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Ritu Bhatt,Massachusetts
Instituteof Technology
229
cized modernismfor its complicitywith capitalismand for the operativerole "theory"playedin legitimizingthe modernagendasof
architects.His questioning of the easy translationof modernist
"theory"into practiceunderminedthe credenceof theoryproduced
by practicingarchitects.2Since the 1980s, architecturaltheoryhas
been producedmore often by architecturaltheoriststhan by practicing architects.3
More recently,a numberof books, most particularlythose
writtenby feministsand deconstructivisttheorists,haveintroduced
a rich and provocativedebateby givingspaceto issuesas diverseas
sexuality,power,representation,gender,politics,and domesticity.4
They arguethat architectureconstructsand is constructedby politics, pointingout how the metaphorof "fashion"is repressedin the
constructionof the modern movement,how the idea of a "pure"
modernspaceconcealsand fetishizessexuality,and how ideasfor a
feministarchitectureaffectarchitecturalpractice.Perhapsit is unfairto generalizeabout such a diversityof essayistsand theoristsas
the "postmodernists"
becausemost of them arguefrom particular
and
hold differing viewpoints. Yet they share
subject positions
claimsabout the relevanceof truth, rationality,and objectivityin
theirwritings,and these call for a closerexamination.
The adventof postmodernismhas broughtabout a shift in
emphasis from object to subject, revealingunintended political
motivationsin the constitutionof knowledge.In rejectingan understandingof architectureas object,postmoderncriticsarguethat
is not simplya platformthat accommodatesthe view"architecture
ing subject,but rathera viewingmechanismthat producesthe subject."5BeatriceColomina, in her essayentitled, "The Split Wall:
Domestic Voyeurism,"analyzesphotographsand drawingsof the
interiors of houses designed by Le Corbusier and Adolf Loos.
Colominashowshow the imagesof idealized,pure utopianspaces
concealand enablethe domesticationthat occursinside. She illustratesher claim that buildingsparticipatein producingdomesticated subjects by showing how they reinforceimages of female
subjects as vulnerable,mysterious,and desirablesexual objects.
Similarly,in anotheressayentitled"Untitled:The Housingof Gender"MarkWigleydiscussesthe complicityof spatialorderwith the
patriarchalauthoritydescribedin Alberti'swritings.Wigley argues
that "placeis not simply a mechanismfor controlling sexuality.
Rather,it is the control of sexualityby systemsof representation
that producesplace."'Accordingto Wigley,representation
hasspecific ideologicalfunctions.He statesthat, "theeffectof the maskis
that spaceappearsto precederepresentationand thereforeassumes
a specificideologicalfunction.'"7
He also questionsthe concept of
as
a
construct
of
"rationality"
knowing. In criticizing"rationality"
Bhatt
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and "order"he claimsthat "thebuildingmasqueradesas order.Order itselfbecomesa mask.This maskof orderuses figuresof rationalityto concealthe irrationalityof both individualsand society."
Accordingto Wigley, "rationalityis literallyaddedto the building
as the representationof an effacementof representation."8
Such theoreticalargumentshavenot only destabilizedarchitecture; they have completely unsettled the way we experience
buildingsand urbanspaces.While it is importantthat traditional
ideasof architectureand spacebe problematized,it is
"essentialist"
crucial
to examinethe methodologiesat playin the investiequally
I examinepostmodernmethodologiesand argue
Herein,
gation.
that both recognitionof the cognitiverole of our experienceof architectureand understandingof objectivityarecriticalto the modern-postmoderndebate.'My aim hereis to contestthe postmodern
critiquesleveledagainstobjectivityand show how broadernotions
of rationalityarefundamentalto architecturaltheory.
230
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so, he challenges the idea that science alone provides the true descriptions of reality. Putnam shows how scientific inquiry, much like the
humanities, is holistic and relational relying on a number of preexisting assumptions. He develops a broader understandingof rationality
and objectivity and shows how these are not only central to studies in
ethics and value theory, but are also crucial to understandinginquiry
in the sciences.21 Satya Mohanty, in LiteraryTheoryand the Claimsof
History: Postmodernism, Objectivity, MultiCultural Politics (1997)
builds on Putnam's ideas; more directly, he addresses the skeptical
strandsof postmodern thought and shows how they are both theoretically and politically inhibiting. He points out that the older, positivists' view of objectivity is fundamentally flawed because it establishes
a false subject-object split in which subjectivity is diametrically opposed to objectivity. This reductive split does not recognize any cognitive value gained from subjectiveexperiences.In his book, Mohanty
develops a Realist account of knowledge as an alternative to
postmodern skepticism and demonstrates the continuity between
theory and subjectiveexperience, and the largerrelation between subjective experience and objective knowledge.2 On the other hand,
Nelson Goodman in LanguagesofArt:An Approachto a Theoryof Symbols (1968) deals more directly with art and argues that aesthetics is a
branch of epistemology. Goodman emphasizes that in this form of
knowing-understanding a work of art is not a matter of appreciating it, or having an "aestheticexperience"of it, but is a matter of interpreting it correctly. According to Goodman, emotions function
cognitively and play a central role in developing aesthetic awareness.23
Drawing upon these accounts of knowledge developed by
Goodman, Mohanty, and Putnam, I argue that our experience of
architecture involves a combination of aesthetic perception, evaluation, and cognition, and relies on the discernment of a dense particularity of human feeling not adequately theorized by the rational
thought of positivism. Rationality herein is understood broadly; it
is not opposed to passion. Both emotions and imagination are essential to rational choice as well as to many acts of aesthetic cognition. This broader understanding of rationality is closely related to
the Aristotelian idea of practical reasoning. In contrast to deductive
reasoning in which a conclusion follows necessarily from the stated
premises, practical reasoning leads to action. In practical reasoning,
one cannot proceed from stated premises to a conclusion, as there
is no general positive premise of the form "Alwaysdo X.'"24For example, a statement such as "Always park your car in space number
10," cannot be taken as a starting point for reasoning what to do,
unless this statement is hemmed in by particular clauses such as "if
it is available" or "if it is a weekend or a holiday." Aristotle points
out that such modifying clauses can be infinite. Practical reasoning
May2000 JAE53/4
232
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standingof the broaderrolethe aestheticplaysin our social,moral, aboutthe invisibletacticsof capitalism,waysin whichphysicalforms
can be used for manipulativeends, and how a readingof an archiand politicallives is crucial.
To explainthis idea let us sketcha scenarioin which we di- tecturalformin purelyaesthetic,formal,or technicaltermsdoes not
rectlyaddressthe questionof objectiveknowledgeand architecture's adequatelyrepresentthe full engagementof architecturein our sorelationshipto politics.Letus assumetwo agentswho claimverydif- cial and politicallives. Hence, one could arguethat the processby
ferentexperiencesof the CrystalPalace.In this scenario,the agents' which A has come to readthe CrystalPalaceas an artfulplayerof
knowledgeandexperienceof the buildingis derivedsolelyfromrep- capitalistidealsis rational.This does not implythatsuchexperience
resentations,drawings,and documents.For agentA, it representsa is dispassionate,but that it occursbecauseof and throughemotions
thatthe CrystalPalaceno longerextechnologicallyadvancedbuildingfor its time, with a rationaland and imagination.Furthermore,
innovativeuse of materialsand methodsof productionenablingthe istsreinforcesthe pointthatwhatcountsas "real"doesnot restsolely
constructionof a weightlessand flowingform. Let us also suppose on the physicaland experientialattributesof a realobject,but upon
thatA associatesthe physicalqualitiesof the buildingsuch as trans- how our experienceof realityis continuouslyinformedand transparencyand blurringof the boundariesbetweenthe exteriorandin- formedby our theoretical,cultural,and politicalknowledge.
teriorwith idealsof being sociallyopen and democratic.For agent
I usethisscenarioto illustratethe largerargumentof thispaper
on
the
other
the
innocent
and
of
that
such
B,
hand, seemingly
pureexpression
personalconflictsand argumentsbringto the surfacethe
the Crystal Palace is deceptive because the building fosters rationalcharacter
of ourexperienceof architecture.28
Ourexperiences
commodificationwith a remarkable
of
For
ideals.
of
architecture
do not simplydescribea fullyindependent"real"obmastery capitalist
B to showA thatthereis anotherwayto experienceandforma judg- jectwith a fixeddegreeof evidence,but attemptto articulatewhatis
ment aboutthe CrystalPalacewould requirethat B drawA's atten- initiallydisorderedor largelyunintelligible.To perceivearchitecture
tion to the particulars-the way in which transparencyboth in its fullcontext,in its repleteparticularity,
one requiresimagination
empowersthe viewerto see throughthe structure,and disempowers to constructthe whole.29Imagination,herein,playsa centralrole in
the viewer by not allowingescapefrom being viewed;the way in the actsof cognitionand rationalchoiceand contrastswith the conwhich the palace'salternatingreflectiveand transparentstatetrans- cept of imaginationas a flightof fancy.In fact, imaginationfocuses
formthe viewerinto a voyeurwhoseeye hasthe powerof appropria- moreon realitythanon fancy.Ourexperiences
of thisrealityareevalution withoutpurchase.And the veryideaof an experiencelimitedto ations;they reflectwhat we hold important,worthy, or fulfilling.
surfaceconcealsthe fact that one can Therefore,in all actsof imaginativereconstruction
thataremediated
lookingthrougha transparent
see but not touch,see but not hear,see but not speak,andso forth.26 by oursocial,theoretical,andpoliticalknowledge,we makearchitecIn this processof deliberation(whichis "practicalreasoning" tureaccessibleand/orinaccessiblein newways.As a result,our expein Aristotelianterms),the end is notan abstractconclusionderived riencescan be moreor less correct,and can be subjectto normative
from deductive reasoning,but is a transformatoryexperiencein claims.Furthermore,
sinceourperceptionsof architecture
representa
whichA comesto recognizeand readthe CrystalPalacedifferently; formof practicalreasoning,theseperceptionsarerationalandevaluathat is, it involvesa reconstructionof the CrystalPalacein A's mind tive in a mannerthatleavesroomfor re-evaluation.
The Realistconfrom an "infinite"numberof particulars.27
B's pointingout the par- ception of knowledge proposed here, while taking into account
ticulars,such as the illusoryoperationof a transparentsurface,does postmodernclaimsaboutthe constructednatureof ourexperienceof
not necessarilyimply that there is a logical connection between architecture-thatis, experiences
changewith increasedknowledgeas
the
and
it
it
Rather
is
form
a
of
well
as
or
social
doesnot
transparency
judgment supports.
political
context-arguesthatconstructedness
in
which
one
can
sift
withfacto
make
it
or
and
stresses
the
unstable,
practicalreasoning
throughparticulars
ipso
arbitrary
cognitiveand
out committingoneselfto abstractgeneralconcepts.Furthermore, evaluativenatureof our experienceof architecture.
the fact that A comes to agreewith B's judgmentdoes not in any
way assumethat B's judgmentrepresentsthe truth that is deductivelyinferred.RatherB'sjudgmentrepresentsa truththat can only Objectivityand PoliticalComplicity
be imaginativelyperceived,and thus the judgmentremainsopen to
modificationthroughrationaldeliberation.
The importantquestionthat follows from the above discussionis
A's comingto readthe CrystalPalacedifferentlyalsosuggests this: Can we criticizethe CrystalPalace (which has been seen as
an enhancementin A's sensibilityand imagination-a realization complicitwith capitalistand colonialpractices)without abandon233
Bhatt
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of the CrystalPlace:
Historiography
AnEpistemologicalEnterprise
In orderto illustratethis argument,I will brieflyreviewhow the
CrystalPalacewas initiallyacceptedand categorizedby criticsand
architecturalhistoriansand how changesin the theoreticalperception of the definition of architecturehave informed its history.
James Fergusson,in Historyof the ModernStylesof Architecture
(1873) cites the CrystalPalaceas one of the sourcesof the "Modern Styles."His entire discussion, however, revolvesaround the
controversyit inspired:Was the CrystalPalacea work of architecture or of engineering?Fergussonclaims that, "Asfirst proposed,
the Hyde ParkCrystalPalace,though an admirablepiece of Civil
Engineering,had no claimto be consideredas architecturaldesign.
Use, and use only, pervadedeveryarrangement,and it was not ornamentedto such an extent as to elevateit into the class of Fine
Arts.The subsequentintroductionof the archedtransept,with the
consequentarrangementsat each end and on each side, did much
In Fergusson'sopinion, the reto bringit within that category.""33
erectedbuildingat Sydenham,on the otherhand, "hasa fargreater
claim to rank among the important architecturalobjects of the
world."Its huge scale,its truthfulconstruction,and its ornamental
arrangementqualifyit to be architecturewith a capital, "A."He
arguesthatwhile the CrystalPalacepossessesthesethree"greatele-
234
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ments of architecturaldesign,it is deficientin two others."One is ment of the mid-nineteenth century, a monument often hailed with
an "insufficientamount of decoration"which does not allow the pardonable exaggerationas the first modern building."38Hitchcock's
Palaceto be altogethertaken "out of the categoryof first-classen- main concern is to mark the lineage of Modern design and he sees the
gineering,and to make it entirelyan object of Fine Art." But its Crystal Palace as a direct ancestor of modern architecture. In subsegreatestdefect, Fergussonmaintains,is "thatit wants solidity,and quent histories of modern architecture,the prefabricationof its interthat appearanceof permanenceand durabilityindispensableto changeable parts is recognized as the most important contribution of
makeit reallyarchitecturalin the strictmeaningof the word."34 the Crystal Palace. As Ralph Lieberman points out, the construction
It is only much laterin Nikolaus Pevsner'sPioneersofMod- process of the Crystal Palace symbolized a modernity in which we
ernMovement:FromWilliamMorristo WalterGropius(1937), that were "as far as we can [sic] be from the jealously guarded knowledge
the CrystalPalaceis acceptedas much as a feat of engineeringas it of medieval masons; the modern age was to replace secret techniques
is an "outstandingwork of architecture."35
Pevsnerrecognizesthat with building methods as publicly known as and as universallyreproof
the
nineteenth
"the progress engineeringduring
century has ducible as a scientific experiment."39
he
a
which
is
The significance of the Crystal Place as a metaphor exemplifyclaims, "asconsistent
passedunappreciated,"progress,
and grandioseas thatof Romanesqueand Gothicarchitecture."36
In ing modernity is later taken up as a central theme in Marshall
the revised edition of Pioneersof ModernDesign:From William Berman'sAll that Is Solid Melts into Air (1988). For Berman the role
Morristo WalterGropius(1964), Pevsnerincludesa moreextended of Crystal Palace as a metaphor for fancy, a metaphor for an "unreal"
descriptionof the CrystalPalace.This description,full of modifi- reality, and a metaphor for a dark and dismal modernity, is crucial.
ers, is carefullyreasonedand justified.For example,Paxtonis de- His analysisrevealsthe role the building has played-both literal and
scribedas an "outsider,"and the CrystalPalaceas a "temporary" metaphorical-in literature, fiction, and history. In Berman's book,
structure.Furthermore,Pevsnerconsidersit importantto explain the tendency of solid materialto decompose and melt is argued to be
that an "outsider"would not have daredsuch an "unprecedented the basic fact of modern life and the Crystal Palace emerges as its
design"had it not been for the temporarynatureof the building. quintessential representation.40Berman's discussion of Dostoevsky's
Nevertheless,Pevsneracknowledgesthat the Crystalpalaceis an Notesfrom Undergroundrevealshow the fantasy of the Crystal Palace
was more dismal than its reality. Citing Dostoevsky's fantasy of the
outstandingbuilding.In Pevsner'sown words:
Crystal Place, Berman points out that, wherever the process of modernization has not emerged from within, modernism takes on a fantastic character. According to Berman, Dostoevsky's fantasy of the
Crystal Palace as representingwestern mechanical view of the world
was more dismal than the creative ingenuity of its design and conception. Written at a time when modernism was being radically questioned, Berman'sdiscussion of Dosteovsky's Underground Man's fear
becomes very relevant. The Underground Man's suspicion of the
building's pure crystalline form is expressed most clearly in the following passage:"You believe in the crystal edifice indestructible for
all eternity, the kind that you could never stick your tongue out at on
the sly or thumb your nose at secretly. Well, perhaps the reason I am
afraid of that edifice is that it is crystal and indestructible for all eternity and one can't even stick one's tongue out at it on the sly."41
In her article entitled, "The Invisible Mask," Andrea Kahn
focuses on this fear and explores the "invisible"ways by which the
Crystal Palace controls and disciplines space. Kahn compares the
WhilePevsnerrecognizesthe CrystalPalaceasone of the many Crystal Palace to Jeremy Bentham's panopticon and argues that both
Englishcontributionsto the modernmovement,it is HenryRussell constitute "an apparatusof covert control based on the manipulation
Hitchcock,who, in his 1937 MoMAshow "ModernArchitecturein of lines of sight." Kahn points a number of ways by which the CrysEngland,"describesPaxton'sprojectas "themost propheticmonu- tal Palace manipulates and legitimizes control: how it allies the act
235
Bhatt
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of shopping with the act of observing nature, how its power derives
from diffusion rather than constraint, how the opportunity to see
and be seen provides the masses with a false sense of power that obscures and legitimizes their economic powerlessness, and so forth.42
From the above discussion, it is clearthat changes in our knowledge of the CrystalPlacehave been informed by theoreticalshifts in the
definition of architecture.For Fergusson,architecturebelonged to the
realmof Fine Arts and his most important taskwas to justify the building as architecturewith a capital "A."For Pevsnerand Hitchcock, the
importanceof the building lay in tracingits lineagewithin Modernism;
their most important task was to show the contribution of English
nineteenth-centuryengineering. In subsequent histories, written during the second half of the twentieth-century,the building continued to
be mentioned for its unique process of prefabrication. In fact, its
method of construction became more important to architecturalhistory than its design or its relation to ideology and colonialism. In
MarshallBerman'swriting, the Palaceis transformedinto the quintessential metaphor for modernity, including its darkeraspects. But it is
Andrea Kahn's interpretationof the Crystal Palace determined by her
postmodern thesis that, "architectureis the disciplinization of space,
and that perceptionsin architectureexert a covertcontrol"that enables
us to readthe building as an insidious playerof capitalism.In the above
example, new theories of architecturehave contributed to our understanding of the CrystalPalacethe same way as new empiricalevidence.
This brings to the surfacethe fundamentaldisciplinarydivide that exists between architecturalhistory and architecturaltheory. Postmodern
theorists have rightly pointed to the constructednature of knowledge,
enabling us not to take historicalfacts at face value, but to understand
them with respect to their theoretical interpretation. However, while
pointing out that truth, rationality, aesthetics, and objectivity are social and cultural constructions, they also deny their role in knowledge
acquisition. Becauseof such skepticism, postmodern theory has ceased
to play a cognitive role. The problem today is not that history with a
capital"H"is consideredthe only source of knowledge, but that theory
with a capital "T"teaches us to be skepticalof all forms of knowing. It
is important to recognize that new theoreticaljustifications and judgments inform knowledge; however, these judgments need to be
grounded in particularsof its object-its experience,its emotional and
cognitive aspects.
Acknowledgments
Afterword
Ever since postmodernism made us aware of how our aesthetic
judgments can be politically complicit, we have become extremely
May2000 JAE53/4
238
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Notes
1. A numberof contemporarytheoristshaveinvokedBentham'spanopticon
in theirwritings.Foran interestinganalysis,seeAndreaKahn,"TheInvisibleMask,"
AndreaKahn,ed., DrawingBuildingText(Princeton:PrincetonArchitecturalPress,
On Vision
1991), pp. 85-106. Also see JonathanCrary,Techniques
of the Observer:
and Modernityin theNineteenthCentury(Cambridge,MA: MIT Press,1990).
2. Theory'srelevanceto practicehasbeen questionedeversinceTafuricriticized the operativerole theory played in legitimizingthe "modern"agendaof architects. A numberof other books such as ArchitectureCriticismIdeology(1985),
(1988), DrawingBuildingText(1991), Out ofSite:A Social
Architectureproduction
CriticismofArchitecture(1991), Strategiesin ArchitecturalThinking(1992), and
RethinkingArchitecturalTheory(1988) have contributed to the debate about
theory'srelationshipto practice.
3. Tafuri'sfamousclaim that "architectsshould do architectureand historiansshould do history"exemplifieshow theory and practicein architecturehave
come to occupy separaterealms.In a similarvein, JeffreyKipnis arguesthat "all
architecturaltheoriesand historiesalwaysalso operate,beneaththeirveil of objectivity and asidefrom theirannouncedintent, in the serviceof a designagenda,despite their frequentprotestationsto the contrary."See JeffreyKipnis, "Formsof
Irrationality,"in John Whiteman,JeffreyKipnis, RichardBurdett,eds., Strategies
in Architectural
Thinking(Cambridge,MA:MIT Press,1992), p. 149. Forpositions
that criticize the current split between theory and practice in architecture,see
MichaelHays, "On TurningThirty,"in Assemblage
no. 30 (Cambridge,MA:MIT
Press,1996), pp. 6-11; and Diane Ghirardo'sreviewof "Space,Placeand Gender"
and "Architectureand Feminism"in HarvardDesignMagazine(Cambridge,MA:
GraduateSchool of Design, 1997), pp. 76-77.
4. See Nana Ellin, ed., Architecture
ofFear(Princeton,NJ: PrincetonArchitecturalPress, 1997); Debra Coleman, ElizabethDanze, and Carol Henderson,
eds., Architectureand Feminism(Princeton, NJ: Princeton ArchitecturalPress,
1996); ChristopherReed,ed., Not at Home:TheSuppression
ofDomesticityin Modern Art and Architecture,(London: Thames and Hudson, 1996); Diana Agrest,
PatriciaConway, and Leslie KanesWeisman, eds., TheSex ofArchitecture(New
York:HarryN. Abrams,1996); MarkWigley, WhiteWalls,DesignerDresses:The
Fashioningof ModernArchitecture(Cambridge,MA: MIT Press, 1995); Beatrice
as MassMedia (Cambridge,
Colomina, Privacyand Publicity:ModernArchitecture
MA: MIT Press,1994); DeborahFausch,PauletteShingley,Rudolpheel-Khoury,
Zvi Efrateds., Architecture:
In Fashion(Princeton:PrincetonArchitecturalPress,
1994); Doreen Massey,Space,Placeand Gender(Minneapolis:Universityof Minnesota Press, 1994); BeatriceColomina, ed., Sexualityand Space(Princeton,NJ:
PrincetonArchitecturalPress, 1992).
5. "TheSplitWall:DomesticVoyeurism,"in BeatriceColomina,ed., Sexuality and Space(Princeton,NJ: PrincetonArchitecturalPress, 1992), p. 83.
6. Wigley, "Untitled:The Housing of Gender,"in BeatriceColomina, ed.,
Sexualityand Space,p. 350.
7. Ibid., p. 387. In a similarvein, CatherineIngrahamcritiquesthe epistemological and representationaldependenceof architectureon orthogonality.She
arguesthat it is in the space of the line, the wall, that the architecturaldramabetween sexualityand spatialitybeginsto play out. The wall, which alwaysdreamsof
itself as the sexlessgeometricline, is where, Ingrahamclaims, "the differencesof
sexualitybegin to be homologizedas materialdifferences,albeitin complexways."
See CatherineIngraham,"Initial Proprieties:Architectureand the Space of the
Line,"in Sexualityand Space,p. 266.
8. Wigley, "Untitled: The Housing of Gender," p. 379.
9. Here my use of the term modern-postmodernmayappearto be simplistic. Clearlythese classificationsdo not adequatelyrepresentthe richnessand complexityof the debate.I haveused them only to makeclearhow discursiveformations
distinguishthemselvesthroughpolemics.Moreover,my critiqueof postmodernism
is directedat those theoristswho take a position of extremerelativism.
10. Stanford Anderson in "The Fiction of Function" criticizes the
postmodernistsfor equating modernismwith functionalism.He arguesthat few
modernist architectshave endorsedthe narrowfunctionalism-the "utility"-focused design methodologies-that postmodernistscriticize.Andersonfocuses on
the role of function in the modernmovementsince the 1932 exhibitionon the InternationalStyle by Henry-RussellHitchcock and PhilipJohnson.A reviewof architecturaltheory from roughly 1750 to 1932, however,revealsnot only a richer
notion of function but also a less instrumentalrelationshipbetween theory and
practice.See StanfordAnderson,"The Fiction of Function,"in Assemblageno. 2
(Cambridge,MA: MIT Press,1987), pp. 19-31.
11. The fact-valuedistinctionis boundup with the riseof sciencein the sevwithobjectiveknowlenteenthcenturyin Westernthought.Factscameto be associated
edgethatwasabsoluteandunchanging,whilevaluescameto occupya subjectiverealm.
The dissociationof factsandvaluesconjuredup problemssuchas: How can a person
functionboth as a knowerof factsand a chooserof values?How can one be at home
with a realitythat is supposedto be experiencedneutrally,withoutemotion?
12. RobertVenturi,Denise Scott Brown,and StevenIzenour.Learningfrom
Las Vegas(Cambridge,MA: MIT Press,1972), p. 90.
13. MiriamGusevich,"TheArchitectureof Criticism:A Question of Autonomy,"in AndreaKahn, ed., DrawingBuilding Text(Princeton,NJ: Princeton
ArchitecturalPress,1991), p. 9.
14. Built in 1851 in London to house the firstInternationalGreatExhibition, the CrystalPalacewas movedfromcity to countryin piecesand reconstructed
at Sydenhamwhereit remaineduntil it burneddown in 1937.
15. PierreBourdieu,Distinction:A SocialCritiqueoftheJudgementof Taste,
RichardNice, trans.(Cambridge,MA: HarvardUniversityPress,1984), pp. 11-96.
16. For a skepticalreadingof value judgmentsand normativetheoriesof
evaluationsee BarbaraHerrnsteinSmith, "Truth/Value,"Contingencies
of Value:
AlternativePerspectives
for CriticalTheory(Cambridge,MA: HarvardUniversity
Press, 1988), pp. 85-124.
17. Mary McLeod, "Everydayand 'Other' Spaces,"in Architectureand
Feminism,pp. 1-37.
18. McLeodpoints to the limitationsof relyingsolely on empiricalobservation. She acknowledgesthatJacob'sfocus on everydaylife-on how spaceis actually used-does not offer satisfactoryanswersto questions relatedto the tacit
operationsof power.Ibid., 23.
19. Ibid., 25.
20. See Nelson Goodman,Languages
ofArt:An Approachto a TheoryofSymbols (New York:The Bobbs-MerrillCompany, Inc, 1968); Hilary Putnam,Reason, Truthand History(Cambridge,UK: CambridgeUniversityPress,1981); Satya
P. Mohanty,LiteraryTheoryand the ClaimsofHistory:Postmodernism,
Objectivity,
MulticulturalPolitics (Ithaca,NY: Cornell UniversityPress,1997).
21. See Putnam,"Factand Value,"and "Two Conceptsof Rationality,"in
Reason,Truthand History (Cambridge,UK: CambridgeUniversityPress, 1981),
pp. 127-149.
22. See Mohanty, "Introduction:Criticism as Politics," "On Situating
Objective Knowledge," and "Identity, MultiCulturalism, Justice," in Literary
Theoryand the ClaimsofHistory:Postmodernism,
Objectivity,MulticulturalPolitics
(Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1997), pp. 1-24, 149-197, and 198-252.
237
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May2000 JAE53/4
28. This example also illustrates that our experiences are not fully rational.
It is not easy to distinguish between an illusion and cognition. The sifting of information and reinterpretation of the whole from the particular can happen suddenly,
slowly, or in retrospect, and is mediated by the social and political theories. The
most important consideration is on what epistemic foundation we base our judgments and evaluations and how do we distinguish between an illusion and cognition. For more on this, see Mohanty, Literary Theoryand the Claims ofHistory, pp.
202-216.
29. Iris Murdoch defines imagination as "a spontaneous intuitive capacity
to put together what is presented to us so as to form a coherent spatio-temporal
experience which is intellectually ordered and sensuously based." On the role imagination plays in perceiving truth, see Iris Murdoch, "Imagination," Metaphysics as a
Guide to Morals (London: Penguin Books, 1992), pp. 308-348.
30. Mohanty argues that experience, properly interpreted, can be as much
a source of knowledge, as it can be of mystification. Experiences can be evaluated
as justified or unjustified in relation to the subject and her world. See Mohanty,
About:Philosophical
Essays,pp. 89-90.
45. Mohanty,LiteraryTheoryand the ClaimsofHistory,xii.
238
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