G.R. No.

124699 July 31, 2003

BOGO-MEDELLIN MILLING CO., INC., petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS AND HEIRS OF
MAGDALENO VALDEZ SR., respondents.
Ponente: CORONA
Facts:

On December 9, 1935, Magdaleno Valdez, Sr., father of respondent Heirs purchased a

parcel of unregistered land from Feliciana Santillan.
Before the sale, a strip of such land had railroad tracks owned by petitioner BogoMedellin Milling Co., Inc. (Bomedco) used for hauling of sugar canes to their mill.
In 1965, Bomedco was able to place the strip of land under its name in the Cadastral
Survey of Medellin, Cebu and subsequently claimed it as its own and declared the same
for taxation purposes.
In 1989, Heirs discovered Bomedcos claim. They filed a complaint for payment of
compensation and/or recovery of property with damages at RTC Cebu.
Heirs contention: Santillan granted Bomedco, in 1929, a railroad right of way for a period
of 30 years; thus it expired sometime in 1959 but Heirs allowed Bomedco to continue
using the land because one of them was the latters employee.
Bomedcos contention: It was the owner and possessor the strip of land having allegedly
bought the same from Feliciana Santillan in 1929, prior to the sale with Valdez in 1935
and Heirs claim was already barred by prescription and laches because of its open and
continuous possession of the property for more than 50 years.
RTC of Cebu ruled in favor of Bomedco citing Article 620 of the Civil Code; that
Bomedco had been in possession of strip of land in good faith for more than 10 years,
thus, already acquired ownership through acquisitive prescription. It was held apparent
because heirs themselves had acknowledged that the existence of the railway tracks of
Bomedco was already known by the late Magdaleno Valdez. It was held continuous
because the railway tracks had been continuously occupying said easement.
Upon appeal to the Court of Appeals, the decision of the RTC was reversed.

Issues:
1. Did Bomedco gain ownership of the strip of land thru extraordinary acquisitive
prescription?
2. Can an easement of right of way be acquired through prescription?

Ruling:
1. No.
The Supreme Court held that Bomedco had no adverse possession of the land.
There was no hostile use of such a nature and exercised under such circumstances as

to manifest and give notice that the possession is under a claim of right. It was found
that for the years 1930, 1937, 1949, 1962 and 1963, Bomedco unequivocally declared
the property to be a central railroad right of way or sugar central railroad right of way
in its real estate tax receipts. Instead of indicating ownership of the lot, the phrases used
showed that Bomedco had possession of such by virtue of the right of way granted to it.
Certainly an owner would have found no need for these phrases.
An easement or servitude is a real right, constituted on the corporeal immovable
property of another, by virtue of which the owner has to refrain from doing, or must allow
someone to do, something on his property, for the benefit of another thing or person. It
exists only when the servient and dominant estates belong to two different owners. It
gives the holder of the easement an incorporeal interest on the land but grants no title
thereto. Therefore, an acknowledgment of the easement is an admission that the
property belongs to another.
The only time Bomedco assumed adverse possession was upon filing a claim
over the property in 1965 during the cadastral survey. Since 1965 and until the filing of
the complaint for the recovery of the subject land before the RTC of Cebu in 1989, only
24 years had lapsed - the required 30-year extraordinary prescriptive period had not yet
been complied.

2. No.
The Supreme Court emphasized that an easement is continuous if its use is, or
may be, incessant without the intervention of any act of man.
The easement of right of way is considered discontinuous because it is
exercised only if a person passes or sets foot on somebody elses land. Like a road for
the passage of vehicles or persons, an easement of right of way of railroad tracks is
discontinuous because the right is exercised only if and when a train operated by a
person passes over another's property. In other words, the very exercise of the servitude
depends upon the act or intervention of man which is the very essence of discontinuous
easements.
The presence of more or less permanent railroad tracks does not in any way
convert the nature of an easement of right of way to one that is continuous. It is not the
apparent signs that categorizes whether the easement is continuous or not, rather it is
the manner of exercise. The presence of physical or visual signs only classifies an
easement into apparent or non-apparent.
Under Article 622 of the Civil Code, discontinuous easements, whether apparent
or not, may be acquired only by title. Unfortunately, Bomedco never acquired any title
over the use of the railroad right of way whether by law, donation, testamentary
succession or contract. Its use of the right of way, however long, never resulted in its
acquisition of the easement because, under Article 622, the discontinuous easement of a
railroad right of way can only be acquired by title and not by prescription.

The Supreme Court furthermore answered the question, when is a party deemed
to acquire title over the use of such land? It cited two scenarios: (a) voluntary easement
with heirs for continued use (b) filing of case against heirs for conferment of a legal
under Article 629 of the Civil Code. Bomedco failed to exercise either modes for
acquisition.
Petition Denied.

G.R. No. L-37409 May 23, 1988

NICOLAS VALISNO, plaintiff-appellant, vs. FELIPE ADRIANO, defendant-appellee.
Ponente: GRIO-AQUINO
Facts:

The parcel of land in question was originally owned by Eladio Adriano, the father of
Felipe and Honorata Adriano. On June 6, 1959, the said land was subsequently bought
by Nicolas Valisno from Honorata. Felipes land adjoins the land in question on the bank
of the Pampanga River. The land is planted with watermelon, peanuts, corn, tobacco,
and other vegetables.
At the time of the sale to Valisno, the land was irrigated by water from the Pampanga
River through a canal about seventy (70) meters long, traversing the Felipes land.
On December 16, 1959, Felipe levelled a portion of the irrigation canal; thus Valisno was
deprived of the irrigation water and prevented from cultivating his land.
Valisno filed a complaint for deprivation of water rights in the Bureau of Public Works and
Communications. The Bureau ruled in Valisnos favor and ordered Felipe to reconstruct.
However, Felipe asked for reinvestigation.
During the pendency of the reinvestigation, Valisno rebuilt the irrigation canal at his own
expense because his need for water to irrigate his watermelon fields.
On June 20, 1960, he filed a complaint for damages in the Court of First Instance of
Nueva Ecija.
On October 25, 1961, the Secretary of Public Works and Communications reversed the
Bureau's decision by issuing a final resolution dismissing Valisno's complaint. The
Secretary held that Eladio Adrianos water rights which had been granted in 1923
ceased to be enjoyed by him in 1936 or 1937, when his irrigation canal collapsed. His
non-use of the water right since then for a period of more than five years extinguished
the grant by operation of law. Thus, Valisno, as subsequent vendee did not acquire any
water rights as well.
On April 21, 1966, the CFI of Nueva Ecija held that Valisno had no right to pass through
the Felipes land to draw water from the Pampanga River, citing Section 4 of the
Irrigation Law, wherein controversies between persons claiming a right to water from a
stream are within the jurisdiction of the Secretary of Public Works and his decision on
the matter is final.

Upon appeal to the Court of Appeals, the case was elevated to the Supreme Court for
pure question of law.

Issue:
1. Whether the provisions of the Irrigation Act (Act No. 2152) or those of the Civil
Code should apply to this case.
Ruling:
1. The Civil Code applies.
The existence of the irrigation canal on Felipes land for the passage of water
from the Pampanga River to Honorata's land prior to and at the time of the sale of
Honorata's land to Valisno was equivalent to a title for the vendee of the land to continue
using it as it was considered as an apparent sign as provided in Article 624 of the Civil
Code:
Article 624. The existence of an apparent sign of easement between two estates,
established or maintained by the owner of both shall be considered, should either
of them be alienated, as a title in order that he easement may continue actively
and passively, unless at the time, the ownership of the two estates is divided, the
contrary should be provided in the title of conveyance of either of them, or the
sign aforesaid should be removed before the execution of the deed.
The deed of sale in favor of Valisno included the "conveyance and transfer of the
water rights and improvements" appurtenant to Honorata Adriano's property. By the
terms of the Deed of Absolute Sale all "rights, title, interest and participations over the
parcel of land above- described, together with one Berkely Model 6 YRF Centrifugal
Pump G" suction, 6" discharge 500-1500 GPM, with Serial No. 5415812 and one (1) set
of suction pipe and discharge of pipe with elbow, nipples, flanges and footvalves," and
the water rights and such other improvements appertaining to the property subject of this
sale.
Water rights, such as the right to use a drainage ditch for irrigation purposes,
which are appurtenant to a parcel of land, pass with the conveyance of the land,
although not specifically mentioned in the conveyance. As an easement of waters in
favor of Valisno has been established, he is entitled to enjoy it free from obstruction,
disturbance or wrongful interference, such as Felipes act of levelling the irrigation canal
to deprive him of the use of water from the Pampanga River.

EDUARDO C. TAEDO VS HON. BERNARD

(G.R. No. L-66520, August 30, 1988)

FACTS:

Private respondent Antonio Cardenas was the owner of two (2) contiguous parcels of
land situated in Cebu City which he had inherited from Lourdes Cardenas Lot 7501-A
where there is a building as an improvement.
On Lot 7401-B, the following were the improvements:
- one four-door apartment of concrete and strong materials
- one two-storey house of strong materials
- a bodega of strong materials
- and a septic tank for the common use of the occupants of Lots 7501-A and 7501-B
Cardenas then sold Lot 7501-A to Tanedo and mortgaged Lot 7501-B to the same as a
security for a loan obtained. Cardenas also further agreed that if he will sell Lot 7501-B,
it will be sold to Tanedo.
However, Cardenas sold Lot 7501-B to Sps Sim.
When Tanedo offered to redeem the property, Sps Sim refused and even blocked the
sewage pipe between Lots 7501-A and 7501-B.
Tanedo then filed an action for legal redemption and damages.
Sps Sim claimed to be the absolute owner of Lot 7501-B and that Tanedo has no right to
redeem the same. Cardenas however alleged that the Deed of Sale that was executed
in favor of Sps Sim was really intended to be an equitable mortgage.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the right to continue to use the septic tank ceased upon the subdivision of the
land and its subsequent sale.
RULING:
No, as this is not one of the modes of extinguishment of easement.
Article 631 of the Civil Code enumerates the grounds for the extinguishment of an easement. In
the instant case, no statement abolishing or extinguishing the easement of drainage was
mentioned in the deed of sale of Lot 7501-A to Eduardo Taedo. Nor did Antonio Cardenas stop
the use of the drain pipe and septic tank by the occupants of Lot 7501-A before he sold said lot
to Eduardo Tafiedo. Hence, the use of the septic tank is continued by operation of law. Sps
Romeo and Pacita Sim the new owners of the servient estate (Lot 7501- B), cannot
impair, in any manner whatsoever, the use of the servitude.
REVERSED AND SET ASIDE.

COSTABELLA CORPORATION v CA & KATIPUNAN LUMBER CO.

(G.R. No. 80511, January 25, 1991)

FACTS:

Contsabella Corporation owns the real estate properties designated as Lots Nos. 5122
and 5124 where a resort and hotel were constructed.
Katipunan Lumber Co., on the other hand, are the owners of adjoining properties more
particularly known as Lots Nos. 5123-A and 5123-C.
Before the petitioner began the construction of its beach hotel, the private respondents,
in going to and from their respective properties and the provincial road, passed through
a passageway which traversed the petitioner's property.
Sometime later, Constabella Corporation closed the aforementioned passageway when
it began the construction of its hotel, but nonetheless opened another route across its
property through which the private respondents, as in the past, were allowed to pass.
As a consequence, Katipunan Lumber Co. filed an action for injunction with damages
and alleged that the petitioner had deprived them access to their properties and caused
them damages, and even constructed a dike without any necessary permit.
Constabella Corportaion denied the existence of an ancient road (claimed by Katipunan)
and alleged that it and its predecessors-in-interest had permitted the temporary,
intermittent, and gratuitous use of, or passage through its property and that it was
justified in walling its property in view of the need to insure the safety and security of its
hotel and beach resort, and for the protection of the privacy and convenience of its hotel
patrons and guests. They further alleged that there was another existing and adequate
access to public road through other properties.
The lower court decided in favor of the respondents and held that they have acquired a
vested right of passageway based on its long existence and its continued use and
enjoyment not only by the private respondents, but also by the community at large.
CA reversed the decision of the lower court and held that the easement of right of way is
a discontinuous one which, under Article 622 of the New Civil Code, may only be
acquired by virtue of a title and not by prescription.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the private respondents had acquired an easement of right of way, in the form of
a passageway, on the petitioner's property.
RULING:
No, the easement was a discontinuous one and was not acquired through prescription.
It is already well-established that an easement of right of way, as is involved here, is
discontinuous 15 and as such cannot be acquired by prescription. This easement is not

compulsory if the isolation of the immovable is due to the proprietor's own acts. Basing on
Article 650, the owner of the dominant estate may validly claim a compulsory right of way only
after he has established the existence of four requisites:
(1) the (dominant) estate is surrounded by other immovables and is without adequate outlet to a
public highway;
(2) after payment of the proper indemnity;
(3) the isolation was not due to the proprietor's own acts; and
(4) the right of way claimed is at a point least prejudicial to the servient estate.
Additionally, the burden of proving the existence of the foregoing pre-requisites lies on the
owner of the dominant estate.
Here, there is absent any showing that the private respondents had established the existence of
the four requisites mandated by law. They failed to prove that there is no adequate outlet from
their respective properties to a public highway.
SC held that the true standard for the grant of the legal right is "adequacy." Hence, when there
is already an existing adequate outlet from the dominant estate to a public highway, even if the
said outlet, for one reason or another, be inconvenient, the need to open up servitude is entirely
unjustified. Hence, Katipunan Lumber Co.s cannot be said to be isolated, for which a
compulsory easement is demandable.
SET ASIDE AND DISMISED.

Tomas Encarnacion vs. CA, Intestate Estate of the Late Eusebio de Sagun and the Heirs
of the late Aniceta Magsino Vda. De Sagun

Facts:
-

Petitioner and private respondent heirs of Aniceta are the owners of two adjacent estates
in Batangas.
Petitioner owns the dominant estate, and the private respondents own the servient
estate. The servient estate stands between the dominant estate and the national road.
Before 1960, the servient estate was not enclosed by a concrete fence. People going to
the national highway just crossed the servient estate at no particular point. However,
private respondents constructed a fence around the servient estate, which was a
roadpath measuring 25m long and about a meter wide. meter width of the path was
taken from the servient estate and the other from Magsinos lot [neighbor]. There was no
compensation asked, and none given.
Petitioner also started a nursery business on his land at the time of the construction of
the fence. He used the pathway as passage to the highway for his family and customers
use.
Petitioners nursery business thrived, and he purchased an owner-type jeep for
transporting his plants. However, it could not fit in the road, so he approached Aniceta
and Elena Romero Vda. De Sagun and requested for them to sell to him meter of their

property to be added to the existing pathway. They refused, thus he instituted an action
for the issuance of a writ of easement of a right of way over an additional width of 2
meters over de Saguns parcel of land.
Trial courts attention was called to the existence of another exit to the highway, 80m
away from dominant estate, thus it dismissed petitioners writ, claiming that petitioners
action will destroy the fence and decrease defendants small parcel of land, and that the
contention that the land is more convenient to the business and family use is not among
the conditions specified by Art. 649 of the Civil Code to entitle plaintiff to a right of way to
the passage of the jeep. CA affirmed.

Issue: Whether petitioner has sufficiently established his claim for an additional
easement of right of way

Held: Yes. Contrary to the conclusion of the lower and appellate courts, petitioner has actually
sufficiently established his claim for an additional easement of right of way. While there is a
dried river bed less than 100m away from the dominant estate, that access is grossly
inadequate.

Generally, a right of way may be demanded when there is absolutely no access to a public
highway, and even when there is one, it is difficult or dangerous to use or grossly insufficient.
When a private property has no access to a public road, it has the right of easement over
adjacent servient estates as a matter of law. The riverbed route is transverse by a semiconcrete bridge and there is no ingress, nor egress, from the highway. It must literally jump 45m up, and the river was impassable during rainy season due to floods.

Art. 651 provides that the width of the easement of right of way shall be that which is sufficient
for the needs of the dominant estate, and may accordingly be changed from time to time. It is
the needs of the dominant property which ultimately determine the width of the passage, and
these needs vary from time to time. The easement to be established in favor of petitioner is
continuous and permanent in nature, thus the indemnity shall consist of the value of the land
occupied and the amount of the damage caused to servient estate by virtue of Art. 649.

Simeon Floro vs. Orlando A. Llenado, deceased, substituted by his wife Wenifreda, in her
own capacity as administratrix of the Estate of Orlando A. Llenado and as Legal Guardian of
Minors Ma. Bexina, Avelino and Antonio and Court of Appeals | GR No 75723 | June 2, 1995

Facts:
-

Simeon Floro is the owner of Floro Park Subdivision in Bulacan. The subdivision has its
own egress and ingress to and from MacArthur Highway by means of one of its lots and
PNR level crossing.
Orlando, on the other hand, is the registered owner of 2 parcels of land known as the

Llenado Homes Subdivision. Prior to its purchase by Llenado from owner Francisco de
Castro, the land was known as Emmanuel Homes Subdivison, a duly licensed and
registered housing subdivision in the name of Soledad Ortega. It was separated from
Floro Park by a 5-6m wide Palanas Creek.
Llenado Homes does not have any existing road or passage to the highway. A proposed
access road traversing the Riceland of Marcial Ipapo has been specifically provided in
the subdivision plan of Emmanuel Homes, duly approved by the defunct Human
Settlement Regulatory Commission.
The Llenados were granted permission by the Floros to use the road they also use as
passageway to the MacArthur Highway in February 1983. However, on April, Floro
barricaded the road, preventing the Llenados from using it.
Llenados request for reopening the road was denied, thus he instituted a complaint for
Easement of Right of Way with Prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory
injunction and damages.
The lower court granted the prayer of writ of mandatory injunction upon filing of the
bond. Floro was ordered to allow Llenado or his agents to pass by. Floros motion for
reconsideration was denied.
Floro appealed to the CA but moved to withdraw his petition.
Llenado died and was substituted by his wife Wenifreda.
The trial court dismissed the case and lifted the writ of preliminary mandatory injunction.
Upon appeal, CA set aside RTCs decision and held that Llenado must be granted the
establishment of a legal or compulsory easement of right of way passing through Lots 4
and 5 of Floro Park; removal of the barricades found in Lot 5; and payment of damages.

Issues: (1) whether or not a valid contract of easement of right of way exists when the owner of
one estate voluntarily allows the owner of an adjacent estate passage through his property for a
limited time, without compensation;

(2) Whether or not an owner/developer of a subdivision can demand a compulsory

easement of right of way over the existing roads of an adjacent subdivision instead of
developing his subdivision's proposed access road as provided in his duly approved
subdivision plan. [No]

Held: Failing to establish the existence of the prerequisites under Articles 649 and 650 of
the Civil Code, private respondent Llenado's bid for a compulsory easement of right of
way over Road Lots 4 and 5 of the Floro Park Subdivision must fail.
The use of Road Lots 4 and 5 by the Llenados during the month of March was by mere
tolerance of Floro pending the negotiation of the terms and conditions of the right of way. This is
evident in Wenifredas testimony, they said to us to go on while they are preparing the papers;
we can use that for a while, while they were making for the papers. Although such use was in
anticipation of a voluntary easement of right of way, no such contract was validly entered into by
reason of failure of the parties to agree on its terms and conditions. Thus, Llenados cannot
claim entitlement of right of way on the basis of voluntary easement. Having ruled that no
voluntary easement of right of way had been established in favor of private respondents
Llenados, we now determine whether or not they are entitled to a compulsory easement of right
of way.

For the Llenados to be entitled to a compulsory servitude of right of way, preconditions found in
Art. 649 and 650 must first be established. The dominant estate must be surrounded by other
immovables and has no adequate outlet to public highway; after payment of property indemnity;
the isolation was not due to the acts of the proprietor of the dominant estate; the right of way
claimed is at the point least prejudicial to the servient estate; the distance from the dominant
estate to the public highway may be the shortest. Private respondents have failed to prove the
existence of the prerequisites. Llenado failed to mention the proposed access road through
Ipapaos ricefields.
During the pendency of the civil case, Llenado filed with HSRC an application for the
amendment of the original subdivision plan, which is: conversion of L14, B6 into a road lot,
designed to connect with Road Lot 5 of Floro Homes; closing both ends of Road Lot 3, portion
leading to Marianos property and the portion leading to the Ipapo right of way, to be converted
into saleable residential lots. Only the first was approved the Ipapo right of way remained.
When asked by the court as to the policy of the HSRC regarding the approval of a subdivision
plan in connection with the right of way issue, Engr. Ravello responded that as a prerequisite for
approval, the subdivision must have an access road. It was not necessary that the access road
be a paved road. A dirt road was sufficient provided that the owner of the lot used as access
road gives his consent and the owner/developer/applicant of the proposed subdivision develops
the proposed access road, as approved by the HSRC, in compliance with Section 29 of
Presidential Decree No. 957 which states that The owner or developer of a subdivision without
access to any existing public road or street must secure a right of way to a public road or street
and such right of way must be developed and maintained according to the requirement of the
government authorities concerned.
Upon their appeal to the CA, Llenado submitted Marcial Ipapos letter, informing HSRC that he
did not give a road right of way over his property in favor of the original developer. This seemed
to be induced by Engr. Ravellos testimony, as Ipapos notarized affidavit given by Ortega to
HSRC could not be found. However, it is inadmissible as evidence by reason of Sec. 20, Rule
132 of ROC.
There being an existing right of way over the Ipapo property, the first requirement for a grant of
a compulsory easement of right of way over the Floro Park Subdivision has not been met. In the
case at bench, no proof was presented by private respondent Llenado that he complied with this
requirement. The complaint for easement of right of way filed by him in the lower court did not
contain a prayer for the fixing of the amount that he must pay Floro in the event that the
easement of right of way be constituted. Thus, the existence of the second requisite has
likewise not been established.
There can be no denying that the isolation of the Llenado Homes Subdivision is the doing of its
owner/developer/applicant. It appears that the access road indicated in the Plan of the
Emmanuel Homes Subdivision and the Llenado Homes Subdivision for which a right of way
over the Ipapo property was procured, was merely for the sake of securing an approval of the
proposed development plan. There were no proofs of actual work having been done to construct
a road, even just a dirt road, over the right of way that would connect Road Lot 3 of the Llenado
Homes Subdivision to the MacArthur Highway. Private respondent Llenado admitted that the
Ipapo riceland was no longer being cultivated and there was already a fence made of adobe
wall constructed on it. Indications are that it has already been abandoned as a ricefield. There
was no reason for private respondent's failure to develop the right of way except the
inconvenience and expenses it would cost him. Hence, the third requisite has not been met.

If the servitude requested by private respondent Llenado is allowed, other subdivision

developers/owners would be encouraged to hastily prepare a subdivision plan with fictitious
provisions for access roads merely for registration purposes. Thereafter, said developers could
abandon their duly approved plans and, for whatever reason, open up another way through
another property under the pretext that they have inadequate outlets to a public road or
highway. Furthermore, if such practice were tolerated, the very purpose for which Presidential
Decree No. 957 was enacted, that is, to protect subdivision buyers from unscrupulous
subdivision owners/developers who renege on their duties to develop their subdivisions in
accordance with the duly approved subdivision plans, would be defeated.
In order to justify the imposition of the servitude of right of way, there must be a real, not a
fictitious or artificial necessity for it. Mere convenience for the dominant estate is not what is
required by law as the basis for setting up a compulsory easement. Even in the face of a
necessity, if it can be satisfied without imposing the servitude, the same should not be imposed.
This easement can also be established for the benefit of a tenement with an inadequate outlet,
but not when the outlet is merely inconvenient. Thus, when a person has already established an
easement of this nature in favor of his tenement, he cannot demand another, even if the first
passage has defects which make passage impossible, if those defects can be eliminated by
proper repairs.
As borne out by the records of this case, despite the closure of the subject road, construction
work at Llenado Homes Subdivision continued. The alternative route taken by private
respondent is admittedly inconvenient because he has to traverse several ricelands and rice
paddies belonging to different persons, not to mention that said passage, as found by the trial
court, is impassable during the rainy season. However, private respondent has no one to blame
but himself for not developing the proposed access road through the Ipapo property.
It appears, from the records that during the period from March 1983 until the closure of the
subject roads on April 7, 1983, private respondent was allowed to pass thru petitioner's
subdivision without any agreement on compensation. During the same period, the subject roads
(Road Lots 4 and 5) were damaged due to the trucks and heavy equipment passing thereon.
Justice and equity demand that petitioner be compensated for the said damage. Hence, the
lower court's decision awarding to petitioner Thirty Thousand Pesos (P30,000.00) as actual and
compensatory damages should be affirmed. Petitioner should likewise be indemnified for the
use of his property from July 15, 1983 (upon the reopening of the subject road pursuant to the
issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction) until October 16, 1986 (when the writ was
lifted). In the absence of a specific provision applicable in the case at bench as to the amount of
proper indemnity, the award of Sixty Thousand Pesos (P60,000.00) as temperate or moderate
damages pursuant to Articles 2224 and 2225 of the Civil Code 57 is considered proper and
reasonable.
[G.R. No. 95252. September 5, 1997]

LA VISTA ASSOCIATION, INC., petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, SOLID HOMES, INC., ATENEO DE MANILA UNIVERSITY, ROMULO
VILLA, LORENZO TIMBOL, EMDEN ENCARNACION, VICENTE CASIO, JR., DOMINGO
REYES, PEDRO C. MERCADO, MARIO AQUINO, RAFAEL GOSECO, PORFIRIO CABALU,

JR. and ANTONIO ADRIANO, in their behalf and in behalf of the residents of LOYOLA GRAND
VILLAS, INC., PHASES I AND II, respondents.

FACTS:

MANGYAN ROAD is a 15-meter wide thoroughfare in Quezon City abutting Katipunan

Avenue on the west, traversing the edges of La Vista Subdivision on the north and of the
Ateneo de Manila University and Maryknoll (now Miriam) College on the south.
Mangyan Road serves as the boundary between LA VISTA on one side and ATENEO
and MARYKNOLL on the other
The area comprising the 15-meter wide roadway was originally part of a vast tract of
land owned by the Tuasons in Quezon City and Marikina. On 1 July 1949 the Tuasons
sold to Philippine Building Corporation a portion of their landholdings amounting to
1,330,556 square meters by virtue of a Deed of Sale with Mortgage. Paragraph three
(3) of the deed provides that x x x the boundary line between the property herein
sold and the adjoining property of the VENDORS shall be a road fifteen (15)
meters wide, one-half of which shall be taken from the property herein sold to the
VENDEE and the other half from the portion adjoining belonging to the
VENDORS.
On 7 December 1951 the Philippine Building Corporation, which was then acting for and
in behalf of Ateneo de Manila University (ATENEO) in buying the properties from the
Tuasons, sold, assigned and formally transferred in a Deed of Assignment with
Assumption of Mortgage, with the consent of the Tuasons, the subject parcel of land to
ATENEO which assumed the mortgage. The deed of assignment states The ASSIGNEE hereby agrees and assumes to pay the mortgage obligation on the
above-described land in favor of the MORTGAGOR and to perform any and all terms and
conditions as set forth in the Deed of Sale with Mortgage dated July 1, 1949, hereinabove
referred to, which said document is incorporated herein and made an integral part of this
contract by reference x x x
On 30 January 1976 ATENEO informed LA VISTA of the formers intention to develop
some 16 hectares of its property along Mangyan Road into a subdivision. In response,
LA VISTA President Manuel J. Gonzales clarified certain aspects with regard to the use
of Mangyan Road. Thus x x x The Mangyan Road is a road fifteen meters wide, one-half of which is taken from
your property and the other half from the La Vista Subdivision. So that the easement of a
right-of-way on your 7 1/2 m. portion was created in our favor and likewise an easement
of right-of-way was created on our 7 1/2 portion of the road in your favor (paragraph 3 of
the Deed of Sale between the Tuasons and the Philippine Building Corporation and
Ateneo de Manila dated 1 July 1949 x x x x

On 28 April 1976 LA VISTA President Manuel J. Gonzales, in a letter to ATENEO

President Fr. Jose A. Cruz, S. J., offered to buy under specified conditions the property
ATENEO was intending to develop.
LA VISTA became one of the bidders. However it lost to Solid Homes, Inc., in the
bidding. Thus on 29 October 1976 ATENEO executed a Deed of Sale in favor of Solid
Homes, Inc., over parcels of land covering a total area of 124,424 square meters

subject, among others, to the condition that 7. The VENDOR hereby passes unto the
VENDEE, its assigns and successors-in-interest the privileges of such right of
way which the VENDOR acquired, and still has, by virtue of the Deeds mentioned
in the immediately preceding paragraph hereof; provided, that the VENDOR shall
nonetheless continue to enjoy said right of way privileges with the VENDEE,
which right of way in favor of the VENDOR shall be annotated on the pertinent
road lot titles
LA VISTA President Manuel J. Gonzales however informed Solid Homes, Inc., that LA
VISTA could not recognize the right-of-way over Mangyan Road because, first,
Philippine Building Corporation and its assignee ATENEO never complied with their
obligation of providing the Tuasons with a right-of-way on their 7.5-meter portion of the
road and, second, since the property was purchased for commercial purposes, Solid
Homes, Inc., was no longer entitled to the right-of-way as Mangyan Road was
established exclusively for ATENEO in whose favor the right-of-way was originally
constituted;
LA VISTA, after instructing its security guards to prohibit agents and assignees of Solid
Homes, Inc., from traversing Mangyan Road, then constructed one-meter high cylindrical
concrete posts chained together at the middle of and along the entire length of Mangyan
Road thus preventing the residents of LOYOLA from passing through.
On 17 December 1976, to avert violence, Solid Homes, Inc., instituted the instant case,
docketed as Civil Case No. Q-22450, before the then Court of First Instance of Rizal and
prayed that LA VISTA be enjoined from preventing and obstructing the use and passage
of LOYOLA residents through Mangyan Road.
On 20 November 1987 the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City rendered a decision on
the merits[2] in Civil Case No. Q-22450 affirming and recognizing the easement of rightof-way along Mangyan Road in favor of Solid Homes, Inc., and ordering LA VISTA to pay
damages
LA VISTA appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals which subsequently upheld the
decision of the RTC
Thereafter LA VISTA filed a case for review on certiorari with the Supreme Court

ISSUE: Is there an easement of right-of-way over Mangyan Road

HOLDING: YES, an easement exists. Petition is denied. In coming to its decision, the SC held
the following:
From the facts of the instant case it is very apparent that the parties and their respective
predecessors-in-interest intended to establish an easement of right-of-way over Mangyan Road
for their mutual benefit, both as dominant and servient estates. - PLEASE SEE ITEMS IN
BOLD AND UNDERLINED

This is quite evident when:

(a) the Tuasons and the Philippine Building Corporation in 1949 stipulated in par. 3 of their Deed
of Sale with Mortgage that the boundary line between the property herein sold and the

adjoining property of the VENDORS shall be a road fifteen (15) meters wide, one-half of which
shall be taken from the property herein sold to the VENDEE and the other half from the portion
adjoining belonging to the vendors;
(b) the Tuasons in 1951 expressly agreed and consented to the assignment of the land to, and
the assumption of all the rights and obligations by ATENEO, including the obligation to
contribute seven and one-half meters of the property sold to form part of the 15-meter wide
roadway;
(c) the Tuasons in 1958 filed a complaint against MARYKNOLL and ATENEO for breach of
contract and the enforcement of the reciprocal easement on Mangyan Road, and demanded
that MARYKNOLL set back its wall to restore Mangyan Road to its original width of 15 meters,
after MARYKNOLL constructed a wall in the middle of the 15-meter wide roadway;
(d) LA VISTA President Manuel J. Gonzales admitted and clarified in 1976, in a letter to
ATENEO President Fr. Jose A. Cruz, S.J., that Mangyan Road is a road fifteen meters wide,
one-half of which is taken from your property and the other half from the La Vista Subdivision.
So that the easement of a right-of-way on your 7 1/2 m. portion was created in our favor and
likewise an easement of right-of-way was created on our 7 1/2 m. portion of the road in your
favor;
(e) LA VISTA, in its offer to buy the hillside portion of the ATENEO property in 1976,
acknowledged the existence of the contractual right-of-way as it manifested that the mutual
right-of-way between the Ateneo de Manila University and La Vista Homeowners Association
would be extinguished if it bought the adjacent ATENEO property and would thus become the
owner of both the dominant and servient estates; and,
(f) LA VISTA President Luis G. Quimson, in a letter addressed to the Chief Justice, received by
this Court on 26 March 1997, acknowledged that one-half of the whole length of (Mangyan
Road) belongs to La Vista Assn., Inc. The other half is owned by Miriam (Maryknoll) and the
Ateneo in equal portions;

G.R. No. 136996

December 14, 2001

EDILBERTO ALCANTARA, FLORENCIO VILLARMIA, POLICARPIO OBREGON, + RICARDO

ROBLE, ESCOLASTICA ONDONG, ESTEBAN RALLOS, HENRY SESBINO, SERGIO
SESBINO, MANUEL CENTENO, + RENATO CRUZ, MARCELINO CENEZA, BUENAVENTURA
ONDONG, and BENJAMIN HALASAN, petitioners,
vs.
CORNELIO B. RETA, JR., respondent.
FACTS:

Edilberto Alcantara, Florencio Villarmia, Policarpio Obregon, Ricardo Roble, Escolastica

Ondong, Esteban Rallos, Henry Sesbino, Sergio Sesbino, Manuel Centeno, Renato
Cruz, Marcelo Ceneza, Buenaventura Ondong and Benjamin Halasan, filed with the
Regional Trial Court, Davao City, Branch 14, a complaint4 against Cornelio B. Reta, Jr.
for the exercise of the right of first refusal under Presidential Decree No. 1517, injunction
with preliminary injunction, attorney's fees and nullity of amicable settlement.
The plaintiffs claimed that they were tenants or lessees of the land located in Barangay
Sasa, Davao City, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-72594, owned by Reta;
that the land has been converted by Reta into a commercial center; and that Reta is
threatening to eject them from the land. They assert that they have the right of first
refusal to purchase the land in accordance with Section 3(g) of Presidential Decree No.
1517 since they are legitimate tenants or lessees thereof.
They also claimed that the amicable settlement executed between Reta and Ricardo
Roble was void ab initio for being violative of Presidential Decree No. 1517.
On the other hand, Reta claimed that the land is beyond the ambit of Presidential
Decree No. 1517 since it has not been proclaimed as an Urban Land Reform Zone; that
the applicable law is Batas Pambansa Blg. 25 for failure of the plaintiffs to pay the
rentals for the use of the land; and that the amicable settlement between him and
Ricardo Roble was translated to the latter and fully explained in his own dialect.
On March 8, 1994, the trial court rendered a decision dismissing the complaint and
ordering the plaintiffs to pay Reta certain sums representing rentals that had remained
unpaid.5
On April 6, 1994, plaintiffs appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals.6
On December 9, 1998, the Court of Appeals promulgated a decision 7 affirming in toto
the decision of the trial court.
ISSUE:
Whether petitioners have the right of first refusal under Presidential Decree No. 1517.
RULING:
NO. The area involved has not been proclaimed an Urban Land Reform Zone (ULRZ). In
fact, petitioners filed a petition with the National Housing Authority requesting that the land they
were occupying be declared as an ULRZ. On May 27, 1986, the request was referred to Mr.
Jose L. Atienza, General Manager, National Housing Authority, for appropriate action.9 The
request was further referred to acting mayor Zafiro Respicio, Davao City, as per 2nd
Indorsement dated July 1, 1986.10 Clearly, the request to have the land proclaimed as an ULRZ
would not be necessary if the property was an ULRZ.
To be able to qualify and avail oneself of the rights and privileges granted by the said
decree, one must be:
(1) a legitimate tenant of the land for ten (10) years or more;
(2) must have built his home on the land by contract; and,
(3) has resided continuously for the last ten (10) years.

Obviously, those who do not fall within the said category cannot be considered "legitimate
tenants" and, therefore, not entitled to the right of first refusal to purchase the property should
the owner of the land decide to sell the same at a reasonable price within a reasonable time
G.R. No. 114348

September 20, 2000

NATIONAL IRRIGATION ADMINISTRATION, petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and DICK MANGLAPUS, respondents.
PARDO, J.:
FACTS:

On June 28, 1963, a free patent over three (3) hectares of land, situated in barrio
Baybayog, municipality of Alcala, province of Cagayan was issued in the name of
respondent's predecessor-in-interest, Vicente Manglapus, and registered under Original
Certificate of Title No. P-24814, in his name. The land was granted to Vicente
Manglapus,4 subject to the following proviso expressly stated in the title:
"TO HAVE AND TO HOLD the said tract of land, with the appurtenances
thereunto of right belonging unto the said VICENTE MANGLAPUS and to his heirs and
assigns forever, subject to the provisions of sections 113, 121, 122 and 124 of
Commonwealth Act. No. 141, as amended which provide that except in favor of the
Government or any of its branches, units, or institutions, the land hereby acquired shall
be inalienable and shall not be subject to encumbrance for a period of five (5) years from
the date of this patent, and shall not be liable for the satisfaction of any debt contracted
prior to the expiration of that period; that it shall not be encumbered, alienated, or
transferred to any person, corporation, association or partnership not qualified to acquire
lands of the public domain under said Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended; and
that it shall not be subject to any encumbrance whatsoever in favor of any corporation,
association or partnership except with the consent of the grantee and the approval of the
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and solely for educational, religious or
charitable purposes or for a right of way; and subject finally to all conditions and public
easements and servitudes recognized and prescribed by law especially those mentioned
in sections 109, 110, 111, 112, 113 and 114 of Commonwealth Act No. 141 as amended,
and the right of the Government to administer and protect the timber found thereon for a
term of five (5) years from the date of this patent, provided, however, that the grantee or
heirs may cut and utilize such timber for his or their personal use (emphasis ours)."

Subsequently, respondent Manglapus acquired the lot from Vicente Manglapus by

absolute sale.

On July 18, 1974, the land was registered in Dick Manglapus' name under Transfer
Certificate of Title No. T-26658 of the Register of Deeds for the Province of Cagayan.
The land is particularly described as follows:
"Lot No. 3559, Pls-497, with an area of 30,438 square meters, and covered by
TRANSFER CERTIFICATE OF TITLE NO. T-26658, and Tax Declaration No. 11985."

Sometime in 1982, NIA entered into a contract with Villamar Development Construction.
Under the contract, NIA was to construct canals in Amulung, Cagayan and Alcala,
Cagayan. NIA then entered a portion of Manglapus' land and made diggings and fillings
thereon.

ISSUE:
Whether the NIA should pay Manglapus just compensation for the taking of a portion of
his property for use as easement of a right of way.
RULING:
NO. We agree with NIA that the Transfer Certificate of Title25 and the Original Certificate
of Title26 covering the subject parcel of land contained a reservation granting the government a
right of way over the land covered therein.
Article 619 of the Civil Code provides that, "Easements are established either by law
or by the will of the owners. The former are called legal and the latter voluntary
easements." In the present case, we find and declare that a legal easement of a right-of-way
exists in favor of the government. The land was originally public land, and awarded to
respondent Manglapus by free patent. The ruling would be otherwise if the land were originally
private property, in which case, just compensation must be paid for the taking of a part thereof
for public use as an easement of a right of way.
WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the petition for review on certiorari, and REVERSES
the decision of the Court of Appeals