Esposito BIOS

posthumanl1itt.
.j
CARY WO LFE, SERIES EDITOR
5 Dorsality: Thit1king Back through Technology
and PoliUcs
David Wills
4 Bios: Biopolitics and Philosophy
Rober to Esposito
3 Wlwn Species M eet
Donna J. Haraway
2 The Poetics of DNA
Judith Roof
1 The Pnrn>'ite
Michel Serres
Copyrighted material
lOS
Biopolitics and Philosophy
Roberto Esposito
Translated a nd with nn lnt rod uol ioo by Timothy C1mpbcll
posthumanltles 4
University of Minnesota Press

lvfinnenpolis
London
The University o f 1\linne.sota Press gratefuiJy acknowledges the assistance provided

fo r the publication of this book by tnc McKnight l'oundat io n.
O riginally published as Bios: Biopoliticn e filosofia. Copyright 2004 Giulio Einaudi
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Library of Congre.s.s Catalogingin-Public.ation Data
Esposito, Roberto, 1950IBios. English. )
Bios: biopolitic~" and philosophy I Ro berto Esposito; translt~ted t~nd with

an introducrion by Timothy Campbell.
p.
crn. - (Posthumanities series; v. 4)
OriginaUy published: llios: Jliopoli rica c fdosofia.
Includes bibliographical reference.s and index.
IS!lN -13: 978-0-8 166-4989- 1 (nc : alk. paper)
ISBN -10: 0-8 166-1989-S (he : :dk. pa per)
ISBN-13: 978-0 -8166-4990 -7 (pb: alk. pa per)
ISBN - .10: 0-8 166-4990-l (pb : al.k. paper)
1. Biopotitics. 2. Political science-Philosophy. I. Title.
JA80.E77 13 2008
320.0l- dc22
2007015837
Printed in the United Stares of Americt~ o n acid-free paper
The Ulliversity o f Minnesota is an equnl opportunity educator and enployer.
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15 14 13 12 II 10 09 08
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Contents
TRANS! ATOR'S INTRODUCTION
Bios, Immunity, Life: T he Though t of Roberto Esposito

Timotl1 y Campbell
"
VII
Bios
Introduction
Qt,ff
T he Enigma of Biopolitics
13
TWO
T he Paradigm of Immunization
45
TH REE
Biopower and Biopo tentiali ty
78
FOUR
Th anato politics (The Cycle of Genos)
uo
FIVE
The Philosophy of Bios
Notes
195
Index
2 o
- 2
146
TRANSLATOR'S INTRODUCTION
Bios, Immunity, Life

The Thought of Roberto Esposito
Timothy Campbell
The name of Roberto Esposito is largely unknown in the United States.

Outside of a few Romance Studies departmerlts who know him primari ly
for Communitas: The Origin and Desrir1y of the Communit)t, the work of this
Italian philosopher over the past twenty-fi,e years remains completely untranslated into English.' That his introduction to an American audience
should occur now and concern his most recent study, Bios: Biopolitics a.11d
Philosoph)\ is owing in no small part to the particular (bio)political situatioo
in which we find ourselves today: the ever-increasing concern of power with
the life biology of its subjects, be it American busiJlCsses urgi ng, indeed forcing, workers to be more active physically so as to save on health care costs,
or the American government's attempts in the "war o n terror" to expose the
lives of foreign nationals to death, "fighting them there" so as to "protect"
American lives here.' Yet this politicizatioo of biology, the biopolitics that
forms the o bject of Esposito's study, has a long and terrible history in the
tweotieth ceotury. Indeed, Bios may be profitably read as nothing sbort of a
modern genealogy of biopolitics that begins and ends in philosophy.
Tn the following pages, I wi ll sketch the parameters of th is genealogy
and Esposito's contribution to our current understanding of biopolitics,
particularly as it relates to the conceptual centerpiece of Bios. what Esposito calls the "paradigm of immunization:'lmmunity has a long and wellkno,m bistory in recent critical thought. Niklas Luhmano placed imrnuoit)'
at t11e heart of his systems theory in his 1984 opus Sozia/e Systerne; DoJma
1-Iaraway deployed "an immuoc system discourse" in her seminal reading
of postrnodern bodies from 1988; Jean Baudrillard in the early 1990s spoke
vii
viii TrJnslators Introduction
of artificial sterilization compensating for "faltering interoal immunological defenses:'' For them and for many writing today on immun ity, the term
quickly folds in to autoimmunity, becoming the ultimate horizon in which
contemporary politics inscribes itself. Others contin ued to discuss immunity thro ughout the 1990s-Agnes Heller most prominently-as well as
Mark C. Taylor, but no one placed it more forcefully at the center of cootemporary po litics than did Jacques Derrida in a se.ries of interviews and
writings after the "events" of September n.' Speaking of autoimmunity
aggression and suicidal auto immunity, Derrida affiliates the figure of immunity with trauma and a repetition compulsion.' As the reader will soon
d iscover, much sets apart Esposito's use of immunity from Derrida's, as well
as the others just mentioned, especially as it relates to Esposito's radical inversion of immunity in its communal antinomy and the subsequent effects on
our understanding of biopolitics. In the first section, therefore, I attempt
to trace where Esposito's use of the immu nity paradigm converges and
diverges with Derrida and others.
In the second pa rt, I situate Bios more broadly within current American
and European th inking oo biopolitics. Here o bviously the work of Michel
Foucault in his seminars from 1975 and 1976 on biopolitics and racism merits
considerable attention for it is precisely on these d iscou rses that Esposito
will draw his own reflections in Blos.6 But as anyone who bas followed the
recent fortunes of tbe term "biopolitics" knows, ti\O other figures dominate
contemporary discussions of life in all its forms and they both originate in
Italy: Giorgio Agamben and Antonio Negri. In Homo Sacer, Remnants of
Auschwitz, and The Open, Giorgio Agamben declines biopolitics negatively,
anchoring it to the sovereign state of exception that separates bare life (zoe)
from political forms of life (bios).' For Antonio Negri, writing witb Michael
Hardt, biopolitics takes on a distinctly positive tonality when thought together with the multitude. It is between these two con tradictory poles
that Esposi to's focus on bios must be understood. Indeed, as I argue here,
Bios comes to resemble someth ing like a synthesis of both Agamben's and
Negri's positions, with Esposito co-opting Agamben's negative analysis of
biopolitics early on, on ly to criticize later the an tihistorica l moves tba t
characterize Agamben's association ofbiopolit ics to the state of exceptio n.9
In some of Bios's most compelling pages, Esposito argues instead for the
rnodern o rigi n of biopolitics in the immunizing features of sovereignty,
property, aod liberty as tbey emerge in the writings of Hobbes and Locke.
It is at this point that the differences wi th Hardt and Negri become clear;
Traos)3tOr's ln1 rodoctioo ix
they concern oot only what Esposi to argues is thei r misgu ided app rop riation of the term "biopolitics" from Foucault, bu t also their fai lure to register the thanatopolitical declension of twentieth-cen tury biopolitics. Essentially, Esposito argues that Hardt and Negri aren't wrong in push ing for an
affi rmative biopolitics-a project that Esposito himself shares-but that it
cao emerge only after a thoroug hgoing deconstruction of the in tersection
of biology an d politics that o rig inates in immun ity.
Clearly, uuderstand ing ltal.iau con trib utious to biopolitical d iscou rse is
crucial if we are to regisr.er the o riginality o f E,~posit.o's a rgument. Equally,
though, o ther critical texts will also help us in situating Bios within con temporary work o n biopolitics- )ud ith Butler's reflectio ns on mo urn ing
a nd community in Prect~rious Life an d Giving a.n Account Oneself come to
mind , as do Keith Ansell Pearson's Deleuzian musings on symbiosis a nd
viroid life, as well as )Urgen Habermas's recent Tile Future of Hum<lll Nature
a nd Ro nald Dworkin's essays on euthanasia and abortion.'0 Here too Esposito's wo rk shares a n um ber of areas o f contact with tl1em, rangirlg from th e
notion of communir.y to the genetic engineering that promises ro preven t
" lives unworthy of life'' in Binding and Hache's p hrase." But o ther texts
figure as well, especially as they relate to Esposito's reading o f community/
immunity. I will introdu ce them at appro priate momen ts and then in my
conclusion tie up some of the loose ends that inevi tably result when b road
in troductions of the sor t I am attempting are made. Most io1portan t will
be asking after th e use value of bios for imagini ng a public culture no longer
inscribed in a negative horizon of biopolitics.
Commun ity/ Immunity
In order to appreciate the originality of Esposito's u nderstaod ing of biopolitics, I first wan t to rehearse the rela tion o f commun ity to immu nity as
Esposito sketches it, not only in Bios but in his two earlier wo rks, Cornmunitas: Origin and De.Hitl)' of the Communit)' and lmmuuitas: The Protection
arrd Negation of Life." Read ing the terms dialectically, Esposito asks if th e
relation between com mun ity and immunity is ultimately o ne of contrast and
juxtaposition, or rather if the relation isn't part o f a lar ger move in wbicb
each term is inscribed reciprocally in the logic o f the other. T he launching
pad for his reflections concerns the principles o n wb iffi communities are
fou11ded. Typically, of course, when we think of commun ity, we im mediately
thin k of tbe common, of tba t wb iffi is shared among the members of a
group. So too for Esposito: commun ity is in habited by the commu nal, by
x Translator's lntroduction
that whicb is not my own, indeed that begins where "my own" ends. It is
what belongs to all or most and is therefore "public in juxtaposition to 'private; or 'general' (but also 'collective') in con trast to particu lar:' " Yet Esposito notes three further meanings of commtmitas, all associated with the
term from which it originates: the Latin mu11us. T he first two meanings of
mu11us - onus and officium- concern obligation and office, while the third
centers paradoxically on the term dom1m, which Esposito glosses as a form
of gift that combines the features of the previous two. Drawing on the
classic li nguistic studies of Benveniste and Mauss, Esposir.o marks the
specific tonality of this communal do11um, to signify not simply any gift
but a category of gift that requires, even demands, an exchange in return.
"Once one has accepted the munus," Esposito writes, then "one is obliged
to retu rn the onus, in the form of either goods or services {offtciu.m/."' 5
Murws is, therefore, a mucb more intense form of doman because it requires a subsequent response from the receiver.
At this po int, Esposito can distill the po li tical con.notations of nnmus.
Unlike dom1111, munus subsequently marks "the gift that one gives, not the
gift that one receives: "the contractual obligation one has vis -a-vis t he
other: and finally "the gratitude that dema.nds new donations" o n the part
of the recipient (emphasis in original). Here Esposito's particu lar declension of community becomes dear: tllli1 king community through cormnullitas will name the gift that keeps on giling, a reciprocity in the giving of a
gift that doesn't, indeed cannot, belong to oneself. At its (missing) origin,
communitas is constructed around an absent gift, one that members of
commu nity cannot keep for themselves. According to Esposito, this debt
or o bligation of gift giving operates as a kind of o riginary defect for all
those belonging to a community. The defect revolves around the pernicious effects of reciprocal donation on individua l identity. Accepting the
mu11us directly underm ines the capaci ty of the individual to ideo tify himself or herself as such and not as part of the communi ty.
T want to ho ld the defective features of comrnunitas in reserve for the
mo ment and reintroduce the question of in1munity because it is precisely
the immunitary mecbanism that will link community to bio politics." For
Esposito, immu nity is cotermin us with community. It does not simply
negate cornmunitas by protecting it from what is external, but rather is inscribed in the horizon of the conunu nal rrwnus. lm n:lUne is he-and imm unity is dearly gendered as mascu line in the examples from classical
Rome that Esposito cites-who is exonerated or has received a dispensatio
Traos)3tOr's ln1 rodoctioo xi
from reciprocal gift giving. He who has been freed from communal obligations or who enjoys an o riginary autonomy o r successive freeing from a
previously contracted debt enjoys the condition of immunitas. The relatio nship immunity maintains with individual identity emerges clearly here.
Immunity conno tes the means by which the indhidual is defended fro m
the "expropriative effects" of the community, protecting the ooe wbo carries it from the risk of coo tact with those wbo do oot (the risk being precisely the loss of ir1d ividual identity)." As a result, the borders separatir\g
what is one's own from the co mmunal are reinst.it.u ted when the "subst.itution of private or ind ividualistic models fo r communitarian forms of organization" takes place." It follows therefore that the condition of immunity sign ifies both not to be an d not to have in commoo.20 Seen from this
perspective, immunity presupposes community but also negates it, so that
rather thao centered simply on reciprocity, communi!)' do ubles upon itself, protecti ng itself from a presupposed excess of communal gi ft givi ng.
For Esposito, the conclusion can only be that "to survive, the community,
every co mmunity, is forced to introject the negativity of its own opposite,
e''en if the opposite remains precisely a lacking and contrasthe mode of
being of the commu nity itself:'" It is this introjection of negativity o r immunity that will form the basis of Esposito's reading of modern biopolitics.
Esposito will argue that the modern subject who enjoys civil and political
rights is itself an attempt to attain immun.ity from the contagion of the possibility of comm unity. Such an attempt to immu nize the indi,id ual from
what is common ends up putting at risk the community as immunity turns
u pon itself and its constituen t element.
Immunity and Modernity

Those familiar witb Jean-Lu c Nancy's writings on the inoperative commu nity or Alphonso Li ngis's reflections on the sba red nothingness of com munity will surely hear echoes of both in much of the preceding synopsis."
What sets Esposito's analysis apart from them is the degree to which he reads
immunity as a historical category inextricably linked to modernity:
T hat politics has always in some way been preoccupied with defend ing life
doesn't detract fro m the fact that beginning from a ccrrain moment tha t
co incides exactly witb the origins of m odernity, such a self-defensive
requirement was identified not only and simply as a given, but as both a
problem and a strategic option. By this it is understood that aU civilizations
past and present faced (and in some way solved) the needs of their own
xii Translator's Introduction
immunization, but that it is onJy in the modern ones that immunization

constitutes its most intOnate essence. One 1night coJUe to affirm that it
wasn't modernity that raised the question of the self-preservatio n of life~
but that self-preservation is itself raised in modernity's being [essere j, which
is to say it invents modernity as a historical and categorical apparatus able
10 cope with iiY
For Esposito, modernity doesn't begin simply in the institution of sovereign

power and its theorization .i n Hobbes, as Foucault a(gues. Ratlle(, modero ity
appears precisely when it becomes possible to theorize a relation between
the communitarian muuus, which Esposito associates with a Hobbesian
state of generalized conflict, and the institution of sovereign power that
acts to protect, or better to immunize, the commu nity from a threa tened
return to conflict.
If we were to pusb Esposi to's argument, it might be more appropri<lle to
speak of the sovereign who immu nizes the commu nity from the commu nity's owr1 implicit excesses: tile desire to acquire the goods of aoother,
and the violence implicated in such a relation. When its individual members
become subject to sovereign power, that is, when it is no lo nger possible
to accept the n umerous th reats the community poses to itself and to its
individual members, the community immunizes itself by instituting sovereign power. With the risk of contlict inscribed at the very beart of community, consisting as it does in interaction, or perhaps better, in the equ<>lily
between its members, immunizatio n doesn't precede or follow the momen t
of community but appears simultaneously as its "intimate essence." The
moment when the immunit.ary aporia of community is recognized as the
strategic problem for nascent European natio n-states signals the advent of
modernity because it is then tbat sovereign power is linked theoretically to
communal self-preservation and self-negation."
Two further reflections ougbt to be made at th is poiiit. First, by focusing
on the immunizing features of sovereignty as it. emerges in modernity, Esposito takes issue with a distinction Foucault makes between the paradigm
of sovereignty and that of governmentality. For Foucault, govern mentality
marks the "tactics of go,ernment which make possible the contin ual definitio n and redefinition of what is within the competence of the State and what
is not, the public versus the private, aod so on: These tactics are linked to
th e emergence of the popu lation as an objective of power that culrni.natcs
at the eod of tbe eighteenth centu ry, particularly regarding campaigns to
reduce mortality." A full-fledged regime of govern mentality for Foucault
Translalo r'slotroduction x:iii
cannot be tho ught separately from the emergence of biopower that takes
con trol of" life in general -with the body as one pole and the popu lation
as the o ther" in the n ineteenth century.26 Esposito, however, shows bow Foucault oscillates between sovereignty and governmentality precisely because
of his failure to theorize the immunitary declension o f both terms. Both
a re inscribed in a modern biopolitical horizon thanks to a modernity that
strengthens exponen tia lly its own immunitary characteristics.
Secood, Esposito's focus oo immu n ity ough t to be compared to recent
attempts, most notably by j udith Butler, to construct a conceptual language
for describing gender and sexuality as modes o f rela tion, o ne tha t would
"provid e a way of thin king about how we are not on ly constituted by our
relations b ut also dispossessed by tbem as well."" Esposito's language of an
always already immunized and immunizing munus suggests that Butler is
dearly right in affirming the importance of relationality for imagining commun ity, but at the same time that any hoped-for future com mun ity con structed o r1 "t11e social ''lllnerability of bodies" will founder on t11e implicit
threat contained in any relation among the same socially constituted bodies."
In o ther words, an eco logy o f socially interdependent bodies doesn't neces sarily ensu re vulnerability, but might actually augmen t calls for protection.
Th us the frequen t suggestion of immunity in Bu tler whenever the body
appears in all its vulnerability or the threat of contagion sym bolically produced by the presumed enemy." For his part, Esposito is attempting something different: the articu lation o f a political semantics that can lead to a
non immu nized (or radically communitized} life.3"
Autoimmunity after September 11
Yet Esposito's diagnosis of the present biopolitical scene doesn't rest excl usively on reading the an tinom ies of community in immtunity or, for tha t
matter, on the modero roots o f immun iza tion in the institution o f sovereignty. In Bios and lmmunitas, Esposito sketches the outlines of a global
a utoimmu nity crisis that grows more dangero us and lethal by the day. T he
reason, Esposito argues, has p rimarily to d o with our contin uing failure to
appreciate how much o f o ur current political crisis is the result of a collective
failure to interrogate the immu nitary logic associated with modern political thoug ht. In somewhat similar fash ion, Jacques Derrida also urged forward an autoimmunity d iagnosis of the cu rrent political rnoment, bcgiJmiJJg
in bis writings on religion with Gianni Vattuno, theo in The Politics of Friendship, and most famously in h is interviews in the aftermath of September u.
xtv Translator's Jntrodtlction
I want to summarize briefly bow Derrida conjoins politics to autoimmu nity so as to distinguish Esposito's own use of the term from Derrida's.
Setting ou t their differences is a necessary step to understanding more
fully the contemporary formation of power and what strategies are a\ailable to reso lve the current moment of political autoimmun ity crisis.
In "Faith and Knowledge;' his contribution to Gianni Va ttimo's ''o lume
titled OtJ ReligiotJ, Derrida utili-tes the optic of immunity to describe a
situation in wh ich religion returns to th e forefwnt of political d iscou rse.
Interestingly, the change will be found in religion's relation to immunity.
For Derrida, (auto)immunity names the mode by which religion and science
are reciprocally inscribed in each other. And so any co ntemporary analysis
of religion must begin with tbe recognitio n tbat religion at the end of the
millennium "accompan ies and precedes" what he calls "the critical and teletechnoscience reason: or better those technologies that decrease the distance
and increase the speed of commu nications globally, wh ich he links to capitalism aud the Anglo-American id iom.31 The sarne movcrncnt tl1at makes
religion and the tele-tech noscience coextensive results in a countermove of
immunity. Drawing upon the etymological roots of religion in religio, which
he associates with repetition and then with performance , Derrida shows
how religion's iterability presupposes the automatic and the machinelike in other words, presupposes a teclliJique that marks the possibility of faith .
Delivering technique (technology) o ver to a faith in iterabili ty shared witb
religion allows him to identify the au to immunitary logic underpinn ing
the current moment of religious revival and crisis. He writes: "It l tl1e movement that renders religion and t.ele-technoscien tific reason J secretes its
own antidote but also its own power of auto-inununity. We are here in a
space where all self-protection of the unscathed, of the safe and sound, of
the sacred (heilig, boly) must protect itself against its own protection, its
own police, its own power of rejection , in short against its own, which is to
say, against its own immunity:'"
Tn the context of th e overlapping fields of religion and tele-tech noscientifi c
reason, immunity is always autoimmun ity for Derrida and hence always destructive.!! is immunal because, on the one hand, religion - be will substitute the term "faitll" repeatedly for it- canno t allow itself to share performativity with tele-reason as the effects of that same reason inevitably lead to an
undermining of t he basis for religion in tradition, that is, in maintai ning a
holy space apart from its iterable features. Furthermore, it is autoimmunal
to the degree that. t.he pror.ect.io n of the sacred space, the "u nscathed" of
Translator's Jntroducl ion
Y:Y
the preceding quote, is created precisely thanks to the same iterability, the
same features of pe rformance that it shares with tele-technoscientific reason. The result is a protective attack against protection itself, o r a crisis in
a utoimmu nity.
Not surprisingly, religious (auto )immunity also has a biopolitical declension for Derrida, thoug h he never refers to it as sucb. Th us, in the mechanical principle by which re.Jigions say they value life, they do so only by priv ileging a transcenden tal form of life. "Life" for many religions, Derrida
writes, "is sacred, holy, infin itely respectable o nly in t.he name of what is
worth more than it and what is not restricted to the naturalness of the biozoological (sacrificeable):'" In this, biological life is repeatedly transcended
or made the supplement religion provides to life. So doing, transcendence
o pens up the co mmunity, constitutively formed around the living, to the
"space of death that is linked to the automa ton ... to technics, the mach ine,
prosthesis: in a word, to the dimensions of the auto-immune and selfsacrificial supplernentarity, to this death drive that is silently at work io C\cry
commu nity, every auto-co-immunity.''" For Derrida (as for Esposir.o) the
aporia of immunity operates in every community, based o n "a principle of
sacrificial self-destructio n ruining the principle of self-protection:'" At the
origin of religio us immunity lies the distinction between bio-zoological o r
anth ropo -theological life and transcendental, sacred life that calls fortb
sacriftces in almost parasitical form so as to protect its own dignity. If there
is a biopolitical moment to be found in Derrida's analysis of religion and
autoimmu nity, it will be found here in the difference between biological
life and transcendental life that will contin ually require the difference between the two to be maintained . It is, needless to say, despite the co ntemporary co n text that info rms Derrida's ana lysis, a conceptual aporia that
precedes the d iscussion of capitalism, life, and late-twentieth-cen tury technology. Writing in 1994, Derrida gestures to these cbaoges, but in his analysis of the resu rgence of religion within a certain kind of political discourse,
a utoimmu nity co-o rigi nates with religion in the West.
Whether the same ho lds true in the political dimension, Derrida doesn't
actually answer, at least not in his import<tn t work from 1997, The Politics
of Friendship. T here instead, after the requisite footno te marking the debt
he owes Blanchot, Bataille, and Nancy, Derrida empbas~tes a different poli tical declension of (political) commu nity, on e based on a certain form of
friendship of separation urldergird ing philosophical attempts to thin k a
future commun ity of so litary friends:
xvi Translator's Jntrodtlction
T hus is announced the anchoritic comm unity of tbose wbo Jove in separation .. . The invitation con1es to you from those who can lo'e only at
a distance. in separation .. . Those who love onl}' in c utting ties are the
uncompromising friends of solitary singularity. T hey invite you to enter
into this comm un ity o f social disaggregation {tiClinison}, which is not
n('CC?Ssarily a srcnt society, a conjuratio n, the occu]l' sharing of esoteric or
crypto-poetic knowledge. The d ;ossical com:cpt of the secret belongs to a

thought of the commun ity, solidarity, or the sect- initiation or priv:lte
space which represents the very thing the friend who speaks to you as a
friend of solitude has rebelled against.' '
Here a different form of political relationship emerges, one linked to Bataille's

"community of those without conununit:y;' and one at least in itially distinct
from the a utoimmunizing featu res of religion . Derrida suggests as much
with his gesture here to the Deleuzian singularity, those separate en tities
whose very separateness fu nctions as the invitation to the common." At the
same time , Derrida does preface the remarks with the adjective anchoritic,
thereby associati ng the form of d istan t love afforded those wh o have with drawn for religious reasons from th e world with a political d in1ension. Derrida suggests tha t in the separateness o f singularity it may be possible to
avoid some o f the immunizing features of community that emerged with
his discussion on faitb.
If I have focused initially on these two pieces in an in troduction to Esposito's thoug ht, it is bee<Luse they inform much o f Derrida's import<Ln t
reflections o n g lobal a utoimmu n ity in the wake of September n. Without
rehearsin g here all of the in tricacies of his analysis, the rein troductio n o f
the notion of autoimmun ity into a more p roperly political discourse, both
in his interviews with Giovanna Borradori after Septem ber 11 a nd in his
later reflections on democracy in Rogues, shows Derrida extending the
a utoimmu ne p rocess to two related fronts: first, to a constituent "pervertibility o f democracy" a t the heart of defin ing d emocracy, and second the
suicidal, au to imm une crisis that has marked American foreign policy since
the L98os. As for the first, democracy for Derrida appears to have at its
heart a paradoxical mean ing, one in which it continually postpones both
the moment when it C<Ln be fully realized as the political government in
which the many rule and simu ltaneously the possibility that when such an
event comes, the many may precisely vote to suspend democracy. Writing
with the recent experience o f J99 0S Algeria in mi nd, Derdda argues that
"d emocracy has always been suicidal" because tbere a re always some wbo
Translaror~s
Introduction xvii
do no t form part of the many aod who must be excluded or sent off." The
result, and it is one that we ought to keep in mind when attempti ng to
think Esposito's thought on commun ity/immunity, is that "the autoinunune
topology always dictates that democracy be seut off [remoyerf elsewhere,
that it be excluded or rejected, expelled under the pretext of protecting it
on the inside b)' expelling, rejecting, or sending off to the outside tbe domestic enemies of democracy.""' For Derrida, autoimmunity is inscribed
"right onto the concept of democracy" so that "democracy is never properly what it is, never itself For what is lacking in democracy is proper
mean ing, the very {memef mean ing of the selfsame {memej ... the it-self
{soi-meme/, the selfsame, the properly selfsame of the itself'' 0 A fundamental, constituthe lack of the proper marks democracy.
Esposito's analysis of the immunity aporia of community does, much
like Derrida's analysis of democracy, implicitly evoke in community something like democracy, but we ought to be carefu l in li nking the two discussions on autoimmunity too closely-first, because Esposito clearly refuses
to collapse the process of immunization into a full -blown autoimmune
suicidal tendency at the heart of community. That he doesn't has to do primarily with the larger project of which Bios and fmmrmitas are a part,
namely, how to think an affirmative biopolitics through the lens of in1munity. Esposito's stunning elaboration of a positive immunity evidenced by
mother and fetus in Immunitas is the proof that iounu nity doesn't necessarily degenerate-and that sense is hardly unavoidable in Derrida's discussion- in to a suicidal autoimmunity crisis. In this, Esposito sketches the
our.lines of an affirmative model of biopolitical immu nity, whereas rarely if
ever does Derrida make explicit the conceptual language of biopolitics that
undergirds his ana lysis.
But, as 1 mentioned, Derrida speaks of autoimmunity in a different context, ooe that characterizes Americao foreign policy after September u as
essentially an autoimmune reaction to previous cold-war policy that. armed
and trained former freedom fighters dur ing the co ld war's hot phase in
Afghan istan in the early 198os. He says:
Imm igrated, trained, prepared for their act in the United States by the
United State~, these IJijru:kers incorpomt'c so to speak, two suicides in one;
their own (and one wiU remain forever defenseless in the face of a suicidal,
autoimmunitary aggressio n- and that is what terrorizes most) but also the
suicide of those wbo welcomed, armed and trained them:n
X\'iii Translator>s [ntroduction
Tbe soul-searching among the British in response to the bombings in London in the summer of 2005 is clearly proof of the correctness of Derrida's
analysis; in the United States, a similar analogy might be found with the
Oklahoma City bombings (though there was clearly less reflection on the
elements that contributed to that instance of suicidal immunity than in
the United Kingdom). In any case, by linking American foreign policy to
su icide via autoimmu nity, Derrida not on ly acknowledges an important
hi.s torical coo text for understanding September u, but implicitly links"th.esc
hiJackers" to technical proficiency and high -tech knowledge and, so it would
seem, to his earlier analysis of tele-reason and technology as reciprocally
implicated in religious iterability. Although space doesn't allow me more
than a mere mention, it might be usefu l to probe fu rther the overdetermined connection of the "religio us" in radic.-li Islamic fundamen talism with
just such a technological prowess. ln any case, for the present discussion
what matters most is that Derrida believes that September n cannot be
thought independently of the figure of immun ity; indeed, d~at as long as
the United States continues to play the role of "guaran tor or guardian of
the entire world order;' au to immun itary aggression will continue, provoked in turn by future traumatizing events that may be far worse than
September u.
How, then, does Esposi to's reading of an immunological lexicon in biopolitics d iffer from Derrida's? Where Derrida's emphasis falls repeatedly on
autoimmu nity as the privileged o utcome of American geopolitics in the
period preceding September u, Esposito carefully avoids contlating immunity with au toimmunity; instead, he repeatedly returns to the question of
munus and modernity's attempts to immunize itself against the ever-present
threat, from its perspective, of immunitis reversa l into the cornmuoal,
from immu nization to commun ization:'' Writing at length in Immunitas
on the impe rative of security that assails aU con temporary social systems
and the process by which risk and protection strengthen each o ther reciprocally, he describes the autoimmu nity crisis of biopo liti cs and with it the
possibility of a dialectical reversal into community. "Evidently, we are dealing;' Esposito writes, "with a limit po int beyond which the entire biopolitical
horizon risks entering in a lethal contradiction with itself:' He co ntinues:
This doesn>t mean tb~1t we can turn back the dock, perhaps reactivating
the ancient figu res of sovereign power. It isn't possible today to imagine a
politics that doesn't turn to life as such, that doesn>t look at the citizen from
the point of view of his living body. But th is can happen reciprocally in
Translator's Jnrroduct ion >: i:x
opposite for ms that put into play the different meanings of biopolitic.s:
on the or\< hand the self-destructive revolt of immun ity against itself or
the opening to its reversal in community:'.}
Looking back today at the series o f attempts after September 11 in t he

Un ited States to immuni-ze tbe "homeland" from future attack - the term
itself a powerful immunizing operator - it isn't hard to imagine that we
a re in the midst of a full-scale a utoimmunity crisis whose symptomology
Derrida and Esposito diagnose.
Yet a political. a utoimmu nity crisis isn't the only possible biopo li tical
o utcome of the present moment. Esposito suggests that another possibility
exists, one to which his own affirmative biopolitics is d irected, namely,
creating the conditions in which it becomes possible to identify and deconstruc t the p rincipal twentieth-centu ry biopolitical, or better, thanatopolitical, dispositif~ tbat have historically characterized th e owdero i.nunu n itary paradigm. On ly after we have sufficiently understood the exten t to
wh ich ou r political catego ries operate to immun ize the collective po litica l
body from a different set of categories associated with commu nity can we
reorient ourselves to the affirmative biopolitical opening presented by the
cu rrent crisis in in1mtmity. This open ing to community as the site in which
an affi rmative biopolitics can emerge is the result of a dialectical reversal at
the heart of tbe immunitary paradigm: once we recogn ize that immu nization is tbe mode b y which biopolitics has been decl ir1ed since th e dawn of
modernity, the question becomes how to rupture the juncture between biology and poli tics, between bios and polirikos. The necessary first step is moving away from a rationality o f bodies when attem p ting to lo cate the object
of politics, and so shifting the conceptual ground on which inlmuni'la tion
d epends. An affirmative biopolitics thoug ht through the mu.n.us of comm un ity proceed s with the recognition that a oew logic is requ ired to conc.e ptualize and represen t a new commun ity, a coming "virtual" community,
Esposito will say with Delcuze, characterized by its inlpersonal singularity or
its singular impersonality, whose confi nes will run from men t.o plan ts, to
an imals independent of the material o f their individuation.''
Biopolitics and Contemporary It alian Though t
Tbe reference to a virtual, f'lltu re commun ity immediately recalls two other
con temporary thi nkers from Italy who arc d eeply engaged with th e noti on
of biopolitics in its coo tem porary configuration. Of course, I am speaking
o f Antonio Negri and Giorgio Aga rnbe n. That. modern Italian political
x.x Translator's Introduction
philosophy has emerged as perhaps the primary locus for research related
to biopolitics is not happenstance. Few places have been as ferti le fo r Foucau lt's teachings; few places so well primed historically and politically to
reflect on and extend his work. T he reasons, it seems to me, have to do
principally with a rich tradition of political philosophy in Italy-we need
only remember J\1achiavelli, Vico, de Sanctis, Croce, and Gramsci, for instance- associated with the specificity of the Italian history and a political
scene characterized by the imrnuniziog city-state. Many o ther reasons
may account for it, but. what they together spell is an ongoing engagemen t
in Italy with po litics thought in a biopoli tical key.
With that said, the more one reads of recent Italian contributions to
biopolitics, the more two diverging lines a ppear to characterize them: one
associated with the figure of Agamben and the negative to nality be awards
bio politics; the other a radically affLTmative biopolitics given in the writings
of Michael Hadt and Toni Negri. As th e originality of Esposi to's readi ng
of modern biopolitics cannot be appreciated apart from the irnplicit d ialogue r.hat r uns through Bios with both Agamben, and Hardt and Negri, I
want to summarize these two often competing notions of biopolitics. What
emerges in Esposito's analysis is a thorough critique of both Agamben and
Negri; bis pinpoin ting of tbeir failures to think th roug h the immunity
aporia tbat characterizes their respective configurations ofbiopolitics leads
to bis own auemptto design a future, affirmative bio poli tics. That all three
la unch the ir reflections from essentially the same series of texts, namely,
Foucault's series of lectures collected in English in Society Must Be Defended
and the fifth chapter of Tire Hisrory of Sexualit)> suggests that we o ught to
begin there for an initial definition of biopolitics before turning to their
respective appropriations of Fo uca ult.
For Foucault, biopolitics is another name for a tecbnology of power, a
biopower, which needs to be distinguished from the mechanisms of discipline that emerge at the en d of the eightee nth cenr.ury. This new configu ration of power aims to take "control of life and the biological processes of
man as species and of ensuring that they are not disciplined but regularized:'' T he biopolitical apparatus includes "forecasts, statistical estimates,
and overall measures;' in a word "security mechan isms [that] have to be installed aro und the random elemen t inherent in a population of living beings
so as to optim ize a state of life."'' As such, biopolitics is juxtaposed in Foucau lt's analysis to the power of sovereignty leading to the important distinc-
Translator's Jnrroduct ion >.'Xi
tion between them: "It [biopower l is the power to make live. Sovereign!)'
took life and let live. And now we have the eme rgence of a power that I
would call the power of regularizatio n, an d it , in contrast, consists in making live and letting die: Biopower thus is that which guarantees the contin uous lhing of the human species. What turns out to be of abnost
greater irnporlaoce, however, for Agamben, Negri, and Esposito, is the rela tion Foucau lt will draw between an emerging biopower at the end of the
eighteenth centu ry, often in opposition to .i ndividual disciplinary mechanisms and its cu lmination in Nazism. for Foucau lt, what links eig hteenth century biopower to Nazi biopower is p recisely their shared missio n in
limiting the alea to ry element of life and death. Thus, "(CJon trolling the
ran dom elemen t inhereot in bio logical processes was one of the regime's
immediate o bjectives:''" T his is not to say that the Nazis simply operated
one-dimeosionaUy on the body politic; as Foucault notes repeatedly, the
Nazis had recourse again and aga in to di sciplinary power; i.n fact "no State
could have more disci.pl inary power than the Nazi regime;' presumably
because the attempts to amplify biopower depended on certain concurren t
disciplinary tools." For Foucault, the specificity of the Nazis' lethal biopower
resides in its ability to combine an d thereby in tensify the power directed
both to the ind ividual a nd to the collecthe body.
Certainly, other vectors crisscross bio politics in Foucault's a nalysis, and
a number of scholars have dooe rem;lrkable jobs in locati.ng them, b ut the
outline above is sufficient for describing the basis o n which Agamben, Hardt
and Negri, and Esposito frame their respective analyses.;2 Thus Agamben's
notion of biopolit.ics is certainly indebted to the one sketched above-the
impression that modern ity produces a certain form of biopolitical body is
inescapable readi.ng Agambeo as it is one implicit in Foucault. But Agarnben's
principal insight for thinking biopolitics coocerns p recisely tbe distinction
between /!los and zoe aod tbe process by which he links the sovereign exceptio n to r.he production of a biopolitical, or better a zoo-poli tical, body. In deed, Homo Sacer opens with precisely th is di stinction:
The Greeks had no single term to express what we mean by the word
''life.~
Tht'y used two terms that, although traceablt to a common etymological

root, arc semantically and morphologically distinct: zoe, which expressed
rhe simple fact of living common to aU Jiving beings (animals, men, or
gods) and bios, which indicated the fo rm or way of life proper to au
ind ividual or group' '
xxii Transb.1 tor's lntrodtlction
Leaving aside for the moment whetber in fact tbese terms exhaust the Greek
lexicon for life, Agamben attempts to demonstrate the preponderance of
zoe for the production of the biopolitical body.' ' The reason will be fou nd
in what Agamben, following Carl Schmitt, calls the sovereign exception,
that is, the process by which sovereign power is premised on the exclusion
of those wbo are simply alive "'hen seen from the perspective of the polis."'
Tbus Agamben speaks of an inclusive exclusion of zoefrom politica l li fe,
"almost as if politics were the place in which life had to transform itself
into good and in wh ich what had to be politicized were always already
bare li fe:;o A number of factors come together to condition politics as the
site of exclusion, but chief among them is the role of language, by which
man "separates and opposes himself to his own bare life and, at the same
time, maintains himself in relation to that bare life in an inclusive exclu
sion:'" The ilomo sacer is precisely the political ftgure that embodies what
is for Agamben the origi nary political relatio n: it is the name of the life
excluded from the political hle (bios) that sovereignty i.l\stitutes, oot so much
an ontology of the one excluded (and therefore featuring an unconditional
capacity to be killed), but more the product of the relation in which bios is
premised not upon another form of life but rather on zoe (because zoe is
not by definition sucb a form), and its principal characteristic of being
merely alive and beoce killable.
In sucb a sch.eme, th.e weigbt afforded t:be classical state of exception is
great indeed, and so at least initially biopolitics for Agamben is always already
inscribed in the sovereign exception. Thus Agamben will de-emphasize the
Foucauldian analysis of the emergence of biopower in the late nineteenth
century, for it represents less a radical rupture with sovereignty or for that
matter a disciplinary society, and will instead foregroun d the means by
which biopolitics intensifies to the point that in the twentieth century it
will be transformed into thanatopo litics for both totalitarian and democratic states. Certain ly, a number of differences remain between the classic
and modern models of biopolitics-notably the dispersal of sovereign power
to the physician and scientist so that the homo sacer no longer is simply an
analogue to the sovereign - and of course Agamben will go out of his way
to show how the political space of modernity is in fact a biopolitical space
linked to "the birth of the camps."" But t:be Ol'erwhelming impression is of
a kind of flattening of the specificity of a modern biopo li tics in favor of a
metaphysical reading of the originary aod infioite state of exception that
has since its inception eroded the political fou ndations of social life. For
Translator~s
[[lt(()duction xxiii
Agamben, an authentically political bfos always withdraws in favor of the

merely biologicaLS' The result is a po li tics that is potentially forever in ru ins in Marco Revelli's description, or a politics that is always already declined negatively as biopolitical.'"
Where Agamben's negative characterization of contemporary biopolitics
as than atopolitics depends on the predominance of z(J~ O''er bios, Hardt
a nd Negri's radical affirmation of biopolitics centers instead on the productive features of bios, and "ideutifyiog the materia li st din1cnsiou of the
concepr. beyond any conception that is purely naturalistic (life as 'zoe') or
simply anthropological (as Agamben in particu la r has a tenden cy to do,
making the concept in effect indifferent) :'., Leaving aside for the moment
the descriptor "indifferent;' wh.icb it seems to me fails to mark the radica l
negativity of Agamben's use of the term, what stands out in Hardt and
Negri's reading of biopolitics is the mode by whicb tbey join contemporary forms of collective subjectivity to the tra nsformations in the nature of
labor to what a o umber of Italian Marxist th inkers have terrued irnrnaterial
labor.62 Thinking together these changes in forms o f labor-ones characterized not by the factory b ut rather by "the in tellectual, immaterial, an d
communicative labor power" affiliated with new communication technologies- through Foucault's category of biopower allows Hardt and Negri to
see biopolitics as both the locus in which power exerts itself in empire and
the site in whicb new subjectivities, what they call social singuh1rities, subsequen tly emerge. Th us the tcrrn "biopo li tical" characterizes not only the
new social formation of singularities called the multitude but also the emergence of a new, democratic sovereignty, one joined to a radically different
understanding o f the common.
As Ha rdt aod Negri themselves readily admit, reading tbe mu ltitude
ontologically as a biopolitical social formation represents a significant reversal if not outright b reak with Foucault's conception of biopolitics. Where
Foucault o ften associar.es the negative features of biopower with irs object,
a biopolitical subject, Hardt a nd Negri dean chor biopolitics from its base
in biopower in the current moment of empire to read it p rimarily and
affi rmatively as a social category. T hus: "Biopolitical production is a matter
o f ontology in that it constantly creates a new social being, a new h uman
nature" linked to the "cootinuous encounters, communicatioos, a nd coocatenations of bodies."" They do the same in their reading of Agamben,
forgoing h is decleosion of a twentieth-ceotury thanatopoli tics by evoking
instead a new form of sovereignty in which the star.e of exceptjon presu mably
xxw Translator's Introduction
either no longer operates or is sooo overwhelmed by the rbizomatic production of singu lar m ultitudes, u nveiling the illusory nature of modern sovereignty. In its place the mu ltitude produces a concept of the common,
which "breaks the continuity o f modern state sovereignty and attacks biopower at its heart, de mystifying its sacred core. All that is general o r public
m ust be reappropriated and managed by the mu ltitude a nd thus become
common.''6' Transposing into tbe biopolitica l language. we have used to
this poi nt, Hardt and Neg6juxtapose the affumati.ve biopolitics associated
with the multitude and the conunon to biopower and its privileging of modern sovereignty.
ln Bios Esposito takes up a position directly opposite both Agamben and
Hardt and Negri and their conflicting uses of biopolitics. First Agamben.
Certain ly, Esposito's genealogy of biopo litics shares man y features with
Agamben's read ing of modern biopolitics thro ug h tbe figu re of the homo
sacer. Indeed , the chapter on thanatopolitics and the cycle o f genos is nothing short of au explicit dia logue with Agambeu a nd his biopolitical interpretation of Nazism, as well as an implicit critique of Agamben's biopolitics. lb see why, we need to rehearse b riefly the ch ief lines of argumen t
Esposito develops for working thro ugh the coordinates of Nazi biopolitics.
Significantly, Esposito first pinpoints a n oscillation in Fouca ult's reading
of Nazism. On the ooe hand , Nazism for Foucault shares the same biopoli tical valence with a number of modern regimes, specifica lly socialist,
wh ich Foucault li nks to a racist matrb:. On the other hand, the mode by
which Foucault frame.s his interpretations of Nazism privileges the singular
natu re of the "Nazi event:' as Esposito calls it.. The resu lt is a n underlying
inconsistency in Foucault's reading: either Nazi biopolitics is inscribed
along with socialism as racism, and hence is no longer a singular event, o r it
maintains its singularity wben the focus turns to its relation to modernity.M
The second line will be fou nd in Esposi to's principal question concern ing the position of life in Nazi biopolitics. "Un like a ll the other forms past
a nd present;' he asks, "why did Nazism propel the homicidal temptation of
biopolitics to its most co mplete realizatio n?"" That h is answer will move
through the ca tegory of immunization suggests tbat Esposito refuses to
superimpose Nazi thanatopolit ics too directly O\'er contemporary biopolitics."" Rather, he attempts to inscribe tbe most significan t elements of the
Nazi. biopoli tical apparatus in the larger project of im.lnUJlizing life thro ugh
the production of d eath . In so doing, death becomes both the object and
Translalo r's Jntroduct'iOn :o:v
the therapeutic instru men t for curing the German body politic, sim ultaneously the cause a nd the remedy o f "illness." Esposito dedicates much o f
the final third o f Bios to elaborating the immw1izing features of Nazi biopolitics in order to reconstruct the move from a modern biopolitics to a Nazi
thanatopolitics. The Nazi immWlitary apparatus, he theorizes, is characterized by the absolute normativization of life, the d ou ble enclosure of the
body, and the anticipatory sup pression of life. Space doesn't allow me to
a nalyze each, though the reader wil.l certainly fi od sorue of the most com pelling pages o f Bios here. More useful is to ask where Esposito's overall
portrayal of Nazi biopolitics diverges from that o f Agamben in immu nization. By focusing on the ways in which bi.os becomes a j uridical category
and 11omos (law) a bio logized one, Esposito doesn't directly challenge Agamben's reading o f the state of exception as an a poria of Western politics, one
the Nazis intensified enormo usly so that the state of exception becomes
the noon. Rather, he pri,,iJeges the fi gu re o f immun ization as the ultinlate
horizon withi n wh ich to u nderstand Nazi poli tical, social, j uridical, and
medical policies. In a sense he folds the state of exception in the more
global reading of modern immun ity dispositifs.
Implicit in the op tic o f immu nity is a critique o f the categories by wh ich
Nazism bas been understood, two of wh ich a re primarily sovereignty a nd
the state of exception.69 By p rivileging the immunitary paradigm for ao
understanding o f Nazi biopolitics, Esposito forgoes Agamben's foldi ng o f
sovereignty into bio poli tics (and so bypasses the Musulmann as the embodimen t of the twen tieth-cen tury homo sacer), focusing instead o n the
biocratic elements o f the Nazi dictatorship. He notes, for instance, the requirement that doctors bad to legitimate Nazi political decisions, which
previously had been transla ted into the Reich's oew legal codes, as well as
the req uired presence of a physician in all aspects of the workin gs of the
coocerltration camp from selection to tbe crematoria. Esposito's analysis
not. only draws upon Robert Lifton's classic descript ion o f the Naz i stat.e as
a "biocracy;' b ut more importan tly u rges forwa rd the overa rch ing ro le that
immunizatio n plays in the Nazi understanding of its own political goals;
indeed, the Nazi politicization of medicine cannot be fully understood apart
from the a ttempt to immun ize the Aryan race.' Central therefore to Esposito's reading of the biopoliticaltonality of the Nazi dictatorship is tile recognition o f the therapeutic goal the Nazis assigned the concentration camp:
only by exterminating tbe jews did the Nazis believe that the German genos
xxvi Translator's Introduction
cou ld be strengthened and protected. And so for Esposito the specificity of

the Nazi experience for modernity resides in the actualization of biology,
when the transcendental of Nazism becomes life, its subject race, and its
lexicon biological."
An Affirmative Biopolitics?
Tbe same reasons underlying Esposito's critique of Agamben's biopolitics
also spell out his differences with Hardt and Negri. Not only docs Esposito
explicitly distance himself from their reading of the multit.ude as an affirmati,e biopolitical actor who resists biopower- he notes how their line of
interpretatio n pushes well beyond Fouca ult's manifest intentions when
delimiting biopolitics, beyond the resistance of life to power - but he asks
a decisive question for their use of biopolitics as an organizing principle
around wbicb tbey posit their critique of empire. "If life is stronger than
the power that besieges it, if its resistance doesn't allow it to bow to the
pressure of power, tbco how do we account for the outcome obtained io
modernity of the mass prod uction of death?"" In a number of interviews
Esposito has continued to challenge Hardt and Negri's reading of biopolitics. What troubles Esposito principally is a categor ical (or historical) amnesia vis-i\-vis modernity's negative inflection of biopoliticsP
Essentially, Esposito charges that Hardt and Negri's reading of the multitude is riven by the same irnmunitary aporia that characterizes Agamben's
negative biopolitics. Jn what way does the biopoli tical mu ltitude escape the
immw1itary aporia that resides at the heart of any creation of the common?
Although he doesn't state so explicitly, Esposito's analysis suggests that
fold ing biopower into the social in no way saves Hardt and Negri from the
long and deadly genea logy of biopolitics in which life is protected and
strengthened through deatb, in what Esposito calls the "enigma" of biopolitics. Esposito laid some of the groundwork for such a critiq ue in the early
1990s when, in a series of reflections on the impolitical, he urged forward a
thorough deconstruction of many of the same political categories that undergird Hardt and Negri's analysis, most particu larly sovereignty. It certainly is
plausible (and productive} to read Bfos through an impolitical lens, in whicb
Esposito offers biopolitics as the latest and ultimate of all the modern politics categories tbat require deconstruction. Indeed, it's not by chance that
the fi rst chapter of Bios aggressively positions biopolitics not only as onc
of the most significant ways of organizing contemporary political discourse,
but also as the principal challenger to the classic political category of sover-
Translator's lnlroduction xxvii
eignty. For Esposito, sovereignty, be it a new global sovereignty called empire or the long-lived national variety, doesn't transcend biopolitics bu t
rather is immanen t to the workings of the immu nitary mechanism that he
sees driving all forms of modern {bio)politics. The multitude remains inscribed in modern sovereignty, whose final horizon, following Esposito's
reading of Foucault, is the immunitary par<ldigm itself.ln other words, the
multitude remains anchored to a genealogy of biopolitics. Th us Esposito
not only deeply qucstioos the hermeneutic value of sovereigrlty for understanding the conr.emporary political scene or for imagining a progressive
politics oriented to the future, b ut also points to a so,ereign remai nder in
the figure of multitude.
Bios also offers another less explicit o bjection to Esposito's analysis of
Hardt and Negri's use of the term "biopolitics." We recall that for Hardt
and Negri the m ultitude produces a new concept of the common, which
correspo nds to their belief that the multitude represents a rupture with a ll
forms of state sovereignty. T h is occurs than.ks to the econorn ic and bio political activity of the multitude, which coincides with a "co mmonality
created by the positive externalities or by the new informatio nal networks,
and more generally by all the cooperative and communicative forms o f
labor.''' '' Tbe multitud e mobilius the common io tbe move from a respublica to a res-commu11is, in which the multitude comes to embody ever
more the expa nsive logic of singularity-commonality. However, Esposito's
reading of commu11itas!immunitassketched above suggests that there is no
common obligation join ing members of a community;, pote11tia that can
be thought apar t from at.tempts to immunize the commun ity, or in this
case the multitude. As Esposito notes, "withou t th is immunity apparatus
individual and common life would die away:'" Tbe impolitica l question
Esposito raises for Hardt and Negri is precisely whether the new biopolitical
mu ltitude somehow transcends the political aporia of imm unity that undergirds every conception of comrnunir.y. Perhaps in the new configuration o f
the common that they describe and the fu ndamental changes in the nature
of immaterial production, the global mwrus changes as well, so that, unlike
e''ery previous form of community, the multitude no longer has any need
of immun izing itself from the perils of commuttitas. )ust such a reading is
suggested by Hardt and Negri's repeated troping o f the multitude as a network of rhizomatic singuladties, who presumably would have less need o f
immunizii1g tbemselves because the network itself provides the p roper
threshold of virtual contact. Esposito in Bios implicitly raises the question of
xxviii Translator's lntroductjon
whether tbese singularities acting in common and so forming "a new race
or, rather, a new humanity" do n't also produce new forms o f immu nity.'
Immunity, we recall, emerges as a constituent element of commu nity
for Esposito, when the common threatens personal identity. Thus it isn't
difficult to read those pages in Bios dedicated, for instance, to the immunitary
mechaoism in Locke as aimed as well at Hardt ;tnd Negri. Writing apropos
of the. potential risk of a world that is given in common (and therefore e.xposed to an unlimited in distinction) is ne utralized by ao element presupposed in t.he originary manifestation .. . namely, that o f t.be relationship one
has with oneself in the form of personal identity, Esposito once again situates personal identity as the subject and object of immunitary protection."
The res-communis that Hardt and Negri see as one of the most importaot
productions of the mu ltitude is in Esposito's reading of Locke always seen
as a threat to a res propria. Following this line of inquiry, Bios asks us, what
becomes of personal identity when the multitude produces the new sense
of the common? Is it now less a threat given new forms of communication
and labor, or rather does the threat. t.o in dividual identity increase gh'en
the sheer power of extension Hardt and Negri award the multitude? What
is at stake isn't on ly a question of identity o r difference here, but the p revalence of one or the other in the mu ltitude. Seen in this optic, tbeir emphasis on tbe singularity and commooality of the multitude may iiJ fact be an
attempt to W<lrd off any suggestion of an underlying antinomy between
the mu ltitude as a radically new social formation and personal identity.
A Communal Bfos
Given these differences, the obvio us question will be what form Esposito
awards his O>''n conception of biopolitics such tha t it avoids the kinds of
difficulties raised in tbese other contributions. After two illuminating readings of bios in Arendt and Ileidegger- which may be read as dialoging with
Agarnben's discussion of homo sacer and his appropriation of "the open" via
Heidegger-Esposito sets out to construct just such an affirmative vision by
"opening the black box of biopolitics;' returning to the three disposirifs that
he had previously used to characterize the Nazi bio-thanatological p roject
and then reversing them. These are the normativization of life, the double
enclosure of tbe body, and the an ticipatory suppression of life that I noted
earlier. The effect of appropriatulg thern so as to rC''crse Nazi immunitary
procedures will surprise aod certainly challenge many readers. Esposito clearly
is aware of such a possible reactjon and his response merits a longer citation:
Translator's Jntroducl ion x:xix
Yet what does it mean exactly to overturn them and then to turn them iu.:.~ide
out?Tbe attempt we want to l"nake is that of assurning the same categories
of~(life." body,'' and "birth," and
then of converting their imm unitary

(which is to say their self-negating) declension in a direction that is open
to a more o riginary and in tense sense of commmdtns. Only in this way- at
the point of intersection and tension between conte mporary re flections that
h'we moved in such a direction - will it be possible to trace the initial features of a biopolitics that is finally affirmative. No longer over life but of life."
Esposito recontextualizes his earlier work on commuuita.1 as the basis for

a n affirmative biopolitics: fo llowing his terminology, the term becomes
the operator whereby a long-standing immunitary declension of bios as a
form of life can be reversed." He premises such a reading on the belief that
con temporary ph ilosophy bas fundamentally failed to grasp the rela tion
between Nazi bio-thanatological practices and biopolitics today. "The
truth;' he writes, "is tha t many si mply believed that the collapse of Nazism
would also d rag the categories that had characterized it into the inferno
from which it bad emerged!''" On ly by identifyi ng the immunit.ary apparatus of the Nazi biopolitical machine an d then overturning it-the word
Esposito uses is ro1esciare, which connotes the act of turning inside out can contemporary p hilosophy come to terms with the fu ndamen tal immunitary features of today's global biopo litics and so devise a new lexicon
able to confron t and alter it.
It's precisely here that Esposito synthesizes Agamben's negative vision of
biopolitics with Hardt and Negri's notion of the common as signaling a
new affirmative biopolitics. Esposito doesn't offer a simple choice between
inununity and community that will once and for all announce the arrival o f
a new h uman nature and with it an affirmative biopolitics. The continuum
between Nazi a nd contemporary biopolitics that characterizes Agamben's
approach is less sign ificant from th is point of view than the continuum of
immun ity and community. At the risk of reducing Esposito's line of argu men t, he suggests that if Nazi thanatopolitics is the most radically negative
expression of inm1Unization, then inverting the terms, or changing the
negative to a positive, might offer contemporary thought a series of possibilities for thinking bios, a q ualified form of life, as the communal form of
life. Such a positive conception of biopolitics can only emerge, however, if
one si.mult.aneously devclops a conception of life t11at is aporetically exposed
to otbers in such a way that the individual escapes an inlmunization of the
self (and hence is no longer an individual proper)." For Esposito, it is less
xxx Tr.-.nslator's Introduction
a matter of exposure th.an of openness to what is held in common with

o thers." The reader will find much of interest in the way Esposito draws on
the work of Merleau-Ponty, Levinas, and Deleuze when elaborating such
a conception."
The reference to the singu lar and the common also echoes those pages
of Aga mben's The Coming Communi!)\ especia lly the sections in wb.icb
Agamben anchors a o ude, exposed life to incommun icability. We recall
that the coming commun ity for Agamben begins when a mean ingful coo text for life emerges in which d eath has mean ing, that is, when it can be
communicated. Only when the previously meaningless a nd unfelt death o f
the individual takes o n meaning can one speak mo re properly of singularities without identity who enjoy the possibility of commu nication. Su ch a
commu nity will consequently be "without presuppositions and without
subjects" aod move "into a communication without the incornmuoicable."''
So too for Esposito, though Bios doesn't offer many details on the communicative aspects of an affirmative bi.opolitical commun ity. To find them we
need to turn t.o Commtmitas, where Esposito links forms of commun ication to singular Jives open to each other in a co mmun ity. There the differences with Agamben can be reassumed around their respective readings o f
Heid egger and Bataille. Th us, when Aga mben emphasizes death as the
means by which a life may uncover (or recover) an au thentic opening in to
Daseitt, he rehearses those moments o f Heidegger's thought that celebrate
death as the fi nal horizon o f our existence. For Esposito, such a perspective
is too limiting for thinking futu re forms o f community. "Death;' he writes,
glossing Bataille, "is o ur communal impossibility of being that which we
endeavor to remain -isolated individuals.";
In that sense, Aga mben and Esposito certainly agree on the antinomy
be tween individuals or subjects and commu nity. But for Bataille as for Esposito, the crucial thought for a future commun ity conceros precisely what
puts members of the community o utside themselves; not their own d eath,
"since that is inaccessible," but rather "the death of the ot.her."86 Tn such a
reading, communication occurs when beings lose a part of themselves, the
Bataillian rent or a wound, that unites them in communication while separating them from their id entity." It is in Bataille's notion of"strong communication" linked to sacrifice that Esposito locates the key for unlocking
a contemporary communitas, one in which commu nication wi ll name "a
con tagion provoked by the b reaking of in di,,idual boundaries a nd by the
reciprocal infection o f wounds" in a sort of arch -event. of contagion and
Translator's Jntroducl ion x:xxi
communication.'' The implicit question for Esposito appears to be how to

create conditions in which such a co ntagion can be contained without involving the entire immunitary machinery. To do so we need to develop a
new vocabulary for thinking the boundaries of life and its other, in biojuridical forms that recognize the one in the other such that any living being is thought in "tbe unity of life; in a co-belonging of wh<H is d ifferent.~
Essentially, then, Esposito's emphasis on difference is linked to bis larger
defense of personal identity througho ut Bios, which is deeply in flected, as
the reader will discover, in chapter 3 by Esposito's encounter with a hyperindivid ualistic Nietzsche. This may explain in part his defense of bios as
individuated life as opposed to zoe.
Birth and Autoimmunity
Esposito's emphasis on man and his relation to his living being (as opposed to Heidegger's distinction between life and existence) calls to mi nd
o ther attempts to think nonontologically the d ifference between living beings through other perspectives on life. Keith Ansell-Pearson's privileging
of symbiosis and of inherited bacterial symbionts is perhaps the most sophisticated, in his attempts to show how "amid cell gorgings and aborted
invasions" a reciproca l infection arises sucb that the bacteria "are reinvigorated by tbe incorporation of th.eir permaoent disease." The human becomes
nothing more tha n a viroid life, "an in tegrated colony of ameboid beings;'
not distinct from a larger history of symbiosis that sees germs "not simply
as 'disease-causing; but as ' life-giving' entities:' 9Consequently, anthropocen tric readings of human nature will give way to perspecti\es that no longer
focus on one particular species, such as human kind, but rather on those
that allow us to think life together across its different forms (biological, social,
economic). The reference to disease as life-giving cerw inly recalls Esposito's
own read ing of Nietzsche and the category of compensatio in Immunitas, as
well as Machiavelli's category of productive social conflict, suggesting that
some fo rms of immunity do not necessarily close off access to an authentically political form of life. lndeed, reading the immunitary system as only
self-destructive fails to see other interpretive perspectives in which immu nity doesn't protect by attacking an authentic bios grounded in a common
mutws, but rather augments its members' capacity to interact with their
environment, so that community can actually be fo rti fied by irnm unity.
The primary example Esposito offers for such an inununitary opening
to community will be found in birth. In Immunitas, Esposito introduces
x.xxij
Translator's lntroduction
pregnancy as a model for ao immunity that augments the ability of the fetus
and mother to remain healthy as the pregnancy ru ns its course. Their interaction takes place, however, in an immun itary framewo rk in which the
mo ther's system o f se lf-defense is reined in so that the fe tus does not become the object of the mo ther's own immunization. The immun ity system
of the mother "immunizes itself against an excess of immu nization" thanks
to the extraneousness of the fetus to the mother.91 lt isn't tha t the motber's
body fai ls to attack the fetus- it docs-bu t the irnrn uoological reaction
winds up p rotecting the fetus an d not. destroying it.. In the example o f p regnancy with its p roductive immunitary features, Esposito finds a suggestive
metaphor for an immunity in which the greater the diversity of the o ther,
which would in traditional immunitary terms lead to an all-out immunitary
struggle against it, is o nly o ne possibility. Another is an immunization that,
rather than attacking its communa l antinomy, fortifies it. Bios as a political
form of life, a community, emerges out of an immu nization that successfully irumun izes itself against attacki ng what is other, with the result that a
more general defense of t.he system itself, the community, occu rs.
T his may accow1t for the distance Esposito is willing to tra,el in awardin g
birth a political valence. In some of Bios's most rewarding pages, Esposito
suggests that immunization isn't tbe on ly category capable of preserving
or protecting life from death, but rather that birtb, or the con tinual rebirth
o f all liJe in diJ'ferent g uises, can function sinlihuly. Dra,ving on Spinoza's
theory o f li fe and Gi lbert Si mo ndo n's reflectio ns o n individuatio n, Esposito extends the category o f birth to those moments in which the subject,
"moving past one threshold;' ex-periences a new form of individuatio n. He
assumes a stratum of life that all living beings share, a co mmo n bios that is
always already politica l as it is tbe basis on which the continued birth of
individuation occurs. So doing, he elaborates bios in such a way tha t :We
will in turn be inscribed with in it: tbere is no life witbout individuation
through birth. Although Esposito doesn't say so explicit.ly, the suggestio n is
that a new affirmative biopolitics might begin by shuftling the term s by
which we think of the preservation of life. Life is no longer linked exclusively
to those deemed wo rthy of it along witb those who are not, but now comes
to mark every form of life tbat appears thanks to individuation. He writes:
If one th inks about it. life and birth are both the contrary of death: tbe 6.rst
synchronically and the second diachronically. The only way for life to defer
death isn't to preserve it as such ( perhaps i.n the irnmun itary form of n.ega
tive protection)) but rather to be reborn continually in different guises.9~
Translator's ln1 roduc:tioo xxx ij i
An ontology of the individual or th.e subject becomes less a concern thao

the process of individuation associated with the appearance of life, be it
individual or collective. Attempts to immunize life aga inst death give way
to strategies that seek to promote new forms of individuation. The emphasis on individuation (and not the individual) allows Esposito to argue
that the individual is tbe subject that produces itself through individuation, wbich is to say that the individual "is not definable outside of the
political relationsh ip with. those tbat share the ''ital experience." So too
the collective, which is no lo nger seen as the "neutralization of individuality" but rather as a more elaborated form of individuation." Rather than
limiting bios to the immunizatio n of life, Esposito imagines an affirmative
bios tha t privileges those conditions in which life as m<tn ifested across different forms is equ ipped for individuation. T here will be no life that isn't
born anew and hence that isn't inscribed in the hor~wn of bios. Thus Esposito repositio ns bios as the living common to all beings that allows for
individuation to take place, not thwug h the notion of a common bodyfor that too assumes an immunizing function -bur. rather through a bios
that is inscribed in the flesh of the world. Those pages dedicated to Francis
Bacon are significan t here for Esposito sees in Bacon's paintings not only a
reversal of the Nazi biopolitica l practice of animaJizing man, but also an
opening to flesh as describing the condition of the majority of bumanity.
Or more than an opening to the category of flesh, we might well speak of a
non belonging or an intcrbelonging amo ng bodies that makes certain that
what is different isn't closed hermetically within itself but remains in contact
with the outside. Essentially, Esposito is describing not an exteriorization
of the body but rather an internal, even Bataillian rending, that impedes
the body's own absolute immanence. It is on this basis that an affirmative
biopolitics can begin to be imagined.
The Biopolitics of Biotechnology
What does the opening to bios as a political category that h uman ity shares
tell us about that o ther development that so decidedly marks the curren t
biopoliticaJ moment, namely, biotechnology? The question isn't posed in
the reflections and exchanges with regard to biotechnology between )li rgen
Habermas and Ronald Dworkin; indeed, missing is precisely a reflection on
the role biotechnology plays for con temporary biopolitics."' The uJlCOvering
of tbe immun itary paradigm in Bfos, however, allows us to see just where
biopolitics and the eth ical uncertainty surrounding biotech nology might
X.XXJV
Translator's Introduction
intersect. Consider first Habermas's objection that genetic p rogramm ing,

which allows individuals to enhance what they believe to be the desirable
features o f future offspring, places the future of hu man nature at risk. Describing a new type of in terpersonal relationship "that ar ise.s when a person
makes an irreversible decision about the natu ral traits of another person:
Habermas argues tbat our self-und erstanding as members of the species
will be altered wben a person or persons can manip ulate tbe genetic basis
of life of a nother; the basis of free societies that arc premised on relations
"between free a nd equal hu ma n beings" will be und ermined. He adds:
"Th is new type o f relationship offends our moral sensibility because it con stitutes a foreign body in the legally institutionalized relations of recognition
in modern societies:'" The referen ce to foreign bodies in new recogn ition
pro tocols makes it clear that Habermas's language is o ne largely indebted
to the lan guage of irnrnunit)' Wbat's more, the impression is that for Habermas symmetrical relations among the members of a group are homologo us
to the fou ndation of a moral and ethical co m.mur1ity; he assumes something like an un problematic origin of community that is both the cause
and the effect of " human nature: With the genet ic manipulation of the
human, the de,elopmen t o f certain individuals becomes un hinged fro m
their free and unhindered growtb. Knowing tbat o thers a re responsible for
who aod what they are not on ly alters bow they see themselves an d the
kinds of narratives they construct about their individual lives, b ut also jeopardizes how others will sec them (as p rivileged, as escaping somehow from
the natural develop ment of characteristics that occur in interactions with
o thers). These social fo undations o f society will be irreparably damaged
when some members are allowed to intenene genetically in the development of others.
Certainly, Esposito's analysis in Bios an d elsewhere shares a number of features with Haberrnas's sym ptomology of a catastroph ic oeoliberal eugen ic
regime in wh ich individual choice o n futu re genetic programming operates, in not so di fferen t for m, to immu nize certain individ uals fro m the
commun ity. But Esposito parts ways with Habermas in two areas. First,
by disclosing the nega tive mod ality of commun ity in immun ity, Esposito
deconstructs the transcendental concept ion o f commun ity that fo r Habermas is structured by "forms of communica tion throug h which we reacb
a n und erstandi ng with one another.""" For Esposito, there is no o d ginary
moment o f ind ividual self-undc rstaoding that b rings together subjects
to form a commu nit.y, but. rather an impolitical irnrnunitary mechanism
Translalor'sl otroduction XXX\'
operating at th.e h.eart of th.e genesis of community: everyone is joined to gether in their subtraction from community to the degree the gift o f the
mu11us does not belong to the subject. There is "nothing in common;' as he
titles a chapter in Commuuitas, and hence no self-understanding that can
bridge the irreducible difference between subjects. If there is to be a d efense of community ag<tinst the th.rea t of future members whose geneticaUy altered bodies undercut the shared life experiences of aU, it can not be
prem ised on the effects of biotechnology to subtract certain members
from the communal giving o f the mtmus. A critique o f the dangers of con temporary eugenics based on the threat it raises for the bio logical conformity o f its members ru ns aground therefore on the in1pu lse to create a
transcending norm of biological li fe.
This by no means precludes a thoroughgoing critique on Esposito's part
of the biopoliticallexicon in which neoliber<ll eugenic practices are inscribed.
Although Esposito in Bios doesn't discuss curren t neoliberal eugenics, certai nly genetic p rogram ming cannot be thought apart frorn a history of
twentieth-century immunizing biopo litics. Thus, in genetic en hancement
o ne observes the domination of the p rivate sp here in questions of public
interest, which is captured in the blurring between therapeutic and enhancing interventions. As Esposito shows, such a blurring was already a part of
early-twentietb -cen tury eugenics beginning in tbe Uo ited States. The result
is th<tt in the realm of biotechnology and geoetic engineering, politics continues to cen ter on- Esposito wi ll say to be crushed by-the purely biological. But there is mo re. Neoliberal eugenics often appears to combine
within it the three immunitary procedures sketched above that Esposito
locates in a Nazi thanatopolitics. The enormous influence that bio logists
enjoy today for how individual life may uofold later suggests that the absolute normativization of life has increased exponentia Uy, witnessed in the
example with wbich Esposito opeos Bios of the French ch ild, born witb
serious genetic lesions, who sued his mother's doctor for a missed diagnosis.
One can easily imagine other such cases in the near fu ture in which a failu re
to intervene genetically migh t well lead to similar cases against parents or
doctors. So too the second immunitary procedure in wbich the bodies of a
future generation of geneticaUy enhanced individuals can be said to belo ng
no longer to themselves, but rather to the individuals who had ea rlier
d ecid ed on their genetic makeup. A heredita ry patrimony based on the
elimination of weaker elements will occur oo lo nger primarily th rough
euthanasia or sterilization, but rather by selecting beforehand the desired
x.xxvi Translator's Introduction
cbaracteristics. In this sense, where the bodies of the German people during
Nazism were said to belo ng to the Fuhrer, neo liberal eugenics disperses the
choice to the marketplace and science that together will determine which
genetic features are deemed of value. Thus, in ever more rapid fashion
bioengineered bodies may be said to belong to the mechanisms of profi t
and science. So too the preemptory suppression of birth that now takes place
rou tinely in those insta nces in wbich the risk of genetic defects surroundirlg a bir th leads to early termination of the pregnancy. Tb is is not to say, o f
course, that. Nazi t.hanato politics and contemporary neoliberal eugenics
are coterminus for Esposito. In his recent discussion of to talitarian ism and
biopolitics, Esposito anticipates o bjectio ns to any kind o f superimposition
of Nazism and liberalism:
If for Nazism man is bis body and on!)' his body, for liberalism , beginn ing
with Locke, man has a body, which is to say he possesses his body- and
therefore can use it) transtOrrn. it, and sell it rnuch like an iJtternal slave. ln
this sense liberalism- naturally I'm speaking of the category that founds
it- overturns the Nazi perspective} transferring the property of the body
fro m the State to the individual, but within the same bio politicalle:dco n.-n
Here Esposito im plicitly marks the shared vocabulary of liberalism that collaborates deeply with capitalism and twen tietb -century thanatopoliticsnot the double of Nazi biopolitics o r its return, but their shared indebtedness to the te rms of an immunizing modern bi.opolitics.
Dworkin and Life's Norm
The acuteness of Esposito's a ngle of vision o n liberalism also allows us to
situate his position with regard to Ro nald Dworkin's discussi.on of abortion, euthanasia, and bio technology. What we find is a thoroughgo ing deconstruction of the biopolitical and immunizing features of many o f the
terms Dworkin employs. To review: in Life's Dominiou from 1994, Dworkin
speaks of the sacred and inviolable characteristics of "buman life" in c ur
rent debates ou euthanasia and abortion in a n atterupt to u ndercut any
arguments about the fetus as enjoyin g any in trinsic righ ts as a person. His
argument hinges on a reading of the sacred as embedded in human a nd
"artistic creation,:
Our special concern fo r art and culture reflects the respect in which we hold
artistic creatio n, and our special concern for the survival of animal species
reflects a parallel respect for what nature~ understood as divine or as secular,
Translator's Jntro ducl iO[l xxxvij
has produced. These twin bases of the sacred come together in the case of
survival of o ur own species, because we treat lt as crucially j rnportant that
we survive no t o nly biologically but cul turally, that o ur species not only
lives but thrives.j$
Naturally, the sacred life Dworkin defends is not bios at all b ut what he
calls su bjective life, the "personal value we have in mind when we say that
normally a person's life is the most important thing he or sbe has; wbicb
is to say bare li fe. Such a conflation of bare life and bios accoun ts for h is
failu re to think life across different forms; a sacred life is one limited almost
entirely to bare life and hence to all the associations that it calls forth.
No t surprisingly, the emp hasis he places o n artistic a nd divine creation
appears again in bis most recent defense of biotechnology. Tbere the invio lability of life is linked to a defense of biotech nology via the notion of
creation. In an essay titled "Playing God;' Dworkin strongly pushes for
what appears to be a neolibc ral euge nics program masked by the term
"ethic ind ividualism." "There is no th ing in itself wrong;' he writes, "with
the detached ambition to make the lives of future generations of h uman
beings longer and more fu ll of talent and hence ach ievement." "On the
contrary;' he continues, "if playing God means struggling to im p rove our
species, bringing into our conscious designs a reso lution to improve wha t
God deliberately or natu re blindly has evolved over eons, then the first
principle of ethical individualism commands that struggle, and its second
principle forbids, in the absence of positive eviden ce of danger, hobb li ng
the scientists and doctors who volunteer to lead it!''' To the degree the
weig ht we affo rd human lives is continge nt on a no tion of creation, the
"playing God" of the title, biotech nology cannot be separated from t he
implicit sacred nature of created life in all its forms. The emphasis on creation (a nd not creation ism, we should be clear) leads Dworkin down the
path of a robust defense of bio techno logy. Wbo, tbe argument runs, would
disagree with the implicit d esire of r.he not.-yet.-born individual to live a
lo nger a nd more successful life?'""
Here too Esposito offers a rejoinder. By focusing o n the invio lability o f
individual human life, Dworkin fails to weigh properly the singularity of all
life, which is to say that as long as the emphasis is placed on the individual
and o ther traditional forms used to decline the subject, D'vorkin's perspective 011 li fe is d isastrous for any affirmative biopoli tics. What's more, in such
a scbeme, eth ic individualism quickly becomes the oorrn tha t transcends
life; it is a norm of life that. limirs life t.o the confines o f an individual subject
xxx.viii Translator's Jntrodm:tion
and individual body; in th is it operates, as it has traditiooally done, to immunize the communi!)' and modern icy itself, from the immanence of impersonal, singular life. Such an immanence Esposito anchors to the bios of
commrmitas-not one based, as Dworkin would have it, on a commun ity
of citizens who "recognize that the community bas a communal life," but
rather an ecumenical comrn uo ity that runs to all life-forms and one that is
not always and everywhere transcended by notions of citizenship and individuality.'0' In o ther words, Dwork.i.u's explicit link.i.ug of the "sacred" nature of biotechnology and bare life depends not simply on the function of
creation but more importantly is riven through with a debt owed the notion
of the individual. It isn't simply that the governmen t and commerce o ugh t
to "fuel, restrain, or shape these developments fin biotechnology];' but
rather that life understood as the opening to the impersonal singularity
and to the trans- or preindividual cannot emerge as the immanent impu lse of life so long as the norm of life i.s on ly thought in terms of the in dividual subject.10' The open question is to what degree the marriage betwee n biotechnology and the individ ual subject represents a radical jump
in q uality of the immunizing paradigm. How one answers that will determine the prospects for a coming, affirmative biopolitics.
A Fortified Bios?
How, then, can we set about reversing the cu rren t thana topolitical inflection of biotcchnics and biopolitics? Esposito's fina l answer in Bios will be
found by rethinking precisely the relation between norm and life in opposition to Nazi semantics by developing another semantics in which no fundamental norm exists from which the others can be deri,ed. This is because
"every behavior carries with it the norm tbat places it in existence within a
more general natural order. Considering that there are as many multiple
individuals as there are infu1ite modes of substance means that the norms
will be mu ltiplied by a corresponding number."' 0 ' Once the notion of in dividual no longer marks an individual subject but the process of individuation linked to the birth of all forms of life, our attention will then shift
to producing a multiplicicy of norms within the sphere of law. The ind ividual
will no longer be seen as simply the site in which previous genetic programming is executed, no mere hardware for a genetic software, but instead the
space i.n which individuation takes place thanks to every livu1g form's interdcpeodeoce with otber livu1g forms. Norms for individuals will give way
to individualizing norms that respect. the fact that the human body "lives
Transla1or's1ntroductjon :o:xix
in an infinite series of relations with the bodies of o thers." '"'I-Jere as elsewhere Esposito is drawing o n Spinoz.a for his elaboration of a new, nonimmunitary seman tics of a multiplicity o f norms, in which no rms cannot
be though t outside the "movement o f life; o ne in which tbe value of every
norm is linked to its traducibility from one system to another. The resu lt is
the continual deconstruction of any absolute norma tive system, be it Nazi
thanatopolitics or con tem porary capitalist bioenginee ring of the human .
The result is both a defense of difference among life-forms and their associated norms and an explicit critique o f otherness, which for Esposito in evitably c.alls forth immunization from the implici t threat o f contagion and
death.'"' The emphasis on difference (and not o therness) amo ng life-forms
in the closing pages of Bios is linked to change, which Esposito sees not on ly
as a prerogative of the living, but as tbe basis for elaborating a radical tolerance toward a world understood as a mu ltiplicity of different living forms.
The question, fi nally, is how to fortify a li fe's opening to o ther lives witho ut at th e same time inscribing it in ar1 i.rumu nitary paradigrn . For Esposito,
the answer, as I suggest.ed when addressing Dworkin's neoliberal perspective on biotechnology, lies in destabilizing the absolute immanence of the
individual life by forgoing an emphasis on the individual life in favor o f an
" indefin ite life: T he reference to Deleuze's last essay, "Pu re Imma nence;
allows Esposito to counterpose the absolute immanence of individ ual life
to the absolu te singularity of a "life." Tbe relevan t quote from Deleuze
merits ci tation:
T he life of the individual gives way to an impersonal and yet singular life
that releases a pure event freed from the accidents o f internal and eA'ternal
life, that is, from subjectivity and objectivity of what happens: a "Homo
lantum" with \vhom CVC'ryonc empathizes and who attains a sort of bcatitlld('.
It is haecccity no longer of in dividuation but of singul;orization: a life of
pure immanence, neutral beyond good and e'il, fo r it was only the subject
that incarnated it in the midst of rbings that made it good or bad. Tbe life
of such an irldividuality fades away in favor of the singular life immanent to
a man who no lo nger has a name. tho ugh he can be m istaken for no othe r.
A singular essence. a life. 106
Esposito's excursus on flesh and individuating birth attempts to articulate

the necessary conditions in '"hich the character istics of just sucb a singular
homo tan turn ca n be actualized ; implicit in the figu re of the homo tarrtum
is a "oorm of life that doesn't subject life to the traoscen deoce of a oorm,
but makes the norm t.he immanen t impulse of life :''"' If we were to express
xl
Transl;;1tor's lntroductjon
such a figure biopolitically, the category of bios wiU name the biopolitical
thought that is able to think life across all its man ifestations or forms as a
unity. There is no zoe that can be separated from bios because "every life is
a form of life and every form refers to life:'' " Esposito here translates
Deleuze's singular life as the reversal of the thanatopolitics he sees under
pinning the N<lZi normative project in wbich some Jives were oot coosid
ered forms and hence closed off from bios. The opening to ao affirma tive
biopoliti.cs takes place precisely when we recogn ize that harming one part
o f life or one life banns all lives. T he radical toleration of life-forms that
epitomizes Esposi to's readi ng of contemporary biopolitics is therefore
based on the conviction that every life is inscribed in bios.
No greater obstacle to fortifying bios exists today tban those biopolitical
practices that separate out z6i! from bios, practices that go hand in hand
with the workings of the immunitary par<ldigm. Esposito seems to be sug
gesting that our open ing to an affinnative biopolitics becomes thinkable
only when a certain moment has been reached when a philosophy of life
appears possible in the folds of an ontology of death, when the irnrnunitary mechanisms of the twenty-first century reach the point of no return.
In such an event, when the immunitary apparatus attacks bios by producing zoe, a space opens io which it becomes possible to posit bios as not io
opposition to z6ebut as its ultim ate horizon. Th us the subject of Bios is l.i.fe
at the beginning of the twenty-fi rst century, its fortunes inextricably joined
to a ductile immunitary mechanism five hu ndred years or so in operation.
Five hundred years is a long time, but the conditions, Esposito argues, may
be right for a fundamental and long overdue rearticu lation or reinscription of bios in a still to be completed political lexicon that is radically
humanistic to the degree that there can be no z6i! that isn't already bios.
One of tbe shorthands Esposito offers in Bios for tb.inkiog the difference
will be fouod in the juxtaposition between a "politics of mastery and the
negation of life" and another future, affirmative politics of life.' ..
Life as Bios
These ;ue, it seems to me, the most significant elements of Esposito's geneal
ogy and ontology of contemporary biopolitics. What 1 would like to do in
the remaining pages is to suggest possible areas of contact between Bios
and contemporary public cu lture.
Esposito's uncovering of tbe reciprocity between community and immunity captures brilliantly the stalemate that continues r.o characterize debates
l 'r:tnslaror's lntroduction xli
about the choice between security and freedom. One need only recall the
Patrio t Act a nd the justificatio n for its attacks o n civil liberties in the name
o f " homeland security" to see where the disastrous effects of excessive immunization on a community will be registered: precisely in immunity's
closing to community. Once we see immun ity/commu nity as a continuum
we can understand the p recise meaning of "the war on terror begins at
home" as directed aga inst the radical ope.ning to social relations tha t are
implicit in the gift and obli.g ation of tbe rnunus, both globally aod locally.
We are living, Esposito suggests, in one of the most lethal immun itary
mechanisms of the modern period, lethal for both global re lations, which
now are principally based on war, an d the concurrent repression sanctioned
by security concerns. As I bave noted repeatedly, recognizing the dangers
o f immun ization for meaningfu l a nd productive relations between individual members and among commu n ities doesn't in any way lead Esposito, however, to argue for a retu rn to some p rivileged origin of comm un ity.
Attempts to locate such an orig in arc doomed to a melancholic search for
community that can never be met. At the same t.ime, recognizing the fu tility of such a search creates an opportun ity, thanks to the con temporary
immunity crisis, to think again what the basis for co mmunity might be.
Wbat needs to take place therefore is tb inking thro ugh a dialectic of ho w
to singularize "we." Esposito's itii1erary that mo,es tb rough imm un ities
that fortify singular "we's" than ks to tbe articulation of individuation can
help ma ke us not only mo re attentive to our encou nters with others and
the other, but also to examine more deeply the kinds o f motivations that
undergird these kinds o f encoun ters.
Obvio usly, the opportunity fo r thinking anew the assumptions o n which
communities come together will have a profound iinpact on the kind of
public c ulture we wish for ourselves. What kind of p ublic culture, for instaoce, makes possible and nourishes an open ing to the common tlesb of
all, one that. is capable o f vitalizing all fo rms of life? Is there already implicit in the notion of public cultu re a private space that can have no truck
with the kinds of retoo led relations Esposito is describing? These kinds o f
questions are not easily asked in the current war on terror, a war founded
precisely on excluding "terrorists" from tbe horizon o f bios, that is, as forms
of life (now enemy combatan ts) wbo do not merit any political q ualification.
Thus, when Presi dent Bush speaks of teuod sm as rep resenting "a mortal
danger to all humanity" or wben he describes "tense borders" u nder assault,
the implicit connect.io n to an immu nitary pa radigm beco mes o bvious. 110
xlii TrJ nslators Introd uction
It is beca use terrorism represen ts a wa r oo b umani ty th.at it is a war against

life itself, that borders must be defended and strengthened. Not simply geograph.ic borders bu t, mo re significa ntly, the borders o f the kind o f life that
can and can not be inscribed in bios. The result is once again the politicization o f life and with it the demarcation of those lives ou tside bios. T he effect o f limiting bios to only those on one side of the border isn't simply to
ma rk, however, those who can be sacrificed as homo sacer, as Agamben
would have it, b ut rather to attack with violer1ce the mwrus irnm unity
shares with commu nity. Inte restin gly, in some of his speeches Presiden t
Geo rge W. Bush also speaks o f liberty as the vital catalyst fo r im proving
"the lives of all"; leavin g asid e just what he in tends for liberty, clearly tod ay
liberty is disclosed ever more readily as a n effect of the immu nity mod ality,
much as Esposito describes it in those pages d edicated to Locke.'" In perhaps more obviou s f.1sh ioo than in recent memory, liber ty is spectacu la rly
reduced to th e security of th e subject; a subject who possesses liberty is the
secure(d ) citizen. Althoug h Esposito doesn't elaborate oo the relation of
the modern subject to the citizen- as the closing pages of Bios make clear,
his resea rch is moving necessarily towa rd a genealogy of"the person"- he
d oes explicitly suggest that a semantics of the individ ual or the citizen has
always functioned within an immu nitary paradigm.'" As tem pting as it
migbt be to read liberty as a vi tal mu ltiplier of community in opposition to
immu niry, such a strategy is doomed to failu re as well, given liberty's historical failure to main tai n a ny au to no my with regard to the p rotection o f li fe.
If we read Esposito carefully, the fi rst step to a public cultu re made vital
by communi tas begins with the recogn ition that the lives o f "terror ists"
can in no way be detached fro m a political qualification that is o rig inary
to life. Ra ther than merely agreeing to the ir exterioritation to bios, whicb
a ppea rs as bo th an ethical and a ph ilosophical failu re of enormous magn itude, wbat we need to do is to uoderstand aod p ractice differently the u nity
o f bios a nd politics in such a way t.hat we n o longer reinfo rce t.he poli ticization of li fe (which is p recisely what the war o n terro r is intended to
d o), b ut instead create the conditions for what he calls a "vitalization o f
polit ics:'" ' No greater task confronts us today than imagining the fo rm
such a vitalized politics migh t take, as that is p recisely the direction in
which an originary and in tense sense o f communitas resides.
Bios
Introduction
Prance, November 1000. A decision o f the French Appeals Court opens a

lacerating conflict in French jurisprudence. Two appeals arc overturned,
which had in turn reversed the previous sen tences. The court recognized
that a baby by the name o f Nicolas Perruche, who was born with serio us
ge netic lesions, had the right to sue the doctor who bad misdiagnosed a
case of German measles in the pregnant mother. Against her expressed
wishes, sbe was prevented &om aborting. What appears to be the legally
irresolv;lble object of controversy in the entire incident is attributing to
small Nicolas the right. not to be born. At issue is not the proven error of
the med ical laboratory, but rather the status of the subject who contests it.
How can an individual have legal recourse against the only circu mstance
that furnishes him with juridical subjectivity, namely, that o f his own birth?
Tbe difftculty is both of a logical and an ontological order. If it is already
problematic that a being can invoke his or her right not to be, it is even
more difficult to tb ink of a non being (wh ich is precisely who has not yet
been born) that. claims the right to remain as such, and therefore not to
enter into the sphere of being. What appears undecidable in terms of the
law is the relation between bio logical realty and the j uridical person, that
is, between natu ral life and a form of life. It is true that being born into
such conditions, the baby incurred harm. But who if not he himself could
have decided to avoid it, eliminating beforehand his own being as the su bject of li fe, the life proper of a subject? Not on ly. Because every subjective
right correspor1ds to the obligation of not obstructing those who are in a
condition to do so signi fies that. the mother would have been forced to
3
4 lntroduction
abort irrespective of her cboice. The right of tbe fetus not to be born would
be configured therefore as a preve ntive duty on the part of the person who
conceived to eliminate him fsopprimerloj, instituting in such a way a eugenic
caesura, one that is legally recogn ized, between a juridical life that is judged
as valid and another "life unworthy of life:' to use the Nazi phrase.
Afghanistan, November zoOJ. Two montbs after the terrorist <lttacks of
September n, a new kind of "humanitarian" war takes shape in the skies
above Afghanistan. The adjective Jrumtmitarian no longer co.ncen1s the reasons behind the conflict-as had occurred in Bosnia and Kosovo, namely,
to defend entire populations from the threat of ethnic genocide-but its
privileged instrument, which is to say air bombardments. And so we find
that both bighly destructive bombs were released along with provisions and
medicine on the same territory at the same time. We must not lose sight of
the threshold that is crossed here. Tbe problem doesn't lie only in tbe dubious juridical legitimacy of wars fought in the name of universal rights
on the basis of arbitrary or biased decisions on the part of those who had
the force t.o impose and execute them, and not even in the lack of uniformity often established between proposed ends and the results that are obtained. The most acute O):ymoro n of h uman itarian bombardment lies
rather in the superimposition tbat is man ifested in it between tbe declared
intention to defend life and to prod uce actual deatb . The wars of the twen tieth century have made us accustomed to the reversal of the proportion
between military deaths (which was largely the case before) and civilian
victims (which are today far superior to the former). From time immemorial racial persecu tions have been based on the presupposition that the
death of some strengthens the life of others, but it is precisely for this reason
that the demarcation of a clear division between lives to destroy and lives
to save end ures and indeed grows. It is precisely such a distinction that is
tendentiously erased in tbe logic of bombardments that are destined to
kill and protect the same people. The root of such an indistinction is not to
be sought, as is often done, in a structu ral mutation of war, but rather in
the much more radical transformation of tbe idea of huma.nitas that subtends it. Presumed for centuries as what places h uman beings {gli uomini/
above the simple common life of other living species (and therefore charged
with a political value). humanitas increasingly comes to adhere to its own
biologi.cal material. But once it is reduced to its pure vital substance and
for that reason removed from every juridical-political form, the humanity
of man remains necessarily exposed to what. both saves and annihilates it.
Introduction 5
Russia, October zoo2. Special groups of the Russian state police raid the
Dubrovska Theater in Moscow, where a Chechen commando un it is ho lding almost a thousand people hostage . The incursion results in the death of
128 hostages as well as almost all of the terrorists thanks to an incapacitating
and lethal gas. T he episode, justified and indeed praised by other governments as a model of firmn ess, marks <tnotber step witb respect to the others
I've alread y described. Even if in this case the term " human itarian" was not
used, the underlying logic is no different: the deaths here emerge o ut of the
same desire t.o save as many lives as possible. Without lingering over o ther
troubling circumstances (such as the use of a gas that was prohibited by
international treaties or the impossibility of making available adequate antidotes wh ile keeping secret tbeir very nature}, let's consider the point that
interests us most. The death of the hostages wasn't an indirect and accidental
effect of the raid by law enJorcement, which can happen in cases sucb as
these. lt wasn't the Chechens, who, surprised by the police assault, killed the
hostages, but the police who killed tbem d irectly. Frequently one speaks of
the specularity of the methods between terrorists and those that face off
against them. Th is is understandable and under certain lin1its inevitable.
But never before does one see governmental agents, charged with saving
prisoners from a possible death, ca rry out tbe massacre themsehes, which
the terrorists had themselves only threatened. Various factors weighed in the
Russian president's decision: the desire to discou rage o ther attempts of the
sort; the message to the Chechens that their fight had no hope of succeeding; and a display of sO\ereign power in a time of its apparent crisis. But,
fundamentally, something else constitutes its tacit assumption. T he blitz
o n the Dubrovska Theater not only marks, as 1said, the withdrawal of po litics io the face of bru te force, nor is it irreducible to the unveiling of an
o riginary conn ection between politics and evil [male/. lt is the extreme expression that politics can assume when it faces, without any mediation, the
question of the survival of human beings suspe nded between life and
death . To keep them alive at all cost, o ne can even decide to hasten their
death.
China, Februflry 2003 . The Western media circulates the news (strongly
censored by the Ch inese government) that in the sole province of Henan
there are a million and a ha lf Chinese who are seroposi tive, with some villages such as Donghu ha,,ing a percentage that reaches upwards of So percent of the population. Unlike other Tb ird World cou ntries, the contagioo
does nor. have a natural or a sociocultural cause, but. an immediar.e economic
6 Introduction
and political one. At its origin is not unprotected sexual relations nor dirt)'
drug needles, b ut rather the sale e n masse of blood, wh ich the central government encouraged and organ ized. The blood, which the government had
extracted from peasants who were in need of mo ney, was centrifuged in
large containers that separated the plasma from the red globules. While the
former was sent to rich buyers, the latter was again injected into tbe donors
so as to avo id anemia and to force them into repeating the operation. But
it only took one of them to be infected to contaminate the entire stock of
blood contained in the huge cauldrons. Thus, en tire villages were fi lled
with those who were seropositive, wh ich, given the lack of medicine, became a death sentence. It is true that China has recently sold cheap an tiAIDS medicines produced locally on the market, b ut it did not make them
available to the peasants of Henan , whom it not o nly ignored, bu t whom it
obliged to keep quiet at the risk of imprisonment. The affa ir was revealed
by someone who, left alone after the deaths o f h is relatives, preferred dying
in prison rather than in his own hut alo r1e. It's enough to move o ur gaze
onto another, larger phenomenon to see that bio logical selectio n in a country that co ntinues to define itself as commun ist isn't o nly of class, b ut also
o f sex. This happens at the moment when the state policy o f"a single ch ild"
(wh ich was intended to halt a growing demographic) is joined to tbe technology of ecography, causing the abortion of a large o umber of those who
wou ld have become futu re women. Tb is made the former traditional practice in the cou ntryside, of drown ing fe male infan ts upon birth , UJHJecessary, but it was bound to a ugmen t the n umerical disproportion between
males and females. It has been calcu lated that in less than twen ty years it
will be difficult for Chinese men to find a wife, if they don't tear her away
from her family as an adolescent. Perbaps it's for this reason that in China
the rela tion between female and male suicides is five to one.
Rwanda, Apri/2oo4. A Uoited Nations report tells us that around ten thousand bab ies of the same age are the bio logical resu lt of mass ethn ic rapes
that occurred ten years ago d uri ng the genocide that the Hutu committed
o n the Tutsi . As occurred later in Bosnia and other parts of the world, such
a practice modified in original ways the relation between life ;md deatb that
had until then been recognized in traditional wars and even in those socalled asymmetrical wars against terrorists. vVhile in these 'vars death always comes from life-and even comes through life as in kami kaze su icide
attacks-in the act of etho ic rape it is also life that emerges from death,
Introduction 7
from violence, and from the terror of women who were made pregnant
while unconscious from the blows they had received or immobi lized with
a knife to their throat. It is an example of "positive" eugenics that is not
juxtaposed to the negative one practiced in China or elsewhere, but rather
constitutes its counterfactual result. Whereas the Nazis and all their imita
tors carried out genocide b)' p reemptively destroying birth, those of today
do so th rougb forced birth and therefore in the most drastic perversion of
th e event tbat brings essence to self {in se /'essetwl ), other tba n th.e prom ise o f life. Contrary to those who saw in the newness of birth the symbolic
a nd real presupposition for renewed politica l action, ethnic rape makes it
the most acute point o f connection between life and death, b ut which occu rs in the tragic pawdox of a new generation of life. That all Rwandan
mothers of the war, when asked about their own experiences, declared
their love for their children born from hate signifies that the force of life
prevails once agai n over that of death . Furthermore, the most extreme irnrn un itary p ractice, which is to say affirming the superiority of one's own
blood t.o the point o f imposing ir. on those with whom one does not share
it, is destined to be turned against itself, p roducing exactly what it wanted
to avo id. The Hutu children of Tutsi women, or the Tutsi ch ildren o f Hutu
men, are tbe objective communitarian, wh ich is to say multietbnic o utcome
of the most violent racial immuni~ation. We are faced here too witb a sort
of undecidability, or a double-faced phenomenon in which life and politi cs arc jo ined in a relation whose interpretation demands a new conceptual lan guage.
Ar. the center of such a language is the notion of biopolitics. It is by
starting with biopolitics that events such as those I've just described, wh ich
escape a more tradi tional in terpreta tion, find a complex of meaning tha t
mo ves beyond their simple ma nifestation. It is true that they pro vide an
extreme in1age (though certain ly not unJaitbful) of a dynamic that already
involves all the most important political p henomena of our time. From
the war of a nd against terro rism to mass mig ratio ns; from the politi cs o f
p ublic health to those of demography; from measures of security to the
un limited extension of emergency legislation - there is no phenomenon
o f in ternational importance that is extraneous to the do uble tendency tha t
situates the episodes I've just described within a single of line of meaning.
On the one hand, a gwwing superimpositio n between the domai.n o f power
or of law /diritto) and that of life; oo the otber, ao equally close implication
8 Introduction
that seems to have been derived with regard to death. It is exactly the tragic
paradox that Michel Foucau lt, in a series of writings dating back to the
middle o f the 1970S, examined. Why does a politics o f life always risk being
reversed into a work o f death?
I think I can say, without failing to acknowledge the extraordinary ana
lytic power of h is work, that Foucault never fuUy ans1vered the question; or
better, that he. always hesitated choosing from among differen t responses,
responses that were for their parr tributaries of different modes of approaching the question that he himself had raised. The opposite interpretations of
biopolitics, the one radically negative and the o ther abso lutely euphoric
that tod ay lead the field, do nothing except make absolute (by spreading
them apart) the two hermeneutic options between which Foucault never
decided. Withou t an ticipating here a more detailed reconstruction of the
affair, my impression is that this situation of pbilosopbical and political
stalemate originates with a question that is either missing or has been in sufficiently posed coocero ing the presuppositions of tl1e theme in question:
not just what biopolitics signifies but bow it was born. How is it configured
O\'er time and which aporias does it continue to carry? It's enough to extend
research on the diachro nic axis as well the horizon tal level to recognize
that Foucau lt's decisive theorizations are nothing but tbe final segment (as
well as tbe most accomplished) of a line of discourse that goes rather fur
ther back in time, to the beginning of tbe last century. To bring to light this
lexical tradition (for the first time I wou ld add ), revealing its contiguity
and seman tic intervals, o bviously doesn't o nly ha1e a p hilological emphasis, because o nly a similar kind of operation of excavation promotes the
force and orig inality of Foucault's thesis through differences with it; bu t
above aUbeca use it aUows us to peer into the black box of biopolitics from a
variety of angles and with a greater breadth of gaze. lt becomes possible to
construct a critical perspective oo the interpretive path that Foucault bimself
created; for example, wi th reference to the complex re lationship, wh ich he
instituted, between the biopolitical regime and so,ereign power. We will return in more detail to this specific point further on, but what ought to draw
our a tten tion - beca use it involves the very same meaning of the category
in question- is the relation between the politics o f life and the ensemble of
modern political categories. Does biopolitics precede, follow, or coincide
temporally witll modernity? Does it have a h istori.cal, epochal, or o rigi.nary
dimeosioo? Foucault's respoose to such a question is not completely clear, a
question that is decisive because it is logically connected t.o th e in terpreta-
lntroduc1 io o 9
tion of contemporary experience. He oscillates between a continuist attitude a nd another that is more inclined to mark differential thresho lds.
My thesis is that this kind of an epistemo logical uncertain ty is attribu table to the failure to use a more ductile paradigm, one that is capable o f
a rticulating in a more intrinsic manner the two lemmas that a re enclosed
in the concept in question, which I have for some time now referred to in
terms of immu nization. Without expanding here on its overall mean ing
(which I've had occasion to defi ne elsewhere in all its projections of sense),
the elemen t r.hat qu ickly needs to be esr.ablished is the peculiar knot. tha t
immun izatio n posits between biopolitics a nd modernity.' I say quickly because it restores the missing lin k o f Foucault's argumentation. Wha t I wan t
to say is tbat only wben biopolitics is linked conceptu ally to the immun itary dynam ic of the negative protectio n of life does biopolitics reveal its
specifically modern genesis. This is not because its roots are missing in other
precedi ng epochs (they aren't), but because on ly modernity makes of individual self-preservation the presupposition of all other political catego ries,
from sovereignty to liberty. Naturally, the fact that modern biopolitics is
also embodied throug h the mediation of categories that are still ascribable
to the idea of order (understood as the transcendental of the relation between power and subjects) means that tbe politicity of bios is still not
affirmed absolutely. So tbat it might be, which is to say so that life is immediatel)' translatable into politics or so that politics might assume an intrinsiwlly bio logical characterization, we have to wait for the totalitarian turn ing point o f the 1930s, in particular for Nazism. There, not only the negative
(wh ich is to say the work o f d eath) will be functionalized to stabilize order
(as certain ly was still the case in the modern period), but it will be produced in growing quantities according to a thanatopolitical dialectic tha t is
bound to condition the strengthening of life vis-~-vis the ever more extensi,e realization of death.
In th e point of passage from the first to the second form o f immunization
will be found the works of Nietzsche, to whom l've dedicated an entire chapter of this book. 1 have do ne so not only for his underlying biopolitical relevance, but because he constitutes an extraordinary seismograph of the ex
haustion of modern political categories when mediating between politics and
life. To assume the will of power as the fundamental vita l impulse means
affirtn i\g at the same time that life has a constitutively political di mension
and tbat politics bas no other object tban the maintenance and expansioo
o f life. It is precisely in the relationsh ip between these two ulr.imate modes
10
[ntroduction
of referring to bios that tbe innovative or conservative, or active or reactive

character of forces facing each other is established. Nietzsche himself and the
meaning o f his works is part of this compariso n and struggle, in the sense
that together they exp ress the most explicit criticism of the modern immunitary loss of meaning and an element of acceleration from with in. From
here a categorical as well as sty listic splitting occurs between rwo ton<llities
of thought juxtaposed and interwoven that constitutes the most typical
cipher of the Niet~schean text: destin.e d o r\ the o.ne side to anti.cipatc, at
least on the theoretical level, the destructive and self-destructive slippage
of twentieth-century biocracy, and on the o ther the prefiguration of th e
lines of an affirmative biopolitics that has yet to come.
The fina l section of the book is dedicated to the relation between philosophy and bio politics after Nazism. Why do I insist on referring p hilosophy to what \\anted to be the most explicit negation of philosophy as ever
appeared? Well, first because it is precisely a similar negation that demands
to be understood ph ilosophically ir1 its darkest corners. And then because
Nazism negated philosophy not on ly generically, but in favor of biology, o f
which it considered itself to be the most accomplished realization .! examine in detail this thesis in an extensive chapter here, corroborating its truthfulness, at least in tbe literal sense that the Nazi regime brought tbe biologization of politics to a point that had never been reacbed previously. Nazism
treated the German people as an organic body tbat needed a radical cure,
wh ich consisted in the violent removal of a part that was already considered
spiritually dead. From this perspective and in contrast to communism (which
is still joined in posthumous homage to t he category of totalitarianism),
Nazism is no longer inscribable in the self-preserving dynamic of both the
early and later modernities; and certainly not beca use it is extraneous to
immunitary logic. On the contrary, Na-tism works within tbat logic in such a
paroxysmal maoner as to turn the protective apparatus aga inst its owo
body, which is precise ly what happens in a utoimmu ne diseases. The final
orders of self-destruction put forward by Hitler barricaded in his Berlin
bunker offer overwhelming proof. From this point of view, one can say
that the Nazi experience represents the culn1ination of biopolitics, at least
in that qualified expression of being absolutely indistinct from its reversa l
into thaoa topolitics. But precisely for this reason the catastropbe in wbicb
it is immersed constitutes the occasion for an epocl1al rethinking of a category that, far from disappearing, every day acquires more meaning, not
Introduction n
only in the eveots I ooted above, but also in the overall configuration of
contemporary experience, and above all from the moment when the implosion of Soviet communism cleared the field o f the last p hilosop hy o f
modern history, delivering us over to a world that is completely globalized.
It is at th is level that discou rse today is to be cond ucted: the body that
experiences ever more intensely the indistinction between power and life is
no longer that of the. individua l, nor is it that sovereign body of nations,
but that body of the world that is both torn a nd un ified. Never before as
today do the confl icts, wounds, and fea rs that r.ear the body to pieces seem
to put in to play noth ing less than li fe itself in a singu lar reversal between
the classic philosophical theme of the "world of life" and that theme heard
so often today of the "life of the world." T his is the reason that contemporary thought cannot fool itself (as still happens today) in belatedly d efending modern political categories that have been shaken and o verturned.
Contemporary thought cannot and must not do a nythi ng o f the sort, because biopoli.tics originates precisely in these political categories, before it
rebels against. them; and then because r.be heart of the problem r.hat we are
facing, wh ich is to say the modification of bios by a part of politics identified
with technology [tecnicaj, was posed for the first time (in a man ner that
wou ld be insufficient to define as a pocalyptic), precisely in the antiphilosophical aod biological ph ilosophy of Hitlerism . I d o realize how delicate
this kind of statement may seem in its contents and still more in its resonance, b ut it isn't possible to place questions of expediency before t he
truth of the matters at hand. From another perspective, twentieth -century
thought has from the beginning in1plicitly undersr.ood this, acceptin g the
comparison a nd the struggle with radical evil o n its own terrain. It was so
for Heidegger, along an itinerary tbat brougb t h inl so close to that vortex
tha t he risked letting himself be swaUowed by it. But the same was al so true
for Arendt an d Foucault, both of wbom were conscious, albeit in differen t
ways, r.hat one cou ld rise above Nazism o nly by knowing its drifts a nd its
precipices. It is the path that I myself have tried r.o follow here, working
back to fron t within three Nazi dispo>~tifs: the absolute normativization of
life, the double enclosure of the body, and the anticipntory suppression of
birth. 1 have traced them with the inten tion o f p rofiling the admittedly
a pproximate and provisional contours of an affirmative biopolitics that is
capable of overtum ing the Nazi politics of d eath in a politics that is no
longer over life b u t ofW'e.
12
Introduction
Here there is a final point that seems to me useful to daruy before proc.eeding. Without denyi ng the legitimacy of o ther interpretions or o ther
normative projects, I do not believe the task of philosophy-even when
biopolitics challenges it-is that of proposing models of political action that
make biopolitics the flag of a revo lutionary manifesto or merely something
reformist. This isn't beca use it is too radical a concept but bec.1use it isn't
radica l enough. Tb is would, moreover, contradict the initial presuppositioo according to which it is no longer possible to disarticulate poli.tics
and life in a form in which the former can provide orientation to the latter.
Th is is not to say, of course, that politics is in capable of acting on what is
both its object and subject; loosening the grip of new sovereign powers is
possible and necessary. Perhaps what we need today, at least for those wbo
practice philosophy, is the converse: not so much to th ink life as a function
of politics, but to think politics within the same fo rm of life. It is a step
that is anything but easy because it would be con cerned with bringing life
into relation with biopolitics not from the outside- io the modality of
accepti ng or refusing-but from with in; to open life to the point at which
something emerges which had unt il today remained out of view because it
is held tigh tly in the gr ip of its opposite. I have attempted to offer more
than one example of such a possibility and of such a dema nd with rega rd
to the figure of flesh, norm, and birth thought inversely with respect to body,
law, and nation. But the most general and in tense dimension of th is constructive deconstruction has to do pcecisely with that immuni tary pacadigm that constitu tes the distinctive mode in which biopolitics has until
now been put. forward. Never more than in this case does its semantics,
that of the negative protectio n of life, reveal a fundamental relation with
its cornmunitarian opposite. If immuttitas is not even thin kable outside of
the common munus tha t also negates it, perha ps biopolitics, whicb until
now has been folded tightly in to it, can also turn its negative sign into a
different., positive sense.
CHAPTER ONE
The Enigma of Biopolitics
Bioi politics
Recently, not on ly has the notion of "biopolitics" moved to the center of
international debate, but the term has opened a completely new phase in
contemporary thought. From the moment that Michel Foucault reproposed
and redefined the concept {when not coining it), the entire frame of political philosophy emerged as profoundly modified. It wasn't that classical categories such as tbose of "law" [dirirto}, "so,ereignty; and "democracy"
sudden ly left the scene-they con tinue to organ ize current political discourse-but that their effective meaning always appears weaker and lacking
any real interpretive capacity. Rather than explaining a reality that everywhere
slips through their analytic grip, these categories themselves demand to be
subjected to the scrutiny of a more penetrating gaze that bo th deconstructs
and explains them. Let's consider, for instance, law /Iegge}. Differently from
what many have argued, tbere is noth ing that suggests that such a domaio
has somehow been reduced . On the contrary, the impression is that the
domain of law is gaining terrai n both domestically and internationally;
that the process of normativization is investing increasingly wider spaces.
Nevertheless, this doesn't mean that juridical language per se re,eals itself
to be incapable of illuminating the profound logic of such a change. When
one speaks of "human rights; for example, rather than referring to establi shed juridical subjects, one refers to individuals defined by nothing other
than the simple fact of being alive. Something analogous can be said about
the political dispositif of sovereignty. Anything but destined to weaken as
13
14 The Enigma of BiopoUtics
some had rashly forecast (at least witb regard to tbe world's greatest
power), sovereignty seems to have extended and inte nsified its range of action-beyond a repertoire that for centuries bad characterized its relation to
both citizens and other state structures. With the clear distinction between
inside and outside weakened (and therefore also the distinction between
war and peace that had cha racterited sovereigo power for so long), sovereignty finds itself directly engaged with questions of life and death that no
longer have to do with si.ogl.e areas, but with th.e wodd in all of its extensions. T herefore, if we take up any perspective, we see that. something that
goes beyond the customary language appears to involve directly Jaw and
politics, dragging them into a dimension that is outside their conceptual
apparatuses. Tbis "something" - this element and this substance, tb is substrate and this upheaval- is precisely the object of biopo litics.
Yet there doesn't appear to be an adequate categorical ex:actitude that
correspo nds to the epochal relevance of biopolitics. Far fwm havi ng acquired a definitive order, the concept of biopoli tics appears to be traversed
by an uncerr.ainty, by an uneasiness that impedes every stable connotation.
Indeed, 1 would go further. Biopolitics is exposed to a growing hermeneutic pressure that seems to make it not only the instrume.nt but also the
object of a bitter philosophical and political figh t over the configuration
and destiny of the current age. From here its oscillation (though one could
weU say its disruption) between interpretatioos, and before that e''eo its
different, indeed conflicting to nalities. What is at stake of course is the
nature of the relation that forces together the two te rms that make up the
category of biopolitics. But even before that its defi nition: what do we
understand by bios and how do we want to think a politics that directly
addresses it? The reference to the classic fgure of bios politikos doeso't
help, since tbe semantics in question become meaningful precisely when
the meaning of the term withdraws. If we waot to remain with the Greek
(and in particular with the Aristotelian) lexicon, biopolitics refers, if anything, to the dimension of zoe, which is to say to life in its simple biological
capacity [ten uta/, more than it doe.s to bios, understood as "qualified life"
or "form of life; or at least to the line of conjugation along which bios is
exposed to zoe, naturalizing bios as well. But precisely with regard to this
terminological exchange, the idea of biopolitics appears to be situated in a
zone of double iodisccrnibility, first because it is inhabited by a term that
does not beloog to it and indeed risks distorting it. Aud then because it is
fixed by a concept, precisely that. of zoe, which is stripped of every formal
The enigma of lliopolitics 15
connotation. Z6<! itself can only be defined problematically: what, assuming it is even conceivable, is an absol utely natural li fe? It's eve n mo re the
case today, when the human body appears to be increasingly challenged
and also literally traversed by technology /tecnicaj.' Po litics penetrates
directly in life and life becomes other from itself. Thus, if a natural life
doesn't exist that isn't <H tbe same time tech.nologic<Jl as well; if the relation
between bios and z6i! needs by now (or has always nee.ded) to include in it
a third coHclatcd term, techne-then how do we hypothesize an exclusive
relation between politics and life?
Here too the concept of biopolitics seems to withdraw or be emptied of
con tent in the same mo ment in which it is formulated. What remains clear
is its negative value, wbat it is not or the horizon of sense that marks its
closing. Bio politics has to do with that complex of mediations, oppositions, and dialectical o perations that in an extended phase made possible
the modern political order, at least according to current interpretation.
With respect to these and tl1e q uestions and problems to which they correspond relative to r.he definitio n of power, to the measure of its exercise
and to the delineation of its limits, it's indisputable that a general sh ift of
field, logic, and the object of politics has taken place. At the moment in
which on one side tbe modern distinctions between public and private,
state and society, local and global collapse, and on the other that all o ther
sou rces of legitimacy dry up, life becomes encamped in the cen ter of every
political procedu re. No o ther politics is co nceivable other than a politics of
life, in the o bjective and subjective sense of the term. But it is precisely
with reference to the relation between the subject and object of politics
that the interpreti,e di,ergence to which 1 alluded earlier appears again:
How are we to comprehend a political go,'ero ment of life? In what sense
does life govern politics or in wbat sense does politics govern life? Does it
concern a govero ing of or over life? It is the same conceptual ahernative
that one can express through the lexical bifurcatio n between the terms,
used indifferently sometimes, of "biopolitics" and "bio power: By the fi rst
is meant a politics in the name of life and by the second a life subjected to
the command of politics. But here too in tb is mode the paradigm that
seeks a conceptual linking between the terms emerges as split, as if it bad
been cut in two by the very same movement. Compressed (aod at the same
time destabilized ) by competing readings and subject to con tin uous rotations of meaning around its own aris, the concept ofbiopolitics risks losing
its identity and becoming an enigma.
t6 The Enigma of Biopolitics
To understand wh.y, it isn' t enough. to limit our perspective simply to

Foucault's observations. Rather, we need to retu rn to those texts and to
authors (often no t cited) that Foucault's discussion derives from, and against
which he repositions h imself, wh ile criticaJJy deconstructing them. These
can be cataloged in three distinct and successive blocks in time (at least
those tha t explicitly refer to the concept of biopolitics). Tbey are characterized, respectively, b y an approach that is organ istic, anthropologica l, and
natura.listic. lo the first insta nce, they refer to a substanti.al series of essays,
primarily German, that are jo ined by a vitalistic co nception o f the stat.e,
such as Karl Binding's Zurn Werden und Leberr derStaa ten (1920), o fwhich
we will have occasion to speak later; Eberhard Den nert's Der Staat als
lebendiger Organismus (1920); and Edward Hah n's Der Staat, ein Lebenwesen (1926).' Our a ttention will be focused, however, most intently on the
Swede Rudolph KjeUen, probably because be was tbe fi rst to employ the
term "biopo li tics" (we also owe him the expression "geo po li tics" tha t
Friedrich Ratzel aod Karl Haushofer will later elaborate in a deci dedly
racist key) . Wi th respec t t.o such a racist prope nsity, which will short.ly
thereafter culm inate in the Nazi theo rization of a "vital space" (Leben srawn) we should note that KjeJJen's position remains less conspicuous,
despite his p roclaimed sympathy for WiJhelm in ian German as well as a
certain propensity for an aggressive foreign policy. As be bad previously
argued in h is book o f 1905 on the great powers, vigorous states, endowed
with a limi ted terri tory, discover the need for extending their borders
through the conquest, fusion , and colonialization of other lands-' But it's in
the volume from 1916 titled The State as Form of Life that Kjellen sees th is
geopolitical d emand as existing in close relation to an o rga nistic co nception tbat is irreducible to constitu tional theories of a liberal framework:'
While these latter represent the sta te as the a rtificia l product of a free
cboice of individuals that have created it, he un derstands it to be a "living
form" (som li'sform in Swedish orals Lebensform in German), to the exten t
that it is furnished with instincts and natural drives. Already here in th is
transformation of the idea o f the state, according to which the state is no
longer a su bject of law born from a voluntary con tract bu t a whole that is
integrated by men and which behaves as a single individual bo th spiritual
and corporeal, we can trace the originary n ucleus of biopolitical seman tics.
In Outline for a PolitiCill S)stem, Kjcllcn brings together a compendium of
the preceding theses:
The Enigma of Bio politics 17

T his tension that is characteristic of life itself .. . pushed me to denominate
such a discipliJle biopolitics, which i.s analogous with the science of life,
namely, bio logy. In so doing we gain muc.h, considering that the Greek
word bios designates not only natural and physical life, but perhaps just as
significantly cultural life. Naming it in this way also expresses that dependence of the laws of life that society manifes ts and that promote, more than
anything else, the state itself to that role of arbiter or at a min imum of
mcd iator..s
These are expressio ns that take us beyond the ancient metap hor o f the
body-state wi th all its multiple metamorphoses of post-Romantic inspiration. What begins to be glimpsed here is the reference to a natu ral substrate, to a substantia l p rinciple tba t is resistMt an d that tmderlies any
abstraction or construction of institutional character. The idea of the impossibility of a true overcoming of tbe natura l state in that of the po litical
emerges in oppositio n to the modern conception derived from Hobbes that
one can preserve life only by instituting a n artificial barrier with regard to
nat.ure, which is itself incapable of neutralizing the conflict (and indeed is
boun d to strengthen it) . Anything but the negation of nature, the political
is nothing else bu t the cont in uation o f nature at another level and therefo re
destined to incorporate and reproduce natu re's original characteristics.
If tb is process of the na turalization of poli tics in Kjellen remains in scribed wit bin a historica l-cu ltural apparatus, it experiences a decisive acc.eleration in the essay that is destined to become famous p recisely in the
field of comparative biology. I am referring to Staatsbiologie, which was
also p ublished in 1920 by Baron Jakob von Uexkiill wi th the symptomatic
subtitle Allatom)' Physiology, and Pathology of tl1e State. Here, as with Kjell~n, the discourse revolves around the biological coo figuration of a statebody that is unified by h<~rmonic relations of its own organs, rep resentative of different professions aod competencies, but with a dual (and
a nyth ing but. irrelevant) lexical shift. with respect t.o the preceding model.
Here what is spoken about is not any state but the German state with its
peculiar characte ristics and vital demands. What makes the d ifference,
however, is ch iefly the emphasis that pathology assumes with respect to
what is subordinated to it, namely, a natomy and physiology. Here we can
already spot the harbinger of a theoretical weaving- that of the degenerative syn drome and the consequent regenerative program-fated to reach
its macabre splendors in the foUowing decades. Tb reatenii1g the public
18 The Enigma of Bio po~tjcs
health of tbe German body is a series of diseases, which obviously, referring to the revo lutionary traumas of the time, are located in subversive
trade unionism, electo ral democracy, and the right to strike: tumors that
grow in the tissues of the state, causing anarchy and finally the state's dissolution. It would be "as if the majority of the cells in ou r body (rather
than those in our brain) decided which impulses to commu nicate to the
nerves:'' But even more relevan t, if we consider the d irection of future
totalita rian developments, is the bio political reference to those "parasites"
which, having penetrated the political body, organ ize themselves to the
d isadvantage of other ci tizens. T hese are d ivided betwee n "symbiont.s"
from different races who under certain circumstances can be useful to the
state and true pa rasites, which install themselves as ao extraneous living
body within the state, and which feed off of the same vital substance.
Uexkiill's th rea teningly prophetic conclusion is that ooe needs to create a
class of state doctors to fight the parasites, o r to confer o n the state a medical competency that is capable of bringing it back to bealtb by removing
the causes of the disease and by expelling the carriers of germs. He writes:
"What we are still lacking is an academy with a forward-looking vision not
o nly fo r creating a class of state doctors, but also for instituting a state system of medicine. We possess oo organ to wbicb we can trust the bygiene of
the state."
The third text that shou ld ho ld o ur attention- because it is expressly dedicated to the category in question- is Bio -poli rics. Written by the Engli shman Morley Roberts, it was published in London in 1938 with the subtitle
Au Essay in the Plt)'>~olog)\ Pathology aud Politics of the Social aud Somatic
Organism.' Here too the underlying assumption, wh ich Roberts sets forth
immed iately in the book's in trod uction , is the connection, oot only analogical, but real, between politics and bio logy, aod particularly medicine. His
perspective is not so distant fuodamenrally from that of Uexki.ill. If pbysio logy is indivisible from the pathology from which it der ives its meaning
and emphasis, the state organism can not be ttuly known or guided except
by evaluating its actual and potential diseases. More than a simple risk, these
diseases represent the ultimate truth because it is principally a living entity
that in fact can die. For this reason, bio politics bas the assignment on the
one band of recognizing the organic risks tha t jeopa rdize the body politic
and on the other of locating and pred i.sposi ng mechanisms of defe nse
against them; these too are rooted in the same b iological terrain . The most
innovar.ive part. of Roberts's boo k is con nected precisely t.o r.his ultimate
Tbe nigma of JliopoHtics 19
demand and is constituted by an extraordinary comparison between the

defensive apparatus of the state and the immuni tary system that anticipates an in terpretive paradigm to which we will return:
T he stmplcst way to think of tmmunity is to look on the human body as a
complex sociaJ organism, and the national org<lnism as a simpler functional

individual, or "person." both of which are ex-posed to dangers of innumerable
kinds for which they must contlnually provide. Th is provision is im mun ity
in action. 10
Beginning with this first formulation, Roberts develops a parallel between

the state and the human body involving the entire immunological repertoire - from antigens to antibodies, ftem the function of tolerance to the
reticuloendotbelial system-and finds in each biological element its political equivalen t. T he most.sign ificant step, however, one that moves in the direction p reviously taken by Uexkull, is perhaps constituted by the reference
to mechan isms of immu nitary repulsion a nd expulsio n of the racial sort:
T he studen t of political biology should study national mass attitudes and
their results as jf they were actual secretions o r ex.cretion. National o r inter
national repulsions may rest on little. To put the matter at once o n the
lowest physio logical level, it is well known that the smell of o ne race may
offend as much or even more than different habit's and customs. 11
Tbar Roberts's text d oses witb a comparison berween an immunitary rejection of the Jews by the English a nd an a naphylactic shock of the poli tical
body in the year in which the Second World War begins is indicative of the
increasingly slippery slope t.bat the first biopolitical elaboration takes on: a
polit ics constructed directly on bios always risks violen tly subjecting bios
to politics.
The second wave of interest in the thematic of biopolitics is registered in
Prance in the 1960s. The difference from tbe fust wave is all too obvio us
a nd it couldn't be o therwise in a h istorical frame that. was profo undly
modified by the epochal defeat of Nazi biocracy. The new biopolitical theory
appeared to be conscious of the necessity o f a seman tic reformula tion e\en
a t the cost of weakening the specificity of the category in favor of a more
d omesticated neoh umanistic d eclension, with respect not on ly to Nazi
biocracy, but also to orgaoistic theories that had in some way anticipated
their themes and accents. T he volume that in 1.960 virtually opened this new
stage of study was programmaticaUy titled La biopolitique: Essai d'irrterpn!tatiorr de l'l1istoire de l'humanite et des civilisations [Biopolit.ics: An essay on
20
the interpretation aod history of human ity and civilization], and it takes
exactly th is step." Already the double reference to history and human ity as
the coordinates o f a discourse inte ntionally oriented toward bios expresses
the central direction and conciliatory path of Aroon Starobinski's essay. When
be writes that "bio politics is an attempt to explain the history of civilization
on the basis of tbe laws of cellu lar life as well as the most elementary biological life," he does not in fact intend to p ush his treatment toward a sort
of naturalistic outcornc. " Oo the contrary, the author argues (sometimes
even acknowledging the negative connotations that the natural powers
[pote11ze} of life enjoy), for the possibility as well as the necessity that politics inco rporates spir itual elements that are capable of gove rning these
natu ral powers in function of meta political values:
Bio politics doesn't negate in any way the blind forces of violence and the
will to power) nor the force.s of self~destruction that exist in man and in
human civilization. On the contrary. biopolitics affirms their ex-istence in
a way that is comple tely particular becaust these forces are che elementary
forces of life. But biopolitics denies that these forces :ue fdtal and that they
c.1nnot be opposed and directed by spiritual forces: the forces of justice,
charity, and truth. 1' 1
That the concept of biopolitks thus risks being whittled down to the point
of losing its meaning, tbat is, of being overturned into a sort of traditional
humanism, is also made dear in a second text pu blished four years later
by an author destined for greater fortune. Tam referring to Edgar Morin's
Introduction a rme politique de l'homme." Here the "fields" that are truly
"biopolitical of life and of survival" are includ ed in a more sweeping aggregate o f the "an thropolitical" type, which in tu rn refers to the project o f
a "mu ltidimensional politics of man." Rather than tightening the biologicalpolitical nexus, Morin situates his perspective on the problematic connection in whicb the infrapolitical tbemes of murin1al survival are p roductively crossed with those tha t are suprapolitical or phi losophical, relative to
the sense of life itself. The resu lt, more than a biopolitics i.n the strict sense
o f the expression, is a sort o f"onto-politics;' which is given the task of circumscribing the development of the human species, limiting the tendency
to see it as economic and productive. "And so all the paths of life and all
the paths of politics begin to intersect and then to peoetrate one aoother.
They announce a n onto -politics that is becoming ever rnore in timate ly
and globally mao's being." " Althougb Morin, in the following book dedicat.ed to the paradigm of human nature, contests in a pa rtially self-critical
The En igma of Biopo litics
21
key the h uman istic mythology that defines man in opposition to the an imal, culture in opposition to nature, and order in opposition to disorder,
there d oesn't seem to emerge from o f all this an idea ofbiopolitics endowed
with a convincing physiognomy' '
Here we are dealing with a theoretical weakness as well as a seman tic
uncertain ly to which the l~vo volumes of Cahiers de 1<1 biopolitique, pu blished in Paris at the end of the 196os by the Organisation au Service de Ia
Vic, certain ly do oot put ao. end.lt is true that witl1 respect to the preceding essay we can recognize in them a more concrete attention t.o the real
conditions of li fe of the world's populatio n, exposed to a double checkmate
o f neocapitalism and socialist realism-both incapable o f guiding productive development in a direction that is compatible with a significant increase in the quality of life. And it is also true that in several of these texts
criticism of the current economic and political model is substantiated in
references concerning technology, city pla nn ing, and medicine (or better
the spaces and the material forms of liviJlg beings) . Still, oot even here can
we say that. the definitio n of biopolitics avoids a categorical genericness
that will wind up reducing its hermeneutic scope: "Biopolitics was defined
as a science by the conduct of states and h uman co llective.s, determined by
laws, tbe natural environment, and onto logical givens that support Life and
determine man's activities."'; There is, however, no suggestion in such a
defmition of what the specific statute of its object or a critical analysis of
its effects migh t be. Much like the Days o f Biopolitical Research held in
Bordeaux in December 1966, so too the.se works have difficulty freeing the
concept o f biopo litics from a mannerist formu lation in to a meaningfu l
conceptual elaboration.'"
The th ird resumption of biopolitical studies took place in the Ang loSaxon world and it is one that is still ongoing. We can locate its formal introduction io 1973, whe11 the In ternati011al Poli tical Science Associatioo
o fficially opened a research sit.e on biology and po litics. After that. various
international conventions were organized, the first of which took place in
Paris in 1975 at the Ecole des Hau tes Etudes en Sciences Humaines and ano ther at Bellagio, in Warsaw, Chicago, and New York. In 1983, tbe Association for Politics and the Life Sciences was founded, as was the jo urnal Politics
and Lifl! Sciences two years later, as well as the series Research in Biopolitics
(of which a number of volumes were published )." But to locate the beginning of th is sort of research we oced to return to the middle of the 1960s
when t.wo t.exts appeared t.hat elaborated the biopoliticallexicon. If Lynton K.
22
Caldwell was the Jirst to adopt the term in question io his 1964 article
"Biopolitics: Science, Ethics, and Public Policy:' the two polarities with in
which is inscribed the general sense of this new biopolitical thematization
can be traced to the previous year's Human Nawre iu Politics by james C.
Davies." It is no coincidence that wben Roger D. Masters attempts to sys
tematize the thesis in a volume (dedicated, however, to Leo Strauss) twen ty
)'ears later, be will eventually give it a similar title., The Nature of Politics."
These are precisely the two terms that constitute both the object and the
perspective of a biopolit.ical discourse, which after its organistic declension in
the 1920s and 1930s and its neohumanistic one of the 196os in France, now
acquires a marked naturalistic character. Leaving aside the quality of this
produ ction, which in general is admittedly mediocre, its symptomatic value
resides precisely in the direct and insistent reference made to the sphere of
nature as a privileged parameter of political determination. What emergesnot always with full theoretical knowledge on the part of the authors- is a
considerable categorical sh ift with respect to the principal line of modero
political philosophy. While political philosophy presupposes nature as the
problem to resohe (or the obstacle to overcome) through the constitu tion
of the political order, American biopolitics sees in nature its same condition
of existence: not only the genetic origin and the first material, but also the
sole contro lling reference. Politics is anything but able to dominate nature
or "conform" [formare] to its ends and so itself emerges "informed" in
such a way that it leaves no space for other constructive possibiliti es.
At the o rigin of such an approach can be distinguished two matrices: on
the one side, Darwinian evolu tion (or more precisely social Darwi nism),
and, on the other, the ethological research, de,eloped principally in Germany at the eod of the 1930s. With regard to the first, the most importan t
point of departure is to be sought in Physics 1Wd Politics by Wa lter Bagehot
within a borizon tbat includes authors as diverse as Spencer and Sumner,
Rarzel and Gumplowitz.24 The clear warning, however, is that the emphasis
of the biopolitical perspective resides in the passage from a physical paradigm to one that is exactly biological, something that Thomas Thorson
underscores forcefu lly in his book from 1970 with the programmatic title
Biopolitics.'$ What matters, therefore, is not so much conferring the label
of an exact science on politics as referring it back to its natural domain , b)'
wh ich is understood t11e ''ita I terrain from which it emerges and to which it
inevitably returos.26 Above all, we are dealing with the contingent conditioo
of our body, which keeps human action within the limits of a determi nate
The En;gma o f Biopolitics 23
anatomical and physical possibility, but also the biological or iodeed genetic
baggage of the subject in question (to use the lexicon of a nascent sociobiology}. Against the thesis that social events requ ire co mplex histo ric explanatio ns, they refer here finally to dynamics that are tied to evolu tive demands
of a species such as ours, differen t quantitathely but not qualitati,ely from
the anima l that precedes and comprises our species. In th is way, not only
does the predomioantly aggressive behavior of man (as well as the cooperative) refer to an instinctive modali.ty of the animal sort, but insofar as it
inheres in ou r feral nature, war ends u p taking on a character istic of in evitability." All political behavior that repeats itself "~ th a certain frequency
in history-fro m the con trol of territory to social hierarchy to the do mination of women - is deeply rooted in a prebuman layer oot on ly to wbicb
we remain t ied, but wh ich is usually bound to resurface.ln this interpretive framework, democratic societies are oot impossible in themselves, but
a ppear in the fonn of parentheses that are destined to be qu ickly closed
(or that at least allow ooc to sec the dark depths out of which they contradictorily emerge). The in1plicit and often explicit conclusion of the reasoning is that any institution or subjective opt ion that doesn't con fo rm, or at
least adapt, to such a given is destined to fail.
The biopolitical ootioo tha t emerges at this point is sufficiently clear, as
Somit and Peterson , the most credentialed theore ticians of this io terpretive line express it." What remaios problematic, however, is tbe final point,
wh ich is to say the relation between the analytic-descriptive relatio n and
that of me propositional-no rmative (all because it is one th ing to study,
explain, and forecast and ano ther to prescribe}. Yet it is precL~ely in this
postponement from the first to the second meaning, that is, from the level
of being to that of requirement, tha t the densest ideologica l valence is concentrated in the entire discourse.'~ The semantic passage is conducted
through the do uble versant of fact and value in tbe concept of natu re. It is
used as both a given a nd a task, as the presuppositio n and the result., and
as the or igin and the end. If political beha,,ior is inextricably embedded in
the dimension of bios and if bios is what connects human beings [l'uomo}
to the sphere of natu re, it follows that me only politics possible will be the
one that is already inscribed in ou r natural code. Of co urse, we cannot
miss the rhetorical short-ci rcuit on '"hich the eo tire argument rests: no
longer docs the theory interpret rea li ty, but reality determines a theory
that in tu rn is destined to corroborate it. Tbe response is announced even
before the analysis is begun: human beings cannot be other than what. they
24 The Enigma of Biopotitics
have always been. Brought back to its natura l, innermost part, politics remains in the grip of bio logy without being able to reply. Human history is
nothing but our nature repeated, sometimes misshapen, but never really
d ifferent. The role of science (but especially of politics) is that of impeding
the opening of too broad a gap between nature and history; making our
nature, in the fi nal analysis, our only bistory. Tbe enigma of biopolitics
appears resolved, bu t in a form that assumes exactly what needs to be
"researched.))
Politics, Nature, History
From a certain point of view it's understandable that Foucault never gestured to the different biopolitical interpreta tions that preceded bis ownfrom the moment in which his extraordinary survey is born precisely from
the distance he takes up with regard to his predecessors. This doesn't mean
that no points of co ntact exist, if not with their positi.ve contents, then
witl1 the critical demand that follows hom them, which refers more broadly
to a general dissatisfaction with how modernity has constructed the relation among politics, nature, and history. It is only here that the work begun by Foucau lt in the middle of the 1970s manifests a complexity and a
wdica lity that are utterly incomparable witb the preceding theorizations.
It isn't irrelevant that Foucault's specific biopolitical perspective is indebted
in the first place to Nietzschean genealogy. This is because it is precisely
from genealogy that Foucau lt derives that oblique capacity for disassembly
and conceptual reelaboration that gives his work the originality that everyone has recogn ized. When Foucault, returning to the Kantian question
surro unding the meaning of the Enlightenment, establishes a contemporary point of view, he doesn't simply allude to a different mode of seeing
things that the past receives from the present, but also to the in tenal that
such a point of view of the present opens between the past and its selfinterpretation. From this pe rspective, Foucau lt doesn't thi nk of the end of
the modern epoch-or at least the analytic block of its categories high lighted by the first biopolitical tl1eorizations-as a point or a line tltat interrupts an epochal journey, but rather as the disruption of its trajectory produced by a different sort of gaze: if the present isn't what (or only what) we
have assumed it to be uo til now; if its mean ings begin to cluster arou nd a
different sernanti.c epi.cen ter ; if someth ing novel or ancient emerges f(orn
withiiJ that contests the man nerist in1age; this meaos, theo, that the past,
which nonetheless the present derives from, is no longer necessarily the
The njgma o f Biopolitics 25
same. This can reveal a face, an aspect, or a profile that before was obscured
or perhaps hidden by a superimposed (and at times imposed) narrative;
not necessarily a false narrative, but instead functional to its prevailing logic,
and for this reason partial, when not tendentious.
Foucault identifies this narrative, which compresses or represses with in
creasing difficulty somet:b ing that is heterogeneous to its own language,
with the discourse on sovereignty. Despite the infi nite variations and tra nsformations to which it has been subjected in the course of modern ity on
the parr. of those who have made use of it, sovereignty has always been based
on the same figu ral schema: that of the existence of two distinct entities,
namely, the totality of individ uals and power that at a certain point enters
into relation between individuals in the modalities defined by a third element, which is constituted by the law. We can say that all modern philoso phies, despite their heterogeneity or apparent opposition, are arranged
within th is triangular grid, now one, now the other, of its poles. That these
affi rm the absolute character of sovereign power according to the Hobbesian model or that., on t he contrary, they insist. on its limit.~ in line wit h the
liberal tradit ion; that they subt ract o r subject the monarch with respect to
the laws that he himself has pro mulgated; that they subject o r distinguish
the principles of legality and of legitimacy- what remains common to all
these conceptions is the ratio that subtends them, whicb is precisely the
one characterized by the preexistence of subjects to sovereign power t:ba t
these conceptions introduce and therefoce by the rights [diritto/ tha t in
this mode they maintain in relation to subjects. Even apart fro m the breadth
of such rights-one that moves from the minimu m of the preservation of
life and the maximum of participation in political government -the role
of cou nterweight that is assig ned to subjects in relation to sovereign decision is clear. The result is a sort of a zero-su m relation : the more rigb ts one
has, the less power there is and vice versa. Tbe entire modern philosophicaljuridical debate is inscribed to varying degrees within this topological
altern ative that sees politics and Jaw (Iegge/, decision and the norm as
situated o n opposite poles of a dialectic that bas as its object the relation between subjects {sudditij and the sovereign."' Their respective weight depends
o n the prevalence that is periodically assigned to the two terms being compared. When, at the end of this tradition, Hans Kelsen and Carl Scb rnitt
will argue (the one, nonnativism, anned against the otl\er, decisionism), they
do nothii1g but replicate the same topological contrast that from Bodin on ,
indeed in Bodi n, seemed to oppose the versant of law to that of power.
26 The Enigma of Biopolitks
It is in the breaking of this ca tegorical frame that Foucault consciou sly

works." Resisting what he himself will define as a new form of knowledge (or
better, a different o rder of discou rse with that of all mode rn p hilosophicalpolitical theories} doesn't mean, o f course, erasing the figure or reducing
the decisively objective role of the so,ereign paradigm, but rather recogn izing the rea l mechanism by which it functio ns. It isn't that of regulating
relations between subjects or between the.m a nd power, but rather their
subjugation at tile same time to a specific juridical and political order. On
the one side, rights will emerge as noth ing other the instrument that the
sovereign uses for imposing his own domination. Correspondingly, the sovereign can dominate o nly on the basis of the right that legitimates the whole
o pera tion . In this way, wbat a ppeared as split in an alternathe bipolarity
between law and power, legality an d legitimacy, and norm and exception
fmds its un ity in a same regime of sense. Yet th is is nothing but the first effect of the reversal of perspective that Foucault undertakes, one that intersects with another effect relative to the line of d ivision no longer internal
to t.he car.egorical apparatus of the sovereign dispo$itif, bu t now immanen t
to the social body. T his perspective claimed to un ify it th rough the rheto rical procedure of polar o ppositions. It is as if Fouca ult u ndertook the dual
work of deconstructing or o utflanking the modern narration, which, while
suturii1g an apparen t divergence, located a real distinction. It is precisely
the recomposition of the duality between power and right, excavated by the
sovereign paradigm that makes visib le a confl ict just as real that separates
and opposes groups of diverse ethnicity in the pred ominance over a given
territory. T he presumed conflict between sovereign ty a nd law is displaced
by the far more real conflict between potential rivals who fight over the use
of resources and their con trol beca use of their different racial makeu p.
I bis d oesn't mean in any way tbat the mecbanism of juridical legitimation
fails, but rather tban preceding and regulatii1g tbe struggle under way, it
consti tutes the resu lt a nd instru men t used by those who now a nd again
emerge as victo rious. It isn't that the d iscourse of rights fdirittof determines
war, but rather that war adopts the discourse of rights in order to consecrate tbe relation of forces tha t war itself defines.
Already this unearthing o f the constituithe character o f war- not its
background or its limit, but instead its origin and form of politics - inaugurates an analyti.c horizon whose historical import we can o nly begin to
see today. But the reference to the conflict between races, a topic to whicb
Foucault dedicar.ed his co urse in 1976 at the College de France, indicates
The Enigma of Biopolio ics Zl
someth ing else, whicb b rings us directly to ou r underlying theme. Tbat sucb
a conflict concerns so-called populatio ns from a n ethnic poin t of view
refers to an element that is destined to disrupt in a much mo re radical
way the modern political and ph ilosoph ical apparatus. I am referring to
bios, a life p resupposed sin1ultaneously in its general <md specific dinlension
of biological fact. Ibis is both the o bject and the subject of tbe conflict and
therefore of the politics tbat it forms:
It seems to me that o ne of the basic phenomena of the nineteenth century
was what might be called power's hold over life. W hat I mean is t he acquisitio n of power over man insofar as man is a living being. that the bio logical
came un der State control, that there was at least a certatn tendency that
leads to what might be termed State control oft be biological' '
Th is phrase that opens the lecture of March 17, 1976, and appears to be a
new formu lation, is in fact already the point of <mival of a trajectory of
thought tha t was inaugurated a t least a biennia l before. T hat the fi rst utilization of the term in Foucau lt's lex icon can be traced d irectly back to the
conference in Rio in 1974, in which Foucault. said that "for capitalist. society
it is the biopolitical that is important before everything else; the bio logical,
the somatic, the corporeal. The body is a biopolitical reality; medicine is a
biopolitical strategy" doesn't have much importance." Wbat cou nts is that
all his texts from tbose years seem to converge in a theoretical step with in
wh icb every discursive segmen t comes to assume a mean ing that isn't completely perceptible if it is analyzed separately or outside o f a biopoli tical
sen1antics.
Already in Discipline and Puuish, the crisis of the classical model o f sovereignty, wh ich was represented by tbe decline o f its deadly rituals, is marked
by the emergence of a new disciplinary power, which is addressed rather to
the life of the subjects that it invests.'' Althougb capital p unishment tbrough
the dismemberment of the convicted responds weU to the indiv idual's
breaking o f the contract (maki ng him guilt.y o f inju ring the Majesty), from
a certain mo men t every individual death now is assumed and in terpreted
in relation to a vital requ irement of society in its totality. Yet it is in the
cou rse Foucault offered sin1u ltaneously titled Abnormal that the p rocess o f
deconstruction of the SO\'ereign paradigm in both its state-power d eclination and its juridical identity of subject culminates: the entrance and tben
the subtle colonization o f medical knowledge in what was first the competeoce of law (dirittoj establishes a true shift in rcgin1e, one tbat pivots no
longer on the abstraction o f j uridical relations but on the taking on of life
2S The Enigmo of Biopolitics
in the same body of those who are its carriers.'; In the moment in wbicb
the criminal act is no longer to be charged to the will of the subject, but
rather to a psychopathological configuration, we enter into a zone of indistinctio n between law and medicine in whose depths we can make out a
new rationality centered on the q uestion of life-of its preservation, its
development, and its management. Of cou rse, we must not confuse levels
of discourse: such a problematic was always at the center of sociopolitical
dynam ics, but i.t is ooly at a certain point that its centrality reaches a thresho ld of awareness. Modernity is the place more than the time of this transition and turning [svolra]. By this l mean that while, for a long period of
time, the relation between politics and life is posed indirectly-which is to
say mediated by a series of categories that are capable of distilling or facilitating it as a sort of clearinghouse-beginning at a certain poin t these
partitions are broken aod life enters directly into the mecha nisms and dispositi(s of governing h uman beings.
Without retracirlg the steps that articu late this process of the govem mentalizat.ion of life in Foucauldian genealogy-fro m "pastoral power" to
the reason of state to the expertise of the "police"-let's keep our attention
on the outco me: on the one side, all political practices that governments
put into action (or even tbose practices that oppose them) tu rn to life, to
its process, to its needs, and to its fractures. On the o ther side, life eaters
into power relations not only on tbe side of its critical thresnolds or its
pathological exceptions, but in all its extension, articulatioo, and du ratio n.
From this perspective, life everywhere exceeds the juridical constraints
used t.o trap it. This doesn't imply, as I already suggest.ed, some kind of
withdrawal or contractio n of the field that is subjected to the law. Rather, it
is the latter that is progressively transferred from tne transcendental level
of codes and sanctions that essentiaUy nave to do with subjects of will to the
immaneo t level of rules ar1d norms that are addressed instead to bodies:
"these power mechanisms are, at least. in part, those that, beginning in the
eighteenth century, took cnarge of men's existence, men as livi ng bodies."'6
It is the same premise of the biopolitical regime. More than a removal of life
from the pressure that is exercised upon it by law, it is presented rather as
delivering their relat ion to a dimension that both determines and exceeds
them both. It is with regard to tbis meaning that the apparently con tradictory expression needs to be understood according to which "it was life more
tnan the law tnat became tbe issue of political struggles, even if the la tter
The Enigma of Biopolirics 29
were formulated through affumations concerning rights:'' 7 What is in q uestion is no longer the distribution of power or its subordination to the law,
nor the kind of regime nor the consensus that is obtained, b ut something
that precedes it because it pertains to its "primary material." Behind the
declarations and the silences, the mediations and the conflicts that have characterized the dynamics of modernity - the dialectic tha t up until a certain
stage we have named with the terms of liberty, equality, democrac y (or, on
the contrary, tyranuy, force, aud do01i.natio.n) - Foucault's analysis uncovers
in bios the concrete power from which these r.erms originate and toward
wh ich they are directed.
Regarding such a conclusion, Foucault's perspective would seem to be
close to tha t of American biopo litics. Certain ly, he too places life at the
center of the frame and be too, as we have seen, does so polemically vis-Avis the juridical subjectivism and h umanistic historicism of modem political ph ilosophy. But the bios that he opposes to the disco urse of rights a nd
its effects on domi.natiorl is also configured i.u terms of a historical semantics that is also symmetrically reversed with respect to the legitimating one
of sovereign power. Nothing more than life-in the lines of developmen t
in which it is inscribed o r in the vortexes in which it contracts-is touched,
crossed, and modified in its innermost being by history. This was the lesson that Foucault drew from the Nietzschean genealogy, when be places it
within a theoretical frame that substi tuted a search for the origi.u (or the
prefiguration of the end) with that of a force field freed from the succession of e\en ts and conflict between bodies. Yet he also was influenced by
Darwinian evolution, whose end uring actuality doesn't reside in having
substituted "the grand o ld biological metaphor of life and evolution" for
h istory, but, on tbe contrary, in having recognized in life the marks, the intervals, an d the risks of h.istory.'3 lt is precisely from Darwin, in fact, that
the knowledge comes that " life evolved, that the evolu tion of the species is
d etermined, by a certain degree, by accidents of a histor ical natore."" And
so it makes li ttle sense to oppose a natural paradigm to a h istorical one
within the frame of life, or locate in nature the hardened shell in which life
is immobilized or loses its historical content. This is beca use, contrary to
the underlying presupposition of Anglo-Saxon biopolitics, something like a
definable and identifiable human nature doesn't exist as such, independent
from the mean ings that cultu re a nd therefore h istory have, over the course
of time, imprinted oo it. And then because the same knowledges tha t have
:10 The Enigma of Biopolitics
thematized it contain within them a precise historical connotation outside

of which their theoretical direction risks remaining indeterminate. Biology
itself is born around the end of the eighteenth century, thanks to the appearance of new scien tific categories that ga,e way to a concept of life that
is radically different from what was in use before. "1 wou ld say; Foucau lt
will say in this regard, "that the notion of life is not a scientific concept; it
has been an epistemological i11dicaror of which the classifying, delimiting,
a nd other functions had an effect on scientific discussions, ar1d not on
what r.hey were r.alking about!'
It is almost too obvious the sh ift (though one cou ld also rightly say the
reversal) that such an episte mo logical deconstruction impresses on the
category of biopolitics. T hat it is always historically qualified according to
a modality that Foucau lt defines with the term "biohistory" as anything
but limited to its simple, natura l casting implies a further step that to this
point has been excluded from all the preceding interpretations. Biopolitics
doesn't refer on.ly or most prevalently to tbe way i.n which politics is captured- limited, compressed, and determined-by life, but also and above
all by the way in which po litics grasps, challenges, and penetrates life:
If one can apply the term bio -l1istory to the pressures through wh ich the
movements of life and processes of history interfere with o ne another. o ne
would have to speak of biopower to designate what brought life and its
mechanisms into the realm of cxplic.it calculations and made knowledgepower <.ln agent of transformation of human lifc.41
We can already glimpse in this formu lation the radical novelty of the Foucau ldian approach . What in the preceding declensions of biopolitics was
presented as an unalterable gi,en-nature or life, insofar as it is h umannow becomes a problem; not a presupposition but a "sire; the product of a
series of causes, forces, and tensions that themselves emerge as modified in
an incessaot game of actioo and reaction, of pusbing and resisting. History
and nature, life and politics cross, propel, and vio late each o ther according
to a rhythm that makes one simultaneously the matrL'< and the ptavisional
outcome of tbe o ther. But it is also a sagittal gaze that deprhes it of its presumed fullness, as well as of every presumption of mastery of the entire
field of knowledge. just as Foucault adopts the category of life so as to
break apart the modern disco urse of sovereignt y and its laws from within,
so too in turn does that of history remove from life the naturalistic flatten ing to which the American biopolitical exposes it:
The enigma of lliopolitics 31
It is history that designs these complexes Ithe genetic variations fro m which
the various populations arise) before erasing them; there is no need to search
for brute and definitive biological facts that fro n1 the depths of "nature"
would impose themselves on history.:&
It is as if the ph ilosop her makes use of a conceptual instrument that is nee

essary for taking apa rt a gil'en order of discou rse in order to gil'e it o th.er
meanings, at the. moment in wh.ich. it ten ds to assume a similarly pervasive
behavior. Or additionally that it is separated li:oro i.tself, having been
placed in the in terval in such a way as to be subject r.o the same effect o f
knowledge that it allows externally. From here we can see the conti nual
movement, the rotation of perspective, along a margin that, rathe.r than distingu ish ing concepts, dismantles a nd reassembles them in to pologies that
are irreducible to a monolinear logic. Life as such doesn't belong either to
the order of nature or to that of history. It can not be simply ontologized,
no r completely histori ci~ed, bur. is iJlscribed in the moving margin of th eir
intersection aod their tension. The meaoing of biopo litics is sought "io
this dual position o f life that placed it at the same time ourside hisr.ory, in
its biological environment, and inside human historicity, penetrated by
the latte r's techniques of knowledge and power.""
The complexity of Foucault's perspective, that is, of bis biopolitica l
wntiere, doesn't end here. lt doesn't on ly concern his own position, which
is situated precisely between wh<H be e<1Us "th.e th.resbold of modernity;' on
the li mit in wh ich modern kJlowledge fo lds upon itself, carried in th is
way o utside itself. Rather, it is also the effect of mean ing tl1at from an undecidable threshold commun icates with the notion defined thusly: once the
dialectic between politics and life is reconstructed in a fo rm that is irreducible to every monoca usal syntbesis, wbat is the consequence that derives
for each of the two terms and for their combina tion? And so we return to
the qu estion with which l opened tltis cbapter on the ultio1are mean ing of
biopolitics. What does biopolitic,s mean , what outcomes does it. produce,
a nd how is a world conti nually more governed by biopolitics configured?
Certainly, we are concerned with a mechan ism or a productive dispositif,
from tbe momen t that tbe reality that invests an d encompasses it is not left
unaltered. But productive o f what? What is the effect of biopolitics? At this
point Fo ucault's response seems to diverge in directions that involve two
other notions that are implicated from the outset in the concept of bios,
b ut which a re situa ted on tbe extremes of its semaotic extension: these are
32 The Enigma of Biopolilic~
subjectiviz<lt'ion and death. With respect to life, both. constitute more than
two possibilities. They are a t the same time life's form and its background,
origin, and destination; in each case, however, according to a divergence that
seems not to admit any mediation: it is either one or the other. Either biopolitics produces subjectivity or it p roduces death. Either it makes the subject its own object or it decisively objectifies it. Either it is a politics of life or
a politics over life. Once again tbe category of biopolitics folds in upon itself
without d isclos.ing th e solution to i.ts owo enigma.
Politics of life
In this interpretive d hergence there is something that moves beyond the

sim ple difficulty of definition, which touches the profound str uc ture of
the concept of biopolitics. It is as if it were traversed initially and indeed
constituted by an interval of difference or a sema ntic layer tha t cuts a nd
opens it into two clements that arc not constitu ted reciprocally. Or that the
elcrnents arc constituted only at the price o f a certairl violence that subjects
one to the domination of the other, co ndition ing their superimposition to
an obligatory positioning-under {sotto-posizione}. It is as if the two terms
from which biopolitics is formed (life and politics) cannot be articulated
except through a modality that sin1u ltaneously juxtaposes them. More than
com bining them or eveo arranging them along the same li ne of signification, they appear to be opposed in a long-lasting struggle, the stakes of whicb
are for each the approp riation and the domination o f the other. From here
the never-released tension, that laceratin g effect from which the notion o f
biopolitics never seems t.o be able to liberate itself because biopo litics produce.s the effect in the form of an alternative between the two that cannot
be bypassed. Either life holds politics back, pinning it to its iolpassable
natu ral limit, or, on the contrary, it is life that is captu red and prey to a
politics that strains to in1prisoo its innovative potentiaL Between the two possibilities there is a breach in signification, a blind spot. that. risks draggi ng the
entire category into vacuum of sense. It is as if biopolitics is missi ng something (an in termediary segment or a logical juncture) that is capable of unbinding the absoluteness of irreconcilable perspectives in the elaboration of
a more com plex paradigm that, without losing the specificity o f its elements,
se~tes h old of tbe internal connection or indicates a common hor~wn.
Before attempting a definition, it is to be noted that not even Foucau lt is
able to escape completely from such a deadlock, and tb is d espite working
in a profou nd ly new framework with respect to the precedi ng formula-
The nigma of JliopoHtics 33
tions. Foucau lt too ends up reproducing the stalemate in th.e form of a further "indecisiveness"- no longer relative to the already acquired impact of
power on life, but relative to its effects, measured along a moving line that,
as was said, has at one head the pro duction of new subjectivity and at the
other its radical destruction. That these contrastive possibilities co habit
within the same analytic axis, the logica l extremes of wbich they constitute,
doesn't detract from the fact that tbei r different accentuations determine
an oscillation in the eo tire d iscourse in opposite directions both fwm th e
interpretive and the stylL~tic poin t of view. Such a dyscrasia is recognizable
in a series of logical gaps and of small lexical incongruences or of sudden
changes in tonality, on which it is not possible to linger in detail here. When
taken together, however, they mark a difficulty that is never overcome or, more precisely, an underlying hesitation between two orientations that
tem pt Foucault equally. Yet be never decisively opts for one over tbe oth.er.
The most symptomatic indication of such an uncertainty is constituted by
the defi o i.tions of th e category, which he ftorn tirne to time puts in to play.
Notwithstanding t.he significant. distortions (owi ng to the different con texts in which they appear), the definitions are mostly expressed indirectly.
Th is was already the case fo r perhaps Foucault's most celebrated formulation, according to wh.ich "for millenn ia, man remained what he was for Aristo tle: a living animal with the additional capacity for a political existence;
modem man is an animal whose politics places his existence as a Living being
in question:'" Th is is even more the case where the notion of biopolitics is
derived from the contrast with the sovereign paradigm. In this case too a
negative modality prevails: biopo litics is primar ily that which is uot sovereignty. l\1ore than having its own source of light, biopolitics is illuminated
by lhe rwiligbt of something that precedes it, b y sovereignt)ls advance into
the shadows.
Nevertheless, it is precisely here in the articulation of the relation between the two regimes that the p rospective splitting to which I gestured
previously reappears, a split that is destined in this case to invest both the
level of historical reconstruction an d that o f conceptual determination. How
are sovereignty and biopolitics to be related? Chronologically or by a differing superimposition? It is said that one emerges o ut of the backgrou nd
of lhe olher, but what are we to make of such a background? Is it the defmitive withdrawal of a preceding p resence, or rather is it the ho rizon that
embraces and holds what newly emerges within it? And is sucb an emergence really new or is it already inadverten tly installed in the categorical
34 The Enigma of Biopolitic.s
framework that it will also modify? On this point too Foucau lt refuses to
respond definitively. He conti nues to oscillate between the two opposing
hypotheses without opting co nclusively fo r either o ne or the other. Or better: be adopts both with that characteristic, optical effect of splitting or
doubling that confers on his text the slight dizziness that simultaneously
seduces aod disorients the reader.
The steps in which discontinu ity seems to prevail are at first sight univocal. Not only is biopolitics o th er than sovereigrlty, but between tl1e two a
clear and irreversible caesura passes. Foucau lt writes of r.bat disciplinary
power that constitutes the first segme nt of the dispositifthat is tru ly biopolitical: "An important phenomenon occurred in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries: the appearance - one shou ld say the invention - of a
new mechanism of power which had \'Cry specific procedures, completely
new instruments, and very diffllrent equipment. It was, I believe, absolute!)'
incompatible with relations of sovereignty:''" Tt is new because it turns most
of all on tl1c control of bodies and of that which they do, rather tl1an on
the appropriatio n of the earth and its products. From th is side, the contrast
appears frontally and withou t any n uances: "It seems to me that this type
of power is the exact, point-for-point opposite of the mechanics of power
that the theory of sovereignty described o r tried to transcribe.".., For this
reason, it "can therefore 110 longer be transcr ibed in terms of sovereignty.""
What is it tbat makes biopoli tics completely unassimilable to tbe sovereign? Foucau lt telescopes such a difference in a form ula, justifiably famous
for its synthetic efficacy, which appears at the end of The History ofSexualitr
"One might say that. the ancient right to take life or let live was replaced by
a power to .foster life or disallow it to the point of deatb.''49 The opposition
couldn't be any plainer: whereas in the sovereign regime life is nothing
but the residue or the remainder left over, saved from the right of taking
life, in biopoli tics li fe encamps at the center of a scenario of which deatb
constitutes the ex ternal li mit or the necessary contour. Moreover, whereas
in the fi rst instance life is seen from the perspective opened by death, in
the second death acquires importance o nly in the light radiated by life. But
what precisely does affirming life mean ? 1o 11wke live, rather than limiting
oneself to allowing to live? T he internal articulations of the Foucauldian
discourse are well known: the distinction - here too defined in terms of
succession and a totality of coprescnce - bctwcen the discipli nary apparatus and dispositij~ of control; tbe tcchrliqucs put into action by power witb
regard first to individual bodies and then of popu lations as a whole; the
The n igma of JliopoHtics 35
sectors- school, barracks, hospital, facto ry- in which they driU and the
domains -b irth, d isease, mo rtality -that they affect. Bu t to grasp in its
complexity the affirmative semantics that -at least in this first declension
of the Foucauldian lexicon-the new regime of power connotes, we need
to turn again to the three categories of subj'Ctiviza.tion, making immanent,
and production that characterize it. Linked between them by the same o rientatio n of sense, they are distinctly recognizable in th ree genea logica l
branches itl wh ich the biopolitical code i.s born and tbeo develops, which
is to say those that Foucault defines as t.he pastoral power, the art of govern ment, and th e police sciences.
The fi rst alludes to that modality of govern ment of men that in the
)ewisb-Christian tradition especially moves th rough a strict and one-toone relation between shepherd and flock. Unlike the Greek o r the Roman
models, what counts is not so much the legitimacy of power fixed by law
o r the maintenance of the haonony betwee n citizens, but the concern th at
the shepherd devotes to protecting his own tl ock. The relation bctweetl
them is perfectly unique: as the sheep follow the will of him who leads
them withou t hesitation, in the same way the shepherd takes care of the
life of each of them, to the point, when necessary, of being able to risk his
own life. But what con notes the pasto ral practice even more is tbe mode in
wh ich such a result is realized: that of a capillary d irection, that is both collective and individ ualized, of the bodies and souls of subjects. At the center
of such a process is that durable dispositif co nstituted by the practice of
con fession o n wh ich Foucault con fers a pecu liar emphasis, precisely because it is the channel through which the process of subjectivizat.io n is
produced of what remains the object of power.; Here fo r the first time the
fundamenta l meaning of the complex figu re of subjection is disclosed. Far
from be ing reduced to a simple o bjectivi-ta tion, confession refers ratber to
a movement tbat conditions the domination over the object to its subjective participatio n in the act of domi nation. Con fessi ng-and in this way
placing oneself in the ha nds of the authority of him who will apprehend
and judge its truth - the object of pastoral power is subjugated to its own
o bjectivizat ion and is objectivized in the constitution of its subjectivity.
Tbe medium of this crisscrossing effect is the co nstruction of the individual. Forcing him in to exposing bis subjective truth, controlling tbe most
intimate souJlds of his conscience, power singles out t11e o ne that it subjects
as its own object, and so doing recogn izes him as an in dividual awarded
with a specific subjectivity:
36 The Enigma o f Biopolitics
It is a form of a power that makes individuals subjects. T here are two meanings of the word "subject": subject to someone else by control and depend ence; and tied to his own identity by a conscience or self-knowledge. Both
meanings suggest a form of power v~thich subjugates and makes subject to.s1
If the directio n of the conscience by the pastors of sou ls opens the mo,ement of the subjectivization of tbe object, the conduct of government,
which was theorized and practiced in the form of the reason of state, translates ar1d determi.ncs the progressive shift of power frorn t11e outsi.de to wi.tb.i.n
the confines of that o n which it is exercised. Although the Machiavellian
principle still preserves a re lation of singu larity and of transcendence with
regard to its own principality, the art of governing induces a double movement of making immanent and plunllization. On the one side, power is no
longer in circular relation with itself, which is to say to the preservation or
the ampliJication of its own order, but in relation to the we of those that it
governs, in the sense that its ultimate end is not simply that of obedience
but also t11c welfare of tbe governed. Power, rnore than dominating men
and territories from on high, adheres to their demands, inscribes irB own
operation in the processes that the go,erned establish, and draws forth its
own force from that of the subjects [sudditif. But to do so, that is, to collect
and satisfy all the requests that arrive from the body of the population ,
power is forced into multiplying its own services for the areas that relate to
subjects - from that of defense, to the economy, to that of public health.
From here there is a double move that intersects: the first is a vertical sort
that moves from the top toward the bottom, placing in continuous communication the sphere of the state with that of the population and families, reaching finally that of single individuals; the other the horizontal,
\vhich places in productive relation the practices and the languages of life
in a form tbat amplifies the horizons, improves tbe services, and intensifies
the performance. With respect to the inflection of sovereign power that is
primarily negative, the differe nce is obvious. If sovereign power was exercised in terms of subtraction and extraction of goods, services, and blood
from its own subjects, governmen tal power, on the contrary, is addressed
to the subjects' lives, not on ly in the sense of their defense, but also with
regard to how to deploy, strengthen, and maxim ize life. Sovereign power
removed, extracted, and finally destroyed. Governmental power reinforces,
augments, and stimu lates. With respect to the salvific tendency of the pastoral power, governmental power sbifts decisively its attention onto the
secular level of health, longevity, and wealth.
The Enigma of BiopoHrics 37
Yet in order tbat the genealogy of biopolitics can be manifested in all

its breadth, a final step is missi ng. Th is is represented by th e science of th e
police. Po lice science is not to be understood in any way as a specific technology within the apparatus of the state as we understand it today. It is
rather the productive modality that its government assumes in all sectors
of individual and collective experience - from justice, to finance, to work,
to health care, to pleasu re. More than avoiding harm {mali}, the police need
to produce goods {ben if. Here the process of the positi,e recou,ersiorl of
the ancien t sovereign right of death reaches itB zenith . If the meaning of the
term Politik remains the negative o ne of the defe nse from in ternal and external enemies, the semantics of Polizei is absolutely positive. It is ordered
to favor life in aU its magnitude, along its enti re extension, tbrougb all its
articulations. And, as Nicolas De Larnare wrote in his compendium, there
is even more to be reckoned with. The police are given the task of doing
what is necessary as well as what is opportune and pleasurable: "In short,
li fe is the object of the police: the indispensable, tbe useful, and the superfluous. T hat people survive, live, and even do bet.t.er than just t.hat: th is L~
what the police have to ensure:';' ln his Elements of Police, johann Heinrich
Gottlob von )usti aims the lens even further ahead: if the object of the police
is defined here too as "live individuals living in society; a more ambitio us
understand ing is that of creating a virtuous ci rcle between tbe vital develo pment of individua ls and the strengthening of the forces of the state:"
IT] be police has to keep the citizens happy- happiness being understood
as $llrvival, life, and improved living .. . to develop those clements constituitive of individuals' lives ill such a way that their development also fosters
the strength of the state.''
Tbe affirmative character is already fu lly delineated above, those featu res
(at least from this perspective) that Foucault seems to assig n to biopoli tics
in contrast r.o the commanding tendency of the sovereig n regime. In oppositio n to it, biopolitics does not li mit o r coerce {violenta/ li fe, but expands
it in a manner proportio nal to its development. More than two parallel tlows,
we ought to speak of a singu lar expan sive proc.ess in which power and life
constitute the two opposing and co mplementary faces. To strengthen itself,
power is forced at the same time in to strengthening the o bject oo wbich it
d ischarges itself; not only, but, as we saw, it is also forced to render it subject
to its own subjugation /assoggettamento]. Moreover, if it wants to stimulate
the action of subjects, power must no t on ly presuppose but also prod uce
38 The Enigma of Biopolitic~
the conditions of freedom of tbe subjects to whom it addresses itself.

But-and here Foucault's disco urse tends toward the maxi mum point of
its own semantic exte nsion- if we are free for power, we are also free
against power. We are able not only to support power and increase it, but
also to resist and oppose power. In fact, Foucault concludes that "where
there is power, there is resistance, and yet, or rather consequen tly, tb is resistance is never in a position of exteriority in relation to power:'" This
doesn't mear1, as Foucau lt qu ickly points out, that resistance is always already subjected to power against. which it seems to be opposed, but rather
that power needs a point of con trast against which it can measure itself in
a d ialectic that doesn't have any definitive outcome. It is as if power, in order
to reinforce itself, needs continually to divide itself and fight aga inst itself,
or to create a projection that pulls it where it wasn't before. This line of
fracture or protrusion is life itself. It is the place that is both the o bject and
the subject of resistance. At the moment in wh ich it is directly invested by
power, li fe recoils against power, agai.ost the sarue strik.i.og force tltat gave
rise to it:
Moreover. against this power that was still new in the nineteenth century,
the forces that resisted relied for support on the very thing it iHvested, that
ls, on life and man as a living being ... life as a political object was in a sense
take n at face value and turned back against the system that was bent on
controll ing it.S6
Simu ltaneously with in and outside of power, life appears to dominate the
entire scenario of existence; even when it is exposed to tbe pressure of
power-and indeed, never more than in such a case-life seems capable
of taking back what bad deprived it before and of incorporating it into its
infinite folds.
Po litics over life
Th is, however, isn't Foucau lt's entire response, nor is it his only. Cerr.ain ly,
there is an internal cohere nce therei n, as is testified by an entire interpretive line, which not on ly has made itself the standard-bearer of Foucault's
position, but which bas pushed Foucault's response well beyond bis own
manifest intentions.>' Be that as it may, this doesn't eliminate an impression of insufficiency, or indeed of an underlyi ng reservation concerning a
definitive ou tcome. Jt is as if Foucault hirnself wasn't completely satisfied
by bis own historical-cooceptual reconstruction or that he believed it to be
only partial and incapable of e>ehausti ng the problem; indeed, it is bound
The Enigmo of Biopolioics 39
to leave unanswered a decisive question: if li fe is stronger tban tbe power

that besieges it, if its resistance doesn't allow it to bow to the pressure of
power, then how do we account for the outco me o btained in modernity of
the mass productio n of death?" How do we explain that the culminatio n
of a politics of life generated a lethal power that con tradicts the productive
impulse? This is the paradox, the impassable stumbling block that not only
twentietb-centllTy totalitarian ism, but also n uclear power asks philosophy
with regard to a resolutely affi rmative dcclensi.on of biopoli tics. How is it
possible that a power of life is exercised against. life itself? Why are we not
deali ng with two parallel processes or simply two simu ltaneous processes?
Foucault accents the direct and proportional relation that runs between
the develo pment of bio power and the incremental growth in homicida l
capacity. There have never been so many bloody and genocidal wars as
have occurred in tbe last two centuries, wbicb is to say in a completely
biopolitical period. It is enough to recall that the maximum internati onal
effort for o rgao1izing health, the so -called Be,eridgc Plan, was elaborated
in the midd le of a war thar. prod uced 50 million dead: "One could symbolize such a coincidence by a slogan: Go get slaughtered and we promise you
a long and pleasant life. Life insurance is connected with a death command:'' Why? vVhy does a power that functions by insllTing, protecting,
and augmenting life express such a potential for death ? It is true that wars
and mass destruction are oo longer perpetrated in the name of a politics
of power {potenzaj-at least according to the declared intentions of those
who co nduct these wars - but in the name of the survival itself of populations that are involved. But it is precisely what reinforces the tragic aporia
of a death that is necessary to preserve life, of a life nourished by the deaths
of o thers, and fmally, as in the case of Nazism, by its own death."'
Once aga in we are faced with that enigma, that terrible unsaid, that the
"bio" placed before politics holds for the term's mean ing. Wby does biopolitic.s continually threaten t.o be reversed into t.hanatopolit.ics? Here r.oo the
response to such an interrogative seems to reside in the problematic point
of intersection be tween sovereignty and biopolitics. But seen now from an
angle of refraction that bars an interpretation linearly in opposition to the
two types of regime. The fo ucauld ian text marks a passage to a different
representation of their relation by the sligbt but meaningful seman tic slip
be tween the verb "to substitute" (which still con notes discontinu ity) and
the verb "to complement;' which alludes differently to a process of progressive and contin uous mutatio n:
40 The Enigma of Biopolitics
And I think that one of tbe greatest transformations that the political right
underwent i.o tbe ni.oeteen.th century was precisely that. I woul.dn1t say exactly
that sovereignty's old right- to take life or let live - was replaced, but it
came to be compl.ement.ed by a new right which does no t e rase the old right
but which do es penetrate it, permeate it.li 1
It isn't that Fouca ult softens the typological distinction as well as the
o pposition between the two kinds of power: these are defined as they were
previously. It is only that, rather than deploying the distinction along a
single sliding line, he retu rns it to a logic of copresence. From this point
of view, the same steps that were read before in a discon tinuous key now
appear to be articu lated according to a differen t argumentative strategy:
T hi.s power cannot be described or justi.lied in ter ms of the theory of
sovereignty. It i. radically heterogeneous and should logically have led to
the complete disappearance of the great juridical edifice of the theory of
sovereignty. In fact, the theory of sovereignty not only contin ued to exist as,
if you like, a n ideology of right; it also continued to organize the jurid ical
codes th;ot nineteenth-century Europe adopted after the Napoleonic codes."
Foucault furnishes an initial explanation of the ideological-functiona l

kind vis-a-vis such a persistence, in the sense that the use of the theory of
the sovereign, once it has been transferred from the monarch to the people,
would have allowed both a concealmen t and a jurid icization of the dispositifs of control put in to action by bio power. From here tbe institution of a
double level that is intertwi ned between an effective practice of the biological kind and a formal representation of juridical character. Contractualist
philosophies would have constituted from this point of view the natural
terrain of co ntact between tbe old so,,ereign o rder and the new governmenta l a pparatus, applied this time not only to the individua l sphere, but
also to the area of population in its totality. And yet, this reconstruction ,
insofar as it is plausible on tbe historical level, doesn't completely answer
the question on the theoretical level. h. is as if between the t.w o models,
sovereignty and biopolitics, there passes a relation at on ce mo re secret and
essential, one that is irreducible both to the catego ry of analogy and to that
of contiguity. What Foucault seems to refer to is rather a copresence of opposing vectors superimposed in a threshold of o riginary indistinction that
makes one both the grou nd and the projection, the truth and the surplus
of the o ther. It is th is an ti norn ic crossing, th is aporetic kJlOt, that prevents
us from interpreting the association of sovereig nty and biopolitics in a
mono linear form or in the sense of cont.emporaneity or succession. Nei-
Tbe nigma of JliopoHtics 41
ther the one nor the other restores tbe complexity of an association tbat is
much more antith etical. In their mutual relatio n, different ti mes are compressed within a singular epochal segment constituted and simultaneously
altered by their reciprocal tension. Just as the sovereign model incorporates the ancient pastoral power- the first genealogical incunabulum of
biopower - so too biopoli tics carries within it the sharp blade of <1 sover eign power that both crosses and surpasses it. lf we. consider the Nazi state,
we can say indi fferently, as Foucault hi mself docs, that it was the old sovereign power that adopts bio logical racism for itself, a racism born in oppositio n to it. Or, o n the contrary, that it is the new biopolitical power that made
use of the sovereign right of death in order to give life to state racism. If we
have recourse to the first interpretive model, biopolitics becomes an in ternal
articulation of sovereignty; if we privilege the second, sovereignty is reduced
to a formal schema of bio politics. The an tinomy emerges more strongly with
regard to nuclear equi librium. Do we need to look at it from the perspective
of li fe that, notwit!1staoding everyth ing, has been able to ensure it o r fwrn
the perspective of total and mass death that contin ues to threaten us?
So the power that is being exercised in this atomic power is excrdscd in
such a way tltat it is capable of suppressing life itself. And , therefore, to
suppress itself insof<lr as it is the power that guarantees life. Eitber it is
sovereign and uses the atomic bomb, and therefo re cannot be pov.'er, bio power. o r the power to guarantee life. as it has been ever since the ni oe~
teenth century. Or, at the opposite extre rne> you no longer have a sovereign
right that is in excess of biopower> but a biopower that is in excess of
sovereig n right.63
Once again, after having defined the terms of an alternating hermeneutic

between two opposing theses, Foucault never opts decisively for one or
the otber. On the one hand, be hypothesi-us something like a return to the
sovereign paradigm within a biopolitical horizon. In that case, we would
be dealing with a literally phan tasmal event, in the technical sense of a
reappearance of death-of the destitute sovereign decapitated by the grand
revolu tion- on the sce ne of life; as if a tear suddenly opened in the reign
of immunization (wbicb is precisely that of biopolitics), from which the
blade of transcendence once again vibrates, the ancient sovereign power
of taking life. On the o ther hand, Foucault introduces the opposing hypothesis, which says that it was precisely the final disappearance of the
sovereign paradigm tbat liberates a vital force so dense as to overflow and
be turned against. itself. With the balancing constituted by sovereign power
42 The Enigma of Biopo titics
d im inished in its double orientation o f a bsolute power and indiv idual

rights, li fe would become the sole field in wh ich power that was otherwise
d efeated is exercised:
T he excess of bio powcr appears when it becomes technologically and politically possible for ma n n ot only to mam1ge life bu t to mak e it proliferate, to
create living matter, to b u ild the monster, and ultimately, to build viruses
t hat cannot be co ntrolled and that are universally d estructive. T ltis fonnid-
able extension of biopower, unJike what Jwas just saying about atorni.c
power, will put it beyond all human sovereignty.().
Perhaps we ha,,e arrived a t th e poin t o f maxi mu m tension, as well as a t

the poin t of potential internal fracture o f the Fouca uldian d iscourse. At
the cen ter remains the relation (not only historical, b ut conceptual a nd
theo retical) between sovereign ty a nd politics, o r more generally between
modern ity and what precedes it, between presen t aod past. Is that past
truly past o r docs it extend as a shadow that reaches up to the present u nti l it
covers it entirely? ln this irreso lution there is somctbirlg more than a simple
exchange between a topological approach o f the ho rizon tal so rt and ano ther,
mo re epochal, o f the vertical kind; o r we a re dealing with both a retrospective and a prospective gaze." There is in decision concerning the underlyin g
mean ing of secularization. Is it nothing otber than the cbanoel, the secret
passage th rough wbicb death has retu rned to capture "We" again ? Or, oo
the con tra ry, was it p recisely the abso lute disappeara nce of deatb, its cooelusive d eath withou t remainder that sparks in the living a lethal battle
against itself? Once again, how do we wish to th ink the sovereign paradigm within the bio political order, and then what does it represen t.? Is it. a
residue that is delayed in consuming itself, a spark that doesn't go out, a compensatory ideology o r the ultimate truth, because it is prior to and originary
of its o wn installa tion, its o wn p rofou nd subsurface, its own u nderlying
structure? And when it pushes witb greater force so as to resurface (or, oo
the cont ra ry, when it ult.imat.ely collapses), does d eath rise again in the
heart of li fe un til it makes it b urst open ?
What remains suspended here isn't o nly the question of the rela tion o f
modernity with its "pre," bu t also that of the rela tion with its "post:' Wha t
was twentieth-cen tury totalitarian ism with respect to the society that preceded it? Was it a limit po int, a tea r, a surplu s in which the mechanism of
biopower broke free, got out o f hand, or, on the contrary, was it society's
sole a nd oa tural outcome? Did it iiJte rrupt o r d id it ful fiU it? Once agaio
the problem concerns t.he relat ion wi th the sovereign parad igm: d oes
The Enigmo of Biopolioics 43
Nazism (but also true (reate) commu nism) stand on the outside or inside
vis-a-vis it? Do they mark the end or the return? Do they reveal the most
intimate linking or the ultimate disjunctio n between sovereignty and biopolitics? It isn't surprising that Foucault's response is split into lines of argument
that are substantially at odds with each other. Totalitarianism and modernity are at the same time continuous and discontinuous, not assimilable
and indistingu ishable:
One of the numerous reasons wby ifioscism and Stalinism ) arc, for us,
so puzzling is that in spite o f their histo rical weakness they are no t quite
o riginal. They used and extended mechanisms already present in most
other societies. M.orc than that: in spite of tJteir internal madness. they
used to a large extent the ideas Hnd the devices of our political rationa.Liry.~u
The reason Foucault is prevented from responding less paradoxically is

clear: if tbe thesis of indistinction bet\\een sovereigoty, biopolitics, and
totali tarianism were to prevai l- the continuist hypothesis-he wou ld be
forced to assu one genocide as the constitui.tive paradigm (or at least as the
inevitable outcome) of the entire parabo la of modernity67 Do ing so would
contrast with his sense of historical distinctions, which is always keen .
If instead the hypothesis of difference were to prevail - the discontinuist
hypothesis- his conception of biopower wo uld be invalidated every time
that death is projected iilSide tbe circle of life, not only du ring the first half
of the J900S, but also after. lf totalitarianism were the result of,.hat came
before it, power wou ld always have to enclose and keep watch over life
relentlessly. If it were the temporary and contingent displacement, it would
mean that life 0\'er time is capable of beating back every power that wants
to violate it. In the first case, biopolitics would be an absolute power over
life ; in the second, an absolu te power of life. Held between these two opposing possibilities aod blocked in tbe aporia that is established when they
intersect, Foucault continues to run sin1u ltaneously in bo th directions. l-Ie
doesn't cut t.he knot, and the resu lt is t.o keep his ingenious intuitions
unfi nished on the link between politics and life.
Evidentlv, Foucault's difficulty and his indecision move well bevond a
'
.
'
sin1ple question of historical periodization or genealogical articulation between tbe paradigms of sovereignty and biopolitics to invest the same logical and seman tic configuration of the latter. My impressioo is that sucb a
heroneneutic impasse is co nnected to the fact that, notwithstanding the
theorization of their reciprocal inlplica tion, or perhaps because of th is,
the two terms of life and politics are to be t.hought as origin ally distinct
44 The Enigma of Biopolitics
and only later joined in a manner that is still extraneous to them. It is precisely for this reason that politics and life remain indefinite in profile and in
q ualification. What, precisely, are "politics" and "life" for Foucau lt? How are
they to be understood and in what way does their definition reflect on their
relationship? Or, on the contrary, how does their relation impact on their
respective defin itions? If one begins to tbink them separately in their absoluteness, it becomes difficult and even contradictory to condense them in
a sir1gl.e concept. Not only, but one risks blocking a more profou nd understanding, relating precisely to the originary and elemental character of that
association. It has sometimes been said that Foucau lt, absorbed for the
most part in the question of power, never sufficiently articulated the concept of politics- to the point of substantially superimposing tbe expressions of "biopower" and "biopolitics: But an analogous observation-a
conceptual elaboration that is Jacking or insufficient- could be raised as
well in relation to the other term of the relation, wh ich is to say that of life;
that despite describi ng th e term analyticall y in its historical-instituti.onal,
economic, social, and productive nervat.ure, life remains, nevertheless, little
problematized with regard to its epistemological constitution. What is life
in its essence and even before that, does life have an essence-a recognizable and describable designation ou tside of the relation with other lives
and with what is not We? Does there exist a sin1plc life - a bare li fe - or
does it emerge from the beginning as formed, as put into form by something that pushes it beyo nd itseU'? From th is perspective as well, thecategory of biopolitics seems to demand a new horizon of mean ing, a different
interpretive key that is capable of linking the two polarities together in a
way that is at the same time more limited and more complex.
CHAPTER TWO
The Paradigm of Immunization
Immunity
for my part, I believe I've traced the interpretive key irl the paradigm of
" immun ization" that seems t.o have eluded Fo ucault. How and in what
sense can immun izatio n fill that semantic void , that interval of mean ing
wh ich remains open in Foucault's text between the constitutive poles of the
concept of bio politics, namely, biology a nd politics? Let's begin by o bserving that the category of"immunity;' even in its current meaning, is inscribed
precisely in their intersection, that is, oo tbe tangential line that links the
sphere of life with that of law. Where the term "immunit)?' for the biomedical sphere refers to a condition of natural or induced refracto riness o n the
part of a living organism when faced with a given disease, immunity in
political-j urid ical language alludes to a tempora ry or definitive exemption
on the part of subject with regard to concrete o bligations or responsibilities that under normal circumstances would bind one to others. At this
point, however, we still remain only at the outermost side of the question:
many political terms of biological derivation (or at least of assonance) such
as those o f "body:' "nation:' and "constitu tio n" come to mi nd. Yet in the
notion o f immunization something more determines its specificity when
compared witb the Foucauldian notion of bio politics.lt concerns the intrinsic character that forces together the two elements that compose biopolitics.
Rather than being superimposed or j uxtaposed in ao externa l form that
subjects one to the d omi.nati on of the other, in the irnrnuJlitary paradigm ,
bios and nomos, li.fe and politics, emerge as the two constituent elements of
a single, indivisible whole t.hat assumes mean ing fro m their interrelation.
45
46 The Paradigm of lmmuniza6on
Not simply the relation that joins life to power, immunity is the power to
preserve life. Contrary to what is presupposed in the concept of biopolitics-understood as the result of an encounte r that arises at a certain moment between the two components- in this perspective no power exists
external to life, just as life is ne,er given o utside of relations of power. From
this angle, politics is noth ing other than the possibility or the instrument
for keeping life alive fin vita Ia vita}.
Yet t11e category of i.nunuJli.zation enables us to take anot11er step forward
(or, perhaps better, laterally) to the bifurcatio n that ru ns between the two
principal decli nations of the biopo litical paradigm: one affirmative and
productive and the other negative and lethal. We have seen how the two
terms tend to be constituted in an alternating and reciproca l form that
doesn't take into account points of contact. Thus, either power negates life
or enhances its development; or violates life and excludes it or protects and
reproduces it; objectivizes life or subjectifies it- without any tenns that
rn ight med iate between them. Now the hermeneutic advantage of the
in1munir.ary model lies precisely in t.he circumstance that these two modalities, these two effects of sense-positive and negative, preservati,e and
destr uctive-finally find an inte rnal articu lation, a semantic juncture that
o rganizes them into a causal relatio n (albeit of a negative kind). Tb is means
that the negation doesn't take the form of th.e violent subordination that
power imposes on life from the outside, but rather is the intri nsically antinomic mode by which life preserves itself thcough power. From this perspective, we can say tlut immunization is a negative [form] of the pro tectio n of
life. It saves, insures, and preserves the organism, either individual or co llective, to which it pertains, but it does not do so directly, immediately, o r
frontally; on the contrary, it subjects the organism to a condition that simultaneously negates or reduces its power to expand. just as in the medical
practice of vaccinating the indi,,idual body, so the immunization of the
political body functions similarly, introducing within it a fragment of the
same pathogen from which it wants to protect. itself, by blocking and con tradicting natural development. In this sense we can certainly trace back a
prototype to Hobbesian political philosophy: when Hobbes not only places
the problem of the conservatio vitiAe at the center of his own thought, but
conditions it to the subordination of a constitulive power that is externa l
to it, namely, to sovereign power, the immun itary principle has ''irutally
already been founded.
The Paradigm of Immunization 47
Naturally, we must not confound the objective genesis of a theory with

that of its self-interpretation, which obviously occurs later. Hobbes, and
with him a large part of modern political philosophy, is not fully cogn izan t
of the specificity (and therefore also of the co ntrafactual consequences) of
the conceptual paradigm that he in po int of fact also inaugurates. In order
for the power of the contradiction that is implicit in <Jo immuniwy logic
to come to light, we need to tu rn away from the level of irreflexive elaboration to that of conscious reflection. Jn other words, we need to introduce
Hegel into the discussion. It has been noted that Hegel was the first to assume the negative not just as the price-an unwan ted residue, a necessary
penalty- paid for the positive to be realized, but rather as the motor of the
positive, the fuel tbat allows it to function. Of course, Hegel doesn't adopt
the term or tbe concept of immunization as such. Tbe life to which the
Hegelian dialectic refers concerns that of reality aod of thought in their
constituti.ve indistinctness, rather than that of animal-man assumed as individual and as species (even if the constitution of subjectivity in some of
his fu ndamental texts occurs thanks to a challenge with a death t.hat is also
bio logical).' The fi rst knowingly to use such a transition is Nietzsche. When
Nietzsche transfers the center of the analysis from the sou l to the bodyor better, when he assumes tbe soul as the immunitary form that protects
and imprisons the body at the same time -the paradigm acquires its specific
critical weight. Here we are dealing not only with the metaphor of a l'trulent
vaccination that Nietzsche imparts to the common man, contaminating
him with man's own madness, but also with the interpretation of an entire
civilization in terms of self-protectio n and immunity. All of knowledge and
power's dispositifs play the role of protective containment in the face of a
vital power [potenza] that is led to expand without limits. What Nietzsche's
judgment might be about sucb an epochal occurrence - double, ambivalent - we will see shortly. The fact remains, bowever, that with Nietzsche,
the category of immunization has already been completely elaborated.
From that moment on, the most innovative part of twentieth-century
cu lture begins to make implicit use of the paradigm. The negative-that
which contradicts order, norms, values- is taken on not on ly as an indispensable element of h uman histo ry in all its singular or social configurations that it assumes periodicall)', but indeed as histor)"s productile impulse.
Without that obstacle or lack represented by the negative, the life of the
individual and of the species would never find enough energy to develop
48 The Paradigm oflmmunization
on its own. Instead it would remain dominated by the jumble of natural

impulses from which it needs to free itself in order to be able to ope n itself
to the sphere o f greater performance /prestnzioni/. Thus Emile Durkheim
refers precisely to immuno logy when considering an ineliminable and functional polarity o f human behavior that appeared as pathological in a social
environment:
Smallpox, a vaccine of which we usc to inoculate ourselves) is a lruc disease
that we give ou rselvc..~s volunttlrily. yet it incrc..~:;ses our chance of survival.
T here may be many otltcr cases where tltc damage caused by the sickness is
insignificant compared with the im munities that it confers upon us.1
But it is perha ps with the philosophical anthropology develo ped in Germany in the middle o f the last cen tury that the lexical horizon in which
the dialectical notion of compellsario acquires its most explicit immun itarian valence. From Max Scheler to Helmu th Plessner, ending with Arnold
Gehlen, the col!ditio humatw is li teraUy constituted by the negativity that
separates it from itself.' It is p recisely for this reason t.hat the human is
placed abO\'e other species that surpass the human on the level o f those
natu ral elements required to live. In ways different fro m Marx, not only
can the alienation of ma n not be reintegrated, but indeed it represents the
indispensable condition of our own identity. And so the man wbom Herder
had already defined as an "invalid o f h is superior forces" can be transformed into the "armed combatant of his inferi or forces;' into a "Proteus
o f surrogates" who is able to turn his own initial lack into a gain.' It is p recisely these "transcendences in rhe here and now"-what Geh len defines
as institutions-that are destined to immunize us from the excess o f subjectivity th rough an objective mechanism that simultaneously libera tes and
deprives [destituisce/ us.>
Yet if we are to recogn ize the unm un itary semantics at the cen ter of
modern self- represe ntation, we need to move to the point of intersection
between two rather different (albei t convergi ng) hermeneutic li nes. The
first is that which extends from Freud to Norbert Elias alo ng a theoretical
line marked by the knowledge o f civilization's necessarily inhibiting character. When Elias speaks of the transformation of hetero-co nstrictions in to
self-constrictions tha t characterize the move from the late-classical period
to tl1e modern one, he doesn't simply al.lude to a p rogressive margi.nalization
of violence, but rather to its enclosure withiiJ tbe colfioes of the individual psyche . Th us, while physical conflict is subjected to a social regu lation
The Paradigm of Immunization 49
that becomes always more severe, "at the same time tbe battlefield, is, in a
sense, moved within. Part of the tensions and passions that were earlier directly released in the struggle of man and man, must now be worked ou t
within the human being." This means that on one side the negative, in
this case confl ict, is neutralized with respect to its most d isruptive effects;
on the other that the equilibrium arrived at in such. a way is for its part
marked by a nega tive that undermines it from with.in . Th.e life of tbe ego,
divided between the d6ving power of the unconscious and th e inhibiting
one of the superego, is t.he site in which such an inununitary dialectic is
expressed in its most concentrated fo rm.
The scene doesn't change if we shift our attention to the o utside. As was
already noted, th is is wha t results when other lines intersect with the first
(albeit less critically) . I am referring to the critical route that leads us to
Parson's functionalism and Luhmann's systems th.eory. That Pa rsons himself li nked his own research to the "Hobbesian problem of o rder" is in th is
sense doubly indicative of its i.mrn unitary declension: fi rst because it d irectly
jo ins up with the philosopher with whom our genealogy began, namely,
Hobbes; and second for the seman tic and conceptual slippage that occurs
vis-a-\is Hobbes, relative to tl1e overcoming of the acute alternative between
order and conflict and the regulated assumption of conflict within order.
Just as society needs to in tegrate in to itself th.at individual who negates its
essence, so too is order the result of a conllict tbat is bo th preserved and
dominated.'
Niklas Luhmann is the one who has derived the most radical consequences from immunization, particularly regarding terminology. To affirm,
precisely as he does, that uthe system does not inununize itself against the
no but with the help of the no" or, "to put this in terms of an older distinction, it protects th rough negation aga inst annih ilation;' means getting
right to the heart of the question, leaving aside the apologetic or at least
the neutral connotations with which the author frames it! His thesis that
systems function not by rejecting confl icts and con tradictions, but by producing them as necessary antigens for reactivating their own antibodies,
places the entire Luhmann ian discourse within the semantic orbit of inlmwlity.9 Not on ly does Luhmann affirm that a series of historical tendencies
point to a growing concern to realize a social ioununology from the onset of
rnodernity, particu larly from the eighteen th century o nwards, but he pinpoints "society's specific immunitary system" in the legal system.'" Wbeo
the internal development of a true immunological science- begi nning at
50 ThC:' Paradjgm of Immunization
least with the work of Burnet- doesn't just offer an analogical border to
this complex of argumentations but something more, then the immunitary
paradigm comes to constitute the neuralgic epicenter between intellectual
experiences and traditions of thinking that are rather differen t." While cognitive scientists such as Dan Sperber theorize that cu ltural dynamics can
be treated as biologica l phenomena and therefore become subject to the
same epidemiological laws that regulate living organisms, Donna Haraway,
in cd tical d ialogue wi.th Foucault, comes to argue that "the immu ne system is a plan for meaningful action to construct and mainr.ain the boundaries for what may cou nt as self and other in the dialectics of Western
biopolitics:'" Similarly, whereas Odo Marquard interprets the aestheticization of postmodern reality as a form of preventive anesthetrlation, incipient globalization furnishes another area of research, or rather the definitive
background to our paradigm." just as communicative hypertrophy ca used
by telernatics is the reverse sign of a generalized immunization, so too the
calls for i.nununizcd identities of small states arc ooth.ing but the co untereffect. or r.he cr isis of an allergic rejection to global contamination.''
The new element that I have proposed in this debate concerns what appears to me to be the first systematic elaboration of the immunitary paradigm held on one side by the contrastive symmetry with the concept of
comm unity - itself reread in the light of its original meaning - and on
the other by its speciftcally modern characterrlation." T be two questions
quickly show themselves to be intertwined. Traci ng it back to its etymological roots, immunitas is revealed as the negative o r lacking [privativaj form
of communitas. If communitas is that relation, which in binding its members to an obligation of reciprocal donation, jeopardizes individual identity, immuniras is the condition of dispensation from such an obligation and
therefore the defense against tbe expropriating features of communitas. Dispensatio is precisely that wh ich relieves the penswn of a weighty obligation,
just as it frees the exemption (l'esol!ero} of that onus, which from irs origin
is traceable to the semantics of a reciprocal mr.mus.' Now the poi nt of
impact becomes clear between this etymological and theoretical vector and
the historical or more properly genealogical one. One can say that generally immu.nitas, to the degree it protects the one who bears it from risky
contact ,;ith those who lack it, restores its own borders that \\ere jeopardized by the cornrnon. But if immun i.zation impli es a substitution or an
opposition of private or individualistic models with a form of communi-
Tbe Paradigm of Immunization 51
tary organization- whatever meaoing we may wish to attribute to such ao

expression- the structural connection with the processes of modernization is clear.
Of course, by instituting a structural connection between modernity
and immunization, I do not intend to argue that modernity might be interpretable on ly througb <lo immunitary paradigm, oor tbat it is reducible
only to the modern. In other words, I do not deny the heuristic productivity of more consolidated exegetical models of usc such as "rationalization"
(Weber), "secularization" (Lowith ), or " legitimation" (B lumenberg). Bur. it
seems to me that all three can gain from a contamination with an explicative category, which is at the same time more complex and more profo und,
one that constitutes its underlying premise. Tbis surplus of sense witb respect to the above-mentioned models is attrib utable to two distinct and
linked elements. Tbe fi rst bas to do with the fact that while the modern
epoch's sclf-imerpretivc constructions-the q uestion of technology /teclliCtl}
in the Jirst case. that of the sacred in the second, and that of myth in the
third-originate in a circumscribed thematic center, or rather are situated
on a unique sliding axis, the immunization paradigm instead refers us to a
semantic horizon that itself contains plural meanings-for instance, precisely tbat of munus. Investing a series of lexical areas of different provenance and destination, the dispositif of its neutralization will prove to be
furnished by equal internal articulations, as is testified e''eo today by the
polyvalences that the term of immuni ty sti ll mai ntains.
But this horizontal richness doesn't exhaust the hermeneutic potential
of the category. It also needs to be investigated- and this is the second element noted above-by looking at the particular relation that the category,
immunity, maintains with its antonym, communit y. We have already seen
how the most incisive meaniog of immunitas is inscribed in tbe reverse
logic of communitas: immune is tbe "oonbeing" or the "not -having" anything in common . Yet it is precisely such a negative implication with its
contrary that indicates that the concept of immunization presupposes that
which it also negates. Not only does it appear to be derived logically, but it
also a ppears to be internally inhabited by its opposite. Certain ly, one can
always o bsene that the paradigms of disillusion, secularization, and legitimation - to remain '"ith those cited abo,'e - presupposed in a certain way
their own alterity: illusion, the divine, and transcendence, respectively. But
they also assume precisely that which at various tio1es is consumed, wb icb
52 The Paradigm of lmnnmiz.:Jtjon
then lessens or at least cbanges into sometbing different. Por its part, the
negative of immunitas (which is another way of saying commtmitas) doesn't
only disappear from its area of relevance, but co nstitutes simultaneously its
object and motor. What is immunized, in brief, is the same community in a
form that both preserves and negates it, or better, presenes it through the
negation of its original horizon of sense. From this point ofview, one might
say that more than tbe defensive apparatus superimposed on the comm u
nity, immu nization is its internal mechan ism {ingnmaggio/: the fold that .i n
some way separates community from itself,shelt.e ring it from an unbearable
excess. T he differential margin that prevents the comm unity from coinciding with itself takes on the deep semantic intensity o f its own concept. To
survive, tbe commun ity, every community, is forced to introject the nega
tive modality of its op posite, even if the opposite remains precisely a Jack
ing and contrastive mode of being of tbe community itself."
But the structural connection between moder nity and immun ization
allows us to take atlother step forward with reference to the "time" o f biopoli
tics. I noted earlier how Foucault himself oscillates between two possible
periodizations (and therefo re interp retations) of the paradigm that he himself in troduced." If biopolitics is born with the end of sovereignty-supposing that it has really come to an end - tb is means that the h istory of
biopolitics is largely modern and in a certain sense postmodern. If instead,
as Foucault suggests on other occasions, biopolitics accompanies tbe saver
eign regime, constituti ng a particular a rticulation or a specific tonality,
then its genesis is more ancient, one that ultimately coincides with that o f
politics itself, which has always in one way or another been devoted to life.
With regard to the second case, the quest ion is, why did Foucau lt open up
a new site of reflection? Tbe semantics of immunity can p rovide us witb
an answer to tbis question to the degree in wbich immunity inserts bio poli
tics into a historically determ ined grid. Maki ng use of the immuoitary
paradigm, one would then have to speak about biopoli tic.s beginni ng wit.h
the ancient world. When does power penetrate most deeply in to biological
life if not in the long phase in which the bodies of slaves were fully mailable to the uncon trolled domination of their masters, and when prisoners
of war co uld be legitimately run through with a victor's sword? And h ow
can the power of life and death exercised by the Roman paterfamilias witb
respect to his own ch ildren be understood if not biopoli tically? 19 What dis
tinguishes tbe Egyptian agrarian politics or tbe politics of hygiene and
The Paradigm oflmmunization 53
health of Rome from protective procedures and the development of life set
in motion by modern biopower? The only p lausible response would, it seems
to me, have to refer to the intrinsic immunitarian con notation s of the latter, which were absent in the ancient world .
If one moves from the historical to the concep tual level, the difference
appears even more evident. Consider the greatest philosopher of antiquity,
Plato. In perhaps no one more than Plato can we iden tify a movement of
thought that would seem to be oriented toward biopolitics. Not on ly docs
he take eugenic practices that Sparta adopr.ed with respect ro frail babies,
and more generally "~th regard to those not seen as suitable for public life,
as normal, indeed eve.n as expedient, but-and this is what matters morehe en la rges the scope of political authority to include the reprod uctive
process as well, going so far as to recommend that methods of b reeding for
dogs and other domestic animals be applied to the reproduction of offspring (paidopoiia or teknopoiia) of citizens or at least to the guardians
[guardia11i /:
It follows from our conclusions so fur tltat sex should preferably take place
between men and women who are outstandingly good, and should occur as
little as possible between men and wonl<n of a vastly inferior stamp. lt also
follows that the offspring of the first group shouldn't (reproduce 1. This is
how to max:im ize the potential of our flock. And the fuct that all this is happening should be concealed from everyone except the rulers themselves, if
the herd of guardians is to be as free as possible from conflict."
Some have noted that passages of this sort-anything but rare if not always
so ex'J)Iicit-may well have contributed to a biopolitical reading that Nazi
propaganda took to an extreme." Witho ut wanting to introduce the rantings of Bannes or Gabler regarding the parallels between Plato and Hitler,
it's enough merely to refer to the s uccess of Hans F. K. GUnther's Platon als
Hiller des Lebe11s in order to identify the interesting outcome of a bermeneuticalline thar. also includes aur.hors such as Windelband ." When GUnther
interprets the Platonic ekloge in terms of Auslese or Zucht (from ziichten),
that is, as "selection;' one cannot really speak of an out-and-out betrayal of
the text, but rather of a kind of forcing in a biological sense that Plato
himself in some way a uthorizes, o r at a minimum allows (at least in The
Republic,
in Politics, and in Laws, unlike in the more avowed lv d ualistic
.
di.alogues). Undoubtedly, even if Plato doesn't d irectly state what happens
to "defective" babies with ao explicit reference to infan ticide or to their
54 The Paradigm of [mm unization
aba ndonmen t, nevertheless, when seen in the con text of his discou rses,
o ne can clearly infer Plato's disinterest toward them; the same holds true for
the incurably ill, to whom it's not wo rthwhile devo ting useless and expensive care ' ' Even if Aristotle tends to moderate the deeply eugenic and thanatopolitical sense of these texts, it remains the case that Plato revealed himself as sensitive to the dem<>nd for keeping pure the genos of the gu<>rdians
an d mo re genera lly of the governors of the polis according to rigid Spartan
customs handed down by Criti.as and Seoopbone."'
Should we concl ude from Plat.o's proximity to a bio politic.al semantics
that o ne can trace a Greek genesis for biopolitics? I would be carefu l in responding affirmatively, and not o nly because the Platonic "selection" does
not ha,e a specific ethnoracial inflection, nor more precisely a social o ne,
but instead an aristocratic and a ptitudinal one. Moreover, instead of moving in an immunitary direction, one that is orien ted to the preservation of
the i11d ividual, Plato's discourse is clearly d irected to a cornrnunitarian sense,
ex tended r1amcly to the good of the koinon. It is this collective, public,
commu nal, indeed immunitary demand that keeps Plato and the entire
premodern cultu re mo re generally external to a co mpletely biopolitical
horizon. ln his important studies o n ancient medicine, Mario Vegetti has
shown how Plato harshly criticizes the dietetics of Herodicus and Dione,
precisely for th is lacking, individualistic, and therefore necessarily impolitical tendency." Contrary to the modern biocratic dream of medica lizing
politics, Plato stops sho rt of poli ticizi ng medicine.
Natu rally, having said this, it's not my intention to argue that no o ne befo re modernity ever posed a questio n of immunity. On a typo logical level,
the demand for self-presenation, strictly speaking, is far more ancient and
long-lasting than the modern epoch. Indeed, one could plausibly cla im
that it is coextensive with the entire history of civilization from tbe momen t
that it constitutes the ultimate precondi tion, o r better, tbe 6 rst condition,
in the sense that. no society can exist. without. a defensive apparatus, as
primitive as it is, that is capable of pro tecting itself. What changes, howe,er, is tl1e moment one becomes aware of the question, and therefore of
the kind of responses generated. That politics has always in some way been
preoccupied with defending life doesn't detract from the fact that beginning from a certain mo ment that coincides exactly with the origins of
modernity, such a self-defensive requirement was identified not only and
simply as a given, but as both a problem aod a strategic option. By this it is
underst.ood that. all civilizations past. and present faced (and in some way
The Paradigm oflmmuniZal iOo 55
solved ) the needs of their own immunization, but that it is only in the modern ones that immun ization consti tutes its most inti mate esse nce. One
might come to affirm that it wasn't modernity that raised the question of
the self-preservatio n of life, but that self-preservation is itself raised in
modernity's own being fcsserc], which is to say it iO\ents modernity as a
historical and categorical appan tus able to cope with it. Wh<lt " 'e understand
by modernity therefore in its complexity and its innermost being ca n be
understood as that metalanguage that for a number of centuries has given
expression to a request that or iginates in life's recesses through the elaboration of a ser ies of narrations capable of respon di ng to li fe in ways that
become mo re effective and mo re sophisticated over time. This occurred
when na tural defenses were din1 inished; when defenses tha t had up to a
certain point constituted the symbolic, protective shell of human experience were lessened, none more inlportant than the transcendental order
that was linked to the theological matrix. It is the tear that sudden ly opens
in the middle of th e last rn illenniuru in that earlier inlmu nitarian wrapping t.hat determines the need for a different. defensive apparatus of the
artificial sort that can protect a wo rld that is co nstituthely exposed to risk.
Peter Slote rdijk sees the double and con tradictory pro pensity of modern
man o rig inating here: on the one side, protected from an exteriority witho ut ready-made shelter, on tbe otber, precisely beca use of th is, forced to
make up for sucb a Jack with tbe elaboration of new and ever stronger
" imm unitary baldachins," when faced with a life not on ly already exposed
fdenudataj but completely delivered over to itself."
If that. is true, then the most important political categories of modernity
are not be interpreted in their absoluteness, that is, for what they declare
themselves to be, and not exclusively on the basis of their historical configuration, but rather as the lingu istic and institu tional forms ado pted by the
immunitary logic in order to safeguard life from tbe risks that derive from
its own co llective con figuration and conflagratio n. That such a logic expresses itself thro ugh histo rical-conceptual figures shows that the modern
implication between politics and life is di rect but not in1mediate. In order
to be actualized effectively, life requires a series of mediations constituted
precisely by these categories. So that life can be preserved and also develop,
therefore, it needs to be ordered by artificial procedu res that are capable of
savi ng it frorn natural risks. Here passes th e double fu1e that d istinguishes
modern politics; on one side, from that wbich precedes it, and, on the
o ther, fro m the condition that fo llows it.. Wi th regard to the first, modern
56 The Paradigm of lmmunjzation
politics already bad a clear biopolitical tendency, in the precise sense tbat it
is emphasized , beginni ng with the problem of co11serva tio itae. Yet differently with respect to what will happen in a phase that we will call fo r now
second mod ernity, the re la tionship between po litics and life circulates
through the problem of order and through historical-conceptual categories - sovereignty, proper ty, liberty, power - in wbicb it is innervated. It
is this presuppositio n of order with respect to living su bjectivity from
wh ich it objectively is generated that determines tle aporetic structure of
modern political p hilosophy; indeed , the fact t.hat its response to the question of self-preservation from which it is born emerges not o nly as deviated
b ut, as we will see soon enough, as also self-contradictory, is the consequence
or the expression of a dialectic that is already in itself antinomic, as is the
immunitary dialectic. If modern political philoso phy is given the task of
protecting life, which is always determined negatively, then the political
categories organized to ex.press it will end up rebounding against their own
proper meanings, twisting against thernselvcs. And tl1at notwitl1star1d ir1g
their specific contents: the pretense of responding to a n immed iacy- the
q uestion of consenatio vitae-is contradictory to the mediations, which are
precisely the concepts o f sovereignty, property, and liberty. That all of them
a t a certa in point in tbeir historical-semantic parabola are reduced to the
security of the subject wbo appears to be the owner or beneficiary, is not to
be understood either as a con tingent derivation o r as a destiny fixed beforehand, but rather as the consequence o f the modality o f im mun ity th rough
which the Modern tl1inks tl1e figure of the subject.'" Heidegger more than
anyone else u nderstood the essence of the problem. To declare that modernity is the epoch of representation, that is, of the subjectum that positions
itself as an ens i11 se substa11tialiter completum vis-a-vis its O\vn object, entails
b ringing it back philosophically to the horizon of immu n ity:
Represenration is now, in keeping witb the new freedom, a going forthfrom ou1 of itself-into tbe sphere, first 10 be made secure, of what is
made secure .. . T he subjectum, the fundamental certainty, is the being
represented together-with - made secure at a ny time - o f representing
man together '"'ith the e ntity represented, whethe r something human o r
nonhuman, Le. together wilh the objtctive.2t1
Yet to link the modern subject to such a horizon of immunitary guarantees

also means cecogJlizing the apo ria in wh ich the same ex.pecience cemains
captured: that of looking to shelter life in the same powers [potl!nzef that
interdict its development..
The Par-.!digm of lmmllniZal iOn 57
Sovereignty
The conception of sovereignty constitutes the most acute expression of
such a power. ln relation to the analysis initiated by Foucault, SO\'ereignty
is understood not as a necessary compensatory ideo logy vis-it-vis the intrusiveness of control dispositifs nor as a phan tasmal replica of the ancient
power of death to the new biopolitical regime, but as the first aod most
influential that the biopolitical regime assumes. That accounts for its long
persistence in a European jucidical-politica] lexicon: soveteignt.y isn't before or after biopolitics, but cuts across the entire horizon, furnish ing the
mosr. powerful response to the modern problem of the self-preservation o f
life. The importance of Hobbes's philosophy, even befo re his disruptive categorical innovations, re.sides in the absolute distinctness by which this transition is felt. Unlike the Greek conception - which generally thinks politics in the pa radigmatic distinction with the biological dimension - in
Hobbes not only does the question of conservatio vitae reenter fully in the
poli.tical sphere, but it comes to consti.tute by far its most prevalent d imen sion. In order to qualify as such, to deploy in its forms, life must above all
be maintained as such, be protected as such, and be protected from the
dissipation that threatens it. Both the definition of natural right, that is,
what man can d o, and that of natmallaw, that is, wbat man must do, account for th is original necessity:
The Right of Nature, which Writers commonly call )us Naturale, is the
Liberty e"ch man hath, to usc his own power, as he will himsclfe, for
the preservation of his own Nature; that is to say, of his own life; and
consequently, of do ing any thing, which in his own judgement, and
Reason, hee shall conceive to the aptest means thereunto.!?
As for natural law, it is "a Precept, or generall Ru le, found ou t by Reason,

by which a man is forbidden to do that, which is destructive of his life, or
taketh way the means of preserving the same, and to omit., that, by which
he th inketh it may be best p reserved.'0
Already the setting up of the argumentation situates it in a clearly biopolitical frame.It's not by chance that the man to whom Hobbes turns his
attention is one characterized essentially by the body, by its needs, by its
impulses, and by its drhes. And when one even adds the adjective "political;'
this doesn't quali tati,ely modify the subject to which it refers. Wi.th respect
to the classic Aristotelian d ivision, the body, consid ered politically, remai ns closer to the regions of zce than to that of bios; or bet.ter, it is sit.uated
58 The Paradigm of Lmnnmization
precisely at the point in wbicb such. a d istinction fades aod loses meaning.
What is at stake, or, more precisely, what is in constant danger of exti nction, is life understood in its materiality, in its immediate physical intensity.
It is for this reason that reason and Jaw converge on the same point defined
by the pressing demands of preserving life. But what sets in mot ion the
argumentative Hobbesian machine is tbe circumstance that neither one
nor the other is able by itself to acb ie.ve such an o bjective without a more
complex apparatus in condition to guarantee it. The initial attempt at selfpreservation (conatus sese praeserva 11di) is indeed destined to fail given the
combined effects of the other natural impulses that accompany and precisely contradict the first, namely, the inexhaustible and acquisitive desire for
everything, which condemns meo to generalized conflict Although it teods to
self-perpetuation, the fact is that life isn't capable of doing so autonomously.
On the contrary, it is subjected to a strong co unterfactual movement such
that the more li fe pushes in the direction of self-preservation, the more defensive and offensive means arc mobilized to this end, given the fundamental equality among men, all of whom are capable of killing each other
and th us, for the same reason, all capable of being killed:
And therefore. as lo ng as this naturall Right of every man to every
thing endureth. the re can be no security to any man. ( how strong or
wise soever he: be), of living out the time. which Nature ord inarily
allo,veth men to live.3 1
It is here that the immu nitary mechanism begins to operate. If life is
abandoned to its internal powers, to its nat.ural dynamics, human life is destined to self-destruct because it carries within itself something that ineluctably places it in contradiction with itseu. Accord ingly, in order to save itseU',
life needs to step out from itself and constitute a transcendental point from
which it receives orders and shelter. It is in this interval or doubling of life
with respect to itself that. the move from nature t.o artifice is to be posi tioned. Tt has the same end of self-preservation as nature, but in order to
actualize it, it needs to tear itself fro m nature, by following a strategy that
is opposed to it. Only by negating itself can nature assert its own will to
live. Preservation proceeds through the suspension or the alienation {estra neazione./ of tbat which needs to be protected. Therefore the political state
cannot be seen as the conti.nuation o r the rei.nforccment of 11atu re, but
rather as its oegative converse. Tb is doeso't mean that politics reduces life
to its simple biological layer-that it. denudes it. of every qualitative form,
The Paradigm of lmmuniZ3lion 59
as one might argue only by moving Hobbes to a lexicon in which be doesn't

be lo ng. It is no coincidence that he never speaks of "bare life; but on the
contrary, in all his texts, implies it in terms that go well beyond simply
maintain ing life. If in De Give he argues that" IB]ut by safety must be understood, not the sole preservation of life in what condition soever, but in o rder
to its happiness; in Elements be stresses that with the judgment (Salus populi suprema lex esto)"must be understood, not the mere preservation of their
lives, but generally tbei.r benefi t and good," to conclude io l.eviathau that
"by safety here is not meant. a bare preservation, but also all other co ntentments of life, which every man by lawfu l industry, without danger or hurt
to the Commonwealth, shall acquire to himself:'"
Nor does this mean that the category of life in the modern period replaces that of politics, with progressive depoliticization as its result. On the
con trary, on ce the centrality of W'e is established, it is precisely politics that
is awarded the responsibility for sa,ing life, but-and here is the decisive
point in the structure of the immunitary paradigru-it occurs th rough an
anti nomic dispositif that proceeds via the activation of its con trary. In
order to be saved, life bas to give up something that is integ ral to itself,
what in fact constitutes it principal ''ecto r and its own power to expand;
namely, the acqu isitive desire for everything that places itself in the patb of
a deadly reprisal. Indeed, it is true that every living organism has within it
a sort of natural immunitary system - reason - that det'ends it from the
attack of external agents. But once its deficiencies, or rather its counterproductive effects, have been ascertained, it is substituted with an induced
immunity, wh ich is to say an artificial one that both realizes and negates
the first. T his occurs not only because it is situated outside the individual
body, but also beca use it now is given the task of forcibly containing its
primordial intensity.
This second inlmunitary (or better, meta-iomJUnitary) dispositif, whicb
is desti ned to protect life against. an inefficient and essentially risky protection, is precisely sovereignty. So much has bee n said about its pactional in a ugurat ion and its prerogatives that it isn't the case to re turn to them here.
Wha t a ppears most relevant from our perspective is the constitutively
aporetic relation that ties it to tbe subjects to whom it is directed. Nowhere
more than in this case is the term to be understood in its double meaning:
they arc subjects of sovereignty to the extent to which they have voluntarily instituted it through a free contract. But they are subjects to sovereigllty
because, o nce it has been instituted, they cannot resist ir. for precisely the
60 The Parad igm of lmmunizatjon
same reason: otherwise they would be resisting themselves. Because they

are subjects of sovereignty, they are subjected to it. Their consensus is requested on ly o nce, after which they can no longe r take it back.
Here we can begin to make ou t the constitutively negative character o f
sovereign immunization . lt can be defined as an immanent transcendence
situated outside the control of those tha t also produced it as the expression
o f their own will. This is precisely the contradictory structure that Hobbes
assigns to the concept of representation: the one representing, that is, th e
sovereign, is simu ltaneously iden tical and different with respect. to those
that he represents. He is identical because he takes their place [stare alloro
posto j, yet different from them because that "place" remains outside their
range. The same spatial an tinomy is seen temporally, that is, that which the
instituting subjects declare to ha,e put in place eludes them because it logically precedes them as thei.r own same presup position." From this poi.o t
o f view, on e could say that the immu nization of the modern subject li.es
precisely in this exchange between cause and effect: he, the subject, ca n be
presupposed, self-insured in Heidegger's t.e rms, because be is already caught
in a p resupposition that precedes and determines hin1. It is the same relation
that holds between sovere ign power and individual righ ts. As Foucault explains it, these two elements must not be seen in an inversely proportional
relatio nship that conditions the eolargemeo t of the fi rst to tbe sbrii1king of
the second or vice versa. On the contrary, they mutually inlplicate themselves in a form that makes t he first the complementary reverse of the
o ther: only individuals who are considered equal with others can institute
a sovereign that is capable of legitimately representing them. At the same
time, on ly an absolute sovereign can free individuals from subjection to
o ther despotic powers. As a more recent, discri.oli.oating historiograph)' has
made clear, absolutism and individualism, ratber than excluding or contradicting each other, implicate each other ii1 a relation tbat is ascribable to
the same genetic process.'' It is through absolutism tha t individuals realize
themselves and at the same ti me negate themselves; presupposing the ir
own p resupposition, they are deprived insofar as they are constituted as
subjects from the moment that tbe outcome of sucb a founding is nothing
o ther than that which in tu rn constructs them.
Bebind the self-legitimating account of modern i.olmunization, the rea l
biopoli ti.cal functi.on that modern individualism performs is made clear.
Presented as the discovery and tbe i.olplementation o f the subject's auton omy, individualism in reality functio ns as t.he immu nitary ideologemme
The Par-.!digm oflmmuniZal iOn 61
through which modern sovereign ty implements the protection of life. We

shouldn't lose sight of any in termediate passage in this dialectic. We know
that in a natural state men also relate to each other according to a modality
o f the individual that leads to generalized co nflict. Bu t such a conflict is
still always a horizontal relation that binds them to a communal dimension.
Now, it is exactly this commona lity - the danger that derives to each and
every one - that is abolished through that artificial individua lization constituted precisely by the sovereign dispositi(. Moreover, the same echo is to
be heard in the term "absolutism;' not o nly in the independence of power
from e'ery external li mit, b ut above all in the d issolution p rojected onto
men: their transformatio n into individuals, equally absolute by subtracting
from them the munus tha t keeps them bound communa lly. Sovereign ty is
the not being [iltwn ess~>re] in common of in dhiduals, the political form
of their desocial~lation.
The negat ive o f immrmitas already fi lls our e ntire frame: in order to save
itself unequivocally, life is made "private" in the two meanings of the expression. It is privatized and deprived of that rela tion that ex-poses it t.o its
communal mark. Every external relationship to the vertical line that binds
everyone to the sovereign command is cut at the root. Jndhidual literally
means this: to make indivisible, united in oneself, by the same line that
divides one from everyone else. The individual appears protected from the
negative borde r tbat makes h im bimself and not other (more than from
the positive power of the sovereign). One might come to affirm that sovereignty, in the final analysis, is nothing o ther than the artificial vacuu m crea ted aro und every individ ual-the negative of the relation or t.he negative
relation that exists between unrela ted entit ies.
Yet it isn't only this. There is something else tbat Hobbes doesn't say
explicitly, as he limits himself to letting it emerge from the creases or the
internal shifts of the discourse itself. It concerns a remnant of violence that
the immunitary apparatus can not mediate because it. has produced it itself.
From th is perspective, Foucault seizes on a n im portant po int that is not
always underlined with the necessary emphasis in the Hobbesian literature: Hobbes is not the philosopher of conflict, as is often repeated in regard
to "the war of every man aga inst every man; but rather the p hilosopher o f
peace, or better of the neutralization of confl ict, from the moment that the
political state needs preemptively to insure against the possibility of internecine warfare.>; Yet the neutralizatioo o f conflict doesn't completely provide for its eliminatio n, but instead for its incorporation in t.he immunized
62. The Paradigm oflmmunization
organism as ao antigen at once necessary to the contin uous formation of

antibodies. Not even the protection that the sovereign assures his subjects
is exempt. Especially here is manifested the most striden t form of an tibody. Concurrently, in the order of instru ments ado pted to mitigate the
fear of violent death that all feel toward the o ther, it remains a fear that is
more acceptable because it is concentrated on one o bjective (though not
for this reason essentially different from tbe one already overcome).ln a
certain seose, the asymmetric condition in tensifi es this fear, a condition i.n
which the subject fsuddito] finds himself vis-a-vis a sovereign who preserves
that natural right deposited by all the o ther moments of the entrance into
the civil state. What occurs from this, as a result, is the necessary lin king of
the preservation of life with the possibility- always present even if ntrely
utilized-of the taking away of life by the one who is also charged with insuring it. ll is a right precisely of life and death, understood as the sovereign prerogative that cannot be con tested precisely because it has been
authorized by the same subject that end ures it. The paradox tbat supports
the entire logic lies in the circumstance that the sacri ficial dynamic is unleashed not by the distance, but, o n the co ntrary, by the assumed identification of individ uals with the sovereign who represents them with their
explicit will. Tbus, "noth ing the Sovewign Representative can doe to a subject, o n what pretense soever, can properly be caUed an Injustice, or Injury:
bee<luse every Subject is Autbor of every act the Soveraign dotb.":l(o It is
exactly this superimposition between opposites that reintroduces the term
of death in the discourse of life:
And therefore it may and does o ften happen in Common-wealths, that a
Subject may be put to death, by the command of the Soveraign Power,

an.d yet oeitber doe the other wrong: As wben )eptha caused his daughter
to be sacrificed: In which, and the like cases, he that so dieth, had Liber ty
to doe the actio n, for which he is neverthelesse~ without Injury put to death.
And the sam e ho ldeth also in a Soveraign Princ.e , that p utteth to de<tth an
Innocent Subject."
What emerges here with a severity that is only bare ly contained by the
exceptional character in which the event appears circumscribed is the constitu tive antinomy of the sovereign immunization, which is based not only
on the always tense relationship bet,;een exception aod norm, but on its
normal character of cxcepti.on (because anticipated by the same o rder that
seems to exclude it). This exception-the limiil al coincidence of preservation and capacity to be sacrificed of life-represents both a remainder
Tbe Paradigm of Immunization 6.3
that cannot be mediated aod the structural antinomy on which the mach ine of immun itary mediation rests. At the same time, it is the residue of
transcendence that immanence cannot reabsorb- the prominence of the
"political" with respect to the juridical with which it is also identifiedand the a poretic motor of their dia lectic. It is as if the negative, keeping to
its imm unitary function of protecting life, suddenly moves outside the
frame and on its reentry strikes life with uncontroUable violence.
Property
The same negative dialectic that uni tes ind ividuals to sovereignty by separating them invests all the political-juridical categories of modernity as
the inevitable result of their immunitary declension. Th is bolds true in
the first instance for that of"property!' Indeed, one can say that pro perty's
constitutive relevance to the process of modem immunization is ever more
accentuated with respect to the concept of sovereignty. And this for two
reason s. First, thanks to the o riginary antithesis that juxtaposes "common"
to "one's own" /proprio}, which by definition sign ifies "not common;' "one's
own" is as such always immune. And seco nd, because the idea of property
marks a qualitative intensification of the entire immunitary logic. As we
just o bsened, while sovereign immunization emerges transcendent with
respect to tbose wbo also create it, that of pro prietary immunization adheres to them - o r better, remains within the conJines of their bodies. lt
concerns a process that conjoins making immanent /immane-ntizzazionej
and specialization: it is as if the protective apparatus that is concentrated
in the unitary figure of sovereignty is multiplied to the degree that sovereignty, once mu ltiplied, is installed in biological organisms.
At the center of tbe conceptual transition will be found the work of
John Locke. Here, just as in Hobbes, what is at stake is the preservation of
life (preservation of himself; desire of self-presenation [traos: in English )),
which Locke from the beginn ing declares to be "the first and strongest
God Planted in Men;'"' but in a form that conditions it to the presence of
something, precisely the res propria, that con temporaneously ar ises from
and reinforces it.
For the desire, strong desire of Preserving bis Life and Being having been
Planted in him, as a Pr inciple of Action by God himself, Reason, which
was the Voice of God in him, could not but teach him and assure him, that
pursuing that natural Inc.lination he had to preserve his Being, he foUowed
the Will of his Maker, and therefore had the rig ht to make use of those
64 The Paradigm of lmmuniza6on
Creatures, which by llis Reason or Senses he could disco,er would be

serviceable tber.eu.nto ..~d thus Man.)s Property i.u the Creatures, was
fo unded upon the r ight he had, to make use of those things, that were
necessary or useful to his Being. )ll
The right of pro perty is therefore the consequence as well as the factual
precondition for the permanence in life. Tbe two terms implicate each other
in a constitu tive connection that makes of one the necessary precond ition
of the other: without a li fe in which to inhere, property would not be given;
but without something of o ne's own- indeed, without. prolonging itself in
property- life would not be able to satisfy its own pri mary deman ds and
thus it wou ld be extinguished. We mustn't lose sigh t of the essential steps
in the Mgument. Locke doesn't always include life among the properties of
the subject. lt is true that in general he unifies lives, liberties, a11d states
(trans: in English] within the denomination of property, so that he can say
that "civil goods are life, li berty, bodi ly health and freedom from pain , and
the possession of outward things, such as lands, money, furniture, and
the like!' But in other passages property assumes a more restricted sense,
one that is limited to material goods to which life doesn't belong. How
does one explain such an incongruence? I believe that to understand them
less in obvio us fashion, these two enunciative modalities shou ld not be
juxtaposed but integrated and supcrin1posed in a singu lar effect of sense:
life is contemporaneously inside and outside properl-y. It is within from
the point of view of having-as part of the goods with which everyo ne is
endowed /in dotazione}. But beyond that, life is also the all of the subject if
one looks at it from the point of view of being. Indeed, in this case it is
property, any kind of property, that is part of life. One can say that the relationship and the exchange, which from time to time Locke sets up between
these two optics, define bis entire perspective. Life and property, being
and having, person and thing are pressed up together in a mutual relatioo
that makes of one both the content and the container of the other. When
he declares that the natural state is a state of"l.iberty to dispose, and order,
as he lists, his Person, Actions, Possession, and his who le property, within
the Allowance of those Laws under wh ich he is; and therein not to be
subject to the arbitrary Will of another, but freely to follow his own;' on
the one hand, he inscribes proper ty in a form of ufe expressed in the
personal actio n of an acting subject; on the other, he logically includes
subject, action, and uberty in the 6gure of "one's own."" In this way it
Tbe Paradigm of Immunization 65
emerges as an "inside" that is inclusive of an "o utside" that in turn subsumes it within.
The resulting antinomy will be fou nd in the logical difficu lty of placing
property before the ordering regime that institutes it. Unlike in Hobbes
(but also differently than Grozio and Pufendor), Locke's notion of prop
erty precedes sovereignty, which instead is ordered to defend it:12 lt is the
presupposition and not the result of social organization. Yet-and here
appears the questio rl witl1 wh ich Locke hi.mself explicitly begins-what if
property is not rooted in a form of inter human relation, in which property
fin ds its own foundation within a world in which it is given in common?
How can the common make itself "one's own" and "one's own" subdivide
the common? What is the origin of "mine; of "yours," and of "his" in a
universe of everyone? It is here that Locke impresses on his own discourse
that biopolitical declension that folds it in an intensely immunitarian sense:
T ho ugb the Earth, and aU iJuerior Creatures be common to aU M.en, yet
every Man has a Property in his O'A'll Person. This no Body has any Right
to but himself. The labour of his Body and the Work of his Hands, we
may say, are properly his. \~Vhatsoever then he remove.s out of the State that
Nal\ lfChath provided, and left it in, he hath m ixed his l abour ' 'ith, and
joync.~d to it something that is his own, and thereby makes it his Propc.~rty:u
Locke's reasoning unravels through concentric circles whose center does

not con tain a political-juridical principle, but rather an immedi;Hely biological reference. The exclusion of someone else cannot be established except as
part of the consequential chain that originated in the metaphysical proviso
of bodily inclusion. Property is implicit in the work that modifies what is
naturally given as work, which in turn is included in the body of the person
'"ho performs it. Just as work is an extension of the body, so is property an
extension of work, a sort of prosthesis that throug h the operation of the
arm connects it to the body in the same vital segmeot; not only because property is necessary for the material supporr. of life, but because its prolongation
is directed to corporeal formatio n. Here another transition is ''isible, indeed,
e\en a shift in the trajectory with respect to the subjective self-insurance
identified by Heidegger in the modern repra1<sen.tatio: tbe predominance
over the object isn't established by the distance that separates it from the
subject, but by tbe movement of its incorporation. The body is the primary
site of property because it is the location of the first property, which is to say
what eacb person holds over hin1self [ha su se stesso/.lf the world was giveo
66 The Paradigm of Immuniz.otion
to us by God in common, the body belongs solely to the individual wh.o at

the same time is constituted from it and who possesses it before any other
appropriation, which is to say in originary form. It is in this exchangetogether both a splitting and a do ubling-between being (a body) and
having o ne's own body that the Lockean individual finds its ontological
and juridical, its onto-juridical foundation for every successive appropriation. Possessing one's owo corporeal form {persona/, he owns aU his performances, begi.no ing witl1 the traosformatio rl of the material object, wh ich
he appropriates as transitive property. From that moment. every other individualloses the right over it, such that one can be legi timately killed in
the case of theft. Seeing bow thro ug h work the appropriate object is incorporated into tbe owner's body, it then becomes one witb tbe same biological life, and is defended with the violent suppression of the one that
threatens it as the object has oow become an integral part of his life.
Already here the i.mmunitary logic seizes and occupies the entire Lockean
argumentative frarnework: t11e potential risk of a world given in CO.n1.1110rl and for this reason exposed to an unlimited indistinct.ion-is neutralized
by an element that is presupposed by its same originary manifestation because it is expressive of the relation that precedes and determines aU the
others: the relation of everyone witb himself or berself in the form of personal identity. Th is is both tbe keroel and the sbeU, the cooteot and the
wrapping, the object aod the subject of the immunitary protection. As
pcoperty is protected by the subject that possesses it, a self-protecting capacity, preserved by the subject thro ugh his proprium and of that proprium
through himself (through the same subjective substance), extends, strengthens, and reinforces it. Once the proprietary logic is wedded to a solid
underpinning sucb as belonging to one's own body, it can now expand
into communal space. T his is not directly negated, but is incorporated and
recut in a division th.at turns it inside out into its opposite, in a multiplicity
of th ings that have in common on ly the facr. of being all one's own to the
degree they have been appropriated by their respective owners:
From all \vhich it is evident, that though Lhe things of Nature arc given in
common, yet Man (by being Master of himself, and Proprietor of his Person,
and the Actions or Labour of it) , had still in himself tltc great foundation of
Property; and that whicb made up the grc.1t part of what he apllyed to the
Support o r Comfor t of his being. wben Invention and i\.rts had improved
the conveniences of Life, was perfectly his own, and did not beJong i.n
common to others.H
The Paradigm of Jmmunization 67
Earlier l noted th.at we are dealing witb an immunitary procedure that is

much more poten t tha n that of Hobbes because it in heres in the same
form-though one could say in the material-of the individual. The increment of functionality that derives from it is nonetheless paid with a
corresponding intensification of the contradiction on which the entire system rests, which is no longer situa ted in the poin t of connection and tension between individuals and tbe sovereign, as in tbe Hobbesian model,
but io tbe complex relation that moves betweerl subjectivity and property.
What is at stake isn't only a question of identity or of difference-the divergence that is opened in the presupposed convergence between the two
poles - but also and above all in the displacement of their prevalent relation . It is defined generally according to the following formulation: if the
appropriated thing depends on the subject who possesses it such that it becomes one witb the body, I be owner in turn is rendered as such only by the
thing !hat. belongs to him-and therefore he himself depends on it. On
the on e hand, the subject dom inates the thing i.o the speci fic sense that he
places it with in his domain. But, o n the o ther hand, the thing in turn dominates the subject to the degree in which it constitutes the necessary objective
of his acqu isitive desire I tensione/. Withou t an appropriating subject, no
appropriated thing. But without any a ppropriated thing, no appropriating
subject- from the moment it tbat doesn't subsist o utside of the constitutive
relation with it. In th is way, if Locke ca n hold that property is the contin u<ltion of subjective iden tity-or the extension of subjective identity outside
itself-one sooner or later can respond that "with private property be ing
incorporated in man himself and with man himself being recognized as its
essence ... carries to its logical co nclusion the denial of man, since man
himself no longer stands in an external relation of tension to the exteroa l
substance of private property, but has himself become the essence of private
property": its sim ple appendage." We must nor lose track of the reversible
features that unir.e both cond itions in one movement.. ft. is precisely the in d isti nction between the two terms-as is o riginally established by Lockethat makes the one the domiuu.s of the other, and which therefore constitutes them in their reciprocal subjection .
The point of transition and inversion between the two perspectivesfrom tbe mas1ery of the subjec1 to that of the thing- is situated in 1he private (pri vato} character of appropriation. lt is through i.l that the appropriating act becomes at the same time exclusive of every other act, thanks
to the thi ng itself: the privacy (primtezzaj of possessio n is one with the
68 The Paradigm of1 mmunization
subtraction {privazione/ that specifies in wbom privacy is DOt shared with

the legi timate owner, which means the entire com munity of nonowners.
Fro m this point of view-not an alternative to, but speculative of the
first -the negative clearly begins to preva il over the positive, or better, to
manifest itself as its internal truth . lt is "one's own" that is not common,
that does DOt belong to others. The passive sense of every appropria tion
su btracts from every other one the appropriative jus toward the thing that
has already been appropriated irl the form of private property. But then
also in the active sense, such that the progressive increase in individual
property causes a progressive decrease in the goods that are at the disposition of o thers. Internecine conflict, exorcized from with in the proprietary
universe, in tb is way is clearly moved ou tside its confines, in the formless
space of non-property.lt is true that in principle Locke institutes a double
limit to the increase of propert)' in the o bligation to leave for others the
things necessary for their maintenance {conservazionej and in the prohibition of appropriating for o r1esclf what isn't possible to consume. But then
he considers it inoperative at th e moment when goods become commutable
into money and therefore infinitely capable of being accumulated without
fearing that they might be lost:" From that point on, private property conclushely breaks down the relation of proportionality that regulates therelation of one to another, bu t it also weakens that wh ich unites the owner of
property to himself. Th is occurs when property, both priva te and subtractive {pril'ati va j, begi ns to be emancipa ted (from the body from which it
seems to depend) to take on a configuration of purely juridical stamp. The
intermediate point of this long process is constitu ted by the breaking of
the link, introduced by Locke, between property and work. As we know, it
'"as precisely this that joins proprium within the conJines of the body. When
such a connection begins to be considered as no longer necessary- according to a reasoning set in mo tion by I-lume aod perfected by modero political economy-one witnesses a true and particu lar desubstantializat.ion of
pwperty, theorized in its most accomplished form in the Kantian disti nction between posses,~o phaerwmenon (empirical possession) and possessio
noumenon (intelligible possession ), or, as it is also defined, detcntio (possession without possession). At this point, what will be considered tru ly,
eveo defmitively, one's own is on ly that which is distant from the body of
him who juridically possesses it. It is not physical possession that testifies
to complete juridical possession. Originally though t within ao indissoluble
The Paradjgm oflmmuniZal iOo 69
link with the body tbat works, proper!)' is alread y deli ned by its extraneousness to its own sphere.
I can only caiJ a corporeal thing or an object in s pace m ine, when even
though in physical possession of it, I am able to assert that I am in possession of it in anoth<r real non-physical sense. Thus, I am not entitled to call
an apple mine merely beC<Juse l hold it in my hand or possess it physically;
but only when I am entitled to say"l possess it, although I have laid it out of
my band, and wherever it may Lie:-il
Distance is the condition, the testimon ial of the duration of possession

for a tempo rality that goes well beyond the personal life to whose preservation it is also ordered. Here already the con tradiction implicit in propriet<try logic fully emerges. Sepa rated from the thing tbat it also inalienably
possesses, the individual proprietor remains exposed to a risk of emptying
out that is far more serious than the tbreat that he had tried to immunize
himself from by acquiri ng property, precisely because it is the prod uct of
acqu id og property. The appropriative procedure, represented by Locke as
a person ification of the thing- its incorporation in the proprietor's bodylends itself to be interpreted as the reification of the person, disembodied
of its subjective substance. It is as if the metaphysical distance of modern
representation were restored thro ug h tbe theo rization of the incorporation of the object, but tb is time to the detrimeo t of a subject who is isolated and absorbed by the autonomous power of the thing. Ordered to
produce an increment in the subject, the proprietary logic inaugurates a
path of inevitable desubjectification. This is a wild oscillation logic in the
movement of self-refutation that seizes all the biopo litical categories of
modernity. Here too in this case, but in a different form, with a result that
cooverges with that of sovereign immunization, the proprietary paradigm's
immunitary procedu re is able to preserve life o nly by enclosing it in an orbit
that is destined to drain it of its vital element. Where before the individual
was displaced [desti tuito j by sovereign power that he himself institur.ed, so
now too does the individual proprietor appear expropriated by the same
appropriative power.
Liberty
Tbe third immunitary wrapping of modernity is constituted by the category of liberty {libertil/:" As was already the case for those of SO\'ere\gnty
and property, and perbaps in a more pronounced manoer, its historical-
70 The Parad igm of1mmunization
conceptual sequence is expressed by the general process of modern immu nization, in the double sense that it reproduces its deportment and amplifies
its internal logic . Th is may sound strange for a term so o bviously charged
with accents so constitutively refractory for every defensive tonality, and if
anything oriented in the sense of an opening without reserve to the mutabiliry of events. But it is precisely in relation to such a breadth of horizonstill protected in its etymon - that is possible to measure the process of
secnaotic tightening aod also of Joss of meaning {prosciugamento) that
marks its successive history.'"' Both the root leuth or leudh-from which
originates th e Greek eleutheria and the Latin libertas-a nd the Sanskrit
root frya, which refers instead to the English freedom and the German
Freiheit, refer us to something that has to do witb an increase, a non-closing
{dischiudimcnto}, a flowering, also in the typically vegetative meaning of
the expression . If then we consider the double semantic cbain that descends from it- wh ich is to say that of love (Lieben, lief, love, as well as,
differently, libet and libido) and that of friendsh ip (friend, Freund)-we
can deduce not on ly a confirmation of this original affirmative connotation:
the concept of liberty, in its germinal nucleus, alludes to a connective power
that grows and develops according to its own internal Jaw, and to an expansion or to a deployment that unites its members in a shared dimension.
It is with respect to sucb an originary inflection that we should interrogate the negative reconversion that the concept of liberty undergoes in its
modern formulation. lt's certainly the case that from the beginn ing the
idea of "free" flibero ) logically implicates the contrastive reference to an
opposite condition, that of the slave, understood precisely as "non -free:;
But such a negation constitutes, more than the presupposition or even t he
prevailing coo tent of the notion of liberty, its external limit: even though it
is tied to an inevitable contrary symmetry, it isn't tbe concept of slave that
confers significance on that of tbe free man, but tbe reverse. As it botb
refers to r.he belonging to a disti nct people and to humanity in general,
what has prevailed in the qua li fication of e/eu theros has always been the
positive connotation with respect to which the negative constitutes a sort
of background o r contour lacking an autonomous semantic resonance.
And, as has repeatedly been brought to ligh t, th is relation is inverted in the
modern period, wben it begins to assume increasingly the features of a
so -called negative liberty, with respect to that defined instead as "positive,"
as in "freedom from." What nevertheless has remained obscu red in the
ample lir.erat:ure is the fact that both mean ings undersr.ood in th is way-
The Paradigm of lmmuni-z.arion 71
compared to their in itial meaning- in fact emerge within a negative horizon of meaning. If we assume the canon ical distinction as Isaiah Berlin
elaborates it, indeed not o nly doe.s the first liberty-understood negatively
as an absence of interference-but also the second, which he reads positively, appear quite distant from the characterization, both affirmative and
relational, fl)(ed at the origin of the concept:
The positive" sense of the word ''libertl' derives from the wish on
the part of the individual to be his own master. I wish my life and
dec.isio ns to depend upon myself, not o n external forces of whatever
kind. I wish to be the instrument of my own~ not of o ther men1s, acts
of will. I wish to be a subject, not an object . . . I wish to be somebody
not noborl;r.$;:
Tbe least that one can say, in relation to such a definition, is that it is man ifestly unable to think liberty affLrmatively in the modern conceptual lexicon of the individual, in terms of will and subject. lt is as if each of these
terms-and sti ll more when placed together - irresistibly pushes liberty
close to its "not;' to the poin t of dragging it inside itself. Qualifying liberty-understood as the mastery of the individual subject over himselfis his not being disposed to, o r his not being at the disposition of others.
Ib is oscillation or inclination of modern liberty toward its negative gives
added significance to an observation of Heidegger's, according to wbich
"not only are the individua l conceptions of positive freedom different and
ambiguous, but the concept of positi,,e freedom as such is indefi nite, especially if by positive freedom we provisionally understand the not-negative
I nicht negative] freedom!'" The reason for such a lexical exchange, wh ich
makes the positive, rather than affirmative, simply a nonnegative, ought to
be so ught in the break, which is implicit in tbe individualistic paradigm, of
the constitutive link between liberty and otherness (or alteration)."' It is
that wh icb encloses liberty in the relation of tbe subject with himself: he is
free when no obstacle is placed between him and his will-or also between
his will and its realization. When Thomas Aquinas translated the Aristotelian proa.ire,~s with electio (and the bou/e,~s with l'oluntas), the paradigmatic move is largely in o peration: liberty will rapidly become the capacity
to realize that which is presupposed in the possibility of the subject to be
himself- not to be other than hirnsell'. Free will as tbe seU'-establisbment
of a subjecti,,ity that is absolutely master of its own will. From this perspective, the historical-cooceptual relatioo comes fully in to view, which joins
such a conception of liberty with o ther political categories of modernity,
72 The Paradigm of [mmunization
from tha t of sovereignty to that of equality. On the one band, on ly free

subjects can be made equal by a sovereign who legitimately represents them.
On the o ther hand, such subjects are themselves conceived as equally sovereign within their own individuality-obliged to obey the sovereign because they are free to command themselves and vice versa.
The immunitary outcome- but one might also say the presupposition of such a move cannot be avoided. In the moment in which liberty is no
longer understood as a ruode of be ing, but rather as a riglll to have something of one's 0\\~1-more precisely the full predominance of oneself in
relation to o thers-the subtractive or si mply the negative sense is already
destined to characterize it ever more dominan tly. When this en tropic process is joined to the self-preserving strategies of modern society, the overturning and emptying of ancient communal liberty (libertates} into its
immune op posite wW be complete. If the invention of the individ ual constitutes the medial segment of this passage-and therefore the sovereign
frame in which i.t is inscribed-its abso lutely prevaili ng language is that of
protection. From this point of view, we need to be careful in not distorting
the real sense of the battle against individual or collective immunitates
fought o n the whole by modern ity. It isn't that of reducing but of intensifying an d generalizing the immunitary paradigm. Without losing its typically
polyvalen t lexicon, immunity progressively transfers its own semantic center
of gravity from the sense of"privilege"to that of "securi ty." Unlike the ancient libertates, con ferred at the discretion of a series of particular en titiesclasses, cities, bodies, convents-modern liberty co nsists essentially in the
right of every single subject. to be defended from the arbiters that undermine au tonomy and, even befo re tbat, life itself. In the most general terms,
modern liberty is that which insures the individual against the in terference
of o thers throug h the voluntary subordin ation to a more powerfu l order
tbat guarantees it. It is here that the antirlornical relation with tbe sphere
of necessity originates that ends by reversing the idea of liberty into its
opposi tes of law, obligation, and causali ty. Jn this sense it is a mistake to
interpret the assumption of constricting elements as an internal contradiction o r a conceptual error of the modern theorization of liberty. Instead, it
is a direct consequence: necessity is nothing other than tbe modality tbat
the modern subject assumes in the contrapuntal dialectic of its own liberty,
o r better, of li.berty as the free appropriation of "one's own." The famous
expression according to wbicb tbe subject in cbains is free is to be interpreted in this way-not in spir.e of but in reaso n of: as the self-dissolving
The P:n"'.!digm o f lmmllniZaliOn 73
effect of a liberty that is ever more overcome by its purely self-preserving

functio n.
If for Machiavelli "a small part of the people wish to be free in order to
conunand, but all the others who are countless, desire liberty in order to live
in safety;' Hobbes remains the most consequen tial and radical theoretician
of this move: liber ty preserves itself or preserves the subject that possesses
it, losing itself and as a consequence losing the subject to the extent the
subject is a subject of li berty." That in him liberty is defined as "the absence of all impediments to actio n, that are not con tained in the nature
and the intrinsic quality of the agent;' means that it is the negative result of
a mechanical game of fo rce within which its movement is inscr ibed and
which therefore in tbe fina l analysis coincides with its own necessity.' In
this way- if he who puts liberty to the test can do noth ing other than
wha t he bas done- his de-liberation (de-liberazionej has the literal sense
of a renouncing indetcrmi.nate liberty and of enclosing liberty i.n the bonds
of its own predetermin ati.oo:
Every Deliberation is then sayd to end when that \vhereof thty Ddibcmtt is
either done, or tho ught impossible; because tiU then wee rNa in the liberry
of doing, or omitting according to our Appetite, or Aversion."
As for Locke, the immunitary knot becomes ever more restrictive and absolute: as was already seen, it doesn't move through tbe direct subordination
of individuals to the sovereign-on the contrary, their relation now begi ns
to include a right of resistance- but ratl1er thro ugh the dialectic of a preserving self-appropriation.lt is true that, with respect to Hobbes's surrender
of liberty, liberty for Locke is inalienable, but exactly for the sam e reasons
'"e find in Hobbes, which is to say because it is indispensable to the physical existence of he who possesses it.
Consequently, it emerges as joii1ed in an indissolu ble triptych formed
with property and li fe. On more than one occasion, Hobbes co nnects liberty and li fe, making the fi rst a guarantee for the permanence of the seco nd. Locke pushes even more resolu tely in this direction. Indeed, liberty is
"so necessary to, and closely joyned with a Man's Preservation, that he cannot part with it, but by what forfeits his Preservation and Life together." 5
Certainly, liberty isn't only a defense aga inst the infringements of others; it
is also the subjective right that corresponds to the bio logical-natu ral obligatiOtl to preserve ooeself in life under tbe best possible conditions. That it
is enlarged t.o include all o ther individ uals according to t.he precept. that no
74 The Paradigm of Immunization
one "ought to harm another in his Life, Health, Liberty, or Possessions"

doesn't alter the strictly immun itary logic that underpins the entire argu ment, which is to say the reduction of liberty to p reserving life is understood as the inalienable property that each one has of himself.S'
Beginning with such a drastic semantic resizing, which makes of liberty
the biopoli tical coincidence berween property and p reservation, its meaning tends to be stab ilized ever nearer the imperative of security, until it
coincides with it. lf for Montesquieu political liberty "consists in security,
or, at least, in the opin io n that we enjoy security;' it is jeremy Bentham who
takes the definitive step: "What means liberty? ... Security is the political
blessing I have in view; security as against malefactors, o n the o ne hand,
security as against the instruments of government on the other.""' Already
here the immun ization of liberty appears as definitively actualized according to the dual direction of defense by the state and toward [tbe state]. But
what quali fies it better still in its antinom ical effects is the relation that is
installed with its logical opposite, namely, coercion. The po int of suture
between the expression of liberty and what negates it from within -one
cou ld say between exposition and impositio n- is constituted exactly by
the demand for insurance {assicurativaj: it is what calls forth that apparatus
of laws which, though not directly producing liberty, constitute nonetheless
the necessary reversal: "Where there is no coercion, neither is there secu rity ... That wbicb lies under the name of Liberty, wbich is so magnificent,
as the inesti mable a nd u nreachable work of the Law, is not Liberti! bu t
security!' 61 From this point of view, Bentham's work marks a crucial moment in the inununitary reconversion to which modern political categories
seem to entrust their own survival. The preliminary condition of liberty is
to be singled out in a control mechan ism that blocks every contingency in
the dispositif"tbat a nticipates it beforehand. The design of the famous Panopticon expresses most spectacularly this osciUatioo in meaning excavated
in t.he heart of liberal cultu re.
As we know, it was Foucault. who furnisl1ed a biopolitical interpretation
o f liberalism that wo uld bring to light the fundamental antino my o n which
it rests and which reproduces its power. 1b the degree that it isn't limited
to the simple enunciation of the imperathe of liberty but implicates the
organization of condi tions tba t make this effectively possible, liberalism
contradicts its own p(cmiscs. Needing to construct and channel libe rty in
a nondestructive direction for all of society, liberalism continually risks
destroying what it says it wants t.o create.
The Par-.!digm of l mm llniZal iOn 75
Liberalism, as J ur1derstand it, this liberalism that can be characterized as

the new art of governiJlg that is formed in the eighteenth century, implies
an intrinsic relatio n of production/destruction with regard to liberty ...
With one hand it has to produce liberty, but this same ge.s ture implies that
with the other hand it must establish Jimitations, checks, coercions, ob1igatio ns based o n threat's) etc,6 2
Ib is explains, within the libe ral governmental framework, the tendency to

intervene legislatively, which has a contrafactual result with respect to the
original intentions: it isn't possible to determine or define liberty except. by
contradicting it. The reason for such an aporia is obviously to be found in
liberty's logical pro file. But it is also revealed more tellingly when we consider the biopolitical fmme in which Fo ucault from the beginning had
placed it. Earlier Hannah Arendt gathered together the fundamental terms:
"For politics, according to the same pbilosopby [of liberalism], m ust be
concerned almost exclusively with the maintenance of life a nd the safeguarding of its interests. Now, where life is at stake aU acti.ou is by definition under the sway o f necessity, and the proper relation to take care o f
life's necessities."63 Why? Why does the privileged reference to life fo rce
liberty into the jaws of necessity? Why does the rebellion of liberty against
itself move through tbe emergence of life? Arendt's response, which in singular fashion adberes to tbe Foucauldian in terpretive scenario, follows the
passage, within the biopoli tical paradigm, from the d omain o f individua l
preservation to that of the species:
T he rise of the political and social scie nces in the ninetee nth and twentieth
centurie.s has even w idened the breach between freedom and politics: for
government, which since the beginning of the modern age had been identified ' ' ith the total domain of the politi<1ll, was now considered to be the
appointed protector not so m uch of freedom as of the Life process, the
interests of society <>nd its individuals. Security remained the decisive
criterion, but not the individual's security against "violent death.', as in
Hobbes ( where the cond ition of aJJ liberty is freedoou from fear), but a
security which sho uld permit an undisturbed developme nt of the li fe
process of society as a whole.6"
The stip ulation is of particular in terest: it is the same cu lture o f the individual - once inlmersed in the new horizon of self-preservation - tha t
produces somethin g that moves beyond it i.n terms of vital complex p rocess.
But Arendt doesn't make the decisive move that Foucault does, wbicb con sists in understanding the relation between individual and totalit.y in terms
76 The Paradjgm of Immunization
of a tragic antinomy. When Foucault notes that the failu re of modern political theories is owed neither to theory nor to po li tics but to a rationality
that forces itself to in tegrate individ uals within the totality o f the state, he
to uches on the heart of the q uestion. If we superimpose h is discourse on
that elaborated by the anthropologist Luis Dumont regarding the nature
and the destiny of individua l modernism, we have a conftrmation that
takes us even fu rther in the direction we are moving here. Asking after the
reason first for t11e nationalistic and theo the totalitarian opening {sboccoj of
liberal individualism (which represents a further jump in qualir.y), Dumont
concludes that the political categories of modern ity "fu nction: which is to
say they d ischarge the self-preserving function of life to which they are
subordinated, including their own opposite or vice versa, o r incorporating
themsehes in it. At a certain point, the culture of the individual also incorporates that wh.ich in principle is o pposed to it, which is to say the prinlacy
of all on the parts wh ich it gives the name of "olism." T he pathogenic effect
that ever rnore derives from it is, accordi.og to Dumont, due to the fact
that, when placed against its o pposir.e, extraneous paradigms, such as those
o f individualism and uolism: these in tensify the ideological force of t heir
own representations so much that they give rise to an explosive mix.
Tocqueville is the autbor who seems to have penetrated most deeply
into this self-dissolving process. All of his analyses of American democracy
are tnwersed by a modality that recognizes both the inevitability and the
epochal risk of such a process. When he delineates the figure of the homo
democratiws in the point of intersection and friction between ato mism
and massification, solitude and conformity, and a utonomy and heteronomy,
he does nothing other than recognize the en t ropic result of a parabola that
has at its uppermost point p recisely that seU'-immun~la tion of liberty in
which the new equa lity of conditions reflects itself in a distorted mirror.''
To hold - as he does with the unparalleled intensity of a restrained pathosthat d emocracy separates ma n "from his contemporaries . . . it throws him
back forever upon himself alone, and th reatens in the end to confine h im
entirely within the solitude of his own heart;' o r that "equality places men
side by side, unconnected by any common tie;' means to have understood
deeply (and with reference to its origin) , the immu nitary loss of meaning
that afflicts modern politics. At the moment when the democratic individual, afraid not to know how to defend the particular interests that move
hin1, eods up surrendering "to the first master wbo appears: the itinerary
will already be set in motion, o ne not so different from another which wi ll
The Paradigm of Lmmunization 77
pusb biopolitics nearer its owo opposite, that of thaoa topolitics: the herd,
opportu nistically do mesticated, is already ready to recognize its willi ng
shepherd. At the end of the same century, it is Nietzsche who will be the
most sensitive witness to such a process. As for freedo m-a concept that
seemed to Nietzsche to be "yet mo re proof of instinctual degeneration;' he
no longer has My doubt: "Tbere is no one more inveterate or thorougb in
damaging freedom than liberal institutioos.' 0
CHAPTER THREE
Biopower and Biopotentiality
Grand Politics
It's no coincidence that the preceding chapter closed with the name of Nietzsche. He, more than anyone else, registers the exhaustion of modern political categorie.s and the consequent disclosing of a new horizon of sense.
We already gestured to him in the brief genealogy first sketched of the
immunitary paradigm, bu t that reference isn't enough to restore the stra tegic relevance that h is thought bas for my own analysis generally. Nietzsche
isn't simply the one who b ri ngs the inunu nitary lexico n to its full development, b ut is also the one who makes evident its negative power, the uncontrollable nihi listic dissipation in meaning that pushes it in a self-dissolving
direction. This is not to say that be is able to escape it, to withdraw himself
completely from its growing shadow. Indeed, we will see that for an important part of his perspective, it will result in reproducing and making it more
powerful than before.' Yet tb is doesn't erase the deconstructive force h is
work exercises on other texts with regard to modern immu nization, which
prefigures the lines o f a different conceptual language.
The reasons why such a language, irre.spective of its presumed affiliations,
has never been elaborated, nor even fully deciphered , are many, not the
least of which is the enigmat ic character that increasingly comes to characterize Nietzsche's writing. My impression, nevertheless, is that these reasons refer on the whole to the missing or mistaken characterization of its
internal logic or, better perhaps, its basic tonality of logic, tbat only today,
precisely from the categorical scenario utilized by Foucault, can be seen in
78
Biopowcr and Biopotcnlialit)' 79
all its import. I am aUuding oot ooly to the two interventions that Foucau lt
dedicated to Nietzsche-even if the second, "Nietzsche, Genealogy, History;'
more than any o ther (beca use it centered on the genealogical method) ,
brings us directly to the question at hand: precisely how far does the Foucauldian analysis mo,e within the biopolitical o rbit? It is precisely the point
of gn1vitation or the paradigmatic axis from which Nietzsche's entire production, with its internal twists aod fractu res, which begins to reveal a
semarltic n ucleus that is inaccessible in the interpretive frames ir1 which it
has been placed until now. Otherwise, how would it be possible that. something, let's call it a decisive stitch in the conceptual mater ial, escaped our
attention: that Nietzsche has been read not o nly in heterogeneous but in
mutually opposing terms (eveo before he was totus politicus for some oo
the "right" or the left" and radically impolitical for others?)' Without even
arriving at his more recent interpreters, if we simply compare Lllwitb's thesis
that "this political perspective stands not at the margi ns of Nietzsche's ph ilosophy but rather at its rn iddlc" with that of Georges Bataille, according
to which "the movement of Nietzsche's thoug ht implicates a defeat of the
d iverse possible foundatio ns for contempo rary politics: we can understand
the impasse from which Nietzschean literature still seems unable to extricate
itself.> Probably it is because both the "hyperpolitical" and the " impolitical" readings clasb witb mi rror-like results within the notioo of "politics";
Nietzsche's text is explicitly extraneous to such a notion, favoring instead
another and different conceptual lexicon that today we can best describe as
"biopoliticaJ:'
It is with respect to such a conclusio n that Foucault's essay "Nietzsche,
Genealogy, History" opens a significan t tear in perspective. In it Foucault
esseotiaUy thema tizes the o pacity of the origin, the interval that separates
the o rigin from itself, or better, from that which is presu pposed in it as perfectly cooforrning to its intimate esseoce. Thus, what is put up for discussioo
isn't only the linearity of a history destined to substantiate the conformity
of the origin to the end-the fi nality of the origin and the originality of
the end-but also the entire conceptual fou ndation on which such a conception is based. T he entire Nietzschean polemic vis-a-vis a history that is
incapable of coming to terms with its own nonhistorical layer-and therefore to extend to itself that thorough bistoricization that it demands be appli.ed to everyth ing but itself-takes aim at the presumptive ai.r:s of universality on bebalf of conceptual figures born as a result of specific demands
to wh ich it is tied in both their logic and development. When Nietzsche
So Biopower and Biopotentiality
sees in the origin of th ings not the identity, unity, or purity of an uncontaminated essence, but rather the laceration, the m ultiplicity, a nd the alteration of something that never corresponds to that which it declares to be;
when he discerns the tumult of bodies and the proliferation of errors as
well as the usurpation of sense and vertigo of violence behind the ordered
succession of events and the network of meanings in whicb they seem to
consist; when, in short, he traces the dissocia tion and the contrast in the
heart itsel f of their apparent couci li.ation, he profound ly questions the
entire regulating form that European society has for centuries given itself.
Furthermo re, he interrogates the exchange that has often been verified,
between cause and effect, function an d \'alue, and reality and appearance.
Th is is true not on ly for modern juridical-political categories, beginning
with equality, which practically all of the Nietzschean corpus contests, to
that of liberty, deprived of its presumed absoluteness and reduced to the
constituti.ve aporia that reverses it into its opposite, to law [diritto/ itself,
identified in its origi nal sernblance of naked coouJland.lt is especially true
for the entire dispositifthat constitutes both the analytic paradigm and the
normative scenario of these categories, namely, that self-legitimating narrative acco rding to wh ich the forms o f political power appear to be the intentional resu lt of the combined will of single subjects united in a founding
pact. When Nietzsche describes the state-whicb is to say the most developed juridical and political construct of the modern epoch - as "some
horde or other of blond predatory an imals, a race of co nquerors and masters which, itself o rganized for war and with the strength to o rganize others,
u nhesitatingly lays i!S fearfu l paws on a popu lation which may be huge ly
superior in nu merical terms but remains shapeless and nomadic;' o ne can
consider "that sentimentalism which would bave it begin with a 'contract'"
liqu idated.'
From these first annotations the th read that links them to the proposed
hermeneutic activated a century afterwards by Foucau lt is already clear. If
a n individual subject of desire and knowledge is withdrawn from a nd
an tecedent to the forms of power that structure it; if what we call "peace"
is nothing but the rhetorical representation of relations of force that emerge
periodically out of continuous confl ict; if ru les and laws are nothing o ther
than rituals destined to sanction the d omination of one over another - all
the instruments laid out by modern political phi losophy are destined to
reveal themselves as simultaneously false ar1d ineffective. False, or purely
apologetic, because they are incapable of restoring the effective dynamics
Bjopo"vcr and Biopo tcntia)jry 81
in operation behind their surface figures. Ineffective because, as we saw io

the preceding chapter, they bump up more and more '~olently against their
own inte rnal co ntradictions un til they break apart. What breaks apart,
precisely, more than the single categorical seams, is the logic itself of the
mediation o n which they depend, no longer able to hold or to strengthen a
content that is in itself eluslve of any formal control. What that content might
be for Nietzsche is well known: it concerns the bios that gives it the intensely
bi.opoliti.cal connotation in Nietzsche's discussio n, to which I've already
referred. All of Nietzschean cr iticism has accented t.he vital element- life
as the only possible representatio n of being.' Nevertheless, what has a clear
ontological rele,ance is always interpreted po litically; not in the sense of
any form that is superimposed from the outside onto the materi<ll of
life-i t is precisely this demand, experienced in all its possible combina
tions by modern political philosophy, which has been shown to be lacking
in foundation. But, as the constitu tive character of li fe itself, life is always
already poli.tical, if by "political" ooe iJltends not what mode rn ity wantswhich is to say a neu tralizing mediation of immunitary nature- but
rather an originary modality in which the living is o r in which being lies.
Far from all the contemporary ph ilosophies of life to which his position is
from time to time compared, this is the manner in which Nietzsche tbinks
the political dimeosioo of bfos: not as character, law, or destioatioo of some
thing that Lives previously, but as the po,ver that informs Life !rom the begin
ning in aU its extension, constitution, and in tensity. T hat li fe as well as the
will to power -according to the well-known Nietzschean formulationdoesn't mean that life desires power nor that power captures, directs, or
develops a purely bio logical life. On the contrary, they signify that life does
not know modes of being apart from those of its continual streogthening.
To grasp the characteristic trait that Nietzsche alludes to in the expression "grand politics: we need to look precisely at the indissoluble web of
life and power [poteiJZa]: in the double sense that. living as such is on ly
strengthened internally and that the power is imagi nable on ly in terms of a
living organism. Here as well emerges the essential sense of the Nietzschean
project for constructing a "new party of life; less tied to contextual contingencies. Leaving aside the prescriptive, troubling co ntents with wh ich
he from time to time thougbt to fill them, ,;hat matters here in relation to
our argument is the distance such a reference constitutes with regard to
every mediated, dialectical, and external modality that seeks to uoderstand
the relation betwee n politics an d li fe. ln th is sense, we begin to see how
82 Diopowcr and Biopotcntiality
much Nietz.sche himself will say about it in Beyond Good and Evil, though
such an observation could also be extended to his entire body of work. It is
"in all essentials a cririque of modernit)> not excluding the modern sciences,
modern arts, and even modern po litics, alo ng with pointers to a contrary
type that is as little modern as possible-a noble, Yes-saying type."' Apart
from tbe problematic identiry of the kind prefigured by Nietzsche, what
remains beyond any doubt is its polemical objective: modernity as the formal
negation, or negative fonn, of its own vital coo tent. What unifies his logical,
aesthetic, and political categories is precisely the constitutive antinomy that
wants to assume, preserve, and develop an immediate, what Nietzsche will
call"life" through a series of mediations o bjectively destined to contradict
them (beca use in fact they are obligated to negate tbei r character of im
mediacy). From here the rejection not of this or of that institution, but of
the institutioo, insofar as it is an institution and thus separated from and
therefore given to destroying that power of life that it has also been
charged with safeguarding. ln a paragraph titled appropriately eno ugh
"Critiq ue of Modernit.y;' Nietzsche stat.es that "our institutions are no longer
any good: this is universally accepted. But it is not their fault, it is ours. Once
we have lost all the instincts from which institutions grow, we lose the institutions themselves because we are no longer good enougb for tbem."
Wbat produces such a self-dissolving effect is the incapacity of modern in
stitutions - from party to parliameo t to the state - to relate directly to
li fe and therefore their tendency to slip into the same vacuum that such an
interval of difference create.s. This is separate from the political position chosen beforehand: what matters, negatively, is its not being biopolitical -the
scission that opens between the two terms of the expression in a form that
"'rings bios from politics and ao originary poliliciry from life, or better, from
its constilutive power.
From here, in the affirmative reversal of such a negativity, the positive
meaning of"grand politics" emerges:
The grand politics places physiology <tbove aUotber questions- it wants
to rear {2ikhcen/ humanity as a whole , it measures the range of the races,
of peoples, of in.divid uals accord u1g to ... the guarantee of life they carry
within them. Tnexorably it puts an e nd to everything that is degenerate and
parasitical to life!
Before confronting with the requisite attention the most problematic part
of the passage, that one relative to parasitic and degenerative pathology, let's
linger over the passage's overall meaning. We know the emphasis Nietzsche
6iopO\ver and Biopoteotialil)' 83
placed on ph.ysiological studies in opposition to every form of idealistic

thought. From this poin t of view, the placement of psychological studies
in a culture is clear, and more so ghen the language strongly influenced by
Darwin (despite whatever the relevant distinctions that separate Nietzsche
from Darwin in a form that we will have occasion to examine in d etail) .'0
But we are not concerned on ly " 'ith Da rw in. What Nietzsche wan ts to assert is that, at least beginning from a certain momen t that coincides with
the irreversible crisis of the 01odero political lexicon, the on ly politics not
reduced to the mere prese rvation of already existing institutions is the one
that confronts the problem of life from the perspective of the human species
and o f the mobile thresholds that define it, by contiguity or d ifference, with
respect to other living species. Contrary to the presuppositions of modern
individualism, the individual-which Nietzsche vindicates and exalts in its
cha racter of exceptiona lity - cannot be thought except against the backdtOp of large eth.nosocial aggregates th.at always emerge by way of con trast.
Nevertheless, th is fust consideration of method doesn't COtl)pletely answer t.be question that Nietzsche poses, one that calls into question something whose extraordinary scope and amb ivalent effects we a re o nly able
to make out today. It concerns the idea that the human species is never
given once for all time, but is susceptible, in good and evil, to being mo lded
in forms for which we do not have ao exact knowledge, b ut which nevertheless constitu te for us both an absolu te risk and an inalienable challenge.
"Why," Nietzsche asks himself in a crucial passage, "shou ldn't we reali.ze in
man what the Chinese are able to do with the tree , so thus it p roduces on
o ne side roses an d on another pears? These natural p rocesses of the selection
of mall, for example, wh ich until now have been exercised in an infinitely
slow and awkwa rd way, could be taken over by man himself."' ' Rather than
being disconcerted by the irregular approach of linking man to plan t (not
to men tion that of breeding), what we need to foreground is Nietzsche's
precocious undersr.anding that in r.he cen turies to come the political terrain of com pa ri son a nd battle will be the one relative to redefining the
hu man species in a scenario of progressive displacemen t of its borders
with respect to what is not human, which is to say, on tbe one ban d to the
animal and o n the o ther to the inorganic.
So too the central emphasis attrib uted to the body against its "disparagers"
has to be traced back to tl1e specificity to the biopolitical lex icon in the sense
of the species. Naturally, a comprehensive polem ic emerges that takes aim
against. a phi losophical, spiritualistic, or abstractly rational tradition. We
8-t Biopower and Biopotentiality
recall that reason just as soul is an integral part of an organism that has its
unique expression in the body, wh ich in tu rn doesn't weigh indifferently in
the deconstruction of the most influential metaphysical categories. However, to reread the entire history of Europe through "the underlying theme
of the body" is an o ption that cannot be truly understood o utside of an established biopolitical lexicon. Certainly, using a physiological terminology
io politics is anything but original. Still, the absolute originality of the
Nietzschean text resides in tbe transferral of the relation between state and
body from the classical level of analogy or metaphor, in wh ich the ancien t
and modern tradi tion positions it, to that of an effectual reality: no politics
exists other than that ofbodies, conducted on bodies, through bodies. In this
sense, ooe can rightly say that physiology, wbich Nietzsche never detaches
from psychology, is the very same material of politics. lt is its pulsating
body. But if we are to reveal all of the political pregnancy of the body, we
must also exami ne it fwm another angle, not o nly that of the physio logical
decl ir1atioo of politics, but also that of the political characterization of
physiology. If the body is t.he material of politics, politics-naturally, in
the sense that Nietzsche confers on the expression-takes the form of the
body. It is this "form" - there is no life that isn't in some way fo rmed, th us
a "form of life" - that keeps Nietlsche distant from any type of biological
determinism, as Heidegger well understood." Not only because every conception of the body presupposes a later philosophica l orientation, but because the body is constituted according to the principle of politics-struggle
as the first and final dimension of existence. Struggle outside oneself, toward other bodies, but. also within as the unstoppable conflict among its
o rganic components. Before being in itself [irr -se], the body is always agairrs~
eveo with respect to itself. In this seose, Nietzscbe can say tbat "every pbilosopby tbat ran ks peace above war" is "a misunderstanding of the body.""
Ibis is because in its continual instability the body is no thing but the always
provisional result of the confl ict of forces t.har. constitute it.
We know how much the Nietzschean conception of the bod y has weighed
o n contempo rary biological and medical theories in authors such as Roux,
Mayer, Foster, and Ribot. Our perspective emphasizes, however, that all
of them derhe from Nietzsche the d ual principle that the body is produced by determinate forces and that such forces are always in potentia l
conflict among them." lt is not a res exte11sa, substance or material, but the
material site of such a conflict and of the conditions of domination and
6iopO\ver and Biopotcotialil)' 85
subjection, and hierarchy and resistance, that from time to time determine
it. From here it is a short distance to the essentially political a nd hence
biopolitical semantics that the same definition of life assumes.
One could define life as a durable form of l>rocess of tletermirlllti ons of
fOrce in which different forces in conflict grow in unequal measure. In tltis

sense there is <\Jl opposition in obeying: one's own force is in fact not lost.
In d1e same way, in cornmanding, we have to admit that the absolute force
o f the adversary is not defeated. absorbed. o r dissolved. "To command" and
to obey') are complementary forms of the struggle. 16
It is precisely because the power of single opponents is never absolute; he

that provisionally loses always has a way of exerting his own residual forces
such that the battle never ends. The battle never ends with a defi nithe victo ry or unco nd itional surrender. ln the body neithe r sovereignty-the
utter domination of another- nor the equality among many exists as they
are perennially engaged in mutually overtaking each other. T he un interrupted polemic that Nietzsche wages against modern political p hilosophy
has precisely to do with such a presuppositio n: if the battle within the single
body is in itself in fin ite; if bodies therefore cannot distance themsehes from
the p rinciple of struggle because struggle is the same form as life: how
then can the order that conditions the survival of subjects to the neutralization of the cooflict be realized? What condem ns modern political concepts
to ineffectuality is exactly th is split between life and conflict - the idea of
preserving life through the abolitio n of conflict. One could say that the heart
o f Nietzsche's p hilosophy will be fo und in his rebuttal of such a conception, wh ich is to say in the extreme att.em p t to bring again to the surface
that harsh and p rofound relation tha t holds together politics and life in the
unending form of struggle.
Cou nterforces
From these initial considerations it is already clear t.hat Nietzsche, wi thou t
formulating the term , a nticipated the e ntire biopolitical course that Fou cau lt then defined and developed: fro m the cen trality of the body as the
genesis and termination of sociopolitical dynamics, to the founding role of
str uggle and also o f war, to the configuration of j uridical-institutional
orders, to finaUy tbe function of resistance as the necessary counterpoin t to
the deployment of power. One can say that aU the Foucauld ian categories arc
present in a nutsheU in Nietzsche's conceptual language: "War is aoother
86 Biopower and Biopotentiality
matter" - so Nietzsche notes in the text that functions as the definitive

balance sheet of his entire work. "Being able to be an enemy, bei-ng an
enemy-perhaps that presupposes a strong nature; in any case, it belo ngs to
every strong nature. It needs objects of resistance; hence it looks for what
resists: the aggressit'e pathos belo ngs just as necessary to strength as vengefulness and rancor belong to weakness."" Nevertheless, this passage already
leads to an ana lytic landscape not limited to foreshadowing the Foucauldian
th eorization of biopolitics, but which in some ways also rnoves beyor1d it,
or better, enriches it with a conceptual structure that contributes to untangli ng the underlying an tinomy to which I refe rred in th e open ing chapter : to that immunitary paradigm that represents the peculiar figure of
Nietzschean biopolitics. According to Nietzsche, reality is constituted by a
complex of forces counterposed in a confl ict that never ends conclusively
because those who lose always maintain a potential of energy, which is
able not only to li mit the power of those who dominate, but, at times, to
reverse the predominance in their own favor.
In Nietzsche's text, this syst.emic description, so to speak, is characterized
by a tonality that is anything but neutral, but wh ich is indeed decidedly
critical: in the sense that once the play of forces has been defined from the
objective point of view of quantity, assessing their quality remains open .
Such forces, io short, are not in the least equivalent, so that it matters a great
deal io a given pbase which of these expa nds and wbich, on tbe contrary,
contracts. In deed, it is precisely on th is that the larger trend depends-th e
" health;' to adopt Nietzsche's lexicon-of the totality constituted by their
struggle. There are forces that create and o thers that destroy; forces that
strengthen and o thers that dimin ish; forces that stimulate and others that
debilitate. Yet the peculiar characteristic of the Nietzschea n logic is tbat the
most important distinction between these forces doesn't pass through
their constructive or destructive effect, but ratber involves a more profoun d disti nctio n, relative r.o the more or less original character of the
forces themselves. The question of immunizatio n bears upon this aspect,
not on ly the objective emphasis that it comes to assume, but also the explicitly negative connotation that Nietzsche g ives immunity, io an o pposite
trend to the posith'e connotation that modern philosophy has conferred
upon it. Sucb a hermeneu tic difference or even deviation doesn't relate to
the preserving, salvific ro le that it exercises toward li fe-Nietzsche acknowledges it in the same way as does Hobbes-but instead to its logical-
Biopowcr and Biopolcmlialil)' 87
temporal arrangement in relation to the o rigin. To say this in the most concise way possible: while for Hobbes the im mun itary demand comes first- it
is the initial passio n that moves men do minated by fear-for Nietzsche
such a demand for protection is second with respect to another more original impulse, constituted we know by the will to power. lt isn't that life
doesn't demand its own preservation - otherwise the subject of every possible expansion wou ld van ish -but it is in a form that, in co ntrast to all
the modern philosophies of conservatio, is subordinated to the primary
imperative of development, with respect to which it is reduced to a simple
consequence:
Physiologists need to think tw ice before putting the instinct of"preservation"
as the cardimtl instinct of an o rganic be.ing. Above all, whal livcs wants to
give vent to its own force;"preservation'' is only one of the consequences
of that.*~
Here we are cooceroed with an argumeo t to which Nietzsche himself

assigns such prominence that. he situates it exactly at the point of rupture
with the entire traditio n that precedes him: not o nly, he essentially ado pts
it against the philosopher to whom he o therwise is closest (even from this
perspective), namely, "consumptive Spinoza":"
The- wish to preserve o neself is the symptom of a condition of distress, of
a limitation of the really ftmdamcnl'a1 instinct of life, \\)hich aims at tiJe
e.xpa,sion ofpon:er, and wishing for that, frequently risks ;:md even S.'lcrifice-.s
seU'-prcscrva tion.lu
The text. cited above appears eve n more clear-cut. than t.be preceding o ne:
preservation isn't to be co nsidered only incidental and derivative with
respect to the will to power, but in latent contradiction to it. And this is
because the strengthening of the vital o rganism doesn't suffer limits
o r red uctions, but, on the contrary, because it ten ds cootinually to move
beyo nd and transgress them. It moves as a vortex or a flame, disrupting or
burn ing every defensive partition , every li minal diaphragm, every border
of definition. It crosses wbat is diverse and joins what is separate until it
absorbs, incorporates, and de,ours everything that it meets. Life isn't only
bound to overcome every o bstacle that it comes up against, but is, in its
own essence, the overcoming of the other and finally of itself: "And th is
secret life itself told me: 'Behold; it said,' ram that which must always overcome itself"" By now Nietzscbe's discourse beods i.o an ever more extreme
88 Biopower and Biopo te ntiality
d irection, which seems to include its own contrary in a powerful selfdeconstructive movement. Identifying life with its own overcoming means
that it is no longer "in itself"-it is always projected beyond itself. But if
life always pushes outside itself, o r admits its outside with in it, wh ich is to
say, to affirm itself, life must co ntinually be altered <md therefore be negated
insofar as it is life. Its fu ll realization coincides witb a process of extroversion o r exteriori'tation that is destined to carry it into contact witb its own
"oot"; to make of it something that isn't simply life -neither on ly life nor
life o nly-but something that is both more than life and other than life:
precisely not life, if for "life" we understand something that is stable, as
what remains essentially identical to itself. Nietzsche translates this intentionally paradoxical passage into the thesis that "buman existence is merely
an uninterrupted past tense, a th ing that lives by denying and c.onsuming
itself, by opposing itself."" It is the same reason for which in Bqond Good
and Evil he can write both that "life is essentially a process of appropriating, injuring, overpowering the alien and the weaker, o ppressing, be ing
harsh, imposing yo ur own form, incorporating, and at least., the very least,
exploiting" and simu ltaneously that life brings to the foreground "the feeling of fullne.ss, of power that wants to overflow, the happiness associated
with a bigb state of tension, tbe consciousness of a wea lth that w<mts to
make gifts and give way." '"'
At the bottom of such a conceptual tension, or indeed bipolarity, whicb
seems to push Ni etzsche's disco urse in divergi ng directions, is a presupposition that is to be made exp licit. Once again Nietzsche- in contrast to the
largely dominant paradigm of modern an thropology, but also differently
from the Darwinian conception of "struggle for existence"-holds that
"in nature it isn't extreme angst that dominates, but ratber superabundance and profusion pushed to the absurd.""' Life doesn't evolve from an
initial deficit but from an excess, which provides its do uble-edged in1pulse.
On the one hand, it is dedicated to imposing itse lf over and incorporating
everything that it meets. On the other hand, once it has been filled to the
brim with its own acquisitive capacity, it is pro ne to tip over, dissipating its
own su rplus of goods, but also itself, wha t Nietzsche will define as "the bestowing virtue.''' s Here o ne already begins to glimpse the most troubling
aspects of Nietzscbean discourse: eo trusted to itself, freed from its restrain ts,
li fe tends to destwy and to destroy itself. It tends to dig a crevasse on every
side as well as within, one into which life continually threatens to slip.
Such a self-dissolving tendency isn't to be underst.ood as a defect of nature
or as a breach that is bound to damage an initial perfection . Nor is it an

accident or the begi nning that sudden ly rises up or penetrates into life's
domain. Rather, it is the constitutive character of life. Life doesn't fall in an
abyss; rather, it is the abyss in which life itself risks falling. Not in a ghen
moment, but already at the o rigin, from the moment that that abyss is nothing other than the in terva l of difference that withdraws tbe origin from
every identifying consistency: the in/origineity of the origin tha t the Nietzscbeao genealogy ultimately traced to th e source of being-in-life. lo order
to find an image or a concepr.ual figure of such a deficie/IC)' for excess, it is
enough simply to return to one of the primary and most recurrent categories for Nietzsche, namely, that of the Dionysian. The Dionysian is life
itself in absolute (or dissolu te) form, unbound from any presupposition ,
abando ned to its original flow. Pure presence and therefore unrepresentable
as such beca use it is witho ut form , in peren nial transforma tion, in the con
tinuous overcoming of its own in ternal limits, of every principle of individuatio n and of separation betweerl beings, genus, aod species, but simultaneously of its external limits, r.hat is, of irs own categorical definitio n. How
do we determine what not only escapes determinacy, but is also the greatest
power of indeterminacy? And then do we differentiate what overwhelms
all identities- and therefore all differences- in a sort of infinite metonymical contagion, that doesn't withhold anything, in a continual expropri
arion of everything distinct and the exterior~tation of everything within?
We can see in the Dionysian-understood as the in/original dimension of
life in its entirety- the trace or the prefiguration of the common muuus in
all of its semantic ambivalence; as the donative elision of individual limits,
but also as the infective and therefore destructive power of itself and the
o ther. It is delinquency both in the literal significance of a lack and in the
figurative sense of violence. Pure relation and therefore absence o r implosion of subjects in relation to each otber: a relation wit bout subjects.
Agai nst th is possible semantic declension, against. the vacuum of sense
that opens at the heart of a li fe that. is ecstatically full of itself, the general
process of immunization is triggered, which coincides in the final analysis
with all of Western civilization, but which finds in modernity its most rep
resentative space: "The democratizatio n of Europe is, it seems, a link in the
cbain of tbose tremendous prophylactic meas11res which are the conception
of rnodero ti rnes.''' 6 Nietzsch e is the first no t only to have .i.ntu itcd the
absolute in1portaoce of inmJUnization, but to have reconstructed its entire
history in its genesis and int.ernal ar ticu lations. Cerr.ain ly, o ther authors-
90 Biopow(;'r and Biopotentiality
from Hobbes to Tocqueville - recognized the onset of immunization fust

in the fear of violent death and then in the demand for protectio n with
respect to the danger of individual passions that are highly combustible.
But the abso lute specificity of the Nietzschean perspective with regard to
antecedent and successive diagnoses lies, on the one band, in the retu rn of
the immunitary paradigm to its origin;rry biological ma trix, and, on the
o ther, in the capacity to reconstruct critically the negative dialectic of the
paradigrn . As to th e fi rst, we note that Nietzsche retcrs all of the dispositif~
of knowledge, which are apparen tly directed to the search for truth, to the
function of preservation. Truth he defi nes as a lie-today we wo uld say
ideology- mo re suitable for sheltering us from that originary fracture of
sense tha t coincides witb the potentially unlimited expansion of life." T he
same is true for the logical categories, from that of identity, to ca use, to
non -contnrdicrion - all understood as biological instru ments necessary
to facilitate survival. They serve to save our existe nce fro rn what is most
unbearable about it; to create the minimal conditions to orient ourselves
in a world that has no origin or end . T hey construct barriers, limits, and
embankments with respect to that co mmo n IITIIIIU S that both strengthens
and devastates life, pushing it contin uously beyond itself. The procedures
of reason raise up an immun itary dispositif against that vortex that in
essence we are; against the trans-individual explosion of the Dionysian and
aga inst the contagion that derives from it, one that aims at restabil~ting
meaning and at redrawing lost boundaries, filli ng up the empty spaces
deepened by the power of"ou tside: T hat outside is brought inside , or at
least faced and then neutralized in the same way that what is open is con tained and delimited in its most terrifying effects of incalculability, incomprehension, and unpredictability. Initially the Apollonian principle of individ uation works to do this. Then, beginning with the g rand Socratic
therapy, followed by the entire Christian -bourgeois civilization (with ao
increasingly intensive and exclusive restorative expression) the fo llowi ng is
attempted: to block the fury of becoming, the flow of transformation, the
risk of metamorphosis in the "framework" of prevision and prevention."
If this is the anesthetic or prophylactic role of the forms of knowledge,
the same holds tr ue for power and for the juridical and political institutions that flank moral and religio us codes, reinforcing them in a logic of
rn utuallcgitimation. Above aU, these institutions arc bom from ancestral
fear, but are always secondary with respect to the originary wi ll to power
that grips man in a way unknown t.o other animals: "I f one considers that
Biopower and .Biopotentialit}' 91
man was for many hundreds o f thousands o f years ao animal in the high est degree accessible to fear;' it seems clear that the only way of mastering
it is to construct the great immunitary invo lucres in tended to protect the
human species from the explosive potential that is implicit in its instinct
for unconditional affirmation.'" From Greek civilization onwards, institu tions constructed by men "grow o ut of precautionary measures designed
to make them safe from one a no ther and from their inner explosivity.""'
Tbe state is organized above aUto defuse such explosivity, as, after all, ruodern political p hilosop hy had already argued in a line of reasoning that saw
in it the on ly way to master a n otherwise lethal interi nd ividual confl ict.
Nevertheless, it is precisely with regard to this last passage that Nietzsche
grafts the change of theoretical paradigm tbat places h im not only outside
of that interpretive lineage, but in direct contrast with it: "The state is a
prudent institu tion for the protection of individua ls against one another;'
he admits, but then soo n after adds, "if it .is completed and perfected too far
it will in the end enfeeble the individual and, indeed, dissolve him-that is
to say, thwar t the original pu rpose of the state in the most thorough way
possible."" Eviden tly, what is at stake is not only the ability o f the state to
protect but more generally the overall evaluation of the immunitary logic,
which Nietzsche diametrically reverses with respect to the substantially
positive one of modern anthropology.
The thesis he advances is that such a logic cures illness [male/ in a selfcon tradictory form because it produces a greater illness than the o ne it
wanted to pre\'en t. T his occurs when the decided-upon compensation,
with respect to the preceding vital orde r, is so considerable as to create a
new an d more deadly disequ ilibrium. Just as the state homologizes through
forced obedience the same individua ls that it intended to free, so too do all
the systems of truth, which are also necessary for correcting harmfu l errors
and superstitions, create new and more oppressive semantic blocks that
are desti ned 1.0 obstruct the energetic flow of existence. In both of these
cases, therefore, the stability and the duration that irnmu n itary programs
assure wind up in hibiting that in novative deve lopment that they need to
stin1 ulate. Impeding the possible d issolution of the organism, they also
stop its growth, condemning it to stasis and impoverishment. This is the
reason why Nietzsche defines morality, religion, and metaphysics sim ultaneously as both medicine and disease. Not only, b ut as di seases stronger
than the medicines tbat work agai nst them because they are produced for
the same use:" [T )he worst sickness of manki nd originated in the way in
92 Bjopower and Bjopo tentjaHty
which they bave combated their sicknesses, and what seemed to cure has
in the long run produced something worse than that which it was supposed
to overcon1e." 31
With Nietzsche we are already in a position to reconstruct the entire
diagram of immunization. Immunity, because it is secondary and deriva
tive with respect to the force that it is intent on ftghting, always remains
subaltern to it. Immunity nega tes the power of negation, at least what it
considers as sud 1. Yet it is precisely because of this that iuHnuu ity continues
to speak the language o f the negative, which it would like to annul: in order
to avoid a potential evil, it p roduces a real one; it substitutes an excess with
a defect, a fullness with a emptiness, a plus with a minus, negating what it
affirms and so do ing affuming noth ing other than its negation. It is what
Nietzsche means by the key concept of "resentment;' which he identifies
with <1U forms o f resistance or of vengeance, and '"hich is contrasted with
th e originary affinnative forces of life:
For millennia this instinct for revenge bas dominated humanity to such
an extent tbat metaphysics, psychology and historical representation. and
above aU rno ra.lity are marked
by it. \~Vherever man has tho ught) even there)
he has also inoculated the bacillus of revenge into thi ngs."
Perhaps nowhere more thao here does Nietzsche penetrate so deeply in to

the countereffective logic of the irornunitary paradigm. Furthermore, Niet
zsche explicitly recogn izes this as the force -weakness is also a force, albeit
o ne that degenerates from the will to power-that characterizes the entire
process of civilizatio n. If, as often happens, we do have full kno wledge o f
it, this is because knowledge, just like all cognitive apparatuses, is also its
product. Ye t what couo ts eveo more is the mode in wbicb th.is force actso r, mo re precisely, "reacts." Just as in every medica l in1munization, immu
nization here too injects an antigenic nucleus in to the social body, which is
designed to activate protective antibodies. Doing so, however, it infects the
o rgan ism in preventive fasl1ion, weakening its primogenital fo rces: it risks
killing what it is meant to keep alive. Nevertheless, it is what the ascetic
priest or the pastor of sou ls does with regard to the sick flock: "He brings
salves and balsam, there is no doubt; but he needs to wou nd befo re he can
cure; then, in relieving the pain be has inflicted, he poisons the wound."''
More than a force that defends itself from a weakness, it is a weakness that
draws off the force, draining it from within, separating it from itself. As
Deleuze observed, the reactive force acts via decomposition and deviation,
Biopowcr and Biopolcnlialil)' 93
subtracting its power from the active force in order to appropriate some
and to divert it from its originary destination.>' So doing, however, it incorporates a force that is already exhausted, thwarting its capacity to react.
Th is force continues to react, but in a debilitated form that isn't an active
response, but rather a response without action, an action that is purely
imaginary. Establishing itself within the organism, be it indiv idual or collective that it aspires to defend, the organism itself is brought to ruin. Having destwyed the active forces in order to assimilate their power, noth ing remains except to direct the poiso n point. within, until it bas destroyed
itself as we ll.
Double Negation
What has been delineated above is a paradigm of great internal complexity. Not only forces and weaknesses clash and become entangled in a knot
that doesn't allow for a stable distinction to be made, but what was a fo rce
can be weakened to such an extent that it turns into its opposite, just as an
initial weakness can, at a certain mo ment., assume t.be form of a force that
takes possession of power. Furthermore, the same element can simu ltaneously constitute a force fo r some and a weakness for others. This happens
in Christian ity as well and in religion generally, which the few use instrumentally to impose thei r own domination over the many aod which is
therefore destined to reinfo rce the former to the detriment of the latter. In
addition, it also furnishes the latter with the means to retal iate on another
level against the former and to drag them down in to the same vortex. Something similar can be said for art and in particular for music. They can serve
as potent stimu lants for our senses according to the originary meaning of
the term "aesthetic"; but they can also become a sort of subtle "anesthetic"
with respect to the traumas of existence. This is what happens to music of
the Romantic period until Wagner. Not any different, finally, is tbe double
fdoppiaj, or better divided {sdoppiata}, reading that Nietzsche proposes of
juridical-political institutions, beginni ng with that of the state; from on e
perspective, the state is seen as the necessary bulwark against destructive
conflicts, and from another it is a mechanism that inhibits vital energies
that have been completely scattered. Moreover, the entire process of civilization implies consequences that are reciprocally antinomic- precisely
those that concern faci litating and weakening life. A.nd doesn't Nietzsche
define history as something useful and yet harmful? In sbort, to live, mao
needs in different situations (but at times in the same situations) both one
thing and its opposite. He needs the histor ian and the nonhistorian, truth
and lies, memory and forgetfulness, and health and disease, not to mention the dialectic between the Apollon ian and the Dionysian into which all
the other bipolarities finally devolve.
Such an ambivalence, or even aporeticity of judgment, derives from the
mutability of perspective with which one views a given phenomenon, not
to mention the always variable con tingency in which it is situated. But digging deeper, the ambivalence is rooted in a con tradiction that is as it were
structural, according r.o which immunization, on r.he one han d, is necessary to the survival of any organism, but, on t.he o ther, is harmful because,
blocking the organism's transformation, it impedes biological expansion.
This in tum derives from the fact to wh ich Nietzsche repea tedly draws
attention, namely, that preservation and development, to the degree they
are implicated in an indissoluble connection - that is, if something doesn't
keep itself alive, it cannot develop-are in latent opposi tion when placed
on another terrain, namely, th e one decisive for the will to power. Not on ly,
Nietzsche argues. In fact, what "is useful in relation t.o the acceleration of
the rhythm of development is a 'use' which is different from that wh ich
refers to the maximum establishment and possible d urability of what is
develo ped;' but "what is useful to the duration of the individ ual can become
a disadvantage for its strength and its splendor, which is to say tbat what
preserves the individ ual can hold it and block its development:'" Development presupposes d uratio n, but duration can delay o r impede development. Preservation implies expansion, but expansion compromises and
places preservation at risk. Here already the indissolubly tragic character
of the Nietzschean perspective comes into view, not only because the effects
are not directly referred back to their apparent cause, but beca use the wrinkle of a rea l au tonomy opens between the one and the others: the surv ival
of a force opposes the project of strengthen ing it. Limiting itself to survival, it weakens itself, flows back, and, to use the key word in Niet.zschean
semantics, dege11erares, which is to say moves in the direction opposite its
own generatio n. On the o ther hand, howe\'er, must we necessarily draw
the paradoxic<tl conclusion that to expand vitally, an organ ism has to cease
to survive? Or, at a minimum, that it must face death?
This is the most extreme point of o ur inquiry, the conceptual intersection
before which Nietzsche finds himself. Jn the course of his work (a nd frequen tly in the same texts) , Nietzsche furnishes two kinds of responses,
which sometimes appear to be superimposed, wh ile at other mo ments
Biopowcr and Biopolcmlialil)' 95
seem to be incompatible . A good part of the question plays out in Nietzsche's difficult relation with Darwinian evolution, or better with what he,
not always correctly, co nsiders as such. We already know that Nietzsche
rejects tbe idea of an initial deficit that would push men to struggle fo r
their survival according to a selection that is destined to favor the fittest.
He overturns this "progressive" reading witb a d ifferent approach thatinterpreting the origin of life in terms of e.xuberance and prodigalityanticipates conversely a d iscontiouous series of increments and decrements
that are governed not. by a se lective adaptation but. rather by the struggle
within the will to power: of the reductio n of the wi ll to power for some
and of its increase for o thers. But rather than be ing to the advantage of the
strong and best, as Darwin wo uld have it (at least the Darwin reread by
Nietzsche thro ugh Spencer}, this redounds to the benefit of the weak and
the worst:
What surprises me mo re tha n anything else. when contemplating the g rand
destinies of man is co have always before my eyes the opposi[c of what
Darwin with bis school sees or wants to sec: natur-<11 selection in favor of
the stronger, the more gifted, the progress of the species. One can touch
with o ne's hand the exact opposite: the elimi oatjo n of cases to the contrary.
the uselessness o f types that are highly successful, the inevitable victory of
the average and even of those below average..l7
Tbe reason for such a q ualitative decrease is fouod, on the one haod, in the
preponderance of the number of those less endowed with respect to th e
superior few and, on the other hand, in the organ ized strategy put in mo tion by the former against. the latr.er. While the weak, gripped by fear, tend
to protect themselves against the traps surrounding them {and by this increase them}, tbe strong continually put their life on the line, for example,
in war, exposing life to the risk of an early dissolu tion. What results fina lly
is a process of degeneration that continually accelerates given that the remedies utilized form pa rt of the same process: medicines implicated in the
same disease that they in ten d to cure, which are constituted ultimately by
the same poison. This is the dialectic of immunization that Nietzsche continually linked to decadence and to wh ich be gave tbe name nihilism,
especially in his later works." Nihilism includes within itself the instruments
by which it o vercomes itself, beginning precisely with tbe category of decadence. Thus nih ilism con ceptually appears to be insurmountable: modernity doesn't have di ffererlt languages apart from inlmunization, which is
consti tutively negative.
Not even Nietzsche is able to escape from such a conceptual constrain t

(a nd from this point of view He idegger wasn't wrong in keeping him on
this side of nihilism, or at least on its meridian). lndeed, he remains utterly
implicated in at least one conspicuous vector of immunization . It is true
that Nietzsche intends to oppose that process of immunitary degeneration
which, ratber than strengthening the organism, has the perverse effects of
debabilitating it further. Tbe substitution of the will to power for the struggle
for survival as both the o rltogenetic and philogeneti.c boriwos of reference
constitutes the clearest confirmation. And yet precisely such a negation of
immu nization situates Nietzsche (or at least th is Nietzsche) with in its
recharging mechan ism. Negating the immunitary negatio n, Nietzsche un doubtedly remains tbe prisoner of the same negative lexicon. Rather than
affirming his own perspective, Nietzsche limits himself to negating the o pposite, remaining, so to speak, subaltern to it. just as happens in every logic
of the reactive type, whose structurally negative modality Nietzsche so effectively deco nstwcts, his critique of modern immun ization respon ds to
something that. logically precedes it. T he same idea of degeneration (Eutartu.rrg), from which Nietzsche derives the means of developing the an tidote,
has an intrinsically negative configuration: it is the contrary of generation,
a generation folded upon itself and perverted - not an affirmative, but the
negative of a negative, typical after all of the antigenic procedure.lt isn't by
coincidence that tbe more Niettsche is determined to fight the immunitary
syndrome, the more he falls into the semantics of infection and contam ination. All the themes of purity, integrity, o r perfection that obsessively return (even autobiographically) have this unmistakably reactive tonali ty,
which is to say doubly negative toward a rampant impurity that constitutes
the discourse's true primum:
As has always been my wont- extreme undeanliness {Ltwtcrkc-ic] in relaw
tio n to me is the p resupposition o f rny e)l.; stence; I perish under unclean
conditions- I constantly swim and bathe and splash. as it were, in water-
in some perfectly transparent and resplendent element .. . My whole

Znratlwstra is a dith}'ramb on so1itude or, if 1 have been understood. on
cleanliness fReinheit].>'
Not on ly, but Nietzsche presents the degeneration as both the cause and
the effect of tbe progressive contagion of tbe uncontamina ted by the contamirlated. lt is these latter who, in order to reject the positive force of their
own power, con tam ina te the former, and so swifdy extend rbe infected
Biopowcr and Biopotcnlialit)' 97
a reas to the point that the decadence against which Nietzsche exhorts us to
fight -more than a disease that can be easily eliminated as such-is unquestio nably the advancing line of the contagion:
Decadence is not something one can combal': it is absolutely necessary and
belongs to c\'ery epoch and every people. What needs to be fought against
witlt aUollc's strengtlt is the contagion of the healthy p<lrts of the orgMism.'"
We cannot avoid the hyperi.m.mu rlitary d irection that this cri tique of
immunizat ion ado pts. To refrain from an excess of protec tio n- from the
weaker species' obsession with self-p reservation-protection is needed from
their co ntagion. A stronger and more impenetrable barrier must be constructed, stronger than the one already in place. In so do ing, the separation
between the healthy and sick parts will be rendered definitive, where the
biological distinction, or better op position, between the p hysiological and
the pathological has a transparent social rnea ll i.ng: "Life itself doesll't recogJJ i.ze either solidarity or 'equality of rights' a rnong the healthy aJJd diseased parts of an organism: the lat.r.er need to be lopped off o r t.he who le
will perish:'" It would be superfluous to in dicate to the read er the numerous passages in which Nietzsche insists o n the necessity of preservation.
More useful would be to accentuate the rig id disjunction Nietzsche makes
between different classes, and in particular between tbe race of masters and
slaves. His exaltation of incommun icable castes in India speaks volumes
on the subject. What is to be emphasized here is the categorical colltrast
that also emerges vis-a-vis modern political philosophy: Nietzsche opposes
liberal individualism and democratic universalism's homo aequalis t.o the
premodern homo iearchicus, which serves to co nfirm the regressive and
restorative cha racter of th is axis in the Nietzschean discourse. Moreover,
the favorable citations of de Bou lainviller, which a biopolitical Foucau lt
quotes on more than occasion, move i.n the same antimodern directioo."
De Boulainviller is one of the first. t.o have contested the lexicon of sovereignty and of the one a nd indivisible nation in favor of all ineducible separatio n between conflicting classes and races. That Nietzsche's racism is o f
the ho rizontal or diagonal kin d, in wbicb he discriminates between dherse
pop ulations o r makes a break within the same nat io nal community, is an
undecidable question in the sense that be moves from one level to another
according to the texts in question and th e circumstances in whi.ch he is
writing. But wbat deserves our atteo tion i.!l the conceptual pro6le sketched
here is the obvious contradiction with regard to the thesis of originary

abundance, of a zero-sum game according to which the elevation of the
one is directly proportional to the coercion, and indeed the elimination,
of o thers:
The crucial thing about a good and healthy aristocracy, however, ls that
it ... has no misgjvings ln condoning the sacrifice of a vast number o f
people who must for its sake be oppressed and diminished into incomplete
people, slaves} tools."
Of course, Nietzsche's position, as some have observed, isn't an isolated

o ne when seen against the background of his time.''' Accents of the sort
C<ln be found not only in conservative thought, but even in the liberal traditio n, where reference is made to the destiny of extra-European peoples
subject to colon~tation and racial exploitation. But what makes it relevant
for our analysis is its intense biopolitical tonali ty. What is undoubtedly in
question i.o this sacrificial balance, ir1 wh ich one level must necessarily drop
down so that another can rise u p, L~n't o nly power, prestige, or work, but
life itself. In order for life's biological substance to be intensified, life must
be marked with an unyielding distinction that sets it against itself: life
against life, or, mo re severely, tbe Hfe of one against the nonlife of others:
"What is lifi?? - Life - that is: continuaUy shedding something that wants
to die."" Not only is life to be protected from the contagion of death, but
death is to be made the mechanism for life's contrastive reproduction. The
reference to the eliminatio n of parasitic and degenerative species comes up
again in all its crudeness, contained in the r.e xt I cited earlier on grand politics. That it concerns refusing to practice medicine on the incurable, or
indeed of eliminating them directly; of impeding the procreation of unsuccessfu l biological types; or of urging those suffering from irreversibly
hereditary traits to comm it suicide - all of this can be interpreted as an
atrocious link in the gallery of horrors ru nning from the eugenics of the
nineteenth century to the exterm ination camps of the twentieth. Personally,
I share tl1e hermeneutic option of not softening {either metaphoricaUy or
litera lly) passages and expressions of the sort, which Nietzsche himself
shares with authors such as Lombroso, Emerson , Lapogue, Gumplowicz,
and still others: for an implacable border divides human life, one tha t conditions the pl.easu re, knowledge, and power of the few to the struggle as
weU as the deatb of tbe many. If anything, the open questioo remaim how
Biopower and .Biopotentialiry 99
to reconstruct tbe in teroal logic that push.es Nietzscbeao bio politics in to

the shelter of its thanatopo liti cal contrary.
My impression is tbat such logic is firmly associated with that immunitary semantics against which Nietzsche too, from another point of ''iew,
struggles with clearly contradictory results. T he epicenter of such a contradiction can be singled ou t in the point of intersection between a tendency
to biologize existence and another, con trary and specu lative, one, which is
based on th e e:xisteo tializati.on or the pu ri ficati.oo of what also refers to th e
dimension of life. Or ber.t.er: functionalizi ng the former so as to fulfill the
latter. It is as if Nietzsche simultaneously moves in two opposite but convergent directions toward o ne objective: as we have already seen, on the one
hand, he associates the metaphysical construct, which the theo-pbilosophical
tradition defines as a "soul;' to the body's bio logy; on the other hand, he
withdraws the body from its natura l degradation thro ugh an artiftcial regeneration that is capable of restoring its origir1al essence . On ly whe n bios
is fo rcibly broug ht back into the circle of zoe can bios overcome itself in
something that pushes it beyond itself. It isn't. surprising that Nietzsche
seeks the key to such a paradoxical move in the same Plato arou nd whom
his deconstruction turns. This is possible to the degree that Nietzsche substitu tes a mew physical Plato, tbe o ne of the separatio n and opposition of
body and soul, for a biopoli tical Plato. In this sense, he can argue that the
true Platonic republic is a "state of geniuses; which is actualized th rough
the eli mination of lives that do not meet the required standards. At th e
center of the Platon ic project, there fore, are the demands to maintain the
purity of the "race of guardians" and through them to save th e entire "human
herd" from degenerative contagion . Leaving aside the legitimacy of similar
interpretations of Plato- whose thanatopolitical folds we have seen, o r
have occasion to see shortly - what counts most here at the end of our discourse is the intensely immunitary attitude that subter1ds the q uestion. Not
o nly is the solution to the degenerative impulse sought. in the blocking of
becoming, in a resto ratio n of the initial condition, o r in a return to a perfection of what is integr al, pure, and permanen t. Rather, such a restoration,
o r physical and spiritual reintegration (spiritual because it is physical}, is
strictly co nditioned by the inco rporation of the negative, both in the lethal
sense of the annibilatioo of those that do not deserve to live, aod in the
sense of the crushing of the originary d innension of an imality of those who
remain. When Nie tzsche iiiSists on the defin itive zoological connotation of
'"ill
100
Bio power and Diopo tcntjaJity
terms such. as Zilchtu11g Ib reeding] or Ztlhmu11g !domestication I, h.e is determined to assert (against the entire h uman ist cu lture) that man's vital
potential lies in that profou nd belonging to what is still no t, or is no
longer, human, to something that co nstitutes for the hu man both the primogenital force and the specific negatio n. Only when man u ndergoes the
same selective trea tment applied to animals or to greenhouse plan ts will he
be able to cultivate the self-generating capacity that degeneration bas progressively consumed.
When th is Platon ism, now reversed by a biopolitical key, co mes in to
contact with the contem porary theories on degeneration of Morel a nd o f
Fare-of whom I'll speak at length in the ne>."t chapter-the results appear
to be devastating. Thus it isn't entirely unfounded to see in this Nietzsche,
o n the one band, the nihilistic apex of nineteenth-century social Darwin ism,
a nd, on the other, that conceptual passage toward the eugenic activism
that will be tragically on display i11 the next century. Tts specific ax is of ideological elaboratio n emerges i.n the con fluence of Galton's cri.rn i.nal patl1ology
and the animal sociology of a uthors such as Espinas and Schneider." If the
o rigin o f the criminal act lies more deeply in the bio logical conformity (and
therefore in the genetic patrimo ny of the one who commits the crime than
in a free individ ual choice) , it's clear that punishment can not b ut be characterized by both prevention and fi nality, relative oot to the single individ ual b ut to the entire hereditary line from which it comes. Such a line, wben
not broken, is destined to be transmitted to its descendants. But this first
superimposition between the mentally ill and the criminal involves a seco nd
and more extreme superimpositio n between the h uman and the animal
species. From the moment that man appears bound by an unbreakable system of biologica l determinism, he ca n be reclaimed by his anima l matrix
from whicb he wrong ly believes to bave been emancipated (precisely on
the strength of that distortion or perversion, civilization, whicb is noth ing
o ther than co ntinual degeneration). Seen from th is a ngle, we are well beyond th e metapho r of the an imal that o riginated with Hobbes, the man who
is a wolf toward his equals. Taken literally, the wolf-man isn't actually what
remains of a superior type already under attack, or better, one inhabited by
another kind of inferior animal destined to devour h im from within: the
parasite, the bacillus, or the tick tha t sucks h is blood and transmits it, now
poisoned, to the rest of the species. With regard to such a biological risk
(wh ich is therefore also political), there can only be a similarly biopolitical
Biopowcr and Biopolcnlialily tOt
response in the lethal sense in which such a term is reversed in the nihilist
completion of the immunitary dialectic. Once again in question is the generation o f the negation of degeneration, the effectuation o f life in death:
A sick person is a parasite o n society. Once one has reached a certain state
it is indeceut to Jive any longer . .. Create a new kin d of responsibility, the

physicians, to apply in al.l cases where the highest interest of life, of asccr~dit~g
life, demands that degenerating li fe be ruthlessly pushed down and aside for example in the case of the right to procreate, the right to be born, the
right to live.46
Posthuman
Nonetheless, this isn't Nietzsche's last or on ly word on the subject. Certainly, it is the origin of a discursive line that is unequhocal in its conclu sions and its effects of sense, whose categorical extraneousness from the
most destructive resu lts of nineteenth-century eugenics it wou ld be arduous to demonstrate. But this li ne ouglll not to be separated from another
perspective r.hat. is irreducible to the first., and indeed whose underlying in spiration runs contrary to it. The internal po int of distinction between
these two different semantics is to be fo und in the perspective that Nietzsche assumes with regard to the process of biological decadence, which is
defined in terms of degeneration or of passive n ihilism. How does ooe behave toward it? By trying to stop it, to slow it down, to hold it in check
through immunitary dispositifs that arc the same and contrary to those
that it itself activated (and ultimately responsible for the decline under way};
or, o n the con trary, to push it. toward completion, and so doing provoke its
self-destruction? By erecting new and ever denser protective barriers against
the wide-ranging contagion, or ratber encouraging it as the means to the
dissolu tion of the old organ ic equilibrium and therefore the occasion for a
new morphogenetic configuration? By tracing more markedly the lioes of
separation between social classes, groups, and races to the point. of conditioning the biological development of the one to the violent reduction of
the others? Or instead by trying to fi nd in their difference the prod uctive
energy for common expansion?
ln the p receding paragraphs, we became familiar with Nietzsche's first
res ponse to these questions, along with its ideological presuppositions and
the thanatopo liti.cal. consequences. Without being able to establish any
chronological sequence between the two, it's o pportu ne at this stage to
102
Biopower and Biopotentiality
note that at a certain point (that contrasts with and is superimposed upon
his response), he appears to fo llow another track. The supporti ng idea is
that on ly by acceleratin g what will nevertheless take place can one liberate
the field for new affirmative powers /potenze]. Every other option -restorative, compensative, resistant-creates a worse stalemate than before:
Even today there arc still par ties wh ich dream of the cn1b-like retrogri!$Sio"
of all things as their goal. But no one is free to be a crab. It is no use: we
hal'e to go forwards. i.e. step ll)' sr.ep further in decadence (- this being tn)'
defi nitio n of rnodern '(progress". ..) . YOu can check this development and.
by checking it, dam up, accumulate degene ratio n itself, making it more
vehement and sruldtm: no more can be done...'
Implicit in sucb expressions is the perspective (not extraneous to what will

take the name of"etemal return") that, if a parabolic incline is continually
increased, it ends up meeting itseU' in circu lar fashion at the point from
wh ich it began to move, retu rning again toward the top. It is exactly here
that Niet~sche begins to decorlstruct the hyperinunu nitary machine that
he himself set in mo tion against the debilitating effects of modern immunization. Where before he emphasized a strategy of containment, now
enters another of mobilization an d the un leashing of energy. Force, even
reactive force, is unstoppable in itself: it can on ly recoil against itself- Wben
pushed to a point of excess, eve ry negation is destined to negate itself.
After baving annihilated everything that it encounters, negatio n cannot
but fight agai nst its own negativity a nd reverse itself in the affirmative. As
Deleuze rightly argues, at the origin of this conceptual passage isn't the
masked propensity for the dialectic (a sorr. of reverse Hegelianism), but
rather the defi nitive release from its mach inery: affirmation is not the synthetic resu lt of a double negation, but instead the freeing of positive forces,
which is p roduced by tbe self-suppression of tbe negation itself. As soon as
the inmlUnitary rejection, what Nietzsche calls "reaction:' becomes inte11se
enough to attack the same a ntibodies that provoked the rejection, the break
with the o ld form becomes inevitable.
Of course, this seems to contradict what was said about the irreversibility of degeneration. In part it does, b ut only if we lose sight of the subtle
line of reasoning that implies the possibility o f its own reversal. As is customary for an author who distrusts the objectivity of the real, the question
is one of perspective. The self-deconstruction of the immun ity paradi.grn
that Nietzsche operates (tha t runs counter to his eugenic aim) d oesn't rest
on a weakening of the vitalistic project., nor on an o utright. abando nment of
Bk,powcr and Biopotcnrialiry 103
the degenerative hypothesis. At stake isn't the centrality of tbe biopolitical

relation betwee n health and illness, b ut a di fferen t conception of one a nd
the other an d therefore o f their relation. What fa ils in this more complex
intlection o f Nietzschean though t is the dividing line that separates them
in the metaphysically presupposed form of the absolu te distinction between good <Jnd evil. In this sense, then, Nietzsche can declare that "there is
no health as such, an d all attempts to define a thing that way have been
wretched failu res ... there are innumerable bealtbs of tbe body ... a r1d the
more we abj ure the dogma o f the 'equality o f men; the more must the
concept o f a normal health along with a normal diet and the normal co urse
o f an illness, be abandoned by medical men:;o Yet, if it isn't possible to settle
on a canon of perfect health; if it isn't the norm that determines bealth, b ut
health that creates its own norms in a man ner that is increasingly plu ral and
reversible - then every person bas a d ifferen t idea of health and therefore it
inevitably follows that even an all -engaging defin ition o f ill ness isn't possible. And oot only in the logi.cal sense that, if one doesn't koow what bealtl1
is, a stable conception of illness cannot be determined (projilare/, bu t in the
biopolitic.al sense as well beca use health and illness are in a relatio n that is
mo re complex than their simple exclusion. Illness, in sho rt, isn't only the
con tw ry of bealtb, b ut is its presu pposition, its mea ns, a nd its path; illness
is tbe somethi ng from which health originates and that it carries with in as
its inalienable interoal component. No true health is possible that doesn't
ta ke in (comprendaj-i n the dual sense o f the expression: to know and to
incorporate- illness:
Final1)' the great question would stiU remain whether we can n.:.aUy tlispense
with illness - even for the sake of our virtue-and whether our thirst for
knowledge an d self-knowledge in p<>rticular docs not require the sick soul
as much as the healthy, and whether, in brief, the will to health alone, is
not a prejudice, cowardice, aod perhaps a bi.t of very subtle barbarism and
backwardness.51
At stake in th is po lemic against a will to health, one incapable o f con fron ting its own opposite (and therefore also itse lf), is the challenge the
relation between life and death con tinually p resen ts to health. T here's no
need to imagine such a challenge as the battle between two juxtaposed
forces, as a besieged cit)' defend ing itself from an enemy inten t on penetrati ng and conquering it. Not that an image of the sort is extra neous to
the profound logic of Nietzscbeao discourse, as clearly results from its
explicitly eugen ic side. But, as has been said , such a n image d oesn't exhaust
104 Biopower Jnd Biopotentiality
the logic. Indeed, one can assert that the extraordinary force of Nietzsche's
work resides exactly in its inte rsectio n and contradiction of another analytic trajectory, which is situated within itself (and not worlds apart from it}.
The figure that emerges here is of a superimposition by way of contrast, all
of whose logical passages (both in their succession and in their copresence)
need to be recogn~ted . We ha,,e seen how Nietzsche contests moderniry's
immunitary dispositifs not thro ugh negation, but instead by moving imrnunizatio rl f.roru the institutional level to that of actual feffettil'a} li fe; needing t.o be protected from the excess or r.he dispersion of life, no longer in
the sense of a formal political order, but in the survival of the species as a
whole. In a philogenetic framework of growing degeneratio n, such a possibility is conditioned both by tbe isolation and by the fencing in of those
areas of life that are still whole with respect to the advancing contamination
on the part of tbe weak whose life is ending, as well as by the reduction of
the sick (in Malthusian fasl1ion} in favor of the healthy. Nonetheless, we
have seen how th is prescri.ption constitutes no tl1ing o t11er than the fi rst
hyperimmunitary or thanatopolitic.al stratum of the Nietzschean lexicon.
A second categorical vector draws alongside and is joined with it, one
that move.s in a direction that diverges from the first, or perhaps better,
one tbat allows for a different reading. More than a revision, this vector
moves through a semaotic deferral of the preceding categories, beginning
with that of"heahh" and "illness; b ursting their nominal identiry and placing them in direct contact with their contrary logic." Fcom this perspective {and with respect to the metaphor of the besieged city}, the danger is
also biological; it. is no longer the enemy that makes an attempt on life
from the o utside, b ut the enemy is now life's own propulsi,e force. for this
reason "the Greeks were certainly not possessed of a square and solid healthiness; - their secret was to honour even sickness as a god if only it bad
power.";> Being "dangerously bealthy, ever again health" means that this
kind of health must. necessarily traverse the sickness which it seems to
fight!' Health is not separate from the mortal risk that runs through it,
pushing it beyond itself, continuously updating its norms, overthrowing and
re-creating rules for life. The result is a reversal that occurs by an intensifica
tion of the defenshe and offensive logic that governs the eugenic strategy: if
health is no longer separable from sickness; if sickness is part of bealtbthen it wiU no longer be possible to separate the individual and social body
according to insurmountable lines of prophylaxis and hierarchy. The entire
immunitary semantic now seems to be rebut.ted, or perhaps better, to be
Bk,powcr and Biopotcnrialiry
105
rein terpreted in a perspective that si multaneously strengthens and overturns it, that co nfi rms it a nd deconstructs it.
A paragraph in Humau, All Too Human titled "Ennoblemen t th rough
Degeneration" condenses in brief tu rns of phrase the entire trajectory tha t
I've reconstructed to this point. At its center will be fou nd the commu nity
held together by t:be equali ty o f conditions a nd pa rticipation based on a
sha red fa ith. More than possible risks from the outside, wha t undermines
tire community's vitality is its stability: tl1e more the corumun ity is preserved
intact, the more the level o f in novation is reduced. T he greatest danger
that the community faces is therefore its own preve ntive withdrawa l from
d anger. Once in111mnized , the commun ity doesn't ru n any risk of wou nd ing, bu t it is precisely for th is reason that it seals itself off blocking from
within any possibility of relation with the outside and therefore any possibility of grow th . Avo iding degeneration (according to the eugen ic prescriptions o f perfect health), the result is that the commu n ity loses its own selfgenerating potential. No longer capable o f creating conditions of growth,
it folds in upon itself. Saving it from such a decline are individuals who,
free from the syndrome o f self-preservation, a re more inclined to experiment, although for the same reason they are biologically weaker. Disposed
as they a re to increasing tbe good that they possess (as well as their own
vital substance), sooner or later they are bouod not only to risk th.eir lives,
but also to damage the en tire communi ty. It is p recisely h.ere in the clench
of this extreme risk, that the poi nt of productive conju nctio n between
generation and innovation is p rod uced:
It is precisely at tbis injured arrd weakened spot that the wbole body is as
it were inoculated with so rn.ething ne,v; its stre ngth must, however. be as a
who le sufficient to receive this new thing into its blood a nd to assimilate it.
Degenerate natures are of the highest significance whe rever progress ls to
be effocred."
Th is might seem r.o be me re theater for someone who elsewhere harps on

defendi ng the health of races a nd of ind ividuals fro m the contagio n of
those who have d egenerated . In reality, as we've already had occasion to
discuss, the step in question is u nderstood Jess as a d ista ncing from the
immunitary paradigm, and more as immun ity's open ing to its own comm unal reverse, to that form of self-dissolving gift giving that communitas
names. The vocabulary that Nietzsche adopts indicates a similar semantic
overlappi ng, wbicb is situated precisely in t:be poin t of confluence between
the lexicons o f an imm un ity and commu nity. I'm not speaking only of the
106 Biopower Jnd Biopotentialit)'
identification of the oew with inJection, but also of the nobilizing effects
produced by inocu lation. Just as in the body of th e commu nity, so too in
that of the individual, "the educator has to inflict injuries upon him, or
employ the injuries inflicted on him by fate, and when he bas thus come
to experience pain and distress something new and noble can be inocu
lated into the injured places. ll will be taken up into the totality of bis
nature, and later the traces of its nobility will be perceptible in tbe fruits
of his nature.""'
Clearly, the language Nietzsche adopts is immunitarian, that of vaccination-a viral fragment is placed into the individual or collective organism,
which it is intended to strengthen. But the logic that underpins it is not
directed to preserving identity or to simple survival, but rather to innovatio n and alteration . The difference between the two levels of discourse {and
the slippage of one in to tbe other) lies in the mode of understanding the
relation with the "negative," and even before that with its own definition.
Tbat for which Nietzsche recommends th e i.noculatioo isn't an antigen des
tined to activate the antibodies, nor is it a sort of supplemental an tibody
intent o n fortifying the defensive apparatus of the imm unitary system. In
short, it isn't a lesser negative used preventhely to block the path of a
greater negative. All of this is part of that dialectical procedu re tbat Nietzsche criticizes as reactive and to whicb he poses instead a d ifferent modality
according to which what is considered evil [male/upon fi rst view (suffering,
the unexpected, danger) is considered positively as characterizing a more
intense existence. From this perspective, the negative not on ly is in turn
detained, repressed, or rejected, but it is affirmed as such: as what forms an
essential part of life, even if, indeed precisely because, it continually endangers it, pushing it on to a problematic fault line (faglia/ to wbich it is both
reduced and strengthened. Niettsche sees the same role of philosophy- at
least of that phi losophy capable of abandoning the system of ill usions to
which it itself has con tributed and so do ing seu.ing itself adrift-as a sort
of voluntary intoxication. No longer the protecting Mother, but the Medusa
that one cannot look upon without experiencing the lacerating power of
unbearable contradictions. ln this sense, the real philosopher "puts himself
at risk;' because he singles out tbe truth of life in something that continually overtakes it, in an exteriority that can never be completely interiorized,
dominated, or neutralized in the name of other more comforting or obliging truths.;'
.Biopower and 6iopotentiaHt}' 107
Can we give the name of community to tb is exteriority with regard to

the immunitary systems within which we endlessly seek refuge, just as
Georges Bataille dared to do in his own time against an interpretive tendency oriented in the opposite direction?" Without wanting in any way to
twist a philosophy whose entire layers and internal levels of con tradiction
I bave tried to reconstitute, we can S<l)' that a series of texts induce a cautious,
affirmative response.[ am not referring on ly to those grouped around the
them e of donation -of tbe "bestowing vinue"-whose deconstr uctive
character cannot be avoided with respect to every appropriative or cumulative conception of the will to power.; Nor am I referring to those vision ary passages concerning the "stellar friendship:' also extended especially to
those who are far removed and remote from us, even our enemies."' Ratber,
it concerns splinters, flashes of thought that are capable of sudden ly illu
minating (if on ly for an instant) that profound and enigmatic nexus betwee n hospes and hostis (one that is situated at the origin of the Weste(t}
tradi.tion in a kno t that we have sti ll oot been able to unravel). Certainly,
all of this carries us along to the semantic threshold of that. common muuus
whose opposite pole we have glimpsed.
Yet, if we adopt a more complex perspective, it is also the center, the
incandescent nucleus of immu11itas.ln o rder to see it more clearly, we need
to understand donation and also the friendship with the enemy no t in an
ethical sense (whicb wou ld be completely extraneous to the Nietzschean
lexicon, constitutively immune [refrattarioj from all altruistic rhetoric), nor
in a properly anthropological sense, but in a radically ontological sense.ln
Nietz,sche, donation is not an o pening to another man, but. if anything to
the other of man or also from man.lt is the alterat ion of the self-belonging
that an anything but exha usted human istic tradition has attributed to mao
as one of the most proper to him of his essential properties - against whicb
the Nietzschean text reminds us tbat man is still not, nor will ever be, what
he considers himself to be. His being resides beyond this or beyond that
side of the identity with himself. And indeed, he is not even a being as such,
but a becoming that carries together within itself the traces of a different
past and the prefiguration of a new futu re. At the center of this conceptual
passage lies the theme of metamorphosis. With regard to the ''retarding elements" of every species that is inten t on constructing ever new means
of preservation (who arc determined to last as long as possible), the ()hermensch (or bowever we may want to translate the expression) is characterized
108 Biopower ;md Biopotentiality
by an inexhaustible power of transformation. He literally is situated outsid e of himself, in a space that is no longer (nor was it ever) that of man as
such. It isn't so importan t to know where or what he will become , because
what he connotes is precisely becoming, a breaking through, a moving beyond his pro per topos. It isn't that his life do esn't have form; it isn't a
"form o f life?' Ra ther, it bears upon a form that itself is in perpetual movement toward a new form, traversed by an alterity from which it emerges sirn ultaneously d ivided and multiplied.
In this se nse, Nietzsche, the hyper individualist, can say that t.he individual, th e o ne u nd ivided [l'indirisoj, d oesn't exist - that it is contradicted
from its coming into the world by the genetic p rinciple according to which
"two are born from one and one from two."" It is no coincidence that
birth, p rocreation, and pregnancy constitute perhaps the most symbolically
cbarged figure of Nietz.schean philosophy, one Nietzscbe cha racterizes as
falli ng u nder the sign o f a painful delivery. T his occu rs because no term
rno(e than ch ild birth refers the theme of donation to its concrete biological dimension, wh ich otherwise is simply met.aphorical or classically in tersubjective. Child birth isn't only an offer of life, but it is the effective site in
which a life makes itself two, in which it opens itself to the difference with
itself according to a movemen t that in essence contradicts the in1munitary
logic of self-preservation. Against every presupposed in teriorizatioo, it
exposes tbe body to the split that always traverses it as an outside o f its
inside, the exterior of the inte rio r, the common of the immune. Th is holds
true for the individual body, b ut also fo r the collective body, which emerges
as naturally challenged, infiltrated, and hybridized by a diversity that isn't
o nly external, b ut also internal. It is so for the ethnos and for the geuos, that
is, for the race tbat, despite all the illusions of eugenics, is never pure in
itself, as well as for the species."' It is precisely with respect to the species,
to wbat Nietzscbe de6 nes as human in order to distinguish it essentially
from all the others, that he pushes the deconstruction or conversio n of the
irnmun itary paradigm fa rth er and deepe r into its opposite. Certain ly, its
superimposition with the animal sphere can be and bas been in terpreted
in the most varied of ways. Undoubtedly, the sin ister reference to " the
beast of prey" o r to "the breeding an imal" contains within it echoes and a
tonality that are attribu table to the more deterministic and aggressive tend encies of social. Darwin ism . But in the an imaliz.ation of rnan someth ing
else is felt tbat appears to mark more the fu ture of the b urnan species a nd
less the a ncestral past. In Nietzsche, the animal is never interpreted as the
Biopowcr and Biopo1cntialit y 109
obscure abyss or the face of stone from which man escapes. On tbe con trary, it is tied to the destiny of"after-man" (as we could hazard translating
Obermensch}. It is his future not less than his past, or perhaps better, the
discontinuous lines along with which the relationsh ip between past and
future assumes an irreducible configuration vis-a-vis all those that have
preceded him. It's not by accident that the destiny of the animal is enigmatica lly con nected through man to him who can exceed bim in power and
wisdom-to a man who is capable of redefining the rneao ing of his own
species no longer in humanistic. or anr.hropological terms, but in an thropocentric or bio technological terms:
VVhat are the profound transformations that must de rive from the theories
according to which o ne asserts that there is no God that cares for us and
that there is no eternal morall"w ( humanity as athcistil'llly immoral) ?

T hat we arc animals? That our life is transitory? That we have no rcspon-
sibiliry? The wise one and the anUnal wiJI grow closer <:lnd produce a new
type [of human [."'
Who or what this new "type" is naturally remains indeterminate, and not
just for Nietzsche. But certainly Nietzsche understands (indeed, he was the
first to seize with an absolu te purity of a gaze) that we are at the threshold
beyond wb icb what is called "man" enters into a different relationship witb
his own species- beyond which, indeed , the same species becomes the
object and tbe subject of a biopolitics potentially different from what we
know because it is in relation not o nly to human life, but to what is o utside
life, to its o ther, to its after. The animalization of man in Nietzsche contains these two signs, wh ich are perilously juxtaposed and superimposed:
taken together, they form the point where a biopolitics precipitates in to
death aod where the horizon of a new politics of life, wbich I outline
here, begins.
CHAPTER FOUR
Thanatopolitics (The Cycle of Genos)
Regeneration
Michel Fo ucault was the first to provide us with a biopolitical interpretation of Nazism.' The force of his reading with respect t.o other possible
readings lies in the distance he takes up with respect to all modern political
categories. Nazism constitutes an irreducible protrusion fo r the history
that precedes it because it introduces an antinomy that went unrecognized
until tben in its figure and in its effects. It is summarized in the principle
that life defends itself aod develops oo ly through the progressive enlargement of the circle of death. Thus the paradigms of sovereignty and biopolitics, which seemed at a certain point to diverge, now experience a singular
form of indistinction that makes one both the reverse and the complement
of the other. Foucau lt locates the instrument of this process of superimposition in racism. Ooce racism has been inscribed in the practices of
biopolitics, it performs a double function: that of producing a separation
within the biological conrinuum between those that need to remain alive and
those, conversely, who are to be killed; and that more essen tial function of
establishing a direct relation between the two co nd itions, in the sense that
it is precisely the deaths of the latter that enable and authorize the survival
of the former. But that isn't all. In o rder to get to the bottom of the constitutively lethal logic of the Nazi conception [of life ], we need to take a final
step. Contrary to mucb of wbat we bave beeo led to believe, such a cooception doesn't concentrate the supreme power of ki lling on ly in the hands of
the leader /capo]-as happens in classical d ictatorships-but rather distributes it in equal parts to the entire social bod y. Its absolu te newness lies
110
Tbam~topolirics
111
in the fact that everyone, directly or indirectly, can legitimately kill everyone
else. But if death as such (and here is the unavoidable concl usion of th is
line o f "reason ing") constitutes the mo to r of develo pment o f the entire
mechan ism -which is to say that it needs to produce it in ever greater dimensions, first with regard to the external enemy, then to the internal, and
then lastly to the German people themselves (as Hitler's fmal orders make
perfectly clea r) - then the result is an abso lu te coincidence. of homicide
a nd suicide that places it outside of every traditional hermeoeuti.cs.
Nevertheless, Foucau lt's interpretation isn't compler.ely satisfYing. I spoke
earlier of the discontinuity that the interpretation aims at instituting in the
modern conceptual lexicon.2 Yet, the category assigned to fix more precisely
the point of caesura of Nazi experience for history preceding it (namely,
that of biopolitics) winds up constituting the part of the ir unio n: "Nazism
was in fact the paroxysmal development of the new power mechan isms
that had bee n established since the eighteenth century:'' Certain ly, Nazism
carries the biopoli tica l procedures of modernity to the extreme point of
their coercive power, reversing r.hem in to thanatological ter ms. But the
process remains within the same semantics that seemed to have lacerated
it. It extends on to the same terrain from which it appeared to tear itself
away. In the Foucauldian reading, it is as if the tear were subjected to a
more profound continuity tba t reincorporates its precision: "Of course
Nazism alone took the play berween the sovereign right to kill and the
mechan isms of biopower to this paroxysmal point. But this play is in fact
inscribed in the workings of all Sta tes:' Even if Foucault ultimately doubts
such an affirmation, the comparison is by now established: even with its
unmistakably new featu res, Nazism bas much in commo n biopolitically
'"ith other modern regimes. The assimilation of Nazism to communism is
even stronger; tbat too is traced back to a racist matri.x and therefore to the
no tion of biopower tha t the matrix presupposes. We are already quite far
from the discon tinuist approach that seems to mot.ivar.e Foucau lt's interpretation. lt is as if, despite its contiguous and progressive steps, the generality of the framework pre,ails over the singularity of the Nazi event: both
vertically in relation to the modern era and horizontally with regard to the
communist regime. If the latter has a bio political con text and if both inherit
it from recen t history, the power of rupture that Foucault bad conferred
on h is own analysis is dirni.o ished o r indeed has gone missing.>
It is p recisely tbe comparison with communism (activated by the unwieldy car.egory of totalitarianism) that a llows us to focus on the abso lute
112
ThJnatopo litks
specificity of Nazi biopoli tics. Altho ugh the communist regime, in spite
of its peculiarity, originates nonetheless in the modern era- its logic, its
dynamics, and its wild swings in meaning-the Nazi regime is radically different. It isn't born from an exasperated modernity but from a decomposed
modernity. If we can assert that communism always "carries out" (realizzi./
one of its philosophica l traditions (even in an aggravated form), not:b ing
of the sort can be said of Nazism. Yet this is nothing more than a halftruth, which ought to be completed as follows: Nazi.srn does uot, nor can
it, carry out a philosophy because it is an actualized [realizzata) bio logy.
Whi le the transcendental of commu nism is history, its subject class, and its
lexicon economic, Nazism's transcendental is life, its subject race, and its
lexicon biological. Certainly, the communists also believed that they were
acting on the basis of a precise scientific vision, but only the Nazis identified
their vision with tbe comparative biology of buman races and animals.
I.t is from t his perspective that Rudo lph Hess's declaration needs to be
understood in the most restricted sense, according to which "National Socialism is nothi ng but applied biology:'' In reality, Fritz Lenz, along with
Erwin Baur and Eugen Fischer, used the expression for the fi rst time in the
successful manual Rassetrhygierre, in a context in wh ich they refer to Hitler
as "the great German docto r" able to wke "the final step in the defeat of
that historicism aod in the recognition of values that are purely biological!
In another influential medical text, Rudolph Ramm expressed his views
simi larly, asserting that "unli ke any other political ph iloso phy o r any o ther
party program, National Socialism is in agreement with natural history
and the biology of man:'
We need to be careful not to lose sight of the utterly specific q uality of
this explicit reference to biology as opposed to philosophy. It marks the
true breaking point with regard not only to a generic past, but also with respect to modern biopolitics. It's true, of course, that the political lexicon
has always adopted biological metaphors, beginning with the long-standing
notion of the state as body. And it is also true, as Foucau lt showed, that
beginning with the eighteenth century the question of life progressively
intersects with the sphere of political action. Yet both occurred thanks to a
series of linguistic, conceptual, and institutional mediations that are completely missing in Nazism: every division coUapses between politics and biology. What before had always been a vitalistic metaphor becomes a reality i.n
Nazism, not iu tbe sense tbat political power passes d irectly into the haods
of bio logists, but in the sense that politicians use bio logical processes as
Thaoalopolitics 113
cri teria with which to guide tbeir own actions. In sucb a perspective we
canno t even speak of simple instrumentalization: it isn't that Nazi politics
limited itself to adopting biomedical research of the time for legitimizing
its ends. They demanded that politics be identified directly with biology in
a completely new form of biocracy. When Hans Reiter, speaking in the name
of the Reicb in occupied Paris, proclaimed tha t "th.is mode of th inking
biologically needs to become little. by little that of all the people," beca use
at stake was t!1e "substance" of the same "biologi.cal body of the rlation ; he
underst.ood well that he was speaking in the name of something that had
never been part of a modern categorical lexicon .10 "We find ourselves
at the beginn ing of a new epoch," writes another ideo-bio logist of the
regime, Hans Weinert. "Man himself;' Weinert con tinu es, "recognizes the
laws of life that model it individually and co llectively; and the National
Socialist state was given the right, insofar as it is in its po,;er, to infl uence
human becorni.ng as the welfare of the people and the state deman d:'"
As long as we speak of biology, however, we remain on a level of discourse that. is far too general. In order to get to the heart. of the question,
we need to focus ou r attention on medicine. We know the role that Nazi
doctors played in the exterminatio n effected by the regime. Certainly, the
availability of tbe medical class for undertaking forms of thanatopolitics
also occurred elsewhere-tb ink of tbe role of psych.iatrists in tbe diagnosis of mental illness for dissidents in Stalin's Soviet Union or in the vivisection practiced by japanese doctors on American prisoners after Pearl
Harbor. But it isn't simply about that in Nazi Germany. I am not speaking
solely about. ex-periments o n " human guinea pigs" or anatomical findings
that the camps directly provided prestigio us German doctors, but of the
medica l profession's d irect participa tion of in all of the phases of mass
homicide: from the singling ou t of babies and then of adults condemned
to a "mercifu l" deatb in the T 4 program, to the extension of what was called
"euthanasia" to prisoners of war, to lastly the enormous therapia magna
auscltwitzciense: the se lection o n the ramp leadi ng into the camp, the start
of tl1e process of gassing, tl1e declaratio n of being deceased, the extraction of
gold from the teeth of the cad<l\'ers, and supervision of the procedu res of
cremation. No step in the productio n of death escaped medical verification.
According to the precise lega l disposition of Victor Brack, bead of the Second "Eu thanasia" Departme nt of the Reich Cha ncellery, o nly doctors had
the right to inject pbeool in to the heart of victims or to o pen the gas valve.
If ultimate power wore the boots of the SS, supreme auctoritas was dressed
U4 Thanatopolitics
in the white gown of the doctor. Zyklon -B was transported to Birkeoa u in

Red Cross cars a nd the inscription that stood o ut in sharp relief at Mau thausen was "cleanliness and health." After all, it was the personal docto r to
the Euthana,~e Programm who constructed the gas chambers at Belzec, Sobib6r, and Treblin ka.
All of this is already well known and documented in the acts of the legal
proceedings against those d octors believed to have been directly guilty of
m urder. But the paltry sen tences with respect to the enormity of their acts
testify to the fact t.hat the u nderlyi ng problem isn't so much d etermin ing
the individual responsibility of single doctors (as necessary as th at is), b ut
defining the overall role that medicine played in Nazi ideology and practices.
Wby was tbe medic<ll profession the one that adhered u nconditionally to
the regime, far surpassing any other? And why was such an extensive power
of life and deatb conferred on doctors? Why was the sovereign's scepter
given just to them-and before that the book of the clergyman as well?
When Gerhard Wagner, fuh rer of German doctors {Reicllsiirztefiiltrerj before
Leonardo Conti, stated that. the physician "should go back t.o his origi ns,
he should again become a priest, he should become a priest and physician
in one:' he does noth ing other than sta te that the judgment over who is to
be kept alive and wbo is to be condemned to death is vested in tbe physician
and solely in the physician, that it is h.e and oo ly he who possesses the
knowledge of what qualifies as a valid life endowed witb value, and therefore is able to fix the limits beyond which life can be legiti mately extinguished.'2 Introducing Das iirztliche Ethos [The physician's ethos ], the work
o f the great n ineteenth-century doctor Christoph Wilhelm Hufeland, the
head of Zyklon-B distrib ution at Auschwitz, Joachim Mrugowsky spoke of
"the doctor's divine mission;' and "the priest of tbe sacred flame of life."" In
the no-man's-land of this new tbeo-biopolitics, or better theo -zoo-politics,
doctors really do return to be tbe great priests of Baal, who after several
millennia found themselves facing their ancient Jewish enemies, whom
they cou ld now finally devour at will.
We know that the Reich knew well how to compensate its doctors, not
only with university professorships and honors, but also with something
more concrete.lf Conti was promoted directly under Himmler, the surgeon
Karl Brandt, who bad already been commissioned in operation "Euthanasia," became one of th.e most powerfu l men of the regime, subordinate
only to the supreme authority of the FUhrer in h is subject area, wh ich was
the unlimited o ne of the life a nd death of everyone (without dwelling on
Thaoalopolitics 115
Irmfried Eberl, promo ted at th irty-two to commandant ofTreblinka). Does

this mean that all German doctors (or on ly th ose who supported Nazism)
were simple butchers in white gown s? Although it would be conven ient to
think so, in reality this wasn't the case at all. Not only was German medical
research one of the most advanced in the world (Wilhelm Hueper, father
of American oncology, asked the Nazi minister of culture Bern bard Rust if
he might returo to work in tbe "new Germany"), but what's more the Nazis
had launched the most powerful carnpaign of the period against cancer,
restricting the use of asbestos, tobacco, pesticides, and colorants, encouraging the diffusion of o rganic vegetables and vegetarian cu isine, and aler ti ng
everyone to the potentially carcinogenic effects of X-rays. At Dachau, while
the chimney smoked, biological boney was produced. Io addition, Hitler
himself detested smoking, was a vegetarian and an animal Jo,er, besides
be ing scrupu lously attentive to questions of hygiene.'"'
What does all of this suggest? T he th esis that emerges is that between
this therapeutic attitude and the thanatological frame in wh ich it is inscribed
isn't a sin1ple contradictio n, but rather a profound connectio n; to the degree
the do ctors were obsessively preoccupied with the health of the German
body, tlley made {operarej a deadly incision, in tile specifically surgical sense
of tbe expression, in its body. In short, and altllough it may seem paradoxical, it was in order to perform tbei.r th erapeu tic mission that tbey turned
themselves into the executioners of those they considered either nonessential
o r harmfu l to improvi ng public health. From this point of view, o ne can
justifiably maintain that genocide was the result not of an absence, but of a
presence, of a medical eth ics perverted into its opposite' ' It is no coincidence that the doctor, even befo re the sovereign or the priest, was equated
'"ith the heroic ftgure of the "soldier of life." In corresponding fashioo ,
Slavic soldiers wbo arrived from the East were considered not only ad,ersaries of the Reicb, but "enemies of life." It isn't eoough to coocl ude, however, that the li mits between healing and killing have been eliminated in
the biomedical vision of Nazism. Instead we need to conceptualize them as
two sides of the same project that makes one the necessary co ndition of
the o ther: it is on ly by killing as many people as possible that one could
heal {risarwrej those who represented the true Germany. From this perspective it even appears plausible that at least some Nazi doctors actua lly
believed that they were respecting the substance, if not the forrn , of the
Hippocratic oath that they had taken, oamely, not to harm in any way the
patient. {rnalato}. It's on ly that they identi fied the patient as the German
u6 Thanatopolitics
people as a whole, rather tban as a single individual. Caring for that body
was precisely what required the death of all of those whose existence
threate ned its health. It's in th is sense that we are forced to defend the hypothesis put forward earlier that the transcenden tal o f Nazism was life
rather than death, even if, paradoxically, death was considered the only
medicine able to safeguard life. [n Telegram Number 71 sent from his b unker
in Berlin, Hitler ordered the destruction of the cond itions of subsistence
for the Germao people who had proven thernselves too weak. Here the
limit. poin t of the Nazi an tinomy becomes suddenly clear: t.he life o f some,
a nd finally t.he life of t.he one, is sanctioned only by the death of everyone.
At this po int the question that o pened the chapter p resents itself again.
Un like a ll the other forms past a nd present, why did Nazism p ropel the
homicidal temptation of biopolitics to its most complete realizatio n? Why
does Nazism (and on ly Nazism) reverse the proportion berween life a nd
d eath in favor o f the latter to the point of hypothesizing its own selfdestruction? The a nswer I wou ld p ut forward refers again to the category
o f immu nization because it is only immun ization that lays bare the lethal
paradox that p ushes the protection of life over into its potential negation.
Not o nly, b ut it also represents in the figure of the auto immune illness the
ultimate condition in which the protective apparatus becomes so aggressi,e that it turns agaimt its own body (which is what it should protect),
leading to its death. That this in terpretive key captures better the specificity
of Nazism is demonstrated o n the other side by the particularity of the
d isease against which it intended to d efend the German people. We aren't
dealing with any ordi nary sort of disease, but with an infective one. What
needed to be avoided at all cost was the contagion of superior beings by
those who are inferior. Tbe regime propagated the fight to the death against
the Jews as tbe resistance put up by the body (and originally the healthy
blood) of tbe German nation against the invading germs tbat bad penetrated withi n a nd whose inte nt. it was to undermine the u nity and life o f
the German natio n itself. We know the epidem iological repertoire that the
ideo logues o f the Reich adopted when po rtraying their supposed enemies,
but especially the Jews: they are in turn an d sirnult<tneo usly "bacilli," "bacteria; ''parasites; ''viruses:' and "tnicrobes." 17 lt is also true, as Andrzej
Kaminski remembers, that Soviet de tainees were sometimes designa ted
witJ1 the same terms. And certai nly the characterizatio n of t11c Jews as parasites is part of the secular h istory of a nti -Semitism. Nonetheless, such a
defin ition acquires a differen t valence in the Nazi vocabulary. Here too it is
ThonaiOpOliliC$ U7
as if wbat to a certain point remained a weighty analogy now actually took

form: the Jews d idn't resemble parasites; they d idn't behave as bacteriathey were bacteria who were to be treated as such. In this sense, Nazi politics
wasn't even a proper biopolitics, but more literally a zoopolitics, o ne expressly
directed to human anin1als. Conseq uently, the correct term for their massacre - anything but the sacred "holoca ust" - is "extermination": exactly
the term used for insects, rats, and lice.. Sozia/e Desinfektion it was ca lled.
".Eiu f..<ws, Ein Tod"-a louse is your death was wfi.tten on a washroom wall
at Auschwitz, next to the coupler. "Nacl! dem Abort, vor dem Esse11, Hi.inde
waschett, ni.chr vergessen" (After the latrine, before eating, wash your hands,
do not forget).'"
It is for this reason that we need to award an absolute literality to the words
Himmler addressed to the SS stationed at Kharkov according to which
"anti-Semitism is like disinfestations. Keeping lice away is not an ideological question- it is a question of clean liness."" And after a ll , it was Hider
himself who used an immunological terminology that is even more p recise: "The discovery of r.he Jewish virus is one of the greatest revo lutions o f
this world. The battle that we fight every day is eq ual to those fought in the
last century by Paste ur and Koch:' 20 We sho uldn't blur the diffe rence between such an a pproach, which is specifically bacteriological, with another
that is simply racial. The final solution waged against the Jews bas just such a
biologic<ll-immunitarian characterization. Indeed, the gas used in tbe camps
passed th rough shower tubes that were allocated for disinfections, but on ly
that d isinfecting the Jews seemed impossible from the moment that they
were considered the bacteria from wh ich one needed to rid oneself. T he
ident ification between men and pathogens reached such a po int that the
Warsaw gbetto was intentionally constructed in a zone that was already contaminated. And so, according to the modalities of a prophecy rea lized, the
Jews fell victinl to rile same disease that was used to justify their ghettoization: finally r.hey had become really in fected and therefore were n ow agents
of infection.2 ' Accordingly, docto rs had the right to exterminate them.
Degeneration
In the a utoimmunitarian parO.I.'}'Sm of the Nazi vision, generalized homicide is therefore understood as the instrument for regener<Hing the Gerrnan people. But this in turn is made necessary by a degenerative tendency
that appears to undermine vital forces. Tile titles of two widely read books
in the middle of the 1930s are ind icative o f such a syUogism: they are \folk in
u8 ThJnatopolitics
Gej'ahr [Nation in danger] by Otto Helmut and Volker am Abgrund [Peoples

on the precipice ] by Friedrich Burgdorfer.12 The task of the new Germany
is that of saving the West from the th reat presen ted by a growing degeneration. The prominence of this category-which we have already co me
across in Nietzsche- in the Nazi ideological machine should in no way be
downplayed. It constitutes the conceptual passageway th rough wbich the
bio politics of the regime could present itself as the prose.cutioo, and indeed
the completion, of a d iscourse that circulated widely in the philosophical,
juridical, and even medical cultu re of the period. Originally relative t.o the
eli mination of a th ing with respect to the genus to which it belongs, the
concept of degeneration progressively takes o n an increasingly negative
valence that assin1 ilates it to terms sucb as "decadence;"'degradation;' and
"deterioration;' though with a specific biological characterization." Th us,
if in Buffon it still con notes the simple environmenta l variation of a organism with respect to the general featu res of his race-what Lamarck considered nothing other than a successful adaptation-Benedict-Augustin Morel's
Traite des degenerescences moves it decisively in a psychopathological direction.'' The element that signals the change with respect to its original
meaning isn't to be found only in the shift from anatomy to bioanth ropology, but rather io tbe move from a static to a d ynamic seman tic: more
than something given, the degenerative phenomenon is a process of dissolution. Produced by the intake of toxic agents, it can lead in a few generations
to sterility and therefore to the e>..1in ctio n of a specific line. All of the multiple
tests that were conducted o n the subject between the end of the nineteenth
century and the beginning of t.he next do nothing but reintroduce (in more
o r less the same arguments) the same schema: having on ly with difficulty
survived the struggle for existence, the degenerate is he who carries imprin ted
within him the physical and psychological wounds in a form that is forced
to become exponentially aggravated in the move from fatber to son. Wbeo
in the tSSos Magnan and Legrain will transpose them to a clinical environ ment, the definition has already established its constitu tive elements:
Degeneration {rlegboerescencej is the pathological state of being that, in
comparison with generations closer 1'0 it in time, is constitutively weakened
in its psychophysical resistance and only re;1lizes in an incomplete manner
the biological conditions of the hereditary struggle for life. T his weakeni11g
that is translated into permanent stigma is essentially progressive, except for
possible regeneration. \Vhen this life doesn't survive, .i t rnore or less rapidly
leads to the ann ihiJation o f the spec.ies.1 ~
Than3tOpolilic:s 119
Naturally, in order for the category to pass over into Nazi biopolitics, a
series of cultural mediations will be needed- from Italian criminal anthropology to French hereditary theory, to a clear-cut racist recomersion of
Mendelian genetics. But the most salient featu res are presen t in it, beginning with the enfolding of pathology into abnormality. What characterizes
the degenerate above aUis his distance from the norm: if the degenerate in
Mo rel already expresses his de.viation from the normal type, for Ita lian
Giuseppe Sergi "it is impossible to find an invariable norm for his behavior
in him :''" What is intended here by "norm"? In the first inst.ance it would
seem a quality of the biological sort - the potentiality of a given organism
for ''ital develo pment understood both from a physical and a psychologiC<ll point of view. Regarding precisely that, as the Englishman Edwin Ray
Lankester makes clear, "degeneration can be defined as a gradual mutation
in the structure in \vbich tbe organism is able to adapt itself to less various
and more complex conditions of life."" Th is doesn't mean that soon after a
slippage in the defi nition of nonn occurs fwm the morphogenetic level to
that of the anthropological. The biological abnonnalit.y is nothing but the
sign of a more general abnormality that links the degenerate subject to a
condition that is steadily differentiated with regard to other individ uals of
the same species. Bu t a second catego rical move follows the fi rst, wb ich is
destined to move abnormality &om the intraspecies dimension to the lim its of the human itself. To say tbat the degenerate is abnormal means pushing him toward a zone of indistinction that isn't completely included in the
category of the human . Or perhaps better, it means enlarging the latter category so as to include its own negation: the non-man in man and therefore
the man-animal [uomo-bestia}.'-' lt is the Lombrosian conception of"atavism:
in which all the possible degenerations are accounted for, that performs
the function of the excluding inclusion. It is configured as a sort of biohistorical anach ronism that reverses the line of human evolution until it has
bro ught it back in con tact with that of the an imal. Degeneratio n is the an imal element that reemerges in man in the form of an existence that isn't
properly animal or human, but exactly their point of intersection: the contradicto ry copresence between two genera, two times, two organisms tha t
are incapable of producing a unity of the person and consequently for the
same reason incapable of forming a juridical subjectivity. The ascription of
t11c degenerate type to an ever vaster number of social categories-alcoholics,
syphilitics, bomosexuals, prostitutes, the obese, even to the urban proletariat
itself- reinstates t.he sign of this uncontrollable exchange between biological
L20
Thanato po litics
norm and juridical-political norm. What appears as the social result of a

determinate biological co nfiguration is in reality the biological representation of a prior political decision.
More than any other, the theory of heredity makes clear the improper
exchange between biology and law [diritto]. At the same time that Morel's
essay was published, Prosper Lucas's Trait~ appea red from the same Parisian
editor, Ballihe, on "natu ral heredity in tbe state of health and disease of
th e nervous system: followed at a d istance of twenty years by Theodule
Ribot's I:/Jeredite: Etude P>J'CI!ologique sur ses phenome11es, ses lois, ses causes,
ses consequences." At the center of these texts, and of many o thers that followed , is a clear shift in perspective from that of the individual (un derstood
in a modern sense as the subject of law an d of judgment {decisione]), to the
line of descent in which he constitutes only the final segment. A vertical
relation linking fathers a nd sons and through them with their ancestors is
substituted for the so lidarity or the horizon tal competitio n between brothers
that is typical o f liberal-democratic societies. Contrary to what pedagogical and social theories (inspired by the notion of equality) pu t forward, the
d ifference that separates individuals appears insurmountable. Both somatic
and psychological featu res are predetermined at birth according to a biological chain tha t neither individual will nor educa tion can break. )ust as for
virtue and fortu ne, so too hereditary malformations take oo the aspect of
an inevitable destiny: no one can escape from oneself; no one cao break the
chaiJ1 that inexorably tics one to o ne's past; no o ne can choose the direction
o f one's own life. It is as if death grabs life and holds it tightly: "Heredity
governs the world;' concludes Doctor Apert. "The living act, but the d ead
speak in them a nd make them what they are . Our ancestors lh'e in us."' 0
Life is nothing but the resu lt of something that precedes it and defines it in
all its movements. The Lombrosian figure o f the "born delinquent" constitutes
the most celebrated expression: as tbe aocieot wisdom of the myth teaches us,
the faults o f the father always devolve upon their sons. Law {diritto f, which
precisely o rigi nates in myth, can do nothing but model its procedures on
this first law, which is stronger than any other because it is rooted in the most
profound reasons of biology and blood. In Lucas's definit ion, heredity is "a
law, a force, and a fact."" l\1ore precisely, it is a law that bas the irresistible
force of fact; it coincides with its own facticity.
Here emerges the reversa l of the relatio n between nomos a nd bios to
which I referred earlier: what in reality is the effect is represented as the
cause and vice versa. Andre Pichot has drawn our at.tention to the fact. that
Thana10pOli1icS 121
the economic-juridical ootioo of hered ity (which is apparently calculated

using biological heredity) constitutes instead its foundation." After all, the
Latin term hereditas doesn't designate what is left to one's descendants at
the moment of death . It is only from 18 2 0 on that the word begins to be
applied by analogy to the area of the transmission of biological characteristics. Proof of this wW be found in the fact that the classic hereditary
mona rchy, whicb also refers to descent based on blood ("blue blood"),
doesn't depend on a genetic type of co nceptio r1, but rather on a juridical
protocol that responds to a determinate social order. Motivated less by
biology, the obligatio n of dynastic succession was also justified by argu men ts of a theological nature -the divine right of kings. In order for such
a process to be seculariud, however, we need to wait first for the birtb of
natural Jaw and positive law; not, however, withou t a d ifferent tradition inserting itself between the t\\'0, namely, that originating in Ca lvinism (whicb
reintroduces the idea of d ivi ne predestination that is applied to every ind ividual). What needs to be highlig hted is that post-Darwin ian hereditary
theory is situated exactly at. the po int of antinomic confluence between
these two trajectories; o n one side, it completely secularizes the dynastic
tradition of the aristocratic sort; on the other, it reproduces the dogma of
predestination in bio political terms. When the embryologist August Weismann defilles germinative plasma, he wW arrive at a singular form of "biological C.tlvinism'' according to wbich the desti ny of the living being is
completely preformed-naturally, with the variant that the so ul is not immortal, but rather blood, which is t ransmitted immuta bly through the
bodies of successive generations.
This line of reasoning is grafted on to the theory of degeneration until it
becomes its own presupposition: Oo the one baod, the degenerative process
spreads via tbe t ransm ission of hereditary characteristics. If blood tbat is
inherited canoot be modified geoeticaUy (according to the thea-biological
principle of germinative plasma), why then does the organic deficiency in crease exponen tially in the passage from father to so n, unt il o ne arrives at
sterility and the extinction of the hereditary line? On the other hand: if in
the space of a few generat ions dissolution is inevitable, why then should
one fear the phenomenon spread ing? The answer has to do with the idea
of contagion: degenerative pa thology doesn't only mu ltiply metonymicall)'
witJ1i n the same body in a series of interrelated d iseases, but spreads irresistibly from one body to the next. We can say tbat degeneration is always degenerat.ive. It reproduces itself in tensely and extends from inside to outside
122
ThanJtopolitics
and vice versa . Tb is contaminating power of an internal transmutation

a nd of a n external transposition is in fact its most characteristic feature.
For this to be so, it must follow that it is both hereditary and contagious,
which is to say contagious on the vertical level of lineage as well as on the
horizontal le,el of social communication. What creates the difficulty is
precisely this copresence: according to Weismann's law, if the germimltive
plasma cannot be modified, then it isn't susceptible to contagion. If instead it is a potenti.al vehicle for contami.nation (as the theory of expanded
dege neration wou ld have it.), th is shows that the genetic structure is not
unalterable. This logical difficu lty, which has p roduced some confusion
between contagious diseases (tuberculosis and syph ilis, for example) and
hereditary diseases, has been met by the intermediate thesis that the same
tendency to contract the disease {con.tfJgio} can be hereditary. Thus, the
external infection occurs t:ban ks to internal predisposition and tbe interna l
predisposition thanks to an external infection. That degeneration is spread
thwugh heredi.tary transmissi.oo or through contagion rnatters less. Jn any
case, what. counts is the construction of the immunitary apparatus intent
on blocking its advance. Some decades later, the illustrious German professors Fischer and Verschuer will split the re.search area in two: the first
will study the blood of different ethnic groups, the second tbe hereditary
lines of monozygote twins. Josef Mengele will produce the operative synthesis in his laboratory at Auschwitz.
Was such an outcome inevitable? Was it implicit in the logic of thecategory of degeneration? The answer isn't a simple yes. Bu t that it bas an immunitarian timbre is made evident by its explicitly reactive valence. Reactive,
however, doesn't necessarily mean reactionary. l am referring not o nly to
the important fact tha t many, who were not exponents of the Catholic
right as well as progressive and socialist authors, make reference to such a
category. What joins tbem all together fundamentally is tbe idea tbat degenerative pathology isn't. simply the negative result of progress, but that
one derives from the other. Not by chance the genesis of degenerative pathology is located in the years immediately following the French Revolution,
when natural selection begins to be weakened by a protective stance with
regard to the weakest parts of society. The classist connotation of such a line
of argument (when not racist) is clear. But that doesn't cancel out a series
of other vectors that seem to push the concept in the opposite d irection,
especially the conviction that a return to the past isn't possible (to simple,
nar.ural selection), but rather that one needs r.o have recourse r.o a ser ies of
Thnoato po litks 123
artificial interventions (in particular the hypothesis of an unavoidable

spread of the degenerative process in all social sectors and environments).
Born in a part, degeneration winds up involving the whole.lt is a global sickness that continually expands no t only among inferior races, but also among
superior ones. It is precisely the alleged connection with the dynamics of
moderni:;wtion - from industrial~lation to urbanization - that seems to
tie. it to the destiny of the bourgeois and intellectual classes.
As I noted, Lorobroso had insisted earlier on the mysterious a.nd worrying connectio n that exists between genius and madness: gen ius, insofar as
it is a deviation from the norm, is a soph isticated form of degenerative
neurosis. But it is the Hungarian doctor of jewish origin Maximilian Siidfeld, known to tbe larger public as Max Nordau, who more than any other
localizes degeneration in the intellectual sphere. In his book dedicated to
Entartrmg. Pre-Raphaelites, Parnassians, Nietzscheans, Zolians, lbsenians,
and so o n arc all included in this category-all assimilated on the typological level to those who "sat is!)' their insane instincts with the assassin's
knife or with the dynamite's fuse rather than with pen or paintbrush:'" It
is impossible not to see the thread that ties similar evaluatio ns with future
Nazi lucubrations with regard to dege.nerate art. The point I want to empbas~te will be fou nd in the fact that if all of modern art is declared to be
degen erate, then in corresponding fasbion this indicates that degeneration
has the same aesthetic nerv<tture as is presupposed in the same category of
"decadent ism."
That degeneration, on the other hand, isn't o nly negative-or better,
that it is a minus sign that can, from another point. of view, be tu rned into
a plus-comes across in a text that seems to move radically against it, but
iostead expresses an elemeot tba t was from tbe beginning lateot in the
concept. I am referring to Gina Ferrero Lombroso's I vantaggi delh1 degenerazione [The advan tages of degeneration ). After stating the prem ise that
"no clear line separates progressive characteristics from regressive characteristics in an imals, that is, degeneration from evolution ; she asks herself
"if many of the phenomena held to be degenerate are no t instead evolutionary, useful rather than damaging manifestations of the adaptation the bu man body makes to the conditions in which it lives."'' No t only, but Lombroso takes aoother step fonvard that places it in a particular arraogemeo t
tl1at lies wi.th iJl the immunitary paradigm. As was the case for Nietzsche i.n his
more radical stage, this doesn't actually have an exclusionary or neutralizing character, but rather assumes and valorizes the different, r.he dissimilar,
t24
ThanatopoHtks
and the abnormal inasmuch as they are innovative and transformative

powers of reality. Therefore, when Lombroso refers explicitly to the "immun ity produced by the diseases suffered," she can conclude that
the degenerates are those who fuel the sacred torch of progress; to them
is given the function of evolution o f c ivil ization. Like bacteria of fennen
tatio n, they assume the office of deco mposing and reconstructing insti~
tutions; the uses that they make of their time activate the material exchange
of this highly compkx organism that is human society."
This citation restores to degeneration all of the category's breadth as well

as its paradoxical characteristics. lt implies both the biological inalterability
o f being and its continual modification. Fixedness and movement, identity
and transformation, concentration and dissemination: all are extended along
a line that superimposes nature and society, conservation and innovation,
immun~tation and communication, and they seem to rebound against
themselves and to turn into their o pposi te, after which they once agai n return {riasssestarsi] to their initial coordinates. Tbey oscillate from the part
to the whole and back again . T he idea o f degeneration, which L~ broad
enough that it includes the entire civilized wo rld, at a certain poin t closes
around its own sacrificial object, drastically separating it from the healthy
type, push ing it toward a destiny of expu lsion and annihilation. More than
theor ies, however, artistic practices register this singular rotation of sense.,.
Already the Zolian cycle of Rougon-Macquart and the dramas of Ibsen, or
in Italy De Roberto's 1 view ! or Mastriani's l t'ermin, constitute a figurative
laboratory o f considerable expressive depth." But the works that, perhaps
more than any others, account for such a semamic. circuit are three texts
that follow one another in the short arc of a decade, namely, Robert Lou is
Stevenson's The Srrange Case of Doctor Jekyll and Mr. Hyde, The Picrure of
Dorian Gray by Oscar Wilde, and Bram Stoker's Dracula. The trajectory they
seem to follow moves away from superimposition to the progressive splitting
between light and shadow, health and sickness, and the norm and abnormality (all placed in a narrati,e frarnewOfk that calls forth in detail the degenerative syndrome that was moving across the society o f the time): from
the scenario of a degraded and tentacle-like metropolis to the paroxysmal
centrality of blood, to the battle to the death between doctor and monster.
What characterizes the three stories, however, is the gro,ving lag between
the intention of the protagonist and that of reality, which the texts both
h ide and allow to emerge. The more the protagonist wants to free bimself
from the degeneration that he carries within, p rojecting it outside himself,
Thnoatopolitks 125
the more the result is an excess of death that bursts on the scene, swallowing him up. Thus, in Stevenso n's text, Jekyll, a doctor in legal medicine,
attempts to immu nize himself from his own worst features through the
biochemical construction of another self. "And thus fortified, as I supposed
o n every side, 1 began to profit by the strange immun ities of my position:'"
But the alieo creature quickly escapes from the control of its crea tor and
takes possession of bis body. It is another, but genera ted by the ego aod so
destined to reenter there. A "he: an "animal;' a "brute:' which, however, is
impossible to isolate because he is one wi th himself, wi th his body, his
blood, and his flesh:'
This was the shocking thing .. . that that insurgent horror was knit to him
closer than a wife, closer than any eye; Jay caged in his flesh, where he heard
lt mutter and felt it stl'uggle to be born; and at every hour of v.:eak.ness. and
in the confidence of slurnber. prevailed against him and deposed hi m out
of life."
Cootwlled, kept, dorucsticated by ever larger doses of the arltidote, the

monstrous do uble (which is the same subject seen in back light) finally
gains the upper hand over him who has tried to dominate him and carries
him into the vortex. The degenerate is none other than the doctor himself,
both his shadow an d his ultimate truth . The o nly way to stop bim is to put
him to death /dargli Ia morte}, killing in the same act that self witb wbom
he always coincides.
Tn the second story, that of Wi lde, the divergence between self and o ther
is accentuated. The double is no longer within the body of the subject, as
was the case in Jekyll-Hyde, but is o bjectified in a portrait that both mirrors and betrays the o riginaL It is what degenerates in his place- every
time that be behaves in a debased way. Tbe detachment from the real, whicb
is to say from the constitutive alteration of the subject, is represented by the
pall wrapped arou nd tbe pain ting ii1 order to hide it from everyone. Th us,
the decay of the painted image-the projection of evi l (male} ou tside itself-keeps death at a distance, ensuri ng the immortality of the subject.
But, as in the previous case, the doubling cannot last for long. The mechanism breaks down and the image aga in assumes the face. T he painted degeneration is in reality his own: " Upon the walls of the lonely locked room
'"here he had spent so mucb of his boyhood , he had buog \vith his own
hands the terrible portrait whose changing features showed him the real
degradation of his We, aod ii1 front of it bad draped the purple-aod-gold
pall as a curtain:'" T he final blow that Dorian delivers to the "mo nstrous
<26 ThonotopoUtics
soul-life" inevitably returns to hit him, wbo has already been transformed
into the image of the monster.'' It is he who lies on the ground, dead "with
a knife in h is heart:'" The killing of death-the autoimmunitary dream o f
man-reveals itself once again to be illusory: it can't do anything except
reverse itself in the death of the same killer.
With Dn~cula the relationship between reality and its mythological representation moves decisively in favor of the latter. The forces of good appear
to be posed frontally against those of evil .i n a project of definitive immunization against disease. The demon is projected outside the mind r.bat has
created it. He encapsu lates in himself all of the characteristics of the
degenera te-he is no longe r the other in man, but the other from man
(dal/'uomo j. Both wolf, bat, and bloodsucker, he is above all the principle of
contamination. Not only does be live on the blood of others, b ut he reproduces by multiplying himself in h is victims. Just as in fu ture manuals of
racial hygiene, the ulti mate crime committed is the biological one of the
transm ission of infected blood. He carried co ntamination, namely, Transylvania, into London homes; he immersed the o ther in the same [uello
stessoj and consigned the same to the other. T he championing of contemporary degenerative theory is so absolute that the text cannot fail to cite
the relevant authors: "Tbe Count is a criminal and of criminal type. Nordau and Lombroso would so classify hin1.""' Just like tbe degenerate, he is
not a true man, but has human features. He doesn't bave an image, but
continually changes appearance. He is not a type but a countertype. He
belongs to the world of the "non" -no longer alive, be is still and above all
else "undead:' repulsed by life and by death into an abyss that cannot be
bridged. He is an already dead, a half dead, a living dead, just as other vampires some fifty years later will be designated with the yellow star on their
arms. His killing, with a stake through the beart and the bead cu t off, has
the characteristics of sah,ific death that will be shortly en larged liberally to
include millions of "degenerates." To p ut an end to the "man that was;' to
that "carnal and unspiritual appearance:' to the "foul Thing:' means freeing not on ly those whom he threatens, but also himself, giving h im finally
back to that death to which he belongs and wh ich he carries within him
without being a ble to taste it:'s
But of the most blessed of aU, when this now Un-Dead be made to rest
as true dead, then the soul of the poor lady whom we low sbaU again be
free ... So that, my friend, it will be a blessed hand for her that shall strike
the blow that sets her free: 10
Thanatopolirics 127
Eugen ics
The eugenics movement wi ll take u p the task of translati ng these kinds of
literary hallucinations into reality; the movement will flare up in the opening years of the 1900s as a p urifying fire across the entire Western world
(countered only by the Catholic. church and the Soviet Lissenkim):" With
respect to the theory of degeneration and its folds <llld in ternal antinomies,
eugenics marks both a positive resu lt and a sharp reduction in complexity.
We need o nly d(aw the necessary conclusions: if civilized peoples are exposed
to progressive degeneration, the on ly way to save them is by reversing the
direction of the process that is under way, to remove what produces th e
disease that corrupts it so as to reinstate it in the ho rizon of goodness,
health, and perfection. The substitution of the posithe prefix "eu" witb
that of the negative "d e" directly expresses this reconstructive intention .
But the simplicity of the move doesn't explain a dua l dislocation, abo,e all
from the descriptive level (where we find degenerative semantics) to that of
the prescriptive. What was ur1derstood as a given or a process becomes witl1
eugenics a project and a p rogram of intervention; consequenr.ly, it. moves
from nature to artifice. While d egeneration remains a natural phenomenon, completely with in the sphere of bios, the eugenic procedure is characterized by the technical {tunica/, which is certainly applied to life, but in
a form that intends precisely to modify spontaneous development. In truth,
the discourse of eugenics (more thao that of nature as such) declares that it
wants to correct procedures that ha1c negatively influcnc.cd the course o f nature.lt begins with those social institutions and with those protective practices with regard to individuals who are biologically speaking inadequate
with respect to natural selection (and which, if left to its own d evices, natural selection wou ld eliminate) . The thesis ''ariously repeated in all the texts
in question is that artificial selection has no other purpose than that of restoring a natu ral selection that has been weakened or o uUified by compensatory
mechanisms of the humanitarian sort. But is it really the idea of an artificial
reconstruction of the natu ral order that constitutes the problem-how to
rehabilitate nature through artifice or how to apply artifice to nature without denaturalizing it? The only way to do so successfu lly is to adjust p reventively the idea of nature to the artificial model with which nature wants
to restore itseiJ~ rejecting as unnatural all that doesn't conform to the model.
However, the negative that was to be neutralized now reappears: to affinn
a good genos means negating wbat negates it from within. Th is is the reason
that a positive euge nics (from the work of Francis Galton o n), directed to
JZ8 Thonatopolitics
improving tlte race, is always accompanied by a negative eugenics, one designed to im pede the diffusion of dysgen ic exemplars. And yet, where would
the space for increasing the best exemplars be found if not in the space produced by the elimination o f the worst?
The concept of "racial hygiene" constitutes the median point of th is
categorica l passage. It represents not only tlte German translation of tlte
eugenic orien tation, but sometlting tbat discloses its essential nervation .
We can trace a signi.licaot con fionatioo of th e change in course in Wil helm
Schallmayer's essay, Vererbrwg und Auslese im Lebenslauf der Volker: Eiue
staatswissenschaftlich Studie auf Grund der ueueren Biologic [Heredity a nd
selection in the vital development of nations A social a nd scientific study
based on recent biology]:" If we keep in mind tha t the same a utho r bad
written a book some years earlier, dedicated to treating the degeneration of
civilized nations, we can clearly see the move that German political science
makes vis-a-vis biology." Tt is true that Schalhnayer doesn't adop t Aryan
racism, as was the case with Ludwig Woltman n io a contemporary piece
titled Politische Authropologie.50 But this makes the biopolitical approach that
it inaugurates even more important. Contrary to every hypothesis put forward by the democratic left fo r social reform, the power of the state is tied
directly to the biological health of its members. By this it is understood
that the vital interest of the nation resides in increasing tbe strongest and
cbecking, in parallel fasbion, the weak o f body and of mind . Tbe defense
of the national body requires the removal of its sick parts. Jn h is intl uential
manual Rasseuhygiene, Alfred Ploetz bad furnished the most pertinent key
for understanding the meaning o f the transformation u nd er way: race and
life are synonymous to the degree in which the first immunizes the second
'"ith regard to the poisons that th reaten it.' ' Born from tbe s!Iuggle of
cells aga inst infectious bacteria, life is now defended by the state against
every possible con tamination. Racial bygiene is the iomlUnitary therapy that
aims ar. preventing or extirpating the pathological agen ts that jeopardize
the biological quality of future generations.
What is sketched here is a radical transformatio n of the notion of politics itself, at least in the modern sense of the exp ression. As was the case
with Francis Galton, but still more in Karl Pearson's biomet rics, politics
appears to be pressed among the fields of mathematics, economics, and
bio logy. The politi.cal choices of national organ isms are to be derived rigid ly
from a calculation of the productivity of humao Life with regard to its costs.
If it is possible to quantify the biological capital o f a nation on the basis o f
Th3na10pOlilicS
l29
the vital qualities of its members, tbe division into zones of different value
will be inferred. Nevertheless, it would be a mistake to take such a value in
an exclusively economic sense. If this seems to prevail in the Anglo-Saxon
and Scandinavian matrices of eugenics, it doesn't in the German case. Certainly, the reference to a differential calculus between c.osts and revenues
isn't Jacking there either, but it is always subordinated to a more profound
and underlying difference relative to the typology of human life as such. It
isn't mao that is valued ou the basis of his econom ic productivity, but ceonomic productivity that is measured in proportion to the h uman type to
wh ich it per tains. This helps to account for the extraordinary developmen t
of anth ropo logy in Germany in the closing decades of the nineteen th in to
the first half of the following century, culminating in the 1930S and 1940s,
which saw So percent of all anthropo logists in Germany join the National
Socialist party. It wasn't by chance that Vacher de Lapouge wrote in bis Essais
d'Anthroposociologie o n Race et milieu soci1li that "the revolution that bacterio logy has produced in medicine, anthropology is about to produce in the
political sciences.;2 What is at sr.ake, even before its socioeconomic implicatio ns, is the definition of the human generally and its internal thresholds.
The distinction between races, both superior and inferior, more and less
pure, already constitutes the first intraspecies clivage, apparently confirmed
by Ludwik Hirszfeld and Karl Laodsteiner's coo temporary discovery of
different blood groups: rather tha n being the representative of one gen us,
the anthropos is the container of radically diverse biotypologies that move
from the superman {Aryan) to the an ti-man {Jew), passing through the
average man {Mediterranean} and the subhu man {Slavic}." But what matters more is the relation between such a clivage within the human race and
'"bat is situated outside with regard to others. In this sense, German anthropology worked closely with zoology on the one hand and botany on the
other: man is situated in a line with diverse quali tative levels that include
both plan ts and animals. Up to this point., nevertheless, we still remain
within the con fines of a classic evolutio nist model. The new element that
brings matters to a head lies, however, in the superin1position that progressively occurs when distinguishing muong the various species - in the sense
that one appears contemporaneo usly outside and inside the o ther. From
here a do uble and crisscrossed effect: on the one side, the projection of established huruan types i.n the botanical and zoological "catalog"; on tl1e other,
the incorporation of particular ao imal and vegetable species withllt the
human race. In particular th is second step explains not only the growing
130 ThanatopoHtks
fortune of anthropology, but also the otherwise incomprehensible circumstance that Nazism itself never renounced the category of humanitas, on
which it awarded the maximum nonnative importance. More than "bestializing" man, as is commonly thought, it "anthropologized" the an imal,
enlarging the definition of fwthropos to the po int where it also comprised
animals of inferior species.'' He who was the object of persecution and
extreme violence wasn't simply an animal (which indeed was respected
and protected as such by one of the most advanced pieces of legislation
of the entire world), but was an animal-man: man in the animal and the
animal in man. This explains the tragically paradoxical circumstance that
in November 1933-which is to say some years before Doctor Roscher conducted experiments on the compatib ility of h uman life with the pressure
at twelve tho usand meters high or with immersion in freezing water-the
regime promu lgated a circu lar that prohibited any kind of cruelty to animals, in particular with reference to cold, to heat, and to the inocu lation
of pathogenic germs. Conside6Jlg the zeal with which the Nazis respected
their own laws, this means that if those interned in the extermination camps
had been considered to be only animals, they would have been saved. After all,
in January 1937, Hinunler expressed himself in similar terms when addressed
the officers of the Wehrmacht: "I recently saw a seventy-two-year-old mao
who had just committed his seventy-third crime. To give the name animal
to such a man wou ld be offensive to the animal. Anima ls don't behave in
such a fashion:'" lt isn't surprising that in August 1933, when Goring an nounced an end to "the unbearable torture and suffering in an imal experiments;' he wen t so far as to th reaten to send to concentration camps
"those who still th ink they can treat animals as inanimate property.;
Garland E. AUen notes bow American eugenics, which was the most advanced at the beginning of tbe twentieth century, bad its start in agriculture."
lts first organization was born of the collaboration between the American
Breeders Association,the Minnesota Agricultural Station, and the School of
Agriculture at Cornell Un iversity. Charles B. Davenport, the same Davenport
who is considered to be the father of the discipline, had earlier attempted
to form an agricultural company under tbe direction of tbe department of
zoology at the Unhersity of Chicago in which Mendelian theories were to
be experimented on domestic animals."' Subsequently, he turned to the
Carnegie Foundation i.n Washington to finance a series of experiments on the
hybridization and selecti011 of plaots. Finally, in 1910, with funds awarded
him by the Harri man and Rockefeller families, he created a new center of
Thaoalopolitics 131
generic experimentation, the Eugenics Records Office ar Cold Spring Harbor, which was comm itted to th e study of heredity in humans. The huge
success of these initiatives is largely indicative of the relation that eugenics
instituted between human beings, animals, and plants. Moreover, the periodicals bo rn in that context, in particular The American Breeders' Magazine,
The journal of Heredit)'. and Eugenical News, ord ina rily published works in
which one moved from the selection of cb ickens and pigs to the selection
of h umans without posi ng the question of conti nuity between tbem. If a
farmer or a breeder wants to enco urage a bet.ter reprod uctio n of vegetables
and rabbits, or co nversely, wants to block a defective stock, why, the exponents of the new science asked, shou ld it be any different with man? In
1892, Charles Richet, vice president of the Frencb Eugenics Society and fu ture Nobel Prize winner (in 1913) , prophesized that qu ite soon "one will no
longer simply be content to perfect rabb its and pigeons but will try to perfect humans."' When , some decades later, Walther Darn', Reich M.i.n ister
for Nutrition wil l advise Himmler to "transfer his attention from the
breeding of herbs and the raising of chickens to human beings;'"' Richet's
pro phecy will be realized. Even in their t itles, two books published a year
apart, Maurice Bo igey's J:elel'age huma.in and Charles Binet-Sangle's I.e
haras hrmJain, give the sense of the general inclination of anthropological
discourse toward zoo logy, or better, toward the ir complete overlapp ing."
"Let us consider coldly the fact tbat we consti tute ;t species of anima l;'
exhorts Doctor Valentino, "and from the moment that our race is accused
of degenerating, let's attempt to apply some principles of breeding to its
improvement: let's regulate fecundation."' Vacher de Lapo uge had already
included in his project of Selections socia.les the services of a "rather restricted
group of absolutely perfect males."., But the most faithfu l actualization of
what just Sicard de Plauzoles called "human zootechnics" was certainly the
organization Lebensborn, o r "fon t of life," wh ich was founded by Himmler
in 1935. In order to augment the productio n of perfect Aryan exemplars,
severa l thousa nd babies of Ge rman blood were kidnapped from their respective families in the occupied territories and entrusted to the care of
the regime.
lf"positive" eugen ics was directed to the sou rces of life, negative eugenics (wbich accompanies the positi,e as its necessary condi tion) rests on
the same terrain. Certainly, it was vigilan t wheo it came to all the possible
cbanoels for degenerative contagion: from tbe area of immigration to that
of matrimony, which were regulated by ever more d rastic norms of racial
132 Thanatopolilk.s
homogeneity. But "the most significant point ... in its bio-sociological

weig ht;' as one Italian eugen icist expressed it, remained that of sterilization.' In addition, segregation was understood less as the restriction o f
personal freedom and more as the elimination of the possibility of procrea tion, as a sort of form of sterilization at a distance. It was no coincidence
that several "feeble-minded" were given the choice between being segregated
and being sterilized. The latter is the most radical modality of immunization because it intervenes at the root, at tbe o d ginary point in which li fe is
spread {si comunica}. It blocks life not in a ny moment of its developmen t
as its killer but in its own rising up-impeding its genesis, prohibi ting life
from giving life, devitalizing life in advance. It might seem paradoxical wanting to stop degeneration (whose final resu lt was sterility) through sterilization, if such a n antinomy, the nega tive doubling of the negative, wasn't an
essential part, indeed the very basis of the immunitary logic itself. Therefore, on the question of steri lization the eugenicists never gave in a nd the
Nazis made a tlagship out of tbeir own bio-thanatology. Certainly, crim inals were already being castrated in 1865, but what was then considered
above all else to be a punishment becomes something quite different with
the development of the eugenics obsession. It concerned the principle according to wh ich the political body had to be vaccinated beforehand from
every disease that could alter the self-preserving function. Carrie Buck, a
girl from Virgini<l who was sentenced to be sterilized after baving been
judged (like her mother) "weak in the mi nd" {debo/e di melltef, appealed
her case to the County Co urt, the Court of Appeals, and finally to the
Supreme Court. She charged that. her rights had been violated under the
fourteenth Amendment (according to which no state shall deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property without d ue process of law) . Justice
OJi,er Wendell Holmes, a eugenicist, rejected her appeal, however, for the
following reasons:
It is bcmr for all the world, if instead of waiting to execute degenerate
offspring for crime, or to let them st<Hvc for their imbecility, society can
prevent those who are manifestly unfit from contin uing tbeir kind. T he
principle tbat sustains compulsory vaccination is broad enougb to cover
cuttiJ1g the Fallopian tubes . . . Three gen.eratiOllS of im beciles are eno ugh '
Defined as "poor white trasb;' tbe girl was sterilized together witb another
8,300 citizens ofVirginia.
If the first immunitary procedure o f eugenics is sterilization, euthanasia
constitutes the last (in the ultimate meaning of t.he expression). In a bio -
Thanatopolilics 133
political lexicon turned into its opposite , a "good" birth or nonbirth can not but correspond to a "good" death. Attention among scholars has recently
been directed to the book, p ublished in 1920 by the ju rist Karl Bin ding
and by the psychiatrist Alfred Hoche, with the title Die Freigabe der Vernichtung lebensunwerten Leben (The a uthorization of the destruction of
life uowortby of W'e[.67 But such a text, which seems to ina ugu rate a new
genre, is already the result of an itine.rary that ends (at least in Germa ny)
in another work tbat is rw less significant. l am speaking about Adolph
lost's essay Das Recht auf den Tod [The right to die ], which twenty-five
years earlier first introduced the concept o f negativen Lebenswert, which is
to say "life without value" {which was replaced with the right to end life in
the case of an incurable disease) . Yet the difference (also with respect to
Anglo-Saxon eugen ics) is the progressive shift of such a right from the
sphere of the individual to that of the state. Wh ile tbe fi rst preserves the
right/obligati on to receive death, only the seco nd possesses the right to
give it. Where the bealtb of the political body as a whole is at stake, a Life
that doesn't. conform to those interests must be available for termination.
f urthermore, as )ost asks, doesn't this already happen in the case of war,
when the state exercises its right to sacrifice the lives o f its soldiers for the
common good? T he new element here with respect to an argument tbat at
bottom is traditional lies in the fact that it isn't so m uch that medical killing
falls un der the e<Hegory of war as that war comes to be inscribed in a biomedical vision in wh ich euthanasia e merges as an integral part.
ln relatio n to this framework, Binding and Hache's essay nevertheless
signals a categorical opening that is anything but irrelevan t, not only on
the level of quantity (from the momen t that the incu rably ill, as well as the
mentally retarded and deformed babies are added as potential o bjects of
eu thanasia), but also oo the level of argumenl<ltion. From this point of view
one might say that the jurid ical and biological competencies that the two
a uthors represen t achieve an even greater integration, wh ich makes t.he one
not. on ly the formal justification b ut also the content of the other. It is as if
the right/obligation to die, rather than falling from on high in a sovereign
decision on the body of citizens, springs from thei r own vital makeup. In
order to be accepted, death must not appear as the negation but rather as
the natu ral outcome of certain cond itions of life. In this way, if Binding
is COJlCerned abou t guaranteeing th e legal posi tion of doctors engaged in
euthanasia through a com plex procedure of asking for the consen t of those
who have been judged incapable o f giving it, Hoche avo ids the thorny
134
Thanotopolitic.s
j urid ical q uestion tnanks to purely biological criteria: that deatn is juridically
irreproachable not so much because it is j ustified by more pressing collective demands, but beca use the persons whom it strikes are alrrudy dead.
The meticulous lexical research of those expressions that correspond to their
dim inished situation-" half-men; "damaged be ings," "mentally dead;'
"empty h um<>n husks'' (Leere-Menschetthulsen), "human ballast" (Ballastexistenzen)- has precisely tbe objective of demonstr<>ting tha t in their
case death does uot come fwrn outside, because fwru tbe beg ion ing it is
part of those lives-or, more precisely, o f these existences because that is
the term that follows from the subtraction of life from itself. A life in habited by death is simply flesh , an existence without life. Th is is the exact title
of film that will later be made in order to instruct person nel working on
T4, the Nazi euthanasia program: Daseitt ol!ne Leben (Existence without
life). Moreover, Hitler himself bad juxtaposed existence and life according
to an explicit hierarchy of values: "From a dead mechan ism wh ich on ly lays
claim to existence for i.ts own sake, there must be formed a living organ ism
with the exclusive aim of serving a h igher idea!:' Existence for the sake of
existence, simple existence is dead life or death that lives, a flesh withou t
body. In ord er to unravel the apparently seman tic tension that is present in
the title of Binding and Hache's book, that of a " life unworthy of life;' one
need ooly substitute "existence" for the first term . The books are immedia tely ba lanced: the life unworthy of life is existen ce deprived of life - a life
reduced to bare [nuda/ existence.
The in terval of value between existence and life is verified most clearly
in a correlated d oubling o f the idea o f human ity. We know the differen t
q ualitative thresholds introduced in the notion of hum anity by the German
a nth ropology of the period: ltumanitas is extended to the point of containin g within it someth ing that doesn't belong to it and indeed essen tially
negates it. Now, such a variety of anthropic typologies demands an analo gous differentiation in the behavior of those to whom it. might. refer from a
no rmative poin t of view. lt isn't ethically human to refer to diverse types of
people /'uomo} in the same manner. Binding an d Hoche had previously cautioned against "a swollen conception of h uman ity" and "an overevaluation
o f the value of life as such:'' 0 But against such a concept o thers offered a
d ifferent and loftier notion of humanity, not only i.o relation to the collective body weakened by the u np roductive weight o f those of lesser worth
(Minderwertigen), but also to these latter ones. It was with this in m ind,
with the T 4 Program in fu ll operation, that Professor Lenz declared that
Thanatopolitics 135
"detailed discussion of so-called euthanasia . . . can easily lead to confusion

about whether or not we are d eali ng with a matter which affects the safeguarding of ou r hereditary endowment. I sho uld like to prevent any such
discussion. For, in fact, this matter is a purely humanitarian problem!'"
Furthermore, Len z did nothing other than fully express a reason ing that
had beeo made loog before. Tha t e uthanasia was defined as Gnadenrod,
"mercy killing;' "a death with pity; or "misericordio us" - which, according to Italian eugenicist Enrico Morsell i, comes from "misericord," the
short-bladed knife used at one time to put an end to the sufferi ng of the
dyi ngis the result of the conceptual inversion that makes the victi m
himself the beneficiary o f his own elimination .12 With birth constitu ting
his illness, tha t is to say the fact of being born against tbe will of nature,
the on ly way to save the defective person from such a subhuman condition
is that of hand ing hirn over to death and thereby liberating biro from ao
inadequate and oppressive life. For th is reason, the book that immediately
follows Bind ing and Hache's text has as its title Die Er/Osurrg der Menschheir tom Elerrd [The liberation of hu manity fro m suffering )." "Free those
who cannot be cured" was also the invocation on which the film Existerrce
without Life concluded . ln France, where state-sponsored euthanasia was
never effectively pwctked, Binet-Sangle, in his I.:tlrt de mourir suggests
carrying out the final delivery from pain tb rougb gas by injecting morphine tbat will transport the beneficiary to the fi rst level of "beatitude;'
wh ile Nobel Pr ize win ner Richct holds that those ki lled mercifully do not
suffer and that, if they were to consider it on ly briefly, they would be grateful to those who saved them from the embarrassment o f living a defective
life ." Even befo re then, Doctor Antoine Wylm had warned:
IF)or such beings that are incapable of a conscious and tr uly human life,
death has less suffering than life. I realize there isn't a good probability that
I will be heard. As for euthanasia, which I consider to be mo ral. many will
object with a thousand arguments in which " "'son will not pky any role
whatsoever, but in which tltc most intantilc sentimenta1ism wiU be freely
bandied about. Let us wait for the opportune moment."
Genocide
Tbat moment arrived in the opening mooths of 1939, \vhen Karl Brandt,
Hitler's trusted personal physicia n, was g iven the responsibili ty together
with Phil ipp Bo ubler, the head o f the Reich Chancellery, for beginning
the process of euthan asia on children younger than three years of age who
J36 Thonatopolitics
were suspected of having "serious hereditary illnesses; such as idiocy, mongolism, microcephalia, idrocephalia, malformations, an d spastic conditions.
The ground had been meticulously prepared by the diffusion of fi lms o n
the condition o f the subhuman lives of the disabled, such as Das Erbe
(Heredity) , Opfer der Vegangwheit (Victim of the past), and lch klage an (1
accuse) . The occasion fo r such steps was the request made to Hi tler to
a utho rize the killing of a baby by the name of Knauer, who was blind a nd
was missing a leg and an ann. just as soon as "rncrcy" was ber1evolcntly
acco rded him, a Reich's Committee was founded for assessing hereditary
a nd serious congen ital diseases, headed by Hans Hefelman n (who in fact
had a degree not in medicine b ut in agricultural economics). Together with
the committee a series of centers were set up, which were identified as "Institutio ns o f Special Pedia trics" or even "Thera peutic Institutions of Convalescence;' \vhere thousands o f children were killed by verna l injection or
with lethal doses o f morphine a nd scopola mine.
In October of the same year tbe decree was extended to adu lts as well
and given the name T4 Program (from the add ress Tiergarten 4 in Berlin).
The fact that the decree was backda ted to the outb reak of the Second
World War is the most obvio us sign of the thanatopolitical character o f
Nazi biopolitics as well as the bio political character of modem war. Only
in war can one kill witb a therapeu tic aim in mind , namely, the viral salvation of one's own people. Moreover, the p rogram of eu thanasi<t extended
also geogr aph ically with the Eastern advance o f German troops. Between
1940 and 1941, the Polish camps of Chelmno, Belzec, Sobib6r, and Trehlinka
joined the six principal centers of eliminat ion in Germany: Hartheim, Sonnensteim, Grafeneck, Bernburg, Brandenburg, and Hadamar.ln the meantime, with tbe expansion o f"special trea tmen t" to include prisoners or war,
the T4 p roject (which was still bein g implemented by doctors) was taken
over by Operation l4tl3 (from the reference n um ber in the documents of
the Camp Inspectorate). This too main tained its medical o utlook, b ut. n ow
answered directly to the SS. lt was also the point of passage to outrigh t extermination: on january 20, in the so-called Wannsee conference that had been
called by Rein hard Heydric.h, the final solution was decided for all Jews.
That is what is defined as "genocid e: From the momen t when Raphael
Lemkin, a professor of in ternational law at Yale Un iversity, coined it in 1944,
the term has continued to elicit discussion (and doubt).76 Formed from
a hybrid between the Greek root genos aod the Latin suffix dda (from
caedere), the word quickly found itself linked to similar, tho ugh no t identical,
l hanato po litic:s 137
concepts, primarily that of "ethnocide" and "crimes against h uman ity: The
result was a knot that was difficult to un tie. What distinguishes the collective
killing of the genos from that of etlmos? Is it the same th ing when oppressors
speak of"people" o r of"race"' And what is the relatio n between the crime o f
genocide and that conceived in relation to the entire human species? An
o ther difficulty of tbe historica l va rie ty w<~s added to t:b is 6 rst terminological problem. From the moment the subject of genocide is always a state
a nd that every state is the creator of its own laws, it is d ifficu lt for the state
that commits genocid e to fu rnish a legal definition of the crime that it itself has committed. That said, scho lars do concur that in o rder to be able
to speak about genocide, the following min im u m co nditions must be met:
(r) that there exists a d eclared in ten tion of the pa rt of the sovereign state
to kill a homogeneous group of persons; (z) that such killing is potentially
complete, that is, involves all its members; and (3) t:bat such a group is killed
insofar as it is a gwup, not for econ omic o r political motives, but rather
because of its bio logical constitution. It is clear that the genocide o f the
Jews on the part of the Nazis meets all these criteria . Still, r.o define the
specificity of it is ano ther matter, one that conce rns the symbolic and
material role o f medicine to which we have so often drawn atten tion here:
it involves the therapeutic p urpose that is assigned to extermination fro m
the begirUling. Its im plementers were convin ced tbat on ly extermination
could lead to the renewal of the German people. As emerges from the
pervasive use of the term Genesuug 01ealing) with regard to th e massacre
in progress, a singular logical and semantic chain lin ks degeneration, regeneration, and genocid e: regeneratio n overcomes degeneration th rough
gen ocide.
All tbose authors who bave implicitly or explicitly insisted on the bio
poli tical cha racterization of Nazism converge a round this thesis: it is the
growing implication between politics and life that introduces into the latter
the normative caesura between those who need t.o live a nd those who need
to die. What the immun itary paradigm adds is the recognition of the
homeopathic tonality that Nazi therapy assumes. The disease against which
the Nazis fight to the death is none o ther than death itself. Wha t they want
to kill in the Jew and in all human types like them isn't life, but the presence
in life of death: a life that is already dead because it is marked heredi tarily
by an o riginal and irremediable d eformation; the contagion of the German people by a part of li fe inhabited and oppressed by deatb. Tbe only
way to do so seemed t.o be to accelerate the "work of the negative: namely,
138
Thanotopolitic~
to take upon oneself tbe na tural or divine task of lead ing to death the life
o f those who had already been p romised to it. In this case, death became
both the object and the instru ment of the cu re, the sickness and its remedy. This explains the cult of the dead that marked the entire brief life o f
the Reich: the force to resist the mortal infection that th reatened the chosen race could only come from de;td ancestors. Only they cou ld transmit
to their descendants the courage. to give or to receive a p urifying death in
relation to tlta t otber dcatb that grew like a poisorw us fungus in the soil of
Germany and t.be West.. It was this that the SS swore in a solemn pledge
that seemed to correspond to the nature and the destiny of the German
people. A response was needed to the presence of death in life (this was degenenttion) by tempering life on the sacred fire of death: giving deatb to a
death that bad assumed the form of life and in this way bad invaded life's
e''ery space. It was this insidious and creeping dea th that needed to be
blocked with the aid o f the saving Great Death bequeathed by the German
heroes. Thus, the dead become both the infectious germs and the im.rnu nitary agents, the enemies to be extinguished and the protection to be activated.
Con fined to this do uble death an d its infinite do ubling, Nazism's immun itary mach ine wound up smashed [ingrana.ggij. It strengthened its own immu n itary apparatus to the point of remaining victim to it. Tbe only way
for ao indiv idual or collective o rganism to save itself defin itively from the
risk of death is to die. It W<lS what Hitler asked the German people to do
before he committed suicide.
If th is was in general terms the deadly logic of the Nazi event liceudaj,
what were its decisive arr.iculatio ns and its principal immunitary disposirifs?
I would indicate essentially three. Absolute normativization of life constitutes
tbe first. In it we can say that the rwo semantic vectors of immunity, tbe biological and the juridical, for tbe fi rst time are completely superintposed according to tbe double register of the biologization of the 11omos an d simu lta neously rhat of the juridicalizatio n of bios. We have already seen the growth
o f the influence of biology, and in particular of medicine, which took place
in all of the ganglions of individual and collective experience during those
years. The doctors who had enjoyed grea t authority and prestige in Wilhelm in ian a nd Weimar Germany became mo re powerful in areas that bad
to that point been reserved for o ther eltpertises. ln particular, their presence
was made felt in courtrooms, where tltey accompan ied (an d in some cases
surpassed) the magistrates in the application of restrictive and repressive
no rms. For example, when selecti ng individuals r.o undergo sterilization,
Thaoatopolitics 139
the legal commission, as well as the court of appeals, were composed of a

judge and two doctors. T he more the categories subjected to review were
widened to include the practically un limited field of racial deformities and
social deviance, the more the power of medicine grew together with that of
psychiatrists and anthropologists. The Nuremberg laws on citizenship and
on the "protection of blood and the honor of the German people" fu rther
strengthened the position and power of medical doctors. When tbe programs
of euthanasia fina.lly begar1 ar1d the coocentration camps came into operation, doctors became those priests of life and of death I spo ke of earlier' '
This fi rst side of the immu nitary logic, which is attributable to the bio logization of Jaw [diritto/, need not, however, o bscure the othe.r side of the
coin, which is to say the ever more extensive ju ridical (an d therefore political) control of medicine. The more, in fact, the docto r was transformed into
a public functionary, tbe more he lost autonomy with respect to the st ate
ad ministration o n wh ich , in the final analysis, he wou nd up depending.
What was uoder way, in short, was a clear-cut transfo rmation of the relation between patient, doctor, and state. Wh ile the relation between the first
two terms was loosened, that of the second two was tightened. In the moment in which the cu re (and before that still the diagnosis) was no longer a
private but a public function, the doctor's responsibility was no longer
exercised in relation to those wbo were sick, but ratber to the state, the sole
(and also secret) depository for archiving the cond itions of tbe patient
that befo re had been reserved fOf medicine. It is as if the role of the subject
passed from the sick (who by now had become the simple object of biological defin ition and not. of healing) to doctors, and from them in time to
the state institution." On the one hand, and as proof of this progressive
consignment, the 1935 racial laws were no t prepared by a committee of
experts, as they bad been the preced ing year, but rather, directly by political person nel. Oo th.e other hand, if the regulations on he reditary disease
still required a semblance of scientific judgment on the part of doctors,
those concerni ng racial discrimination were assigned by pure chance. More
than reflecting d ifferent bio logical caesuras within the population, they
created them out of nothing. Doctors did nothing else except legitimate
decisions with their signatures that had been made in the political sphere
and tra nslated into laws by the new legal codes of the Reicb. Th us, a political
juridicalization of the biological sphere corresponded to a bio logization of
the space that before had been reserved for juridical science.'9 To capture the
essence of Nazi biopo litics, one must never lose sight of the interweaving
140
Thanatopolitics
of the two phenomena. It is as if medical power a nd political-ju ridical

power are mu tually superimposed over each other through alternat ing
points that are ultimately destined to completely overlap: this is precisely
the claim that life is supreme, which provokes its absolu te subordination
to politics.
The concentration and later the extermination camps constitute the
most symptomatic figu re of such a chiasm us. T he term "extermina tion"
(from extermilwre) already refers to a terminological leak, just as the word
elim ination alludes t.o a moving beyond the th resho ld that. the Ro mans referred to as limes. Naturally, the structu rally aporetic character of the camp
resid ed in the fact that the "ou tside" o r "beyond" were constituted in the
form of an " inside" so "concen tra ted " as to make impossible any hope of
escape. It is precisely insofar as it was "o pen" with respect to the closed
model of tbe prison tbat the camp was proven to be forever sea led off.
Closed, o ne would say, from its own open ing, just as it is desti ned to be in terned from its owo exteriority. Now, such an obv iously self-con trad i.cting
condition is nothing o ther than the exp ression of the indistinction tha t
emerges between the horiw n of life and that o f Jaw that has been completely
politicized. Grabbing ho ld directly of life (or better, its fo rmal dimension) ,
law cannot be exercised b ut in the name of something tha t simultaneously
makes it absolu te and suspends it. Against the common conviction that the
Nazis limited themselves to tbe destructio n of the law, it is to be said instead
that they extended it to the point of including within what also ob,,io usly
exceeded it. Main taining that they were remO\'ing life from the biological
sp here, they placed all aspects of life u nder the command of the norm. If
the concentration camp was certain ly not the place of Jaw, neither was it that
of mere a rbitrary acts. Rather, it was the antinomical space in which what
is arbitrary becomes legal and the law arbitrary. In its material constitution,
the camp reinstates the most extreme form of the immunitary negation, oot
o nly because it definitively superimposes the procedures of segregation,
sterilization, and euthanasia, bu t also because it antic ipates all that could
exceed the d eadly outcome. Ordered to lock up the perpetrators of crimes
that hadn't yet been committed (and therefo re were not p rosecu table on
the basis o f Jaws in force), t he camp is con fig ured as a form o f Schutzlwftlager ("preventive detention"), as was written above the entrance to Dacha u.
What was detained in advance, which is to say what is completely lacking
{destituire}, was life as such, subjected to a oorma tive presupposition that
left no way out.
ThanatopolilicS 141
Nazism's secood immunitary dispositifis tbe double enclosure of the bod)',

that is, the enclosing of its own closure. It is what Emmanuel Levinas
defined as the absolute identity between our body and ourselves. With respect to the Christian conception {but also differently from Car tesian trad ition), all dualism between the ego {io} and body collapses. They coincide
in a form th<lt doesn't allow for any distinction: the body is no longer only
the place but the essence of the. ego. In th is sense, one can well say that "the
biological, with tbe noti.on of inevitabili ty it entails, becomes more than ao
object of spiritual life . It becomes its heart:' We know the role that the
theory of the transmission of germin ative plasma played in th is conception and, incidental to that, of psychosomat ic heredity: man is completely
defined by the past that be carries and tbat is reproduced in the contin uity
between generations. The terms used by Levinas of "enchan tment" (enchainement) and of a "nailing" (fttre rive) with reference to one's biological
be ing give the mater ial sense of a grip from wh ich one cannot escape."
Wbeo faced with it, it behooves us to accept it as both destiny and responsibility rather than trying vain ly r.o break free . And that is r.rue both for the
one whose destiny is to be condemned unremittingly (wh ich is to say the
inferior man) and for the o ther who recogn izes in it the mark of a proclaimed superiority. In any case, it's a matter of adhering to that natuwJ
layer from wh ich one cannot escape. This is what is meant by double eo closure: Nazism assumes the biological given as the ultimate truth because
it is the basis on the strength of which everyone's li fe is exposed to the
ultimate alternative between contin uation and interruption .
This doesn't mean that ir. resolves itself in an absolute materialism to be
identified entirely in a radicalized version of Darwin ian evolution. Although
the propensity of sucb a sort did in point of fact exist, it '"as accompanied
and complicated by another tendeocy in wh ich some have wanted to see a
sort of spiritual racism, represented, for example, in Roseoberg's positioo.
In reality, these two lines are anyth ing but in contradiction because from
the very start they share a tange ntial point. In none of the writings of its
theoreticians does Nazism deny what is commo nly defined as "so ul" or
spirit-only it made out of tbese the means not to open the body toward
transcendence, but rather to a further and more defi nitive enclosing. In
this sense, the soul is the body of the body, the eoclosing of its closing,
what from a subjective point of view binds us to our objective imprisonment. It is the point of absolute coincidence of the body with itself, the
consummation of every interval of differe nce wi thin, the impossibility of
14 2
Tha natopo Htk s
a ny transcend ence." In this sense, mo re th.ao a reduction of bios to zoeo r

to "bare life" (wh ich the Nazis always opposed to the fullness of "life" understood in a spiritual sense as well), we need to speak o f the spiritualization
o f zoe and the biologization o f the s pirit.' ; The name assumed by such a
superimposition is that of race, which. constitu tes botb the spiritual character of tbe body and the biological character of the soul. It is wha t confers
meao ing oo tbe identity of the body with itself, a meaning that exceeds the
ind i.vid ual bo rders from binh. to d eatll. When Vacber de Lapouge wrote
that "what is inunortal isn't th e soul, a dubious and probably imaginary character: it is th e body, o r rather, the germinative plasma:' he did nothing other
than an ticipate what Nazism will decisively elaborate. The text in which
this bio- theogony finds its most complete definition is Verschuer's ma nual
o f eugenics and racial hered ity. Un like in the old German state an d in contemporary democracies in which one takes people to mean the sum of all
ci ti~ens, which is to say, those i.ndividuals who in habit sta te territory:
II ]n the ethn ic.1 Natio nal~ Socialist state~ we unders tand ~~:people-"' or '(ethn ic"
to be o spiritual and biological unity ... ; the greatest port of the German
people constitutes a great community of ancestors~ \Vhich is to say a solidarity
of blood relations. T his biological unity of people is the foundation of an
ethnic body. an org-anic structure of [Otalitarian character whose various
par ts are nothing Jess than the components of the same unity:' '
Th is represents a furthe r doubling or extension of tbat enclosu re of the

body on itself that Nazism placed at the center o f its immu nitary apparatus. Following the fi rst o pera tio n, wh ich remains at tbe Je,el o f the individual and t.he incorporation o f the self with in his own body, a second
occurs by means of which. every co rporeal member finds himself in turn
incorporated in to a larger body that constitutes tbe organ ic totalit)' o f the
German peo ple. It is only this second incorporation tha t confers on the
first its spiritual value, not in con trast to, b ut rather on the basis of, its bio logical configuration. But. tha t is not all : con necting horizon tally all the
si ngle bodies wi th the one bod y of the German community is the vertical
line o f heredita ry patrimo ny "tbat, as a river, ru ns from a generation to the
next.""' It is o nly at this point in the biopolitical composite of this triple incorporation that the body o f every German will completely adhere to itself,
no t as simple flesh, a n existence without life, b ut as tbe incarna tion o f the
racial substance from wh ich life itself receives its essential fo rm- provided,
natu rally, that it h.as the force to expel from itself aU of tha t wbicb doesn't
be lo ng to it (and fo r which reason hampers its expansive power). It is the
Thanatopolitics 143
lethal outcome tbat inevitably derives from tbe fi rst part of the discourse.
" If one begi ns from th is notion of 'people:" Verschuer concludes, "demographic politics is that of the protection of the ethnic body by maintain ing
and improving the healthy patrimony, the elimination of its sick elements,
a nd the conservation of the racial character of the people."" In this con ceptual frame, it wasn't wrong to define genocide as tbe spiritual dema nd
of the German pe.o ple: it is on ly through the remova l of the infected pa rt
that that body wou ld have experienced p rofoundly its enclosing on itself
a nd through it the belonging to what is shared with every other member:
"Dein Korper gehort dem FUhrer" (Your body be longs to the FUhrer) was
written on posters in Berlin. When the Nazi doctor Fritz Klein was asked
how he could reconcile wbat be had done witb the Hippocratic oath, he
responded: "Of course, I am a doctor and I want to preserve life. And out
of respect for human life, I would remove a gangreno us appendix from a
diseased body. The Jew is the gangrenous appendix in the body of mankind."" Tbe German lfij/kerki:irper [people's body], which was fiUed to the
brim, couldn't live without evacuating its purulent flesh. Perhaps for this
reason, an other of the German doctors defined Auschwitz as au us mundi,
anus of the world."
The third Na:li immu n itary dispositifis represented by the anticiplltory
suppressiorr of birrl1, which is to say not only of life but of its genesis. It is in
this extreme sense th<>t one ought to understand the declaration according
to which "sterilization was the medical fulcru m of the Nazi biocracy." lt
isn't a simple question of quantity. Certainly, between June 1933 a nd the
beginni ng of the war, more than three hundred thousand people were, for
various reasons, sterilized, not to mention that in the following five years
the figure wou ld grow exorbitantly. But it isn't on ly a question of increased
sterili:tation. Wben speaking about sterilization, Nazism had something
else in mind, a kind of excess whose full sense we bave yet to understand.
The Nazis assumed r.hat those numbers, which were already enormo us,
represented a temporary li mitation with regard to what they wou ld wan t
to d o later; for his part, Lenz declared that up to a third of the German
people wou ld have to be sterilized. Waiting for that moment to arrive, the
Nazis didn't waste any time. In September of 1934, the decree on obligatory
abortion was approved for degenerate parents; in june 1935, castration of
homosexuals; in February 1.936, it was decided that women above the age of
th irty-six were to be sterilized using X-rays. We could say that deciding whicb
method to employ keenly interested Nazi medicine. When t he practice of
L44 Thanatopolitics
steriliz.ation was extended to prisoners, a real political-medical battle broke

out (which is to say a thanatopolitical one) that centered on the most rapid
an d economical mode of operation. On the one side, there was the famous
gynecologist Clauberg, the inventor of the test on the actio n of progesterone,
who ferven tly supported the obstruction of the Fallopian tube. On the
o ther side, there were Viktor Brack and Horst Sch um;tnn, wbo favored
Roentgen rays. The result of both procedures was the atrocious suftering
a nd death of a large rw rnber ofworuen.
Despite th e fact that both men and women were operated on with our. distinction, we know that it was the latter who were the principal victims of
Nazi sterilization both in n umber (circa 6o percent) and, above all, in the
frequency of death (90 percent) . They were mutilated with all the pretexts
in place, ones that even contradicted each other: because their husbands
were psychopathic or, on the contrary, because they were unwed mothers.
For those judged to be mentally deficient, the entire uterus was ablated
rather than following the normal ligation of the ovariar1 tubes. When anumber of women who had been threate ned with sterilization responded with
a sort of"pregnancy protest;' obligatory abort ion up to the seventh month
o f p regnancy was ordered. l\1oreover, in the concentration camps, maternity was punished by immediate death. To argue that all of tb is is the work
of chaoce-or to obscure it in the geoeral mechanism of exterminationwould mean losing sigbt of the p rofou nd me;tning of such an event. If we
remember that the Jaw on steril ization was in fact the first legislative measure
adopted by the Nazis when in power (j ust as children were the first victims
of euthanasia), it becomes clear that they wanted to str ike at the begin ning
of life, life at the moment of birth. But we still haven't h it on the crux of
the q uestion. Tbe complexity of the question will be found in the fact that
these lethal measures were adopted in the midst of a pro-natalist campaign
intent on strengthening the German population quantitatively as well.~' It
wasn't by chance that volun tary abortjon was prohibited as a bio logical crime
against the race, whi le funds were set aside for helping numerous families.
How d o we want to interpret such an o bvious con tradiction? What meaning is to be attributed to sucb a mingling of the production and p revention
of life? How did the Nazis u nderstand birth, and what tied birth to death?
A first response to the question lies in the distinction the Nazis \van ted
to make on more than one occasion between "regeneration" and "prOC(Cation:' Wbile tbe former, wh ich was activated on the basis of official eu genic p ror.ocols, had to be supported at all costs, the latter (which occurred
Thanatopolitics 145
spontaneously and unexpectedly) was to be governed strictly by th.e state.

Th is means that the Nazis were anything but indifferent to the biological
phenomenon of birth. In fact, they gave it their utmost attention, b ut in a
form that subordinated it directly to political command. This is the biopolitical exchange that we know so well. On the basis of the racial heredity
that birth carries with it, birth appears to determine the level of citizenship in
the Reich according to the princi ple (a nd also the etymology) that links
birth to the nati.on. In nowhere more than th.e Nazi regime, however, did
the nation seem to take root. in the natural birth of citizens of German
blood. In reality, here as well, what was presented as the source of power
was rather derived from power, which is to say it wasn't bir th that determined tbe political role oftbe living being [vi vente/, b ut its position in the
political-racial calculation that predetermined the value of its birth. lf th is
living being reentered the biopolitical enclosure dedica ted to breeding, it
was accepted or even enco uraged; if it fell ou tside, it had to be suppressed
even before it was announced!' Later, when ind iscriminate exterm ination
was at hand, not even this was sufficient. Neither was it. enough to prevent
birth, nor simply to prompt death. It was believed necessary to superimpose
the two operations, thereby subjecting birth to death. Suspending /illterrompere/ life was too little - one needed to annul the genesis of life, eliminating all posth umo us traces of life.ln this sense , Haru1ab Arendt could
write: "for tbe status of the inmates in tbe world of the living, where nobody is supposed to know if they are alive or dead, is such that it is as
though they bad never been born:'" They simply did not exist. Th is is the
logical reason for wh ich, on the one hand, they co uld be killed an infinit.e
nu mber of t imes in the same day and, on the other, that they were prohibited from committing suicide. Tbeir body without a soul belonged to the
sovereign . Yet, in the biopolitical regime, sovereign law isn't so m uch the
capacity to put to death as it is to nu llify life in advance.
CHAPTER FIVE
Philosophy after Nazism

Tha t biopoli tics experienced with Nazism its most tcrrifyi.og form of histor ical realizatio n doesn't mean, however, that it also shared its d estiny o f
self-destruction. Despite what one might thin k, the end of Nazism in no
way signaled the end of biopolitics. To hypothesize in such a way not on ly
ignores the long genesis of biopolitics (which is rooted in modernity), but
also underestimates the magn itude of the borizon they share. Nazism didn't
prod uce biopoli tics. If anything, Nazism was the extreme and perverse
outcome of a particu lar version of biopolitics, wh ich the years separating
us from the end o f the regime have proven time and again. Not o nly hasn't
the direct relationship between life and death been mod erated, bu t, on the
con tra ry, the relation appears to be in continual expansion. None of the
most important questions of interest to the general p ublic (which is f11st becoming ever more difficult to distinguish from the priva te) is interpretable
outside of a profound and often immediate connection with tbe sphere
of bios.' Fro m the growing prominence of eth nicity in relations between
peoples a nd state, to the cen trality of the question of health care as a privileged index o f the functioning o f the eco nomic system, to the pr iority that
all political parties give in their platforms to pu blic order - what we fi nd
in every area is a tendency to flatten the political into the purely biological (if
not to the body itself) of those 'vho are at the same time subjects and objects.
The in troduction of work in the somatic, cogJlitive, and affective sphere of
individuals; the incip ien t translation of political action into domestic and
international police operations; the enormous growth in migrat.ory flows
The Philosophy of 8itJs 147
of men and women who have been dep rived of every juridical identity, reduced to the state of bare sustenance-these are nothi ng other than the
clearest traces of the new scenario.' If we look then at the continuing indistinction betwee n norm and exception that is tied to the stabilization o f
emergency legislation, we will find yet anotber sign of contemporary society's increasingly evident biopolitica l characterization. Tha t the obsessive
search for seCllfity in relation to tbe threat of terrorism has become the pivot
around which aU th e current governmental strategies tu rn gives an idea of
the transformation curren tly taking place. From the politicization of the
biological , which began in late modernity, we now have a similarly intense
biologization of the political that makes the preservation of life through
reproduction tbe on ly project that enjoys universal legitimacy.
From this perspective, however, it's opportune to recall that not only has
the politics of life tbat Nazism tried in vain to export outside Germanycertain ly in unrepeatable forms-been generalized to the entire world,
b ut its specific im rn un itary (or, more precisely, its autoi.nununitary) tonality has been as well. That the prot.ect.ion of biological life bas become the
largely dominant question of what now bas for some time been called domestic and foreign affairs, both now superimposed on the unified body o f
a world witbout exterior (and bence without an interior), is an extraordinary acknowledgmen t of the absolute coincidence that bas taken place between biopolitics and immunization. Fifry years after the fall of Nazism, the
implosion of Soviet communism was the final step i.n this direction. Tt is as
if at the end of what still saw itself as the last and most complete of the
philosophies o f history, life, wh ich is to say the struggle for its protection/
negation, had become global politics' o nly horizon o f sense.' If during the
cold war the i.nununitary machine still functioned through tbe production
of reciprocal fear aod therefore bad the effect of deterring catastropbes that
always threatened (and exactly for this reason never occu rred ), today, or at
least beginning with September n, 2001 , r.he immunitary machine demands
a n outbreak of effective violence on the part of all contenders. The idea and the practice-of preventive war constitutes the most acute point of this
a utoimmunitary turn of contemporary biopolitics, in tbe sense that here,
in the self-confuting figure of a war fought precisely to avoid war, the negative of the immunitary procedure doubles back oo itsetl' uotil it covers
th e enti re frame. War is no longer the always possible inverse of global coexisterlce, b ut the only effective real ity, where what matters isn't on ly the
specu lar quality that is determined between adversaries (who are to be
148 The Philosophy of Bio'
differen tiated io their responsibility and original motivations), b u t the

counterfactual outcome that their conduct necessarily triggers-i n other
words, the exponential multiplication of the same risks that wo uld like to
be avoid ed, or at least reduced, through instrumen ts that are instead destined to reproduce them more intensely. )ust as in the most serious a utoimmune illnesses, so too in the planetary conflict presently under way: it is
excessive defense that ruinously turns on the same. body that continues to
activate aod streogtl1en i.t. T he result is an absolute iden tification of opposites: between peace and war, defense and attack, and life and d eath, they
consume themselves without any ki nd of differen tial remai nder. That the
greatest threat (or at least what is viewed as such) is today constituted by a
biological attack has an obvious mea ning: it is no longer only dea th that
lies in wait for life, b ut life itself that constitutes the most lethal instrumen t
of death . And what else besides a fragment of W'e is a kamikaze, except a
fragmen t that discharges itself on the life of others with the in tent of killi ng
theru {port<lrl'i Ia morte/?
How does contemporary philosophy position itself when confronted
with such a situation? What kind of response has it furnished to the questions literally of life an d death that biopolitics opened in the heart of the
twentieth centu ry and that continue to be posed differently (though no less
intensely) today? Certainly, the most pervasive attitude has been to repress
or even ignore the problem. Tbe truth is that many simply believed that
the collapse o f Nazism would also drag the categories that had characterized
it in to the inferno from which it had emerged. The common expecta tion
was that those institutional and conceptual mediations that had permitted
the construction and the resistance of the modern order would be reconsti tuted between life and death, which had been fataUy joined together io
the 1930s and 1940s. One cou ld discuss - just as one con tinues wearily to
do so today- whether a return to state sovereignty sbould be applauded, a
sovereign ty r.hreatened by the in trusiveness of new supranational actors, or
rather whether a hoped-for extension of the logic of law to the entire arena
o f international relations is possible. But they are always part o f the old
analytic framework derhed from the Hobbesian matrix, perhaps with a
sprinkling of Kan tia n cosmopolitanism thrown in for good measure, on ly
to d iscover that sucb a model no longer works. In other words, the model
reflects almost nothing of cu rrent reality, let alone is it able to provide effective too ls that might prefigure its transformation. This iso't only because of
the incongruence of con tinu ing to contrast possible opr.ions (such as those
The Philosophy of Bios 149
related to individual righ ts and sovereign power) that have from tbe start
been recip rocally fu nctional in the develop ment of each from the instan t
that rig hts are not given withou t a sovereign power (be it natio nal o r imperial) that d emands they be respected. Similarly, there doesn't exist a sovereign ty that lacks some kind o f ju ridical fou ndation. It's not by acciden t
that the stunning deployment of sovereign power [potenza/ on the part of
the American imperial state is justified precisely in the na me of h uman
rights . More generally, however, the simple fact is that we can't run h istory
backwards, which is to say Nazism (more so than co mmunism) represents
the thresho ld with respect to the past that makes every u pdating of its lexical
apparatus impracticaL Beginning with that threshold {which is both historical and epistemological), the bio political question can no longer be put
off. It can, indeed needs, to be reversed with respect to the thanatological
configuration that it assumed in Hitler's Germany, b ut not di rected toward modern ity, if for no other reason than because biopolitics co ntradictorily originates in i.t in both modality ar1d intensity. This is different from
the form it subsequen tly took in Nazi Germany.
Han nah Arendt was the person who understood early the modern roots
o f biopolitics, using a n in terpretive key that recasts its reason and even
its semantic legitimacy. Contrary to the pervasive thesis that ties modernity to the deploymen t of politics, sbe not only refe rs it back to depoli ticization, but ascribes the process to a crisis in the category of life in place
o f the Greek conception of the world held in common. Christian ity con stitutes the decisive step within such an interpretive scheme, represen ting
in fact. the original horizon in wh ich the concept. of the sacredness of individ ual life is affirmed fo r the first time (albeit inflected in an o ther'"orldJy sense). lt will be sufficient tbat modern ity secularizes it, moving
the center of gravity from the celestial realm to tbat of the earth, to prompt
that reversal in perspective that makes biological survival the highest good.
From there "the on ly thing that. cou ld now be potentially immortal, as
immorta l as the body poli tic in antiqu ity and as individual life du ri ng
the Middle Ages, was life itself, that is the possibility, the possibly everlasting life process of tbe s pecies mankind."' But it is p recisely the affi rma tio n of a modern conservatio l' itae with respect to the Greek interest fo r
a common world that, according to Arendt, sets in motion that p rocess
o f depo liticization that culminates when work that satisfies material necessities became tbe prevalent form of human action. Begin ning from that
1non1ent,
150 The Philosophy of Bws
none of the higher capacities of man was any lo nger necessary to connect
individual life witb the life of the species; individual life became a part of
the life process, and to labo r, to assure the continuity of o ne's own life and
the life of his fa mily, was a ll that was needed. What was not needed, not
necessitated by Jife.s metabolism '"'ith nature, was either superfluous o r
co uld be justified only in terms of a peculiarity of human as distinguished
from other animal life.~
It is exactly the process that Foucault will define shortly tl1creafter i.o
biopo litical terms: individ ual life integrated in the life of the species and
made disti nct. through a series of in ternal breaks in zones of different worth.
But it is also the point at wh ich Arend t's d iscourse tacks in a d ifferent
direction, diverging from the one in itiated by Fouca ult. From tbe momen t that the entrance of the questio n of life on to the scene of the modern
world coincides with the withdrawal of politics uoder the double pressure
of work and prod uction, t.he term "biopolitics" (just as for th e Marxian
term "political economy") emerges devoid of any sense. Jf political acti.vity
is considered in theory to be heterogeneo us to the sphere of biological life,
then there can never be an experience (precisely biopolitical) that is situated exactly at their point of intersection. That such a conclusion rests on
the unverified premise according to whicb tbe on ly valid form of political
activity is what is attributable to the experience of the Greek polis- from
which a paradigmatic sepa ration is assumed irreflexively between the private sphere of the idion and the public sphece of the koinon-determines
the blind spot that Arendt reaches concerning the problem of biopolitics:
where there is an auth entic politics, a space of meaning for the production
of life cannot be opened; and where the materiality of life unfolds, something like political action can no longer emerge.
The truth is that Arendt didn't think the category of life thoroughly
enough and therefore was unable to interpret life's relatio nship witb politics
phi losophically. T his is particularly su rprising for the author who more
than anyon e else elaborated the concept of totalitaria nism (unless it was
precisely the specificity of what Levin as has defined as the "philosophy" of
Hitlerism that eludes her o r is at least bidden from her). It would have
been easy to grasp its nature, to penetrate into the machine of Nazi biopolitics, beginning with a reflection on politics that is strongly marked by a
reference to the Greek polis. The problem (relative not on ly to Arendt) is
that such a reflection doesn't provide direct access from political ph ilosophy,
be it modern or premodern, to biopolitics. In its biocrat.ic essence, Nazism
The Philos<>phy of tlitJs 151
remains mute for classical political thought. It is no coincidence that a radically impolitical thinker such as Heidegger con ducted a real philosophical
comparison with it (although in an implicit and reticent form}. Yet he was
able to attempt it, that is, to think the reverse of the q uestion Nazism raised
for world history, because his starting point, in a certain sense, was the same
presupposition, wbicb is to S<lY tbe "end of philosophy;' or better, its extroversion in something tbat can be ca lled existence, world, or life, but which,
however, cannot be comprehended in modern categories of subject and
object, individual and universal, and empirical and transcenden tal. When in
1946 he wrote Lerter 011 Humanism in the darkest moment of defeat (a defeat
that was also personal), he wrestled precisely with this question. What he
seeks, in the abyss that Nazi thanatopolitics had excavated, is a respo nse
capable of meeting it on its own terms, without, that is, having recou rse
to that h umanistic lexicon that did not know how to avoid it (or even had
contributed to laying the groundwork for it}. Not on ly does his entire
reflection on techawlogy [tecnica/ move in this direction, but also the o ntological transposition of what tradition had defined each ti me as "subject;'
"consciousness;' or "man" responds to the necessity of sustaining the comparison with the powe rs of nihilism /pote11ze del 11ientej on the ir same
le,el. In th is sense, the invitation to think against h uman ism is to be in terpreted "because it does not set the humanitas of man high enough;' as well
as tha t in line with "the "'orld historica l moment;' to a medi tation "not
only about man but also about the 'natu re' of man, not only about his nature but even more pr imordially about the dimension in which the essence
of man, determined by Be ing itself, is at home:''
Fu rthermore, Heidegger didn't wait for the end of the war and the fall of
Nazism to undertake his reOection on the nature of mao removed from
that language (however h umanistic) of liberal, Ma rxist, or existentialist ascendancy that was left undefended witb regard to Nazism and tbe q uestion
of bios. Indeed, the entire thematic of the "factical li fe" (faktisches Leben)
that he took up from the beginning of the 1920s in his Freiburg courses,
first in dialogue with Paul and Augustine and then with Aristotle, implied
the refusal to su bject the primary or concrete experience of life to the
scrutiny of theoretical or o bjectivizing categories that were still rooted in
the transcendence of tbe subject of knowledge - where the disruptive element with respect to the classic framework goes well beyond the results of
the "philosophy of life" that au thors such Dilthcy, Rickert, and Bergson
had elaborated in those years, to t.ake form instead in an unser.t ling of both
152
The Philosoph)' of Bio'
the terms and eveo more of the relation that binds tbem. Not only is factical life, the facticity [fatticita] of life, not to be derived th ro ugh a tradi tional ph ilosophical investigation, bu t it is situated precisely in its reversal.
That d oesn't mean that the horizons do no t intersect, namely, that the vital
experience is closed to philosophical in terrogation (or worse abandoned
to the fl ux of irrationality). What it does mean is that p hilosophy is no t the
si te in which life is defined, but rather that life is the primogen ital roo t of
the sarnc philosophy:
The categories are no t inventions or a group of logical schemata as such,
<'Jattic.es"t on the contrary. they are alive in life itse/fln an o riginal way: aJive
in order to '(form" Jife on themselves. Thry have their own modes of access,
which arc not fo reign to life itself, as if they pOllnccd do, n upo n life fro m
the outside, but instead arc precisely the preeminent way in which life com<'>
to itself'
Already here, in this withd rawal of life &orn any categorical p resupposition,
we cannot rn iss seeing a connection , one that is certain ly indirect, partial,
and differential, with that much more immediate primacy of bios that a
decade later will constitute with Nazism the vitalistic battering ram against
every form o f philosophy. Still, th is doesn't exhaust the a rea of the possible
comparison be tween the thoug ht of Heidegger and the open p roblem of
Nazi biopolitics, not only because bios echoes in tbe facti cal life that is one
with its effective dimension and coincides immediately with its modes of
bei ng, b ut also because of the possibility or the temptatio n to in terpret life
politically (or a t least negatively) . If the facticity of life, which in Being and
Time is assu med u nder the name of Dasein, doe.sn't respond to any external
instance, from the moment that it isn't a ttributable to any preconstit uted
ph ilosophical design, then on ly life is vested with its own decision of existence. But how is a life o r being there {esserci} configured so that it can decide
for itself {su se stessa/, or even that it is such a decision, if not in an intrin sically political modality? What opens the possibi lity of thin king bios and
politics withi n the same conceptual piece is that [first I at no poin t does
a uthent ic being [poter-essere] exceed the effective possibility of being there
{dd1'1>sserci], and second tha t the self-decision of this being is absolutely
immanen t to itself. It is from this side, precisely because it is entirely im
political, which is to say irreducible to any form of political philosophy,
that Hcidegger's thought emerges in the first half of the twentieth century as the only one able to support the ph ilosoph ical confrontation with
biopolitics.
The Ph ilosophy of Bios 153
Th.at Heidegger faced th.e question of biopolitics doesn't mean that he

took on its la nguage or shared its premise, namely, the preeminence of life
in re lation to being in the world. Indeed, we migh t say that he exp ressed a
point of view diametrically opposed to it: the biological category o f life
isn't the site from wh ich t he th inkability of the world opens, b ut is exactly
the contrary. If the phenomenon of living always emerges as a living "in"
or "for" or "w ith" someth ing that we can indicate with the term "world;'
we need to conclude that "wo rld is the basic category of the conten t-ser\se
in the p heno menon, li fe."'" The world isn't the container or the environ ment, but the content of the se nse of life. It is the ontological horizon out
of which only life becomes accessible to us. T hus, Heidegger d istances himself botb from those who, like Arendt, radically set the spbere of life aga inst
that of the world (understood as the public sphere of acting in common),
an d from those who reduced the world to a place for the biologica l deployment of life. Without being able to fo llow in detail the in ternal passages or
the d i.achron.ic moments of Heidegger's discourse, one cou ld generally trace
them back to an underlyi ng te ndency to keep "factical life" apart from
biology.
Bio logic.al concepts of li fe are to be set aside from the very o utset: unnec
e.ssary burdens~ even if certain mo tives might spring from the.s e concepts,
which is possible, however} o nly if the intended grasp of human ex-istence
as life remains o prn, prec.onceptually, to an understand ing of life wh ich is

csscnti;~ly older than that of modern biology."
Even later, when Heid egger will dedicate an entire section o f his 1929-30
course to Tlte Fundamental Cor1cepts of Metapltysics, this d iffidence or categorical deformity with respect to biology will not collapse. It isn't that he
doesn't come into contact with some of the principa l biologists of the time,
as is demonstrated not by the frequent references to Driescb, Ungerer,
Roux, and above aU UexkUU, and by the protocols from tbe sem inars of
Zollikon, which were held specifically with a group of doctors and psychi a trisr.s. It is p recisely these protoco ls that allow us to see (despite th.e declarations o f reciprocal interest} a marked communicative difficulty, if not
indeed a true and precise categorical misunderstanding between conceptual lexico ns that a re profound ly heterogeneous. "Qu ite often," admits
Dr. Medard Boss, who was also tenacio usly involved in a complex operation of semantic loops, "the situations in the sem inars grew remin iscent of
some in1aginary sceoe: h was as if a mao from Mars were visiting a group
o f earth -dwellers in an ar.t.em p t to co rnrnun icar.e with them:' "
t54 The Philosophy of Bios
Why? What are we to make of this substantial untranslatability between

Heidegger's language and that of the doctors and bio logists whose inten tion was still to be receptive? Above all, what does it suggest in rela tion to
our inqu iry? If we recall that Nazi biopolitics was characterized by the
domination of the category of life as opposed to the category of existence - "existence without life" was what was given over [destinam] to death
both in principle and in point offact - it wouldn't be arbitrary to see in Heidcgger's polem ic concerni ng biologism a form of advance counterpositi.oo.
Without wanting r.o homologize profoundly d ifferent terminologies (as can
only be the case between the most significan t philosopher o f the twentieth
century and the mercha nts selling death at a discou nt), we could say that
Heidegger reverses the p revalent relatio n instituted by the latter: it isn't existence that emerges as deficien t or Jacking in relation to a life that has been
exalted in its biological fullness, b ut life that appears defective with respect
to a n existence understood as the only modality of being i.n the openness of
the world. Furthcnnorc, life defi ned biologically doesn't have the attributes of Dasein, b ut is situated in a differen t and incomparable dimension
with respect to the horizon of the latter. It can only be deduced negatively
from Dasein as that which isn't it, precisely because it is "on ly life" (Nur
Lebmden); as "something that only lives" (etwas wie Nur-noch-/eben):
Life bas its own kind of being, but it is essentiaUy accessible only in Da-sein.
The ontology of life takes place by way of a privative iJHerpretation. lt determines what must be the case if there can be anything like just being-alive.
Life is neither pure o bjective presence~ no r is it Da-sein. On the other hand)
Da-sein should never be defined ontologically by regarding it as life (ontologicaUy undetermined) and then as someth ing else on top of that."
But the contrastive symmetry be tween Heidegger and Nazi biopolitics

doesn't end there, not only because both for the former and the latter life
and existence emerge as lin ked by a relation of excluding inlplication - in
the sense that one is defined by its not being equal to the other-but in
both cases the differen tial comparison is constituted by the experience of
death. It is precisely here, nevertheless, that the two perspectives definitively
diverge. While in Nazi thana to politics death represents the presupposition
of life even before its destiny, a life emptied of its biological potentiality
{potenza/ (and therefore reduced to bare existence),for Heidegger death is
the authentic {proprio} mod e of being of an existe nce disti.nct from bare
life. Certainly, the latter life dies too, but in a form lacking in mean ing
that, rather than a true dying (sterben), refers to a simple perish ing, to a
The Ph ilosophy of Bios 155
ceasing to live (verenden).In th is maoner, what simply lives /vivente/ cao not be defi ned in a fully mortal sense o f the word, as can he who experiences his own death, but rather as the end of life, as tha t which from the
beginning confers meaning on life . At this point, the relation between Nazi
biopolitics and Heidegger's thought is d elineated in all its an tinomy. While
in the fi rst the sovereign structure of biopolitics resides in the possibility of
submitting eve.ry life to the scrutiny of death, for the second tbe intentionali ty of death consti.tutes the o d gi nal political form in wb ich existen ce is
"decided" in something that always resides beyond simple life.
Yet we can single out the poin t of Heid egger's greatest divergence from
Nazi biopolitics in his treatment o f that Jiving specificity that is the animal.
In this case as well, the point of dep<lrture is in a certaio sense tbe S<tme:
not only what is the animal, but also how it is situated in relation to the
world of man. We know how Nazism responds to sucb a question, in what
was the culmination of a u adition born at the crossroads between Darwinia n evolutionism and degenerative tlteory: tl1e ao irnal, rnore tharl a separate
species from r.he h uman, is r.he nonhuman par t o f man, r.he unexplored
zone o r the archaic phase of life in which humanitas folds in on itself, separating itself through an internal d istinction between that which can live
a nd that wbicb has to die. Previously in Being and Time (and then in a
more articulated fasbion in The Ptmdamenml Concepts oj'Metaphrsics) and
then in the later Conrriburions to Philosoph); Heidegger travels in a d ifferen t d irection." T he question of animalitas is nothi ng but a particula rly
relevant specification of the relation that was already instituted between
the sp here of Dasein and that o f simple livi ng beings. When this latter assumes the features of the animal species, the separat ion with respect to the
one who exists in the mode of being there (esserci/, that is, mao, becomes
d earer. That the animal is defioed, according to tbe famous tripartition, as
"poor of the world" (welttlrm ), unlike that of the stone, which is "without
the world" (weltlos), and then precisely o f man, who is "the creator of the
wodd" (weltbi/dend), is in fact a way of marking an insurmo untable distan ce in relation to human experience. It is opposed to the animalization
of mao, not only the one theorized but also the one the Nazis pu t in to
practice; here Heidegger situa tes man well o n the outside of the horizon of
the animal. Mao is so incomparable to the anima l that he is not even able
to concep tualize the condition if not by inferring it as the negative of h is
own proper condition. The expression "poor of the world" doesn' t indicate
a lesser level of participation in a common nature with all livi ng beings,
156 The Philosophy of Bios
including man, but an insurmountable barrier that excludes any conju gated form. Contrary to a long-standi ng tradition that thought man as the
ratio11al animal-an animal to which is added the charisma of logos to
make him noble (according to the classic formulation of the zoou logou
echo11), man is precisely the 110mmimal, just as the animal is the no11human
Jiving being (vivente). Despite all the attempts directed at tracing the
affinity, symmetry, and copresence (perhaps in the existential dimension
of boredom), the two universes remain reciprocally .i ncommunicable." As
Heidegger writes in Letter on Huma11ism:
It might seem as though the essence of divinity is closer to us than what
ls tOrelgn i.n other living creatures, closer, namely, in an essential distan.ce
which however distant is no nethe.less more fam iliar ro our ek-s istant essence
than is our appealing and scarcely conceivable bodily kinship with the
beast. 10
Exactly these kinds of passages, however, if they work in completely sheltering Heidegger frorn th e thanatopoli tical drift of Nazism, risk drawing
him 360 degrees in the opposite directio n, close to that h uman ism from
which be had carefully distanced himself. Naturally, the entire movement
of this thought (which is o riented in an o ntological direction) makes impossible not only the reproposition of an anthropocentric model, but also
any concept of human nature as such - autonomous from tbe being to
whose custody man seems called. Precisely this decen tering of man (or
recenteri.ng of bei ng) is connected, however, in the course of Heidegger's
work, to a progressive loss of contact with the theme of "facticallife" in
which the semantics of bios seemed inevitably implicated. It is as if the
originary impulse to think life in the "end of philosophy" (or the end of
philosophy in the facticity of life) slowly flows back with tbe effect of dissolving its same object. Wishing to trace the terms of an extremely complicated q uestion back to an abbreviated formu latioo, we could say that
the absolute distance that Heidegger places between man and animal is the
same as that which comes to separate always in e''er more ob,,ious fasl1 ion
his philosophy from the horizon of bios." And that is precisely because it
risks entrusting bios to nonphilosophy, or better, to that antiphilosophy
that was terrifyingly realized in the 1930s in its most direct politicization.
Tba t it occurred exactly in that pbase of Heidegger's thought, even briefly,
becoming the prey of that antiphilosophy, is to be interpreted differently
and in a more complex mao ner tban it has been to now.lt probably wasn't
an excess of nearness but an excess of distance from both the vital and moral
The Ph ilosophy of Bi11s 157
questions raised by Nazism that made Heidegger lose bis bearings. Precisely because he didn't enter deeply enough (and not because he entered
too much) into the dimension of bios that is in itself political, in the rapport
between qualified existence and biological life, be wound up abandoning it
to those whose intention was to politicize it until it shattered. Once again
the black box of biopolitics remained closed with Heidegger.
Flesh
Apparently, if we are to open the black box of biopo litics we shou ldn't
limit o urselves to skirting Nazi semantics, or for that matter confronti ng it
from the outside. Something more is required and it has to do with penetrating witbin it and overtuming one by one its bio-thanatological principles. l am referring in particular to the three dispositifs that l examined at
the conclusion of tbe preceding cha pter: the trormativization of life, the
double enclosure of the body, and the preemptive suppressio If of birth. Yet
what docs it mean exactly to overturn them and then to tum them inside
out? T he attempt we want to make is that of assuming the same categories
of "life; ''body;' and "birth;' and then of converting their immunitary
(which is to say their self-negating) declension in a di rection that is open
to a more originary and intense sense of communitas. Only in this way at the point of intersection and tension among contemporary rellections
that have moved in such a direction - wiU it be possible to trace tbe initial
features of a biopolitics that is fi nally affirmative. No longer over life but of
life, one that doesn't superin1pose already constituted (and by now destitute) categories of modern politics on life, but rather inscribes the innovative power of a life rethought in all its complexity and articulation in the
same politics. From this poin t of vie,v, the expression "form-of-life;' or
precisely wbat Nazi biopolitics excluded tbrougb the absolute subtraction
of life from every qualification, is to be understood more in the sense of a
vitalization of politics, even if in the end, the two movements tend to superimpose themselves over one another in a single semantic grouping.
Our point of departure, therefore, will be the dispositif of enclosure, or
better, the double enclosure, of the body, wh ich Nazism understood both as
the chaining of the subject onto his own body and as the incorporation of
sucll a body in tha t extensive body of the German ethnic communi!)' It is
only this last incorporation, wh ich is radically destructive of everyth ing
that is held not to be a part of it, that also confers on the subject's body
that spiritual substance that has the value of the absolute coincidence of
the body with respect to itself. Naturally, this powerful ideologemme is ao

integral part of a biopolitical design that is already predisposed for such
a parm:ysmal outcome. This, however, doesn't change the fact that in it
merges, or exerts an influence on, a vector of broader meaning (but also
mo re ancient) that is part of the already classical metaphor of "political
body" and, more generally, on the relation bwveen politics a nd body. What
I want to say is that eacb time tbe body is thought in political terms, o r
politics in terms of th.e body, an immun itary short-circu it is always produced, one destined to close "the political body" on itself and within itself
in opposition to its own outside. And that is irrespective of the political
o rientation-either right or left , reactionary or re,olutionary, mo narchiC<ll or republica n- to which such an operation pertains. In eacb of these
cases, in fact, what constitutes the features either of the absolutist-Hobbesian
or the democratic-Rousseauian line (without introducing genealogies e'en
mo re remo te in time) is the organistic mod el that joins every member of
the body to its assumed u rl ifi.catioo. Even in contractual theories io wb ich
the political body is presen ted as the resu lt of an agreement between multiple individual wills, o r as the o utcome o f a single general will, the political
body in reality is precedent to and propaedeutic to their definitions of it. It
is beca use tbe political body is already inscribed in a single body that its
parts can or must be consolidated in ao identical figure wbose o bject p recisely is the self-preservation of the political organism as a whole. Despite
all of the a utonom isti c, individ ualistic, and fragmenting impetuses tha t
have periodically ensnared (or con tradicted) this general process of incorporation , its logic has largely prevailed in the constitution and the development o f nation-states, a t least u n til modern political categories will be
able to elaborate prod uctively their owo immunitary function of the oeg<llive protection of life."
Then, wbeo such a mechanism b reaks down, or when the immu nitary
demands grow unti l it overflows the ban ks of modern mediation, to talitarianism, a nd in particular Nazism, produced a n additional enclosure o f
the body on itself through a double movement. On the one side , it made
absolutely coterrninus political iden tity with the racial-biological; on the
o ther, it inco rporated in to the same national body the line of distinction
beMeen inside and ou tsid e, which is to say between the por tion of life
that is to be p reserved and what is to be d estroyed. The individual a nd
collective body-the one in the other aod the ooe for th.e other-was immunized in this way, before and beyond the outside a nd its own surplus or
The Philosophy of lli"s 159
lines of fligh.t. Th.ese emerged as interrupted by a refolding of th.e body oo

itself that had the function of providing a spiritual nucle us or a surplus of
meaning, to what was also considered to be absolutely biological. Th.e concept o f the political body was made functional to th is direct tradition of
life in politics as its antithesis, more so than to what is outside it, namely,
to that part of itself j udged to be not up to (inidonea] a similar bio-spiritual
conversion. We previously saw how the fi rst name that the. N:l'lis gave to
such a n abject materi al was th.at of"cx istence" (because it was resistant to
the d ouble corporeal subsumption); "existence without. life" is considered
to be all that does not have the racial qualifications necessary to in tegrate
eth nically the indi,id ual body with that of the collective.' 9 But perhaps a
more meaningful term is that of fksh, beca use it is intrinsic to the same
body from which it seems to escape (and which therefore expels it) . Existence without li fe is flesb that does not coincide with the body; it is that
part or zone of the body, the body's membrane, that isn't one with the body,
that exceeds its boundaries or is subtracted fw ru the body's enclosing.
Merleau-Ponr.y is the twentieth-century ph ilosopher who more than any
other elaborated the notion of flesh. To recognize in h is work a specific feature o f the biopolitical reflection or even only an enervation of bios would
certainly be misleading, given the substantially phenomenological scope in
which his philosophical considerations are situated.'" Tbis doesn't meao,
however, that the theme of flesh tends precisely to exceed it in a direction
not so far removed from what we brought together under the Heideggerian
thematic of the "factical life." As in that case, so too the horizon of flesh
/chair} is disclosed in the point of rupture with the traditional modality o f
philosophy that poses the latter in a tense and problematic relation with its
own "non:' Wben in a text titled Philosoph)' and Non-Pitilosophy Begimring
witlt Hegel, Merleau-Ponty refers to the necessity tbat"philosophy also becomes worldly," philosophy has already shifted in a conceptual orbit in
which r.he entire philosophical lexicon is subjected to a complete rotation
on its own axis." It is in this radical sense that the proposition according to
which "what we are calling flesh, this interiorly worked-over mass, has no
name in any philosophy" is to be understood." It has no name because no
philosophy bas known how to reach that undifferentiated layer (and th us
for this reason exposed to difference), in which the same notion of body,
anything but enclosed, is now turned outside (estroflessaf in an iueduciblc
heterogeneity. What this meaos is that the question of flesh is inscribed in
a threshold in which thought. is freed from every self-referential modality in
favor of directly gazing on contemporaneity, understood as the sole subject

a nd object of phi losophical interrogation. From this point of view, the
theme of tlesh lends itself to a symptomatic reading that can also push beyond the intentions expressed by Merleau-Pon ty because it is rooted therefore within the series of quest ions that his philosophy opened with a lexical
originality at times unequaled by Heidegger h imself. Without wanting in
any way to propose. an inadmissible comparison between the. two, one
could say instead tllat the bli.nd poin t of Hcidegger's analysis of bfos is born
precisely from a missing or inadequate encounter with the concept. of tlesh.
Didier Franck's thesis is that Heidegger's wasn't able to think fu lly the
notion of tlesh because it is a category that is constituted spatially, and
that therefore appears to be irreducible to the tempora l modality tbat Heidegger traced in being.'-' Now, it is precisely at this point that Merleau -Ponty
introduces a different perspective, beginning with an approacb (but also a
semantics) that is more traceable to Husser! tha n to Heidegger. It is from
Husser! in fact tllat M.erleau-Pooty in fers not o nly tile tlleme of the reversibility between sentient and felt (.1enzieute e senti to}, but also that of a relation of otherness that is destined to force open the identity presupposed by
the body proper. When, in a fragment from The Visible and the Invisible, he
writes tbat "my body is made of the same tlesb as tbe world (it is perceived),
and moreover that th is tlesh of my body is shared by tbe world," he takes
another step that brings him into a sem<>ntic range that is situated beyond
both phenomenology and an existciltial analytic.That the world is the horizon of meaning in which the body recognizes itself an d which is traversed
by the diversity that keeps it. from being coterminous with itse lf, means
that it has surpassed not only a Husserlian transcendentalism but also the
Heideggerian dicbotomy berween existence and life." If, for Heidegger, bios
does not recognize any of the modes of being tbat distingu isb a fundamental ontology, in Merleau -Ponty it is precisely living tlesh that constitutes
the tissue o f relations between exisr.ence and the world. Here, then, not on ly
does the spatiality of flesh allow us to recuperate a tempora l dimension,
but it constitutes precisely their tangential point.
Oppose to a philosophy of history such as that of Sartre ... not doubtlessly
a philosophy of geography ... but a philosophy of structure wbich, as a
matter of fact, will take form better on contact with geography than on
contact with history ... In fact it is a question of grasping the nexusneither "h istorical" nor geograph icn of history and transcendental geology.
this very time that is space, this very space that is time, which I will have
The Ph ilosophy of Bios
161
rediscovered by analysis of tbe visible and the llesb, the simultaneous

Urstiftww of tiJile and space which makes there be a h istoricallandscape
and a quasi-geographic.al inscription of h istory.~0
Can we read such a composite o f tlesh, world , and h istory in terms o f

"mon d ialization"? It wou ld be impruden t to respond absolutely yes (a t
least considering Merleau-Ponty's personal journey). But it would be equally
reductive to deny that be is the author who pushed further than others the
th eoretical decl ination of th e relation between body aod world. Not only,
but be, before any one else, also u nderstood that. the enlarge men t o f the
body to the dime nsion of the world (o r the co nfiguration of the world as a
singular body) wo uld fragmen t the same idea o f "political body; in its
modern as well as in its totalitarian declensions. T his is for no o ther reason
than because, not having anything outside itself (and for that reason making
it one with its own outside), such a body wouldn't be able to be represented
as such -doubling upon itself in that self-identical fi.gure, which, as we saw,
cor\stitutes one o f the most terrible im.rnuo itary dispositifsofNazi biocracy.
For us as well as for Merleau -Ponty, the flesh of the world represents the end
and the reversal of that dou bling.lt is the doubling up (sdoppiamento) o f
the body of all and of each one according to leaves that are irreducible to
the identity of a unitary figure: "It is beca use there are these z do ublingsup that are possible: the insertion of the world between the two leaves of
my body [and] the insertion of my body between the two leaves of each
th ing a nd o f the world ."" T hat the fragmcnt-alteady marked by the reference to the "thing" as the possible bridge between body and world -continues with reference to a perspective that. "isn't anr.bropologism:' further
a ttests to the lateral move that Merleau-Ponty makes with regard to Heidegger. In the same moment in which Merleau-Po nty distances himself
from anthropology (in a direction that, even if indirectly, refers to a Heideggerian ontology), he frees h imself from 1-Ieidegger's ontology by assuming
in the place of an objecrJsubject not only every form of life from the human
to the an imal, b ut especia lly (or eve n) what was that "poor of the world"
situated in unsurpassable remoteness from the u niverse of Daseir1." Again,
by alluding to a "participation of the animal in our percept ive life and to
the part icipation of our perceptive life in a nimality;' Merleau-Ponty penetrates more deeply than Heidegger does into the most devastating imagina ry
of o ur epoch, cxpressi.ng himself more forcefully against it.' 9 lnscribi ng the
th reshold that unites the h uman species witb that of the anin1al in the flesh
o f the world , bu t also the margi n that joins the living and the nonliving,
162
The Philosophy of Bio'
Merleau -Ponty contributes to the deconstruction of that biopolitics that bad

made man an animal a nd driven life in to the arms of nonlife.
We might be surprised that the theme of flesh, which Merleau-Ponty
took up in the 1950s, remained o n the margins of contemporary philosophical debates, and even more tha t it was treated coolly and with a certa in difftdence on the part of many from whom more a ttention <Jnd in terest might
h<1ve been expected.'0 If for l yotard the evocation of the chiasmus that flesh
operates between body and world runs the risk of sli pping into a "ph i.losophy
of erudite flesh;' closed to the onset of the event, Deleuze sees in the "curio us
Flesh ism" of more recent phenomenology not o nly a feature that deviates
from what he h imself defi nes as the "logic of sensation;' but both "a pious
and a sensual notion, a mixture of sensuality and religion:'" As for Derrida,
aside from the philological perplexities that he advances on the translation
of the f rencb chair (flesh] into the German Lei I>, he doesn't hide his fear
that an immoderate usc of the term can give rise to a sort of gcJlCric "globalization [mondalisation} of flesh": "By making flesh ubiquitous, one runs the
risk of vitalizing, psychologizing, spiritualizing, interiorizing, or even reappropriating everything, in the very places where one might still speak of
the non properness or alterity o f flesh."" But it is perhaps jean-Luc Nancy,
to whom Derrida's texts were, bowever, dedicated, who expresses the most
important reservation in relation to the discourse that I've traced here.
Tb is is because in tbe same moment in which Nancy clearly distances himself from the ph ilosophy of flesh, he j uxtaposes the urgency of a new
thought of the body to it: "In this sense, the 'passion' o f the 'flesh; in the
flesh, is finished -and this is why the word body ought to succeed on the
word flesh, which was always overabundant, nourished by sense, and egological (egologique J:"
Why sucb a broad rejection? And to what do we owe an o pposition so
marked as to assume the features of a true incomprehension of what llesb
signifies in the theoretical scheme I sket.ched above? Agitat.ing in it. cut.ain ly
is an irritability on the part of contemporary French ph ilosophy with regard to the phenomenological tradition.''' But this pa rticular element is
not to be separated from a more general demand of differentiation in relation to the Christian conception of flesh. Indeed, one co uld say that it is
precisely the Christian origin (ascendenza/ (\vhich is in no way secondary
to phenomenology) t.hat co nstitu tes the true objective of the antiflcsh
polemic. If Michel I-Jeory's most recent essay oo incarnation is takeo as a
sit.e of possible comparison, the t.errns of t.he question can be idenr.ified with
The Philorophy of llitJs 163
sufficient clarity.'; What is seen as problematic in the phenomenological

(but also, even tually, in the on tological) concept of flesh is its spiritualistic
connotation, which becomes evident in Henry's in terpretation itself: without entering too much into the details of the question, what differentiates
the flesh of the opaque and inert material o f the body is its self-affectivity,
which the divine Word directly t:ransmits [tmsmessale]. When Derrida
polemicizes about an excessive fleshiness [carnista/ tbat risks canceling the
coucreteocss of the body, or wheu Naocy sees ir1 incaroation a process of
disem bodiment and in teriorizat.io n that subjects r.he corporeal sig11 to the
transcende nce of meaning, they do noth ing other than reaffirm this spiritualistic characterization of flesh. So doing, they end up offering the same
readin g tbat Henry does, even if with the opposite in ten tion, which is not
more positive but now negative. Rather than d econstructing and overturning it in its hermeneu tic effects (as one might have expected them to
d o), they assume th e conclusions a nd for that reason only spuo1 the object.
If flesh refers to the body translated into spirit, or to spirit that is i.nlwjected
into the body, the path for an effective reth in king of bodies (of each body
and o f all bodies) moves through the definitive abandonment of the ph ilosop hy o f the flesh.
Such a reason ing has its power, wh.icb rests, however, on a premise that
is anything but certain - certainly, with reference to Merleau -Ponty, for
whom, as we saw, flesh doesn't refer at aU to an inrerior~lation of the body,
b ut if anythi ng to its exteriori7-<rtion in a nother body (or even in that wh ich
is not a bod y), b ut also with reference to the same Christian ity, which only
in exceptional circumstances lin ks the term flesh (sarxor caro) to a spiritual
dimensio n, which usually relates instead to the idea of body (soma, corpus).
Even if the two words at a certain moment come to be partially superimposed, certainly what refers most p recisely and intensely to the soul as its
privileged conten t is the body and not llesb."' Flesh, for its part, finds its owo
specifici ty in the material substrate o f wh ich man is initially "made" (even
befo re h is body is fi lled with spirit). Tt is no coincidence that in judaism
(and not so differently in Greece), it is precisely the flesh (basar) that tangibly
represents earth ly elemen ts and therefore suffers and is perishable. Early
Christianity takes up and de,elops this terminology." ln Paul (2 Corinth ia ns 4:11), tlmW! sarx is the mortal existeoce that is exposed to pain and to
si n, just as the expression "in the flesh" (err sarki) alludes precisely to
earthly li fe as sucb , to the po in t where sometin1es (Romans 3:20 an d Galatians 2:16, in a citation from Psalms 143:2), Paul adop ts the formulation
pasa sarx, which means "every living thing [viverrte)." It is true that the
word soma and then corpus can have analogous meanings, but more often
than not it refers to the general unity of the single organism or o f the collective (the church, Christian ity) in which the first is positioned. As for
lertullian, the author of De carne Christi, be wages a difficu lt apologetical
battle against those (Valentino, Marcione,Apelle) who argued for the spiritual or pneumatic character of Christ's flesh. His thesis instead was that
wh ile the corpus cau be immaterial, celestial, and angelic, caro instead is
clearly distinguished from t.he soul or the psyche. There does not exist. a caro
arrimalis [soul-flesh ) or an anima camalis [flesh-soul) (uusquam arrimam
camem ut camem an imam) [never soul-flesh or flesh-soul] (De carne Christi,
XII!, s), but on ly the unity, in the body, of two unmistakable substances
that are different in and of themsehes.
Th.is notion of a materia l-like, inorgaoic, and "savage" flesh, as MerleauPont)' wou ld have called it, has never had a political configuration.lt indi cates a vital reality that is extraneous to any kind of un itary organization
because it is naturally plural." Thus, in Greek the term sarx is usually declined with the plural sa.rkes, and the expression pa.sa. sarx that l noted earlier
preserves a connotation of irreducible multiplicity that can be rendered
with "all men" [uomini./. So that this might set in motion the general process
of constituting the Christian ch urch, it was necessary that the diffused and
dispersed flesh be reunited in a single body." It so happened that we p reviously find in Paulian Christia nit)', and later in the Patristic, that the
words soma and corpus begin to displace those of sarx and ca.ro with ever
greater frequency (without ever completely replacing them). More than an
expulsion of the flesh, this concerns its incorporation into an organ ism
that is capable of d omesticating flesb's centrifugal and anarchic impu lses.
Only the spiritua li-tation of the body (or better, tbe incorporation of a
spirit that is capable of redeeming mao from the misery of his corruptible
flesh) will allow him entranc.e in to the mystical body of the church: "What?
Know ye not that your body is the temple of the Holy Ghost which is in you,
which ye have of God, and ye are not your own? For ye are bought with a
price; therefore glorify God in your body, and in your spirit, which are
God's" (1 Corinthians 6:19-20) .'0 The role that the sacrament of the Eucharist had in this salvific passage from flesh to body bas been noted as the
double extravasation f tral'aso) of the body in Christ in that of the believer
and of that of the believer in the ecclesial body. Witb all the variants as well
as the conflicts that are derived from an initial competition, we can say
that first the empire and then the nascent nation -states activated and secu larized the same theological-political mechan ism; but also here they d id so
in order to save [riscattarej themselves from the risk associated with "bare
life;' which is implicit in that extralegal condition defined as the "state of
nature"-namely, the " flesh" of a plural and potentially rebellious multitude that needed to be integrated in a unified body at the command of the
sovereign."
The bi.opolitical transition that characterizes modernity advanced by
this perspective didn't modify such a "corporative;' as is also demonstrated
on the lexical level by the long duration of the metaphor of "body politic."
That the strategies of sovereign power are addressed directly to the life of
subjects (sudditi/ in all their biological requirements for protection, reproduction, and de,elopment not on ly doesn't weaken, but indeed further
strengthens, the semantics of a body inherited by medieval political theology. T here is nothing more than that body (i n the individ ual and collective
sense) t11at restitutes and favors the dynamic of reciprocal inlplication between po litics and life, and th is for a number of reasons. First., because of
the somatic representation of legitimate citizenship prior to the growing
role that demographic, hygienic, and sanitary questions began to assume
for pubHc administration. And second, because it is precisely the idea of an
organic body tha t implicates, as necessary complement, the presence of a
transcendent principle that is capable of unifying the members according
to a determined functional design: a bod y always has a soul, or at least a
head, without which it would be reduced to a simple agglomerate of flesh.
Far from rejecting en masse this figural apparatus, totalitarian biopolit.ics
(but above all Nazi biopolitics} leads it to its extreme outcome, t ranslat ing
'"bat hud always been considered nothing more than an influential metaphor
into an absolu tely real real ity: if people have the form and tbe substance of a
body, then they must be looked after {curato f, defended, and reinforced with
instruments and a finality that are purely biological. They did n't. exclude
what was traditionally referred to as soul, but they understood it bio logically
as the carrier of a racial heredity that was destined to distingu ish the healtl1y
part from the sick part within the body- the "true" body from a flesh that
lacked ''ita! resonance and wh ich therefore was to be drhen back to death
(respingere alia morte/. As '"e saw previously, this double, bio-spiritual incorporation was the final result of an irnmunitary syndrome so out of con trol that it oot ooly destroys everytbi.ng that it comes into con tact with, but
turns disastrously o n its own body.
t66 The Philosophy of Bios
We noted already that such ao outcome d oesn't in fact mark the exhaustion or on ly the retreat of the biopolitical paradigm. With the end of both
twentieth-century totalitarianisms, the question of life remains solidly a t
the center of all politically significant trajectories of o ur time. What recedes,
howe,er (either because of explosion or implosion), is instead the body as
the dispositif of political iden tification. Th is process of disembodiment is
paradoxically the re.sult of an excess. It is as if the extension of the somatic
surface to the eo tire globe makes the wodd the place (by way of aoti nom ical excellence) in which inside coincides with ou tside, the convex with the
concave, a nd everything with nothi ng. If everything is the body, noth ing
will rigidly define it, which is to say no precise immunitary borders will
ma rk and circumscribe it. T he seemingly uncon tainable prolifew tion of
self-identical agglomerations that are ever more circumscribed by the function of immun itary rejection of the dyna mics of glo balization signals in
reali ty the eclipse of the political body i.n its classical and twentieth-century
sense in favor of somethin g else that appears to be its sheUand proliferating
substance. Ir. is in such a substance that., perhaps for the first tin1e with some
political pregnancy, it is possible to discern someth ing like a "flesh" that
precedes the body and all its successive incorporatio ns. Precisely for this
reason it a ppears aga in when tbe body is in decline. Tbat the Spinozian
name of "multitude" or that of Benjamin's "bare life" can be attribu ted to
it is also secondary with respect to the fact that in it bios is reintroduced
not on the margins or the thresholds, bu t at the cente r of the global polis.''
What the meaning, as well as the epochal outco me, of a relation between
politics and life might be (given the same material formation that escapes
from the logic o f in1mun ita ry) is difficult to say, also beca use such a biopoli tical dynamic is inserted in a framework that is still weighed down by
the persistence (if not by the militarization) of sovereign power. Certain ly,
the fact that for the first time the politicization of We d oesn't pass necessarily through a seman tics o f r.he body (because it refers to a world material
that is an tecedent to or that follows the co nstitutio n o f the subject of law
fdirittoj) opens up a series o f possibilities unknown till now. What political form can flesh take on, the same flesh tbat has always belonged to the
modality of the impo litical? And what can be assigned to something that is
born o ut of the remains of anomie? Is it possible to extract from the cracks
of immunitas the outli nes of a di fferent commuuitas? Pe rhaps the momen t
has arrived to rethink io nontbeological terms the event that is always
The Philosophy of Bios 167
evoked (but never defined in better fashion) tha t two thousand years ago
appeared und er the enigmatic title "the resurrection of the Aesh:' To "rise
again:' today, can not be the body in habited by the spirit, but the Aesh as
such: a being that is both singular and communal, generic and specific,
and undifferentiated and d ifferent, not on ly devoid of spirit, b ut a flesh
that doesn't even bave a body.
Before moving on, a final point re.lative to the modality of incarnation .
We know that some have wanted to sec in the term " incarn ation" tl1e theological bo nd r.hat keeps phenomenology with in a Christian ity-derived
semantics, and which is therefore fatally oriented toward the spiritual:
penetrated by the Holy Spirit, the body of man ends up being d isembodied
in a dialectic tbat subordinates tbe materi<lli ty of the corporeal sign to the
transcendence of mean ing. The body, reduced not to signifying anything
o ther than its owo incarnated being, loses that exteriority, that mu ltiplicit)',
and that open ing that situate it in the real world, what in turn will refer to
its anthropological, techno logical, and political dimension.
Bur is this bow th ings really stand? Or does a similar reconstruction risk
making it j unior to that post-Christian or meta -Christia n nucleus that it
would like to deconstruct (without being able to free itself from that postChristian or meta-Christian nucleus, which has shown thro ugh more than
once in the p resen t work)? My impression is that such a nucleus coincides
in large part with the idea and the practice of incarnation. With regard to
the distinction (and also the opposition) ''is-a -vis the logic of incorporatio n: while incorporatio n tends to un ify a plurality, or at least a d uality, incarnation, on the con trary, separates and m ultiples in t.wo what was o riginally o ne. In the first case, we are dealing with a doubling that doesn't keep
aggregated elements distinct; io the second, a splitting that modifies and
subdivides an initial identity. As the great apologetics of the first centuries
after Christ argued, the Word that becomes llesh establishes the copreseoce
of two d iverse and even opposite natures in the person o f Christ: r.he perfect and complete nature of God and the suffering and mortal natu re of
man. How can a God alter, d isfigure, and expropr iate himself to the poin t
of really taking on the flesh of a mo rt<ll? T he accent here ought to be placed
on the adverb really because it is precisely there, on the material substantiality of a llesh that is identical to ours in aU and for all, that for five centuries
the Chcistian fathers, from Jreneus to Tcrtullian to Augustine, fought a d iffi cult battle against a series of heresies (Docetism, Aranism, Mooopbysism,
168 The Ph ilosophy of Bios
Nestorianism), eacb aimed at negating the insurmouotable contradiction

implicit in the idea of Incarnatio n: to cancel ei ther the nature of God or
that of man and therefo re the line they share. What appears logically unthinkable for classical culture is the two-in-one or the one-that-is-madetwo th rough a slippage of the body out of itself, which coincides with the
insertion of something within that doesn't naturally belong to it.
Given this transition, this contagion, and th is de.natmation, the notion
of flesh needs to be rethought o utside of Chcistian lauguage, narndy, as th e
biopo litical possibility of r.he ontological and technological transmutation
of the human body. One could say that biotechno logy is a non -Christian
form of incarnation. What in the experience of prosthesis (of the transplant or tbe implant) penetrates into the h uman organism is no longer the
d ivine, but the organ of another person {uomo j; o r something that doesn't
live, tbat "di vinely" allows the person to Jive and improve tbe quality of his
or her li fe. But that this new biopo litical feature (which inevitably is technopolitical) doesn't lose every point of co ru act with its own Christian archetype is witnessed in the artist who, perhaps more than any other, has placed
the theme of flesh outside of the body (or of the nonorganic body) at the
center of his own work. We know that classical images of the Incarnation ,
above all at the moment of tbe Crucifixion, mark a break or a ru pture in the
figural regime of the mimesis in which Christian art is framed - as if oot
only the Christ (for example, Durer's), but rather also the entire order of
figuration must slip into the open folds of its martyred bo dy, damaged and
disfigured, witho ut any possibility of restoration." But the fl ight of flesh
from the body, both barely sustained and strained to the point of spasms
by the structure of the bones, constitutes the center itself of the paintings
of Francis Bacon, to wbom I alluded above. In Bacon too this journey to
the limits of the body, tbis slippage of tlesb through its foramen explicitly
refers to the ultimate experience of tbe Christian i.ocarnation: "The images
of t.he slaughterhouse and butchered meat. have always struck me: Bacon
remembers. "They seemed d irectly linked to the Cruci fixion."''' I don't
know if flesh is to be related to the Nazi vio lence, as De leuze would have it
in his admirable comment (tho ugh the horror of that violenc.e always remained with Baco n):'5 The fact is that in no one more than Bacon is the
biopolitical practice of tbe anin1ali:wtion of man carried out to its lethal
conclusion, fi nding a reversed correspondence perfectly in the disfigured
figure of butchered flcsb:
The Ph ilosophy of Bfo< 169
In place of formal correspondences, what Bacon's painting constitutes is

a zone of indiscernibility or mtdecidabilit)' between rnan. and an iJua.l .. . ]t is
never a combination o f forms, but rathe r the COlnmon fact: the com mo n
fact o f man and animaJ.<~O
According to all the e'idence, that acommon fact;' that butchered, de

formed, and ch<tpped flesh, is the flesh of the world. That the painter always
saw in animal carcasses hanging in butcher shops the sha pe of mao (but
also of himself) sign ifies that that bloody mou nd is the cond ition today of
a large section o f humanity. But that this recognition didn't ever lead to
despair means that in it he glimpsed another possibility, tied to a di fferen t
mode of u nd erstanding the relation between the phantasms of death and
the power of li fe:
VVhen the visual sensalion confronts the invisib)(' force that conditio ns it,
it releases a force that is capable o f vanq uishing the invisible force, or even
befriending it. Life scream s at death, but death is no lo nger this all- toovisible thing that makes us faint; it is this invisible force that life detects,
Oushes out, and makes visible through the scnam. Death is j udged fro m
the point of view of Life, and not the reverse, as we Like to believe."
Birth
The second Nazi immuni tary disposirifto deconstruct with respect to its
deadly results is that of supp ressing birth. We saw how it presents itself ;ts
spli t in its actualizatio n and how it is dissociated in two vectors of sense
that are seemingly contradictory: on the one side, the exhibition and the
strengthening o f the generative capacity of the German people; on the
o ther, the homicidal fury that is d estined inevitably to inhibit it. Scholars
have always seemed to bave difficulty deciphering the cootradictioo between a politics of increasing the birthrate aod the antinat<t lism p roduced
first by a .negative eugenics aod tbeo by the elimination en masse of pregnan t mothers. Why did the Nazis commit the mselves so eagerly to draining that vital fount of life that they also wanted to stimulate? The biopolitical
paradigm furn ishes a first response to such a question, identifying precisely
the root of the genocidal d iscrin1ination in the excess of political investment
o n life. But perhaps a more essential motivation is to be traced in the nexus
(one that isn't only etymological) linking the concepts of"birtb" [nascita}
and of "natio n" in an ideological short-circuit that finds its rnost exasperated
expression in Nazism. What kind of relationsbip did the Nazis institute
between birth and m~tion? How were these superimposed in the name
of Nazism-indeed, how were they constituted precisely at their point of
intersection?
We know how the term "nation" is almost identical in almost all of the
principal modern languages and how it derives from the Latin na.tio, wh ich
in turn is the substantive form of the verb nascor. Naturally, in order for
the modern meaning of nation to become stable, a long process is re.quired
that doesn't leave untouched the o riginary rclatiorl with the coocept of
birth. Without ent.ering into the details, we can say that while for the entire
ancient and medieval periods the biological referent in nat ivity prevails
over the political one that is diffused in the concept of nation, in the modem phase the equilibrium between the two terms shifts until it is reversed
in fa,or of the latter. T herefore, if it were possible for a long period to designate as nariones groups of people that were joined b)' a common ethnic
provenance (or on ly by some kind of social, religious, or professional con tigu ity), afterwards ao institutional conno tation prevai ls." It is the genesis
and the development of territorial states that mark this passage: in order to
take on a political sign ificatio n, the bio logical phenomenon of birth (which
is impolitical in itself) needs to be inscribed in an o rbit of the state that is
unified by sovereign power. It was precisely in tb is way tba t a notion ,
which was used generically prior to that moment and often in contrasting
ways - it referred to otbers rather to themselves, as the Roman dichotomy
between uncivil and barbarian nariones an d the populus or the civitas of
Rome attests-came increasingly to assume that powerful charge of selfiden tification that still today connotes the national ideology. T he same
Declaration of Human Rights and of the Citizen (as before it habeas corpus} is to be underst ood in th is way: as the unbreakable bond that links
the bodies of subjects (s11dditi] to that of tbe sovereign.ln th.is perspective
we fu1d aga io the decisive reference to the category of "body." Leaving
aside its monarchical, popular, as well as voluntaristic and naturalistic declinations, the natio n is that tenitorial, ethnic, linguistic complex whose
spiritual identity resides in the relation of every part to the whole, which is
included in it. A common birth const itutes the thread that maintains this
body's identity with itself over the cou rse of generatio ns. It is what joins
fathers to sons and the living to the dead in an unbreakable cbain.lt constitutes in its con tinuity both the biological con tent and the spiritual form
of self-belonging to the na tion in its indivisible whole. We are dealing witb
a relation that isn't unlike what. we saw pass between the seman tics of flesh
The Philosoph)' of Bi"' 171
and that of the body. Just as the body constitutes the site of the presupposed
unificatio n of the anomalous mu ltiplicity o f Aesh, so the nation defi nes
the domain in which all births are co nnected to each o ther in a sort o f
parental id en tity that extends to the boundaries of the sta te.
With respect to this biopolitical dialectic, Nazism marks both a d evelopmen t and a ''ariation; a development because it assigns a value to birth
even more important in the formation of the German na tion.lt isn't only
the unbroker1 li ne that assures the biological continuity of the people across
generations, but also the material form or the spiritual material that destines the German people to d ominate all other peoples (given its abso lute
purity of blood ). But here the difference is fixed with respect to national as
well as other nationalistic models that precede it. In this case, we can no
longer s peak of the politicization of a notion {birth, precisely) that was originally impolitica l, b ut rather of a copresence between the bio logical sphere
a nd the political horizon. Tf the state is really the body of its inhab ita nts,
who arc in turn reun ified in that of the head, politics is nothing other than
the modality through wh ich birth is affirmed as the only living force o f
history. Nevertheless, precisely because it is imested with this immediate
political valence , it also becomes the fold alon g which life is separated
from itself, breaking into two orders tha t are not only hierarchically subo rdinated, b ut also rigidly j uxtaposed (as are those of master and slave, of
men and aniolals, of the living and the dead). It is from this perspective
that birth itself becomes the object of a sovereign decision that, precisely
because it appears to o riginate directly fro m it, transcen ds it, traversing it
along excluding lines. This is how the ambivalence of the Nazis with regard
to what was born is to be interpreted. On one side, the preventive exaltation
of a life that is racially perfect; on the othe r side, removing the one \vho is
assigned to dea th by the same statute of what is considered to be living.
They could die and needed to die because they had never truly been born .
Once identified with t.he nation, birth u ndergoes the same fate, as what is
also held in a biopolitical clench that cannot be loosened except by co llective death.
The same antinomy that characterizes the biopo liticaJ rela tion between
nation a nd birth is fo und a t the center of the category of fraternity. For a t
least two centuries now (that is, from when the republican motto of the
French Revolution was coi ned ), we k1low that t he notion of fraternity,
which. is originally biological or naturalistic, acquired an ii1evi table poli tical resonance. Nevertheless, it is precisely t.he comparison with the o ther
172
two truly significant words witb wbicb it is associated that reveals a deficit'
of theoretical elaboration. If liberty and equality have been analyzed, discussed, and defined at length, fratern ity emerges as one of the terms least
thought about by the political-ph ilosophical tradition. Why> Why is the
one that would appear to be the most comprehensible of the three concepts
still unanalyzed? A fi rst response to this question is to be sought in its originally impolitical characteristic (when not explicitly theological) that has
blocked any kind of historical translation. Leaving aside their anci.eot roots,
liberty and equality are constituted in the modern period and originar.e with
the two great political traditions tha t a re liberalism and socialism . This isn't
the case with fraternity, whose fortune seems limited an d completely consumed in the brief arc between 1789 and 1848. Indeed, with respect to the
o ther two principles of the Re,olution, fraternity is what is established later.
Although previously enunciated in 1789, it only begins to appear in officia l
documents between 1792 a nd 1793 when France, attacked on every side a nd
threatened irlternally, needed to find words and symbols capable of call ing
all to the indivisible u nity of the nation against its enemies. It is then tha t
the term becomes the fundamental and founding principle with respect to
the o ther two, which now emerge as subord inated to it both historically
and logically. Only if all Frenchmen will force themselves into a single will
can the oatioo obtain liberty aod equality for itself and for those who will
follow its example:"
Here is sketched a second and more essential motivation for the politicalphilosophical unthin kability of the category o f fraternity.'"' Political ph ilosophy doesn't fu lly grasp it not only because it is im political, bu t also because it is in tensely biopolitical. This means that fraternity isn't subtracted
from the concept because it is too universa l, abstract, and millenarist as
one might tbink, b ut, on tbe contrary, because it is too concrete, roo ted
directly in the natural bfos. The fact that it takes on strong national connotations in t.he same moment of its emergence on the political scene (as well
as a nati onali stic one as it appeals to the sacra lity of the French nati on)
con trasts in some way with its supposed un iversalism . Unless one wants to
a rgue (as not on ly Robespierre and Saint-Just did, but also Hugo and
Michelet) that France represents the u niversal because it is the coun try
around which the entire history of the world turns- on ly to discover quickly
that all the people that were to be buggered with such a co nviction wound
up inevitably assuming the same for themselves. At stake (much more thao
universal abstractions o f common justice) was, in reality, the reference to a
The Philosophy of Bi11s 173
self-identifica tion founded on the consanguinity of belonging to the same

natio n. More than "phratry;' fratern ity essentially refers to the fatherland
[patria/; it con firms the biological bond that joins in a direct and masculine
lineage the brother to the father (the "motherland" fmadrepatria/ has always
had symbolic connotations of virility). Now, if it is true that democracy is
often referred to the idea of brotherhood, that is because democracy, like aU
modern political concepts, rests o n a naturalistic, ethnocentric, and androcentric frarnework that has never beeo fully interrogated. Wbat preci.sely is
a "fraternal democracy"? Certainly, sublime accen ts can be beard in similar
expressions: a reference to substantial values that move beyond the fo rmalism of equal rights. Yet something different also resonates here and with a
more troubling tin1bre. It isn't the same thing to hold that all men ought to
be eq ual because they are brothers o r that they are brothers because they
are equal. Despite appearances, tbe category of brotberbood is more restricted and more particularistic; it is more excl usive than that of equality
i.n the specific sense that it excl udes all those who do not belong to the same
blood as that of the common fat.ber.51
This perspective makes visible another decisive feature of the idea of
brotherhood. The fact that at the moment of its maximu m diffusion it was
invoked against someone, o r even all of tbe non-French, reveals a conflictual,
when not bellicose, attitude that has been always hidden by its usual pacifist
coloration. Moreover, the figure of the brother (which a long tradition from
Plato to Hegel and beyond associated with that of the friend) had and has
to do with the enemy, as both Nietzsche and Schmitt argued.;' They explained that the true brother (and for that reason the t.rue friend) is precisely the enemy because only the enemy truly puts someo ne to the test. The
enemy confers identity through opposition; he reveals the borders or the
other and therefore also one's own borders. From Ctin aod Abel to Eteocle
and Polin ice to Romulus and Remus, absolute comity, which is to say fratricide, has always been figured through the couple of t.he brother, or even
of twins, as Rene Girard demonstrates when he sees the bloodiest confl ict
always erupting between close relatives and neighbors.n One could say that
blood calls forth blood. And whether metaphorically o r literally, blood becomes the principle of politics, politics always risks slipping into blood.
This was Freud's conclusion , the author who perhaps more tban any
o th er decrypted the paradox of fratcmity. As he tells it in Totem and Taboo,
one day the brothers unite, oppressed by a tyrao nical father.'' They ki ll
him and t.hey devour his flesh, taking his place. This sign ifies, in the first
1i4 The Philosoph)' of Bws
instance (and accord ing to a more "enlightened" in terpretation), tbat the

process o f civilization is connected to the substitution of a despotic a uthority, indeed, to the same p rinciple of a uthority, with a democratic universe
in which the power that is shared by the many replaces the power o f the
One. In this sense, d emocracy emerges as both the cause an d the effect of
the passage from vertica l dom ination to a ho rizonta l one, precisely from
Fa the r to sons. But in a closer a nd less ingenuous an alysis, Fre.ud's allegory
ex hibits a rnore troubling truth, namely, th e perpetuation of the paternal
domination even inside the democratic horizon of the brothers. What else
would brothers literally incorporating the dead father into th emselves
mean, if not that they are inexo rably destined to reproduce the distinctive
features (even if in a plural and d omesticated form)? The fact that from
such an act mo rality /l'attegimnmto morale}, which is to say the sense of
guilt for the homicide they have committed and the respect with regard to
the Law, signifies that the act remains ma rked by that trau matic event, by
the kill ing of someone who doesn't actually disappear from the scene, but
is perpetually regenerated in t.he line of descent from brothers to sons.
Once again the difference is prisoner of the repetitio n an d the dead once
again reach ou t and grab hold o f the Jiving.
Yet Moses rmd Monotheism is the Freudian text that most forcefu lly invests
the biopolitical superimposition of birth and nation.'' T hat it refers on
several occasions to To rem and Taboo (fo llowing to some degree the structural schema) need not hide the politicrll as well as the ph ilosoph ical novelty
o f an essay written in three phases between 1934 an d 1938: these dates are
enough to indicate the adversary to whom it is addressed. It concerns Nazi
anti-Semit ism as it is constituted precisely along a genealogical line that
joins national identity to the foundi ng moment of its origin. In differen t
fashion from those who refused to confront the Nazi dispositif, wbo limited
themselves sin1ply to invalidating the naturalistic presupposition, Freud met
the challenge on the same terrain. In other words, he doesn't. contest the connectio n made by Nazism between the form assumed by a peo pie and the
orig in of it.s founder. It is true that the national commun ity finds its own
identifying foundation in the act of its birth and therefore in the birth of
its most ancient Father- yet precisely because to call in to q uestion its purity and property also means to fun damentally undercu t the sell"-identifying
rncchan isrn of the people of which it is a part. T hi.s is exactly the strategy
Freud uses in Moses and Monotheism. lie understands perfectly well the
risk that he is runn ing as is evinced by t.he substantial series of warnings,
The Ph ilosophy of Bi11s 175
precautions, aod reservations disseminated throughout the text as if to defend it from something close by that threatens it. When he warns in the preamble that "to deny a people the man whom it praises as the greatest of its
sons is not a deed to be undertaken lightheartedly; he intends to warn the
reader that he is push ing up aga inst the adversary's position to such a d egree tha t be risks entering in a zone of indistinction with it." Why? Wh y
precisely was it that Nazism expropriated their identity from the )ewisb
people, denying tllat they migbt have a fonn, a type, or be a race? How can
one carry o ut this kind of expropriation, denying them even a founder by
attributi ng a diffe rent nationality to the fou nder, without converging on
the same an ti-Semitic thesis? Why not just categor ically oppose it? The
o pening that Freud bas created is io effect rather narrow. It doesn't concern
lessening the relation of the o rigin witb regard to the Jewish people (and
by extension to every people), which would mean adbering to the historicist
thesis against which Nazism will have no difficulty in establishing its radi cal position. Rather, it concerns placing the same ootion of origin uoder
an operation of deconstruction that decenters and overturns it in to its opposite: in an originary in/origin that, far from belo nging solely to itself,
splits from itself, divide.s into its own o ther, and thus in the o ther from its
own /nell'altro da ogni proprio}.
This is the political significance of the Egyptian Moses. Freud doesn't con test that Moses founded his people; indeed, Freud supports th is view with
greater force than is tradi tionally held. But he argues that Moses was able
to do it- that is, create a people-precisely because be did 110t belong to
them, because he was impressed with the mark of r.be foreigner and e\en
of the Enemy, of whom be is the natural son.lt is exactly for this reasonthat he was the soo of the jewish people -that he can be their Father and
that be can form tbem according to law proper, wbicb is to say the law of
another /di wz alnof, when not also the law of the other [dell'tlltro}.$' 1-Iowever, with th e relation between ethnic identi ty of r.he natio n and the birth
of its fathers secured (which Nazism insisted upon in primis), this means that
that people {and therefore every people) can no longer clain1 the purity of
their own race, which is already con taminated by a spurious origin. Not
only, but no peo ple can define themselves as the elect, as the jewish people
had fLrst done, aod tben late r the German people (albeit certainly in very
different fashion). No people wiUbe able to name themselves as such, that
is, furnished with a oational identity that is transmitted from father to son,
from the moment in the archetype of Moses, in which the father is nor. the
1i6 The Phjlosophy of Bws
true father, which is to say the natural father, and whose sons are not h is
true so ns-arriving at a point in wh ich these jewish sons with tremendous
effort tried to free themselves from their unnatural father, killing him exactly
as the brothers o f the primitive hordes in Totem and Taboo did. Afterward,
inevitably, they bowed to another law, or the law of the o ther, brought to
them by what wW be subsequently altered by Christianity. Wha t remains
in this uninterrupted sequence of metamorphosis and betrayal is tbe originary doubling of the Origi n, or its defin itive spli tting in a bio.ary chair\ th at
si multaneously un ites a nd j uxtaposes two founders, two peoples, and two
religions, begin ning with a birth that is itself double (j ust as is biologically,
after all, every birth). Anyth ing b ut ordered toward un ifying the two (or the
many in the one), birtb is destined to subdivide the one (the body of the
mother) in to two, before the subsequen t births in turn multiply those in
the plurality of infinite numbers. Rather than enclosing the extraneousness
within the same bio logical or political body (and so canceling it), birth now
puts {rovescia/ what is within tbe maternal womb outside. lt doesn't incor
porar.e, but excorporares, exter iorizes, and be nds outsid e (estroflettej. It
doesn't assume or impose b ut exposes someone (male or female) to the
event of existence. Therefore, it can not be used, in either a real sense or a
metaphoric sense, as protective a pparatus for the self-protection of life. At
the moment in which the umbilical cord is cut and the newborn cleaned
of amniotic fluid, he or sbe is situated in an irred ucible difference with re
speer to all those who have come before.$' With rega rd to them, he or she
emerges as necessarily extraneous and also foreign [strauieroj, sin1ilar to
one who comes for the first time and always in differen t form to walk the
earth . This is precisely the reason why the Nazis wan ted to suppress birth,
beca use they felt and feared that, rather than ensuring the continuity of the
eth nic filia tion, birth dispersed <lnd weakened it. Birth reveals tbe vacuum
and the fractu re from wbicb the id entity of every individual or collective
subject. originates. Birth is the first munus r.hat opens it to tha t in which it
does not recognize itself. Ann ihi lating birth, the Nazis bel ieved that they
were filling up the o riginary void, that they were destroying the murrus and
so definitively immunizing themselves from their traumas. It is the same
reason (albeit with perfectly reversed intensity) that p ushes Freud to place
it at the center of bis essay: not to force the m ultiplicity of birth into the
un itary calculation of the nation, but rather to place the alleged identity of
the nation under the plural law of birth .
The Philosophy of 8i"' 177
Haonab Arendt takes tbe same route at war's end. We already know that
her work cannot be situated with in a proper biopolitical horizon (if such
an expression were to co nnote a direct implication between political action and biological determination) . The body, insofar as it is body-wh ich
is to say, like an organism it is subjected to the natural d emands of protection and development of life - is radica lly extraneous to a politics that
assumes meaning precisely by freeing itself from the order of necessity. Yet
it is precisely o.n the basis of sud1 a n extraneousness witb respect to the
biopo litical paradigm that the political relevance that Arendt attributes to
the p henomenon of birth gains more promi nence. If there is a theme that
recurs with equal in te.nsity in all her texts, it is really this political characterization of birth or the "natal" fea tures of politics. Writing against a long
tradition that situates politics under the sign of death, Arendt refers precisely to the immunitary line inaugurated by Hobbes (not without an
obli.que glance at Heidegger's being-for-death). What she insists upon is
the originary poli ti.city of birth: "Since action is the political activity par
excellence, natality, and not mortality, may be the central car.egory of the
political, as distinguished from metaphysica l thought.";' lf the fear o f
death cannot produce anything b ut a co nservative politics, and there fore
be the negation itself of politics, it is in the event of birth that politics
finds the originary in1pulse of its own innovative power. Inasmuch as mao
had a beginning (and therefore is biroself a beginning), be is the condition
of begin n ing someth ing new, of giving life to a conuno n world.' 0
Here Arendt seems to open a perspective in political on to logy that does
not. coincide either with Greek political philosophy or with modern biopolitics, but refers rather to Roman usage alo ng a line that joins the creatio nism
of Saint Augustine to the Vugilian tradition. Birth, in a way that is different
from tbe creation of the world (which occu rred one time on tbe par t of a
single creator), is a beginning that repeats itself an infinite number of times,
unraveling lines of life that are always differen t. It is this differenr.ial plurality that is the point in wh ich th e Arendtian po liti cal on tology is separated
(or at least is placed on a different plane with respect to biopolitics). In both
cases, politics assumes meaning from a strong relationship with life; but
while biopolitics refers to the life of the h uman species in its to tality or to
that of a particular species of man, the object of politica l ontology is the
individual life as such, wh ich is to say that poli tics is constituted in the
doubled point of divergence or noocoincideoce of the individ ual life with
respect to that of th.e species, as well as the single action vis-a-vis th.e repeated co urse of daily life (which is marked by natural needs).
Yet just as 1 frorn the standpoin t of nature) the rectili.near lUOVern.ent of
mao's life-sp<>n between birtlt and death looks like a peculiar dcvi<Hion from
the com rnon natural rule of cyclical movement. thus action. seen from the
viewpoint of the autorn.atic processes wh ich seern. to detennine the course
of world~ looks like a miracle ... The mi racle that saves the world, the realm
of human affairs, from its normal, "naturalro ruin is ultimately the fact of
natality, in which the faculty of action is o ntologically roo ted. It is, in other
words, the birth of ne\v men and the nc\v be.ginning. the action they arc
ca pable of by virtue of being born."
At th is point we cannot help but see the antinomy o n wb icb rests tbe entire
disco urse in relation to tbe question of bios. It is clear that Arendt endeavors to keep politics sheltered from the serial repetition that tends to subject
politics to natu ral processes and then to h istorical processes as well, which
arc ever rnorc assimi lated to the former. What is surprising, therefore, is
the choice, wh ich sbe often sr.resses, o f assu ming a differential elemen t
with respect to the homogeneous circularity of biological cycle, precisely a
bio logical phenomenon that is in the final, and indeed in tbe first, instance,
birtb.lt is as if, notwithstanding ber refusal of tbe biopolitical paradigm,
Arendt was then brought to use against biopolitics a conceptual instrument
that was extracted from the same material - almost conJirming tbe fact
that today biopolitics can be confronted on ly fwm within, acwss a threshold
that separates it from itself and which p ushes it beyond itself. Birth is precisely this threshold. It is the un localizable place in space or the w1assimilable
moment in the linear flowing o f time in whicb bios is placed tbe maximum
distance from ziMor in wbich life is given form in a modality that is drastically distant from its own bio logical ba reness {nudititit/. T hat the reflection
on the relationship between life and birtb emerged in a mon umental book
on to talitarian ism, which is to say in a direct confrontation with Nazism, is
perhaps not unrelated to th is paradox. Wanting to institute a politica l
thought that is radically coun terposed to Nazi bio politics, Arendt, like
Freud before her (b ut in more explicit fashion), attacks p recisely the poin t
a t which Nazism had co ncentrated its own deadly power. As Nazism employed the p roduction and with it the suppression of birtb so as to dry up
th e source of political actio n, so docs Arendt recall it in o rder to rcacti.vatc
it. But there's more. just as Nazism made birth tbe biopolitical mechanism
for leading every form o f life back to bare life, in the same way Arendt
The Philosophy of BicJS 179
sought in it tbe onto political key for giving life a form that coincides with
the same condition of existence.
It has been said the perspective opened by Arendt rests o n a profou nd
antinomy relative to the theme of bios politikos. It appears cut by a caesura
that links the two terms in the form of a reciprocal diversity. lt is true that
poli tics, just like every human actility, is rooted in the mturalness of li fe,
but accord ing to a modality that assigns meaning to it precisely because of
the dista11ce from it. Birth consti.tu tcs the po int at wh icl1 one sees more
powerfully the tensio n between terms united by their separation: it. is the
glimmering mo ment in which bios takes up distance fro m itse lf in a way
that fron tally opposes it to z6e, that is, to simple biological life. Although
birth is innervated in a process- that of concep tion, gestation, and partu rition- that bas to do directly with the animality of man, Arendt thinks
birtb is wha t distinguishes man most clearly from the an imal, what exists
from what lives, politics from nature. Despite all the distance she takes up
from her former teacher, one can't help but sense i11 this political on tology
a Heideggerian tonality that ends up keepi ng her on this side of the bio political paradigm. The same reference to birth doesn't appear able {except
in metapho ric and literary terms) to penetrate into the so matic network
between politics and life. Out of what vital layer of Life is the politicity of
action generated? How are the individual and gen us linked in the public
sphere? Is it enough in this regard to evoke the dimension of plurality without making clear beforehan d its genesis a nd di recti on?
A diagonal response to this series of questions is contained in the wo rk
o f an a uthor who is less prone to directly interrogating the meaning of po litics, and so p recisely for this reaso n more likely to roo t it in its on togenetic
terrain. I am speaking of Gilbert Sirnondon, wbose thematic assonance
with Bergson and Whi tehead (without returning to Schelling's p hilosop hy
of nature) shouldn't h ide a more essential relation with Merleau -Ponty,
who dedicates his essay r:iudividu et sa ge11ese physico-biologique to Simon don, or with George Canguilhem along a vector of sense that we will analyze
sho rtly." Without wanting to give an accoun t of Simo ndon's entire system
o f thought, the points that ha,e to do directly with our analysis (precisely
the interrogatives that Arendt left open) are essentially two and are tigh tly
connected between them. The first is a dynamic concep tion of being that
identi.fics it with becom ing a nd the second an interpretatiOJl of this becoming as a p rocess o f successive individuations in diverse and concatenated
domains. Writing against monist and dualist p hilosoph ies that presuppose
180
an individual that is already fuUy defined, Simondon tu rns bis attention to

the always incomplete movement of the individua l's on toge nesis. In every
sphere, be it physical, biological, psychic, or social, individuals emerge from
a preindividualistic foundatio n that actualizes the potentialities withou t
e''er arriving at a defi nithe form that isn't in tu rn the occasion and the
material for further individuation . Every individual str ucture, at the moment
of its greatest expansion, always preserves a remainder that cannot be integrated wi.thin its owo dimension without reach ing a successive phase of
developme nt.. And so, as the bio logical individuation of the living organ ism constitutes the con tinuation o n another leve l of incomplete physical
individuation, in turn psychic indhiduation is inscribed in a different position, which is to say in the point of indeterminacy of the biological individuation that precedes it.
What can we conclude from th is with regard to our problem? First of
all , we can say that the subject, be it a subject of knowledge, will, or action
as modern ph ilosophy commonly understaods it, is never separated from
the living roots from wh ich it originates in the form of a splitting between
the somat ic and psychic levels in wh ich the first is never decided {risolle]
in favor of the second. Con trary to the Aren dtian caesura between life and
condition of existence (which is already Heideggerian), Simondon argues
that man never loses his relation with his living being. He is not other from
living (or more than living), but a living hum<m [viverrte umano). Between
the psychic and biological, just as between the biological and the physical,
a d ifference passes through no t of substance or nature but of level and function. T his means that bet.ween man and an imal-but also, in a sense, between the an imal and the \'egetal and between the vegetal and the natu ral
object- the transition is rather more fluid than was imagined, not only by
all tbe antb ropologisms, but also by the ontological pbilosopbies that presumed to contest tbem, by reproducing instead, at a differen t level, all their
human istic presupposi tions. Accordi ng to Simondon, wit.h respect t.o the
animal, man "possessing extensive psych ic possibilities, particu larly thanks
to the resou rces of symbo lism, appeals more frequently to psychism . . .
but there is no nature or essence that permits the founda tion of anthro
pology; simply a threshold is crossed:'6 ' Simo ndon defines crossing this
threshold - which shouldn't be interpreted either as a continuous passage
o r as a sudden transition of natu rein terms of"birth." And so when he
writes that "precisely speaking there is no psycbic individ uatioo, but ao in dividuation of the living that gives birth t.o the somatic and t he psychic;
The Ph ilMoph)' of Bios
181
we need to take the mean ing of that expression rather literally.' Every step
in each phase, and therefore every individ uation, is a birth on a different
level, from the moment that a new "form of life" is disclosed, so that one
could say that birth isn't a phenomenon of life, but life is a phenomenon of
birth; or also that life and birth are superimposed in an inextricable knot
that makes one the margin of open ing of the other:
The individual concentrates in himself the dynamic that gives birth to him
and which perpetuates the firsl o peration in a continuo us individuatio n; tv
live is 1"0 perpetuate ct birl'li tluJt is pernument and rehttive. Jt isn't sufficient
to define tlte living as an org-('lnism. The living is an org-Jnism on the basis of
the first individwltion; but it can Live only if it is an organism that organizes
and is organized througll and across time. The organization oftbe organ ism
is the result of a first individuatio n that can be called absolute. But the latter
more than life is the conditio n of life; it is the conditio n of that perpetual
birth that is life."
Here Simondon completely reverses th e suppressio rl of birth that the Nazi.s

employed as the di,-positiffor biopolitically reconverting life imo deathnot on ly by gu iding all of life back to the innovative potential of birth, but
by making out of it the point of absolute distinction with regard to death.
If one thinks about it, life and birth are botb the contra ry of death: the first
synchronically and the second diachronically. The only way for life to defer
deatb isn't to preserve it as such (perhaps in the immunitary form of negative protection), but rather to be reborn conti nually in differen t gu ises. But
the intensity of the relation that Simon don fixes between politics and bios,
which is to say between bio logical life and form of life, doesn't end here.
The selfsame fact that birth is reproduced every time the subject moves beyood a new thresho ld, experieocing a different fo rm of individuation, means
that birth deconstructs the individual in to somethiog tbat was prior to, but
also con temporaneously after, hin1. Psychic life cannot actualize the poten tial preindividual excepr. by pushi ng him to the level of the transindividual,
wh ich is to say by translating hirn and multiplyi ng him in the sociality of
the collective life. The transindividual-what for Simondon constitutes
the specific terrain of ethics and politics - maintains a dynamic relation
with that of the preindividual, who, unable to be individualized, is precisely
"placed in commoo" in a form of life tha t is richer and more complex. This
means that the individual (or better, the subject) that is produced by indi viduating itself is not defu1able outside of tbe political relationsh ip with
those that.share the same vital experience, but also with that collective, which
182
The Philoso ph)' of Bios
far from being its simple contrary or the neutralization of individuali l)', is
itself a form of more elaborate individuation. Nowhere more than here do
plu rality and singularity intersect in the same biopolitical node that grabs
hold of politics and life. If the subject is always thought through the form
of bios, this in tu rn is inscribed in the horizon of a cum that makes it one
with the being of man.
The Norm o f Life
Nazism's third immunitary dispositif, in whose overturning are to be found
the features o f an affirmative biopoli tics, is constituted by the absolute uormatiizatiorl of life. That the Nazis completely no nnativized life is not
something current interpretation allo ws for. Yet cou ldn't one object tha t
the uninterrupted ''iolation of the normative order characterized Hitlerian
totalitarianism and tbat such a d istortio n o f natural right (diritto] was effectuated p recisely in the name of the primacy of li fe over every abstract juridical p rirlCiple? Actually, althougb both these o bjcctior1s con tain a kernel
o f truth, they do not contradict (except apparently) r.he proposition with
which I began these reflections. As to the first question-the co nstitutively
illegal character o f Nazism-and withou t wanting to give minimum credit
to the self-interested opin io ns of Reich jurists, things are nevertheless more
complex than they might seem at fi rst. Certainly, from a strictly formal perspective, the never-revoked decree o f February 1933 witb which Hitler suspended the articles o f the Weimar Constitu tio n o n personal liberty situates
the twelve years that follow clearly in an extralegal context. And yet-as also
emerges from the double-edged statu te of the concept of the "state of exception" (which one can technically use to refer to t hat particular co ndition), a situation of extraJegality isn't necessarily extraj uridical. Tbe suspension of tbe effective (vigente/ law is a juridical act, even if of the
negative so rt. As o thers have argued, the state of exception is more thao a
simple normative lacu na; ir. is the opening o f a void in Jaw in tended to
safeguard rhe operation of the norm by temporally deactivating it. M.oreover, n ot on ly did the Nazis formally let the complexities of the Wein1ar
Constitution remain in force- albeit exceeding it in every possible waybut they even demanded that the Constitution be "no rmalized" by reducing the use of lbe emergency d ecree tbat had been abused by the preceding
regime. T his explains the cold welcome that Sdunittian dccisionism received
on the part of the regime on ce it was in power. What Nazism wanted was
not an order subtracted from the n orm o n the basis o f a continuous series
of subjective d ecisions, but, on the con trary, to ascribe them to a normative

framework that was objective precisely beca use it originated from the vital
necessities of the German people.
This last formu lation takes us back to the more general question of the
relationship between norm and life in the Nazi regime. Which of the two
prevailed over the other to such ao extent as to make it function oo the basis
of its own demands? Was it life that was rigidly normativized, or rather, does
t11e norm emerge as biologized? ActuaUy, as we saw i.n the precedi.ng chapter,
the two perspectives are not juxtaposed bur. rather int.egrated in a gaze that
includes them both. In the moment in which one appeals to the concept of
concrete, substantial, and material law against what is subjective and what
belongs to the liberal matrix (but also against every kind of jurid ical formalism}, the reference to the life of the nation appears largely to dominate. No
law can be superior (or simply com parable) to that of the German commun ity to preserve and a ugment its own bios. From th is point o f view, Nazi
"j urisprudence" is not attributable to a subjective or decisionistic radicalizatio n of positive law, but, if anything, to a perverse form o f natural right.
O bviously, by this we understand that for "nature" is not to be understood
either law expressed by the divine will or what originated with human reason, but just that biological layer in wbicb the nationa l order (ordinamento
naziorwle) is rooted. After all, isn't it a biological given, blood precisely,
that constitutes tbe ultimate criterion for d efining tbe juridic.1l status of a
person? Jn this sense, the norm is nothing but the a posteriori appli.cation
o f a present determination in nature: it is the racial connotation that attributes or removes the right to exL~t t.o or from individuals and peoples.
Howe\'er, th is biologization of law in turn is the result of a preceding
juridicalization of life. If it were otherwise, where would the subd ivision of
human bios into zones of different value be d erived from, if not from such
a juridical decision? It is precisely in this con tinual exchange between
cause and effect, int.ent.ion and outcome, that the biopolit.ical machine o f
Nazism is at its most lethaL In order that life can constitute the objective,
concrete, and factitious reference of law, it must hme already been p reviously normativized according to p recise ju ridical-political caesuras. What
results is a system that is doubly determined. Something else also emerges
from the combined competition between the power of d octo rs and tha t o f
judges in the application of t11e biopolitical (and therefore thanatopo li tical)
laws of Nazism. Biology and law, and life and norm, hold each o ther in a
doubly linked p resupposition. If the norm p resupposes the facticit.y of life
181 The Philosophy of Bio'
as its privileged coo tent, life for its part presupposes the caesura of the norm
as its preventive defi nit ion. Only a life that is already "decided" according
to a determinate juridical order can constitute the natural criteria in the
applicatio n of the law. From this perspective, we can say that Nazism, in its
own way, created a "norm of life": certainly not in the sense that adapted its
own norms to the demands of life, but in wbat closed tbe entire extension
of life. within the borders of a norm tbat was destined to reverse it into its
opposite. Directly applyi ng itself to life, Nazi law subjected it to a no rm of
death, which at the same time made it absolute while displaci ng it.
How can this terrible thanatopolitic.al dispositif be finally broken? Or,
better perhaps, how can we overturn its logic into a politics of life? If its
lethal result appe<tred to originate from a forced superin1position between
norm and nature, one co uld imagine that the way out might pass through
a more precise separation between tbe two domains. Normativism and
juris-naturali sm-both introduced again with the fall of the Nazi regime
as protective barriers against its recurring threat-followed the same path
from opposite directions: in the first case, auto nomizing and almost purifying the norm in an o bligation always mo re separate from the facticity of
life; in the other, deriving the norm from the eternal pr inciples of a nature
that coincides witb divioe will or, otherwise, with human reason. Yet the
impression remains that neither of these two responses bas stood the test
of time, and no t only because it is difficult to hypothesize the restora tion
of conc.eptual apparatuses anteceden t to totalitarian ism.' ' T he principal
reason is that neither the abso luteness of the norm nor the primacy of nature is to be considered external t.o a phenomenon like Nazism, which
seems to be situated exactly at the point of in tersection and tension of
their opposing radica l~lations. What else is the Nazi bio-la"' if not ao explosive mixture between ao excess of oormativism and an excess of naturalism, if oot a norm superimposed oo oature and a nature tha t is presupposed 1.0 the norm? We can say that in these circumstances the "norm of
li fe" was the tragically paradoxical fo rmu la in which life and norm are held
together in a knot that can be cut on ly by annihilating both.
Yet this knot c.an not simply be undone either, or worse still, ignored. lt
is here, beginning with that "norm of life;' that we need today to start, not
only to restore to the two terms the richness of their originary meaning, but
also to invert the reciprocally destructive relation that Nazism instituted
between tbem. We need to o ppose the Nazi tormativization of life with ao
attempt t.o vitalize that. of the norm . Bur. how? How sho uld we move here
a nd with wbat assumptions shou ld we begin? I believe th.at the theoretical

key of th is passage ca nnot be traced to any of the grand modern juridical
philosoph ies; nor will it be found in positivism, in juris-naturalism, in normathism, or decision ism (or at least in none of those p hilosophies that
modernity together b rought to completion and then did away with). From
this point of view, not only Kelsen and Schmitt, but also Hobbes and Kant,
emerge as un helpful for thin king biopolitics affirmatively. Either they are
constitutively outside its lcx:icon, as Kaut and Kelsen are, or they arc with.i.rl its
negative fold , as Hobbes and Sch mitt are. A possible (and necessary} thread
that we o ught to weave is found instead in the ph ilosophy of Spinoza- to
the extent tha t he remains external to or lateral with respect to the do minan t lines of modern ju ridical tradit ion. There is much to say (and much
has been said) about the stunning force with which Spinozian philosophy
destabiliz-es the conceptual apparatus of contemporary thought. But if we
had to condense in one expressio n the most sign ificant categorical step that
it produces with regard to the relationship between non n a nd nature, between life and law, I would speak o f the substitu tio n o f a logic o f presupposition with one o f reciprocal immanence. Spinoz.a doesn't negate (nor does
he repress, as o ther p hilosop hers do) the co nnection between the two domains, but deploys tbem in a form that situates them worlds apart from
what it will assume ii1 Nazi seman tics: oorm aod life caonot mutually p resuppose one <lDOther because they are part of a single dimension in continuous becomi ng.
Thanks to the path he takes, Spinoza c.an remove himself from the formalism of the modern contract [obbligazione}, in particu lar to that o f the
Hobbesian variant, withou t, however, falling in to what will be the Nazi
biological substantialism. Vl'hat keeps h im apart from both is h.i.s refusal of
that sovereign paradigm that, notwithsw nd ing a Utbe differences, is joined
to substantialism b y tbeir same coercive ten dency. When he writes in on e
o f the mosr. famous propositions in Political Treatise that."every natural thing
has as m uch right from Natu re as it has power to exist a nd to act;' he too is
thin king a "norm of life;' b ut in a sense that rather then presupposing one
to the o ther, joins them together in the same movement that understands
life as always already normalized and the norm as naturally furnished with
vital conten t. The norm is no longer what assigns rights and obligations
from the o utside to the subject, as iil modern transccndcntalisrn-pcrm itting it to do tbat which is allowed and proh ibiting tbat wh.icb is not-b u t
rather the intrinsic mod ality t.har. life assu mes in the expression of its own
186 The Philosophy o f Bios
uorestrainable power to exist. Spinoza's thought differs from all the other
immunitary ph ilosophies that deduce the transcendence of the norm from
the demand for protecting life and conditioning the preservation of life to
the subjection to the norm. He makes the latter the immanent rule that life
gives itself in order to reach the maximum point of its expansion.lt is true
that "each [particular thing] is determined by another particu lar thing to
exist in a certain way, yet the force by which eacb one perseveres in existing
follows from th e eternal necessity of the nature of God;' but such ao individual force doesn't acquire meaning as well as possibility of success except
within the internal extension of nature.' lt is for this reason that, when seen
in a general perspective, every form of existence, be it deviant or defective
from a more limited point of view, has equal legitimacy for living according to its own possibilities as a whole in the relations in which it is inserted.
Having neither a transcendent role of command nor a prescriptive function
with respect to which conformity and deformity are stabilized, the norm is
constituted as the singular and plural mode that nature every so often assumes in all the range of its expressions:
So if something in Nature appears to us as ridiculous, absurd, o r evil, this is
due to the fact that our knowledge is only partial, that wo arc for the most
part ignorant of the order and coherence of Natnre as a whole, and that
we want all things to be directed as our reason prescribes. Yet that which
our reason declares to be evil is not evil in respect of the order and laws
of universal Nature, but only in .respect of our own particular .oature. 71
In nowhere more than th is passage do we find the anticipated over turning

that Spinoza undertakes with respect to Nazi normalization. While the latter
measures the right to life or the obligation to die in relation to the position
occupied with respect to the biological caesura constituted by the norm,
Spinoza makes the norm the principle of unlimited equ ivalence for every
single form of life.
It. cannot be said that Spinoza's intuitions found expression and development in later juridical philosophy. The reasons for such a th eoretical block
are multiple. But in relation to our problem, it's worth paying attention to
the resistance of the philosophy of natural right fdiritw j as a whole to think
the norm together with life: not over life nor begim1ing[rom life, but in life,
\vhich is to say in the biological constitution of tbe living organism. Tb is is
why the few heils of t11e Spi nozian jud dical natu ralism (consciously or UJ1consciously) are to be found less among philosophers of natu ral righ t than
among t.hose who have made the object of t.heir research the development
The Philosophy of lli"s t87
of individual and co llective life. Or better: the moving line that runs from
the first to the second, constantly translati ng the one into the other. As we
know, it's what Simondon defines with the term an d the concept o f"transindividual:' It is no coincid ence that, beginnin g with Simondon, Spinoza
has been interrogated, b ut not (as Etienne Balibar believes) because Spinoza
negates individ uality as such." Rather, we can say tbat for Spinoza nothing
other than ind ividuals exists. These individua ls are infin ite modes of a substance that does not subtend or transcer1d them, b ut is that expressed p recisely in their ir reducible multiplicity; only that such individ uals for Spin oza are not stable and homogenous en tities, but elements that originate
from an d continually reproduce a process of successive individuations. This
occurs not only because, as Nie tzsche will later theorize, every individual
body is a composite of parts belonging to other individuals and in transit
toward tbem, but beca use its expansive power is proportional to the intensity a nd th e frequency of such an exchange. T hus, at the apex of its developrnerlt it finds itself part of a relatio n that is always rnore vast aod complex
with the environmen t t.hat lets it contin ue to the exten t that its own o riginary identity bas been enormo usly red uced.
All of th is is reflected in the Spinozian concept o f natural right. I said
earlier tbat the norm doesn't invest tbe subject from the outside because it
emerges from the same capacity of existence. Not o nly every subject is sui
juris, b ut every behavior carries with it the norm that places it in existence
within a more ge neral natural oder. Consid ering that there are as ma ny
multiple individuals as there are infin ite modes of the substance means
that the norms will be multiplied by a co rresponding n umber. The j uridical
o rder as a whole is the produc t of this plurality o f norms and the provisional result of their m utable equilibrium. It is for th is reason that neither
a fundamental norm from which all the other norms wou ld derive as consequence can exist nor a normative cri terion upon whicb exclusionary
measures vis-a-vis those d eemed abnormal be stabi lized. In short, the
process o f no rmativizatio n is the never-defi ned result of the comparison
and conflict between individual norms that are measured accord ing to the
differen t power that keeps tbem alive, without ever losing the measure o f
their reciprocal rela tion. To this dynamic, determined by the rela tion benveen individuals, is connected tbat relative to their internal transformation.!( the individual is noth ing but the momentary derivatio n of a process
of individuation, which at the same time produces it and is its product, th is
indicates as well that. the norms that the individual exp resses vary according
188 The Phjlosophy of Bws
to his or h.er d ifferent composition. As tbe h.uman body lives in a n infinite

series of relations with the bodies of others, so the internal regulation wi ll
be subject to continuous variations. 111ore than an immunitary apparatus
of self-preservation, Spinoza configures the ju ridical order as a meta-stable
system of reciprocal con taminations in which the juridical norm, rooted
in the biological norm, reproduces the !alter's mutations.
It is this type of arglll11entation that cao be. ascribed to Simondon's
a nalysis aloog the thread of transindividual semantics. When in L'individu
et sa genese plt)sico-biologique he writes that "the values are the p reindividual o f the norm; they express the connection between orders of di fferen t
size; born from the preindividual, they tend toward the postindividual,"
Sirnondon is negating all attempts to make absolute the normative system." That such a system is likened to an indhidual in perpetual mo tion
from the preindividualto the postindividua l indicates that there is never a
mome nt in which the indi,idual can be enclosed in h imself or be blocked
in a closed system, and so removed frorn the movernent that binds hun to
his own biological matrix . From th is poin t of view, the on ly \alue tha t
remains stable in the transition from the norm of one system to another is
the awareness of their translatability in always more diverse and necessarily perishing forms. T he most complete norma tive model is indeed what
already prefigures the movement of its own deconstruction in favor of
another that follows it: "In order for tbe normativity of a system of oorms
to be complete, it's important that there be withi n it both its prefigured
destruction as system and its possible translation in another system accord ing to transductive order."" It is true that there exists a natural tendency
to imagine absolute and u nchangeable norms, but that too is part of an
ontogenetic p rocess that is structurally open to the necessity of its owo becoming: "Tbe tendency to eternity becomes therefo re the consciousness of
the relative: this latter is oo longer the will to stop becom ing or to render
absolute a n origi n and to privilege normatively a structu re, b ur. the knowledge of the meta-stability of the no rms.'''; Just like Spinoza before h im,
Simon don also places the constitution of norms with in the movement o f
life and makes life the primary source for the institution of norms.
lfSimondon tightens norm and life in an affirmative nexus that strengthens both, the most explicit philosophical attempt to vitalize the oorro is
owed, however, to his teacher, Georges Canguilhem.lt's certai.n.ly not the case
here to coosider the irnportaot passages tbat make up Canguilhem's reso lute opposition to Nazism, many of wh ich are biographical. Cangu ilhem
The Philosoph)' of Bios 189
was called in 1940 to Strasbo urg to take up tbe chair left free by the mathematician Jean Cavai lles, a partisan who d ied figh ting Nazism. Cangu ilhem also actively participated in the resistance u nder the pseudonym Lafo nt. I wou ld say that nothing about his philosophy is comprehensible
outside of th is military commitment! The entire conception of bios to
wbich he ded icated h is work is deeply marked by it, beginning with the idea
of "ph ilosophy of biology;' wb icb in itself is counterpose.d to the Nazi's
programmatic anti ph ilosoph ical bio logy. To thi nk li fe ph ilosoph ically, to
ma ke life the pertinent. horizon of philosophy, signifies for h im distancing
it from an object ivist paradigm that, tha nks to it.s alleged scientificity, ends
up canceling its dramatically subjective character. Bu t even before doing
so, it's worth challenging tba t reductio n of life to a simple materia l, to
b rute life, that Nazism precisely had pushed toward its most ruinous conseq uences. When he writes tbat "heahb is in no way a demand of the econo mic order that is to be weighed when legislating, but rather is the spon taneous un ity of the cond itions for the exercise of life;' be can't help but
refer crir.ically and above all to Nazi state medicine, which had made tha t
bio-economic p roced ure the hinge of its own politics of life and death.''
Against it he offers the appare ntly tau to logical thesis that "the though t o f
what lives needs to assume its idea from the living"; here he doesn't only
wan t to replace subjectivity at the center of the biological d imension, b u t
also to institu te a dynamic interval between life and its concept: tbe living
is the one who always exceed s the objective para meters of life, which in a
certain sense always lie beyond itself, in the median statist ic on the basis
o f which its suitabi lity to live and die is measured-' If Nazism stripped
away every form of life, nailing it to its nude material existence, Canguilhem reconsigns every life to its form, making of it something unique and
unrepeatable.
The conceptual instrument he adopts for such an end is precisely tbe category of the norm, wh ich is assumed by juridical, as well as sociological, an thwpological, a nd pedagogical traditions as a descriptive and prescriptive
measure for valuing human behavior! Canguilhem ascribes to the norm
the meaning of the p ure mode or sta te of being. In such a case, n ot only
health but also disease constitu tes a norm that is not superimposed on life,
but expresses a specific situation of life. Before bim, bmile Durkheim, in
"Rules for the Disri.nction of the Normal fwm the Pathological;' had recognized "tbat a fact can be termed pathological only in relation to a giveo
species;' but also that "a social fact can only be termed no rmal in a given
190
The Philosophy of Bio'
species in relation to a particular phase, likewise d eterminate, of its d evelopment."'" Canguilhem pushes further this "dialectical logic": what is d efined
as abnormal not only is included (albeit with its own fixed characterization)
within the norm, bu t becomes the condition of recogn izability and before
that of existence. It is for th is reason "that it is not paradoxical to say that
abnormal, \\hile logically second , is existen tially first."' ' What would sucb
a ru.le be that is o utside the possibility of its infraction and bow wou ld it
be defined? In the biological field, io1 fact, the normal state (as it were, of
full health) is not even perceptible as such. To affirm, as the doctor Leriche
does, that " health is life in the si lence of organs;' means that it is precisely
illness that reveals to us negatively all of the physio logical potentiality o f
the organism." In o rder to be raised to a level of consciousness, beaJth needs
first to be lost. It is because of this second arrangemen t with respect to
wha t negates it that the norm cannot be p refixed or imposed on life, but
o nly inferred from it. Here the deconstruction is already evident that, begin ning from the biological paradigm (liberated in turu froon every presupposed objectivization), Canguilhem under takes with regard to t.he juridical
norm.' While this norm, which establishes a code of behavior that is anterio r to its actuation, necessarily needs to fo resee the possibility of the devia tion of life (and therefore of sanctions with respect to it), the biologica l
norm coincides with tbe vital condition in wbich it is manifested: "[A)o
orga nism's norm o f life is furnished by the organ ism itself, con tained in its
existence ... a humru1 organ ism's norm is its coincidence with the o rga nism
itself!'., Once again it is the "norm o f life" that is in play, b ut according to
an order that, rather than circumscribing life with in the limits of the norm,
opens the norm to the in fin ite un predictability of life. To the necessary
negativity of the j uridical norm - as Kelsen reminds us, every command
can be expressed in tbe form of a prohibition- responds the constitutively
affirmative nature of the biological.' Contrary to the Nazi idea tbat there
exists a type of life which from its inception belongs to death, Canguilhem
reminds us that death itself is a p henomenon of life.
Of co urse, it is also a negative phenomenon, like a disease that precedes
an d in turn determines it. But tbe negativity of d isease {and more so death)
doesn't lie in the modificat ion o f a properly original norm, as theories o f
degenera tion would bave it.lt lies, on the con tra ry, in the organism's incapacity to modify the norm in a hold t11at crushes the norm on itself, fo(cing
it in to an infin ite repetitioo . I-I ere Caoguilh.em grafts th e most innovative
The Ph ilosophy of Bio<
191
part of h is proposal, situating it precisely in tbe point of connection and

difference between normali ty and norma tivity. De rived from the Latin
norma, both terms tend to come together in a defin itio n that at o nce superimposes them while stretching them apart. Completely normal isn't the
person wbo corresponds to a prefixed proto type, bu t the individual who
preserves intact bis or ber own normative power, wh ich is to say the capacity to create continua lly oew oorms: "No rmal man is normative man, the
be ing capable of establish ir\g new, even orgaoic forms.""' It is th e point of
maximu m deconstruction of the inununitary paradigm and r.he open ing
to a di fferent biopolit ical lexicon: the med ico -biological model, em ployed
in an in tensely self-preserving key by all o f modernity [tradizione moderuaj
(not to men tion that of tota litarianism), is bere oriented to a radically innovative mean ing. As on ly Nietzsche o f the "great health" had g lim psed ,
biological normality doesn't reside in tbe capacity to impede variatio ns, or
even diseases of the o rga nism, b ut will be found rather in integrating them
within a different normative rnaterial. If one irlterprets life according to a
perspective t.hat isn't dominated by the instinct of preservatio n; if, as Kurt
Goldstein had a rgued (in a direction, by the way, that Canguilhem himself
take.s up and elaborates), this instinct isn't to be considered "the general
law of life b ut the law of a withdrawn life; then disease will no longer be
configured as extreme risk, b ut rather as the risk of not being able to face
new risks, sucb as the atrophying of what is natu rally imperiling about
hu man natu re: "The healthy organism tries less to mai ntain itself in its
presen t state and environ ment than to realize its natu re. Th is requires that
the organ ism, in facing risks, accepts the eventuality of catastrophic reactions:'" T he logic of the living is capable of in trod ucing a powerful semantic in the juridica l norm against the imrnunitary normalization of life that
is able to p ush beyond its usual d efinition.
The last work Gilles Deleuze left us is titled Pure Immanence: Essa)'S on a
Life ." A short text, in some ways elliptical and incomplete, it does, however, contain all the threads that we have wo,en to this po int under the
sign of an affirmathe biopolitics. De leuze commences with the definition
of a "transcendental camp: understood as something that does not refer to
an object or a subject, b ut rather a poten tializing or depoten tializing flow
that moves bet,veen one sensation and another. Such a cbaracterization is
also to be contrasted with the noti on of consciousness to the degree that,
always focused on the constitution o f a subject separated from the object
192
proper, it ends up inevitably establishing a relationship of reciproca l tran scendence. Against the latter, the transcenden tal field is presented as a
plane of absolute immanence: it doesn't refer to anything else but itself. It
is here that the category of bios comes in to play: "We will say of pure immanence that it is A LJ FE and nothing else ... A life is the immanence of
immanence, absolute immanence: it is complete power, complete bliss:~
Deleuze traces the conceptual genealogy in the later works of Ficbte, for
whom intu i.tion of pure activity is noth ing 6x.ed.90 It isr1't a being, but precisely a life, for Maine de Biran as well (without speaking of Spinoza, Niet.zsche, and Bergson, who remai n the leading lights for Deleuze). Surprisingly,
though, Deleuze's text introduces another un usual reference, to Dickens,
and in particular to the novel titled Our Mutual Frie11d (in French L'11111i
commrm), which seems to inscribe the question of bios in that of commr4llitas and vice versa. I wou ld say that his "theoretical" n ucleus (thougb we
cou ld say biophilosoph ical) resi.des in the con necti ng and divergi ng point
between the life and precisely a life!' Here the move from the determ inate
ar ticle to that of the indeterminar.e has the function of marking the break
with the metaphysical feature that connects the dimension of life to that of
individual conscio usness. There is a modality of bios that cannot be inscribed with in the borders of the conscious subject, and therefore is not
attributable to tbe form of tbe individ ual or of the persoo . Deleuze seeks it
out in the extreme line in which life (Ia vita] encounters [s'itrcolltra} or
clashes with /si scon tra j death. It is that which happens in Dickens's text,
when Rider hood, still in a coma, is in a suspended state between life and
death. In those moments, in which tin1e seems r.o be interrupted and opened
to the absolute force of the event, the fl icker of life that remains to him
separates Rider hood from his individual subjectil'ity so as to present itself
in all its simple biologica l textu re, that is, in its vital, bare facticity:
No one h<1s the least regard for the rn<1n: with them all, he has been an object of avoidance, suspicio n. and aversio n; but the spark of life within him
is cllriously separable from himself now, and they have a deep interest in it,
probably because it is life, and they arc living and nmst die."
The interest o n the part of those present fo r this uncertain spark of life
that "may smolder aod go out, or it may glow aod expaod" is born, therefore, from the fact that io its absolute singularity, it moves beyond the
sphere of tbe individual to be rooted in an impersonal datum-in the circumstance that, sooner or later, one dies (si muore]:"
Between his life and his death, there is a moment that is only that of a life
playing with death. The life of the utdi.vidual gives way to an lwpersonaland
yet singular life that releases a pure event freed fron1 the accidents of internal
and e~"ternal life, that is from the subjectivity and objectivity of what happens: a '' Homo tantumn with who m everyone empathizes and '"'ho attains a
sorl of beatitude.Jt is a haecceity no longer of individuation but of singulariz..:uion: a life of pure imm:;mencc, neutral, beyond good and evil, for it
was only the subject that incar n<lled it in the midst of things that made it
good or bad. The life of such individuality lades away in rovor of the singular
life iJnmanent to a man who no longer bas aua.we, though he cau be mistaken for no other. A singular essence, a life.'
A singu lar [cosi} life, the singularity of a life, Deleuze contin ues, is not distingu ishable {i11dividuabilej, that is, is not ascribable to an indiv idua l,
because it is in itself generic, relating to a genre, but also unmistakable be
cause it is unique in its genre - as that of a newboro, who is similar to all
th e others, but d ifferent from each of them for the tonality of the voice, the
irltensity of a sm ile, the sparkle of a tear?; lt is constitutively irnpropcr, and
for that reason co mmo n, as pure difference can be, the difference that isn't
defined fro m anything other than from its own same differing {differire).
Th is is how the warning that appears in the section on singularity in The
Logic of Sense o ug ht to be understood, according to wh ich "we can not accept the alternative .. . ; eitber singu larities already comprised in individu als and persons, o r the undifferentiated abyss: The difference, which is to
say the singu larity, doesn't reside on the side of the individual, but rather
of the impersonal- or a person t hat doesn't coincide with any of those
(forms] in wh ich we are accustomed to decline the subject (I, you, he),
but, if anywhere, in that of the "fourth person;' as Lawrence Ferling hetti
paradoxically expresses it." Which is to say, in the g rammar of knowledge
and of power tbat has always excluded it:
far from being mdividual or personal, singularities preside over the genesis
o f indi\iduals and persons; they are distrib uted in a "potential" which admits
neither Self nor I. but \vhich produces them by acrualizing or realizing
them, although the figures of this actualization do not at all resemble the
realized potencial. so&

It is the classic and controversial Deleuzian theme of the "virtual," but at
the same time of tbe preindil,idual and of the traosindividual that Simondon posits. Delcuze hi mself refers to it, citing Sirnondon's assertion that
"the living lives at the limi t of itself, on its limit," which is to say a crease in
which subject and object, internal and ex ternal, and organic and inorgan ic
>94 The Philosophy of Bios
are folded.'00 An imperso nal singularity (or a singular impersonality), which,

rather than being impriso ned in the confines of the individual, opens those
confines to an eccentric movement that "traverses me n as well as plants
and an imals independently of the matter of their individuation an d the
forms o f their personality."101
In such a mo,,e we can glimpse something that, while still not tracing
the figure of an affirmative biopo litics, anticipates more than one feature.
If we superimpose the pages of Dickens to wh ich reference was already
made, we perceive that these kinds o f features emerge once again from the
reversal of Nazi thanatopolitics: the life that quali fies t he experience o f
Riderhood , depersonalizing it, is, as in the Nazi laboratory, in direct contact
with death. Wbat Dickens calls "outer husk" or a "flabby lu mp of mortality"
has not a little to do with the "empty shells" and "life unworthy of life "o f
Binding and Hoche- with Treblinld s flesh of the ovens - yet with a fundamental difference that has to do with a change in orien ta tion ; no longer
from life seemi ngly to d eat11, b ut from death scern ingly to a life in wh ich
Riderhood awakes.' 0 ' When Deleuze speaks o f a "sort of beatitude" as a
condition that lies beyond the distinction between good and evil (because
it precede.s, o r perhaps because it follows, the normative subject that places
it in being), be is also alluding to "a norm of life" that doesn't subject life to
the transcendence of a norm, b ut makes the norm the immaoeo t impulse of
life. The appeal to the impersonal as tbe oo ly vital and singular mode isn't
unrelated to the going beyond a seman ti cs of the person that has been
represented from the origin of o ur culture in its ju ridical status (at least insofar as the law was and con tinues to function in rela tion to the intangible
individuality o f the person}. lt is this biojuridical node between life and
norm that Deleuze invites us to uotie in a form that, rather than separating
them, recognizes the one in tbe other, and discovers in life its immanen t
norm, giving to the oorm the potentiality [potmZ11) of life's becoming. That
such a unique process crosses the entire extension of life without. p roviding
a continuous solution -that any thing that lives needs to be thought in the
unity o f life-means that no part o f it can be destroyed in favor of another:
e'ery life is a form of life a nd every form refers to life. T his is ne ither the
conten t nor the fi nal sense of bio politics, but is a minimu m its p resupposition. v\fhethe r its mea ning '"ill again be disowned in a politics of death
o r affirmed in a politics of li fe will d epe nd on the mode in which co ntemporary thought will JoUow its traces.
Notes
Translator's lntroductioo
I. Roberto Esposito) Commtmiras: Odgine e destiuo della c.ommirt'l (Turin: Ein
a udi, t998).
2. Or, when not "exposing" p resumed te rro rists, fOrce-feeding t he m so as to pro
teet their lives. See Luke M itchell, "God Mode," flllrp<r's 313 (August 2006): 9-11 . T bc
American business in question (though by no means the o nly one) is \<Val Mart. where,
in order to d iscourage <unhealthy job applicants, it was suggested that VYal-l\<tart arrange
fo r au jobs to include some physical activity (e.g., all cash.icn; do some cart -gathedngY''
C'\<VaiMart Memo Suggests VVays to Cut Employee Benefit Costs:' New York Times.
October 26, 2oo;).
3. NikJas Luhmann. Social Systems, t rans. John Bednarz Jr. with Dirk Baecker (Stan
fotd, Cnlif.: Sta nford Un iversit}' Press. 1995)~ Do n rla Harnway, "Biopolitic.~ and Post
moderll Bod ies," in Simimrs, Crl>org$ aud H'nme-u: The Reinvent.iou of Natt~rc (New
Yo rk: Routledge,1991), 203- 30; and }cJ n BaudriUard, The Trr.msparenc)'ofEvil: Essn)'S on
Extreme Phe-uomeua (New York: Verso, 1991), 85. Co1npare as well Robert Unger's dis.
c~rssion and p roblcmatiz.ation of "im munity rights' and radic..'ll democracy in False
Necessity: Anti~Neu.s:tirariau Social T!Jcorr ;n rlre Service of Raditcal Democrac.x (Ca m ~
bridge: C.mbriclge University Press, t987), 5t3-17, 530. My thanks to Adam Sitze fo r
drawing m)' 1Uent ion to Unger 's important contriburion to immunity thcoq.
4. Agnes Heller a nd Ferenc Feher, Biopolirics (Brookfield: Aldershot, t994); Agnes
HeUer a nd Sonja J>unrscher Rickmann , t:d s., lhe Politics of tlte Bod)', Race, tmd Nature
(Averbury: Aldershot, 1996); a nd idem, Theory of Moderniry (Malden, Mass.: Blackwell,
l999)- Fo r Mark C. Taylo r, sec Nots (Ch icago: U~ ivcrsit)' of Ch icago P<ess, 1993), as well
as Hidir~g (Chicago: University of Ch icago Press. t998).
5. Jacques Derrida, '<Fait h and Knowledge: The Two Sources o f Religion; in On
Rdigitm, cd. Jacques Den ida and Giaon.i Vatrimo (Sta nford. Catif.: Stanford U.n ivcrsiry
Pres.s. 1998); The Politic.s of Friendship, t rans. George CoUins (New York: Verso, 1997);
"Auto il't ununit}': Real and Symbo )jc Sujcides," irl Philosopilr in tJ Time ofTuror: Dia.
logues with }Urgen Hnbermas and jacques Derrida, ed . Giova nn a Bo rradori (Chic-ago:
19)
l96 Notes to Translator's Introduction

UniYersity of Chicago Press. ZOOJ); :md Rogue.<: 'Ii"o fissnrs tm Reason (Stanford. C.alif.:
Stanfo rd University Press. zoos).
6. l\.{ichel Foucault, ~societ)' J\fusr Be Defeuded~: Lectures ar rile College de FrauceJ
I97S- l9J6, ed. M::1uro Berta ni and Alessand ro fontana. trans. Dmrj d l\lac<W (New York:
Picado r, 2003). See a lso hjs lectures from 1978 to 1979, collected in Naissaru:e rfe Ia
birJpdlil1'que: Cdurs au College de Pnmu (1978-J.979), under the gujdaocc of Alessandro
Fontana (Paris: Seuil, 2004).
7. Giorgio Agamben, Homo Sneer: Sovereigr1 Power and Bare Life, trans. Daniel
Hdler-Roazcn (Stanford, Calif.: Sta nfo rd Universit)' Press, 1998); Remrumts r1[Auschwitz:
The Witness and the ArchiJie, t rans. Dan iel Heller-Roazen (New York: Zone Books,
1999); and The O ptu: h1an ami Animal, trans. Kevirl Atte11 {Stan fo rd, Ca.lif.: Sta rlfo rd
Unive rsity Pre..ss, 2.0 04).
8. Michael Hardt and Antonio Negti, Empire (Cambtidge: Harvard University Press>
2000) and Multitude: Wtlr and Democracy in the i\gt tJf Empire (New York: Pengu il1
Press. 2004).
9. See in th is regard Espo.sito's eal'lier works on political philosophy: Vico e R(J(lSScau
e il mOtlem.o StMo borghese ( Bari: De Donato, 1976)~ La politica e Ia storia: A1uchiavelli e
\fico (Naples: Liguori, tg8o); Ordine e cor~jlitto: Macl1icwelli cIa lett:e.rnrura poUtim del
Rinascime1llQ itnlimw (Naples: Liguori. 1984); Categmie dell'impolit-ico (Bologm: Jl
Mulino, 1988)~ Nove pensieri sulfa politia' (Bologna: 1l Mulino, 1993); and L'origine della
politica: Hannalt Areudt o Simoue Wei!! (Rome: Donzelli, 1996).
10. Judith Butler. Prea~rious Life: Tlte P(Jwcr.f "/Mourning tlnd Violence (London:
Verso. 200,1) and Gi11ing nu A.ccomrt of Ont>self: A. Critique of Ethical Violence (New York:
to rdham Un.iver:sity Press, .2005); Ke ith A.nscll-Pear:soo, 'the Viroid Life: Perspectives Ml
Nietz!.che and tile Transhuman ConditiotJ (New York: Ro utledge, 1997) and Germitwl
Life: The Dijfereuce and Reperirion of Delwu (New York: Routledge, 2000); )urgen
Haber: mas, Tlte Future of 1-Jrm um Ncuure (london: Polit)r Pr:css. 2004); and Rooald
Dworkin, Life's Dominion: Arz Argt.,mellt about Abortion, Euthanasia, rmd Individual
Freeddnr (London : Vimage Books, 1994) as well a s Sovcttign Virt1,c: The TlzeorJ' ami
Practice of Equalit)' (Cambridge;.: Harvard University Press, 2000 ).
I L. Kad Binding and Alfted Hoche, Die Freigabe der Vernidttung lcbensrmwcrten
LtfJen: lhr Mass tmd iltrc Form (Leipzig, 1920). SelectiorlS frorn the work were t r:anslated
into English in 1992. See "Pc;rmitti ng the Destructio n of Unwo rthy Life;' in Lai... and
Medici11e S (1994): 23t- 65.
12. Roberto Esposito , Jmnumitas: Protezione e negazione della vita {Turin: Einaudi ,
20 0!) .
13. Esposito. CtmHmmita$, x_ii.

J1. Em ile Benveniste. bu{o-Europetm Language mu{ Societ)~ trans. Eli.zaberh Palmer
(Co ral Gables, Fla.: Univers ity of Miam i Press> 1973), and Marcel ~lauss, The Gift: The
Porm and Reason for E:-cclwnge iu l\rchaic Societies, trans. VV. D. JLnUs (Lo ndon: Routledge, 20<>2).
15. Esposito. Cmmmmittls, .xji.i.
16. lbid.J xiv.
17. Cf. the chapter in Commtmitasdedicated to guilt: ''Community is definable o nly
on the basis of the lack fr:om which it der:ives a nd that inevitably coo notes it precisely
as an absence or defect of community" (33).
18. See "'Immu.ni.ty" in chapte r 2.
J9. Ibid.
No1es 10 Traos]ators lnlroduc:tioo 197

20. Ibid.
2 l. Ibid.
22. What Esposilo has done, it seems to me, is to have drawn on Nancy's arguments
in 1'hc lrwpcrativc Cvmmunity regarding precisd)' the excessive natu re of c:ommunjry
vis-a -vis the me taphysical subject. Nancy wrile.s that "community does no t weave a
sup~dOI.', immOI:ta l, 01.' t ransmortal Ji(c between subjects . .. but it is COn$titutivc l}', to
the extent that it is a matter of 'constitution' here, calibrated on the death of those
whom we call, perhaps, wrongly, its (members' (inasmuch as it is not a question of
o rgan.ism ).'' Esposjto demonstrates instead that the calibration of \Vhich Nanq' speaks
doesn't j ust involv(' the futu re deaths of the communjty's '< members;' but a lso revolves
around the fnorta.l th reat thai the other members represellt for each other. It is precisely this threat and the calls fo r imnnmiz.atjon from it that explain why so many have
in fact milde the q uestion of community "il quest inn of organism." Or better, it is precisely the UJlretle.cted natu re of com murlity as organism that requi res deconstruction.
Only in this way wiU the biopolitical origins of commu nity be made d ear vi;;1 co m
m unity's aporia in immunity (Jean-Luc. Nancy, The luoperat:ive Conmumil)i ed. Peter
Connor, lrans. Peter Connor, Lisa Garbus. Michael HoUand, and Simone Sawhney
!Minneapolis: Univers ity o f Minnesota Press, 1991], 14).
23. Sec '' lmmuniry'' in chapter 2 .
2'1. Rossella Boniw Oliva's an;;1Jysis of the i mmunization pa r.-.digm is :' propos: '' The
rou te of a mature modernity unbinds t he original'ity of t he relation Ibetween zoon
and the poliricaiJ a nd makes immanent the reasons of living with fc:um-vivere j, which
is always assumed as a subsequent and therapeutic step fO r the condition o f solitude
aod the insecurity o f the individual''(" from the lmtnunc Communit}' to the Communitarian Immunity: On the Recent Reflections of Ro berto Esposito," Diacrit;cs. 36:2
(summer 2006).
25. Michel .Foucault, "GovcrnmenlaUt}'," in The ftJ uc(wlt F..Jfett: Studies in GOl'L'm
memalit)' ed. Graham Bu rceiJ, Colin Gordon, and Peter MiUer (Chicago: University of
Ch icago Press, 1991), 103.
26. Foucault, 'Societ)' Must Be Defended,.., 2.53.
27. Butler, Precarious Ufe, 24. See as well Butler's discussion of the opacity o f the
subject: ''The o pacity of the subject ma>' be a consequence o f its being conceived as a
relat ional being. one whose early a nd primary relations a re not ;;1Jways available to con
scious knnwledge. Moments of unknowingness about oneself tend to emerge in the
con1ex:t of rc1atjons to ocher:>. suggesting that these relations caU ~1 pon p rimary forms
of rel;;1tionality t hat a re no! always available to explicit and reflective thematiz.ation"
{Butler, Giving an ,tccmmt vf Oneself, 20 ) .
28. Butler, Pree-arivus Life. 20.
29. Butler does co me dose to Esposito's position when describing the violent> selfcentered subject : "lts :tctions const ituh~ the building of a subject that seeks 10 resto re
and maintain its mastery through the systematic de.struclion of ils m ultilateral rela
t ioos .. . It shores itself u p, seeks to reco nstitute its iruagi.ncd wholeoess, but ooly at the
p rice of denying its own vulnerability, jts dependency, its exposure, where it exploits
those very ffatures in others~ thereby making those featu res "other to' ilself' ( ibid., 41).
30. Robel.'tO Es-posito, "J otroduzione: l Crroin.i della politka," in Oltra Ia ptJiil'ic.:a:
Aantologia dell'impoliticv (Milan: Bruno Mondadori, 1996)t 1. Lest [ a ppear to reduce their
respective positions to a Hobbesian dedelsion of biopolitics in Esposito and a Hegelian
search fo r recognjtion in subject positions in Butler, eac.h docs recognize the need to
198 Notes to Tmnshnor's Introduction

m uster some sort o f new understanding of I be changing conditions o f "'' hat qualifies as
life. For Bufle r. that seouc:h is p remised on the need to enlarge '' rhe differcnfi:' l ~tUoc:a
tion of grievability that decides what kind of subject is and m ust be grieved": hence the
impo rta nce she place{; on narratjvcs of m ulrilatemlism and changing the norm:1tiw
schemes o f what is or isn't human proffered by the media ( Butler, Pruarious Lift~. xiv).
for his part, E.sposilo chooses to foc us oo the process of .i odividua li.zatioo that occui."S
at both the individual and coUective level. a rgu ing that ''if the subject is always thought
within the form of bfos, this in turn is inscribed in the horizon of a cum Iwit h I that
makes it one with the being of man'' (See "Philosophy aft:er Nazism'' in ch3ptcr 5.). T be
tit le Bios comes into its own here as a te rm that marks the vital experjenccs that t he in d ividualized subject shares a nd has " irl commo n.. politically with others. Esposito's excursus o n life as a for m o f birth that he elabo rate.s in chapter 5 may in fact be read as J
necessnry preface for the kind of changed recognition protocols related to grieving that
Bu tler herself is seekjng.
3 L. Derrida, '' Faith and Knowledge;' 44
32. Ibid. Cf. in this regard tl1e pages fo uca u)t de\'Otes to the theme in Tltc Hermeru!U
tics of the Subject: Lectures at tlte College de FraHce J981- 82, trans. Graham Burchell
(New York: Palgrave, 2005), 120- 21, J82-85. My thanks to Adam Sitze for po inting o ut
the impo rtant connect ions bccwcen b iopolicics ::and these lalcr seminars.
33. Derrida, '' Faith and Knowledge,,.., 51.
34. Ibid.~ emphasis in original.
35. Ibid. In this regard, see A. J. P. Thomson's "\Vbat's 10 Become of'Dcmocracy to
Come?' " Posrmodem Cufwre 1;:3 (May 2005).
36. Oeuida, 'tltc Politics tJf Friendshipt :15; emphasis in original.
37. "Thus Deleuze's ultimate response to Hegel's a rgu ment against the 'richness' of
immediacy is that the significance of the singular- 'this; 'hereJ' inow'- is o nly grasped
within the context of a problem, a 'drama' of thought that give-s it sense, in the absence
of which it is effectively impoverished'~ (Gilles Deleuze: Kq Concepts, ed . Charles J.
Stivale IMontreal: MeGill-Queen's University Press, 2005), 47).
38. Derrida, Rogues, 3J
39. Ibid., 36.
40. Ibid., 36- 37.
4 L. Derrida, "Autoimm uni ty;' 95~ emphasis in orjginal.
42. \\t'ith tlla t said , il is also true that with a different set o f texts in hand a different
rending of Derrida e merges, namcl)', Specters ofJvlarx: The State of the Debt, the Work of
Mourniug, aud the New lnterntnidrwl) t rans. Peggy Kamu f (New Yo rk: Routledge,1994),
as wcU a.s Derrida's lo1ter texts o n bospicalil )', in pa rlicular On Hospitalif)'t I r:ms. Rachel
Bowlby (Stanfo rd, Calif.: Stanfo rd Un ivcrsjry Press, 20001. Hent de Vries aoai)'ZCS Ocrride-an thought and hospitality as well in the last c hapte r of his Religiou aud Violence:
Phifost1phic:al Perspcctivc:s from Kant to Oerrida ( Baltimo re: Johns ILopk.ins Un i\'e rsiry
Pres.s, 2002). My thanks to Miguel Vatter for pointing out these o ther more ''commu nist" texts.
43. Esposito, lmmunitas, 170.
44 . See "The Norm of Life" in chapter 5
45. See Andrea Cav3lletti's rcceot La dttit IJiopolil'icl~, where he im plicitly invokes the
life of the city as one requiring pro tection (Andre-a CavaiJetli, La c.ittit biopolitic.+l:
Mitologie della sicurtZZtl lMilan: Bru no Mondadori, 2005 !, esp. 2o-27). See as well my
interview with Esposito in Dincritic-f. 36:2 (snmmer 2.0 06).
Norcs to Translator's Jntroduction 199

46. Sec too the recent, briiJj;mr co ntributions o f Simona fo rti to discussions o f
biopolitics originating in Italy. Jn addit ion to her grou odbrea.king work from lOOl
tit led Totafimrinnismo (Rome: Laterza, 2001), her s tunning "The Biopolitics o f Souls:
Racism, Naz..isrn, and Plato" recently appeared in English ( P<IIitiall 1"hcmr 34:1 (Febtuary 2006]: 9-32). There she e.x amines ''the ambivalences that connect some of the
assu mptioos of our ph.ilosophical tJ:adition to Naz.i totalita..dan.ism" (JO).
47. FoucauhJ "Society _
Must Be De.fe.nded,v 2,J6-'17
48. Ibid., 246.
49. Ibid., 247.
SO. Ibid., 246.
51 . Ibid., 2;9.
52. See cspec.ially Paolo Virno, The Gmmmar of tile t\1ultitude, t rans. lsa beliJ Berto1etti (New York: Semiote:<t[e], 2004); G<weming Cllirw's Population: From L.cmiuist to
Neoliberal 8iopolitits, ed. Susa11 Greetlhalgh and 6dwin A. \~:inckJer (Stanford, Calif.:
Stanford Univc;rsity Press, 200)): Lessico di biopolitica, ed. Re nata BrJnd imarte , PatriciJ
Ch iantera -Stutte, et al. ( Rome: Manifestolibri, 20 06): a nd An to nella Cutro, Biopolitk<t:
storin e attualiul tli UH amcetto (Verona: Ombrc Corte 100;).
53. Agamben. Homo Sac.e.r, L.
54. On this note sec Laurent DubrcuiJ's "lcuving Polit ics: Bios. Zoe. Life,' ' Diacritics
36:2 (summer 2006).
55. Carl Schmitt, Poliriml Theology: Four' Clwpters on the Coucept of Sot:ereigury,
lrans. George Schwab (Camb ridge: MIT Prcss,J985). Agambcn d iscusses at Jcnglb I he
relation among Schmitt, Benjamin, a nd the sta te of exception in Srnre of Exception.
trans. Kevin AtteU (Chicago: Uni"eJ:sity o f Chicago Press, l005).
S6. AgambenJ Homo Sac.t.!l~ 7
57. Ibid., 8.
58. lbi.d., l74 In th.is sense I agJ:cc with Erk Vogt's ' 'iew that Ag-Muben "couctt$''
Foucault's ana lysis. See his <'S/Citing the Camp;~ in Politics, A1etnp!Jysic.s nnd Dt.arlr;
/3.s5tl)'S on Giorgio Agmnbcn's Homo Stucr (Durham. N.C.: f)uke Univers-jty Press) 2005),
74- 101.
59. Agamben does ta ke up his anal}sis o f Jt'Hldern biopolitics in The Open, where
what he calls the anth ropological mach ine begins produc-jng "'the state of exception'' so
JS to dc;termine the threshold between the; human a nd the inhuman. Yet to the degree
the optic moves aJong the horizon o f the state of exception, modernity a nd with it a
nine teenth-century a nthropologica l d iscourse remai n wedded to a poHtical (and metaphysicaJ) aporia. " Indeed} precisely because the human is already p resupposed every
time. the machine act uaiJy p rod uces a kind o f state o f except ion, :t zone of indeterminacy in which the outside is nothing but the cxc1usjon o f :m inside :md the inside is in
turn o nly the inclusion of a n outside" (Agambe n~ The Ope.uJ 37).
60. M::trco ReveiJi, La politim perduta (Turi n: Einaudi, lOOJ).
6 l. Hardt a nd Negri. Empire. 421.
62. See Paolo Vix.no's previously cited Gmmmar tJ/ tlu: ;.\ 1u ftitude as well as JVIk hacJ
Hardt and Antonio Negri's edited c.oUec tion of essays o n Italian radical thought Lnbor
of DiOIIJ'$HS: A Critique of rlre State Form (Minneapolis: Universit)' of Minnesota Press,
L994).
63. Hardt and Negri, Multitude, J-~8 .
64. CeJ:tainly) the Delcuz_ian. o ptic is crucial..in accou tHirlg for .Hardt arld Negri's posjt i"e vision of biopolitks, as they themselves readily admjt, A new sense of the communal
200 Notes to Transla tor's Int roduction

based o n the multjrude ;md cooperation makes clear the illusory nature of modern
sovereignty. See in Ibis reg.1rd Negri's Kairi)s, aln!ll venus, m ultitudo: Ncn:e lezi<mi im partite c~ rm~ st-es.so (Ro me: Manifesto libri, 20 00 ): "T he te leology of the common, inas much
as it js the motor of the onto logical transfo rmalioo o f the world . c:::mnot be subjected
to the theory o f sovereign mediat ion. Sovereign med iatjon is always in t3ct the fO unda
tioo o( a unit of measure) wh ile ooto log.ical t ran.sformatjo.n. ha s no measure" ( 1.27).
65. Hardt a nd Negri, Mu!titfltfe, 206.
66. In a recent essay, Es posito pushes hjs reading of Foucault to a global reevalua
tioo of the term "totalitarjan.ism": "Rccogoiz.ing the attem pt in Nazism, the o nl}r kind
of its genre, to libe rate the natural features of exjstence fro m their h istorical peculiarity,
means reversing the Arend tian thesis of the to talita rian superim posicion between phi
losophy of natu re a nd philosophy of histo ry. Indeed, it nJe,ms disti nguish ing the blind
spot in their unassimilab iliry and therefore in the p hilosophical imp racticability of the
notion of to talitariallisn"'I "(Roberro Esposito, "Totalita rismo o b iopo litica: Per un'inte rp retazione filosofica del Novecento;1 Micromega5 !2006]: 62-63).
67. See .. Regeneration" in cha pte r 4
68. \'Ve o~1ght w note that much of Esposito's <::ririque of F-ouca~1Jt also holds true
fo r Agamben. Bu t where Foucault links socialism to Nazism via racism. Agamben jo ins
a Nazi biopolirics to modern dcmocrades through 1he state of cxccpl'ion. The result is.
however, chc same: to highlight N;1zism'ssharc.d biopoliti~1l features with contemporary
democracies and so to lessen its singulal'ity.
69. Ln this reg~rd, see the ent ry fo r sovereignty in Espositos Ncwe fJensieri s ull.tt politico ( Bologna: U Mulino, 1993}, 87- 111.
70. "One ca o spea k of the Nazi state as a ' biocracy.'Thc model here is a theocracy, a
system of rule by p riests of a sacred order unde r t he claim o f d ivine prerogative. In the
c.ase of the Nazi b iocracy) the d ivine prerogat ive was tha t of cu re through purifica tion
aod revitalization o f the AJ." fa.n race_,. Lifton goes on to speak of biological act ivism in
the murderous ecology of Ausc.hwitz., which leads him to the conclusion th at the "Nazi
vision of therapy" canrw t be understood apart fro m mass murder ( Robert )a}r Lifton,
The Nazi Doctors: Mediad Killing nnd the Psychoiog)' of Genocide [New York: Basic Books,
4
986], 17, 18).
71 . See " Regerleration'' in ch apter 4 In frwmmitas E-sposito rnakes explicit h is at tempt to fold the notion o f exception into tha t o f immuniza6on. AUuding to Agamben,
Esposito notes tha t .. the irreducibly antinn mical structu re of the nomos basi/el'tsfouoded on the inceriorization o r better che 'internment:' of an extcriorit)' - is especially
evide nt in the case o f exception that Carl Schmitt situates in the 'most external s phere
o f J:-w/ , (Esposito. / mnumitm, 37). Here Esposito :'ttempts ro think immunity through a
Benjaminian reading o f law and violence, but elsewhere he notes tha t s uch a method is
in fact Bataillian. See h is Cmegorie dell'impolitico fo r the debt such a methodology owes
Georges Bataille and the term parwge, o r the liminal coprescocc of separarion :m d
concatenation (Esposito, Cntegorie defl'impolit.icoJ xxii).
72. Sec "PolUtks over Life" in chapter J..
73. See in particuJa r the 200L round table discussion a mong Esposito, Negri, an d
Veca ("Dialogo sull'impero e democrazia; J\;ficromega 5 ( 2001l: 115- 34)) as well as Es
posito's recent claboratioo of biopolltical democracy ("Totalitarismo o b iopolit ita: Per
un'interp retazione filoso fica del Novec.ento;1 J\ficromega .5 (20o6l: .57- 66).
74. l-lurdt and Negri, Mult-itu de, 206.
Nores to Translato r's Jntroduct ion ZOJ

75. "lnle rview "'vith Roberlo Esposito,"' Oiacritic.f 36:2 (summer zoo6). \ Vith more
lime, il would be of great interest to trace how Esposito>s early wo rk o n the lt':1li:m
avant ~garde informs his later reflections o n immunity and b io po litics. See in this regard
his a n: lysis of 1he poetry of Nann i B:lesl rini in ltleo/t,gia delta neo avtmgrwrdiu (Naples:
Liguori, 1976) a nd the resemblance between c:ommwritm as a vital sphere with that of
Balestrioi 1S po ctks.
76. Hardt and Negrj, Multitudt~. 356. But we shou ldn't assu me that the co ntact
implicit in a network doesnt risk precisely the k;nd o f auto immunitary deficiencies
that Saudri.U:nd, fo r instance, sees as the pdncj pal feature of cun:ent politics. 1-Je write-s:
('All integra ted a nd hyperintegrated systems - t he techno logica l system, the social sys~
tem, even t ho ught itself irl artificial inte lligence, a!ld its d erivatives- ter1d towards the
extreme constitt.lted by immunodefidency. Seeking to elimin:.1te all external aggressjo n)
they secrete their nwn internal virulence, their own malignant revers ibility" (Jean BaudriHard, "'Prophylaxis a nd Virulence; in Tire TrausptUCtlC'J' of Evil: Essays ou Extreme PhcnometJa, t rans. James Benedict I Lo ndon: Ve rso, 1993!. 62).
77. See .. Property" in c ha pte r 1.
78. See '' Flesh' in chapter 5~ emphasjs in original.
79. What he will later say a bo ut De leuze's final text) ''Pure hnm:.1nence: A Life . . . ,.. is
a $hOr1hand for his own amt.hsis: bfos is inscribed in the <JUest io o of wmmunita.~ and
vice versa (Sec ''The Norm o( Lifen in chapter 5).
80. See <(Philosophy of Nazism" in chapte r;.
8 L. ln this sense , Espositds conception o f hiopolitics differs from Donna Harnwa)'s.
Haraway, we recall, le:.1ns d irectly on the im m u nitary paradigm as a model fo r inte r
action. If she does-n't sing its p l.'aises, she docs recognize in it the postroodern mode by
which ('the semi-pe rm eable self Iisf able to engage with others (human and non -human,
inner and outer), but always wi th fi n ite consequenc.es" (Haraway, " Bio po litics and Post
m.ode l.'n Bodjes,.. 225). Sjgn.i.ficantly, these ioclude "situated possibiliti.es and imposs-ibilities of individuation and identific-a tion~ a nd o f pa rtial fus ions and dangers." In s ho rt>
only when immun ized is e'er y member capable of inte racrirlg with every other. Bfos
move-.s the accent off of the individual and t he body. the ind ividual body, to a notion of
life, o ne that cannot be traced back to a specific individual, but rather to the dynarn ic
motor of the virtual a nd the s.i ngularities that precede the genesis of .i ndividual setves.
In o ther words) to communitas as t he preindividu~liz.in g mode of h:.1ving and being in
common.
82. Mo re similarities between Butler and Esposjto's re~ding of the subject emerge
he re. "Do we want to say that it is o ur s tatus as 'subjects' th:.1t b inds us all togethe r even
though, fo r many of us, the 'subj<."Ce is m olciplc or fractured ? And docs the i nsistence
on the subject as a precondit ion o f political :.1gency not erase the mo re fu ndamental
modes of dependency that do bind us and out of which e merge o ur thinking a nd a ffili ~
a1ion. the basis of o u r vuloerabiJicy, affLlial ioo. and collecrivc resistance?'} (Butler, Prct'ariou:. L;fi!~ 49).
83. Of particlllal.' jrupo.ttance fo l.' !::.Sposito is the catcgor)' of Oesh appi.'Opriated fi:o m
Merleau~Ponty, and its useful ness for scrambling and eliding p revio usly inscribed
immunita ry borders. Flesh, fOr Esposito, offers the. possibility o f thinking a po titic iza ~
t io n of life that doeso~t move th rough a sem antics of the body. as Oesh l.'cfers to a
('wo rldly material that is a ntecedent to or that follows the co nstitutio n of t he su bject of
law" (See ''Flesh'' in chapter 5.). T he d istillCti.veJy anti-i.n .nu nitary features of flesh make
2.02
Notes to Translato r>s rntroduction
it poss-ible to countenancc the ''eclipse o f the polit ical body,' ' nod with it che emergence
o f a d ifferen t form o f communi ty i n whkh contagious exposure co o thers gives wa}' co
oonstituitive openness. Flesh wilJ then name what is corn mon to all, a being that is
'"singular and common" (ibid.).

84. Giorgio Agamben, The Coming Conmrunif)' trans. Michael Hardt (Minne.apo
lis: Un ive(Sity o f Minnesota J'rcss,J993), 64.
85. Esposito , Communitas, 139 In this regard, see Ad ria na Cavarcro's c.o mpeUing
reading of speech a nd politics in the thought o f Hannah Arendt, to which Esposito's
understanding of the relation hcn.,reen commu nity aod commu nication is indebted:
''Ac.co rdi ng to her !Arendt ), speech - eve n it is understood as plro,te semcmtike- does
not become political b}'way o fth e t hings o fth e comrnurlit}r that spee-ch is able to des.ignate. Rather, speech bec.omes political on account of the self-revelation of speakers who
ex pres..~ and com municilte their u niq ueness th rough speaking-no matter the specific
content of what is said. T he po litical valence o f signify i11g is thus shifted frorn. speedl J nd from language as a syste m of s ignificat ion - to the speaker>1 (Adrjana Cavarero,
F(}t M(}tt Thart Oue V(}ice: Toward a Ph ilosoph)' (}/Vocal Expressi(}rl, t ra ns. Pa ul A.
Kottman [Stanford, Calif.: Stan fo rd University Press, 2005], 190). Fo r the rclatjon
Bataille d raws between t he ind ividual a nd communication. see h is Ou Nietzsche. trans.
Bruce Boone (New York: Paragon , L992),csp. 18-t9.
86. Cf. Jud ith Buder>s gloss of L..1plancc 1s ''Responsibility and Response,. i n Giving
mr Aaormt of Oneself ''The other~ we might say. co mes fi rst. and this means that there
is no reference to ones own dc-t!th that js not a! once a reference to the death of the
o ther" (7;).
87. Georges 6ataillc. "The College o f Sociolog)," in Visitms (}/Excess: Selected Wril'ings. 19ZJ- J939 trnns. Alan Stoekl (Minne...polis: University of 1\linncsota Press. 198.5). 251.
88. Esposito, Connmmitas1 l P
89. S<>e "The Norm of Life" in ch apte, ; .
90. Ansell Pearson, Viroid Life, t82, 189.
9 1. E.spos.ito 1 Tmrmmizas, 20) .
92. See "Birth'' in chapter 5
93. Ibid.
94.. See And rew f ischers help fu l summary of the debilte. "Fiirtirlg with Fascism:
''The Sloterd ijk Debate," Radic.al Philosoplr 9 (January/February 2000): 20...33.

95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
Ha be r mas, 14.
lbjd., 10.
Esposito, ''Totalita rismo o biopolitic.a; 63-64~ emphasis in original.
Dworkin,
Life~o/i
Dominion, J(t-]].
Dworkin, ''Playing God; in S01,.ereign Virhte, 452.

lbid., 4 49
D-wo rkin. "Liberal Commu nity:' in Sovereign Virtue, 227.
Dworkin. ' 1Piaying God;' 452.
103. See "The Norm of Life" in chapter;.
104. lbid.
105. Cf. Espositos re.a ding of Gehlen in b-umtmita$: ''For Gehle n, the other, m ore
t han an alter ego or a di fferen t Sllbject is csseo tially a.nd above aU else a no.n -cgo; tbe
(non' t hat allows the ego to identify with the one who is precisely other fro m jts own
other" (12.1).
Notes to Chapter 1 203

106. Gilles Delcuze. Pure Immanence: &sttrs on .-t Life, trans. Anne Boyman (New
York: Zone Books, 200 1), 18-19.
107. See- {'The Norrn of Life" in chapter 5
JOS. Jbid.
J09. I wish to thank Miguel Vatter for the term inology. For a d iS<:ussion of the d if
fercncc between biopower aod biopolitics, which seems to me implicit io th.is distinction, see Maurizio l azzarato, /(From Biopower to Biopolitic..s; available at http://
www.generation-o nline.org/c/fi::biopolitics.htm (accessed October 10, 2007): '{ Fou
c:mJt's work ought to be con.tir1.uetl u pon th.is fractured li.n.c betwt_-cn rcsista n.ce and creat ion. Foucault's itinerary a llows us to conceive the reversal of bjopower into biopolitic-s. the- '<:1rt of governance' into the productio n a nd government of new fo rms of life.
To establish a conceptual and p olitk aJ distinction between biopower and biopolitics is
to move- il\ step with Foucault's th inking."
110. "Transcdpt, "President Bush Discusses the \Var on Terror; Nationa l Endowment for Democracy, October 5, 2.005 (ava ilable at www.wh itehouse.gov).
I II. "As America ns, we believe that people everf~Ahere-everywhere - ptefer freedom to slavery, and that lihert)' once chosen, i mproves the lives o f ;1U'> (ibid .).
J l2. Cf. Achille Mbembe's discussion o f the individual as o pposed to the person in
d iscuss ions of J\frican socicries: '' f inally, in these societies the ' person' is seen as predominant over the 'individual .' considered (it is :1ddcd) <a st ricdy \Vcstern crcatjon.'
Instead of the individ ual, there a re entities, c.aptive.s of magical s igns, amid an enchanted
and mysterious universe in which the power o f invocation and evocarion replaces the
power of p roduction, a nd in whic.h fanh&sy and caprice coexist no t o nly with the possi
b iJity of disasrcr but wirh its rea lity'' (Achille M bembe, On the Postcolcmy [Berkeley:
University of Californ ia Press, 200LJ, tJ). My thanks to Adam Sitze for po inting out the
deep connectio ns between Esposito and Mbembe.
113. See "Hcsb" in chapter 5
Introduction
L Roberto E.sposito. Conmumitas: Origine e destino della comunita (Turin: Eirlaud i,
L998) and lmmunitas: Protezione e nega:zione della vita {Tu rin: Einaudi. 2002).
1. The
Enigma of Biopolitics
l. See in th is regard the coUcct ion Biopolitik, ed. Christi:m Geyer (Frankfurt,
Suh rkamp. 2001).

2. Karl Binding. Zum Hlertlen uml Lebert der StGullen: Zelm Staat$rechtlichc ,tblwmlfwrgen (Munich and Leipzig: Duncker 8: Hum blot, 1920); Eberhard Dennert, Der Stoat
als lel1endigcr Organismus: .8ioltJgische 8cJrachhtngen zum A ufiJtlu der neueu Zeit (HaUe
(Saalc J: C. E. MUlle r, 1920); and Edward Hahn, Der Stant, ei" Lebe.,wesen (Mun ich: Dt.
Volksverlag. 1926).
3. Rudolph KjcU~o. St11rmaktema: K<Jnlurer kring sttmtidens swrp<Jlitik (Stockholm:
Gcbers, t 905).
4. Rudolph Kjell~ n. StMen sam Lifsform (Stockholm: Hugo Geber, t9t6).
204
Notes to Chapter L
5. Rudolph KjcllCn. Grundriss .w cim:m Srstcm tier Politik (Leipzig: Rudolf Leipzig
Hirzel, 1920 ), 3- 4.
6. Jakob von Uexktill, Stamsbiologie: Arwtomi4!, Phisiologie, Parltologie des. Swmes
(Berlin: Verlag von Gcbrudcr J'actd, L9ZO).
7. lbid., 46.
8. Ibid.,;; .
9. Morley Roberts. Bio~politic.s; An Essay itJ the Pll)'Siologr. Pathology nmf Politics of
the Social aurf Somnric OrgatJism (London: Dent, 1938).
10. Ibid., L):l1 l. Ibid., 160.
12. Aroon Starobinsk.i, La IJiopolhiqr11!: Bssai d'interprttatiou de 1'/tis.toire dcl'lumumitt
et de.s civilisations (Geneva: lmprime rie des Arts, t960).
13. Ibid., 7
14. Ibid., 9.
JS. Edgar Morin,Introductiotl a uue politique de l'homme (Paris: Editions d u SeuiJ,
1969).
16. Ibid., 11.

17. Ibid., 12.
18. Edgar Morin. Le tmradigme perdu: La nature }umwim: (Paris: Editions d u Scuil ,
1973}19. Andre Bine) '(Introduction: Si !'Occident s'est trompe de conte? .. Cahiers de Ia
biop,litique 1:1 (1968): 3
20. AntoneUa Cutro also discusses this first French prod uction in biopolitics in her
Michel Foutlwlt. Tecrtitll c ''ita. 8icJpolitit:a e filos(Jfia del "8hJs 1 (Naples: .8ibllopol is,
2004), wh ich constit utes t he first. useful attempt to systematize Fouca uldian biopoli~
tics. ~lore generally on bjopo lit ics, see Polir.iia della vita. ed. Laura Bazzica)upo and
Roberto Esposito (Milan.: Laterza, 200.}), as wciJ as 8iop(Jlitica mimJrc, eel. Paolo P.etr.icari (Rome: Manifcs to libri, 2003).
21. Rest-arch in Biopolitiu, ed. Stephen A. Peterso n and Albert Son1 it (Greenwich,
Conn.: JAI Press). The volumes. in ordc;r, are Se;t;ual Politics and Political Feminism
(1991)~ Biopofit.ics in the !vfaimtream (1994) ; Human Naw re aud Politics (1995); Rcstarclz
in Riopolirics (1996) ; Reccut Explorati(>ns in Biology and Politiu ( 1997); Sociology ami
Politics (1998); Ethnic Conflicts Explained b)' Ethnic Nepotism (1999); and Evolutionar)'
Approac.hes in the Beha1'ioral Sdeuces: Toward a Betr.er Understaudi.ng ofHuruan Nature
(200!).
22. Lynton K. Caldweli,'1 Biopolitics: Science, Ethics) a nd Public Policy," Yale Rt ,iew,
no. 54 (1964): 1- 16; and James C.
Nwmm Nature in Politics: The Dpwmic.f of
Pqlitical Beloa'iQr (New York: Wile)', 1963).
23. Roger D. Masters) The Nature of Politics (New Haven and Lo ndon: Yale Univer ~
siry P ress, 1989).
2.4. Walter Bagehot, Ph)'Sic..s and Politics. or, Thoughts on she Applicnriou of 1he Pritl
{:iJJics (Jf "NlUural Sele,timl11 and "lnhcritant:e11 w PlJiiticttl StJcirtt)' (Kitchcner, O.nt.:
Ilatochc, 2001).
25. Thomas Thorso n, Biopolirics (Washington, D.C.: University Press o f Americ.a ,
1970).
26. Sec, o n this po int, D. Easto n, ''The Relevance of 13io politics to Political Theory;'
irl Biology ami Politics, ed. Albert Som it (T he Hague: Mouton, 1976), 2.~7-47, as wdl as
befo re; that VViUia m James l\HUer Mackenzie;, Politics and Social Science (Baltimore;:
o,,.,.ies.
No1cs to Chapter 1 205
Jo hns Hopkins Unjversjry Press. L967). and H. Lasswell, The Future of the Compamtil'C
Metlwd, in Compttmtive Politics L(1968): 3- 18.
27. Warder C. AlJee's volumes on the a nimal are classic: Animal Life and Social
GrtJwth {Baltimore: \lt/ilHams & Vv'illdns Comp:m}' and Associ:-.tes in Cooper:atioo wjth
the Century of Progress Exposition, 1932) and TJre Social Life ofAtJin.als ( Boston: Bea
con Press, l958). Also of interest are Lionel 'J'ige.{, lvlen in Cmups (New Yo rk: Vintage
13ooks,J970) and Desmond Morris, Tire Human Zoo (New York: Dell, 1969). For this
<,.natural" conceptio n of wart see especially Quincy 'W right, A SIHdJ' of War (Chic.ago:
Un.ive~:sity of Chicago Press. 1942), aod Haos ). Mocgcnthau, Polit-ics anum g Nmimrs:
The Struggle for Power mul Peac.e (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 19,18). More rece ntly
there is V. $. E. falg-er, 8iopolitits tmd the St-u dy of lutcrnat.ifmal !<clarions: fmplicatlon,
Results, and Perspectives,in Research in Biopolitics2,: 115- 34.
28. Albert Somil and Stephe n A. Peterson, Bi<Jpolitics in the Ytt-Jr .20001 Resrarch ir1
BiopoUtics 8: 181.
29. ln this direction, compare C;.1rlo GaJLi, '(Sui valore politico del concetto d i 'naturn, 'l
in Aworiril c. uawm: Per ttrta swria dei c<JncetH jilosofico-poUEici (Bologna: Cenrro stampa
Baicsi, 1988), 57- 94, and Michcla CammciH, (<II darwioismo e Ja ceoria poHtica," Fifosofia poliricc~, no. 3 (2ooo): 48~;18.
30. An :~cute hjstoricHl-conccptuHl an:I"Ysis of sovcreignl:y, if from another pers-p<:ctive, is that p roposed by Biagio De Giov~mnj, "Discutere Ia sovranilft," in Bazzicalupo
and Esposito, Politica della vira, ; - t;. See as well Lu igi Alfieri's "Sovr;.1nit<i, morte, e
poHrica,'' in the same volume (16-28).
Jl. For a n ;.1nalytic reconstruction o f the problem , see Alessandro Pandolfi, "Fou
caul I peJlsatore politico postroodcroo," io 'f;e studi .su Fmccmdl(Naplcs: 1Crzo Millcon.io
Edizioni. 2000)t l) t- 2.46. On the relation between power ;.10d law, I refer the reader to
Luc.io D'Aiessandro, "Po tere e pen;.1 nella problema tica di Michel Foucault," in La veritil
c: le fnrm e giuridithe (Naples: La citt3 del sole, 1994), l 4l-GO.
32. Michel Fo uca ult. "Society A.fust Be Defended": Lt~ctruts m the College de France,
1975- 1976, ed. Mauro Berta.ni and Alessandro f.otu a .,a. t t:ans. David Macey (New York:
Picador, 2003) , 239-40.
33. Michel f oucault} ..Crisis de U l\ modelo e n }a rnedicina?" il\ Dif.S et. E.crits1 vol. 3
(Paris: Gallimat:d, 2001), 222.
34. lvtichd Fot.1cault, Discipline and Ptmish: The Birth of the Prison, trans. Alan
Sheridan (New York: Vintage Books, 1977).
35. Michel Fo ucaull, Abnormal: Lectures at the College de France J974-J97S1 trans.
G ra ham Burcheii(New York: Picador, 20 03).
36. Michel Fo ucault . '['he Niswrr of Sc:wulit)', vol. t: t\nlntroduction>trans. Robert
Hurler (New Yo rk: Vintage Books, 1978) , 89.
37. Ibid., 14;.
38. Michel Foucault, ''Return 10 Histor}:' in t\estlzeticsJ Method} ami E('istemolog)t
ed . ). Faubion (New York: New Press. 1998), 430- 31.
39. J\ilichel Foucault. "lhe Crises of Medicine o ~: the Crjses of Anti-Medi.c:ine,,, Ptmcault Studies. no. 1 (December 2001): u.
40. Michel Foucault, "Human Nanne: Justice versus Power" (Noam Chomsky and
Michel Foucault), io Michel b mcaultaml 1-Jis fnterlocutorst cd. A. J. Davidson (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1997), uo. Cf. Stefano CatuccYs La tt~atura' della twtura
umaua: Note su M iclztl Foucault, in No am Chomsky and Miche.l Foucault, Della natura
umrma: Ttwariante biologico e potere politico (Rome: Derive Approd i, 2.004), 75- 85.
206
Notes to Chopter 1
4 L. .Foucault, Ni.ftury ofSe:walit)', 143
12. Mkhel Foucaul t, "Bio-h.istoire cl' bio-polit iquc:' i n Dit.s et Ecrits, 1954- 1988, vol. 3
(Paris: Gallimard, 1994), 97
43 . .Fouc:aull, Ni.uwy of.Sexualit)', 143
44. Ibid.
45. Ibid.
46. Foucault, "Society _Must Be De.fe.nded,v 3;~ my emphasis.
47. Ibid., 36.
4.8. Ibid.: HJ)' e mphasis.
49. Foucoult , History ofSe.<unlit)\ 138.
SO.
On the processes of subjecriv.ization, cf. Matiapaola Fimia1~i, .. Le v~ritable amour
et le souci commun du monde.'' in FotJc..ault: Lc courage de Ia viriti, ed. Frederic Gros

(Paris: Presses universitaires de France, 2002)) 87- t27, and Yves Michaud, " Des modes
de subjectivat iollaux: techniques de soi: Foucault et les ide.uit~s de llOtre temps," Citts,
no. 2 (2000): u - 39 Fundamental fo r the theme remains GiUes Dele.u:re, Fouc..ault~ trans.
Sean Hand (Min neapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1.988).
5 1. Jo.1ichc1 Fo~1cault. ('The SubjC:<:I and Power:> Criticallmtuir)' 8:4 (summer t982): 781.
52. Michel Foucault, " omnes et Singulatim': Towards a Critique of Political Rea
son?' in Power> cd. James Faubion (New York: Ncv"" Press. 1997), 321.
>3. Ibid., 322.
>4.
Ibid.
55 . .Foucaulc, Ni.ftUT)' of Sexual it)', 95

56. Ibid., 144- 45.
57. I am a lllldj ng to M ichael Hardt aod Antooio Negri's CmtJire (Cambridge: liar
vard Univers ity P ress, 2000), e.sp. 22- 41, but also to the group headed by the French
j ournal Multitudes. See in particular the first issue of 2000, dedicated preci sely to
8iop11litique et biOfJOJll'(JJr, with cootributions by Maud.z.io Laz.za.rato, l~rk All icz, B.runo
Karsenti, Paolo Napo li, and others. It should be said that the theoretica l politica l pe r
specti\'e is in itself interesting, but onl}' weakly )jnked to that ofFouc.mh, who inspire-s it.
58. See, on t his point, Vale rio Marchetti. 'fla naissance de Ia b iopolit ique:' in Au
rist1ue de Fouctwlt (Paris: Editions du Cer1tre <.~eorges Pompidou: Ce!ltre Michel Ft)U
e:ault, 1997), 237- 47.
59. Michel Fouc.ault, "The Political Technolog)' of Individuals;' in Faubion, Power, 4.05.
60. Marco Revelli has recently discussed the relation between politics and death il\ a
vigorously e1hic.1l and thcorelical essay. La politim perdu ttl (T\Jrin: Einaud i, 2003). See
as well his earlier Oftre. il Nove.cento (Turin: Einaud i, 2001).
6L. Foucault , "Societ)' Jvlust Be Defemletl/' 241; my cmph:,sis.
62. Ibid., 36.
63. Ibid., l B - 54
<i4. Ibid., 254
65. Cf. Michael Donnelly, "On FoucauJt's Uses o f the Notion 'Biopower;" in l\1iche.l
Pmutmlt Philo:uJJJher> ed. Tii.Tl.Otby AJ:'.m.strong (New York: Routledge. 1.991), 199- 20.3. as
welJ as Jacques Ranciere. ' 1Biopolitique ou politique?" Mulritud('..s 1 (March 2000 ): 88.....93
6G. Foucault, 1"The Subject and Power," 779
67. T his is the o utcome that Giorgio Aga.mbcn cohcreutly arrives at in Noma Sater:
Sovere;gn Power and Bare Life, trans. Daniel HelJeraRoazen (Stanford, Cali f.: Stanford
Universit}' Press. 1998).
Notes to Chaplcr z 207

2 . The
Paradigm of Immunization
I . On the communitarian motif in Hegel. see in particular Ros.sella Bonito Oiiva's
Cindividrw modenw e Ia nuova ctmrunit('; (Naples: Guida,1990), esp. 63-64.

2. Emile Du rkheim, Tl~e Rules of Sociological Method, trans. W. D. Halls (New York:
hce Pss, 1982), 7J.
3. Max Sc.heler, Problems of a Sociology of Knowfedgr.. t ra ns. lvlanfred Frings (Lon
do n: Routledge. 1980) and Persm1 nnd Self\'alue: TIJree EssnJ'S, trans. M.S. Frings
(Boston: Kluwer Ac'"ddemic Publisher.s,1987); Hel.ruuth Plessner, Conditiolwmana (l;ran.k.
fu rt am Main: Suhrkam p, L983) and Limits of Community: A Critique ofSocinl Radiml
ism, tran.s. Andrew Wallace (New York: Humanity Books, l999); a nd Arrwld Gehlen,
Urmemch und Spiitkultur: Pllilosopllisc:hc Ergebn~~$-C und Aus::agen (Bonn: Athcmaum
Ved ag, 1956) and J\1an, Hi.s Nature and Plnc.:c ;, t'lte lVorlcl (New York: Columbia Uni
versjty Press, 1988).
4. Plessner, Conditio llumanfJ, ;n.
5. Gehlen> Urrucnsd1 wul Spiitkulu.r, 44- 45
6. Norbert EliM. The Civili.zi,g Process. tr.ms. Edmund Jcphcou (Oxfo rd: Blackwell, 1994), 153
7. for this reading o f Parsons. sec as wcU Stefano Bartolini,"] limiti della pluralit::):
Categoric della po litka in Talcolt Pa rsons:' Quademi di teoria sociale 2 {2002): 33-<lo.
8. Niklas Luhmann. Social S)'stems, trans. John Bednarz Jr. with Dirk Baecker (Stan ford, C'<~lif.: Stanfo rd University Press, 1995), 371-71.
9. !Esposito deals more at length wilh Luhmann a nd immunity) pa rticularly in the
juridic:al sense, io TmmuHitas: Pwtczione e negazitme dellcJ itt~ (Turin: Ei.naudi, l002),
; 2-61.- nans.J
JO. Luhmann>Social Sy::term, 374
1t. Sec in th is regard A. D. Napier1S The Age oflnmwnologr (Chicago: Un.i\'ersit}' o f
Chicago Press, zOOJ).
12. Dan Sperber, Explaining Culturt : i\ Nmurali.stic Approach (Oxford: Blackwell,
1996), a nd Donna Harawa)', "The Biopolitic.s ofPostmodern Bodjes: Determinations of
Self in Immune Systen'l Discourse,'' in Simiam, Cyborgs, and Women: The Reinvention of
Nature (Londo n: Routledge, 1991), 204.
J3. See Odo Marquard. Ae$tl1etica und AnaestiHUic:a: Philosopl1i$c.lie Oberlegtmgen
(Paderborn: F. Schon ing, 1989).
11. On this last poinl, sec Alain Brossac, La dCmocratie immunituire (Pa ris: Dispute,
2003)>and Ro mano Gasparotti> I ruiti della globc~lizzc~zioue: ('Guerra prcvellliva" e logica
delle immrmit('; (B:~ri: Dedalo. 2003). On globali:Zal ion more gencraUr. sec the works of
Giacomo Marrnmao, wh ich have been coUeclcd in Pmmggio a Occideme: Filoso.fi(' e
globc~lizzaziouc (Turin: Bollati Bolinghieri>2003).
l S. In th is regord, sec my lmmunit.ttS, as weU as Communita.s: Origine e clestino della
c..omunitil (Turin: Einaudi, 1998). Giuseppe Cantarano has recently written as well on
S0 01.C of lh.ese S<H:nc themes. Sec his [(I mmunitit imtmlil"iccl (Troina: Ciua Apcrta, 2003).
J6. Bru no Acc.arino has drawn attention to the opposing bipo larity of Delawmg!
Et~tlastrmg (debt/exoneration) in Ln rngione imufficiem e: AI confine trn autoritil e
mzirmalittl (Rome: Manifcstotibri, 1995), 17- 48.
J7. VVith regard to the aporia and the potent ialities of this d ialect ic (or nondialec
t.ic) between irnrnu rlity and comrnu rlity, see the inrelligent essa}' that Massimo T)or'la
208 Notes to Chapter 2

has ded ic:,ted co the ca teg<tr)' o f immu niz.arion using a key thac producthdr pushes ic
loward a diffe rent logic of negatio n: Massimo Don:,. ''Immunity and Negation: On
Possible Developrnent.s of the T heses Outlined in Roberto Esposito's fmnmuitas: D ie~
critic.f 36:3 (zoo6).
J8. See the section '' Politics of Life'' in chapter 1.
19. IEsposito is dearly .refeni.ng to G iOQ)iO Agam.ben1s discussion of paterfamil ias.
See Agamben's Homo Sacer; Sovereign Power nml Life. tra ns . Danile H eller Roazen
(Stanfo rd. Calif.: Stanfo rd Un ivers ity Press, 1998),esp. 81- 90. - Trnus.J .
20. Plato, Republic, tr.ms. Robin w:Hcrfield (Oxford: Oxfo rd University Press,
1993), 17)
21. See irl this regard the ilwaluable e ssa}r by Simo na for ti, -rhe Biopolitics o f
Souls: Political Theor)' 34:1 (2006): 9- Jz.
22. )nilchim Giillt her) Hitler und Platou ( Berlin a nd Leipzig: VV. de Gru }rter, 1933)
and Hitler'S Kampf uml Pllllons Swm.: Eine Stmlie lilur ~leu ide(}/ogischen Aujbcw du
nationalsozial~~~~~chen Freiheitsl,eweguug (Bc;rlin: ,V, de Gruyter,1933); A. Gabler. (Berlin
and Leipzig: VV. de Gruyter, 1934); and H ans F. K. Gihuher) Platon als Hiiter' des Lebens:
Pia tons Zuclrt- und ErzielruHgsgedanken und deren Bedeutung fti.r die Gegeuwart (Munich: J. F. Lehmann, 1928). In t he same di rection as GUnther see Hurnaniws (Munich:
j. F. Lehmann, 1937). For Wilhelm Windclbond, see his P/,uou (Sl1ltlgart: F. From mann,
1928). The fo llowi ng a rc the texis that G unther cites in the third edition of his book on
Plato (1966, 9- 10): Alfred E. Taylor, Pinto: TIJe Mmt and His Work (New York: D ial Press,
L9Z7); Julius Stenzel. Pit~ ton der Erziclter (Leipzig: F'. Meiner, 1928); P;~ul frk>d liioder, PlatotJ (Be rlin and Leipzig: W. de G ruyte r, 1928- 30): Constantine Ritter, Die Kcmrgedmtken
der JJiutonis~:lten Philosc,plzie (Mun.icb: f- Rei.n.hardt, l93t); Wei.' ocr Wilhelm Jaeg-er, Pclideiu:
Die Formung des Grieclrischen A1ensclum (Berlin a nd Leipzig: \V, de G ru ytcr,193 6)~ Leon
Robin, Plmon ( Paris: F. Akan. 1935): Gerhardt KrUger, Eimicht mtd Leidenscltaft: Dns
\.\fesL'n dc:s J'lcwmisclzen Denkt:ns ( ~u.rtk(ul.'t aro Maio: V. Klostc.(ma nn, l939); a nd f .(nSt
Hoffinann, Piaton (Zu rich: Arte mis -Verlag,1950 ).
23. Plato, RcpuiJ/ic, '74
24. Aristotle, The Politics. t rans. Trevor J. Sau ndc;.rs (Nc;w York: Pe nguin Classics,
1981), 88.
25. In add ition to Ma rio Vegen j's recent Quiudici lezioui .tu Plarone (Tu rin: Binaudi,
2003). see in particula r " Medicina c potcre nel mondo a.ntico'' in the fo rthcoming
B;opofitic.:he. \ ,Vith regard to these p roblems and with a ll implicit attellt ion tt') the immu.
n ita ry paradigm. there is che recent pub1ica6on of the im portant essay by Gennaro CarilJo, Kateche;n: Uno su,did sulln dem(}t."t'azin cmticc~ ( Naples: Edito riale Scientifica, 200J).
26. \Vith regard 10 Pete r Slote rdij k, one o ught to keep in mind the lhree i mporl omt
volu mes that ~ppeared under the til]e Splzi.iren ( Frankfurt: Suh rkamp. 2004) in which
the author traces the lineaments o f a t rue a nd actual "social immu nology."
27. This reading of modernity h~s fo r some t'ime been the objec1 o l: d iscussion Jo r
Paolo Flores d Arcais. See his impo rtant essay II sovmno e il dissideme: La demoaa2ic~ pres.a
.sui s~rio (M iJa n: Gananti.l004) aud the debate that cusued in Micrmnegll2- 3 (2004).
28. Marti n Hcidegge r, " The Age of the \ Vorld Picture,)' in Tire Question concerning
Tech,olog)' and Other Eswys. trans. \ ,Villiam Lovitt (New York: Ha rper and Row, 1977),
1.49- 50
29. T ho m as Hobbes, Le,iatharl, ed. Fra ncis B. Ra ndall (New York: \V'ashington
Square Press, 1976), 87.
No res ro Ch3ptcr z 209

30. Ibid.
3 l. Ibid., 87- 88.
32. T homas Hobbe.s, De Give (lo ndon: R. Royston, t651; 1843), 158; Thomas Hobbes,
'J'he Clements <Jf Law (London: TOnnics,1889).178; f<Lobbes, Leviathan, 2.40.
33. See in this regard Car1o Ga11i's "Ordine e contingenza: Linee di lettu ra del Levi
tttww," io Permrsi delle libe-rttl: Saitti in onore di Nicolt1Mtfl't'eutci (Bologna: 11~\ol ll.l i.no.
1.996), 81- 106; Alessandro Biral, Hobbes: La societil senza governo, in II contmNo sociale
nella filosofia politica modema. ed . Giuseppe. Duso (1\<liJan: FrancoAnge.l i. L993), )l- 108;
and Giuseppe Duso, La logim del pote-rt~ (Rome-Bad: Late~:za. 1999).55-85.
34. [am referring in particular to Ro man Schnu r. Individualism us und Absolutism us;
Zur politischen Tlzeorit vor Tlumws Hobbes, t6oo- .1640 (Berlin: Duncker & Hufnblot, 1963).
35. MichC:'I Fo u~ult. "Societ)' i.\fust Be Dcfendcd 9 : LechlfC$ at the Ccllege de France.
1975- 1976, ed. Maruo Bertani ill\d Alessandro Fnntana, trans. David Macey (New York:
Picador, 2003), 90.
36. Hobbes, Lcvinthan, 149
37. Ibid., 150.
38. John Locke. Two Treatises of GcHernment (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1967), 2 2 4.
39. Ibid., 223.
40. John Locke. Epistola de Tolenmtia: A Letter on Toleration, trans. J. W. Gough
(Oxford: Clarendo n Press, 1968}, 67. Cf. t he following: ''And tis not without reason,
!hat he seeks Ouf, a nd is willing to jO)'n in Sociel.)' with ot he rs who arc already united.
o r have a mind to un ite for the mutual PrLtServation of their Lives, Liberties, and Esta te.s,
which l call by th.ci~: general oame, PmtJertl' (Loc:ke, Two TrelUises, 368).
4l. Locket Two Treatises. 324.
42. With regard to the dialectic of prope rty in modern political philosophy, I have
d~:awn importanl insights 6:oro Pietro O:>sta, 11 progctUJ giuridiaJ: Ric:erclle sulla giurisfJru rlenw delliberaliml-o classic:o (Milan: Giuffre.t971) , and Francesco De Sanctis, Problemi
e figure della jilosofia giuridita e polirica (Rome: Bulzoni, 1996) . Paolo Grossi's n dominio e le cose: Perc.e.zioni medicw,_t; e modeme dei diritti reali (M ilan: Giuffre. 1992)
remains crucial for understanding the premtldem tradition.
43. Locke. Two Treari.scs, 30;- 6.
44. Ibid., :n<>-7
45. Karl Marx, Ec.tmomic ami Philosophic. A1t1nuscript.s. of 18441 ed . Dirk f. Struik,
trans.. Martin lvliW~n (New York: Lnternational Publishers, 1964), u S- 19.
46. See, on this point, Pietro Bal'ceUona, L' imlivid~~t~lismo propriet.ar-io (Turin: Bollati
Bo rioghieri, 1987).
47. On this cransfo rmation, sec Adriana Cavarero's ''La fcoria contrattu~listica nci
Tmtuui sui got:eruo di Locke; in II comrmto sociale uella ftlosofta pofit:ifa ruoderua, ed.
Giuseppe Duso (Bo logn": Jl Mulino, 1987), 149- 90.
48. Immanuel Kant, The. Philosoph)' of Lmv: An Exposition of rlre Fundcmrenml p,;, .
dfJies lJ/ Jurispruderu:c as the St:ieru:c lJf .Riglilt l rans. \V. Hastic (l~inb ur:gh : T. & r. Clark,
t887), 6+-6;.
49. f1 have chosen to translate the Italian libertfl with ('liberty" (and not "freedom"),
not onJy because lbe passages Esposiro c ites from Locke iodude the te~:m. but also to
mark the assonances that Esposito will hear between Liberty. dcHberation, libertates.
and, of course. liberalism. - Trttm.J.
210
Notes to Chapter 2
50. Cf. Dicier Nestle, !ileutheritt: Studien zum Wesen dcr Freiheit bci tlen Grietlten
uml im Neuer~ Testamem (TO bingen: 1\-tohr, 1967); Emile Benveniste, /mlo-Europem1
Lmrguage cmd Socier)'. trans. Elizabeth Palmer (london: Faber, 1973); and Richard. B.
Oniaos, 1"1le O rigin$ of European 'thought about the Bod)) the MindJ the Soul, tlte \'1/orld,
Timt.. nnd Fate: New /urerpretntions of Greek. Rorunn aruf Kindred Evidence Also ofSomt
8as-ic }ttwisl1 and Clzristi an Bdicfs (Cambridge: Cam br.i dge Unhe l.'s ity PresS,l988).
SL. In this regard, see Pjer Paolo Po rtinaro)s dense postf.1.ce 10 the t ranslat ion of
Benjamin Constant's La liberril ,tegli amichi, paragonaw a quella dei modemi (Turin:
Cinaud i, 2001).
52. Isaiah Berlin, ''Two Concepts of liberty," in Four Concepts of Liberty (New York:
Oxford U niversity Ptess) 1970),130; my emphasis.
53. Marti n Heidegger, The Esse,1ce of Human Freedom: An Introduction to Philosophy, trans. Ted Sadler (New York: Co1l t inuum , 2002), 13.
54. (Esposito is punning here 011 the asso nance bet\....eeJl alteritci (otherhood) and
alterazione (alterJt ion}.- n a ns.l
55. NkcolO Machiave1li, Discourse$ ou l.il')', Oxfnrd \Vor1d's Clas.sks, trans. j ulia
Conaway and Pete r E. llondo nd la (Oxfo rd: Oxford Unjvc rsity Press, 1997), 6456. Thomas Ho bbes) '' Of liberty and Necessity," in The Eng/i)h Works of Tflomm
Nol>bes, vol. 4 (Lo ndon: John Bohn, 1890 ), 27J.
~7. Hobbes, Leviathan, 37
58. locke, 1\t'O Trtmises~ 302.
59. Ibid., 289.
60. Charles de Scondat, Baron de Montesquieu, Spirit of LawsJ t rans. Thomas Nu
gcot (I:Citcbeocr, Oot.: B~toche Books) lOOl ), 206; Jeremy Beotharu, Rutiom~le of judicial
EvUier1ce, in The Works of jeremy Bemlwm, vol. 7 (Edinbu rgh: John Bowring, 18-13), .522.
6 L. Jere my BenthJm, AtfnmucripiS (University College o f London), lxix, 56. See t he
doctol.'al lhesis of Mal.'cO Stangh crlln, "Jc re.n w .6 cotham c il govcrno dcgli .i ntc res.si''
(Unive rsity of Pisa, 200L- 2).
62. Michel Foucault, "la questione del Jibetalismo," i11 8iop1Jiitica t liberali.smo: Dcui
e scritti su potere ed etica 1975- 1984. t rans. Ottavio M.-.rrocca (lvtiJan: Medusa, 200L),L60.
63. Hannah Arendt, ''\Vhat Is f reedo m?" irl Bttween Past ami Future: Eight Exercises
in Political Thought (New Yo rk: Vikir'lg Press, 1961), 155.
64. Ibid., 150.
65. Michel Fouca ult, Tedmologies of the Self' A Seminar with Michel FIJucault, ed.
Lu ther H. Marrin (Amherst: Unjve rsity of Massachusetts Press. 1988),l)l.
66. l uis Du mont, Es)a)'S IJtJ lr~dividualism: Modern Ideologr i11 au Amhropological
Perspectite (Chicago: Universiry o l: Chicago Press, 1986).
67. For the figu re of the homo tlemocmticus I refe r 10 the reader to Massimo C1cciari's impo rtant observat ions in L'arcipelago (Milan: Adelphi, L997), U7- 18. See too
Elena Pulcini, L'individ uo senzll pa$sioui: Jndiviclualismo moderno e pcrdittt flel legame
sociale. (Tu rin: Bollat i Boringhieri. 20 01}, L27- 28. On Tocqueville more generally, c.f.
.FI.'aoccsca M3.d a De Saoctis, Tempt, di dcnwcrm:ia: Sullll ctmdizitme modema (Naples-:
Editoriale Scientifica, 1986).
68. Alexis de Toc.queville, Democra9 in Amerim, ed . Franc is Bowen, t rans. Henry
Reeve, vol. 2 (Cambridge: Sever aod Frantis, J862 ), 12 1., 12 4.
69. Ibid., 169.
70. Frledrkh Nietzsche. Twilight of the idols, or, How to Pltilosophizc whl1 a Hamrnert
t ra ns. Duncan Lorge (Oxford: Oxford Univers ity Press, 1998), 68; 64.
Notes to Chapter 3 Zll

3 Biopower and Biopotentialit)'
I. !The- te rm Esposito uses in t he chapter title is biopot-euza, which connotes both
power :md a potcnt ialiry fo r prod ucing and u ndergoing change. Since Esposito intends
it as a necessary step on the way to t hinking an affirmative. bio po titics, I have translated
it as poteotja)jty uolcss o therwise iodkatcd.- Tnms. j
2. [See t he introduction to Esposito)s 1998 p reface to Categorie dell'impolitico
(Ilologna: II MuJjno, 1988) for fu rther thoughts o n the " impolitical." - Trnm.J
3. Karl LOwith, .. Su J:Opcan N iJ1iJism: ReOections o n the Europeao \VaJ:,'' in Mcutir1
Heidegger arul Europerm Nihilism, trans. Gary Steiner (New York: Columbia University
Press, 1995), 206; Georges Bataille, ""NietzS('he and the Fascists," in Visions of .Excess, t rans.
AUan Stoekl (Minneopolis: Unjversit)' of Minnesota Press, L98S), 24.
4. Michel Foucault, .. Nietzsche, Genealogy, H istory," in Aesthetics) Method arul
8pimmolog)\ ed. ). Faubion ()'lew York: New Press, 1998), 369-91.
5. Friedrich Niet"tsche, On the Gtmealogy of Morals: A Polemic: By Way of Clarification ami Supplement f.O My La.st Book, Beyond Good arJd EviiJ trans. Douglas Smith
(Oxford: Oxfo rd Universjty Press, J997). 66.
6. Friedrich Nietzsche, Frammenti postumi (188s- J887)1 in Optrt compltte di
Priedricl1 Nietzsche, vol. 8 (Milan: Adclpbi,199Z), 139 [As no complete edition of Nictzschc~s posthumous works cx..ists in English, 1 have cited fhc ll~1ti :m a nd where possible
the German.-1Ya1rs.].
7. frjedrich Nietzsche, Ecce Nomo, trans. \'V:,I1cr Kaufmann (Nev..,. York: Vintage
!looks, 1967), JU.
8. Friedrich Nietzsche, 'twilight of tlze (dcJI$1 ort Now to PhilostJphize wil'11 a tlammert
tra ns. Duncan La rge (Ox-ford: Oxford University Press, 1998), 65.
9. Nietzsche, Frammetlli poswmi (1888- 1889). 408.
10. On the complex (elationsh.ip bctwceo N.ietzsdw aod Darwin.isrn a nd tnOI.'C generally wit h the biological sciences, see especially Eric Blonde!, Nietzsclre, le corps et Ia
cr1fture: La philosophic. comme gtu~.alogie phil<Jiogique (Paris: Presses UJliversitaires de
Fra nce, 1986); H. Brobjer. Darwinisnms, in Nietzsclre-Handbuch (Stuttgart-\Veimar:
Met1.Jer, 2ooo); Barbara Stiegler, Nietzsche et. fa biologie (Paris: Presses univetsirai res de
Fr:ance, 2001); Gregor}' Moore) Nictuche, Biol<Jgy and Metaphor (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 2002), as well as Andrea Orsucci, Dalla biofogia cellularc ntle
scienza dello <ipirito (Bologna: II Mulino, 1992).
l L. Nietzsche, Frammertti Postumi (188I-J882) , 432-33
J 2. I am referring, of cou rse, to Ma rtin Heidegger, Nietzsche, trans. David Farrell
Krell (San Francisco: H:rpcrSanFrancisco. J99t).
13. Fried rich Nietzsche. Tire Gar Science, tr-ans. \.Ya]ter Kau fmann (New York: Vintage Books, 19711, 34- 35
H. Fo r this rel:~tion see csped:IJ)' Remo Bodci's chapte r dedicated to Nietzsche in
his important work DestitJi persotwli: L'ertl delln colotJizzazione delle coscienze (M ilan:
fc hrine Ui, 200:1), 83- 116, as well as Jgoacc Haaz, Les ~cmuptitms du t'Orf's chez Ribot et
N;etzuhe (Parjs: L'Harmattan, 2002).
15. In this sense the work c.o ntemporary with Nietzsche of the grealest importa nce
is \tVilhclm Roux's Der Kc1111f1f dcr Theile im Organism us (lcjpzig, J.88J). For IJ\()I.'C o.n
Ro ux, see \Volfgang MiillerLaute r, "Der Organjsmus als innere Kampf: Der Einfluss
von Wilhelm Rou.x auf FJ."iedrich Nietzsche; Nietzsclum Studicn 7 (1978): 89-22:~.
J6. Nic;tzsche, Frammenti postumi (1884- 1885). 238.
212. Notes to Chapter 3

J7. Niet"a;chc. f:ca' Iltmw, 231- 31.
J8. Nict"achc, Frammeuti postumi (188$- 1887)> 77- 78.
19. ''[t should be- considered symptomatic when some p hilosophers - for example
Spinoza who v.Y~ts consumptive - considered the instinct of sclf-p re$ervation decis-iV'e
and had to see it that way; tOr they were individuals in conditions o f d istress" (Niet
zsche, The GaJ' Scicm:e, 292).
20. Ibid., 29J- 92.
2l. Nietz.sche, TJrus Spake Zaratlwsrm: A Book for Ail mrd NotH>.. trans. Thomas \Vayne
(New York: Algora Publishing, 2003), 87.
22. Friedrich Nictzsc.he, " Histo ry in the Service and Disservice of Life,'' in Unmodem
Oburvtll';om, trarlS. Gary Brown (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1990), 89.
23. Fried rich Nietuchc. Be)ond Good rmd E~o,.il: Prelude to a Philosoph)' of tl~e Future.
trans. Judith Nnrman (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 153, 154.
24. T he reference here is to w. H. Rolph's Ri~Jiogis'Cile ProiJitmc 2uglt'icl1 als Ve-rsuch
zur Entwickttmg cincr nationalerJ Ethik (leipzig: \ViJhelm Engelmann. 1882).
25. "Unc.ommn11 is the highest virrue and useless> luminous it is and gentle ill its
brilliance: a bestowing virtue is the h ighest virtue" (Niet"tsche. ThtJS Spake Zamtlmstm, )7).
26. Friedrich Nietzsche, Htmrcm, All Too Htmrcm: A Book for Free Spirits) trans. R. J,
Hollingdalc (Cambridge: Cambridge Un iversity PrcsS,l986), 376.
27. See in this regard Umberlo Galimberti>s Gli equit'Oci dell'mrimtt (Milan: Feltrinelli, 1987).
28. friedrich Nictz.schc, "On Truth nod Lies in a Nonmoral Sense," in The Nietzsche
Readt.'i ed. Keith Anseii Pearson a nd Du ncan Large (OxfOrd: Blac.kwell Publish ing,
2006). 1.2~.
29. Nietzsche, Human, Atl Too Humnu, 89.
30. Friedrich Nietzsche, Twilight of the Idols, trans. Duncan La rge (Oxfo rd: Oxford
Univc.sity Prcss,1998), 78.
3 L Nietzsche, Human, Atl Too Human, 113.
32. Friedrich Nietzsche. Da)'br'ctlk: Thoughts IJn the Prejudit:ts ofMIJrolity, trans. R. ).
Hollingdole (Com bridge: Cambridge Un iversity Press, 1982), )2.
33. Niet7-~che, Prammetlli postwni (1888- J889 )J 214.
34. Nietzsche, On the GenetliiJg)' 1Jf Morals, 105.
35. I am referring to Gilles Delem:e. N ictzsclie rmd Philosophy, t ra ns. Hugh Tomlin
son (New York: Cnlumbia Ullivers ity Press> 20 06).
36. Nietzsche, Frammertti poshJmi (188$- 1887), 283, 289.
37. Ibid., 93
38. For the theme of decadcnce,$CC Giuliano Campioni, "Nietzsche, Taine et Ia dCcadencc:' in Nietzsche: Cent ar15 de reception frm:faise. cd. Jacq ues Le Rider (San-Denis:
Editions Suge, 1999), 31- 61.
39. Nietzsche, Ec:.cc lJonw, l-33- 34 !The Ha li:m t ranslncion of the German differs
widely from the English. For "unclean" (Lauterkeir in Germa n), one re-ads (Oconta mi
nat<:d" (amwmintltt:} a nd fo r ..d eaoliness" (Reinlteit io Gt.u nao ). puri1y (purczza) .
Given Esposito's emphasis on the themes of integrity a nd pu rity, [have chosen to add
the German in brackets. - TIans.]
40. N.iel7...Sche, Frtmzmeuti poswmi (1888 - 188p), 2t].
4 L lbid.,J77
42. !See irl pa.rticu.lar Michel Foucault's "Society M'rlSt 8t /)cfcndcd"': C.uturcs trt the
Notes ro Chapter 4 ZlJ
Colll:ge de Fnmce, l9JS- J9761 eel. M:wro Berta ni a nd Alessandro Fontan::t, trnns. David
Macey (New York: Picador. 2.003), csp. the seminars o f f ebruary 18 :md 15. L9i6.- Tmns.]
43. Nietzsche, Be-yotJd Good and Evi/1 152.
44. lam referring to Domen ico Losurdds import."nt and debatable book NietZ$clu:,
il rebello nrisrocrnrico1 biografia int.cllettunle e bilancio critico (Tu rin: Bollati Boringhieri,
2002).
45. Nietzsche, Tire Gny Science, 100.
46. Rather important in this direction is Alexander T ille. Vonr Dnrwin bis Nierz-sdre:
Gin 8udr Cnlwic:kltmgsethik (Leipzig": C. G. Nauo1.aon. 1895) .

47. Cf. Alfred E.spinas, De-s socihd!- animales: Etude de ps)'clrologie c.omparie (Paris:
G. 8aj)liere, 1877). ar'ld two texts ftorn Georg Heinrich Schl\eider: Der r;cri.sche Vliflc
{Leipzig: Abel, !188?1) 3nd Der mensclllicl1e Wille 1.:om Standprmkte der ,1eue.re'' Entwick
luugstl1torierl (des "Dar'win;.snws'') (Berlin: F. D u mmlers,1882). The texts of E.spinas and
Schneider were part of Nietzsche's library.
48. Nietache, Twiligl1t of the Idols, 61.
49. Ibid. , 68.
50. Nietzsche, Tl1e Gu.r Science, Iii
S l. Ibid.
52. In th is direct ion . $CC Marco Voz:za, Esisttmza e inter(m:tazione: Nietzsche oltre Heitleggcr (Rome: DonzciH, 2001). On 1hc metaphor of ilJncss, stc Pat rick \Votling, Nietzsd1e
etle probUmw de. Ia civilisation (Paris: Presses universitaires d e Fra nce, 1995), 111ff.
53. N iet"achc, Humtm, All J'Cw N uman, 99
54. Nietzsche, Tire Gny Scienc.t~, 346.
55. Nict7...St::he, Numan, A ll Too Human, 107.
56. Ibid., 108.
57. Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil1 96.

58. GL"'rgcs .Bataillc, On Nietzsche, tl.'aos. Bwcc Boone {New Yor.k: Paragon, l992),
8, 2j.
59. Cf. f.u rio Semerari, n predone, il barbaro, il giardiuie-re (Bari: f)edalo,2ooo) 1 145ff.
60. Massimo Cacciari dedicates intense pages to this theme in L'arcipefago (Milan:
Adelph i, 1997), 135- 54.
61 . Nietzsche, Franwumti postwni (J884- 188sJ, 317.
62. Nietache, Da)break, 149.
63. Niet7.$( he. Prammetlli postu.m; (1881- 188.z), 348.
4. T hanatopolitics
1. .Michel FoucauJt, "Societ)' A1ust Be Defended": Lectures at tire College de France,
1975- 1976 ed. Mauro Betta n i and Alessandro Fontana, trans. David !\lacey (New York:
Picador. 2003), 258- 6).
2. See the section titled ''Politics over Life" in chapter 1.
1
3. Foucault, ".Societr Must Be Defended/' 258.

4.
5.
1996),
6.
1bid., 260.
Ahtin13rossat, L'fpre uve du disastre: Le
sitcle et le:. mrnps (Paris: Albin Michel,
l4tff.
Simona Forti offers a n exemplary profile of the relation be tween to ta litarianis m
and ph ilosophy irl her Jl wtalitariani.smo (Rorne.Bari: Laterza, 200l).
x.x
214
Notes to Chapter 4
7. Roberc Lifton , The Nazi Oocwrs: Medical Killingamltl1e Ps)'choi<Jg)' ofGeum:ide

(New York: Basic Books,1986), j l .
8. Erwi n Baur, Eugen Fischer, a nd Fritz Lenz, Gnmdriss der mensciJiidten ErblicM.;eit
slehre rmd Rmsenhygiene ( Munich: J. f. Lt:hrnano,1923), 417- 18.
9. Rudolf Ramm, Arztliclle Recllrs 1md Srandeskunde: Der Arzl als Gt.sur~dlleit
serzieher ( 6c,lin: W. de Gruytcr,1943). 156.
JO. Hans Reiter, (rLa biologie dans Ia gestion de I'Etat:' in Brat et srmti(Paris: F. So riot,
19<12). Other contributions include L. Conti, "L'organisation de Ia sante publique du Reich
pendant la guen:c''; F. von Vcrschuer, "L,i01.age h~redjtaire de l'homo\e"~ E. Fischer, .. L~
probleme de Ia race e Ia legislation rac:iale allemande"~ A. Sc:heunert. " La rcche rc.hc et
}\~tude des vita m ines au service de l'alinlentation 1\atio nale.
J L. Hans \Ve inert. Biologisclre Gnmdlagen fur Rnssenkunde 1md Rassen Hygiene
(Stuttgart: Ferdinand Enke Verlag, 1934).
12. Cf. Be n no MUller-H ill, Murderous Science: 1iminatiou br Scientific Selection of
jews., GJpsies, arul Others; GertiU1tl)' J9jJ- J945 trans. George R. Fraser (Oxford: Oxford
Universit}' Press,1988), 94
l 3. Jo;Khim }.-lrugowsk)', '' EinJe ituog,'>in Das iirztliche Ethos, ed. Christoph \Vilhelm
Hufeland (Munich and Berlin:/. F. Lehmann, 1939), 14- 15. See in this regard Lifton, The
Nazi DtJcUJrs, 32.

l 'l. Robert N. Proctor, The Ntlzi lVar on Cancer ( Princeton, N.J.: Princeto n Univers ity Press, 1999), 55
JS. ln additio n to the work of Lifton cited :'bo>~c, sec too in this connecl'ion the relevant work of Rat3ella de Franco, In nome di lppocrnre: Datl'ofoams1o medic.o nazista
ttll'etict~ ddfa sperimcnlrlzJ'cme conternptJrtllletl (Milan: ~ Aoge)j, 2001).
J6. K. Blome, Arzt im Kampf' Erlebnisse uml Gedanken (Leipzig: Johann Ambrosius
Barth Verlag, 1942).
17. Andrzej Ka.m.ins.ki, KonUnlrationsiager 1896 l'is heute: Cine AntJiyu (Stuttgart:
W. Kohlhammcr, 1982), 14;.
18. Primo [..e,i. Survival in f\u$Chwitz: The Na zi Assault ou Humanil")i trans. Stu<:~rt
Woolf (New York: Touchstone Books, 1996), 40.
19. Kamil\ ski,Konut~umionslager 1896 his l1eute, 20 0.
20. Adolf Hitler, Lil>res propos s-ur Ia gtrerrc et Ia paix rcn,eillis sur J'ordre de Martin
Bormrmn, vol. L (Paris: Flammarion, 1952), 321.
2 L. Cf. Christopher R. Browlling, The Pm/1 to Genocide: Essa,.s 1.m l.aum.:hiug the
final Solution (Cambridge: Cambridge Uoiversily Press, 1992), 15)- ;4.
22. Otto Helmut, \folk ir~ Gefa!Jr: Dcr Geburreuriickgang wtd seine Folgeu fiir
Deutschland$ Zuktmji (Mu nich: J. F. Lehmann, 1933), :md Friedrich BurgdOrfer, VOlker
"'" Abgnmd (Munich: j. F. Lehmaon,1936).
23. On t ransformations in the concept of "degenera tion," compare Georges Paul
Gcni l-Pc rrio, Niuoire des tlrigines et de l'C~tJiution de 11idCc de tlf.gf.ntre.fcence en
midecine metllnle (Paris. 1913), as well as R. D. Walter, ' 1\Vhat Became a Degenerate? A
Brief Jli:;tO(y of a Concept: }oumtJI tJ/ the .T-list<Jr)' of Medicine and tile Allied Sciences ll
(1956): 422-29.
24. Bened ictAugustin Morel, Trait..t des dt!gb,ere~cetlct.s ph)'siques, ituelfectutlies et
morales de l'esfJece lumUii.ne el' des causes ttui protluiscnt ces vtlrieu;_s malmlives (Par.is: J. B.
13aillierc: New York: H. Bailliere . L857).
25. Valentin Magnarl and Pau l Maurice Legrain, Lt's degeneres, Ctat menltll el.' S)'U
dromt!S Cpisodiques (Paris: Rueff, 1895L 79
Noles ro Chap1cr 4 Z15

26. Morel, Tmite des dCgbltre.fr:.ences phr sittucs, 5; Gjuseppe Sergi. Le degencmzitmi
umarLc (M i11m: FralcUo D~ molnrd,1889). 42.
27. Edwin Ray Lankester, Degeneration: A Chapter in DarwinimJ (london: Mac mil ~
lan,JS8o), j8.
28. On Italian degenerative theory) see A. Berlin i, ''L'osse.ssione della degenerazione:
ldcolog.ic e pJ."atichc deU'cu gcnctica: diss., ht. Orientale di. NapoU. 2000, aod roore
generally Ma ria Do nzel1i, ed .) La biolog;a: Parametro epistemologico del XIX St!Colo
(Naples: Liguori Editore. 2003).
29. PJ."o sper L.u(aS, !mite philo:Mph ique et phr siologic1uc de tlter-tJite muurcllc (Paris:
/. 13. 13ailliere, 1847- 50), a nd Theodule Ribot, L'l1eredite: Etude psychologique sur ses
phenomene5, se5 lois, ses causes) sts cousiquences (Pa ris: Lad range. 1876). Orl Ribot, see
Re mo Dodei, Destini personali: L'etil della coloniuazio,le delle coscienze (M ilan: Feltrinelli), 6;ff.
30. Eug~ne Apert, L'hirldite rnoriJidt (Paris: E.. f.lam rnarion. 19l9). J.
3 L. Lucas. TraitC pl1ilosopl1ique et physiologuqe de l'l~tfrCditi. naturelle, 5
32. Alldte Pi, hot, La sodCtl putt1 de Darwirt a Hitler (Paris: Flam marion, .2ooo),
8o- S;.
33. Max Nordau, De.genemt.i4-ltJ1 introdu,tion by George L. l\tosse (lincoln: Univer
sil'y of Nebrask Press. L99J), zz.
3:1. Gina Ferrero Lombroso, I vantt:~ggi della degenemzione (T\Jrin: Bocca. 1904),
;6, ll4.
35. Ibid., t8;.
JG. For the literary refe rences that I take up a nd elaborate in t he fo llowing page.s [
am indebted to the directions that Daniel Pick J>I."OVi.dcs in faces cJj Degeneration: 1\
European Disorder, 1848- 1918 (Camb ridge: Cambridge University Press, L989)t 155- 7;.
O n the co ncept of degeneration . see as well J. Edward Chamberli n a nd Sander L.
Gilman, eds., Degeneration: The Dmk Side of Progress (Ne\V YOJ."k: Colllmbia U.n i.vcrsi.ty
Press, 198;).
37. m ile Zola, His !Jxcel/euc!' (London: Ele.k BookS,I9j8); f.ede rico De Roberto, 1
vicercf (Milan: Gar:am6 , 1970); Francesco Mastriani, lvumi (Naples: M. Mikmo, 1972).
38. Rt)bert Louis Stevensol\, The Strange Ctue of Doctor Jekyll <md A1r. Hyde (New
York: Viki11g Penguin, 2002)) 60-61.
39. Ibid., 67, 68, 66.
40. Ibid. , 69.
4l. Oscar Wilde, Tire Picture of Dorum Gmr (Oxford: Oxford Univcrsit)' Press,
1998), ll5.
42. Ibid., 183.
43. Ibid., 184.
44. Bram S toker, Dracula (Toro nto, Ont.: Broadview Press, 1998), 383.
45. Ibid., 279. 252, ljl.
46. Ibid., 253.
47. fo r a detailed (and positive) rc,icw of cllgcn.ic institut ions a nd practices io the
first dec.ades of the last century, see Marie Therese Nisot, La question euginique daru les
divers paxs (Brussels: G. Van Campenhout, 1927- 29).
48. \Vilhcl m SchaU mayer, Vcrer}Jimg unci A uslcse im Lebenslrmf cler VOlker: Eine
staawvissemcllaftl;clt Studie auf Grrmd der rtcmeren n;olog;e (Jena: G. Fischer.t90J).
49. Wilhelrn Schallrnayer, Ul-,er die drohemle kOrperlithe Eutartrmg der Kulturmen$c/Jiteit und die Verstaatlidrung de.s iirztlichen Sttmdes (Berlin: l. HeusC;'r, t8~n).

50. Ludwig \Volcmaon. Politische J\ntltropologie (Eisenach a nd Lcipz:ig: lhOringische
Vcrlags-Ans~lt, l903).
Sl. AJfred Ploetz, Die Tiic/uigkeit wrsen.'1 Rnsse. und der Sclwrz der Schwaclu~u: Bin
\fersudr iiber Ras$cnlz)'giene wtd ilir Verltiiltni.f ~~~den humwum Jtlatlen1 besvmlers zum
Socialism us (Berlin: Fischer Verlag, 1895).

52. Georges Vacher de Lapougc, Race u milieu
S(lCial:
Es:sais d'anthrOfJOsm:ir,ltJgic
(Paris: M. Riviere, 1909).

53. See in this regard the e.ss:ays collected in M. B. Adams, TIJe Welfbom Science:
Cugeuics in Germany, Frcmce, 8m:zil and .Russia (Oxfo~;d: Oxford Uuivcrsity Prcss, 1990).
54. Refe renc-e has already been made to the success o f Alfred Espinas's Des societes
tmimales: Stude de psydwlogie com par& (Paris: G. Baillif re) 1877) 1 13-60. The m ost rele,ant sections for o u r discussjon are perh.-.ps the initial o nes o n pa rasites (distinguished
in "parasites, commensals, and mutual ists").
55. Jo~l Kotek et Pierre Rigoulo t, ~e sieclc des camps: Dttcntlon, concentrat ion, extermina tion, ami rms de mal radical (Paris: Lattes. 2000).
56. Procto r1 The Nazi War on Car~cer, 119.
57. G.-.rl.-.od E. Allen, ~'Chevau.'( de CO\ITSe er chevaux de trait: Nletaphoresct analogies

agrko les dans l'eugenisme amt l'ica in 1910-1940," in Histoire de Ia gCmitique: Pratiques,
techniques ct thb1ries, cd. Jea n-Lo uis fjscher a nd \ Villiam Howard Schncddcr ( Paris:
Cretcil, 1990 ), 83-98.
58. On t he figu re o f Davenpo rt, see in particular his Heredit)' in Retarion to Euger~ics
(New York: Henry Holt and Company. 19u).
59. Charles Richet, ''Dans cent ans;' La Revue scientifique (March u~ 1892): 329.
60. Lifton, :rlze Nlu i Om:tms, 279.
6 L. Ma urice Boigey, L'elel'age l1umairt ( Paris: Payot, 1917)tand Cha rles Binet~Sangle,
Le hnrns humain ( Paris: Albin 1\{ichel, 1918).
62. Chades Valentino, t.e sct:rcl professiomJI en medet:inc, S{~ l'llleur sodl~ le (Paris:
C. Naud, L90J).
63. Vacher de Lapouge, Selcctiom !ocialcs ( J>aris: A. Fontetnoing, 1896) 1 472-73.
6 4. Just Sicard d(;' Plauzoks, Prim:ipes d'h)'giene (Paris: Editions M.t:dk ales, L927).
65. A. ZuccareHi, "11 problema capitale deii'Eugenica," Nocem lufuiore (1924): 2.
66. In !iuck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200 ( 1927). Cf. Amedio Santuosuosso, Corpo eliberu'l:
Una storia tra diritto e $-Cienza (Milan: R. Cortina, 200t). On American b iopolitics a nd
its d ose relat inns with Nazi German}', see Stefan KOhl, The Nazi Cmmection: Eugenics,
American Racism and German Nati<mal-Socialism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994).
67. Karl Binding and Alfred Hoche, Die Freigabe der Verniduung lebensunwerten
Leben: Jlzr lvlass und ihre Hmn (Leipzig: !vlcioer. l9l0 ).
68. Adolph )oSI , Da> Redlt auf den Tod (Go ltingcn: Gru now & Co., 189;).
69. Lifto n, The Nc~zi Docr..ors, 17.
70. Binding a nd Hoche, X rztlichc Bcmerkungco: in D ie Freigabe der Vemiclztung
le:bwsutiWCt't..c.!ll Leben, 6z-t5.z.
7 t. J\!1Oller-H iJJ, Murdcw u s St:iem:c, 40.
72. Enrico Morselli, L)uccisione pietosa (Turin: Bocca, 1928), 17.
73. Ernst Mann (pseudonym of Gerhard Hoffmann) , Die rl0sung dt>r Menschl1eit
vtJm Elefld (\ ,V eimar: F. f'i.n.k> 1922).
74. Charles B inet~Sangle, L'art. de mourir: Difense et JecllnilJuC. du Hticide s.ecomfcf
(Pa ris: Albin Michel. 1919); R ichet... Dans cent an.s," 168.
75. Antoine VVylm, La morale sexuelle (Paris: Alc~n, t907), 280.
No1es to Chapter 4 217

76. Rnphacl Lcmkin. /\xis Rule in Occupied Eumpe: Laws uf Occuptttion, t\nalysis vf
Government, Proposttls for Redress (\Vashingto n, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment fo r International Pf!"ace, Division of International Law, 1944). On the vast literature related to
genocide, I direct the reader o nly w GencJcide; t\ Critical BiblitJgmphic Re.-iew (New
York: Facts on File Publications, 1988), as well as to Y. Ternon, L'etnr criminl!l (Paris:
Scuil,1995).
77. Sec the section titled ''Regeneration" in this chapter.
78. See, on this po int, Anne Carol, Histoire de l'eugenisme
etJ
France (Pa ris: Seuil,
1995).
79. In addjtion to Paul \Veindling's Healtl1, Race afld German Politics between Nationnl
Unijicatitm ami Nazism 1870- 1945 (Camb ridge: Camb ridge Un ivers.ity Press) 1989),
which is a rich source on t he relatio n beh\'een medicine a nd politics from \ ,Vilhelminhm to Nazi Germoll\}r, see too Michel Pollak, "Une po litique sdentifique: Le concours
de l'anthropologje, de Ia biologie et du droit; in La politiqut nazie d'cxterruiuation, ed.
Fran~ois Bedard a (Pa ris: Alb in Michel, 1989), 75- 99
80. Emmnnuel Levinas, "Refle,tions O il the Philosoph}'ofHitlerism; Crit:ica f Tluluir)'
l] : J
(full 1990 ): 69.
8 l. The impossibility of escape {ewuione) is a t t he center o f Levinas's 0 11 Escape,

trans. Bettina Bergo (Sta nford, Calil:.: Stanfo rd Un iversity Prcss, ZOOJ}. Jt seems to me
that no one has noted I hat Bricux , i n h..is play tilled p recisely L'dvasiou, takes up the
ident ica l theme, a t first affi rrning a nd then conte.s ting the idea that a heredital'y d isease
cannot be cured (E-ugCne Brieux, L'tf,,asion, mmldie en 3 actes IParis: Stock,1914J).
82. On the dialectic of incorporation, cf. Claude Lefort, "L'image du corps et le to ta li
tarlsmc: in l!iuveuti<m dbnocnltique (Paris: Faya~:d, L98l).
83. This d ual procedure of the biologizat ion of the spirit and the spiritualizatjon of
t he body constitutes the. nuc.leus of Nazi b iopolit ics. See, in this regard. the c.hapter
t .itlcd .. Polit iquc biologique" of the Anthologic de Ia norore/le 6umpe> wh.ich was pub lished in occupied France by Alfred Fabre-Luce (Paris, t942).lt includes contributions
from Gobirleau, Cha mberlain, Barres, Rostan d, Renal), a nd Maurras, alongside those o f
Hitler.
84. Vacher de Lapouge, Selec.:tiou.s sodales, 306. Cf. Picht)t's /.a sod~tC pure, 124.
85. Otmar vo11 Vers.chuer, Mmwel tl'cugtni<JtH~ et ltt rt dite lwmainc (Par.is: Masson,
1.943), 114. I am citing the French version a nd not the odginal, Leitfaderl der RassenhygieruJ in the fo11owing paragraph s.
86. Ibid.
87. Ibid., n;.
88. Lifto n, lhc Nl,zi Doctors, 16.
89. Ibid., '47

90. Ibid., 27.
9L. Cf. Gisela Bock, "11 nazionalsoci<~lisrno: Polit iche di gcncre c vit:1 delle donne?' in
Storie. delfe dou11e in Otcideme: II Noveceuto (Ro me -Bari: Laterza, 1992), 176- 212. See as
wcU he~: Zwtmgsstcrilis.mi on im N tlziomiiS(JZ.ialis.mus.: Studien zur Rttssenpoliti k und
Frauenpolir.ik (Opladen: \ Vestdeutscher Verlag. 1986)t more generally, o n women u nder
Nazism, see Claudia Koonz, MoriJers itJ the. Fatherland: Womeu1 rl1e Famil)' nnd Nazi
Pt,/i,.ir:s (New York: St. Mart in's PrcsS,1987}.
92. Jn his text on female ferti lity, Frudttbarkeit und Gesundheit der Frau, which
opens with the Naz.i s logan that "the ge11us alld the race a re a hove the in.d i,\,idual," Dr.
Hermann Stieve holds that the value o f women is measured by the state of their ovaries.

To p rove such :1 theshi. he himself conducted experiments on the degree to which
ovaries could suffer lesions under bo~ ts of terror until they atrophied. On this. com pare the third chapter o f Ernst Klee's Auscltwitz, die NS J\tfedizin und ihre Opfer (Frank
furt am Main: S. fischer, 1997).
93. Hannah Arendt, The Origim ofTotafirarimtisrn (New York: Harvest Book, 1968),
444-
5. T he Philosophy of Bios
1. On new hiopo.litical em.etgencies. com pate the exhaustive survey by Laura Bazzica lup o . ..AmbivJienze deUa biopolitic~1,*' in Politica della vita: Sovrrmittl, biopotere,
dirini, ed. lau ril Ba1.zicalupo and Roberto E.spositn (Rome-Bari: Lare rza, 2003), 134-44
See as well Bazzicalupo's Gownu> della vita: Riopolitlca td tcouomia (Ro rl\e-Bari: Laterzo, 2006).
2. For fu rther discus..o;ion of these aspects>see Alessandro Dal Lngo, N<Ju-per$ouc:
L'esdusione dei migranti in utm societil globale (Milan: Felt rineW, 2001}; Salv~torc
PaJidda. Polizia posrrnoderua: Emogmfia del rJuO t'O comrollo sodale (Milan: Feltrinelli>
:w oo); and, more gcncraU}', Saodro MCZ'tadra and PetriUo Agost ino, 1 amfini della globttlizz.ttzione: Lavoro, cultu r(~> citttJdimmza (Rome: M:mifestolihri, 2000).
3. Jn this sense, see Agnes Heller, "Has BiopoJitics Changed the Concept of the
Political? Some Further Thoughts about .Bjo politics," in BiofJolitic.f: Tlu! Politic$ vf
the Body, Rate, cmrf Nawre., ed. Ferenc Feher and Agnes Heller (AJdershot: Avebury,
1996), as well as Heller and feh~r's Biof>oliti (Aldershot and Btoo.k6eld, Vt.: Avebury, L994).
4. Hannah Arendt, The Hurnnrt Condition (Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
L958), 55
5. lbid.,22.
6. 1n this directiorl, c:f. Leonardo Daddabbo> In;.z;: Foucault e Arendt (Milan: B. A.
Graphis, 2003), esp. 43- 46.
7. l\f<lrti n Heidegger, "Letter o n Huma nism; i n 8a.sic.: \Vdrings from Being aud
Time (1917) to ThcT<"k afThiuking (1964) (New York: HarperSanFta ncisco, 1977), 210,
225. Interesting elaboratjons of these reAections a re contained in the reading of.,Letter
on Humanism" as well as Heidegger's elltire thought by Peter Slt)tetdijk in La domestication de l'etre: Pour un iclttircissement de Ia clttiriere, a p-aper given nt the Centre Pom pidou in March 20 00 (Paris: Mille et u ne Nuits, 2o oo).
8. for soch a tonalil)' of Hcidcggcr}s 1ho ugbt, and more gcncraU}' on the early Jicideggcr, see Eugenjo MazzareiJa, Enneneutict' deW4fcttil,itir: Prospettil'e cmtic!Jc deil 'cmtologia heideggeriaua (Naples: Guida, 2002 ).
9. M:urin Heidcggcr, Pltetwmenological Interpretntiom c1J Aristotle: initiation into
Phenomenological Reseat'CIJ, t ra ns. Richard Rojc.ewicz (Bloomington: India na Univer
sity Press, lOOl), 66.
JO. Ibid., 6;.
ll. Ibid., 62.
12. Medar:d Boss. " P.reface to the First German Edition of Martiu liddcggcr's ZollikorJ Semirtars.. ~ in Zollikort Seminars: Protoc:ols Com1ersntiomLett..ers, cd. Mcdard Boss,
t.rans. Franza Mayr and Richard Askay (Evanstor\, IU.: Northwestern Univcrs.ity Press,
2001), xviii.
NoleS 10 Chapler 5 219

13. Martin Heidcggcr, Being ami 'fime, trans. Joan Stambaugh (Albany: Stale Uni-
vcrsil)' of New York Press, 1996), 46.

14. Martin Heidegger> The Ftmdnmemal Coucepts of Memph)'sics: World, Finirude,
Solitude> tTans. \Villiam McNt:ill a nd Nicholas \rValker (Bioomiogron: Jndjana Un ivers ity P ressJ 1995); Contributiom ro PJr;Josoplly: From Enowning, trans. Parv is Emad and
Kenneth Maly (6loo.I1Jiogton: ]ndja oa Un.ivc.rsity P.re.ss, 1.999). l..uca Illcttcrati atcu(alcly
a nalyzes this jtinerary in Tra tecnicn e tmtum: Problemi di omologia tfelvit~(mte in Heitfegger (Padova: Pa ligrato, 2002).
15. IEs1>osito>s obvious target is Giorgio Agaolben's d iscussio u ofbol.'c dom and rhe
a nimal in The Open. - 1ians.]
16. Heidegger> l etter on Humanism," 206.
J7. See, on this point, the persu!'sive C:'ssay by Marc.o Russo, ""Animalitas: HeidC:'gger e
Yantropo lt'Jgia filosofica; Discipline jilo$ofiche 12: 1 (20 02): 167-95.
18. Cf. Jacob Rogozinski, com me les paroles d'url ho rn me ivre . .. : cha.ir de l'histoire et corps po litique.'' Les Cahiers rle Philosoplrie, no. 18 ( 1994-95): 72- L02..
19. See the sect in n titled " Degeneration" in cha pte r 4
20. Noncthc1ess, see Antonio Ma rtone, "La rivolta contro C.1ligola: Corpo e Natura
in Camus e Merleau .Po nty," in Bazzicalupo and Esposito, Polirica detla vita, 234- ...13.
2 L. M:ouricc Merlcau-Ponty, "Philosophy and Non -J>bilosoph) since JicgcJ;' i n Ph ilosophy and NotJ-Philosopliy since Merleau-Ponty (New York: Rout ledge, 1988; reprinted,
Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern U niversity P ress, 1997), 63.
22. Mau rice Merlcau -J>oory, TJrc Visible and tlte Jnvi.fiblc, t ra ns. Alphonso Liogis
(Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern U niversity P ress, 1968), 147
23. See Didier Frant:k, Heidegger et lc pmbl~me de l 'cspm:c (Pad s: Cd itions de r-.linuit,
1986).
24. Merleau -Po nty, Tl1e Visible rmd the lnvisiblt.. '248.
25. The work thai has excavated th is terrajn the roost deeply a od with .i onovati." e
results is Lisc.iani Petrini's La passione del mondo: Saggio StJ A4erlenu-Ponty (Naples:
Ediziorl i Scientifiche Jraliane, 2002) .
26. Merleau- Ponty, The Visible nnd the Invisible, 258- 59.
27. Ibid. , 264.
28. See agajn Pet l.'irl i, La ptusione dd numdo, 119.
29. Mau rice MerlcauPonty, The Nature: Course Notes from the College de France, C:'d .
D. Segla td, t ra ns. Roberl Vallier (Evanston, 111.: Northwestem Universit}' P ress, 2003),
tO). [n this rcgard.see too the chapter chat Elisabeth de Footenay dedicates to Mcrlea~r
Ponty in Le siler~c~ des betes: La phUosopl1ie a l'epretwe de l'cmimalire (Pa ris: Fayard,
1998), 64!H'O.
30. Maurizio Carbone has reconstructed the reasons. tracing in turn a twent icth c.e ntlll')' genealogy of the t he me of flesh in ''Carne: Per Ia s to ria di un fmi ntendimento;
in La c:ume c lu voce: Jn dialogo tm cstet-iat ed eticfl, <.-d. Maurizio Carbone and David M.
Levin (Milan : Mimesis, 2003).
3 t. Vrao\=Ois J..yotard, Oiutmrs, figure (Paris: KUnd:s.ied.. l97l). 2.2-; a nd Gilles Oeleu-ze
a nd Felix Guattari, Wlwt Is Philosoph)'?. trans. Hugh Tomli nson a nd G raham Bu rchell
(New York: Colu mbia University P ress, 199~1), 178.
32. Jacques Dcrrid a,
Touching-fcan-Luc: Ncmq, tr.ms. Chrisrioe Irizarry (Sta.n fo rd , Calif.: Sta nford University Press, 200;), 236,238.
33. )ean-t uc Nancy, Tire Setae of the World. t rans. Je ffreyS. Librett (Mimleapolis:
University o f Min nesota Press, 199i), 149 I have p revious!)' a ntidpated these critk a l
o,
220
Notes to Chapter 5
rcflecrions in "Ch::.ir et corps danIa dCconscrocl ioo do christianisme:' in Sen$ en tous

$ens: Autour des tm.,fwx de / emr-Luc NanCJ; e:d. Francis Guibal a nd Jean-C-Ict M:,rcin
(Paris: Galilee, 2004 ), 153-6,1.
34. DuV"idc Tariz.-zo provides a descriptivc map of conlempor.arr French philosophy in
II pe1rsiero libero: La filosofin francese dopo lo strunumlismo (M ilan: Cortina Raffitello, 1003),
35. J\ilichc.l Heory, Tnc.armuitm: Uue phiiC1sopl1ie de lc~ dwir (Pads: &Htions du Scuil,
2000).
]6. Jer6me Alexandre, Une clrair pour In gloire.: L'nnrllropofogie rialis.te et mystique de
'l"trl"ltllien (Paris: 8eauchcsnc, lOOt), 199ff.
37. Cf. E. Schweizer. F. Baumgartcl, and R. Meyer, ''Flesh;' in Theological Dictionarr
of the New TcsttHfiL'lH., ed. Gerhard Kittel, tra1~S. Geoffrey VI. Brorniley (Grarld Hapids,
M ich.: W. B. Ecrdma ns, J98)).
38. Cf. the neo phenomeno logkal perspecti-..e o f Marc Rihir in Du Sublime en p<Jfi.
tiqt~e (Paris: Payot, 1991).
39. Cf. Xa vier ~cro ix , Le corps de chair, les dimensions itlrique, estllcitique et spir
ituelle de l'amotr (Pads: Edit iol\s du Cerf, 1992). On the 1heme of flesh in Saini Paul,
sec as wcU J. 1\. T. Robinson, Le corps, etude sur Ia thCologie de Saint-Paul ( L)'On: Edilions d u Chalet, 1966).
40. The Bible: 'flze t\utltorizcd King fam es Version (Oxfo rd: Oxfo rd Un ive rsity Press.
1997).
4 l. I previously int roduced these themes in fmnumims.: Protezione e negazione della
vittt (Turin: Eimtudi. 2002), 78-88 and 142- 44- A seemingly differcnl reading of fbe
body is present in the a mple frame that Umberto Galimberti offers in II corpo (M ilan:
fclt ri neU i, 1987).
42. See in pa rticuJar Aldo Bonom i, /{ trionfo rfdla moltitudine (Turin: Bollati Borin
ghieri, 1996): Paolo Virno, A Grammnr of r/re Multitude: For em Anal)'sis ofCot~r.emporarr
l'orms o[Ufc (Cambridge, Mass.: SeroiOICXti c J, 200J); i\ otonio Negri, "i\ppwximalions:
Towa rds an Ontologkal Dcfinitjo n of the MuJtjtudc;' 1\>fultitudes. no. 9 (2002) (available
at h ttp://www.nadj r.org/J1ad i r/ir'litiativ/agp/space/rnuh itude.h tm ); and Augus1o l llu.minati, Del Comrme: Cronaclre del general imellect{Rome: 1\fanife-.stolibri, 2003). As interesting <Hld d iverse as tllese perspectives are, the tisk ultimately is that the reading of biopl'll
itics that r:esults rnay be, if rlot economistic, then minimally producrivistic or workerist,
a nd thC:'re fo rC:' impo Htical. CompJrC:', o n this point, the observa6ons of Carlo FormC:'n t i,
Mercami di futuro: U1opia e crh-i del Net Ecouom)' (Tutin: Einaudi. 2002), 237ff.
43. Cf. Georges Djdi-Hub errnan, Confronring /mages: QuC$tioning the Ends ofJJ Ccrtniu Histor)' ofAn, trans. John Goodman (University Park: Pennsylvania S tate Univer
sity P ress, zoos).
41. David Sylvester, Entretiens a tree Francis Bacon (Geneva: A. Skira, 1996), 29.
45. GilJes Deleuze, Fmnds Bncou: The Logic ofSeuSdriou1 trans. Daniel \V. Smith (New
York: Cool iouu m,l003). 67. On the relation between Deleuze a nd Bocoo, sec Ub:tldo
Fadin i, Figure nel tempo: A pariire dn Deleuze/Bncon (Verona: Ombre Corte, 2003).
46. Oelcuzc, francis 8m:rm, 2 1..

47. lbid.J 62.
48. For a lucid genealogy of the concept of'nation;' see France.sco Tuccari, La t1azione
(Roroe-Bari: Laterza, 2000), not to tnc::ntioo Etienne Balibar's ''History aod Ideo logy:
The Natio n Form; in Race. Nation, Clnss: Ambiguous Identities, ed . Etie nne 13alibar
and Imma., ucl \VaUerstf in (Loldo n: Verso, t99l), 88-106.
Notes h) Chapte r 5
2ll
49. On rhc not ion of"fralcrnily.'' "'~ith particula r reference to f r-..nce, sec Marcel
Davjd, Fmtemiti et R61olution frlmraise: q89- 1799 (P:.nis: J\ubicr,l98j), as well as his Le
PritJtemps de lc~ Fmtemite, Genes.e er Vici$sirudes1 I8Jo - t8SJ (Paris: Aubier, 1992).
SO. Eligio Res Ia cril ic:,IJ)' interrogates the possibility of a frate rnal right in II diritttJ
frntt'>ftJ-o (Rome-Bari: La te rza, 2002).
5 I. On the .relation among fri.cnd-ene01.}1-brothcr. see also jacques Deni.da, The Politics of Friendship, trans. George CoUins (London: Verso, 1997).
52. For the need of a fra te rnal b rother in Nietzsche, see especially Tflw Spoke Zara
tlwsira, traos. T hoo\as \'Vayne (New York: Algo.ra Publishing, 2003). 42- 4:1 .46-47. 161.
For Carl Schmitt, see Ex capti~itale salus: Erfnlmmgen der Zeit 1945/47 (Cologne:
Greven Verlag, 19;0).
53. Rene Girard, Violence and tile Sacred. t rans. P.-. trick Gregory (Baltimore: Joh ns
Hopkins Univetsity Press, 1977).
54. Sigmund Freud, Totem a11d Tahoe>: RtJemblauces btt.-ween the Psyc/Jic Lives <Jf Sav.
ages and Neurotic'f., trans. A. A. Brill (Amherst, N.Y.: Promc;theus Books, 2000).
55. Sigmund Preud, M<Jses ami Mc>m.nheism, t rarlS. Knthedne )n nes (New Yotk: V in
t.-.ge Books,1967). On this theme, see \'IS weiJ my Nove pensieri sullll politica ( Bologna: Il
l\lulino, 1993)) 92- 93) as well as C<Jmmrmitas: origiue t desriuo della comuniu1 (Turin:
Einaudi, 1998), zz- z8.
56. Freud, Moses tmd i\1onotlleism, 3
57. Cf. Phillipe Laco ue -Laba .-the and jean-Luc Nancy, "11 popolo ebraico non
sogn a: in t'llltm .fcetw della p.fi,<wnali.fi: 'fen$ioni ebmid1e nell'opera di Sigmund Freud,
ed. David Megh nagi (Ro m e: Carucci, 1987}.
58. Compare this readjng of the roothcr- son reb tion '"ith Angela Put ioo, Amiche
mie is.teriche (Naples: Cronopio , 1998).
59. Arendt, TIJe Human Condition, 9.
60. Cf. Eugenia Parise, cd., L(l pofil'im tra mrwlitit e nwrfrllitrl: Nanm~ l1 Arendt
(Naples: Edizioni scienti6che italianc, 1993).
61. A re11dt~ The Human Condition1 246-47.
62. Cf. A. F.-.got-Largea uh, "Vindividu.-.t ion c;.n biologie; in Gilbert Simondon: Une
peus~e de l'ir1dividllation et de Ia teclmitJUe (Pads: Albin Michel, 1994). See as well the
other a nthology o f esS<l}'S titled Sim<Jrulou, ed. Pase:a.l Cha bo t (Paris:). Vr.in, 2002).
63. Gilbert Simondon, L'indivirlu et sa genese physicobiologique (Paris: J. MiJlon,
'99;), 77
61 . Gilbert Simondon.L'indi,idullzione psichica e collettiJ'a (Rome: DeriveApprodi,
2001), 8 4; my emphasis.
65. Ibid., 138.
66. Giorgio Ag(lm hen, StMe of Exception, tr.ms. Kevi n Attell (Chicago: Unive rsity o f
Chicago Press, 20 0 5}.
67. The i nsurmo u nta ble apori:1 i n wh ich the polemics between normativism a nd
natu ral right take place J re in plain view in the joint public.-.tion of two essays) the fi rst
by Ernst Cassircr, "Voro \ Vcscn u od \Verden des Natunctbts:~ Zc:itschnJi fiir .RulttspiJilosophie in Lehre und Praxis 6 (1932-31): 1- 27tand Hans Kelsent "Die Gru ndlage der
Naturrechtsleh re;' Osterreicltische Zeitsd1rij't fiir 0/ferJtliches Recht 13 ( 1963): 1- 37 In
2002, the ltaliao jour11al Micmmc:g(~, in its sccood issue, published a number o f es;says
by Angelo Bolafli, S tefano Rodotit, ~rgio Givone, Carlo Galli, and myself precisely on
this theme.
222
NotC:'s to Chapter 5
68. fo r chls juridical philosophical interp retation ofSpinoza, S(.'e above aJJ the relevant
essay hy Ro berto Cicca relli, Potenza e bentitudine: II tliritto nel pensiero rli Baruch Spinoza (Rorne: Carocd, 2 0 03).
69. Baruch Spinoza, Politiml Tretltise, in CmnfJiete Hlorks, ed. lvtichael L. Morg~m.
t rans. Samuel Shirley ([ndianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 2002), 683.
70. Baruch Spinoza, Ethic;, trans. G. H. R. Parkinso n (Oxford: Oxf01:d U.n i.vcrsiry
Press, 2000) , 151
7 L. Spinoz.a, Politicnl Ttwuise, 685.
72. Ctienne .Baljbar, Spirwza and Politics, trMJS. Peter Soowdon (London: VcrsO,J.998),
6.1- 68.
73. Sirnondo l\, L'indivMu et s.a gen~se physico-biologique, 295.
74. Simondon, L'indi1.:iduazioue psichim e collettiva, t88.

75. Ibid.
76. Canguilhem's metapolit ical reflections were already expressed in h is Trail.~ de
Logique ct de Momle, pt.lblished in Marseille in t939 See in particular the L1st two chap
ters, "Morale et Politique" and ''La Nation e t les Relatio1\S internationales" (259-99).
77. Georges Canguilhcm. ~'Une pedagogic de Ia g~u!rjson est-elle possible?" in Ecrits
sur Ia m.!dkiue (Pa ris: ~ditions du Seuil, 2002), 89.
78. Georges Omguilhem, Lc1comrais:umce de lu vic (Paris: Librairie H:tchcl'tC,l952},l2.
79. Cf. GuiiJaume LeBlanc. Canguilliem et fes nom1es {Pa ris.: Presses ~miversita ircs
de France, 1998).
80. tmilc Durkhcim, "Rules for tbc Disti ncrion of the Normal from !he Pathological:'
in The Rules ofSociological lvlethod1 t ra ns. W. D. Halls (New York: Free Presst 1982), 92.
8L. Georges Canguilbem, ''New Rcflcctioos on the Normal a.nd the Pathological,,, in
Tlze Normal cmd the Patlzofogical, trans. Carolyn R. Fawcett (New York: Zone Books,
1991) , 2<13
82. Rcn~ Lcriche, " lntroductioo gCmh:aJe. De la santC i\ Ia maladje. l..a douJeur daos
les maladies. OlLva Ia mfdi<::inC:'?'~ in Encyclopt?die. F-ranp.tise, vol. 6, t6~1: quoted in Can~
gujlhern, Tlte Normal and the Pathologic,,l, 91.
83. Cf. Pierre Macherey, '(Pour u ne histoire nature.Ue des normes;' in N1ic!Jel Fou
cault philosophe ( Paris: Editinns d u Seuil, 1989), 203- 21.
84. Canguilhem, "Ne\11 Reflections;' 258-59.
85. Hans Kelsen, General Theoq of Norm$, trans. Michael Hartne y (Oxford: Oxford
Universit}' Press. 1991), 158-6!. On the cn.nplex then'le nf the norm, r will limit my references co Alfonso Catania, Decisione e norma (Naples: Joveoe, L.97.9 ), as wcU as II problema del diriuo e dell'obbligatoreiul: Studio sulla norma foudamemale {Naples: E.S.J.,
L983). More recent ly, sec also fabjo CiaramcUl, Creazione e interprettlzi<me della norma
(Troino: Cit<o Aperta, 2003).
86. Canguilhem, The Nornwl cmd the Pmhological, 139.
87. Ibid., L99 for the reference to Goldstein, sec Kurt Goldstein, 1'he Orgcmi.nn: 1\
Holistic Approach to Biolog}' Derived from the Patllologicol Dma ;, Man (New York: Zone
BookS,1995).
88. Gilles De leuze, Pure Immanence: ES$ilJS on a Life, trans. Anne Boy man (New York:
Zone Books, 2001).
89. Jbid. 27. Sec as well Rene SchCI.'cr's rHo roo taoturo, Ci01pcrson.ncl: Unc poliliquc:
in Gilles Deh!uze: Une vie philmopltique, cd. f: ric Allicz (Le Plessis~ Robinson: Jnstitut
Sy.n.th~labo pour le progrCs de Ia connaissa11Ce, 1998), 25- 42, and Giorgio Agarnben,
No1cs to Chapter 5 ZZ3

"Absolute Immanence ,' ' in Potentialities: Collected &says i.n PhilosofJh)> t rans. Daniel
HcUcr-Roazcn (St,onfo rd, Calif.: Stanford Un iversity Press, 1999), 220-39.
90. Deleuze. Pure fmmnnem:e, 27.
9 1. (English usage doeso~t requ ire chc determ inate a rticle, " the,' ' v.vith any regularity, thu s ''lite" and not "the lite; but [ ha \'e retained the article as Esposito's a nalysis
makes Uttle sense withom it. The interested reader is also dkected to the d os.ing pages
of Immrmitas in which Esposito discusses at lengt h in a d iffere nt setting the use of the
determinate article preceding self as in "the self.' - Trmu.J
92. Charles Dickens. Our Muhmf Friend (New York: Al fred A. Knopf, 1994), 443
93. Ibid., 14-1
94.. Deleuze. Pure lrunwnerut', 29.
95. IJ have translated cosi as ''singula r*' following the EngJ.ish translation of
Deleuu. T hus Deleuze wr ites: "T he singularities and the events tha t constitute a life
coexist with t he acddems o f the life that corresponds to it" (29).- Traus:.)
96. Gille Deleuze, The Logic of Se,.. t rans. Mork lester with Chork Stivole (New
York: Colu mbia University Press, 1990),103.
97. Law rence Fcrlinghe tti, 1' ll." in U,J regard sur le monde (l'aris: C. Bourgeois.
1969), UL
98. Dcleuzc. J'he L<1gic of Sense, 103.

99. For the pro blcmat icity of the virtua l in Dclcuzc, in relncion w cbc logic of
imma nence, see the intense and acute monograph that Alain Badio u dedica tes to it in
Ocleuze: The Clamor of Being, tr:ms. Louise Burchill (Minneapolis: Universit-y of Minnesota Press~ 1999).
JOO. Simondon, T.:imlividu ct SlJ genese ph)'sico-}JioiCJgiquc, l60; q uoted in Delcllze.
The Logic ofSeose. 104.

JOJ. Deleuze, The Logic o[Seme, 10 7.
102. Oi.ckcns, Our Mutua/Frien d, 443,444.
Index
As-,mben. Giortio: boredom and,

1a9n.ts; community and, xxx-xxxj;
homo Jaur and, xxii- x:xv, :dii, 2o8n.19~
life as bfos und tfJt, X"Xi-xxili, ;cxxi, xl;
negnrive biopolitics and, b::, x.xix,

10t.i n.67; sttHc of cxccptioo a nd, xxv,
199n.;g, aoon.68, 100n.7
animnl: breeding o f, S3, 100; in com ..
p;m,tivc b iolog)' with m ut'l, 90-9l,
112; dcgcncrntion l.lnd, 119; human
and,lJ, 108, t68, 179-80; impersoJlal
s ingul::1rity and, 194; metaphor of, too;
zoopolitits and, 117, 1.29, IJL See al.w

Bacon. Francis; fle-sh; Heideggtr,
Martin
Aquin3s, Thomas, 71
Arcndc,llannoh: biopolicic.s and,t4?so; birth and, l4S.n-79i Foucault
ond. 11; lftidcggcr and, 153: liberalism and, 75- 76: p<>litical speech and,
2o2n.8s; totalitarianism a nd,
lOOn.66
Aristo tlt", 14, .517 '
nulo imm unity. Sec: l)crrida, Jacqlles;
im rnunity
&l:tillc. Georges: commuojc;uion and.

xxx- xxxi; comrnunity and, 107.
Ni~tzsche and~ 79
Boudrillard, Jc;m, vii, 201n.76

B~nthnm , feremy, 74
6 envcni:uc. P.milc , x
Berlin, lsiah. 71
Binding, Karl. Sct''lire u nwo rthy of Ljfe"
Rinet-S:,ngiC, Ch ~\rlcs, 135
biocracy. Src Lifco n. Robert;
thanato pol i1ics
biopolil ics: am rmativc, 191 94.1110.1~
An1erican Mnlribuljons to studies of)
11- :14,1.9-JOi ancient Ro1ne and, 53;
biopowt"r and, IS 16, 41~ l0jn.109;
btott"<hnology :and, xxx:iii- xxxviii;
"'"''"'mitas and, x.ix. xxU-.x.xxiii;
French conlributions to studies of, 19lli immunity and, 45--46; imp<>litic:d
and, xxvi, 21 1n.2.; nuclear pow~r and,
39i so,creignty and, x:x- xxi, 52-53,
60- 61. See also Dclcuzc, G illcs; Kant,
lrnmanucl: thonatopo li tics
bio technology. Sec bior,olitics; tJcsh
birth: ns immunito ry o pening to com
:.1nd, 176;
munity~ xni- xxx_ih
nation a nd, 169- 70i ~upprwion of,jn
N:.zism, 143 '1So 169,171 81. Sec nlso
Arendl,liannh
Blumenberg, Hons. 51
"""'"s
Baco n, J':rancis, xxxiH, 168-69

Badiou, Alain, 1l.}n.99
Bageho1, \V:tltcr, 11
BaJibar. ticnnc, 187
225
226 Index
Bodin, )<'an, ll
body. Su immunity; N3zism; i\iecuche,
Friedrich
Bonito Olh;.1, Rossclla. 122n.14

Doss, Medord, 153
Brack, Victor. !.!.1.144

Brand t, Korl, .!.!.1. us.
Buck, Carrie, 131

Bursdllrfcr, Frkddch, ll.8.
13ush , George \V,, xli- xlii
Butler, )ud ith: nnd deoth of other, zozn 86:

gric,abilil)' and norms, 197n.'W i mastery ~11d subject, 192n. 2Q; m ou rning
and, ix; rel:uional modes o:u\d, :<iii,
t92n.lli vulncr<1bility and, 20m.82
D<nnert. E~rhard, Ul
de Plauzole, Just Sicard,lJI
Derrida, Jacques: -communist" texts of,
12Sn.42i. comparison with Esposito,
x'ii-xix~ critique of flesh and, 162-63;
democr.tcy ~nd. xvi-xvii~ events o f
September JJ and, ''iii, X\'ii xviii;
hospitality and. 1981\.12: pol itic~)
autoimmunit)' rtnd , x:vi- xvii; reUgiou.s
:.nuoimmunity and, xiii- X\'
de Sa net is~ F'mnccsco, xx

Drac11l" (Bra111 Stokcr) , .1.14.l2Ji
Du mont~ Luis, 26.
Durkheim, P.milc: immunization and , Alt

palholosic.ol ond norm, 189 90
Dworkin, Ronald. xx:xvi- xxxix
Cetllitrs dt lit biopolitique, 11
Cald\\ell, Lynton K., 22

Canguilhe!m, George. See norm
c.-.ssircr, Ernst, um.67
Cwarero, Adrian3, 102n.8s
Claub<rg, Carl .L44
c:ommtmiras. Set biopoli1ics; birt h
community. Sec Agombcn, Giorgio;

immunity
Conti, Leo nardo .!.!!:I.
Croce, Bcncdclt('l, XX
Darwinism: Americ.nn biopo litics and, 21.;

Foucault und, 2.0-. See also Nietzsche,
Friedrich
Davenport, Charles B., J.lll
001\1ic:-.s, Jam<'S C., 21:
de Boulainviller, Henry, 97
dcgener:uion: art :and, 11'; a.s global
sickness, 113j dec.tdenu and, u8;
degcnernte .. and, 1tt'- 19, l.J4n.lJ,
l JSl .J6; N:~tism :.md, !!Z:. Sec also
a nimah eugenics: heredity, theory of.
Niet-zsche, Fried rich
de Lapougc, Vacher, 98) 129-31, 142
l) clcuzc, Gilles: uffirm:ni\e biopoUtic:s
a nd, 191 9'1 ; flesh and, 162; reactive
force nnd. ~ self-s uppression of
ncgatht anJ, 101; :.ingularity aod,
l98n.1z; virtual nnd, 193. See also
&con, Francis
Eberl,lmfried, !!1
Elias, 1\or~rl, ;!!

Espinas, Alfrc.d, IOO, llln.47
eugenics: in A meriC'3, 129-30;
d~gcn~r.ttio n and, JAZi. in France,
negruive, 117- 29,131- 32;

molibcralism rtnd,n:x,-n-:ni.iii
positive , z.. 1) 1. Sec also euthanasia
130-3 1;
euthana sia: as illll'llunitnry procedure of

eugen ics, IJl- JJ; in Nnzi Germauy, !lh
131 3l
genocide
See"''"
Fcrlinghctti, Lnwrcncc, 193

fle-sh: animality and, ~ biotechnology
and, 168-69: Christian conctption of,
162 64; enclosure of body and, 157- 59;
as exi.slence without life, 142-43, lj9~
impoliticol chor.oct<r of, 166-6r, incarnation and,167-68; Merleau Ponty
and,159-65, 20m.8;; multitude ond, 165;
norm of life :Jnd, xxxix; Paul's Uners
and, 163- 64; J>Oliticol body and, 158-
59: world n.s, xxx iii. Sr.e fllSQ biopolitics

FoucauJt, Michel: Amel'ican biopo litica)
stud ics t\ncl, 1.9- 30; hiopower nod> x.Ux.iii, 4LL. Ul lli in genealogy of bio
politics,l,l- 311 governmentalization
and. 28-~9: interpretation of Hb~ ral
ism and, 7~1 - 76i Nietzsche as antic:ipa
lion o f, 24- >S. 78- 79. 8:;-86; 1975-1976
ed IT'a
Index 227
seminars o n r.1cism. viii; psto nal and
po lice powcrs. 35-38; perspective on
Nazism, 8- 9, 41-44, no-11~ politic.s of
ljfe and, Jl- J8, 44; "th reshold of
modernity" and, 31- Jl, 43. See also
biopoUtks; subject
Franck, Didier, 160
fraternity: de mocracy and, 173t im
po litical and, lll-72. See als(' Freud,
Sigmund
fre ud, Sigmurld, ~ fraterrlity and, 17374, 176t relation of nation a nd b irth,
174- 76
Galton, Francis, 100, 1.27-28
Gehlen, Arnnld, 4-8.. 201ll.10)
genocide: definition o f, 13(~37, 21/D-76;
euthanasia and, 135-36~ immu nita ry
paradjgm nod, 137-39
Gira rd , Re m~, 173
Goldstein, Kurt, 191
Gra msci. Anto nio . x.x
Gumplowic.z., ludwig, 98
GOother, 1-!ans f. )(., 53
Habermas, Jiirgen, xxxiii- xxxvi
Hah n, Edwa rd,l6
Haraway, Donna, vii, ;o, 2010.81
Hardt, Michael. See Negri, Anto nio, and
Michael Hardt
Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich: figu re
of b rother and, 173; rlegative a nd, 47
Hejdegger, Martin: a nimal and, 155- 56;
humanism and. 156- 57; impolitical
a nd, L)t- 5.2.; .Mcrlcau-Ponty a nd, L6o6t; Nazi thanatopo litics and, u , 134,
151-55.151. Nic1z.scbe nod. 84, 96;
~(open~> a nd, xxviii; ~' posi l i vc freedom'~
a nd, Z!..i relat ion of dea th and Daseiu1
:<XX; ref'me.sentflri(l and . 65; subjectum
and, ~ 6o
Heller, Agnes, viii

Helmut, Otto , u8
Henry, Michel, 162- 63
Herder. Johann Gottfried von, d
he redity, t heory of,120- z1; degeneration
an.d, 121- 24
Herd rich, Rcrnhnrd, 136

Hirnmlcr, Heinrkh, 114, n7.130-3l
Hirszfeld, Ludwik, 119
Hitler, Adolf, H5. U7, 134
Ho bbes, Tho mas: affirmat ive biopolitic.s
aod.l8S: conscrvatio l'itmt and, 17.4647 56-59. 11.9; immunizat ion and, 90 .
177; liberty and, Zli. and natural law
aud natural J."ight, iZi as "philosopher
of peace; 61- 62. See also Nietzsche,
f-riedrich
Hoche, Alfred. See"life unworthr of Hfe"
Holmes, Oliver \Vendell, 131
Hueper, \~'ilhelm, 115
Hufcl:md, Christop h Wilhelm, U4
hwnauitas: arlimaliws and, 155; bio logizntion of, 4- 5; n.ihilism and, 151;
no rmative importance in Nazism,
130, 134
immunity: auto -, x.iii-xixJ 116-17, 1.47-48~
bfcJs and, x.l. 9- u, 191; birth and, :x.x:x:i;
community a nd, jx- x.i, xl- xli, 12, t66i
disp(Jsirifs of. x:xviii- xx.ix, lL 10 1, 104,
161: glo balizat ion and, 147- 48,166:
individual ide ntity and, ;o- ;2; juridi
cal, 45, 191; lcx.icoo o(.lOS-7; r.nedical,
4;-46, 92, 191; modernity and, :d- xiii,
54-56, 72- 77, 197ll.23; negati\'e and,
106-7. 207n. t7. See ni.so Dc;rrjda,
Jacq ues; Hobbes, Tho mas; Luhmann,
Niklas; Nazism; Nietzsche, Friedrich;
t hanatopolitics
impersonal See subject
impoUtk al. Sec biopo1il"ic.s; Heideggcr.
~la rt i n; Nietzsche, Friedrich
individual: birth omd, LOS; displJsitifo f
sovereignty and, 60-62; libcra1ism.
mode mity, and, 76- 77, 83: as opposed
to "pcrson.nlOJo.uz. See als<' immunit y; Nietzsche, F riedrich~ norm;
Si<noodon, Gil be,t
Kam inskiJ Andrzej, u6
ICaot, Immanuel: affi.rmative biopoUrics
and, 185; categories of possession a nd,
68-69
uS Index
Ke[,.,n,llons, 15, t85, t90,:Utn.67
Kjdlcn, Rudolph, t6-t7
MrugO\VSky. Joachim, 114

m1m11.S. Su biopolitics; birth
Klein, Fritz, w
Nancy. k:an-Loc: ;and communir)', xi,

Landsteiner, Karl, 119
t.auarato, Maur;7iO,lOJn.I0.9
Leg r;~in, Paul Maurice, 118
Lemkin, Rophod, 136
Levi, l' r imo, 117
Levi mas, Emma nuel: double enclosure

of lhe bod y, ~ -4l ; on irnpossibility
of cnpc, 21711.&1; philosophy o f
J-liLlerisrn,150
liberolism. Set: eugenics; Fo ucault,
M ichel
liberty: equality and, 71-72: etymology

of. 70; JS .. freedom from." 7o-71; as
immunitary dispositif. vlii,6!rn S
tllw M.1chiavdli, Niccolo
~rc unworthy of life," ix, t6, t94
Lifton, Robtrt,x:x,,loon.]o
Linghi<, Alpho nso, xi
Locke. John: p roperty and, 63-64,
2090.40; work, a nd 6R- 69. Su also
immunit y
Lo mbroso, Ccsnrc, 98) 120, 123
I.om broso, Ginn f~o:rre ro, 123- 24
Lo with , Ka rl, 5t, 79
Lu hmJnn, Niklns, vii, 49-50, 20711.9
Lyotord, Jc-an -Fran ~ois, 162
Machiavelli, Niccolo: Italian political
philosophy and, n; lilx-rty and, 7);

social connict and, l."Y.Xi
Magnan, Valentin, 118
Marquard, Odo, 50
Marx, Karl: alienation ~nd, 48; propert)'
;~nd, 67
Masters, Roger 0., u
Muuss. Mareel, x
Mbembe, Achille, 2.01
McrlcJLJ POn ly, M:,u ricc. See flesh
Montesquicu, Charles Lu is de Secondat.
Baron of, 74
rvtord , Bcncdicl Augustin, 100, H9-20
Morin, Edgar, 10 11
~1 orsdli) Enrico, I)S
161, 19711.21
Nazism: .anthropology and, 129-30; campaign against c'mcer and, 115~ commun ism and,1 11- 12, 148- 49; d;spos;rifs
of, 11- 1'2, tJ8- 4S; cx1crmination tiS
bac-tcriologicnl o perato r in,u7: mcdi

cine ond, 113- 16; philoroph)' and,
w - u , 148 19 Sc'' r1lso biopolitics;
degenerat ion, eu1har1Mi:t; nor.n ;
thanatop<llitics
Negri, Antonio, and Michael H:.1rdt:
biopolitics and, viii- iX", X"iX", niii-x:xiv;
and tht common, xxvii-xxix., t990.64;
interpretation of f'Oucault 3nd, xxvi,
106n.57
NictUchc, Friedrich: bios ond, 9-10, St,
99, 100; bod)' and, SI\-Ss; concept of
Dionrsian and ,\pollonio n,R9-90, 94;
Darwinism nnd. 83, 88. 95. 100 108,
2 Jin. JOt dcgcncnuion and, 94-102,
10;, 2JJill. l3i figu re of enemy and, 173;
freedo m and, 77i gt>nt"tllog)' 11 nd, 79-81,
89; "gr.1nd po l ilk s" ns critique o f
modernity and, 8o 83, 9;~ health :.1 nd,
86-91, 103- 5: Hobbes and, 86- 87;
horizontol racilm in, 97; immunity
paradigm .and , 47, ]3. 86, 89-95;
impolitical and, 79; institutions as
inJt<~ncc of immuni'l..'\tion,91- 94;
interpretJtion of Pb1o, 99; nihilism
and, 95; politics of life and, 81-83;
posthum:an and, 101-9; SpinoZ3 and,
87, lllJ\.19: struc lind, 8o; s uppression
of ncgati\'e os offirmati\'c, 102- 3;
thanato po lit ics a 1\d, 98- 99; will to
power ond , &7- 88, 90. Sec also
Foucault, Michel; lmmt:m;tas;
populnt ion
nomos: relation 10 bios, '1 5. 120, 138
Nordn.u, Max. 12.3
no rm : Congu il hcm ond, 188-89; ind ividua l ~nd; xxxviii; individuation and,
xx-xviii-xli;juridic.'tl,19o -911ife and,
yr
ed IT'ate
Jndc< 229
182.- 83; Nazism
:~nd, 140-
41, 183- 84;
ncgarive and, 47- 48; vitalizal ioo of,

184-88. See also Du rkheirn, bmile~
Spi.noz;:,, Baruch
O r1r Muflml frieml
(Cha.d cs Dickeos),
192-91
Pa(Soos, Talcott, 49
Pearson, Karl, 12.8
Pea tsorl, Keith Arlsell, ix, xxxi
PetC:'rson, Stephen A., 23
Pkhot, Andr~, 12 0
Picture of Dorian Gra)', Tlrt (Osc:ar \ViJde),
124- 26
P lato: figure nf brother in, 173; Nazi
reod ing of, 53-54

Plessner, Helm uth, 48
Ploc<z, i\lfrcd, 112

populat ion: biological caesuras within,
139- 40; body of, 36; d isciplining o f, 34;
e me rgence of, xii; etlmm a nd, 2/.
protection of~ 4. See also Fouc.auJt,
Michel
p rivacy: possession an d , 67- 68
property: as immunitar)' dispositif. 63~ 74, 2090.42; io pa.r-ddjgm o f .i mmunjzat ion, viii. See also Locke, Jo hn;
Marx, Karl; subject
Ra mm, Rudolph, 112
Reiter, HarlS, ll3
Research;, Biopolitics, 2 1
Revelli, Marco, xxiii
Ribot, Theodule, u o
Richer, Charles, 131, 135
Roberts, Mo rley, 18-19
Schallmayer, Wilhelm, 128

Scheler, Max. 48
Schmitt, Carl: affirmative b iopolit ics
a nd, t8; ; decisio.n is.m a.nd, 25; 6g:urc
of enemy and, 173; sovereignty and ,
xx.iij state of exception an d . 182
Sch neider, Georg 1-Jciorich ,too,
213017
Schumann, .Ho rst, l44
secu rity: libcrtyand, 74-75

Simondoo. Gilbcrl: iodivid\lal ontogenesis, 180- 82, 193: individuation,
xxxii-xx:.xii i, t87- 88; Mcrleau-Ponry
and, 179
Sloterdijk, Pctcr, $S,. 208n.26, 2l8o.7
So mit, Albert, 2.3
sovereignty: as contrary o f biopolitics,
14- 15, 27- 35; as disp~Jsilifo f im IUUtl ity,
57- 63; juridical fo undat ion o f, 1,19-50;
mu ltitude and, xxvi; in paradigm o f
immu ni:t3tion, vii i, xii- xiii, 13. See Q/so
biopo litics; Foucault, Miche)j individual; Sch mitt, Carl; subject
Sperber, D-an, ;o
Spino1.a, Baruch: multitude and) 166;
nal ural right a nd,l86- Sj , 222o.68;
no rm and, xx-xix- xl, 18;-88; theory
o f life a nd, xx.xii. Sec also Nic1ucbe,
Friedrich
Starobinski, Aroon) 20
Strange Ca$c of Doct<JT Jekyll ami 1\lr.
Hyde, TIJe ( Robert Louis Stevenson) ,
J.24 - l5
Strauss. Leo, 22
s ubject: abno rma lity and, 119 - 20: de
subjccti6c::ation of, ~ itnmaoence
and, 36- 37 , 63; imperso nal a nd, 19394; juridical, 3- 4, 13; liberty and, 73;
p rocesses of subjectivization a nd,
2o6n.5o; property arld, 66-67;
sovereignly arld, 59- 61
Taylor, Mark C., viii
te rro rism, war o n. xli- x.lii
Tertullian, J6 ,h 167
l'haoalopolilics: as aulo immu nc illness.
u6-t7~ 1s biologizal ion o( spirit md
spiritualization of body, 16;, 21711.83;
s Ufc wi<hout biological potcntialit)',
154; as prefigu ration of affinnalive
biopo litics, lO, l84- 85; biocracy aud,
10, 113, 161; immunitary appa ra tus and,
xx:iv- xxv: jurid ical co ntrol of medicine
aod.JJ9- 40 See (' lstJ biopolitics;
Nietzsche, Friedrich
Thorson, Thomas. 22
230 lndex
TO<:<JUevillc. Alcx:is de: honw deni<Jcmticus aod, ;6--;;, 110n.6i. immu nizatio n
and,9o
UexkuU, Jakob von, 17-19
Vattimo, Gia.noi, _xjjj
Vegetti, Mario. 54
Vico. Giambattista, x:x
\Vagner, Gcrhard, llil

\Vannsee Conference, r~6
\Veber, Max, 51
\Vcinert, Hans, u'
Weismann, August,l21- 2l
Windclbaod, Will><lm, 53
Woltmann, ludwig, 1.2..8.
Wrlm. Antoine, m
Roberto Esposito teaches contemporary philosophy at the Italian Institute

fo r the Human Sciences in Naples. H is books include Categorie dell im -
politico, Nove pensieri sui/a politica, Communitas: Orgine e destino della

comunita, and Jmm unitas: Protezione e negazione della vita.
Timothy Campbell is associa te professor of Italian studies in the Department of Romance Studies at Cornell Un iversity and the author of Wireless
Writing ill the Age ofMarconi (Minnesota, 2006).

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posthumanl1itt.

CARY WO LFE, SERIES EDITOR

5 Dorsality: Thit1king Back through Technology

University of Minnesota Press

The University o f 1\linne.sota Press gratefuiJy acknowledges the assistance provided

Copyright 2008 b}rthe Regents of the U11iversity of Minnes.ota

Bios: biopolitic~" and philosophy I Ro berto Esposito; translt~ted t~nd with

Bios, Immunity, Life: T he Though t of Roberto Esposito

Biopower and Biopo tentiali ty

Th anato politics (The Cycle of Genos)

The Philosophy of Bios

Bios, Immunity, Life

The name of Roberto Esposito is largely unknown in the United States.

viii TrJnslators Introduction

Traos)3tOr's ln1 rodoctioo ix

Traos)3tOr's ln1 rodoctioo xi

Immunity and Modernity

xii Translator's Introduction

immunization, but that it is onJy in the modern ones that immunization

For Esposito, modernity doesn't begin simply in the institution of sovereign

Translalo r'slotroduction x:iii

xtv Translator's Jntrodtlction

Translator's Jntroducl ion

xvi Translator's Jntrodtlction

crypto-poetic knowledge. The d ;ossical com:cpt of the secret belongs to a

Here a different form of political relationship emerges, one linked to Bataille's

X\'iii Translator>s [ntroduction

Translator's Jnrroduct ion >: i:x

Looking back today at the series o f attempts after September 11 in t he

x.x Translator's Introduction

Translator's Jnrroduct ion >.'Xi

Tht'y used two terms that, although traceablt to a common etymological

xxii Transb.1 tor's lntrodtlction

Agamben, an authentically political bfos always withdraws in favor of the

xxw Translator's Introduction

Translalo r's Jntroduct'iOn :o:v

xxvi Translator's Introduction

cou ld be strengthened and protected. And so for Esposito the specificity of

Translator's lnlroduction xxvii

xxviii Translator's lntroductjon

Translator's Jntroducl ion x:xix

then of converting their imm unitary

Esposito recontextualizes his earlier work on commuuita.1 as the basis for

xxx Tr.-.nslator's Introduction

a matter of exposure th.an of openness to what is held in common with

Translator's Jntroducl ion x:xxi

communication.'' The implicit question for Esposito appears to be how to

Translator's ln1 roduc:tioo xxx ij i

An ontology of the individual or th.e subject becomes less a concern thao

intersect. Consider first Habermas's objection that genetic p rogramm ing,

Translalor'sl otroduction XXX\'

x.xxvi Translator's Introduction

Translator's Jntro ducl iO[l xxxvij

xxx.viii Translator's Jntrodm:tion

Esposito's excursus on flesh and individuating birth attempts to articulate

l 'r:tnslaror's lntroduction xli

xlii TrJ nslators Introd uction

It is beca use terrorism represen ts a wa r oo b umani ty th.at it is a war against

Prance, November 1000. A decision o f the French Appeals Court opens a

of referring to bios that tbe innovative or conservative, or active or reactive

14 The Enigma of BiopoUtics

The enigma of lliopolitics 15

t6 The Enigma of Biopolitics