Begriffsgeschichte and the History of Ideas

Author(s): Melvin Richter

Source: Journal of the History of Ideas, Vol. 48, No. 2 (Apr. - Jun., 1987), pp. 247-263
Published by: University of Pennsylvania Press
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BEGRIFFSGESCHICHTE AND THE HISTORY OF IDEAS

BY MELVIN RICHTER

I. Morethantwentyyearsago, in a still indispensablepaper,Maurice

Mandelbaumdistinguishedthe history of ideas as practicedby A. O.
Lovejoyand his school fromboth intellectualhistoryand the historyof
philosophy. In an asideProfessorMandelbaumnoted that runningparallel to American "history of ideas" had been a German movement
originatingwith Dilthey. This was being revivedin post-warGermany
by Erich Rothackerin collaborationwith Hans-GeorgGadamerand
Joachim Ritter in the pages of their Archivfur Begriffsgeschichte.But it

was not ProfessorMandelbaum's

purposeeitherto dealwith this German
movementor to explain the title of its journal. ThereafterAmerican
historiansof ideas have heardlittle aboutBegriffsgeschichte.
This paper
will surveydevelopmentswithinthis Germangenreduringthe past two
decades.
In 1967 two far-reachingprojectswere announcedin the Archivfur
Begriffsgeschichte.After twenty years, these extraordinaryreference
works,althoughstill in progress,have been creatinga new genre.Both
lexiconsmeritthe attentionof scholarswritingin Englishon the history
of ideas and intellectualhistory. Recentlya third Germanwork along
analogouslines has begunto appear.It promisesto be no less significant
than its two predecessors.
Begriffsgeschichte
(the history of concepts or conceptualhistory),
althoughbearinguponthe historyof ideas,of philosophy,and of political
and socialthought,neverthelesshas its own distinctiveproblems,matter,
and methods. The three major Germanworks applyingthis mode of

inquiry are the Historisches Wirterbuch der Philosophie (A Dictionary of

Philosophy on Historical Principles), hereafter cited as HWP; the Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe. Historisches Lexikon zur Politisch-sozialen
Sprache in Deutschland (Basic Conceptsin History. A Dictionary on Historical Principlesof Political and Social Language in Germany), hereafter
cited as GG; the Handbuchpolitisch-sozialerGrundbegriffein Frankreich,
* Research for this
paper was made possible by support from the Earhart Foundation,
the Herzog-August-Bibliothek, Wolfenbiittel; the Institute for Advanced Study, and the
PSC-CUNY Research Award Program of the City University of New York. The author
wished to acknowledge-with thanks-their indispensableaid as well as that of Professors
Reinhart Koselleck, Christian Meier, Thomas Nipperdey, Manfred Riedel, Rudolf Vierhaus, and Drs. Horst Giinther and Rolf Reichardt.
1Maurice Mandelbaum, "The History of Ideas, Intellectual History, and the History
of Philosophy," History and Theory, Beiheft 5 (1965), 33-66.

247
Copyright 1987 by JOURNALOF THE HISTORYOF IDEAS, INC.

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248

MELVIN

RICHTER

1680-1820 (A Handbook of Basic Political and Social Conceptsin France,

1680-1820),hereaftercited as the Handbook.2

has developedout of older Germantraditionsof
Begriffsgeschichte
the
history of philosophy,hermeneutics,legal history, and
philology,
historiography.Its immediatepredecessorsare the Germanspecialtiesof
Geistesgeschichteand Ideengeschichte. Yet the GG and the Handbook

breaknew groundin theireffortsto connectconceptualto socialhistory.

Both attemptcontextualanalysesof conceptsand theirhistory;both seek
to relate conceptualizedthought to structuralchanges in government,
society, and economy. Another innovationis their effort to determine
which concepts were used or contestedby determinategroups, strata,
orders,and classes,both beforeand duringperiodsof crisis,conflict,and
revolution.
Ostensiblyworksof reference,recordingratherthanaddingto knowledge,thesepublicationsarein manyregardsstrikinglyoriginal.Although
the GG and HWP are meant to be limited to the use of concepts in
Europe,and the Handbookto France,these lexicons
German-speaking
deliver rathermore than they promise.They providenew information
aboutthe meaningsandusesof wordsandconceptsin classical,medieval,
have
andmodemlanguages.Thesethreeapplicationsof Begriffsgeschichte
of
the
for
the
historical
of
excellence
set
standards
study
concepts
already
and semanticfields that constitutevocabularies:philosophical,political,
social, legal, and economic. Thus their findings deserve attentionnot
only fromhistoriansof ideas,but fromphilosophersof language,as well
as thoseconcernedwith language,discourses,andhistoriography.Indeed
has much to contributeto our currentconcernswith
Begriffsgeschichte
the implicationsof languageand discoursesfor the writingof intellectual
historyand the historyof ideas.
Despite differencesin their matterand method,these three German
lexicons bear a distinct family resemblance.Both their programsand
actual practicesdivergesignificantlyfrom the history of ideas or intellectualhistoryas writtenby Anglophonescholars.Yet Begriffsgeschichte,
at least in the GG and Handbook,also marksa deliberatebreakwith
earlier German styles of analysis. These include the Geistesgeschichte
exemplifiedby Dilthey and Rothacker,who wrote culturaland intellectual historyin termsof those uniqueviewsof the world(Weltanschauungen) said to animateand unify spiritualaspectsof societiesor epochs.
Another target of the GG and HWP is the work of Meineckeand his
school, that is, an Ideengeschichte(history of ideas) that allegedlyfails
2Historisches Worterbuchder
Philosophie,eds. Joachim Ritter and Karlfried Griinder
Geschichtliche
Basel,
Grundbegriffe.Historisches Lexikon zur Politischvols.;
1971-).
(6
Sozialer Sprache in Deutschland, eds. Otto Brunner, Werner Conze, Reinhart Koselleck
(5 vols.; Stuttgart, 1972-). Handbuch politisch-sozialerGrundbegriffein Frankreich 16801820, eds. Rolf Reichardt and Eberhard Schmitt, in collaboration with Gerd van den
Heuvel and Anette Hofer (2 vols., Heft 1/2 and 3/4; Miinchen, 1985-).

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LOVEJOY AND THE GREAT CHAIN

249

to relate its subjectto specific groupsor to those political,social, and

economicstructureswithinwhichtheyfunction.Anotherimportantmove
fromearlierphilological
is to distinguishthe methodof Begriffsgeschichte
words
of
individual
the
(Wortergeschichte)
history
analysesrelyingupon
or ontologicalargumentsbasedon theirallegedetymology.Of the three,
only the HWP concernsitself with the history of what its professional
practitioners,thatis, philosophers,considerto be its persistingtheoretical
and the historyof its technicalterms(Terproblems(Problemgeschichte)
minologiegeschichte).

as a genreand
I shall sketchthe characteristicsof Begriffsgeschichte
pointout someof the differencesin theoryandpracticeamongits German
practitioners.Finally, I shall attempt a summarycomparisonof their
workto that of A. O. Lovejoyand the school representedin this Journal
since its initial publicationfifty years ago.3
II. In what follows, the readershould rememberthat what is being
discussedare not programmaticstatements.Of these three projects,the
GG is virtuallycompleted;the HWP, morethanhalf-finished;the Handbook,just beginningto appear.The GG and HWP were announcedin
1967, the Handbookin 1982.4
Europe,the GG
Although their primaryfocus is German-speaking
is the mostintensivehistoryof politicalandsocialconceptsyet attempted,
while the HWP containsperhapsthe most extensivetreatmentof philosophicalterms and problemsavailableanywhere.In its treatmentof
Frenchpoliticaland social conceptsbetween 1680 and 1820, the Handbookcoversmuchof the GG's repertoirebut differsfromits predecessor's
method. Despite variationsamong these three lexicons, they share a
common emphasison conceptsas their unit of analysis.None of them
containsarticleson individualthinkersas does the Encyclopediaof Philosophy.While the GG and Handbookdeal exclusivelywith the history
of politicaland social concepts,the focus of the HWP is not so precisely
defined.Dealingwith philosophyin general,it containsmanyarticleson
the historyof concepts.But many subjectssuch as logic are not treated
in this way.
Despiteits editors'originaldecisionto restrictits scopeto philosophy
writtenin German,the HWP includesthe terminologyand conceptsof
most philosophicalschools today, includingmany outside Europe. Its
definitionof philosophyis ecumenical,its coverage,vast in scope. The
3A more detailed account of the theories and methods applied in the HWP and GG
is given in my "Conceptual History (Begriffsgeschichte)and Political Theory," in Political
Theory 14 (1986), 604-37.
4 Rolf
Reichardt, "Pour une histoire des mots-themes socio-politiques en France
(1680-1820)," Mots, 5 (1982), 189-202, and "Zur Geschichte politisch-sozialer Begriffe
in Frankreich zwischen Absolutismus und Restauration," Zeitschrift fir Literaturwissenschaft und Linguistik, 47 (1982), 49-74.

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250

MELVIN

RICHTER

total numberof pages in print alreadyexceeds6,700; in six volumes,it

has reachedthe letter"M." Eightvolumeswereplanned;the finalfigure
may reachtwelve.The longestarticle,on Gott,runsto almost 100 pages
with 890 footnotes;it was executedby a team of scholars,as have been
many entriesin the GG.
as practicedin the HWPremainscloseto the history
Begriffsgeschichte
of philosophyas treatedby Germanscholarssince the eighteenthcentury.5The HWP was indeedfirst conceivedin the 1920sby Rothacker
which dealt with the
in termsof that partof DiltheyanGeistesgeschichte
was abandoned
method
this
historyof philosophicalconcepts.Although
by the HWP'sfirst editor,JoachimRitter,tracesof Rothacker'sproject
as a comare discerniblein many articlesthat treat Begriffsgeschichte
binationof the historiesof philosophicalterminologyand of persisting
philosophicalproblems.In the HWP, the historyof conceptsis written
as part of the internalhistoryof philosophyand relateddisciplines,and
thus excludessocial history. In the FederalRepublicBegriffsgeschichte
in this mode is consideredby philosophersto constitutea specialized
sub-disciplineof their subject.
is also evidentin the HWP's lack
The heritageof Geistesgeschichte
of interestin the political and social membershipof either thinkersor
their audience.The emphasisof the HWP falls principallyupon the use
of conceptsof philosophers,theologians,political,social, and legal theorists;and such scientistsas have affectedphilosophy.Seldomdo contributorsto the HWP attemptto relateconceptualchangeseitherto the
socialpositionof philosophersandotherthinkersor to structuralchanges
in state, society, or economy.It was in part becauseof such omissions
that Germanhistoriansin the 1950s and 60s launchedsystematiccritiand the related form of Ideengeschichteas
cisms of Geistesgeschichte
writtenby Dilthey, Meinecke,and their followers.6
in the form specificto the GG had anotherorigin,
Begriffsgeschichte
and this was in a specializedbranchof historicalstudy.7Since the end
of the nineteenthcentury,Germanmedievalisthistorianshad engaged
in philologicalcriticismof their textual sources.8Their purposewas to
recoverthosemeaningsof medievalconceptssubsequentlylost or altered.
This line of inquirywas later carriedforwardby one of the original
editorsof the GG, Otto Brunner.Attackingearlierworkas anachronistic,
Brunnerinvestigatedsuch concepts as "land" or "territory"(terra,
Land) and "rule," "dominion,"or "lordship"(dominium,Herrschaft)
5 H. G. Meier, "Begriffsgeschichte," HWP, I, 791-92.
J6m Riisen, "Theory of History in the Development of West German Historical
Studies," Germanic Studies Review (1984), 11-25.
7 Gerd van den Heuvel, "Begriffsgeschichte, Historische Semantik," in Handbuch
der Geschichtsdidatik,eds. Werner Boldt and F. Baumgart (Diisseldorf, 1985), 194.
8 H. K. Schulze, "Medidvistikund Begriffsgeschichte"in R. Koselleck, ed., Historische
Semantik und Begriffsgeschichte(Stuttgart, 1979), 242-61.
6

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LOVEJOY AND THE GREAT CHAIN

251

as used in medievaland early modem documents.In Brunner'sview,

previous studies of land tenure and authorityrelationshipshad been
distortedby the use of categoriesthat conformedneither to linguistic
usagein the past nor to those actualpracticesregisteredby the concepts
then in use. Thus the social reality of the past could be accurately
describedonly after historianshad retrievedthe meaningsof concepts
actuallyemployedduringthe periodunderinvestigation.Brunnerheld
that the interpositionof such modernterms as "feudalism,""society,"
and the "state"had distortedboth the problemshistoriansset themselves
and their empiricalfindings.
Brunnerhad his own reasonsfor condemningGeistesgeschichte
and
becauseof their failureto connectideas and conceptsto
Ideengeschichte
their politicaland social settings.In some regardsBrunner'snotion of
social historyresembledthat of the Annalesschool;in others,his mode
of combiningconceptualwith social history resembledthe Wissenssoziologiedevelopedby Karl Mannheimfrom the Marxisttheory of ideology. But becausethese severalmodes of writinghistory originatedin
very differentpoliticaland intellectualorientations,the practitionersof
each viewedthe other with suspicion.9
Although Brunnerhad done much to preparethe way for the GG,
becauseof illness and age, he playeda relativelysmall role in its actual
developmentandexecution.The groupthattranslatedthe GG into reality
originatedin a workshopfor modem social history organizedat Heidelbergby anotherof the GG's editors, WernerConze.10In an early
statement(1966), Conzecharacterizedthe lexicon'sobjectivesas a "serious versionof historicism."11
By this he meant a method that would
social
into
its
treatment
of concepts.These aspirations
history
integrate
articleby ReinhartKoselleck,
wereagainstatedin the 1967programmatic
the GG's third editorand its most brillianttheoristand practitioner.12
The historyof concepts,long amongthe subjectsof Geistesgeschichte,
now was to be linkedin the GG to changesin the political,social, and
economic structuresof Europe. To maintainsuch a balance between
9 This tendency persists among German social historians. See Hans-Ulrich Wehler,
"Historiography in Germany Today," in Observationson "The Spiritual Situation of the
Age," ed. Jiirgen Habermas (Cambridge, Mass., 1985), 235, n. 26, where he lists a
number of social historians who share his own negative estimate of Begriffsgeschichte.
0W. Conze, "Zur Griindung des Arbeitskreis fur moderne Sozialgeschichte," in
Hambirger Jahrbuchfuir Wirtschafts-und Gesellschaftspolitik,24 (1979), 23-32.
11"Histoire des notions dans le domaine
socio-politique," in Roland Mousnier (ed.),
Problemes de la stratification sociale (Paris, 1968), 34.
12 "Richtlinienen fur das Lexikon
politisch-sozialer Begriffe der Neuzeit," in Archiv
fur Begriffsgeschichte 11 (1967), 91. Koselleck's work in Begriffsgeschichteis best represented in his own contributions to the GG, some of which are among the longest and
best contained in it: "Revolution," "Geschichte, Historie," "Krise." His collection of
essays, VergangeneZukunft (Frankfurt, 1979) has been translated by Keith Tribe as
Futures Past (Cambridge, Mass., 1985).

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252

MELVIN RICHTER

concept and structurerequiredthat the two younger editors become

genuineconvertsto each other'soriginalconcern:Conze to Begriffsgeschichte,Koselleckto social history.They did so. Anotherindispensable
member of the working group was ChristianMeier, among the few
classiciststo specializein politicalthought.He coeditedthe fourthvolume
and has made distinguishedcontributionsto many of the GG's articles
dealingwith conceptsof ancientGreekor Roman provenience.
The GG chartsthe careersof politicalandsocialconceptsin GermanspeakingEuropewith particularattentionto the centuryfrom approximately1750-1850.It wasin thatperiodthatdistinctivelymoder political
and social concepts were shaped in forms which both registeredand
of governmental,social,
shapedthe rapidbut persistingtransformations
and economicstructures.As one contributorhas remarked,the GG is
among the few referenceworks since the l'Encyclopedieto have been
writtenwith a specificset of theoreticalconcerns.The Handbookhas an
equallydetailedbut dissimilartheoreticalprogram.
What is the GG's project?It is to test the hypothesisthat the basic
conceptsused in the politicaland social languageof German-speaking
"old Europe"(AltEuropa)weretransformedduringthe periodKoselleck
calls the Sattelzeit, between 1750 and 1850. Begriffsgeschichteis used to

trackthe advent,perception,andeffectsof modernityin German-speaking

Europe,whereit took on a distinctiveform.The GG treatsthe accelerated
of conceptualshiftsin meaningduringthis period
speed(Beschleunigung)
as both effectand cause.Conceptsboth registeredand affectedthe transformationsof governmental,social, and economicstructures.
The methodof the GG is meantto combinethe studyof the language
used to discuss state, society, and economy with identificationsof the
groups,strata,orders,and classes that used or contestedthis language.
This programrequirescontributors(occasionallyindividuals,moreoften
teams)to look backas faras classicalantiquityandforwardto the usages
of our own time. The GG's objectiveis to identifythreetypesof political
and socialconcepts,eachdefinedin termsof Germanusageat the present
day: traditionalconceptssuch as "democracy,"the meaningof which
may still be retrievedand understood;conceptssuch as "civil society"
and "state," whose earliermeaningshave been so effacedfrom usage
since the Sattelzeitthat they can now be understoodonly afterscholarly
reconstructionof their earliermeanings;and neologismssuch as "Caesarism,""fascism,"or "Marxism,"coinedin the courseof revolutionary
transformationsthey helpedshape or interpret.
What is specificallymoder in such concepts?High on the agenda
of the GG are a numberof hypothesesabout conceptualdevelopments
the dispositionto insertmoder
duringthe Sattelzeit:1) Verzeitlichung,
political and social conceptsinto one or anotherphilosophyof history
set out teleologicallyin termsof periods,phases,or stagesof development.
(democratization)of political and social vocabu2) Demokratisierung

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LOVEJOY AND THE GREAT CHAIN

253

lares, which prior to this period had been specializedand relatively

restrictedto elite strata.Duringthe eighteenthcenturyprofoundchanges
occurredin the mannerof reading,what was read,the politicalmessages
delivered,and the size of the audiencesto which they were directed.3)
the ease with which conceptscould be incorporated
Ideologiesierbarkeit,
into ideologies.Underthe systemsof estatesand orderscharacteristicof
Europeduringthe ancienregime,politicaland social conceptstendedto
be specific and particularistic,referringin the singularto well-defined
socialgradations,suchas the libertiesof theBurgerof a city;butbeginning
in the eighteenthcentury,those older terms remainingin use began to
becomemore generalin their social reference,more abstractin meaning
and hence,in the formof "isms" or singularnounslike "liberty,"easily
fitted into open-endedformulaethat could be definedvariouslyby competingmovementsand groupsthat soughtlarge-scaleadherence.4) Politisierung(politicization)of concepts. As old regime social groupings,
regionalunits, and constitutionalidentificationswere brokendown by
revolution,war, and economicchange,politicaland social conceptsbecame more susceptibleto use as weapons among antagonisticclasses,
strata,and movements.
How weresuch wide-ranginggeneralizationsto be tested?In its manifestosthe editorsof the GG insistupon threemethodologicalprinciples.
and social history must be used
1) The resourcesof Begriffsgeschichte
conjointly.Thereis a dynamicinteractionbetweenconceptualand social
changes;only by using both types of history can continuities,modifications, and innovationsbe detected. 2) Because languageis both an
agent and an indicatorof structuralchanges,researchinto the history
of conceptsmust adaptto its own purposesa batteryof methodsderived
from philology, historicalsemantics,and structurallinguistics.When
identifyingand tracingconcepts,Begriffsgeschichte
regularlyuses both
diachronicand synchronicanalyses of language,relies upon both semasiologyand onomasiology,and analysesthe semanticfieldsof political
and social language.133) Conceptualusage and changeare to be established by analyzingmaterialsunusuallybroad in range, discrepantin
origin and appeal,and coveringas many social formationsas possible.
Thesesourcesincludemajorthinkersin Germanphilosophy,political,
social, and economic theory, jurisprudence,theology, and less often,
literature.Informationaboutusage of politicaland social termsby both
elite and other groups,strata,and classes is to be gatheredfrom newspapers, journals, pamphlets, reports and speeches in assemblies;in
documentsoriginatingin governmental,administrative,and legal bureaucracies;and in memoirs,correspondence,and diaries.Finally, it is
requisiteto survey systematicallydictionaries(German, bilingual,and
13 These terms are
explained in my "Conceptual History and Political Theory," op.
cit., 621-27.

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254

MELVIN

RICHTER

multilingual)in each period treatedcomparatively,as well as apposite

entriesin encyclopedias,handbooks,and thesauri.No previousworkhas
so successfullymade systematicuse of such materialsas sources for
establishingpast politicaland social vocabularies.
Of the GG's six projectedsubstantivevolumes,five are in print.They
total more than 5,000 pages. The publicationof the sixth volume is in
sight, and this unprecedentedprojectwill be completedby a seventh
volume devoted to a comprehensivecomputerizedindex. About 120
conceptsmakeup the GG's repertoire.Thusfararticlesaverage50 pages;
they occasionallyexceed 100. The longestto date, and amongthe most
brilliant,is on Revolution,which runs to 135 pages and 778 footnotes.
rich and
In the view of this reader,the GG is full of extraordinarily
novel scholarlydiscoveriesand insights.For anyonegenuinelyinterested
in politicaland social theoriesand their context, this work is indispensable.Becauseits uniquetheoreticalprogramprovidesan unifyingframework and becauseof the qualityof its contributors'scholarship,the GG
must be rankedamong the great referenceworks. It scarcelyneed be
said that articlesvary considerablyboth in qualityand in their authors'
adherenceto the GG's program;and no doubt, like any other type of
scholarship,the GG's work will be criticizedand revised.Yet its interdisciplinaryvalueis alreadyapparent.Althoughthe GG is a collaborative
work by teams of specialists,individualscholarshave alreadybegun to
use its methodsand adaptthem to their own interests.14
The Handbookis the newest of the lexicons. Publishedin volumes
of about200 pages,it first appearedin 1985.Its emphasisis on concepts
used priorto, during,and afterthe FrenchRevolution;on socialhistory;
on popularmentalitiesas conceivedby historiansof the Annalesschool,
rather than on major thinkers;on French lexicometryand discourse
analysis;and on the sociologyof knowledgeas formulatedby Bergerand
Luckmann,that is, treatinglanguageas primarilysocial and creating
operative definitionsof reality.15A common set of carefully chosen
sourcesare prescribedfor use by all contributors.With a repertoireof
150 politicaland social concepts,many of which also figurein the GG,
the Handbook'slengthhas beenprojectedas about3,000pages.The first
subjecttreatedwas Philosophe,Philosophie,(76 pages, 268 footnotes);
the second, Terreur, Terroriste,Terrorisme(44 pages, 175 footnotes).16
"4See the path-breaking study by Kurt Raaflaub, Die Entdeckung der Freiheit. Zur
historisches Semantik und Gesellschaftsgeschichteeines politischen Grundbegriffs der
Griechen (Munich, 1985). Arnold J. Heidenheimer has made perceptive use of the GG
in "Politics and Linguistics," Review of Politics, 48 (1986), 3-30. Valuable books, incorporating contributions to the GG, have also begun to appear; e.g., Horst Giinther,
Freiheit, Herrschaft und Semantik (Frankfurt, 1979).
15 Peter L. Berger and Thomas Luckmann, The Social Constructionof Reality (N.Y.,
1966).
16
The first article is by one of the principal editors, Rolf Reichardt, and Hans Ulrich

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LOVEJOY AND THE GREAT CHAIN

255

The Handbookbegins with a highly informative,lucid, and wellarguedintroductionof 110 pages that is both methodologicaland substantive.Rolf Reichardt,speakingfor the editors,sets out the Handbook's
primarygoals and techniquesfor attainingthem. The Handbookis presented as a historicalsemanticsdesignedfor use in.the social historyof
the Frenchancienregimebeginningwith 1680and continuingthat social
historythroughthe Revolution,and Restoration(up to 1820). Its editors
perceive the Handbookas situated between French Lexicometrieand
that is, betweenthe quantitative,computerGermanBegriffsgeschichte,
aided methodsdevelopedat Saint-Cloudfor studyingpoliticalvocabularies, and the less precisebut more theoretical,qualitative,and interpretativeapproachof the GG.
in the GG, as Reichardtsees it, has not been alBegriffsgeschichte
in
its effortsto show how German-speaking
successful
Europe
together
the
conceptualized greatseriesof structuralchangesconnectedwith the
adventof modernity.The GG uses a methodthat combinesthe history
of conceptswith social history.Koselleckadmitsthat there is a tension
betweenBegriffs-and Sozialgeschichte;
yet in his view the tensionis not
to
both
but
fruitful
subjects,for the editorsof the GG
indispensable
only
refuseto treatconceptsas nothingmorethan indicatorsof change.Conceptsalso affectpoliticaland socialchangebecauseit is throughconcepts
that a horizon is constitutedagainstwhich structuralchangesare perceived, evaluated,and acted upon.
Reichardtreaffirmsmuchof this, statingthat the Handbook'sgreater
emphasisupon socialhistoryandthe socialcharacterof languagederives
as do orthodoxMarxists,
neitherfromtreatingconceptsas superstructure,
nor from assumingthat thoughtis unimportant,comparedto long-term
social and economicstructures,as do many historians.17Reichardtgenerouslyconcedesthatthe Handbookwouldhavebeeninconceivablewithout the GG's theoreticalformulations,without its exciting hypotheses
about the acceleratedpace, patterns, and significanceof conceptual
changes. Reichardt,once Koselleck's student, gives full credit to his
mentorfor his hypothesesabout the patternsfollowedby politicaland
social conceptsduringthe Sattelzeit:historicization,the creationof ideologies, democratization,and politicization.
Where,then, did the GG go wrong?And how should its defectsbe
repaired?Reichardt-andhis colleagueshave been convincedby certain
criticismsof the GG madeby socialhistorians,somelinguists,andliterary
critics.18 Such criticismscenter on the use of sources in the GG. The
editorialteam of the Handbookregardthe GG as excessivelybiasedin
Gumbrecht, who helped devise the Handbook's method; the second is by an associate
editor, Gerd van den Heuvel.
7 Handbuch, Einleitung, Heft 1/2, 26.
18 These are listed in the Handbuch, Heft 1/2, 26, n.26.

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256

MELVIN RICHTER

the directionof elite culture,particularlyin its inclusionof the greatest

thinkersand writers.19
To write the historyof conceptsin termsof majorauthorsis for the
Handbook'seditors unacceptableas an empiricaldescriptionof what
differentstratawere in fact thinking.The actual practiceof the GG is
describedin the Handbookas Gipfelwanderungen,
proceedingfrompeak
to peak. Too many contributorsto the GG are said to have engagedin
which assumesratherthan proves
a discreditedtype of Geistesgeschichte,
the unity of thoughtin a complexsocietyundergoingconflictand crisis.
Nor, in this view, were the editors of the GG able to enforce their
injunctionsto contributorsto consulta prescribedcorpusof sourcesthat
went beyond major theorists. Such alleged errors in the theory and
practiceof the GG haveproduceddistortionsunacceptableto historians,
particularlythose concernedwith the mentalitiesof the classes, orders,
and stratathat were to play importantpartsin the FrenchRevolution.
Anothercriticismstemsfrom the broadrangeover time in the GG's
treatmentof concepts.Becauseits purposewas to identify shifts from
classical and medievalmeaningsof concepts to those they took on in
early modern and moder Germanthought, the GG's teams devoted
considerableattention to older forms of these concepts. Those social
historianswho criticizethe GG also do so because,in their view, it is
too difficultto trace a series of shifts in the meaningof conceptsfrom
classical antiquityto moder times, and at the same time to specify
preciselyhow these conceptswere used by all relevantsocial formations
in each period.
Yet for the historianof politicaland socialtheory,or for the historian
of philosophy,or intellectualhistorian,the GG's procedureoffersgreat
rewards.Althoughmajorthinkersdo not comprisea sufficientbasis for
generalizationsabout conceptualpersistenceand change, any analysis
that omits them would itself be unsatisfactory.The GG attempts to
combinea numberof sourcesandon the wholeprovidesmoresatisfactory
resultsthanhadbeenpreviouslyattained.Certainlymanyproblemsabout
the use of discrepanttypes of sourceshave not been resolvedin the GG,
but the analysis of major thinkerssometimesis crucial to the understanding of conceptualchanges, for the diachronicchartingof major
shiftsin the meaningof concepts,as is done in the GG, makesit possible
to perceivejust how moder conceptsdivergefrom those that preceded
them. Such understandingsare not easy to come by. Their attainment
may be judged by many historiansof thought to equal in importance
19
Curiously enough, Lovejoy, the least sociological of intellectual historians, also
argued against writing the history of ideas in terms of major authors. He used the same
mountaineering metaphors of peaks and valleys (as did Reichardt). More recently an
analogous point about the ahistorical quality of a story based upon a canon of the great
thinkers has been made with great force by Pocock and Skinner.

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LOVEJOY AND THE GREAT CHAIN

257

whatsocialhistorianshaveto tell us aboutthe mentalitiesof less educated

classes.
Of course there is no reasonwhy scholarsshould not be interested
in both types of evidence.As yet, little has been definitivelyestablished
about the effects of highly educatedthinkersupon other strata or the
extent to which the mentalitiesof non-intellectualsaffect intellectuals.
The criticismsof the GG madeby the socialhistoriansseem narrowand
unappreciativeof the fact that a major referencework centering on
conceptswill have readerswho may be interestedin fundamentalshifts
in meaningin the worksof majorthinkersand in othersocialformations
that held, contested,or were unawareof what was being said by those
intellectuallymost prominent.
Some of the most extraordinaryachievementsin the GG occur in
contributionsthat detail how, in a later age, the meaningof a classical
or medievalconceptbecomestransformed.Surelysuch outlooksas Arcannot be omitted from any acistotelianismand anti-Aristotelianism
count of the intellectualcategoriesin which men thought during the
seventeenthand eighteenthcenturies.It is questionablewhetherthe editors of the Handbookhave improvedtheir work by omittingconsideration of how the French receptionof classical and medievalthought
figuredin the conceptualshifts occurringbetween 1680 and 1820.
Obviouslyany work,even as compendiousas these Germanproductions,cannotincludeeverything.Shoulda comprehensive
historyof social
and political concepts be tailored exclusivelyto the agenda of social
historians?The critiquesmadeby them of the GG and acceptedby the
Handbook'smanagingteam simplybrushaside the case for the value of
politicalandsocialthoughtas autonomousenterprisesandthe importance
to historiansof knowinghow, on varyinglevels of theory, change was
beingconceptualizedand understood,for actioneven in revolutionscannot be understoodin isolationfrom the availabledefinitionsof the situation.In decidinguponwhichsourcesoughtto be includedin historical
treatmentsof concepts,no single branchof historicalinquiryought to
have overridingpriority.Abstractthought in the highest reachesof a
society shouldnot be dismisseda priorias insignificantfor its history.20
Such issuescannotbe satisfactorilyresolvedby dismissingas "old-fashioned intellectualhistory" all contributionsto the history of concepts
other than those made by social historiansof mentalities.21
Despitesuchcriticisms,it mustbe saidthatwithintheirchosenrange,
its editors have been remarkablysuccessfulin adaptingboth French
to their program.They have
lexicologyand GermanBegriffsgeschichte
For a subtle discussion of "Why the History of Thought," see Benjamin I. Schwartz,
The World of Thought in Ancient China (Cambridge, Mass., 1985), 1-7.
21 Such comments mar an otherwise most useful article
by Gerd van den Heuvel,
126.
Historische
Semantik,
cit.,
op.
Begriffsgeschichte,
20

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258

MELVIN RICHTER

workedout detailedproceduresfor applyingtheirconceptionof language

as the socialcreationof reality;they havediscoveredpreviouslyunknown
or unexploitedsourcesand devisedproceduresfor analyzingthem. The
list of workscontributorsmust use is itself a majorpiece of research.In
short, the materialsand articlesthus far presentedare remarkablyrewardingand novel.
Two exampleswill have to suffice.Reichardtbeginshis introduction
by summarizing a striking controversy, in the ancien regime and the

Revolution,about the natureof language.On one side revolutionaries

accused the old regime of having used languageas an instrumentof
dominationand oppression;on the other,liberalsand reactionariesalike
chargedthe Jacobinsand the terrorwith a cynicaland deadlyinversion
of the ordinary,establishedmeaningsof words. Another considerable
contributioncomes in an explorationby BrigetteSchlieben-Langeof a
previouslylittle-knowngenre, the new, deliberatelyrevolutionarydictionariesthat appearedbetween 1789 and 1804, the period of greatest
lexicographicalactivity.In a brilliantand highly differentiatedanalysis,
ProfessorSchlieben-Langedemonstratesthe variety and scope of this
corpus. Her essay rivals some of the best lexicographicalwork that
consistentlyinformsthe GG.
Yet some of the methodologicaldecisions taken in the Handbook
have their drawbacks.In his strikingtreatmentof French eighteenthcentury controversiesabout the political uses of language,Reichardt
seems to imply that such ideologicalanalyseswere unprecedented.He
does not referto the long traditionbeginningwith the Greeks,in which
writersuse the rhetoricaltopic of how the meaningsof words become
transformedduring revolutions.22Yet Reichardtmakes an important
contributionto ourunderstanding
of languagein politics,for afterreading
his introduction,we realizethat therewas a powerfulrevolutionarycase
for treatingthe languageof the old regime as a political weapon. In
weremakingpowerfulrejoinders
short,we now knowthatcontemporaries
to Burke'sargumentthat the Frenchrevolutionarieswere irresponsibly
reversingthe plain meaningsof words and terms of politicaldiscourse.
III. Impliedin what has gone beforeis a contrastbetweenthe history
of concepts,a Germanspeciality,and "the history of ideas" and "intellectualhistory."23Theseappearso Americanto Germanscholarsthat
the HWP breakswith its usual practiceand uses Englishfor its entries
on these subjects.Although it is impossiblehere to presenta detailed
22See James Boyd White, When WordsLose Their Meaning (Chicago, 1984).
23 In a favorable review of the Handbook that is to
appear in the Journal of Modern
History, Lynn Hunt notes the Begriffsgeschichteof the GG and Handbook and attributes
to it some of the most valuable West German contributions to the historiography of the
old regime and Revolutionary France.

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LOVEJOY AND THE GREAT CHAIN

259

comparisonof these Germanand Americangenres,a few of the more

salient resemblancesand differencesbetweenthem merit notice.
How does Begriffsgeschichte
differfrom the history of ideas?There
is little pointin attemptingto distinguishbetween"concept"and "idea"
by stipulativedefinition.In both Englishand Germanphilosophicaldiscourse the two terms are often synonyms.The meaningsof "concept"
and "idea" can be determinedonly within the contextof a theory;they
cannot be satisfactorilydeterminedin isolation.24Should we infer that
the Germanemphasisuponconceptsis due to differencesin philosophical
traditions?
Hegel seemsto havebeenthe firstto use the termBegriffsgeschichte,25
and Gadamer,with whom Koselleckstudied,has suggestedsome of the
centralproblemstreatedby the GG. Gadamer'sassumptionis that our
relationshipto the world is determinedby language, our experience
mediatedby concepts.26Yet the GG itself specificallyabjuresany onand is based on a
tological conclusionsdrawn from Begriffsgeschichte
historicalmethodprobablyinsufficientlyhermeneuticand too positivistic
for Gadamer.
BothBegriffsgeschichte
andthe "historyof ideas"arebestunderstood
as sets of proceduresused by scholarsto study past thinkersand their
thought. These proceduresare to be reconstructedboth from the programsof theirfoundersand fromactualperformancesby them and their
disciples.The "historyof ideas"willbe identifiedherewiththe movement
in the United Statesbegun by A. O. Lovejoy;with the work published
in the Journal of the History of Ideas over the past half-century;and with
the entries in the Dictionary of the History of Ideas, whose principal

editor, Philip P. Wiener,long directedthis Journal.

has been used here as a genericterm to designate
Begriffsgeschichte
the practiceof using conceptsand their historyfor analyzingthoughtin
the past rather than alternativeunits of analysis (individualauthors,
texts, schools, traditions,persistingproblems,forms of argument,styles
of thought,discourses).As has been seen, significantdifferencesboth in
their programsand actual practicesdistinguishthe three lexicons discussed above from one another.Each prefersits own form of Begriffsgeschichte.Neverthelessa pronouncedemphasisuponconceptsand their
history is commonto all three projects,and they stand in conspicuous
contrast to the hetereogeneoussubjectstreated in The Journal of the
History of Ideas and The Dictionary of the History of Ideas.
24P. L.
Heath, in Encyclopedia of Philosophy, II, 178.
25
See the definitive account of H. G. Meier, "Begriffsgeschichte," HWP, I, 788-808.
26Koselleck cites Otto Brunner and Walter
Schlesinger in history, Erich Rothacker
in philosophy, Carl Schmitt in law, and Jost Trier in linguistics as preparing the way
for Begriffsgeschichte. "Sozialgeschichte und Begriffsgeschichte," in Sozialgeschichte in
Deutschland, op. cit., 91. See also Hans-Georg Gadamer, Die Begriffsgeschichteund die
Sprache der Philosophie (Opladen, 1971).

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260

MELVIN

RICHTER

What was Lovejoy'sview of the historyof ideas?Why did it lead to

such a markedfragmentationof interests?Whichproblemsattractedhis
attention?Can he be said to have had an explanatorytheory?How does
the historyof ideas compareto Begriffsgeschichte?
Lovejoy'sprogramfor writingthe historyof ideas centerson tracing
"unit-ideas."Thesehe describedas unchangingconstantscomparableto
the elementsof analyticalchemistry.In his view,therearebut a relatively
few such unit-ideas,just as there are a finite numberof basicjokes. His
own masterpiece,The GreatChainof Being, is a study of such a unitidea: "a single specific proposition ... together with some further propositions ... supposed to be its corollary."27

How does the treatmentof conceptsin the Germanworks compare

to Lovejoy'suse of unit-ideas?Probablythe Germangenre closest to
Lovejoywas Ideengeschichte,itself a set of practicesusually identified
with FriedrichMeineckeand his school.28Both the GG and Handbook
in termsthat applyalmostequallywell to
have attackedIdeengeschichte
understand
Lovejoy'suse of unit-ideas.Practitionersof Begriffsgeschichte
themselvesto be engagedin historicalratherthanphilosophicalsemantics.
They do not believe that the same unit-ideacan, without changingits
meaning,be articulatedat differenttimes in what Lovejoy calls ideacomplexes.To follow Lovejoy'sprocedurewould seem to make it impossibleto providean accurateaccountof what conceptshave meantto
those who have used them for determinatepurposesin discrepanthistorical settings.
Thus the GG alternatesbetweensynchronicand diachronicanalysis
of concepts.Synchronicanalysisaddressessuch questionsas: what could
the writerhave intendedto do by writingas he did in a given situation
to a given audience?What was the vocabularyused?What did it mean
at that time?What was its illocutionaryforce?
Diachronicanalysisconstructsa seriesof successivemeaningscarried
a
by single concept over time. The fact that the same word was used
tells us nothingaboutits meanings.Only by diachronicanalysiscan we
learnwhenand how dislocationsoccurredamongolderand newermeanings of a concept.29The notion of an unchangingunit-ideathus cannot
be adaptedto strictlyhistoricalsemantics.30
Another issue separatingthe history of ideas from the history of
concepts is their treatmentof words and concepts. Although Lovejoy
27Arthur 0.
Lovejoy, The Great Chain of Being (Cambridge, Mass., 1948), 14.
28See Felix Gilbert, History and Theory, 13 (1974), 59-64; Isaiah Berlin and Carl
Hinrichs in Meinecke's Historism, tr. J. E. Anderson (London, 1972), ix-liii.
29 Some examples and a more extended analysis of method are given in my "Conceptual
History and Political Theory," 621-23.
30 Quentin Skinner makes a similar case against Lovejoy's use of unit-ideas in his
"Meaning and Understanding in the History of Ideas," History and Theory, 8 (1969),
37-39.

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LOVEJOY AND THE GREAT CHAIN

261

recognized that the two are far from identical, that the same concept
may be given a number of names, he never developed a method for
treating this problem.3' By contrast, Begriffsgeschichte,especially in the
GG, has adapted linguistic techniques to its purpose of charting both
continuities and discontinuities in the use of concepts. Concerned to
identify persisting meanings in concepts transmitted from the classical
or medieval thought, it also studies decisive shifts of meaning in concepts
that continue to be designated by the same word. Finally, it seeks to
identify neologisms. Contributors are meant to use two methods: assembling all the meanings of a given term (semasiology), and seeking all the
terms or names given to the concept at a given time (onomasiology).32
Both philosophical systems and ideologies were viewed by Lovejoy
as unstable compounds, complexes made up of unit-ideas for the most
part logically incompatible. Lovejoy did not find such compounds worth
studying: "the doctrines or tendencies ... designated by familiar names
ending in -ism or -ity ... usually are not units of the sort the historian
of ideas seeks to discriminate.

.. "33This position derives from Lovejoy's

"passion for drawing distinctions in order to gain analytical clarity."34

He first took up the history of ideas because of his interest in detecting
intellectual fallacies. By identifying the unit ideas combined illogically in
idea complexes such as political ideologies or philosophical systems, he
would reveal their inherent confusions.
Again there is an important distinction to be drawn. Since the GG
and Handbook concentrate on political and social language, the development of ideologies is central to their analysis. Almost a quarter of the
concepts treated in the GG and Handbook are "isms" of the sort Lovejoy
declared out of bounds to the historian of ideas. Whereas he regarded
ideologies only as containing philosophical fallacies to be discredited, the
German historians are concerned to chart the development of ideologies,
identify the audiences for them, and provide a causal explanation for
their proliferationsince the eighteenth century. Lovejoy, it has been noted,
was not interested in questions of explanation, even in indicating why
unit-ideas were taken up or abandoned.35Perhaps the greatest effort he
made in this direction was his application of what he called philosophical
semantics:
a study of the sacredwordsand phrasesof a periodor movement,with a view
to clearingup of their ambiguities,a listingof theirshadesof meaning,and an
0. Lovejoy, Essays in the History of Ideas (Baltimore, 1948), xv.
Richter, "Conceptual History and Political Theory," 623-25.
33 Ibid., 5.
34 Mandelbaum, op. cit., 41.
31
Mandelbaum, op. cit., 37.
31 Arthur
32

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262

MELVIN

RICHTER

examinationof the way in which confusedassociationsof ideas arisingfrom

these ambiguitieshave influencedthe developmentof doctrines ... 36
Thus for Lovejoy the history of ideas is meant to unmask ambiguities,
as well as to reveal confusions. In both cases, his theory of causation is
weak: ambiguities "influence" the development of ideologies and systems.
"Influence," originally an astrological concept, unfortunately became
perhaps the principal theoretical issue in American history of ideas.
Lovejoy and his school were open to many of the accusations made
against German Geistes- and Ideengeschichte. Yet he knew what Wissenssoziologiewas (although he could not bring himself to translate it as
"the sociology of knowledge.") He even wrote that it could be combined
with the history of ideas, though he never attempted to practice it
himself. 37 Perhaps he came closest to doing so when he came out without
equivocation against an intellectual history centered on only the most
eminent thinkers and writers. The history of ideas, he wrote, should be:
especiallyconcernedwiththe manifestationof specificunit-ideasin the collective
thoughtof largenumbersof persons,not merelyin the doctrinesof or opinions
of a small numberof profoundthinkersor eminentwriters.... It is, in short,
most interestedin ideaswhich attaina wide diffusion,whichbecomea part of
the stock of many minds.38
Yet neither he nor many of the scholars closely associated with him
ever attempted to relate ideas to the structures of governments, societies,
or economies. Nor was he interested in identifying the groups, strata, or
classes that adopted or rejected ideas.
To trace ideas as masterfully as Lovejoy did, and not only in The
Great Chain of Being, required great learning, intellectual curiosity, tireless research, unusual philosophical acuity, and a delicate sense of what
a text meant to its author, its contemporary audience, and later readers.
For them we should be grateful, especially those who first were attracted
to the history of ideas by Lovejoy. Anyone rereading his work will go
some way towards welcoming the resounding defense of it by Francis
Oakley.39

Yet much of the excitement seems to have gone out of Lovejoy's

program. In the research for an alternative way of proceeding, Begriffsgeschichte has much to offer. It is a recognizably historical mode of
investigation; it addresses questions which in Germany have attracted
36

Lovejoy, Great Chain of Being, 14.

Arthur O. Lovejoy, Essays in the History of Ideas, 2.
38 Lovejoy, Great Chain of Being, 19.
39Francis Oakley, Omnipotence, Covenant, & Order (Ithaca, 1984), Chapter I,
"Against the Stream: In Praise of Lovejoy"; and see above pp. 231-45
7

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LOVEJOY AND THE GREAT CHAIN

263

intellectualhistorianswith broadinterests,and may do so elsewhereas

well.
There is work to be done. Both the GG and Handbookhave demonstratedthat the great lexicographicalworks of the last century, includingthe OxfordEnglishDictionary,areinadequatesourcesfor certain
parts of the vocabulary,includingthose dealingwith politics, with political, social, and economictheory.Feministideas and investigationsof
racial attitudesoffer other potentialapplicationsas yet virtuallyunexwhen adaptedto the needs
plored in Germanwork. Begriffsgeschichte,
of special fields of historicalinquiry,may providea more solid way of
investigatinglanguagethanmanyothertheoriesnow in vogue.And since
there are solid studiesapplyingthe historyof conceptsto Germanyand
France, there is an increasinglyattractivecase for doing the same in
Anglophonesocieties.For those interestedin comparativehistory,Beoffersprospectsthat have yet to be explored.
griffsgeschichte
City Universityof New York

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