THE NATURE OF PHILOSOPHICAL ANTHROPOLOGY

Paul Gerard Horrigan, Ph.D., 2010.

Definition of Philosophy of Animate Nature (Philosophical Psychology)

Etymologically, psychology means the science (logos) of the soul (psych). It is also
called the philosophy of living beings or the philosophy of animate nature. The material object
(the subject matter of a specific science) of the philosophy of animate nature is animate (living)
corporeal beings. The formal object (that is, the particular point of view in which the subject
matter is studied) of the philosophy of animate nature is animate corporeal beings studied from
the philosophical point of view (or animate corporeal beings in their ultimate causes and first
principles). Philosophy of animate nature is thus defined as the science of animate corporeal
beings in their ultimate causes and first principles, studied using the light of natural reason. This
philosophical science was called psychology in the past but it is better to call it philosophical
psychology in order to distinguish it from scientific or experimental psychology (usually just
called psychology these days), which analyzes mental phenomena, classifies them and
determines their proximate causes. In contrast to experimental psychology, part of philosophical
psychologys goal is to seek to penetrate beyond the surface of mental phenomena to the ultimate
reasons, principles, and causes, so as to uncover the nature which gives rise to such phenomena.
Definition of Philosophical Anthropology
The central part of the philosophy of animate nature (animate corporeal beings) is the
philosophy of man (also called philosophical anthropology and philosophy of the human
person).1 The material object of philosophical anthropology is man. Its formal object is man
studied from the philosophical point of view (or man in his ultimate causes and first principles).
Philosophical anthropology is therefore defined as the science of man in his ultimate causes and
first principles, studied using the light of human reason.
The Difference Between Philosophical Anthropology and Experimental Psychology
Though philosophical anthropology and experimental psychology have the same material
object (man), they have differing formal objects. The former is a part of theoretical or
speculative philosophy, while the latter belongs to the realm of the particular sciences. The
parallels and contrasts between the two are presented by George P. Klubertanz as regards their
starting points, methods, and type of conclusion: A. Starting Points. Experimental Psychology:
Specific facts2 that are precise and detailed. They are demonstrated to be universal in fact3 by
1

Some recent manuals of philosophical anthropology in Italian: B. MONDIN, Antropologia filosofica, ESD,
Bologna, 2006 ; J. A. LOMBO and F. RUSSO, Antropologia filosofica. Una introduzione, EDUSC, Rome, 2007 ; F.
BERGAMINO, La struttura dellessere umano. Elementi di antropologia filosofica, EDUSC, Rome, 2007.
2
By specific facts are meant the very specialized results characteristic of the sciences. For example, it is found that
the speed of a nerve impulse is so many centimeters per second at a given temperature.
3
The demonstration of fact (quia est: that something is so) needs complicated procedures of choices of cases,
elimination of disturbing causes, and so forth, when the scientist intends to find out whether something always
occurs.

techniques that more or less closely involve laboratory testing of many individuals. For example,
this science investigates the various conditions that can have an influence on memory; it
considers how much different persons forget after a week, a month, a year; it tests the advantages
and disadvantages of various techniques of remembering. Or the scientist, studying sensation,
tries to find out by careful measurement in many instances the relation between the intensity of a
stimulus and the intensity of a resulting sensation.
Philosophical Anthropology: Facts that need not be specific, but must be very accurately
determined. They are ideally demonstrated to be universal by a proof that gives the reason for
their being universal.4 For example, the philosopher tries to see as clearly as possible what to
remember means; he investigates this action to see what he can learn about the nature of man
from it; he relates this action to other actions of man in terms of the nature thus revealed. Or the
philosopher, studying sensation, investigates its nature, as this is revealed in the fact that it needs
a material stimulus, and is measurable.
B. Methods. Experimental Psychology: The scientist almost always uses elaborate
techniques of observation, usually involving instruments and some form of measurement. The
scientist tends to base the value of his conclusions on the completeness of his coverage of cases.
From these cases, he develops an explanatory hypothesis which must then be checked by further
verifying experiments. When this second stage is completed, he states his conclusions in terms
of laws of behavior.
Philosophical Anthropology: The philosophers techniques are usually not elaborate,
though they must by all means be careful and accurate. Measurement in itself is usually
irrelevant. When knowledge through instruments is used, the instruments themselves are rather a
condition. The technique of the philosopher is usually a rigorous use of reflection, and/or
analysis. From an experience, he passes by means of reflection-analysis to consideration of what
it is that he has observed and of its mode of being.
C. Type of Conclusion. Experimental Psychology: As far as possible, the scientist states
his conclusions quantitatively. In general, what he is looking for are the connections between
various facts, the conditions that modify the fact, and the consequences this fact may have in
relation to other facts. For example, the scientist concludes that retention is better when learningpractice is spaced than when it is continuous; that for any given individual there is a constant
factor in learning efficiency.
Philosophical Anthropology: The philosopher states his conclusions in terms of nature
and mode of being. What he is looking for is the answer to these questions: What kind of
activities are these? What kind of being is man? For example, the philosopher concludes that
memory has a relation to the body, since it is governed at least partly by conditions of matter and
motion; that it is a distinct power because it has a distinct formal object.56
4

Called the propter quid demonstration. By discovering the cause of an effect, it can show the universality of an
effect without the roundabout process of studying many individual cases.
5
It is only to be expected that a person who has not studied these subjects will have only a vague notion of what the
conclusions thus expressed mean, and that he will not as yet know why they are asserted.
6
G. P. KLUBERTANZ, The Philosophy of Human Nature, Appleton-Century-Crofts, New York, 1953, pp. 4-5.

Klubertanz, in conclusion, writes: In the light of these considerations we can see that
both the experimental psychologist and the philosophical anthropologist have true forms of
organized knowledge about man. Both investigators strive to see what man is; both try to find the
causes of human activities. But the experimental psychologist wants to know how the various
human activities can be classified, measured (if possible), and predicted and seeks to express
them as accurately as possible. When the experimental psychologist looks for the causes of
human actions, he looks principally7 for formal conditions and formal relationships (for example,
what actions always, or at least ordinarily, precede other actions). Philosophical anthropology
also wants to know what man does and as accurately as possible, though it is not directly
interested in measuring these actions; rather its interest lies in them as action and being and as a
revelation of mans nature. When philosophical anthropology asks for the causes of human
action, it looks for proximate and remote principles (efficient, formal, material) and for efficient
and final causes as well.8
Philosophical Anthropology and Metaphysics
Though both philosophical anthropology and metaphysics (the science of being as being
[ens qua ens]) are theoretical or speculative philosophies (as contrasted with ethics [moral
philosophy], which belongs to practical philosophy), and their methods are similar, there are
differences between them. It is important to know that the former is not a part of the latter as a
type of applied metaphysics as seen in rationalist, essentialist manuals of scholastic philosophy
influenced by the rationalist Wolff, who profoundly influenced the pre-critical period of Kant.
They have different material objects as well as formal objects. Klubertanz observes:
Metaphysics (or the philosophy of being) follows a method of procedure that is very much like
the method used by philosophical anthropology. Thus, it proceeds by induction, insight, and
analysis (and/or deduction) to arrive at principles that apply analogously9 to all beings or to all
things that have their act of being in a certain way (some principles, for example, apply only to
created being). Thus metaphysics is concerned with the structure of being in terms of act and
potency, and less directly with matter and form, which metaphysics considers rather as instances
of act and potency.
Since man is a being, the principles and conclusions of metaphysics apply to him and to
his nature, his activities, and so forth. In this sense, metaphysics is implicit throughout the
philosophy of human nature.
But man is not just a being (in general); he is a particular kind of being, with his own
proper nature and his own significantly unique activities. Therefore, it would be totally incorrect
to think of philosophical anthropology as applied metaphysics, and it would be almost as great

Principally, though not exclusively. To some extent, he looks for material causes and efficient causes of motion or
change. On the other hand, final causes and the efficient causes of being are usually not dealt with by any science
though there is no reason why any scientist should deny what he himself does not use.
8
G. P. KLUBERTANZ, op. cit., pp. 5-6.
9
Analogy is midway between univocation (application or use in identically the same way) and equivocation
(application or use in two or more completely different ways). It is in a way a relational predication, either through
causality or through a similitude of proportions.

an error to think of it as a branch of metaphysics.10 On the other hand, an excessive separation of

philosophical anthropology from metaphysics would also have unfortunate consequences.11
Briefly, the task of philosophical anthropology in relation to metaphysics is this: In the
course of considering man philosophically, one must make new inductions, which are based on
the evidence proper to living things and to man as such. In making these inductions, one
rediscovers metaphysical principles in a more particularized field of experience and being.
Sometimes, the principle of metaphysics thus discovered will need to be expressed in a new
formulation suited to the special nature of the subject, man. Furthermore, whereas metaphysics
deals directly with being and only indirectly with essence or nature, philosophical anthropology
studies man as a being having a special, proper nature.12
The Method of Philosophical Anthropology
Philosophical anthropologys method, which is systemic, is both analytic-inductive
(analysis-induction) and synthetic-deductive (synthesis-deduction). Bergamino states that
sintrecciano il metodo analitico e quello sintetico secondo i differenti momenti dellindagine.
Nel momento analitico si cerca di osservare i diversi fenomeni e da questi risalire ai loro
10

By applied metaphysics is meant the univocal use of metaphysical principles in the explanation of a particular
being. Such a procedure would result in overlooking all that is special to man. Almost the same consequences would
result from considering philosophical anthropology as a branch of metaphysics.
11
To cut off philosophical anthropology from metaphysics (as if it were simply a diverse kind of knowledge) would
be to prevent the student from understanding man as a being.
12
G. P. KLUBERTANZ, op. cit., pp. 6-7. Concerning the relationship between philosophical anthropology and
metaphysics, Federica Bergamino writes: Intendiamo per metafisica la scienza che studia lente in quanto ente (In
VI Metaphys., lect. 1, 1144), ossia quella disciplina che cerca di arrivare alla natura dellente e quindi si chiede: che
cos lente? E poich ogni realt in qualche modo, ogni cosa, infatti, ente, la metafisica studia i principi di ogni
realt; essa il fondamento di qualunque scienza, e quindi anche dellantropologia filosofica. Se invero si cerca di
comprendere lessenza umana, si sta cercando di determinare un certo tipo di ente, e non si potr fare a meno di
utilizzare principi e concetti metafisici, quali appunto essenza o natura o forma, atto, potenza, materia; affinch lo
studio antropologico non resti su un piano meramente descrittivo ma pervenga effetivamente ai fondmenti, non pu
prescindere da queste nozioni n evitare di confrontarsi con le nozioni di bene, verit, unit, che costituiscono i
trascendentali dellessere e sono oggetto dello studio metafisico. indubbio quindi che la metafisica stia a
fondamento dellantropologia e che ogni antropologia che sia filosofica debba essere unantropologia le cui prime e
ultime istanze sono di ordine metafisico(F. BERGAMINO, op. cit., pp. 17-18).
Regarding the relationship between philosophical anthropology and ethics (moral philosophy), Bergamino
observes: Letica studia lagire libero delluomo o agire morale e cerca di indagarne lessenza e le relazioni
fondamentali in questa implicate, con il fine di formulare delle norme e dei criteri di giudizio che possano costituire
un valido orientamento per lesercizio responsabile della libert personale(A. RODRGUEZ-LUO, Etica, Le
Monnier, Firenze, 1992, p. 3). Come ogni sapere filosofico anche letica esamina lessenza del suo oggetto di studio,
in questo caso lagire morale; a sua volta lantropologia filosofica ha per oggetto lagire delluomo, ma non
unicamente lagire libero bens ogni agire anche quello istintivo e naturale. La finalit delletica poi
eminentemente pratica, vale a dire studia lessenza della vita morale onde formulare e fornire dei criteri e delle
norme per costituire una sorta di bussola del comportamento umano. Il fine dellantropologia invece speculativo;
anche laddove esamina il fenomeno dellagire delluomo nelle sue molteplici forme, sempre per determinare i
principi di questo agire, ossia conoscere lessenza umana in se stessa, al di l delluso che poi si far di tale
conoscenza. poich compito dellantropologia definire le caratteristiche dellessenza umana e determinare se
luomo effettivamente libero, in che cosa consistano la libert, la volont e i rispettivi atti, laffettivit ecc.,
lantropologia filosofica costituisce il fondamento delletica. Se si avr unetica del dovere o unetica edonistica o
unetica della felicit dipender invero dalla concezione della natura umana che ne sar alla base(F. BERGAMINO,
op. cit., p. 17).

principi, nella sintesi i principi gi acquisiti si mettono in relazione tra loro elaborando nuovi
dati.13
The two-fold systemic method of philosophical anthropology is first analytic-inductive
(going from observable phenomena to principles) and then synthetic-deductive (going from the
application of principles to phenomena and the gathering of new data that emerge from this).
Against the utilization of an exclusively deductive method (characteristic of rationalism) and
against the use of an exclusively inductive method (characteristic of positivism), Mercier, in his
Manual of Modern Scholastic Philosophy, affirms the two-fold method of analysis-induction and
synthesis-deduction as the method of philosophical anthropology.14
Koren likewise makes use of the two-fold inductive and deductive method in his
treatment of the philosophy of animate nature: The method to be followed in the philosophy of
living bodies is inductive in gathering the necessary data of experience, although usually this
inductive process will be very simple. The induction is followed by a careful analysis of, and
reflection upon the data, their implications and correlation to general metaphysical principles.
Certain conclusions may be reached in this way, and these conclusions may be used as principles
in deductive arguments to reach further conclusions. For instance, if experience shows that a
quantitative element is always present in sensation, analysis and reflection may establish that this
quantitative element belongs to the very nature of sensation, and from this the philosopher may
conclude that sensation is of an organic nature, because quantity is a property of matter.15
The Parts of Philosophical Anthropology
Philosophical anthropologys core material deals with vegetative life, operative powers,
knowledge in general, sense knowledge in general, the external senses, the internal senses,
intellectual knowledge in general, the intellect, ideogenesis or the formation of the concept,
13

F. BERGAMINO, op. cit., p. 16.

Cf. D. MERCIER, Manual of Modern Scholastic Philosophy, vol. 1, Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner and Co.,
London, 1938, pp. 162-163. Concerning the method to be utilized in philosophical anthropology, Jos Angel Lombo
and Francesco Russo write: Bisogna considerare adesso qual il metodo da seguire nella riflessione filosofica sulla
persona umana. Non adeguato il solo metodo analitico, con il quale vengono presi in esame i singoli fenomeni o
ciascun aspetto della persona; in effetti, se da una parte si avrebbe il vantaggio di ottenere risultati e definizioni
precisi, dallaltra si otterrebbe leffetto di scomporre lindividuo in un agglomerato difficilmente ricomponibile in
modo unitario. Ma appare inadeguato anche il solo metodo sintetico, che studia il singolo come un tutto gi dato;
infatti, da un lato si riuscirebbe a cogliere in qualche modo linsieme, ma dallaltro si sorvolerebbe sulla peculiarit
delle varie dimensioni umane e si trascurerebbe la dinamicit dellindividuo, che ne fa una realt aperta e non
chiusa.
Occorre adottare, invece, unimpostazione che viene definita sistemica, con la quale cio ci si accosta alla
persona umana come ad un sistema i cui elementi sono strettamente coordinati: gli elementi vengono compresi in
riferimento al tutto e il tutto richiede linterazione dei singoli elementi. Cosi, ad esempio, il linguaggio umano non
pu essere compreso a pieno se lo si considera solo come una facolt a s stante, ma lo si pu capire in riferimento
allesistenza di un individuo razionale, relazionale e culturale; daltro canto, per lo sviluppo dellintero individuo
fondamentale la communicazione linguistica (che pu non essere verbale).
Per rispettare limpostazione sistemica, nello studio filosofico della persona umana si intrecciano due momenti:
un momento analitico-induttivo, che cerca di risalire dai fenomeni osservabili ai principi, e un altro momento
sintetico-deduttivo, che cerca di applicare i principi ai fenomeni e raccoglie i nuovi dati che ne emergono(J. A.
LOMBO and F. RUSSO, op. cit., pp. 13-14).
15
H. J. KOREN, An Introduction to the Philosophy of Animate Nature, B. Herder, St. Louis, 1957, pp. 6-7.
14

appetite in general, the sense appetites, the will (rational appetite), freedom of the will, habits,
the human soul, the union of body and soul, and the human person as rational supposit.
The Importance of Philosophical Anthropology
Concerning the importance of our philosophical science, philosophical anthropology
(which is a part of theoretical or speculative philosophy) goes beyond the experimental sciences
(which can answer only in terms of structure, physical and chemical composition, functional
reactions, relationship of actions, etc.) to answer the ultimate questions about man. Wrong
solutions to these ultimate questions can have disastrous consequences for humanity.
The erroneous denial of human free-will, for example, on the part of many influential
thinkers has had, and continues to have, an enormous impact for the worse on law, the penal
system, government, social and educational institutions, for if man has no free-will counsels,
exhortations, commands, prohibitions, rewards and punishments would be in vain.16
Another example: there have been, and there will continue to be, terrible consequences
for countless human lives if thinkers erroneously maintain that the human person consists in selfconsciousness (e.g., Descartes,17 Locke18 and their contemporary imitators) and that one is not a
human person when, for example, one is unconscious or when one is not exercising selfconsciousness, instead of correctly affirming that self-consciousness (an accident) does not
constitute the human person (an individual substance of a rational nature), that one is a human
person even when unconscious or when not exercising self-consciousness, because the human

16

Summa Theologiae, I, a. 83, a. 1, c.: Man has free-will: otherwise counsels, exhortations, commands,
prohibitions, rewards, and punishments would be in vain. In order to make this evident, we must observe that some
things act without judgment; as a stone moves downwards; and in like manner all things which lack knowledge. And
some act from judgment, but not a free judgment; as brute animals. For the sheep, seeing the wolf, judges it a thing
to be shunned, from a natural and not a free judgment, because it judges, not from reason, but from natural instinct.
And the same thing is to be said of any judgment of brute animals. But man acts from judgment, because by his
apprehensive power he judges that something should be avoided or sought. But because this judgment, in the case of
some particular act, is not from a natural instinct, but from some act of comparison in the reason, therefore he acts
from free judgment and retains the power of being inclined to various things. For reason in contingent matters may
follow opposite courses, as we see in dialectic syllogisms and rhetorical arguments. Now particular operations are
contingent, and therefore in such matters the judgment of reason may follow opposite courses, and is not
determinate to one. And forasmuch as man is rational is it necessary that man have a free-will.
17
Cf. R. DESCARTES, Les principes de la philosophie, p. I, n. 8. According to Descartes, what constitutes the
human person is the consciousness the soul has of itself(T. ALVIRA, L. CLAVELL, T. MELENDO, Metaphysics,
Sinag-Tala, Manila, 1991, p. 124).
18
Cf. J. LOCKE, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, book II, ch. 27: For since consciousness always
accompanies thinking, and it is that which makes every one to be what he calls self, and thereby distinguishes
himself from all other thinking things, in this alone consists personal identity, i.e. the sameness of a rational being:
and as far as this consciousness can be extended backwards to any past action or thought, so far reaches the identity
of that person; it is the same self now it was then; and it is by the same self with this present one that now reflects on
it, that that action was done. the same consciousness that makes a man be himself to himself, personal identity
identity depends on that only. Self depends on consciousness, not on substanceThat with which the
consciousness of this present thinking thing can join itself, makes the same person, and is one self with it, and with
nothing else; and so attributes to itself, and owns all the actions of that thing, as its own, as far as that consciousness
reaches, and no further; as every one who reflects will perceive. This may show us wherein personal identity
consists: not in the identity of substance, but, as I have said, in the identity of consciousness

person is ontologically grounded as a rational suppositum with an intense participated act of

being (esse as actus essendi) given by Esse Divinum, Ipsum Esse Subsistens (God).
Krapiecs Critique of Self-Consciousness as Constituting the Human Person: Descartes,
seeing in res cogitans the highest manifestation of being, believed that thinking is what
constitutes the person...According to the German transcendental idealists, it is self-awareness
that determines the person. Other factors that have been thought to determine the person
areconsciousness of ones past and present life (Locke)Philosophical theories that seek the
constitutive element of the person in some quality of being, e.g., in intellectual cognition or
freedom, do not yet really arrive at the problem of the person, for they grasp merely an essential
(according to them) manifestation of personal being, expressing itself in action, and they
absolutize this particular manifestation. They thereby confuse the order of a beings action with
the order of its existence, in which being a person belongs.19
Battista Mondins Critique of Self-Consciousness as Constituting the Human Person:
For Descartesthe I consists in self-consciousnessIdentifying the person with selfconsciousness leads to the concession that he who does not exercise self-consciousness remains
deprived of personality; in such a way, babies who have not yet reached the use of reason, the
sleeping, and the comatose would no longer be or would not not yet be persons!
For these reasons, I consider a psychological definition of the person which does not
carry with it an ontological definition absolutely unsatisfactory.
By transforming the person from an ontological to a psychological fact, Descartes has
opened the door to a series of either grave diminuitions or of enormous exaggerations of the
concept of person. The major diminuitions are those of Hume, Freud, and Watson; meanwhile,
the most exasperating exaggerations are those of Fichte, Hegel and Nietzsche.20
Donald De Marcos Critique of Self-Consciousness as Constitutive of the Human Person:
According to Singer, some humans are non-persons...The key is not nature or species
membership, but consciousnessAccording to this avant garde thinker, unborn babies or
neonates, lacking the requisite consciousness to qualify as persons, have less right to continue to
live than an adult gorilla. ...Singer writes, in Rethinking Life and Death: Human babies are not
born self-aware or capable of grasping their lives over time. They are not persons. Hence their
lives would seem to be no more worthy of protection that the life of a fetus.21
For Peter Singer a human being is not a subject who suffers, but a sufferer. Singers
error here is to identify the subject with consciousness. This is an error that dates back to
seventeenth-century Cartesianism captured in Descartes famous phrase I think therefore I am
(which is to identify being with thinking). Descartes defined man solely in terms of his
consciousness as a thinking thing (res cogitans) rather than as a subject who possesses
consciousness.

19

M. A. KRAPIEC, Metaphysics, Peter Lang, New York, 1991, p. 300.

B. MONDIN, Philosophical Anthropology, Urbaniana University Press, Rome, 1985, p. 251.
21
P. SINGER, Rethinking Life and Death, St. Martins Griffin, New York, 1994, p. 210.
20

At the heart of Pope John Paul II's Personalism (his philosophy of the person) is the
recognition that it is the concrete individual person who is the subject of consciousness. The
subject comes before consciousness. That subject may exist prior to consciousness (as in the case
of the human embryo) or during lapses of consciousness (as in sleep or in a coma). But the
existing subject is not to be identified with consciousness itself, which is an operation or activity
of the subject. The Holy Father rejects what he calls the hypostatization of the cogito (the
reification of consciousness) precisely because it ignores the fundamental reality of the subject of
consciousness the person who is also the object of love. Consciousness itself is to be
regarded neither as an individual subject nor as an independent faculty.22
John Paul refers to the elevation of consciousness to the equivalent of the persons being
as the great anthropocentric shift in philosophy.23 What he means by this shift is a movement
away from existence to a kind of absolutization of consciousness. Referring to Saint Thomas
Aquinas, the Holy Father reiterates that it is not thought which determines existence, but
existence, esse, which determines thought!.2425

22

K. WOJTYLA, The Acting Person, D. Reidl, Dordrecht, 1979, p. 37.

JOHN PAUL II, Crossing the Threshold of Hope, Alfred A. Knopf, New York, 1994, p. 51.
24
JOHN PAUL II, op. cit., p. 38.
25
D. DE MARCO, Peter Singer, in D. De Marco and B. Wiker, Architects of the Culture of Death, Ignatius Press,
San Francisco, 2004, pp. 365-368.
23