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Saving Bosnia on Capitol Hill: the case


of Senator Bob Dole
a

Hamza Kari
a

Faculty of Political Science, University of Sarajevo, Sarajevo,


Bosnia and Herzegovina
Published online: 06 Mar 2015.

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To cite this article: Hamza Kari (2015) Saving Bosnia on Capitol Hill: the case of Senator Bob
Dole, Journal of Transatlantic Studies, 13:1, 20-39, DOI: 10.1080/14794012.2014.990734
To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/14794012.2014.990734

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Journal of Transatlantic Studies, 2015


Vol. 13, No. 1, 2039, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/14794012.2014.990734

Saving Bosnia on Capitol Hill: the case of Senator Bob Dole


Hamza Kari*
Faculty of Political Science, University of Sarajevo, Sarajevo, Bosnia and Herzegovina

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(Received 13 November 2013; accepted 13 May 2014 )


The aim of this article is to analyse the role played by former US Senator Bob
Dole in the formulation of American foreign policy towards Bosnia from 1992 to
1995. While the existing literature on US policy during the war in Bosnia almost
exclusively focuses on the Clinton administration, this article argues that the
administration was reacting to pressure from Senator Dole and other congressional Bosnia hawks. The article will provide a narrative of Senator Doles
activism and contend that he was consistently the most active senator on the issue
of Bosnia; and it will show that congressional pressure prodded the Clinton
administration into taking a more forceful policy aimed at ending the
Bosnian war.
Keywords: Bob Dole; Senate; Congress; Bosnia; war in Bosnia; Yugoslavia

Several years after French President Jacques Chiracs June 1995 visit to Washington,
DC, Richard Holbrooke recalled that Clinton: sent Chirac on an impromptu trip to
Capitol Hill to see Senate Majority Leader Bob Dole and Speaker Newt Gingrich,
hoping that he would be able to persuade the Republican leaders to give the
Administration greater support on Bosnia.1 This is a testament to how far the
executive and legislative branches had parted ways on the issue of Bosnia. In fact,
Holbrooke, the chief architect of the Dayton Peace Accords, wrote later that
congressional efforts by Senators Joseph Lieberman, Joe Biden and Bob Dole to
unilaterally lift the embargo on Bosnia led to some of the most emotional and
contentious struggles of the Clinton Administration.2 And according to Holbrooke,
Dole had made Bosnia his personal project.3
In the literature on US policy towards Bosnia during the 19921995 war, the role
of Senator Bob Dole in advocating for a more forceful policy has been noted; yet, for
the most part, authors have focused on his 1995 bipartisan legislative proposal the
DoleLieberman bill that sought to unilaterally lift the arms embargo on Bosnia.4
But this legislation represented the culmination of Senator Doles active involvement
on the issue of Bosnia since the beginning of the conflict. This article seeks to trace
Doles Bosnia policy activism throughout the Bosnian war and, based primarily on
the archives of the Robert J. Dole Institute of Politics at the University of Kansas,
*Email: karcich@fpn.unsa.ba
This article is dedicated to my parents Hamida and Fikret Kari.
2015 Board of Transatlantic Studies

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21

will provide a narrative of how this activism shaped US policy towards Bosnia from
the dissolution of Yugoslavia until the crafting of the Dayton Peace Accords.
By the time the Bosnian war raged in the early 1990s, Senator Bob Dole already
had a distinguished legislative career behind him. Born in 1923, the Kansas
Republican was first elected to Congress in 1960 and to the US Senate in 1968,
where he served until 1996. He was chairman of the Republican National Committee
in 1971 and1972 and was President Gerald Fords running mate in 1976. Dole was
also the longest-serving Republican leader in the Senate, having first been elected as
majority leader in 1984 a position he held from 1985 to 1987 and again from 1995
to 1996 and serving as minority leader in the interim, from 1987 to 1995. A senator
with presidential ambitions, he ran in the Republican primary in 1988 and became
the Republican nominee in 1996. To campaign full-time for the presidency, Dole
resigned from the Senate in June 1996. His advocacy for Bosnia throughout the
19921995 war and his increasing criticism of the Clinton administrations handling
of Bosnia threatened to spill over into the 1996 presidential race. For the Democratic
incumbent, resolving the Bosnian conflict prior to the 1996 election seemed
politically prudent. For Bob Dole, Bosnia was not simply a political issue to be
exploited; indeed, his interest in the Balkans dated as far back as the mid-1980s.

The collapse of Yugoslavia


As the process of Yugoslavias demise began to unfold in the early 1990s, the
Republican administration of George H. W. Bush was also coping with the
dissolution of the Soviet Union, the unification of Germany, the democratisation
of Eastern Europe, and a host of other foreign policy challenges. In the wake of this
geostrategic realignment, the future direction of US foreign policy had yet to be
clearly articulated. The Republican Party itself comprised several factions, with antiinterventionists like Pat Buchanan arguing for US disengagement from global
commitments, realists calling for action where national interest was at stake and
nationalists who remained focused on domestic issues.5 Top officials in the Bush
administration including James Baker, Brent Scowcroft and Dick Cheney were all
realists who were sceptical of interventions in strategically peripheral regions, and in
their view, Yugoslavia was precisely that. In fact, Baker was quoted as saying that
the USA had no dog in this fight. The realist views of the administration
notwithstanding, pressure did build over time for action to be taken in both Bosnia
and Somalia. In a pre-election year, the reluctance of the administration to get
involved in a potential quagmire seemed practical, and the only substantial policy
implemented by the administration was the establishment of a no-fly zone over
Bosnia.6
Though his party was in power in Washington, Senator Bob Dole soon distanced
himself from the Bush administrations cautious approach to Yugoslavia, and the
Kansas Republican stood out in Congress for his interest in the Balkans. The
senator, himself a Second World War veteran, had been following human rights
issues in Yugoslavia since 1986. His focus had been on violations of human rights of
Albanians in the country,7 and his previous exposure to Yugoslavia left him well
positioned to understand the nuances of Yugoslav politics and the federations path
to disintegration.

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H. Kari

As one of its first policies towards Yugoslavia, the Congress adopted the Nickles
Amendment in 1990 as part of the Foreign Operations, Export Financing and
Related Programs Appropriations Act of 1991, which became Public Law 101513
on 5 November 1990.8 The legislation called for the termination of aid to Yugoslavia
if certain human rights abuses were not addressed, and implementation of sanctions
began on 5 May 1991. But less than three weeks later, Secretary of State James
Baker suspended sanctions, declaring that Yugoslavia was respecting Helsinki
Accord principles. The Nickles Amendment mandated that financial appropriations
could not be used to provide direct aid to Yugoslavia and US representatives in
international financial institutions were also instructed not to support the provision
of such aid. The legislation was not to apply to those Yugoslav republics that had
conducted free and fair elections.9 Senator Dole had taken an active role in
promoting these measures, writing to his colleagues in the Subcommittee on Foreign
Operations and in the Appropriations Committee beginning in October 1990, urging
them to support the legislation,10 which had been introduced by Senators Donald
Nickles and Alfonse D'Amato.11 As the Bush administration prepared to reinstate
aid in late May 1991, Dole and Nickles wrote to President George H.W. Bush to
express their opposition, stating that provisions of the law conditionalising the
possible resumption of aid had not been fulfilled.12
Dole continued to advocate this policy approach in March 1991 when he
published an op-ed in which he argued that foreign aid represented a tool for
supporting democracy and freedom. He wrote that he had introduced legislation
providing for direct aid to those republics on the road to democracy, while at the
same time denying aid to communist central governments in Belgrade and Moscow.
He warned that the situation in Yugoslavia was worsening and pointed out that, of
the six federal Yugoslav republics, Bosnia and three others had held free elections.
He ended the article by declaring that this is no time to be rewarding Belgrade with
American taxpayer dollars.13
In April 1991, the Senate adopted resolution S.Res.106 introduced by Senator
Dole, calling on the Yugoslav president and army to cease the use of force against
Bosnia and other federal republics. The resolution reflected the Senates majority
view that US policy should be based on human rights for all in Yugoslavia.14 After
the adoption of the resolution, Dole wrote to Bosnian President Alija Izetbegovic
informing him of the Senates vote. In his letter, Dole stated that the resolution did
not take a stand on the future of Yugoslavia but did take a stand against the
Yugoslav army using coercion and force against Bosnia and other federal
republics.15
As the situation in Yugoslavia deteriorated, Secretary of State James Baker
visited Belgrade on 21 June 1991. He was to write in his memoirs that the purpose of
his visit was to convey a message that would try to shock the various republic
leaders into accepting two basic realities: that they needed to negotiate their
differences, not act unilaterally; and that under no circumstances would the
international community tolerate the use of force.16 Several days prior to this visit,
Dole sent Baker a letter commending him on the decision to make an appearance in
Yugoslavia. Dole wrote that it was his and the Senates view that it would be wrong
to undermine those democratic forces within the country who are seeking to achieve
alternative structures of government.17 His aim was to emphasise that those

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23

Yugoslav federal republics which were on the path to democratisation should not be
undermined in the name of maintaining Yugoslav unity at any cost.
The following month, Dole wrote to President Bush stating that the situation in
Yugoslavia was worsening. He urged Bush to take steps to pressure, and if
necessary compel, the Yugoslav army to halt its aggression, and he recommended
that Bush personally appeal to Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev to use his influence
with the Yugoslav Government to end all military operations, to establish a NATO
peacekeeping force, and to call for a Security Council meeting to consider a UN
peacekeeping force.18 In August 1991, Senator Dole again wrote to President Bush,
this time together with 13 of his Senate colleagues, to draw the presidents attention
to the situation in Yugoslavia. They urged him to send a special envoy to the
country.19 National Security Advisor Brent Scowcroft replied stating, We believe it
is critical that our immediate focus be in support of EC efforts in Yugoslavia.20 In
September, Dole wrote another letter to President Bush, again urging him to send a
special envoy to Yugoslavia to provide US leadership, and he asserted that allowing
the European Community to take the lead on Yugoslavia had not produced
conclusive positive results.21
By November of that year, Senator Dole sought to impose punitive measures on
Serbia for its role in Yugoslavias descent into chaos. He signed a letter, along with
seven other senators, addressed to fellow lawmakers and stating that the situation in
Yugoslavia had become a war, that the efforts of the European Community had
been ineffective, and that the USA must become actively involved. The authors
stated that the Yugoslav army was controlled by Serbian strongman Slobodan
Milosevic, who they described him as the last hardline communist leader in
Europe. These senators felt that the USA had to send a clear message to Milosevic
and that their legislative measure S.1793 was geared to this end by forbidding US
assistance to Serbia and the parts of Yugoslavia under Serbian control, and putting
an end to US-facilitated multinational aid, air travel and all trade unless the
president certified that Serbia had ended armed conflict, respected internal borders
and ceased all human rights abuses.22
The Bush administration and Bosnia
The European Economic Community decided in December 1991 to recognise the
independence of former Yugoslav republics Slovenia and Croatia. Bosnian leadership faced two choices: to remain part of a Serbian-dominated Yugoslavia or to opt
for independence. The choice was clear. The Bosnian referendum on independence
was held on 29 February and 1 March 1992. Despite the Serbian Democratic Partys
campaign to discourage Bosnian Serbs from voting, the turnout was approximately
64%, with overwhelming support in favour of independence.23 On 6 April, the EEC
recognised Bosnia, followed by US recognition the next day. The Yugoslav National
Army (JNA) and Serb paramilitaries in Bosnia commenced their genocidal war.
In the last year of the Bush administration, Senator Dole continued to advocate
for a stronger US role in ending the conflict and pushed for punitive measures
against Serbia for its role in the violence. He framed the debate by representing the
nature of the conflict in Bosnia as one of aggression and genocide and his press
statements from the period are marked by this terminology. His critique of the
Western approach to Bosnia was marked by references to appeasement.

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H. Kari

Senator Doles advocacy for Bosnia was not a matter of partisan politics. He had
been calling for more vigorous policy during the Republican Bush administration
and continued this advocacy into President Clintons first term. Indeed, the domestic
US debate over Bosnia cut across party lines. Interventionists comprised both former
doves like Congressman Frank McCloskey and neoconservatives such as Richard
Perle. The anti-interventionist camp similarly comprised both Democrats and
Republicans.
As the Bush administration proceeded to diplomatically isolate Serbia, Senator
Bob Dole and Democratic Senator George Mitchell wrote to Russian President
Boris Yeltsin on 11 May 1992 to express their dismay that Russia supported Serbia
in the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe and that it recognised the
new Yugoslavia. We find Russia's recognition and support for the present Serbian
government indefensible, they wrote, and they urged Yeltsin to refrain from
establishing diplomatic relations with Serbia until Serbia began respecting Helsinki
Accord principles.24 In a letter to President Bush written the next day, Dole and 12
of his Senate colleagues supported the Presidents decision to recall the US
ambassador in Belgrade and encouraged efforts to expel the then rump Yugoslavia
from the CSCE. They argued again that the USA should play a more active role in
Bosnia. Specifically, the senators raised the idea of the establishment of a security
zone around the Bosnian capital of Sarajevo to allow for the functioning of the
Bosnian state.25 In late May 1992, in a Commencement Address he delivered at
Sterling College in Kansas, Dole called for a total economic blockade of Serbia, a
freeze of Serbias assets in the USA and across the globe, and a suspension of all
diplomatic relations with Serbia. He further called for the USA to take the lead in
diplomatic efforts to move peacekeepers into Bosnia.26
In September 1992, Senators Dole and Biden introduced bipartisan legislation
that provided for US military assistance not exceeding $50 million in equipment to
be made available to the Bosnian Government once the embargo was lifted.27 This
was the first legislative initiative aimed at providing military assistance to Bosnia,
and it was conditional on the preparedness of US allies to join in such an assistance
effort.28 Though it was dependent on the lifting of the embargo, this legislation was
to herald a series of legislative initiatives with a similar policy aim; and by the end of
1992, Dole had come to the conclusion that lifting the embargo was the best policy.
The UN arms embargo imposed on Yugoslavia in 1991 had remained in place after
Bosnias independence, depriving Bosnia of its right to self-defence. The embargo
had frozen the military advantage in favour of Serbia and the Bosnian Serbs. Efforts
to lift the arms embargo soon became the focus of Congress as it formulated US
policy towards Bosnia.
On 17 December 1992, Dole and 12 other senators wrote to President Bush
stating that the genocide of the people of Bosnia is continuing we believe that the
UN arms embargo against Bosnia must now be lifted. While they lauded
humanitarian effort and sanctions against Serbia, they also felt that allowing
Bosnians to defend themselves was critical. In a dramatic tone, the senators wrote,
What is at stake is the survival of an entire nation.29 Thus began a three-year
congressional campaign aimed at allowing the Bosnian Government to defend its
people and territory.
At the end of that year, Dole published an open letter to Milosevic in which he
stated that Milosevic had been pursuing the dream of a Greater Serbia and that this

Journal of Transatlantic Studies

25

had resulted in genocide in Bosnia. He called for air strikes against Serbias military
assets if Milosevic did not end the bloodshed in Bosnia. The fate of Hitlers
Germany awaits you and Serbia, wrote Dole.30
Doles efforts to shape US policy on Bosnia were assisted in no small part by his
foreign policy adviser Mira Baratta.31 Of Croatian ancestry, Baratta was prescient
on a number of policy issues as they evolved. The Dole Library archive shows that as
early as late August 1992 long before the failure of the London Peace Conference
was evident Baratta had written to the senator that principles espoused in London
were worthy, but that the absence of starting dates and deadlines for their
implementation and the fact that there were no enforcement mechanisms were
problems.32 Barratta was to remain Doles adviser through 1995.

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The Clinton administration and Bosnia


With Democrats in power in Washington, the Republican Party found itself in
disarray on foreign policy. The GOP opposed Clinton on a number of issues but had
yet to formulate and articulate an alternative foreign policy vision. Officially, the
party opted for unilateralism; but in fact, Republicans comprised realists, nationalists, interventionists and anti-interventionists with sometimes very divergent views.
Realists put forth arguments for the selective use of US force for strategic national
interests. Humanitarian interventions were frowned upon. Nationalists were sceptical of international institutions and called for a freer hand in foreign policy, as they
saw institutions and treaties as hampering an assertion of US power. Interventionists
argued for US military dominance in the world and viewed the USA as crucial for
achieving international order; they were supportive of US interventions on the global
periphery because they viewed them as crucial for maintaining US credibility on the
world stage. This group frequently found itself outnumbered within its own party.
Lastly, there were anti-interventionists who called for US disengagement from its
global role.33
Disunity in the Republican Party on foreign affairs was illustrated in the variety
of positions party members promoted on the question of Bosnia. While Dole argued
for lifting the embargo and arming the Bosnian Government, Senator John McCain
opposed this on the grounds that such an intervention would lead to a quagmire. The
1994 congressional elections ushered in the first Republican majority in 40 years and
a new class of freshmen legislators, but most of whom had little interest in foreign
policy. The GOPs Contract with America had, after all, been primarily focused on
domestic issues.34 These differences among Republicans further crystallised the
internationalist and interventionist role played by Dole. His public pronouncements
on the rationale for US intervention in Bosnia consistently underscored the
implications of non-intervention for US credibility and its repercussions on the
international order.
Upon assuming office, Clinton inherited a US and Western policy towards
Bosnia that had been left to the Europeans to shape. It included deployment of a UN
peacekeeping force, sanctions on Serbia and criticism of Serb atrocities. It was clear
that, absent US engagement, the conflict in Bosnia would be a protracted one.35
Former British Prime Minister John Major wrote in his memoirs that following
Clintons election victory in November 1992, the USA and Britain differed on two
issues Northern Ireland and Bosnia. Indeed, Major recalled that:

26

H. Kari

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the conflict in Bosnia was a preoccupation on both sides of the Atlantic. For two years
it remained a running sore between us. The most strident criticism of our policy came
from American Senate and Congressional hawks, who were both keen to dictate policy
and unwilling to deploy American serviceman to Bosnia, where they would face the
hazards that confronted European troops.36

The Bosnian crisis occurred in the immediate post-Cold War period as the both the
European Community and NATO were in the process of transformation. The
European Community was in the last stages of evolving into the European Union;
and in the midst of early confidence among Europeans that they could manage
Yugoslavias disintegration, Luxembourgs foreign minister Jacques Poos declared
that if anyone can do anything here, it is the EC.37 It was soon evident, though,
that the European Community was ill-equipped to respond adequately to the crisis in
Bosnia. And NATO, too, was faced with a changing strategic landscape in Europe.
Events since 1989 had ushered in a new approach by NATO to Central and Eastern
Europe. In fact, at a London summit in July 1990, NATO invited Central and
Eastern European countries and the Soviet Union to establish diplomatic liaisons
with the Alliance.38 This was one of the steps towards greater cooperation in and
eventual enlargement of NATO. But as NATO was redefining its raison d'etre in the
aftermath of the Cold War, the crisis in Bosnia threatened to spill over into the rest
of the Balkans region. This potential scenario had security implications for NATO,
which led to the Alliances involvement in Bosnia. Both the European Community
and NATO were accustomed to incremental change during the Cold War and their
response to the Bosnian war exposed the slow pace at which they were able to adapt
to the conflict in the former Yugoslavia.
And, in the USA, Bosnia was not the only foreign policy crisis on the agenda.
The Clinton administration was faced with an inherited commitment to a
humanitarian mission in Somalia, made by the Bush administration in August
1992. Part of the reason the Bush administration had decided to take action in
Somalia was due to pressure from then Governor Clinton over Bosnia. David
Halberstam notes that it was a widespread belief at top levels of the administration
that deploying troops to Somalia was Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Colin
Powells way of doing something humanitarian but, equally important, of not
sending troops to Bosnia, a place that, as far as he was concerned, was far more
dangerous.39
If Senator Dole agreed with candidate Clintons publicly articulated interventionist policies during the election campaign, it did not take long for Dole to criticise
the incoming administration for distancing itself from those campaign pledges. As
Clinton wrote in his memoirs, he was faced with dug-in positions when he assumed
office. I was reluctant to go along with Senator Dole in unilaterally lifting the arms
embargo, for fear of weakening the United Nations, wrote Clinton, adding that he
was also not in favour of using unilateral airpower that would strain the NATO
alliance.40 Since 1992, Senator Dole had been calling for an end to the arms embargo
and use of air power against the Bosnian Serb military; and Democratic congressman Frank McCloskey had been advocating an identical policy. Bosnian Government officials had also been proposing the same thing for some time. While the exact
origins and ownership of lift and strike cannot be attributed to one individual, the
policy was officially adopted by the incoming Democratic administration in early

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27

1993. John Major recalled that when he visited Washington in February 1993, the
American opinion had become almost evangelical for the policy of lift and strike
lifting the arms embargo and starting air strikes against Bosnian Serbs which
greatly concerned us.41 Former British Foreign Secretary Douglas Hurd was to
write many years later that the American administration was under constant
pressure from Senator Bob Dole, Margaret Thatcher, and other partisans of lift.42
It was clear that Doles advocacy for this policy option was starting to have an
impact.
In fact, as early as 10 February 1993, Dole issued a statement in response to the
nascent Clinton administrations plan for Bosnia. Secretary of State Warren
Christopher had unveiled a policy that excluded any military option for Bosnia
and committed the deployment of US troops to Bosnia only if a comprehensive
peace arrangement agreed to by all sides was reached. Reluctant to support the
Vance-Owen peace proposal, which imagined a division of Bosnia into provinces,
the administration did express its support for the peace process.43 Dole criticised the
administrations plan as falling short of candidate Clintons promises and he rejected
the Vance-Owen peace plan as fundamentally flawed.44
The legitimate Bosnian Government and Bosnian Croats agreed to the VanceOwen peace plan in March 1993, but Bosnian Serbs continued to reject the plan.
Europeans had by then made clear to the US administration that they objected to
allied use of force in Bosnia. And unilateral American action in Bosnia was not an
option as the administration did not want to become solely responsible for Bosnia.
The top ranks of the administration were divided on the use of force, with Vice
President Al Gore and US Ambassador to the UN Madeleine Albright vocally
advocating the use of air strikes. Eventually, on 1 May 1993, Clinton made the
decision to adopt the lift and strike policy that Senator Dole and Representative
McCloskey had been advocating.45 But this policy was abandoned soon after
because Secretary of State Warren Christopher failed to get the support of allies in
Europe.
Why did the new Administration fail to use force in Bosnia early on? Samantha
Power proffered three reasons: (1) the US military was opposed to intervention, (2)
the administrations foreign policy team comprised multilateralists not keen on
acting without the support of European allies and (3) Clinton was concerned about
domestic public opinion.46 Further, American allies, particularly the British and the
French, had troops in Bosnia as part of the UN force. They objected to air strikes on
Serb targets on the ground that could lead to retaliation against their peacekeepers;
and they objected to lifting the arms embargo on Bosnia, too. According to Ivo
Daalder, containment of the Bosnian conflict rather than intervention became the
basis of US policy.47 Undaunted, Senator Dole was to champion the lift and strike
policy and insist on it for the remainder of the Bosnian war. He also remained a
fierce critic of the Vance-Owen, and later the Owen-Stoltenberg, peace plans.
On 16 April 1993, Dole wrote to President Clinton urging him to take the lead in
providing a strong response to the Serbian attack on Srebrenica. Dole pushed for an
ultimatum in eastern Bosnia: the withdrawal of Serbian troops or NATO air strikes.
He argued that resolutions adopted up to that point provided the necessary
authorization, and he emphasised that he was not calling for the deployment of
ground troops. He again urged Clinton to lift the embargo against the Bosnian
Government.48 President Clinton replied on 22 April, stating that he was pursuing

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28

H. Kari

policies focused on diplomatic isolation and the toughening of sanctions but that
other options remained on the table.49 Later that month on 30 April 1993 Dole
and 16 of his Senate colleagues wrote once more to the president, warning of the risk
of not acting to stop Milosevics aggression. The senators acknowledged that the
Senate had favoured multilateral action until then and stated that they would
support a Presidential decision to participate in multinational air and missile strikes
on Serbian military targets. They further stated that these actions could lead to a
negotiated settlement and that to achieve this aim, we would also support a
Presidential decision to lift the arms embargo so the Bosnians could defend
themselves.50 Though supportive of a more forceful policy towards Bosnia,
Congress had yet to obtain sufficient support for the use of airpower; and one
significant obstacle was the long shadow of the Vietnam War and concomitant fears
of a similar quagmire.51
Bob Doles first legislative proposal to end the embargo on Bosnia came in May
1993, only four months after the new administration had taken over. On 27 May
1993, Dole introduced the Bosnia-Herzegovina Self-Defense Act of 1993 to lift the
embargo on Bosnia and authorise up to $200 million in military aid to the Bosnian
Government. In a press statement, Dole emphasised that the embargo was
introduced prior to Bosnias independence and prior to the aggression on Bosnia.
He argued that continued application of the embargo continues to impair Bosnias
right to self-defence. encouraging further aggression. He also acknowledged the
multilateral approach favoured by President Clinton but criticised the focus on
multilateralism as a goal in itself.52 On 20 July 1993, Clinton wrote to Dole stating
that he supported lifting the arms embargo on Bosnia and that the USA supported
an attempt by the Non-Aligned Movement in the UN to lift it. The effort failed to
convince the allies, though, and Clinton reiterated that the approach from the
beginning had been to maintain Western unity and preserve alliance cohesion.53
Serb forces increased their pressure on the besieged Bosnian capital of Sarajevo
in the summer of 1993, and Dole concluded by August of that year that the UN
effort in Bosnia was futile. NATO involvement in Bosnia, which began with the
enforcement of the no-fly zone in April 1993, appeared to offer a more promising
avenue for ending the conflict. On 6 August 1993, when the Bosnian capital was on
the verge on falling, Dole issued a statement pressing NATO to act and declaring
that the Alliance had the authority to do so, based on Article 51 of the UN charter.
He claimed that NATOs credibility was on the line and said that only NATO, and
not the UN, could do the job. He criticised the Owen and Stoltenberg-led peace talks
and called on Clinton to reconsider his position on the Geneva talks.54
Lift by legislation
Dole had tested the congressional waters on Bosnia with the resolution he introduced
in May 1993 to lift the embargo. Having failed to garner sufficient support for this
legislation, he stepped up his efforts in 1994. His next aim was to put the Senate on
the record as supporting this policy goal. On 27 January 1994, the Senate adopted an
amendment (S.AMDT.1281) introduced by Dole, which stated that Serbia was
directly involved in the conflict in Bosnia and had been supporting irregular forces in
the country. It further stated that Bosnia had been unable to defend itself due to the
international arms embargo and that the Bosnian Government had the right, under

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29

Article 51 of the UN Charter, to seek assistance for self-defence. The amendment


expressed the sense of the Senate that the US embargo on Bosnia should be lifted
and stipulated that the president should not only terminate the embargo upon receipt
of such a request from the Bosnian Government but that he should also provide
military assistance to Bosnia if requested. The amendment was adopted in the Senate
by a vote of 879.55 This was to be a first and symbolic legislative victory for Dole
on the issue of Bosnia.
Buoyed by the success of this amendment in early 1994, in April, Dole
introduced a bill to lift the arms embargo. The proposed legislation had 33 cosponsors and reflected the January amendment by stipulating once again that the
president should terminate the embargo after receiving a request from Bosnia for
assistance with self-defence, under Article 51 of the UN Charter.56 In a statement to
the press on 21 April 1994, Dole said that he was authoring bipartisan legislation,
along with Senator Joe Lieberman, to lift the embargo. Clintons announcement of a
new initiative to expand the use of NATO air power to protect safe havens in Bosnia
notwithstanding, Dole wrote that:
now is the time to strengthen the President's hand by letting the British, the French, and
the Russians who have objected to lifting the embargo on Bosnia know that the US
Congress fully supports going it alone if necessary because this embargo has no legal
basis and is unjust.

In other words, Dole saw his legislation as leverage that Clinton could use in
discussions with allies who opposed lifting the embargo. Dole pointed out that his
proposal went further than my earlier amendment and mandates a termination of
the US arms embargo, adding that the best way to ensure that US forces will not be
sent on the ground to fight this war for the Bosnians is to lift the embargo and give
them the means to fight it themselves.57 Senator George Mitchell, who had worked
with the administration to put together an alternative proposal, offered an
amendment which stipulated that the USA would act multilaterally, through the
UN Security Council, to lift the embargo.58
Bosnian Prime Minister Haris Silajdzic had written in early May to both
Senators Dole and Lieberman on the eve of the vote on their legislation. Silajdzic
wrote that the hopes of the Bosnian people are turned to the United States Senate,
and argued that peace was not possible without a balance of power. He said that the
Bosnian Government had participated in all peace talks but that the illegal embargo
prevented the country from defending itself. Since the embargo had failed to end the
war, Silajdzic urged a change of course.59 Interestingly, both the Dole and Mitchell
amendments were agreed to in the Senate, by a vote of 5049. The Washington Post
observed that the contradictory messages communicated by the adoption of these
two different legislative proposals were a testament to the Senates ambivalence
about US policy towards Bosnia. Still, the Senate was in favour of lifting the
embargo even if it had not reached consensus on how to achieve it.60
It was in the summer of 1994 that Senator Dole paid a visit to Bosnia, his only
one during the war. In Europe to mark the Normandy commemoration, his
congressional delegation visited the Bosnian capital in early June. Along with
Senators John Warner and Joe Biden, Dole met with President Alija Izetbegovic and
other high-ranking Bosnian officials. Dole declared that it was incomprehensible that

30

H. Kari

ethnic cleansing and genocide were taking place in Europe at the end of the twentieth
century.61 Following his visit, Dole wrote to Izetbegovic, saying that he was deeply
moved by the courage of the Sarajevans he met during his visit.62

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A change in tactics
Following the failure of his April bill to inspire concrete action, Dole opted for a new
legislative tactic: to attach his amendment to larger binding legislation. On 24 June
1994, Senator Dole proposed such an amendment, which provided that the president
would terminate the embargo on Bosnia. Doles measure was supported once again
by Senator Lieberman. The amendment was to the National Defence Authorization
Act for Fiscal Year 1995. In view of Clintons pledge to veto legislation demanding
unilateral lifting of the embargo, Dole attached his amendment to the defence
authorization bill because he knew it would be difficult for Clinton to veto the entire
bill. On 1 July 1994, the amendment did not pass the Senate, with a split vote of 50
50.63 Senator Sam Nunn had offered a counter amendment on 26 June 1994, stating
that Congress supported a multilateral lifting of the embargo but that a unilateral
lifting of it would result in several unwanted consequences, including disruption of
Contact Group peace efforts, withdrawal of NATO troops from Yugoslavia, and
damage to NATO, and that it would negatively affect the cooperation of other states
in the enforcement of other sanctions. The amendment provided that the lifting of
the embargo would be undertaken if the Bosnian Serb side refused to accept the
Contact Group peace proposal or that a partial lifting would take place if Bosnian
Serbs attacked the UN safe areas while the peace proposal was being discussed.
According to the Washington Post, on 23 June, military officials from Denmark,
Britain, France and Spain testified before the Senate Armed Services Committee and
urged Congress not to unilaterally lift the embargo on Bosnia. They argued that such
a move would escalate the violence and affect the enforcement of other embargoes.
Later that day, Bosnias member of the presidency, Ejup Ganic, testified as well,
arguing that the embargo was imposed on the former Yugoslavia but had left newly
independent Bosnia defenceless. He also stated that the UN safe areas were in fact
the most unsafe places in the country. Ganic emphasised that he was not calling for
the deployment of US troops but simply wanted to be allowed to defend Bosnia.64
According to the New York Times, the Clinton administration had already been
conducting a furious diplomatic and lobbying campaign aimed at heading off
Senator Doles legislation for a unilateral lifting of the embargo; and the
administration threw its support behind Senator Nunns legislative proposal
instead.65 The amendment was passed by a vote of 5248. Phone calls by President
Clinton and Vice President Al Gore to various senators to garner support for Nunns
amendment had apparently been effective.66
But Senator Dole pressed on, and on 8 August 1994, he introduced another
amendment on behalf of 11 other senators, including Lieberman, McCain,
Moynihan, DeConcini and Helms (No. 2479), which stated that:
the President shall terminate the United States arms embargo of the Government of
Bosnia and Herzegovina no later than November 15, 1994 so that the Government may
exercise its right of self-defence under Article 51 of the United Nations Charter.

Journal of Transatlantic Studies

31

Then, on 10 August 1994, Nunn introduced his own amendment on behalf of four
other senators (No. 2524), which sought to initiate a process to lift the embargo on
Bosnia. Known as the NunnMitchell amendment, the legislation provided for the
administration to introduce an embargo-lifting resolution in the UN Security
Council if Bosnian Serbs failed to accept the Contact Group peace proposal within
a specified period of time. In the case that the Security Council failed to vote on the
resolution and Bosnian Serbs refused to accept the Contact Group plan, then:

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None of the funds available to the Department of Defence for any fiscal year shall
thereafter be used for the purpose of participation in, support for, or assistance to the
enforcement of the arms embargo on the Government of Bosnia and Hercegovina67

In a letter to Senator Nunn, Clinton reaffirmed his commitment to ending the arms
embargo on Bosnia. I believe lifting the embargo unilaterally would have serious
implications going well beyond the conflict in Bosnia itself, wrote Clinton, pointing
out that such an approach would disrupt the ongoing negotiation process, strain
relations with European allies, adversely affect NATO cohesiveness and damage
relations with Russia. He committed his administration to introducing a Security
Council resolution on lifting the embargo if Bosnian Serbs did not accept Contact
Group proposal by mid-October of that year. He also indicated that he would
consult with Congress on unilaterally lifting the embargo if the Security Council
failed to pass such a resolution.68 Steven Greenhouse of The New York Times quoted
administration officials as saying that it was under intense pressure from Capitol
Hill that Clinton set a deadline to discourage Congress from supporting the
unilateral lifting of the embargo.69
Doles latest amendment to the defence appropriations bill was adopted on 11
August in the Senate by a 5842 vote. In addition to 37 Republicans, 21 Democrats
voted for the amendment, revealing the bipartisan nature of support for the
proposal. The NunnMitchell amendment was also passed, by a 5644 vote, with
the support of 46 Democrats and 10 Republicans. Finally, in early November 1994,
the Clinton administration announced that it had ordered the military to end its
participation in the enforcement of the arms embargo on the Bosnian Government.70
In his memoirs, Clinton wrote that on 10 November 1994, he announced that the
United States would no longer enforce the arms embargo in Bosnia. The move had
strong support in Congress and was necessary because the Serbs had resumed their
aggression71 In fact, this decision was imposed on the administration by Congress
and was strongly influenced by the sustained campaigning of Senator Dole on the
issue.
The decision not to enforce the embargo, as Ivo H. Daalder put it, came about
because Clinton agreed to this action in negotiations with Congress in order to
prevent passage of a law that would have unilaterally lifted the embargo72 The
NunnMitchell amendment was therefore adopted to stave off Doles far more
sweeping legislative proposal. Daalder observed that Congress had succeeded in
forcing an end to US enforcement of the embargo,73 and Michael Haltzel, a former
adviser to Senator Joseph Biden, singled out the NunnMitchell amendment as one
of the most important congressional decisions on US policy towards Bosnia.74
Analysts have pointed to the implications of this congressional pressure on
transatlantic relations. The congressional decision to cut off funds for embargo

32

H. Kari

enforcement severely damaged the trans-Atlantic bond that is the basis of the North
Atlantic Alliance, asserted Frederick Bonnart.75 George Melloan wrote that a
quarrel between US and European allies erupted:
when the Clinton administration on Nov 11 refused to further enforce the UN arms
embargo with regard to any weapons destined for the Bosnian government. Congress
had demanded this because of rising disgust in America over an embargo that mainly
handicaps the war's victims.

As Melloan pointed out, European shock over this decision was surprising unless
they thought Bill Clinton would ignore Congress.76

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The new majority leaders first order of business


The legislative proposals introduced by Senator Dole had kept attention on Bosnia
on Capitol Hill and beyond. However, it was with the Republican victory in the
November 1994 congressional elections that pro-intervention voices on the Hill
gained a new political ally: the new Majority Leader. With Doles advocacy for the
lifting of the embargo well known, Clinton was therefore in no position to ignore
congressional sentiment on the embargo question.77
After his election as Majority Leader, Dole turned to Bosnia as one of the first
legislative initiatives in his new capacity. He introduced what was by far the most
significant legislation on Bosnia on 4 January 1995 the Bosnia and Herzegovina
Self-Defense Act of 1995. In the final version of the bill as passed by both Houses, it
stipulated that the president would terminate the US arms embargo on Bosnia
following receipt from the Bosnian Government of such a request or after a decision
to withdraw UNPROFOR from Bosnia. Termination of the embargo would be
undertaken twelve weeks after the Bosnian Government requested the departure of
UNPROFOR.78 Administration opposition, the relative quiet in Bosnia, and a laser
beam-like focus on domestic issues in the Republican-led Congress combined to
shelve the Dole bill through the winter and early spring of 1995, observed
Daalder.79 The proposal languished in the Senate from January to July when it
was taken up again. It was in the wake of Srebrenica that congressional pressure on
the administration mounted. Doles non-partisan policy activism towards the
Balkans, his own war experience and the aftermath of Srebrenica were factors that
appeared to pit the Republican would-be presidential challenger against the
Democratic incumbent.80
Two important amendments were offered and adopted to the 1995 legislative
proposal. Senator Nunn put forth an amendment that reiterated the Contact
Groups pledge that a UN Security Council resolution lifting the embargo would
be pursued if Bosnian Serbs rejected the Contact Group peace plan.81 Senator
William Cohens amendment called for the USA to bring the issue of lifting the
embargo before the UN General Assembly if the Security Council failed to adopt
such a resolution.82 As the Senate prepared to vote on Doles bill in July 1995,
according to Bob Woodward, Dole assured Secretary of State Warren Christopher
that he was not seeking to take over the foreign policy. A Senate resolution, Dole
pointed out, would give Clinton leverage with the Europeans to claim that his hands
were being tied by Congress.83 Indeed, President Clinton recalled later that in the

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Journal of Transatlantic Studies

33

summer of 1995, in the aftermath of Srebrenica, the congressional move to lift the
arms embargo had strengthened our ability to push for a more aggressive action in
dealings with the allies.84 The Senate resolution passed by a vote of 6929 and had
the support of 21 Democrats and 48 Republicans. According to Woodward, it was
seen as stunning and direct repudiation of Clinton and his policy It was binding
legislation and an open challenge to Clintons authority.85 The legislation had even
gained the vote of influential Senator Sam Nunn, who had previously supported the
administration, as well as that of Republican Senator John Warner.86 As Daalder
noted, Congress sent a strong message to the administration when the bill passed
both houses of Congress by margins sufficient to override a presidential veto.
Further, the prevailing congressional view had shifted towards support for arming
Bosnians and away from a policy of supporting UNPROFOR in Bosnia, which was
seen as no longer viable.87 According to the New York Times, the vote represented a
rare frontal legislative attack on a Presidents foreign policy and the first time
Congress [had] intervened so forcibly in Mr. Clinton's Presidency.88 Still, the
proposal was vetoed by President Clinton on 11 August 1995.
The problem for Clinton was that European allies with troops on the ground in
Bosnia warned that they would withdraw their peacekeeping troops if the US
Congress unilaterally lifted the embargo. President Clinton had previously pledged
that he would assist NATO allies in case of their withdrawal; but he had also
conditionalised troop deployment on the achievement of real peace in Bosnia. The
success of Doles Senate resolution was leading the USA on a path towards troop
deployment to assist in the withdrawal of allied peacekeepers and this was something
the administration was determined to avoid.89 British Defence Minister Malcolm
Rifkind, attending a foreign policy conference in Congress in June 1995, sharply
criticised lawmakers who supported the withdrawal of UNPROFOR from Bosnia,
stating that this would result in an escalation of violence. Rifkind was critical of
members of Congress who did not heed European views on the conflict in Bosnia.90
As Colin Dueck put it, This congressional pressure, combined with deteriorating
events on the ground in the Balkans, finally forced Clinton to seize the initiative.91
David Halberstam noted that Clinton was also under specific pressure to act in
Bosnia from Senator Bob Dole, who was both a presidential contender and the
Majority Leader, and who likely had enough votes to override a Clinton veto on
arms embargo legislation.92 After the Senate vote in July, National Security Adviser
Anthony Lake was dispatched in early August 1995 to Europe to present the allies
with his new Endgame Strategy for wrapping up the conflict in Bosnia. The
strategy had been debated that summer, when the administration found its options in
Bosnia limited by the UN command, a Congress which demanded action, and allies
reluctant to use force.93 As the election year approached, resolving the Bosnian
conflict became an imperative. The new strategy included both a new initiative for
peace talks and the decision to use air power. According to Woodward, the allies
were to be told that Clinton would veto the legislation but that he was unsure
whether he had enough support in Congress to sustain the veto.94 Among others,
Lakes plan called for a comprehensive peace plan based on the Contact Group
proposal; mutual recognitions of Bosnia, Croatia and the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia; a plan for regional economic integration; and the provision of military
assistance to the Bosnian Government, with the goal of establishing a balance of
power.95

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H. Kari

In his study of US policy towards Bosnia, Daalder writes that a changing


domestic political context was one of the factors that led the USA to actively engage
in Bosnia in the summer of 1995. The congressional votes with which the legislation
on lifting the embargo were passed indicated that Congress could override Clintons
early August veto. Aware of this, the Clinton Administration had to provide
Congress with a credible alternative course if its inevitable veto was going to be
sustained.96 This alternative course was Lakes Endgame Strategy.

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Enforcing the peace


The Endgame Strategy as pursued by Richard Holbrooke led to the Dayton peace
talks in November 1995, which ended the war in Bosnia. After the success of the
peace talks, Clinton asked Congress for support in implementing the peace.
Republicans in Congress, particularly in the House of Representatives, vigorously
opposed the deployment of US troops to Bosnia.97 Dole joined Senator John
McCain in supporting Clinton's decision to deploy troops and Dole was instrumental
in convincing twenty-eight Republicans to support the deployment decision,
resulting in a Senate vote to support it, of 6039.98
Senator Dole had once again risen to the occasion, and this was not lost on either
side of the aisle. Former President Gerald R. Ford wrote to Dole in early December
1995 congratulating him on his statesmanship in support of the deployment of troops
as part of the NATO peacekeeping force to Bosnia. Ford praised this example of
bipartisanship in foreign policy and considered Dole's support most helpful in
convincing the Congress and the American People that the decision is appropriate
diplomatically and militarily.99 Former President George Bush similarly praised
Dole's support of Clinton's decision and for putting the interests of the country
before his political interests.100 Holbrooke also acknowledged that Senator Dole
deserved credit, saying he had ignored every opportunity to exploit the issue.101
David Halbsertam similarly observed that Dole had not only been helpful to
Clinton on Bosnia, but would not use it as a campaign issue.102 Leon Fuerth,
former national security adviser to Vice President Al Gore, disagreed with the notion
that Congress shaped the Clinton Administration's policy towards Bosnia, but did
single out Bob Dole as the leading congressional voice on the issue.103
Interviews conducted by this author with former senior Bosnian officials many
years after the war all pointed to the crucial role played by Senator Dole. Former
Foreign Minister and Prime Minister Haris Silajdi recalled that US policy towards
Bosnia evolved through the lens of the question of whether the arms embargo should
be lifted. He believed that the congressional vote on lifting the embargo led to the
decision to conduct air strikes on Bosnian Serb positions in the summer of 1995. In
this context, Silajdi particularly recalled the role played by Dole and his adviser
Mira Barrata.104 Former Bosnian Ambassador at the UN and Foreign Minister
towards the end of the war, Muhamed airbey, also recalled that Dole and his staff
were very well informed and very active on Bosnia.105 Selmo Cikoti, Defence
Attach in the Bosnian Embassy in Washington, DC from 1994 onwards concurred
with this characterization, as did Mirko Pejanovi, a wartime member of the
Bosnian Presidency.106 Former European negotiator Carl Bildt also noted in his
memoirs that Bosnian government officials had maintained contact with their friends
in Congress and particularly pointed to Bosnian Foreign Minister Muhamed

Journal of Transatlantic Studies

35

airbey's contact with the office of Senator Bob Dole.107 For his unwavering
support for Bosnia during the war, the Canton of Sarajevo in April 2014 awarded
former Senator Bob Dole the title of Honorary Citizen.

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Conclusion
The foreign policy activism of Senator Bob Dole in shaping US policy towards
Bosnia, from the dissolution of Yugoslavia until the Dayton Peace Accords, is often
overlooked but its impact cannot be overstated. Doles interest in Yugoslavia
extended back to the mid-1980s, positioning him to understand the currents of
change that overwhelmed the country in the early 1990s. He was among the first
legislators in the Western world to understand the nature of Milosevics policy of
territorial expansion and he sought to frame the policy debate accordingly. And
during the war in Bosnia, Dole focused his legislative spotlight on lifting the arms
embargo imposed on Yugoslavia but applied to Bosnia. Realising very early on that
this impaired Bosnias ability to defend itself, Dole worked tirelessly to repeal this
policy. He undertook five major legislative proposals including introducing a bill,
offering an amendment, attaching an amendment to a defence authorization bill, and
introducing new legislation in 1995 in his capacity as Majority Leader.
Though supportive of multilaterally lifting the embargo, Dole quickly realised
the infeasibility of this approach and from 1993 pushed for a unilateral approach.
His legislative efforts served to pressure the Clinton administration and provided the
administration with potential leverage in its dealings with reluctant allies. And after
the Dayton Peace Accords were reached, Dole again asserted himself, persuading a
number of fellow Republicans to support Clintons decision to deploy US troops to
enforce the peace in Bosnia.
Senator Bob Dole was at the forefront of congressional efforts to shape US
policy on Bosnia and was unquestionably committed to keeping the issue of Bosnia
at the top of the legislative agenda. Struggling against the instincts of both the Bush
and Clinton administrations as well as many members of Congress, the senior
legislator and war veteran nonetheless sought to steer American policy towards a
more assertive position in Bosnia. It is only by considering his crucial role that we
can obtain a clear picture of the transformation and formulation of US policy
towards Bosnia during the war. Senator Doles efforts to work across party lines
were not always a politically expedient choice, yet his willingness to do so shaped his
legacy, especially on the issue of Bosnia. Indeed, as David Halberstam noted, Dole
was perhaps one of the last figures from the internationalist bipartisan generation of
the past.
Acknowledgement
I would like to thank the Robert J. Dole Institute of Politics at the University of Kansas,
Kimberly Storr for editing and two anonymous reviewers for their useful comments.

Notes
1. Richard Holbrooke, To End a War (New York: The Modern Library, 1998), 67.
2. Ibid., 3031.
3. Ibid., 173.

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H. Kari

4. Samantha Power, A Problem From Hell: America and the Age of Genocide (New York:
Harper Perennial, 2002); Bob Woodward, The Choice: How Bill Clinton Won (New York:
Simon & Schuster, 1996); David Halberstam, War in a Time of Peace: Bush, Clinton, and
the Generals (New York: Scribner, 2001).
5. Colin Dueck, Hard Line: The Republican Party and U.S. Foreign Policy since World War
II (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2010), 2323.
6. Dueck, Hard Line, 2467.
7. Power, A Problem from Hell, 253.
8. Stephen John Stedman, The Former Yugoslavia, in Economic Sanctions and American
Diplomacy, ed. Richard Haas (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1998), 181.
9. Public Law No: 101513.
10. Senate Papers Republican Leadership Collection, Box 124, Folder 7, Foreign Policy
Issues Relating to Balkan States, 19901994 (2 of 2); Senate Papers Legislative
Relations, Box 210, Folder 1, Foreign Policy Dick Yugoslavia, 19911992 (1 of 2),
Robert J. Dole Institute of Politics Archive and Special Collections, University of Kansas;
Foreign Operations Conference Sends Strong Message, Senate, October 27, 1990,
Congressional Record, 101st Congress, 2nd Session.
11. Republican Leadership Collection, Box 124, Folder 7, Foreign Policy Issues Relating to
Balkan States, 19901994 (2 of 2), Robert J. Dole Institute of Politics Archive and
Special Collections, University of Kansas.
12. Republican Leadership Collection, Box 124, Folder 6, Foreign Policy Issues to Balkan
States 19901994 (1 of 2), Robert J. Dole Institute of Politics Archive and Special
Collections, University of Kansas.
13. Bob Dole, Get Smart about Foreign Aid, Washington Post, March 18, 1991, A11.
14. S.Res.106 To express Senate support for democracy and human rights in Yugoslavia
and Senate opposition to the use of force against democratic republics governments in
Yugoslavia, April 18 (legislative day, April 9) 1991, 102nd Congress, 1st Session.
15. Republican Leadership Collection, Box 124, Folder 6, Foreign Policy Issues to Balkan
States 19901994 (1 of 2), Robert J. Dole Institute of Politics Archive and Special
Collections, University of Kansas.
16. James A. Baker III, and Thomas M. DeFrank, The Politics of Diplomacy: Revolution,
War & Peace, 19891992 (New York: G.P. Putnams Sons, 1995), 479.
17. Republican Leadership Collection, Box 124, Folder 6, Foreign Policy Issues to Balkan
States 19901994 (1 of 2), Robert J. Dole Institute of Politics Archive and Special
Collections, University of Kansas.
18. Ibid.
19. Ibid.
20. Ibid.
21. Ibid.
22. Republican Leadership Collection, Box 124, Folder 6, Foreign Policy Issues to Balkan
States 19901994 (1 of 2), Robert J. Dole Institute of Politics Archive and Special
Collections, University of Kansas. The other signatories of the Dear Colleague letter were
Donald Riegle, Al Gore, John Glenn, Alfonse DAmato, Jesse Helms, Larry Pressler, and
Don Nickles.
23. Malcolm, Bosnia: A Short History, op. cit., p. 2301.
24. Senate Papers Legislative Relations, Box 210, Folder 1, Foreign Policy Dick
Yugoslavia, 19911992 (1 of 2), Robert J. Dole Institute of Politics Archive and Special
Collections, University of Kansas.
25. Ibid.
26. Ibid.
27. Power, A Problem from Hell, 301.
28. H.R.5368 Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related programmes Appropriations Act, 1993, 102nd Congress, 2nd Session.
29. Senate Papers Legislative Relations, Box 210, Folder 1, Foreign Policy Dick
Yugoslavia, 19911992 (1 of 2), Robert J. Dole Institute of Politics Archive and Special
Collections, University of Kansas.
30. Bob Dole, An Ultimatum to Mr. Milosevic, Los Angeles Times, December 17, 1992.

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Journal of Transatlantic Studies

37

31. Power, A Problem from Hell, 422.


32. Senate Papers Legislative Relations, Box 210, Folder 2, Foreign Policy Dick
Yugoslavia, 19911992 (2 of 2), Robert J. Dole Institute of Politics Archive and Special
Collections, University of Kansas.
33. Colin Dueck, Hard Line: The Republican Party and U.S. Foreign Policy since World War
II (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2010), 2537.
34. Dueck, Hard Line, 2589.
35. Daalder, Getting to Dayton, 56.
36. John Major, The Autobiography (HarperCollins, 1999), 497.
37. Power, A Problem from Hell, 2589.
38. NATO Handbook (NATO Office of Information and Press, 2001), 378.
39. David Halberstam, War in a Time of Peace, 2501.
40. Bill Clinton, My Life (London: Arrow Books, 2005), 513.
41. John Major, The Autobiography, 539.
42. Douglas Hurd, Memoirs (London: Little, Brown, 2003), 471.
43. Daalder, Getting to Dayton, 101.
44. Republican Leadership Collection, Box 130, Folder 3, Foreign Policy Senate Foreign
Relations Committee Hearing on Yugoslavia, Feb 1991 (2 of 2), Robert J. Dole Institute
of Politics Archive and Special Collections, University of Kansas.
45. Daalder, Getting to Dayton, 137.
46. Power, A Problem from Hell, 304.
47. Daalder, Getting to Dayton, 18.
48. Republican Leadership Collection, Box 230, Folder 4, International Affairs Yugoslavia, 19921993 (2 of 2), Robert J. Dole Institute of Politics Archive and Special
Collections, University of Kansas.
49. Ibid.
50. Ibid.
51. Clifford Krauss, Many in Congress, Citing Vietnam, Oppose Attacks, New York Times,
April 28, 1993.
52. Republican Leadership Collection, Box 230, Folder 4, International Affairs Yugoslavia, 19921993 (2 of 2), Robert J. Dole Institute of Politics Archive and Special
Collections, University of Kansas.
53. Republican Leadership Collection, Box 230, Folder 4, International Affairs Yugoslavia, 19921993 (2 of 2), Robert J. Dole Institute of Politics Archive and Special
Collections, University of Kansas.
54. Ibid.
55. S.AMDT.1281 Amends S. 1281 Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1994
and 1995, January 27, 1994, 103rd Congress, 1st Session.
56. S.2042 A bill to remove the United States arms embargo of the Government of Bosnia
and Herzegovina, April 21, 1994, 103rd Congress, 2nd Session.
57. Republican Leadership Collection, Box 599, Folder 10, Press, Subject Files, Bosnia,
1994, Robert J. Dole Institute of Politics Archive and Special Collections, University of
Kansas.
58. S.AMDT 1696 Amends S.2042 A bill to remove the United States arms embargo of the
Government of Bosnia and Herzegovina, April 21, 1994, 103rd Congress, 2nd Session.
59. Republican Leadership Collection, Box 224, Folder 5, June Trip to Bosnia and
Herzegovina, 1994, Robert J. Dole Institute of Politics Archive and Special Collections,
University of Kansas.
60. Helen Dewar, Conflicting Directives in Senate: Votes Oppose Arms Embargo,
Washington Post, May 13, 1994; Rowan Scarborough, Senate Action Sends Muddled
Message on Balkans, Washington Times, May 13, 1994.
61. Podijeljeni na embargu, Osloboenje, 6.VI.1994, 3.
62. Republican Leadership Collection, Box 114, Folder 8, Foreign Policy Congressional
Delegation (CODEL) The Balkans, 1994 (2 of 2), Robert J. Dole Institute of Politics
Archive and Special Collections, University of Kansas.
63. S.AMDT.1851 Amends S. 2181 National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
1995, 103rd Congress, 2nd Session.

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H. Kari

64. John F. Harris, Europeans Urge Hill to Keep Arms Embargo Against Bosnia,
Washington Post, June 24, 1994.
65. Katharine Q. Seelye, Clinton Tries to Head Off Senate on Bosnia Embargo, New York
Times, June 24, 1994.
66. Katharine Q. Seelye, Senate Fails to Lift Bosnia Arms Embargo, New York Times, July
2, 1994.
67. S.AMDT.2524 Amends H.R.4650, 103rd Congress (19931994).
68. William J. Clinton, Letter to the Chairman of the Senate Committee on Armed Services
on the Arms Embargo on Bosnia-Herzegovina, The American Presidency Project, http://
www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=48968&st=bosnia&st1=congress (accessed
March 16, 2014).
69. Steven Greenhouse, Clinton Proposes Deadline to End Bosnia Arms Embargo, New
York Times August 12, 1994.
70. Michael R. Gordon, President Orders End to Enforcing Bosnian Embargo, New York
Times, November 11, 1994.
71. Clinton, My Life, 633.
72. Ivo H. Daalder, Getting to Dayton: The Making of America's Bosnia Policy (Washington,
DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2000), 31.
73. Daalder, Getting to Dayton, 61.
74. Interview with Dr. Michael Haltzel, 14 June 2011, Sarajevo.
75. Frederick Bonnart, American Strikes a Body Blow to the Trans-Atlantic Security
Alliance, New York Times, November 14, 1994.
76. George Melloan, NATOs Credibility Is Again on the Line, Wall Street Journal,
November 21, 1994.
77. Daalder, Getting to Dayton, 32.
78. S.21 Bosnia and Herzegovina Self-Defense Act of 1995, January 4, 1995, 104th
Congress, 1st Session.
79. Daalder, Getting to Dayton, 62.
80. Power, A Problem from Hell, 423.
81. S. AMDT. 1848 to S.21 Bosnia and Herzegovina Self-Defense Act of 1995, January 4,
1995, 104th Congress, 1st Session.
82. S.AMDT.1851 to S.21 Bosnia and Herzegovina Self-Defense Act of 1995, January 4,
1995, 104th Congress, 1st Session.
83. Woodward, The Choice, 264.
84. Clinton, My Life, 666.
85. Woodward, The Choice, 265.
86. Elaine Sciolino, Senate Vote to End Embargo May Prove a Pyrrhic Victory, New York
Times, July 28, 1995.
87. Daalder, Getting to Dayton, 64.
88. Elaine Sciolino, Defiant Senators Vote to Override Bosnian Arms Ban, New York Times,
July 27, 1995.
89. Power, A Problem from Hell, 423424.
90. Steven Greenhouse, Britains Defense Chief Attacks Some in Congress Over Bosnia,
New York Times, June 22, 1995.
91. Colin Dueck, Hard Line: The Republican Party and U.S. Foreign Policy since World War
II (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2010), 260.
92. Halberstam, War in a Time of Peace, 3023.
93. Daalder, Getting to Dayton, 80.
94. Woodward, The Choice, 265.
95. Daalder, Getting to Dayton, 1123.
96. Ibid., 165.
97. Dueck, Hard Line, 260.
98. Power, A Problem from Hell, 441.
99. Republican Leadership Collection, Box 113, Folder 4, Foreign Policy Bosnia, 1995,
Robert J. Dole Institute of Politics Archive and Special Collections, University of Kansas.
100. Ibid.
101. Holbrooke, To End a War, 345.

Journal of Transatlantic Studies

39

102.
103.
104.
105.
106.

Halberstam, War in a Time of Peace, 359.


Interview with Leon Fuerth via Skype, 11 October 2011.
Interview with Haris Silajdi, Sarajevo, 27 May 2011.
Telephone interview with Muhamed airbey, 20 September 2011.
Interview with Selmo Cikoti, Sarajevo, 20 February 2012; Interview with Mirko
Pejanovi, Sarajevo, 2 July 2012.
107. Carl Bildt, Misija mir (Zid, Sarajevo, 1998), translated from Swedish to Bosnian by
Amna Ibriagi, 250.

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Notes on contributor
Hamza Kari is Assistant Professor at the Faculty of Political Science, University of
Sarajevo. He obtained his BA in Political Science and International Relations from Bogazici
University, MA in International Relations and European Studies at the Central European
University and an MA from the Georgetown University Walsh School of Foreign Service. He
completed his Ph.D. at the University of Sarajevo in 2014. His recent publications include
One-Way Ticket to Kuala Lumpur: Bosnian Muslims in Malaysia in the Early 1990s,
Indonesia and the Malay World, Volume 42, Issue 124, 2014, In Support of a Non-member
State: The Organisation of Islamic Conference and the War in Bosnia, 19921995 Journal
of Muslim Minority Affairs, Volume 33, Issue 3, 2013, and Balkans in Marylands 2nd
Congressional District: Helen Delich Bentley and the War in Bosnia, Croatian Political
Science Review, Volume 50, Number 5, 2013.

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