[10] Zamoranos immediately filed
an Omnibus Motion and Supplement to the Urgent Omnibus
Motion: (1) for Reconsideration; (2) to Hold in Abeyance Filing of
the Instant Case; and (3) to Hold in Abeyance or Quash Warrant of
Arrest, respectively dated February 20, 2006 and February 24,
2006, before the Secretary of Justice.[11] Unfortunately for
Zamoranos, her twin motions were denied by the Secretary of
Justice in a resolution dated May 17, 2006. [12]
Zamoranos second motion for reconsideration, as with her
previous motions, was likewise denied.
On the other civil litigation front on the Declaration of a Void
Marriage, docketed as Civil Case No. 6249, the RTC, Branch
2, Iligan City, rendered a decision in favor of Zamoranos,
dismissing the petition of Pacasum for lack of jurisdiction. The
RTC, Branch 2, Iligan City, found that Zamoranos and De Guzman

are Muslims, and were such at the time of their marriage, whose
marital relationship was governed by Presidential Decree (P.D.)
No. 1083, otherwise known as the Code of Muslim Personal Laws
of the Philippines:
From the foregoing uncontroverted facts, the
Court finds that the allegation of [Pacasum] to the
effect that his marriage with [Zamoranos] on December
28, 1992 is a bigamous marriage due to the alleged
subsisting previous marriage between [Zamoranos] and
Jesus de Guzman is misplaced. The previous marriage
between Jesus de Guzman and [Zamoranos] has long
been terminated [and] has gone with the wind. The fact
that divorce byTalaq was entered into by [Zamoranos]
and her first husband in accordance with PD 1083, x x x
their marriage is dissolved and consequently thereof,
[Zamoranos] and Jesus de Guzman can re-marry.
Moreover, the second marriage entered into by
[Zamoranos] and her first husband Jesus de Guzman
under the Family Code on July 30, 1982 is merely
ceremonial, being unnecessary, it does not modify/alter
or change the validity of the first marriage entered into
by them under PD 1083.
Likewise, in the case of [Pacasum] and
[Zamoranos], their second marriage on December 28,
1992 under the Family Code does not in any way
modify, alter or change the validity of the first marriage
on December 20, 1989 entered into by [Pacasum] and
[Zamoranos] under PD 1083, as amended. In fact,
according to Ghazali, one of the renowned Muslim
author and jurist in Islamic Law and Jurisprudence and
concurred in by retired Justice Ra[s]ul of the Court of
Appeals and also a Professor on Islamic Law and
Jurisprudence, in the case of combined marriage[s], the
first marriage is to be considered valid and effective as
between the parties while the second marriage is
merely
ceremonial,
being
a
surplusage
and
unnecessary. Therefore, the divorce by Talaq dissolved

the marriage between [Zamoranos] and her first

husband[,de Guzman,] being governed by PD 1083, x x
x.
Article 13, Chapter I, Title II of the Code of
Muslim Personal Laws, provides x x x:
Application
The provisions of this title shall apply
to marriage and divorce wherein both parties
are Muslims[,] or wherein only the male party
is a Muslim and the marriage is solemnized in
accordance with Muslim law or this Code in
any part of the Philippines.
Accordingly, matters relating to the marriages
and divorce of [Zamoranos] and her first husband, Jesus
de Guzman[,] shall be governed by the Muslim Code
and divorce proceedings shall be properly within the
exclusive original jurisdiction of the Sharia Circuit
Court.
Art. 155, Chapter 2, Title II, Book 4 of the
Muslim code, provides x x x:
Jurisdiction
Courts
shall
have
jurisdiction over:

The Sharia Circuit

exclusive
original

xxxx
2. All civil actions and proceedings
between parties who are Muslims or have
been married in accordance with Article 13
involving disputes relating to:
a)

Marriage;

b)
Divorce
Code;

recognized

under

this

x x x x
The above provision of law clearly shows no
concurrent jurisdiction with any civil courts or other
courts of law. And any divorce proceeding undertaken
before the Shari[a] Court is valid, recognized, binding
and sufficient divorce proceedings.
Moreover, the instant case is one of the several
cases filed by [Pacasum] against [Zamoranos] such as
complaints for disbarment, for immorality, for bigamy
and misconduct before the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) and in the Civil Service Commission
which were all similar or [based on] the same set of
facts. A pure and simple harassment.
In the light of the foregoing findings, the Court
is of the considered view and so hold that this Court has
no jurisdiction to hear and decide the above-entitled
case for annulment of marriage entered into under PD
1083, x x x. It is the Sharia Circuit Court that has the
exclusive original jurisdiction.
WHEREFORE,
premises
considered,
the
affirmative defenses which are in the nature of motion
to dismiss is hereby granted.
The above-entitled case is hereby dismissed for
lack of jurisdiction.
SO ORDERED.[13]

On separate appeals, the CA and the Supreme Court

affirmed the dismissal of Civil Case No. 6249 by the RTC, Branch
2, Iligan City. On April 3, 2009, the denial by the Supreme Court of

Pacasums appeal became final and executory and was recorded

in the Book of Entries of Judgments.[14]
In the meantime, on August 7, 2009, the RTC, Branch
6, Iligan City, upon motion of Pacasum, issued an Order
reinstating Criminal Case No. 06-12305 for Bigamy against
Zamoranos.[15]
Not surprisingly, Zamoranos filed a Motion to Quash the
Information, arguing that the RTC, Branch 6, Iligan City, had no
jurisdiction over her person and over the offense charged.
Zamoranos asseverated, in the main, that the decision of the RTC,
Branch 2, Iligan City, in Civil Case No. 6249 categorically declared
her and Pacasum as Muslims, resulting in the mootness of
Criminal Case No. 06-12305 and the inapplicability of the RPC
provision on Bigamy to her marriage to Pacasum. In all,
Zamoranos claimed that Criminal Case No. 06-12305 ought to be
dismissed.[16]
On December 21, 2009, the RTC, Branch 6, Iligan City,
denied Zamoranos Motion to Quash the Information. Zamoranos
motion for reconsideration thereof was likewise denied. [17]
Undaunted, Zamoranos filed a petition for certiorari for the
nullification and reversal of the December 21, 2009 Order of the
RTC, Branch 6, Iligan City. As previously adverted to, the CA
dismissed Zamoranos petition. The CA dwelt on the propriety of a
petition for certiorari to assail the denial of a Motion to Quash the
Information:
A petition for certiorari alleging grave abuse of
discretion is an extraordinary remedy. As such, it is
confined to extraordinary cases wherein the action of
the inferior court is wholly void. The aim of certiorari is
to keep the inferior court within the parameters of its
jurisdiction. Hence, no grave abuse of discretion may be

imputed to a court on the basis alone of an alleged

misappreciation of facts and evidence. To prosper, a
petition for certiorari must clearly demonstrate that the
lower court blatantly abused its authority to a point so
grave as to deprive it of its very power to dispense
justice.
Simply put, in a petition for certiorari, the
jurisdiction of the appellate court is narrow in scope. It
is limited to resolving only errors of jurisdiction. It is not
to stray at will and resolve questions or issues beyond
its competence, such as an error of judgment which is
defined as one in which the court or quasi-judicial body
may commit in the exercise of its jurisdiction; as
opposed to an error of jurisdiction where the acts
complained of were issued without or in excess of
jurisdiction.
xxxx
In the present case, [w]e have circumspectly
examined [Zamoranos] Motion to Quash Information
and the action taken by the [RTC, Branch 6, Iligan City]
in respect thereto, and [w]e found nothing that may
constitute as grave abuse of discretion on the part of
the [RTC, Branch 6, Iligan City]. The Order dated
December 21, 2009, which first denied [Zamoranos]
[M]otion to [Q]uash Information meticulously explained
the factual and legal basis for the denial of the issues
raised by [Zamoranos] in said motion. We find the [RTC,
Branch 6, Iligan Citys] stance in upholding the
sufficiency of the Information for bigamy and taking
cognizance of Criminal Case No. 06-12305 to be well
within
the
bounds
of
its
jurisdiction.
Even
assuming arguendo that the denial of petitioners
motion to quash is erroneous, such error was, at worst,
an error of judgment and not of jurisdiction. [18]

Interestingly, even Pacasum was not satisfied with the CAs

dismissal of Zamoranos petition for certiorari. Hence, these
separate appeals by Zamoranos and Pacasum.
We note that Zamoranos is petitioner in two separate cases,
filed by her two counsels, docketed as G.R. Nos. 193902 and
193908, respectively, which assail the same CA Decision.
However, upon motion of counsel for Zamoranos, to obviate
confusion and superfluity, we have allowed Zamoranos to
withdraw her petition in G.R. No. 193908 and for her earlier
petition in G.R. No. 193902 to remain.
Zamoranos posits that it was grievous error for the CA to
ignore the conclusions made by the RTC, Branch 2, Iligan City, and
affirmed by the CA and this Court, to wit:
1.
Zamoranos is a Muslim and was validly married to
another Muslim, De Guzman, under Islamic rites;
2.
Zamoranos and De Guzmans marriage ceremony
under civil rites before Judge Laguio did not remove their
marriage from the ambit of P.D. No. 1083;
3.
Corollary to paragraph 1, Zamoranos divorce
by talaq to De Guzman severed their marriage ties;
4.
Accordingly, matters relating to the marriages and
divorce of [Zamoranos] and her first husband, Jesus de Guzman[,
are] governed by the Muslim Code and [the] divorce proceedings
properly within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Sharia
Circuit Court.
5.
Zamoranos remarried Pacasum, another Muslim, under
Islamic rites; and
6.
On the whole, regular courts, in particular, RTC, Branch
6, Iligan City, have no jurisdiction to hear and decide the case for
declaration of nullity of marriage entered into under P.D. No. 1083
because it is the Sharia Circuit Court that has original jurisdiction
over the subject matter.

For his part, Pacasum, although he agrees with the dismissal

of Zamoranos petition, raises a quarrel with the aforementioned
conclusions of the CA. Pacasum vehemently denies that
Zamoranos is a Muslim, who was previously married and divorced
under Islamic rites, and who entered into a second marriage with
him, likewise under Islamic rites.

We impale the foregoing issues into the following:

1.
Whether the CA correctly dismissed Zamoranos
petition for certiorari; and
2.
Whether the RTCs, Branch 2, Iligan City and the CAs
separate factual findings that Zamoranos is a Muslim are correct.
As a rule, certiorari lies when: (1) a tribunal, board, or officer
exercises judicial or quasi-judicial functions; (2) the tribunal,
board, or officer has acted without or in excess of its or his
jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction; and (3) there is no appeal, or any plain,
speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. [19]
The writ of certiorari serves to keep an inferior court within
the bounds of its jurisdiction or to prevent it from committing such
a grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of
jurisdiction, or to relieve parties from arbitrary acts of courts
acts which courts have no power or authority in law to perform. [20]
The denial of a motion to quash, as in the case at bar, is not
appealable. It is an interlocutory order which cannot be the
subject of an appeal.[21]
Moreover, it is settled that a special civil action
for certiorari and prohibition is not the proper remedy to assail the
denial of a motion to quash an information. The established rule
is that, when such an adverse interlocutory order is rendered, the
remedy is not to resort forthwith to certiorari or prohibition, but to
continue with the case in due course and, when an unfavorable
verdict is handed down, to take an appeal in the manner
authorized by law.[22]
However, on a number of occasions, we have recognized
that in certain situations, certiorari is considered an appropriate
remedy to assail an interlocutory order, specifically the denial of a
motion to quash. We have recognized the propriety of the

following exceptions: (a) when the court issued the order without
or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion; (b)
when the interlocutory order is patently erroneous and the
remedy of appeal would not afford adequate and expeditious
relief; (c) in the interest of a more enlightened and substantial
justice;[23] (d) to promote public welfare and public policy; [24] and
(e) when the cases have attracted nationwide attention, making
it essential to proceed with dispatch in the consideration
thereof.[25] The first four of the foregoing exceptions occur in this
instance.
Contrary to the asseverations of the CA, the RTC, Branch
6, Iligan City, committed an error of jurisdiction, not simply an
error of judgment, in denying Zamoranos motion to quash.
First, we dispose of the peripheral issue raised by Zamoranos
on the conclusiveness of judgment made by the RTC, Branch
2, Iligan City, which heard the petition for declaration of nullity of
marriage filed by Pacasum on the ground that his marriage to
Zamoranos was a bigamous marriage. In that case, the decision
of which is already final and executory, the RTC, Branch
2, Iligan City, dismissed the petition for declaration of nullity of
marriage for lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter by the
regular civil courts. The RTC, Branch 2, Iligan City, declared that it
was the Sharia Circuit Court which had jurisdiction over the
subject matter thereof.
Section 47, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court provides for the
principle of res judicata. The provision reads:
SEC. 47. Effect of judgments or final orders. The
effect of a judgment or final order rendered by a court
of the Philippines, having jurisdiction to pronounce the
judgment or final order, may be as follows:

(a)
In case of a judgment or final order
against a specific thing, or in respect to the
probate of a will, or the administration of the
estate of a deceased person, or in respect
to the personal, political, or legal
condition or status of a particular
person
or
his
relationship
to
another, the judgment or final order is
conclusive upon the title to the thing, the
will
or
administration,
or
the
condition, status or relationship of the
person; however, the probate of a will or
granting of letters of administration shall only
be prima facie evidence of the death of the
testator or intestate.
The requisites for res judicata or bar by prior judgment are:
(1)
(2)

The former judgment or order must be final;

It must be a judgment on the merits;

(3)
It must have been rendered by a court having
jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties; and
(4)
There must be between the first and second
actions, identity of parties, subject matter, and cause of
action.[26]
The second and fourth elements of res judicata are not
present in this case. Suffice it to state that the judgment rendered
by RTC, Branch 2, Iligan City, was not a judgment on the merits.
The lower court simply dismissed the petition for declaration of
nullity of marriage since it found that the Sharia Circuit Court had
jurisdiction to hear the dissolution of the marriage of Muslims who
wed under Islamic rites.

Nonetheless, the RTC, Branch 6, Iligan City, which heard the

case for Bigamy, should have taken cognizance of the categorical
declaration of the RTC, Branch 2, Iligan City, that Zamoranos is a
Muslim, whose first marriage to another Muslim, De Guzman, was
valid and recognized under Islamic law. In fact, the same court
further declared that Zamoranos divorce from De Guzman validly
severed their marriage ties. Apart from that, Zamoranos
presented the following evidence:
1.
Affidavit of Confirmation[27] executed by the Ustadz,
Abdullah Ha-Ja-Utto, who solemnized the marriage of Zamoranos
and De Guzman under Islamic rites, declaring under oath that:
1. I am an Ustadz, in accordance with the Muslim
laws and as such, authorized to solemnize the
marriages among Muslims;
2. On May 3, 1982, after I was shown the
documents attesting that both parties are believers of
Islam, I solemnized the marriage of Jesus (Mohamad) de
Guzman
and Marietta (Mariam)
Zamoranos
in
accordance with Muslim Personal Laws in Isabela,
Basilan;
3. Sometime in 1992[,] Mr. Mohamad de
Guzman and his former wife, Mariam Zamoranos came
to see me and asked my assistance to have their
marriage and the subsequent Talaq by the wife, which
divorce became irrevocable pursuant to the provisions
of Presidential Decree No. 1083; registered [by] the
Sharia Circuit Court in the province of Basilan; and,
after I was convinced that their divorce was in order, I
accompanied them to the [C]lerk of [C]ourt of the
Sharia Circuit Court;
4. Satisfied that their marriage and the
subsequent divorce were in accordance with Muslim

personal laws, the Clerk of Court registered their

documents;
5. In June of 1993, the old Capitol building, where
the Sharia Circuit Court was housed, was razed to the
ground; and, I found out later that all the records,
effects and office equipments of the Sharia Circuit
Court were totally lost [in] the fire;
6. This is executed freely and voluntarily in order
to establish the above statements of fact; and
7. This is issued upon the request of Mr. De
Guzman for whatever legal purposes it may serve.
2.
Certification[28] issued by Judge Kaudri L. Jainul (Judge
Jainul), which confirmed the divorce agreement between
Zamoranos and De Guzman.
3.
Affidavit[29] executed by Judge Uyag P. Usman (Judge
Usman), former Clerk of Court of Judge Jainul at the time of the
confirmation of Zamoranos and De Guzmans divorce agreement
by the latter. Judge Usmans affidavit reads, in pertinent part:
1.

I am the presiding Judge of the Sharias Circuit

Court in the City of Pagadian;

2.

The first time that a Sharias Circuit court was

established in the Island Province of Basilan was in
1985, with the Honorable Kaudri L. Jainul, as the
Presiding Judge, while I was then the First Clerk of
Court of the Basilan Sharias Circuit Court;

3.

The Sharias Circuit Council in the Island Province

of Basilan was housed at the old Capitol Building, in
the City of Isabela, Basilan, Philippines;

4.

As the Clerk of Court of the Sharias Circuit Court

since 1985, I can recall that in 1992, Mr. Jesus
(Mohamad) de Guzman, who is a province mate of
mine in Basilan, and his former wife, Marietta
(Mariam) Zamoranos, jointly asked for the
confirmation of their Talaq, by the wife; which divorce
became irrevocable pursuant to the provisions of
Presidential Decree No. 1083;

5.

In June of 1993, all the records of the Sharias

Circuit Court were lost by reason of the fire that
gutted down the old Capitol Building in the City
of Isabela;

6.

This is executed freely and voluntarily in order to

establish the above statements of fact.

From the foregoing declarations of all three persons in

authority, two of whom are officers of the court, it is evident that
Zamoranos is a Muslim who married another Muslim, De Guzman,
under Islamic rites. Accordingly, the nature, consequences, and
incidents of such marriage are governed by P.D. No. 1083.
True, the Sharia Circuit Court is not vested with jurisdiction
over offenses penalized under the RPC. Certainly, the RTC, Branch
6, Iligan City, is correct when it declared that:
The Regional Trial Courts are vested the exclusive and
original jurisdiction in all criminal cases not within the
exclusive original jurisdiction of any court, tribunal, or
body. [Sec. 20 (b), BP Blg. 129] The Code of Muslim
Personal Laws (PD 1083) created the Sharia District
Courts
and Sharia Circuit
Courts
with
limited
jurisdiction. Neither court was vested jurisdiction over
criminal prosecution of violations of the Revised Penal
Code. There is nothing in PD 1083 that divested the
Regional Trial Courts of its jurisdiction to try and decide

cases of bigamy. Hence, this Court has jurisdiction over

this case.[30]

Nonetheless, it must be pointed out that even in criminal

cases, the trial court must have jurisdiction over the subject
matter of the offense. In this case, the charge of Bigamy hinges
on Pacasums claim that Zamoranos is not a Muslim, and her
marriage to De Guzman was governed by civil law. This is
obviously far from the truth, and the fact of Zamoranos Muslim
status should have been apparent to both lower courts, the RTC,
Branch 6, Iligan City, and the CA.
The subject matter of the offense of Bigamy dwells on the
accused contracting a second marriage while a prior valid one still
subsists and has yet to be dissolved. At the very least, the RTC,
Branch 6,Iligan City, should have suspended the proceedings
until Pacasum had litigated the validity of

Zamoranos and De Guzmans marriage before the Sharia Circuit

Court and had successfully shown that it had not been dissolved
despite the divorce by talaq entered into by Zamoranos and De
Guzman.
Zamoranos
was
correct
in
filing
the
petition
for certiorari before the CA when her liberty was already in
jeopardy with the continuation of the criminal proceedings against
her.
In a pluralist society such as that which exists in
the Philippines, P.D. No. 1083, or the Code of Muslim Personal
Laws, was enacted to promote the advancement and effective
participation of the National Cultural Communities x x x, [and] the
State shall consider their customs, traditions, beliefs and interests
in the formulation and implementation of its policies.
Trying Zamoranos for Bigamy simply because the regular
criminal courts have jurisdiction over the offense defeats the
purpose for the enactment of the Code of Muslim Personal Laws
and the equal recognition bestowed by the State on Muslim
Filipinos.
Article 3, Title II, Book One of P.D. No. 1083 provides:
TITLE II.
CONSTRUCTION OF CODE AND DEFINITION OF TERMS
Article 3. Conflict of provisions.
(1)
In case of conflict between any provision
of this Code and laws of general application, the former
shall prevail.
(2)
Should the conflict be between any
provision of this Code and special laws or laws of local

application, the latter shall be liberally construed in

order to carry out the former.
(3)
The provisions of this Code shall be
applicable only to Muslims and nothing herein shall be
construed to operate to the prejudice of a non-Muslim.
In Justice Jainal Rasul and Dr. Ibrahim Ghazalis
Commentaries and Jurisprudence on the Muslim Code of
the Philippines, the two experts on the subject matter of Muslim
personal laws expound thereon:
The first provision refers to a situation where in case of
conflict between any provision of this Code and laws of
general application, this Code shall prevail. For
example, there is conflict between the provision on
bigamy under the Revised Penal Code which is a law of
general application and Article 27 of this Code, on
subsequent marriage, the latter shall prevail, in the
sense that as long as the subsequent marriage is
solemnized in accordance with the Muslim Code, the
provision of the Revised Penal Code on bigamy will not
apply. The second provision refers to a conflict between
the provision of this Code which is a special law and
another special law or laws of local application. The
latter should be liberally construed to carry out the
provision of the Muslim Code.[31]

On Marriage, Divorce, and Subsequent Marriages, P.D. No.

1083 provides:
TITLE II. MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE
Chapter One
APPLICABILITY CLAUSE

Article 13. Application.

(1) The provisions of this Title shall apply to
marriage and divorce wherein both parties are Muslims,
or wherein only the male party is a Muslim and the
marriage is solemnized in accordance with Muslim law
or this Code in any part of the Philippines.
(2) In case of marriage between a Muslim and a
non-Muslim, solemnized not in accordance with Muslim
law or this Code, the Civil Code of the Philippines shall
apply.
xxxx

Chapter Two
MARRIAGE (NIKAH)
Section 1. Requisites of Marriage.
xxxx
Section 3. Subsequent Marriages
xxxx
Article 29. By divorcee.
(1) No woman shall contract a subsequent
marriage unless she has observed an idda of three
monthly courses counted from the date of divorce.
However, if she is pregnant at the time of the divorce,
she may remarry only after delivery.
xxxx
Chapter Three
DIVORCE (TALAQ)
Section 1. Nature and Form
Article 45. Definition and forms. Divorce is the
formal dissolution of the marriage bond in accordance
with this Code to be granted only after the exhaustion
of all possible means of reconciliation between the
spouses. It may be effected by:
(a) Repudiation of the wife by the husband (talaq);
xxxx
Article 46. Divorce by talaq.

(1) A divorce by talaq may be effected by the

husband in a single repudiation of his wife during her
non-menstrual period (tuhr) within which he has totally
abstained from carnal relation with her. Any number of
repudiations made during one tular shall constitute only
one repudiation and shall become irrevocable after the
expiration of the prescribed idda.
(2) A husband who repudiates his wife, either for
the first or second time, shall have the right to take her
back (ruju) within the prescribed idda by resumption of
cohabitation without need of a new contract of
marriage. Should he fail to do so, the repudiation shall
become irrevocable (talaq bain sugra).
xxxx
Article 54. Effects of irrevocable talaq; or faskh. A
talaq or faskh, as soon as it becomes irrevocable, shall
have the following effects:
(a) The marriage bond shall be severed and
the spouses may contract another marriage in
accordance with this Code;
(b) The spouses shall lose their mutual rights
of inheritance;
(c) The custody of children shall be
determined in accordance with Article 78 of this
Code;
(d) The wife shall be entitled to recover from
the husband her whole dower in case the talaq has
been effected after the consummation of the
marriage, or one-half thereof if effected before its
consummation;

(e) The husband shall not be discharged from

his obligation to give support in accordance with
Article 67; and
(f) The conjugal partnership if stipulated in
the marriage settlements, shall be dissolved and
liquidated.

For our edification, we refer once again to Justice Rasul and

Dr. Ghazalis Commentaries and Jurisprudence on the Muslim
Code of the Philippines:
If both parties are Muslims, there is a presumption that
the Muslim Code or Muslim law is complied with. If
together with it or in addition to it, the marriage is
likewise solemnized in accordance with the Civil Code of
the Philippines, in a so-called combined Muslim-Civil
marriage rites whichever comes first is the validating
rite and the second rite is merely ceremonial one. But,
in this case, as long as both parties are Muslims, this
Muslim Code will apply. In effect, two situations will
arise, in the application of this Muslim Code or Muslim
law, that is, when both parties are Muslims and when
the male party is a Muslim and the marriage is
solemnized in accordance with Muslim Code or Muslim
law. A third situation occur[s] when the Civil Code of
the Philippines will govern the marriage and divorce of
the parties, if the male party is a Muslim and the
marriage is solemnized in accordance with the Civil
Code.[32]
Moreover, the two experts, in the same book, unequivocally state
that one of the effects of irrevocable talaq, as well as other kinds
of divorce, refers to severance of matrimonial bond, entitling
one to remarry.[33]

It stands to reason therefore that Zamoranos divorce from

De Guzman, as confirmed by an Ustadz and Judge Jainul of the
Sharia Circuit Court, and attested to by Judge Usman, was valid,
and, thus, entitled her to remarry Pacasum in 1989.
Consequently, the RTC, Branch 6, Iligan City, is without jurisdiction
to try Zamoranos for the crime of Bigamy.
WHEREFORE, the petition in G.R. No. 193902
is GRANTED. The petition in G.R. No. 194075 is DENIED. The
Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 03525-MIN
is REVERSEDand SET ASIDE. Accordingly, the Motion to Quash
the Information in Criminal Case No. 06-12305 for Bigamy
is GRANTED.
SO ORDERED.

ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA

Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice

ROBERTO A. ABAD
Associate Justice

JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA

Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been
reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer
of the opinion of the Courts Division.

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Second Division
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and
the Division Chairperson's Attestation, I certify that the
conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Courts Division.

RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice
Republic
SUPREME
Manila

of

the

FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 174975

January 20, 2009

Philippines
COURT

LUISA KHO MONTAER, ALEJANDRO MONTAER, JR.,

LILLIBETH MONTAER-BARRIOS, AND RHODORA ELEANOR
MONTAER-DALUPAN, Petitioners,
vs.
SHARI'A DISTRICT COURT, FOURTH SHARI'A JUDICIAL
DISTRICT, MARAWI CITY, LILING DISANGCOPAN, AND
ALMAHLEEN LILING S. MONTAER, Respondents.
DECISION
PUNO, C.J.:
This Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition seeks to set aside the
Orders of the Sharia District Court, Fourth Sharia Judicial District,
Marawi City, dated August 22, 20061 and September 21, 2006.2
On August 17, 1956, petitioner Luisa Kho Montaer, a Roman
Catholic, married Alejandro Montaer, Sr. at the Immaculate
Conception Parish in Cubao, Quezon City. 3 Petitioners Alejandro
Montaer, Jr., Lillibeth Montaer-Barrios, and Rhodora Eleanor
Montaer-Dalupan are their children.4 On May 26, 1995, Alejandro
Montaer, Sr. died.5
On August 19, 2005, private respondents Liling Disangcopan and
her daughter, Almahleen Liling S. Montaer, both Muslims, filed a
"Complaint" for the judicial partition of properties before the
Sharia District Court.6 The said complaint was entitled
"Almahleen Liling S. Montaer and Liling M. Disangcopan v. the
Estates and Properties of Late Alejandro Montaer, Sr., Luisa Kho
Montaer, Lillibeth K. Montaer, Alejandro Kho Montaer, Jr., and
Rhodora Eleanor K. Montaer," and docketed as "Special Civil
Action No. 7-05."7 In the said complaint, private respondents
made the following allegations: (1) in May 1995, Alejandro
Montaer, Sr. died; (2) the late Alejandro Montaer, Sr. is a
Muslim; (3) petitioners are the first family of the decedent; (4)
Liling Disangcopan is the widow of the decedent; (5) Almahleen
Liling S. Montaer is the daughter of the decedent; and (6) the
estimated value of and a list of the properties comprising the
estate of the decedent.8 Private respondents prayed for the
Sharia District Court to order, among others, the following: (1)

the partition of the estate of the decedent; and (2) the

appointment of an administrator for the estate of the decedent. 9
Petitioners filed an Answer with a Motion to Dismiss mainly on the
following grounds: (1) the Sharia District Court has no jurisdiction
over the estate of the late Alejandro Montaer, Sr., because he
was a Roman Catholic; (2) private respondents failed to pay the
correct amount of docket fees; and (3) private respondents
complaint is barred by prescription, as it seeks to establish
filiation between Almahleen Liling S. Montaer and the decedent,
pursuant to Article 175 of the Family Code. 10
On November 22, 2005, the Sharia District Court dismissed the
private respondents complaint. The district court held that
Alejandro Montaer, Sr. was not a Muslim, and its jurisdiction
extends only to the settlement and distribution of the estate of
deceased Muslims.11
On December 12, 2005, private respondents filed a Motion for
Reconsideration.12 On December 28, 2005, petitioners filed an
Opposition to the Motion for Reconsideration, alleging that the
motion for reconsideration lacked a notice of hearing. 13 On
January 17, 2006, the Sharia District Court denied petitioners
opposition.14Despite
finding
that
the
said
motion
for
reconsideration "lacked notice of hearing," the district court held
that such defect was cured as petitioners "were notified of the
existence of the pleading," and it took cognizance of the said
motion.15 The Sharia District Court also reset the hearing for the
motion for reconsideration.16
In its first assailed order dated August 22, 2006, the Sharia
District Court reconsidered its order of dismissal dated November
22, 2005.17 The district court allowed private respondents to
adduce further evidence.18 In its second assailed order dated
September 21, 2006, the Sharia District Court ordered the
continuation of trial, trial on the merits, adducement of further
evidence, and pre-trial conference.19
Seeking recourse before this Court, petitioners raise the following
issues:

I.
RESPONDENT SHARIA DISTRICT COURT MARAWI CITY LACKS
JURISDICTION OVER PETITIONERS WHO ARE ROMAN CATHOLICS
AND NON-MUSLIMS.
II.
RESPONDENT SHARIA DISTRICT COURT MARAWI CITY DID NOT
ACQUIRE JURISDICTION OVER "THE ESTATES AND PROPERTIES OF
THE LATE ALEJANDRO MONTAER, SR." WHICH IS NOT A NATURAL
OR JURIDICAL PERSON WITH CAPACITY TO BE SUED.
III.
RESPONDENT SHARIA DISTRICT COURT DID NOT ACQUIRE
JURISDICTION OVER THE COMPLAINT OF PRIVATE RESPONDENTS
AGAINST PETITIONERS DUE TO NON-PAYMENT OF THE FILING AND
DOCKETING FEES.
IV.
RESPONDENT
SHARIA
DISTRICT
COURTMARAWI
CITY
COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK
OF JURISDICTION WHEN IT DENIED THE OPPOSITION OF
PETITIONERS AND THEN GRANTED THE MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION OF RESPONDENTS LILING DISANGCOPAN, ET
AL. WHICH WAS FATALLY DEFECTIVE FOR LACK OF A "NOTICE OF
HEARING."
V.
RESPONDENT
SHARIA
DISTRICT
COURTMARAWI
CITY
COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK
OF JURISDICTION WHEN IT SET SPL. CIVIL ACTION 7-05 FOR TRIAL
EVEN IF THE COMPLAINT PLAINLY REVEALS THAT RESPONDENT
ALMAHLEEN LILING S. MONTAER SEEKS RECOGNITION FROM
ALEJANDRO MONTAER, SR. WHICH CAUSE OF ACTION
PRESCRIBED UPON THE DEATH OF ALEJANDRO MONTAER, SR.
ON MAY 26, 1995.

In their Comment to the Petition for Certiorari, private

respondents stress that the Sharia District Court must be given
the opportunity to hear and decide the question of whether the
decedent is a Muslim in order to determine whether it has
jurisdiction.20
Jurisdiction: Settlement of the Estate of Deceased Muslims
Petitioners first argument, regarding the Sharia District Courts
jurisdiction, is dependent on a question of fact, whether the late
Alejandro Montaer, Sr. is a Muslim. Inherent in this argument is
the premise that there has already been a determination
resolving such a question of fact. It bears emphasis, however,
that the assailed orders did not determine whether the decedent
is a Muslim. The assailed orders did, however, set a hearing for
the purpose of resolving this issue.
Article 143(b) of Presidential Decree No. 1083, otherwise known
as the Code of Muslim Personal Laws of the Philippines, provides
that the Sharia District Courts have exclusive original jurisdiction
over the settlement of the estate of deceased Muslims:
ARTICLE 143. Original jurisdiction. (1) The Shari'a District Court
shall have exclusive original jurisdiction over:
xxxx
(b) All cases involving disposition, distribution and settlement of
the estate of deceased Muslims, probate of wills, issuance of
letters of administration or appointment of administrators or
executors regardless of the nature or the aggregate value of the
property.
The determination of the nature of an action or proceeding is
controlled by the averments and character of the relief sought in
the complaint or petition.21 The designation given by parties to
their own pleadings does not necessarily bind the courts to treat it
according to the said designation. Rather than rely on "a falsa
descriptio or defective caption," courts are "guided by the
substantive averments of the pleadings." 22

Although private respondents designated the pleading filed before

the Sharia District Court as a "Complaint" for judicial partition of
properties, it is a petition for the issuance of letters of
administration, settlement, and distribution of the estate of the
decedent. It contains sufficient jurisdictional facts required for the
settlement of the estate of a deceased Muslim, 23 such as the fact
of Alejandro Montaer, Sr.s death as well as the allegation that he
is a Muslim. The said petition also contains an enumeration of the
names of his legal heirs, so far as known to the private
respondents, and a probable list of the properties left by the
decedent, which are the very properties sought to be settled
before a probate court. Furthermore, the reliefs prayed for reveal
that it is the intention of the private respondents to seek judicial
settlement of the estate of the decedent. 24 These include the
following: (1) the prayer for the partition of the estate of the
decedent; and (2) the prayer for the appointment of an
administrator of the said estate.
We cannot agree with the contention of the petitioners that the
district court does not have jurisdiction over the case because of
an allegation in their answer with a motion to dismiss that
Montaer, Sr. is not a Muslim. Jurisdiction of a court over the
nature of the action and its subject matter does not depend upon
the defenses set forth in an answer25 or a motion to
dismiss.26 Otherwise, jurisdiction would depend almost entirely on
the defendant27 or result in having "a case either thrown out of
court
or
its
proceedings
unduly
delayed
by
simple
28
stratagem. Indeed, the "defense of lack of jurisdiction which is
dependent on a question of fact does not render the court to lose
or be deprived of its jurisdiction." 29
The same rationale applies to an answer with a motion to
dismiss.30 In the case at bar, the Sharia District Court is not
deprived of jurisdiction simply because petitioners raised as a
defense the allegation that the deceased is not a Muslim. The
Sharia District Court has the authority to hear and receive
evidence to determine whether it has jurisdiction, which requires
an a priori determination that the deceased is a Muslim. If after
hearing, the Sharia District Court determines that the deceased

was not in fact a Muslim, the district court should dismiss the case
for lack of jurisdiction.
Special Proceedings
The underlying assumption in petitioners second argument, that
the proceeding before the Sharia District Court is an ordinary civil
action against a deceased person, rests on an erroneous
understanding of the proceeding before the court a quo. Part of
the confusion may be attributed to the proceeding before the
Sharia District Court, where the parties were designated either as
plaintiffs or defendants and the case was denominated as a
special civil action. We reiterate that the proceedings before the
court a quo are for the issuance of letters of administration,
settlement, and distribution of the estate of the deceased, which
is a special proceeding. Section 3(c) of the Rules of Court (Rules)
defines a special proceeding as "a remedy by which a party seeks
to establish a status, a right, or a particular fact." This Court has
applied the Rules, particularly the rules on special proceedings,
for the settlement of the estate of a deceased Muslim. 31 In a
petition for the issuance of letters of administration, settlement,
and distribution of estate, the applicants seek to establish the fact
of death of the decedent and later to be duly recognized as
among the decedents heirs, which would allow them to exercise
their right to participate in the settlement and liquidation of the
estate of the decedent.32 Here, the respondents seek to establish
the fact of Alejandro Montaer, Sr.s death and, subsequently, for
private respondent Almahleen Liling S. Montaer to be recognized
as among his heirs, if such is the case in fact.
Petitioners argument, that the prohibition against a decedent or
his estate from being a party defendant in a civil action 33 applies
to a special proceeding such as the settlement of the estate of the
deceased, is misplaced. Unlike a civil action which has definite
adverse parties, a special proceeding has no definite adverse
party. The definitions of a civil action and a special proceeding,
respectively, in the Rules illustrate this difference. A civil action, in
which "a party sues another for the enforcement or protection of
a right, or the prevention or redress of a wrong" 34 necessarily has
definite adverse parties, who are either the plaintiff or

defendant.35 On the other hand, a special proceeding, "by which a

party seeks to establish a status, right, or a particular fact," 36 has
one definite party, who petitions or applies for a declaration of a
status, right, or particular fact, but no definite adverse party. In
the case at bar, it bears emphasis that the estate of the decedent
is not being sued for any cause of action. As a special proceeding,
the purpose of the settlement of the estate of the decedent is to
determine all the assets of the estate, 37 pay its liabilities,38 and to
distribute the residual to those entitled to the same. 39
Docket Fees
Petitioners third argument, that jurisdiction was not validly
acquired for non-payment of docket fees, is untenable. Petitioners
point to private respondents petition in the proceeding before the
court a quo, which contains an allegation estimating the
decedents estate as the basis for the conclusion that what
private respondents paid as docket fees was insufficient.
Petitioners argument essentially involves two aspects: (1)
whether the clerk of court correctly assessed the docket fees; and
(2) whether private respondents paid the correct assessment of
the docket fees.
Filing the appropriate initiatory pleading and the payment of the
prescribed docket fees vest a trial court with jurisdiction over the
subject matter.40 If the party filing the case paid less than the
correct amount for the docket fees because that was the amount
assessed by the clerk of court, the responsibility of making a
deficiency assessment lies with the same clerk of court. 41 In such
a case, the lower court concerned will not automatically lose
jurisdiction, because of a partys reliance on the clerk of courts
insufficient assessment of the docket fees. 42As "every citizen has
the right to assume and trust that a public officer charged by law
with certain duties knows his duties and performs them in
accordance with law," the party filing the case cannot be
penalized
with
the
clerk
of
courts
insufficient
43
assessment. However, the party concerned will be required to
pay the deficiency.44

In the case at bar, petitioners did not present the clerk of courts
assessment of the docket fees. Moreover, the records do not
include this assessment. There can be no determination of
whether private respondents correctly paid the docket fees
without the clerk of courts assessment.
Exception to Notice of Hearing
Petitioners fourth argument, that private respondents motion for
reconsideration before the Sharia District Court is defective for
lack of a notice of hearing, must fail as the unique circumstances
in the present case constitute an exception to this requirement.
The Rules require every written motion to be set for hearing by
the applicant and to address the notice of hearing to all parties
concerned.45 The Rules also provide that "no written motion set
for hearing shall be acted upon by the court without proof of
service thereof."46 However, the Rules allow a liberal construction
of its provisions "in order to promote [the] objective of securing a
just, speedy, and inexpensive disposition of every action and
proceeding."47 Moreover, this Court has upheld a liberal
construction specifically of the rules of notice of hearing in cases
where "a rigid application will result in a manifest failure or
miscarriage of justice especially if a party successfully shows that
the alleged defect in the questioned final and executory judgment
is not apparent on its face or from the recitals contained
therein."48 In these exceptional cases, the Court considers that
"no party can even claim a vested right in technicalities," and for
this reason, cases should, as much as possible, be decided on the
merits rather than on technicalities. 49
The case at bar falls under this exception. To deny the Sharia
District Court of an opportunity to determine whether it has
jurisdiction over a petition for the settlement of the estate of a
decedent alleged to be a Muslim would also deny its inherent
power as a court to control its process to ensure conformity with
the law and justice. To sanction such a situation simply because of
a lapse in fulfilling the notice requirement will result in a
miscarriage of justice.

In addition, the present case calls for a liberal construction of the

rules on notice of hearing, because the rights of the petitioners
were not affected. This Court has held that an exception to the
rules on notice of hearing is where it appears that the rights of
the adverse party were not affected. 50 The purpose for the notice
of hearing coincides with procedural due process, 51 for the court
to determine whether the adverse party agrees or objects to the
motion, as the Rules do not fix any period within which to file a
reply or opposition.52 In probate proceedings, "what the law
prohibits is not the absence of previous notice, but the absolute
absence thereof and lack of opportunity to be heard." 53 In the
case at bar, as evident from the Sharia District Courts order
dated January 17, 2006, petitioners counsel received a copy of
the motion for reconsideration in question. Petitioners were
certainly not denied an opportunity to study the arguments in the
said motion as they filed an opposition to the same. Since the
Sharia District Court reset the hearing for the motion for
reconsideration in the same order, petitioners were not denied the
opportunity to object to the said motion in a hearing. Taken
together, these circumstances show that the purpose for the rules
of notice of hearing, procedural process, was duly observed.
Prescription and Filiation
Petitioners fifth argument is premature. Again, the Sharia District
Court has not yet determined whether it has jurisdiction to settle
the estate of the decedent. In the event that a special proceeding
for the settlement of the estate of a decedent is pending,
questions regarding heirship, including prescription in relation to
recognition and filiation, should be raised and settled in the said
proceeding.54 The court, in its capacity as a probate court, has
jurisdiction to declare who are the heirs of the decedent. 55 In the
case at bar, the determination of the heirs of the decedent
depends on an affirmative answer to the question of whether the
Sharia District Court has jurisdiction over the estate of the
decedent.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is DENIED. The Orders of the
Sharia District Court, dated August 22, 2006 and September 21,
2006 respectively, are AFFIRMED. Cost against petitioners.

SO ORDERED.
REYNATO
Chief Justice

S.

PUNO

WE CONCUR:
ANTONIO
Associate Justice

T.

RENATO
C.
Associate Justice
TERESITA
Associate Justice

CARPIO

CORONA ADOLFO
S.
Associate Justice
J.

LEONARDO-DE

AZCUNA
CASTRO

CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify
that the conclusions in the above decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Courts Division.
REYNATO
Chief Justice

Republic
SUPREME
Manila

S.

of

PUNO

the

Philippines
COURT

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 95574 August 16, 1991

HADJI WAHIDA MUSA, HADJI SALMA MUSA, RIZAL MUSA
and
BASSER
MUSA, petitioners,
vs.

HON. COROCOY D. MOSON, in his capacity as Presiding

Judge, Shari'a District Court, Fifth Shari'a District,
Cotabato City and HADJI JAHARA ABDURAHIM, respondents.
Randolph C. Parcasio for petitioners.

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:p
Questions of jurisdiction of the Shari'a District Court, and of
venue, in an intestate proceeding are herein raised.
Involved is the intestate estate of the late Jamiri Musa, a Muslim,
who passed away on 31 December 1987. He had six (6) wives,
three (3) of whom he later divorced, and twenty three (23)
children. He had extensive real and personal properties located in
the provinces of Maguindanao, Davao del Sur and Davao Oriental.
Petitioners, Hadji WAHIDA Musa and Hadji SALMA Musa, are
among those he divorced, while private respondent Hadji Jalai a
ABDURAHIM is one of the three (3) surviving widows, RIZAL Musa
and BASSER Musa are two (2) of his sons.
On 7 July 1989, Respondent ABDURAHIM filed a "Joint Petition for
the Administration and Settlement of the Inestate Estate of the
Late Jamiri Musa and Liquidation of Conjugal Partnership," before
the Shari'a District Court, Fifth Sharia's District, with station at
Cotabato City (SDC Spec. Proceedings No. 89-19) (the Intestate
Case). That Court embraces the province of Maguindanao within
its jurisdiction but not the provinces of Davao del Sur and
Oriental.
The Petition averred that the decedent Jamiri Musa a resident of
Linao, Upi, Maguindanao, left various properties located in the
provinces of Maguindanao (184 hectares), Davao del Sur (61
hectares), and Davao Oriental (207 hectares). Aside from the
settlement of the vast estate, also prayed for was the liquidation
of the conjugal partnership assets of the decedent and

ABDURAHIM and the segregation and turn-over to the latter of her

one-half (1/2) share.
Appearing as oppositors were: Petitioners WAHIDA and SALMA,
the divorced wives, who also claim to be widows of the deceased:
RIZAL, Putih Musa, and Erum Musa, children of WAHIDA with the
decedent; and BASSER, another son. They alleged that venues
was improperly said and that the properties of the decedent
located outside Aguinaldo were beyond the jurisdiction of the
Shari'a District. Court, Fifth Shari'a District.
Finding the Joint Petition to be sufficient in form and substance,
Respondent Judge issued the Order of Publication on 1 July 1989
and initially set the case for hearing on 18 September 1989.
All interested parties were duly represented during the hearing on
said date where petitioners, through counsel, manifested their
desire to have the case amicably settled, Respondent Judo "in the
interest of peace and harmony among the heirs of the deceased
Jamiri Musa," appointed the following as Special Administrators:
ABDURAHIM, for all properties situated in Maguindanao; RIZAL. for
all properties situated in Davao Oriental; and BASSER. for all
properties situated in Davao del Sul.
However, on 4 October 1989, ABDURAHIM, in her manifestation
and Motion to Cite for Contempt," accused BASSER, among
others, of having allegedly fired upon the house of her son in-law
in Maguindanao on 21 September 1989.
Whereupon, on 13 October 1989, an "Opposition to Petition for
Administration and Liquidation of Conjugal Partnership" was filed
by Petitioners, alleging that ABDURAHIM was never legally
married to the decedent and, as such, there was "nothing to
support her claim" of having had a conjugal partnership with the
latter; and that venue was improperly laid. Petitioners also asked
that RIZAL be issued Letters of Administration instead.

In her Reply, filed on 25 October 1989, ABDURAHIM averred that,

her marriage to the decedent was admitted by the latter in
various Deeds of Sale he had signed, which were presented as
documentary evidence. Since there was no amicable settlement
reached, hearings on the Joint Petition were conducted,
commencing on 27 December 1989.
On 16 May 1990, Respondent Judge, issued an Order appointing
ABDURAHIM as Regular Administratrix upon the finding that she
was legally married to the decedent. Petitioners moved for
reconsideration.
In the interim, Respondent Judge issued an Amended Order, dated
4 June 1990, incorporating the testimonies of the two (2) other
witnesses presented by Petitioners, which were omitted in the
Order, dated 16 May 1990. Otherwise, the appointment of
ABDURAHIM as Regular Administratrix was maintained.
On 10 August 1990, Petitioners filed a "Motion for Reconsideration
With Motion to Dismiss," raising once again, mainly the questions
of venue and of jurisdiction of the respondent Court over the real
properties of the decedent situated in the provinces of Davao del
Sur and Davao Oriental.
Respondent Judge denied both Motions and upheld the Court's
jurisdiction in his Order, dated 22 August 1990. Hence, the
elevation of the instant Petition for Prohibition before this Court
seeking to enjoin respondent Judge Corocoy D. Moson, presiding
over the Shari'a District Court, Fifth Shari'a District, from further
taking action on the "Joint Petition ."
Petitioners take the position that Respondent Judge should have
dismissed the Intestate Case for lack of jurisdiction and for
improper venue. Private respondent maintains the contrary.
We rule against Petitioners.

Pres. Decree No. 1083, otherwise known as the Code of Muslim

Personal Laws of the Philippines, explicitly provides that exclusive
original jurisdiction, in matters of settlement of the estate of
deceased Muslims, belong to Shari'a District Courts. Thus:
Art. 143. Original Jurisdiction.The Shari'a District
Court shall have exclusive original jurisdictionover:
xxx xxx xxx
(b) All cases involving disposition, distribution and
settlement of the estate of deceased Muslims, probate
of wills, issuance of letters of administration or
appointment of administrators or executors regardless
of the nature or the aggregate value of the property.
(Chapter 1, Title I, Book IV, par. (b), (Emphasis
supplied).
Since the disposition, distribution and settlement of the estate of
a deceased Muslim is, in fact, involved herein, the Joint Petition
was correctly filed before the Shari'a District Court, Fifth Shari'a
District.
In invoking improper venue, however, petitioners call attention to
the Rules of Court mandating that:
Sec. 1. Where estate of deceased persons settled.If
the decedent is an inhabitant of the Philippines at the
time of his death, whether a citizen or an alien, his will
shall be proved, or letters of administration granted,
and his estate settled, in the Court of First Instance in
the province in which he resides at the time of his
death, and if he is an inhabitant of a foreign country,
the Court of First Instance of any province in which he
had estate. The court first taking cognizance of the
settlement of the estate of a decedent, shall exercise
jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts. The
jurisdiction assumed by a court, so far as it depends on

the place of residence of the decedent, or of the

location his estate, shall not be contested in a suit or
proceeding, except in an appeal from that court, in the
original case, or when the want of jurisdiction appears
on the record. (Rule 73). (Emphasis supplied).
It is then claimed that since the residence of the decedent at the
time of his death was actually in Davao City, not Maguindanao, as
averred by ABDUHARIM, the proceeding is beyond the jurisdiction
of the Shari'a District Court, Fifth Shari'a District, and that venue
is more properly laid in Davao City before the Regional Trial Court
since there are no Shari'a District Courts therein.
At this juncture, it should be recalled that the residence of the
deceased in an estate proceeding is not an element of jurisdiction
over the subject matter but merely of venue. The law of
jurisdiction confers upon Courts of First Instance (now Regional
Trial Courts) jurisdiction over all probate cases independently of
the place of residence of the deceased (In the matter of the
intestate estate of Kaw Singco, 74 Phil. 239 [1943]).
To all appearances, the decedent was a resident of both Linao,
Upi, Maguindanao, and Davao City. In fact, in various Deeds of
Sale presented as evidence by the parties, the decedent
alternately stated his place of residence as either Linao,
Upi,Maguindanao which is the residence of ABDURAHIM, or Davao
City, where Petitioners reside. As this Court held in Uytengsu v.
Republic, 95 Phil. 890 (1954), "a man can have but one domicile
for one and the same purpose at any time, but he may have
numerous places of residence." Venue, therefore, ordinarily could
be at either place of the decedent's residence, i.e., Maguindanao
or Davao City, but for the provisions of the Muslim Code vesting
exclusive original jurisdiction, in matters of disposition and
settlement of estates of deceased Muslims, in Shari'a District
Courts (supra).
But petitioners also contend that the Shari'a District Court, Fifth
Shari'a District, presided over by respondent Judge, has no

territorial jurisdiction over properties of the decedent situated in

the provinces of Davao del Sur and Davao Oriental, citing as
statutory authority therefor the Code of Muslim Personal Laws,
which provides:
Art. 138. Shari'a judicial districts.Five special judicial
districts, each to have one Shari'a District Court
presided over by one judge, are constituted as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
(e) The Fifth Shari'a District, the Provinces of
Maguindanao, North Cotabato and Sultan Kudarat, and
the City of Cotabato.
Indeed, Davao del Sur and Davao Oriental are not comprised
within the Fifth Shari'a District. In fact, those provinces are outside
the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao created by Republic
Act No. 6734, its Organic Act. But as stated in that law, "the
Shari'a District Court and the Shari'a Circuit Courts created under
existing laws shall continue to function as provided therein." (Art.
IX, Sec. 13).
Additionally, the same Organic Act explicitly provides;
(4) Except in cases of successional rights, the regular
courts shall acquire jurisdiction over controversies
involving real property outside the area of autonomy.
(Art. IX, Section 17[4]). (Emphasis supplied)
Since the subject intestate proceeding concerns successional
rights, coupled with the fact that the decedent was also a resident
of Linao, Upi, Maguindanao, owning real estate property located in
that province, venue has been properly laid with the Shari'a
District Court, Fifth Shari'a District, winch is vested with territorial
jurisdiction over Maguindanao, notwithstanding the location in
different provinces of the other real proper- ties of the decedent.

A contrary ruling would only result in multiplicity of suits, to the

detriment of the expeditious settlement of estate proceedings
(See Ngo Bun Tiong v. Sayo, 30 June 1988,163 SCRA 237 [1988]).
Besides, the judgment that may be rendered by the Shari'a
District Court, Fifth Shari'a District, may be executed in other
provinces where the rest of the real estate is situated.
When an action covers various parcels of land situated
in different provinces, venue may be laid in the Court of
First Instance of any of said provinces, and the
judgment rendered therein may be executed in other
provinces where the rest of the real estate is situated
(National Bank v. Barreto, 52 Phil. 818 [1929]; Monte
Piedad v. Rodrigo, 56 Phil. 310 [1931]; El Hogar Filipino
v. Seva ,57 Phil. 573 [L-1932]; Bank of P.I. v. Green, 57
Phil. 712 [1932]).
The Rules of Court likewise provide that the Court first taking
cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a decedent, shall
exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other Courts(Rule 73,
sec. 1). There should be no impediment to the application of said
Rules as they apply suppletorily to the Code of Muslim Personal
Laws, there being nothing inconsistent with the provisions of the
latter statute (Article 187 of said Code).
And while Rule 73 provides that "the jurisdiction assumed by a
court, so far as it depends on the place of residence of the
decedent, or of the location of his estate, shall not be contested in
a suit or proceeding except in an appeal from that court, in the
original case, or when the want of jurisdiction appears on the
record," we have taken cognizance of this Petition for Prohibition
considering that the jurisdiction of a Shari'a District Court, a
relatively new Court in our judicial system, has been challenged.
WHEREFORE, this Petition for Prohibition is DENIED, and the case
hereby REMANDED to the Shari'a District Court, Fifth Shari'a
District, for continuation of the intestate proceedings. No costs.

SO ORDERED.
Paras, Padilla, Sarmiento and Regalado, JJ., concur.

THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 155555. August 16, 2005]
ISABEL P. PORTUGAL and
JR., petitioners, vs.
BELTRAN, respondent.

JOSE DOUGLAS PORTUGAL

LEONILA
PORTUGAL-

DECISION
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
Petitioners Isabel P. Portugal and her son, Jose Douglas
Portugal Jr., assail the September 24, 2002 [1] Decision of the Court
of Appeals affirming that of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Caloocan City, Branch 124[2]which dismissed, after trial, their
complaint for annulment of title for failure to state a cause of
action and lack of jurisdiction.
From the records of the case are gathered the following
material allegations claims of the parties which they sought to
prove by testimonial and documentary evidence during the trial of
the case:
On November 25, 1942, Jose Q. Portugal (Portugal) married Paz
Lazo.[3]
On May 22, 1948, Portugal married petitioner Isabel de la
Puerta.[4]
On September 13, 1949, petitioner Isabel gave birth to a boy
whom she named Jose Douglas Portugal Jr., her herein copetitioner.[5]

On April 11, 1950, Paz gave birth to a girl, Aleli, [6] later
baptized as Leonila Perpetua Aleli Portugal, herein respondent. [7]
On May 16, 1968, Portugal and his four (4) siblings executed a
Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition and Waiver of Rights [8] over the
estate of their father, Mariano Portugal, who died intestate on
November 2, 1964.[9] In the deed, Portugals siblings waived their
rights, interests, and participation over a 155 sq. m. parcel of land
located in Caloocan in his favor.[10]
On January 2, 1970, the Registry of Deeds for Caloocan City
issued Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 34292 covering the
Caloocan parcel of land in the name of Jose Q. Portugal, married
to Paz C. Lazo.[11]
On February 18, 1984, Paz died.
On April 21, 1985, Portugal died intestate.
On February 15, 1988, respondent executed an Affidavit of
Adjudication
by
Sole
Heir
of
Estate
of
Deceased
[12]
Person
adjudicating to herself the Caloocan parcel of land. TCT
No. 34292/T-172[13] in Portugals name was subsequently
cancelled and in its stead TCT No. 159813[14] was issued by the
Registry of Deeds for Caloocan City on March 9, 1988 in the name
of respondent, Leonila Portugal-Beltran, married to Merardo M.
Beltran, Jr.
Later getting wind of the death in 1985 of Portugal and still
later of the 1988 transfer by respondent of the title to the
Caloocan property in her name, petitioners filed before the RTC of
Caloocan City on July 23, 1996 a complaint [15] against respondent
for annulment of the Affidavit of Adjudication executed by her and
the transfer certificate of title issued in her name.
In their complaint, petitioners alleged that respondent is not
related whatsoever to the deceased Portugal, hence, not entitled
to inherit the Caloocan parcel of land and that she perjured

herself when she made false representations in her Affidavit of

Adjudication.
Petitioners accordingly prayed that respondents Affidavit of
Adjudication and the TCT in her name be declared void and that
the Registry of Deeds for Caloocan be ordered to cancel the TCT
in respondents name and to issue in its stead a new one in their
(petitioners) name, and that actual, moral and exemplary
damages and attorneys fees and litigation expenses be awarded
to them.
Following respondents filing of her answer, the trial court
issued a Pre-Trial Order chronicling, among other things,
the issues as follows:
a.
Which of the two (2) marriages contracted by the deceased
Jose Q. Portugal Sr., is valid?
b.
Which of the plaintiff . . . Jose Portugal Jr. and defendant
Leonila P. Beltran is the legal heir of the deceased Jose Q. Portugal
Sr.?
c.
Whether or not TCT No. 159813 was issued in due course
and can still be contested by plaintiffs.
d.
Whether or not plaintiffs are entitled to their claims under
the complaint.[16] (Underscoring supplied)
After trial, the trial court, by Decision of January 18, 2001,
after giving an account of the testimonies of the parties and
their witnesses and of their documentary evidence, without
resolving the issues defined during pre-trial, dismissed the case
for lack of cause of action on the ground that petitioners
status and right as putative heirs had not been established before
a probate (sic) court, and lack of jurisdiction over the case,
citingHeirs of Guido and Isabel Yaptinchay v. Del Rosario. [18]
[17]

In relying on Heirs of Guido and Isabel Yaptinchay, the trial

court held:
The Heirs of Yaptinchay case arose from facts not dissimilar to the
case at bar.
xxx
In the instant case, plaintiffs presented a Marriage Contract, a
Certificate of Live Birth, pictures (sic) and testimonial evidence to
establish their right as heirs of the decedent. Thus, the
preliminary act of having a status and right to the estate of the
decedent, was sought to be determined herein. However, the
establishment of a status, a right, or a particular fact is
remedied through a special proceeding (Sec. 3(c), Rule 1,
1997 Rules of Court), not an ordinary civil action whereby a party
sues another for the enforcement or protection of a right, or the
protection or redress of a wrong (ibid, a). The operative term in
the former is to establish, while in the latter, it is to enforce, a
right. Their status and right as putative heirs of the decedent not
having been established, as yet, the Complaint failed to state a
cause of action.
The court, not being a probate (sic) court, is without
jurisdiction to rule on plaintiffs cause to establish their status and
right herein. Plaintiffs do not have the personality to sue (Secs. 1
and 2, Rule 3, in relation to Secs. 1 and 2, Rule 2,supra).[19] (Italics
in the original; emphasis and underscoring supplied).
Petitioners thereupon appealed to the Court of Appeals,
questioning the trial courts ratio decedendi in dismissing the case
as diametrically opposed to this Courts following ruling in Cario
v. Cario,[20] viz:
Under Article 40 of the Family Code, the absolute nullity of a
previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of remarriage on
the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such previous
marriage void. Meaning, where the absolute nullity of a previous

marriage is sought to be invoked for purposes of contracting a

second marriage, the sole basis acceptable in law, for said
projected marriage to be free from legal infirmity, is a final
judgment declaring the previous void. (Domingo v. Court of
Appeals, 226 SCRA 572, 579 [1993]) However, for purposes other
than remarriage, no judicial action is necessary to declare a
marriage an absolute nullity. For other purposes, such as but not
limited to the determination of heirship, legitimacy or illegitimacy
of a child, settlement of estate, dissolution of property regime, or
a criminal case for that matter, the court may pass upon the
validity of marriage even after the death of the parties thereto,
and even in a suit not directly instituted to question the validity of
said marriage, so long as it is essential to the determination
of the case. (Nial, et al. v. Bayadog, GR No. 13378, March 14,
2000). In such cases, evidence must be adduced, testimonial or
documentary, to prove the existence of grounds rendering such a
previous marriage an absolute nullity. These need not be limited
solely to an earlier final judgment of a court declaring such
previous marriage void. (Domingo v. Court of Appeals, supra)
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied).
Conceding that the ruling in Cario was promulgated (in 2001)
subsequent to that of Heirs of Guido and Isabel Yaptinchay (in
1999), the appellate court found Cario to be inapplicable,
however, to the case in this wise:
To be borne in mind is the fact that the main issue in
the Cario case was the validity of the two marriages contracted
by the deceased SPO4 Santiago Cario, whose death benefits was
the bone of contention between the two women both named
Susan (viz., Susan Nicdao Cario and Susan Yee Cario) both of
whom he married. It is not disputed in said case that SPO4 S.
Cario contracted two marriages with said two women during his
lifetime, and the only question was: which of these two marriages
was validly celebrated? The award of the death benefits of the
deceased Cario was thus, merely an incident to the question of
which of the two marriages was valid. Upon the other hand, the

case at bench is of a different milieu. The main issue here is

the annulment of title to property. The only undisputed fact
in this case is that the deceased Jose Portugal, during his lifetime,
owned a parcel of land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title
(TCT) No. T-34292. However, here come two contending parties,
herein plaintiffs-appellants and defendant-appellee, both
now insisting to be the legal heir(s) of the decedent. x x x. The
status and rights of the parties herein have not, therefore, been
definitively established, as yet. x x x. Necessarily and
naturally, such questions as to such status or right must be
properly ventilated in an appropriate special proceeding, not in an
ordinary civil action, whereunder a party sues another for the
enforcement or protection of a right, or the protection or redress
of a wrong. The institution of an ordinary civil suit for that
purpose in the present case is thus impermissible. For it is
axiomatic that what the law prohibits or forbids directly, it cannot
permit or allow indirectly. To permit, or allow, a declaration of
heirship, or the establishment of the legitimacy or illegitimacy of
a child to be determined in an ordinary civil action, not in an
appropriate special proceeding brought for that purpose, is thus
to impinge upon this axiom. x x x [21] (Emphasis in the original,
underscoring supplied).
[22]

The appellate court, by Decision of September 24, 2002,

thus affirmed the trial courts dismissal of the case.

Hence, the present Petition for Review on Certiorari,[23] faulting

the appellate court to have erred when
I.
. . . it affirmed the RTC decision dismissing the initiatory complaint
as it failed to state a cause of action.
II.
. . . (i) it applied the ruling in Heirs of Guido [and Isabel]
Yaptingchay despite the existence of a later and contrary ruling

in Cario, and (ii) when the Honorable CA and the lower

court failed to render judgment based on the evidence
presented relative to the issues raised during pre-trial, . . .
[24]
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied).
Petitioners thus prayed as follows:
WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed of this Honorable Supreme
Court that the questioned CA decision be reversed, and a new one
entered in accordance with the prayers set forth in the instant
complaint based on the above disquisition and evidence adduced
by petitioners in the court a quo.
IN THE ALTERNATIVE, should the Honorable Supreme Court find
that the pronouncements in Cario apply, a decision be
entered remanding to the court a quo the determination of the
issues of which of the two marriages is valid, and the
determination of heirship and legitimacy of Jose Jr. and Leonila
preparatory to the determination of the annulment of title issued
in the name of Leonila.
Other relief and remedy just and equitable in the premises are
likewise prayed for.[25] (Underscoring supplied).
Petitioners, in the main, argue that the appellate court
misapplied Heirs of Guido and Isabel Yaptinchay and in effect
encouraged multiplicity of suits which is discouraged by this Court
as a reading of Cario shows; thatCario allows courts to pass on
the determination of heirship and the legitimacy or illegitimacy of
a child so long as it is necessary to the determination of the case;
and that contrary to the appellate courts ruling, they had
established their status as compulsory heirs.
In the main, the issue in the present petition is whether
petitioners have to institute a special proceeding to determine
their status as heirs before they can pursue the case for
annulment of respondents Affidavit of Adjudication and of the
TCT issued in her name.

In the above-cited case of Heirs of Guido and Isabel

Yaptinchay,[26] the therein petitioners executed on March 17, 1994
an extrajudicial settlement of the estate of the deceased Guido
and Isabel Yaptinchay, owners-claimants of the two lots
mentioned therein. They later discovered on August 26, 1994
that a portion, if not all, of the two lots had been titled in the
name of the therein respondent Golden Bay Realty and
Development Corporation which in turn sold portions thereof to
the
therein
individual
respondents.
The
therein
petitioners Heirs thus filed a complaint for annulment of titles.
The therein respondents moved to dismiss the case for failure of
the therein petitioners to, inter alia, state a cause of action and
prove their status as heirs. The trial court granted the motion to
dismiss in this wise:
But the plaintiffs who claimed to be the legal heirs of the said
Guido and Isabel Yaptinchay have not shown any proof or even a
semblance of itexcept the allegations that they are the legal
heirs of the aforementioned Yaptinchaysthat theyhave been
declared the legal heirs of the deceased couple. Now, the
determination of who are the legal heirs of the deceased couple
must be made in the proper special proceedings in court, and not
in an ordinary suit for reconveyance of property. This must take
precedence over the action for reconveyance . . . [27] (Italics in the
original; underscoring supplied).
On petition for certiorari by the Heirs, this Court, albeit holding
that the petition was an improper recourse, found that the trial
court did not commit grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the
case. Citing Litam et al. v. Rivera[28] and Solivio v. Court of
Appeals,[29] this Court held that the declaration of heirship can be
made only in a special proceeding inasmuch as the petitioners
here are seeking the establishment of a status or right.
In the above-cited case of Litam,[30] Gregorio Dy Tam instituted
a special proceeding for issuance of letters of administration
before the then Court of First Instance (CFI) of Rizal, alleging in his

petition that he is the son of Rafael Litam who died in Manila on

January 10, 1951 and is survived by him and his therein named
seven (7) siblings who are children of the decedent by his
marriage to Sia Khin celebrated in China in 1911; that the
decedent contracted in 1922 in the Philippines another marriage
with Marcosa Rivera; and that the decedent left neither a will nor
debt. Dy Tam thus prayed for the issuance of letters of
administration to Marcosa Rivera, the surviving spouse of the
decedent. The CFI granted the petition and issued letters of
administration to, on Marcosas request, her nephew Arminio
Rivera.
While the special proceeding was pending, Dy Tam and his
purported siblings filed a civil case before the same court, against
the estate of Rafael Litam administrator Arminio Rivera and
Remedios R. Espiritu, duly appointed guardian of Marcosa. In
their complaint, Dy Tam and his purported siblings substantially
reproduced the allegations made in his petition in the special
proceeding, with the addition of a list of properties allegedly
acquired during the marriage of the decedent and Marcosa.
Finding the issue raised in the civil case to be identical to some
unresolved incidents in the special proceeding, both were jointly
heard by the trial court, following which it rendered a decision in
the civil case dismissing it, declaring, inter alia, that the plaintiffs
Dy Tam et al. are not the children of the decedent whose only
surviving heir is Marcosa.
On appeal to this Court by Dy Tam et al., one of the two issues
raised for determination was whether they are the legitimate
children of Rafael Litam.
This Court, holding that the issue hinged on whether Rafael
Litam and Sia Khin were married in 1911, and whether Rafael
Litam is the father of appellants Dy Tam et al., found
substantially correct the trial courts findings of fact and its
conclusion that, among other things, the birth certificates of Dy
Tam et al. do not establish the identity of the deceased Rafael

Litam and the persons named therein as father [and] it does not
appear in the said certificates of birth that Rafael Litam had in
any manner intervened in the preparation and filing thereof; and
that [t]he other documentary evidence presented by [them] [is]
entirely immaterial and highly insufficient to prove the alleged
marriage between the deceased Rafael Litam and Sia Khin and
[their] alleged status . . . as children of said decedent.
This Court went on to opine in Litam, however, that the lower
court should not have declared, in the decision appealed from,
that Marcosa is the only heir of the decedent, for such declaration
is improper in the [civil case], it being within the exclusive
competence of the court in [the] [s]pecial [p]roceeding.
In Solivio,[31] also cited in Heirs of Guido and Isabel Yaptinchay,
there was a special proceeding for the settlement of the estate of
the deceased, who was a soltero, filed before the RTC of Iloilo. In
the special proceeding, Branch 23 of said court declared as sole
heir Celedonia Solivio, the decedents maternal aunt-half sister of
his mother. Concordia Javellana-Villanueva, the decedents
paternal aunt-sister of his father, moved to reconsider the courts
order declaring Celedonia Solivio as sole heir of the decedent, she
claiming that she too was an heir. The court denied the motion on
the ground of tardiness. Instead of appealing the denial of her
motion, Concordia filed a civil case against Celedonia before the
same RTC, for partition, recovery of possession, ownership and
damages. The civil case was raffled to Branch 26 of the RTC,
which rendered judgment in favor of Concordia. On appeal by
Celedonia, the appellate court affirmed the said judgment.
On petition for review filed before this Court by Celedonia who
posed, among other issues, whether Branch 26 of the RTC of
Iloilo had jurisdiction to entertain [the civil action] for partition
and recovery of Concordia Villanuevas share of the estate of [the
deceased] while the [estate] proceedings . . . were still pending . .
. in Branch 23 of the same court, this Court held that [i]n the
interest of orderly procedure and to avoid confusing and

conflicting dispositions of a decedents estate, a court

should not interfere with [estate] proceedings pending in
a co-equal court, citing Guilas v. CFI Judge of Pampanga.[32]
This Court, however, in Solivio, upon [c]onsidering that the
estate proceedings are still pending, but nonetheless [therein
private respondent-Concordia Villanueva] had lost her right to
have herself declared as co-heirin said proceedings, opted to
proceed to discuss the merits of her claim in the interest of
justice, and declared her an heir of the decedent.
In Guilas[33] cited in Solivio, a project of partition between an
adopted daughter, the therein petitioner Juanita Lopez Guilas
(Juanita), and her adoptive father was approved in
the proceedings for the settlement of the testate estate of the
decedent-adoptive mother, following which the probate court
directed that the records of the case be archived.
Juanita subsequently filed a civil action against her adoptive
father to annul the project of partition on the ground of lesion,
preterition and fraud, and prayed that her adoptive father
immediately deliver to her the two lots allocated to her in the
project of partition. She subsequently filed a motion in the
testate estate proceedings for her adoptive father to deliver to
her, among other things, the same two lots allotted to her.
After conducting pre-trial in the civil case, the trial court,
noting the parties agreement to suspend action or resolution on
Juanitas motion in the testate estate proceedings for the delivery
to her of the two lots alloted to her until after her complaint in the
civil case had been decided, set said case for trial.
Juanita later filed in the civil case a motion to set aside the
order setting it for trial on the ground that in the amended
complaint she, in the meantime, filed, she acknowledged the
partial legality and validity of the project of partition insofar as
she was allotted the two lots, the delivery of which she was
seeking. She thus posited in her motion to set aside the April 27,

1966 order setting the civil case for hearing that there was no
longer a prejudicial question to her motion in the testate estate
proceedings for the delivery to her of the actual possession of the
two lots. The trial court, by order of April 27, 1966, denied the
motion.
Juanita thereupon assailed the April 27, 1966 order before this
Court.
The probate courts approval of the project of partition and
directive that the records of the case be sent to the archives
notwithstanding, this Court held that the testate estate
proceedings had not been legally terminated as Juanitas share
under the project of partition had not been delivered to her.
Explained this Court:
As long as the order of the distribution of the estate has not been
complied with, the probate proceedings cannot be deemed closed
and terminated (Siguiong vs. Tecson, supra.); because a judicial
partition is not final and conclusive and does not prevent the heir
from bringing an action to obtain his share, provided the
prescriptive period therefor has not elapse (Mari vs. Bonilla, 83
Phil., 137). The better practice, however, for the heir who has not
received his share, is to demand his share through a proper
motion
in
the
same
probate
or
administration
proceedings, or for re-opening of the probate or administrative
proceedings if it had already been closed, and not through an
independent action, which would be tried by another court
or Judge which may thus reverse a decision or order of the
probate o[r] intestate court already final and executed and
re-shuffle properties long ago distributed and disposed of (Ramos
vs. Ortuzar, 89 Phil. 730, 741-742; Timbol vs. Cano, supra,; Jingco
vs. Daluz, L-5107, April 24, 1953, 92 Phil. 1082; Roman Catholic
vs. Agustines, L-14710, March 29, 1960, 107 Phil., 455, 460-461).
[34]
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied).
This Court thus set aside the assailed April 27, 1966 order of the
trial court setting the civil case for hearing, but allowed the civil

case to continue because it involves no longer the two

lots adjudicated to Juanita.
The common doctrine in Litam, Solivio and Guilas in which
the adverse parties are putative heirs to the estate of a decedent
or parties to the special proceedings for its settlement is that if
the special proceedings are pending, or if there are no special
proceedings filed but there is, under the circumstances of the
case, a need to file one, then the determination of, among other
issues, heirship should be raised and settled in said special
proceedings. Where special proceedings had been instituted but
had been finally closed and terminated, however, or if a putative
heir has lost the right to have himself declared in the special
proceedings as co-heir and he can no longer ask for its reopening, then an ordinary civil action can be filed for his
declaration as heir in order to bring about the annulment of the
partition or distribution or adjudication of a property or properties
belonging to the estate of the deceased.
In the case at bar, respondent, believing rightly or wrongly that
she was the sole heir to Portugals estate, executed on February
15, 1988[35] the questioned Affidavit of Adjudication under the
second sentence of Rule 74, Section 1 of the Revised Rules of
Court.[36] Said rule is an exception to the general rule that when a
person dies leaving a property, it should be judicially administered
and the competent court should appoint a qualified administrator,
in the order established in Sec. 6, Rule 78 in case the deceased
left no will, or in case he did, he failed to name an executor
therein.[37]
Petitioners claim, however, to be the exclusive heirs of
Portugal. A probate or intestate court, no doubt, has jurisdiction
to declare who are the heirs of a deceased.
It appearing, however, that in the present case the only
property of the intestate estate of Portugal is the Caloocan parcel
of land,[38] to still subject it, under the circumstances of the case,
to a special proceeding which could be long, hence, not

expeditious, just to establish the status of petitioners as heirs is

not only impractical; it is burdensome to the estate with the costs
and expenses of an administration proceeding. And it is
superfluous in light of the fact that the parties to the civil case
subject of the present case, could and had already in fact
presented evidence before the trial court which assumed
jurisdiction over the case upon the issues it defined during pretrial.
In fine, under the circumstances of the present case, there
being no compelling reason to still subject Portugals estate to
administration proceedings since a determination of petitioners
status as heirs could be achieved in the civil case filed by
petitioners,[39] the trial court should proceed to evaluate the
evidence presented by the parties during the trial and render a
decision thereon upon the issues it defined during pre-trial, which
bear repeating, to wit:
1.

Which of the two (2) marriages contracted by the

deceased Jose Q. Portugal, is valid;

2.

Which of the plaintiff, Jose Portugal Jr. and defendant

Leonila P. Beltran is the legal heir of the deceased Jose Q.
Portugal (Sr.);

3.

Whether or not TCT No. 159813 was issued in due course

and can still be contested by plaintiffs;

4.

Whether or not plaintiffs are entitled to their claim under

the complaint.[40]

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The assailed

September 24, 2002 Decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby
SET ASIDE.
Let the records of the case be REMANDED to the trial court,
Branch 124 of the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City, for it to
evaluate the evidence presented by the parties and render a

decision on the above-enumerated issues defined during the pretrial.

No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Panganiban,
(Chairman),
Corona, and Garcia, JJ., concur.

Sandoval-Gutierrez,