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94284; 8 APR 1991]

Issue: The writ of Habeas Corpus was filed by the

petitioner, with the prayer that the respondent produce
around 170 women whom Justo Lukban et, al deported
to Davao. Liberty of abode was also raised versus the
power of the executive of the Municipality in deporting
the women without their knowledge in his capacity as

Facts: Petitioner was charged with violation of Section

2 (4) of the revised securities act. Respondent filed
to cancel the passport of the petitioner and to issue a
hold departure order. The RTC ordered the DFA
to cancel petitioners passport, based on the finding
that the petitioner has not been arraigned and there
was evidence to show that the accused has left the
country without the knowledge and the permission of
the court.
Issue: Whether or Not the right to travel may be
impaired by order of the court.
Held: The bail bond posted by petitioner has been
cancelled and warrant of arrest has been issued by
reason that he failed to appear at his arraignments.
There is a valid restriction on the right to travel,
it is imposed that the accused must make
himself available whenever the court requires
his presence. A person facing criminal charges may
be restrained by the Court from leaving the country or,
if abroad, compelled to return (Constitutional Law,
Cruz, Isagani A., 1987 Edition, p. 138). So it is also that
"An accused released on bail may be re-arrested
without the necessity of a warrant if he attempts to
depart from the Philippines without prior permission of
the Court where the case is pending (ibid., Sec. 20 [2nd
par. ]).

Facts: Justo Lukban as Manila City's Mayor together

with Anton Hohmann, the city's Chief of Police, took
custody of about 170 women at the night of October
25 beyond the latters consent and knowledge and
thereafter were shipped to Mindanao specifically in
Davao where they were signed as laborers. Said
women are inmates of the houses of prostitution
situated in Gardenia Street, in the district of Sampaloc.
That when the petitioner filed for habeas corpus, the
respondent moved to dismiss the case saying that
those women were already out of their jurisdiction and
that , it should be filed in the city of Davao instead.
The court ruled in favor of the petitioner with the
For the respondents to have fulfilled the court's order,
three optional courses were open: (1) They could have
produced the bodies of the persons according to the
command of the writ; or (2) they could have shown by
affidavit that on account of sickness or infirmity those
persons could not safely be brought before the court;
or (3) they could have presented affidavits to show that
the parties in question or their attorney waived the
right to be present.
Held: The court concluded the case by granting the
parties aggrieved the sum of 400 pesos each, plus 100
pesos for nominal damage due to contempt of court.
Reasoning further that if the chief executive of any
municipality in the Philippines could forcibly and
illegally take a private citizen and place him beyond
the boundaries of the municipality, and then, when
called upon to defend his official action, could calmly
fold his hands and claim that the person was under no
restraint and that he, the official, had no jurisdiction
over this other municipality.
We believe the true principle should be that, if the
respondent is within the jurisdiction of the court and
has it in his power to obey the order of the court and
thus to undo the wrong that he has inflicted, he should
be compelled to do so. Even if the party to whom the
writ is addressed has illegally parted with the custody
of a person before the application for the writ is no
reason why the writ should not issue. If the mayor
and the chief of police, acting under no authority
of law, could deport these women from the city
of Manila to Davao, the same officials must
necessarily have the same means to return them
from Davao to Manila. The respondents, within
the reach of process, may not be permitted to
restrain a fellow citizen of her liberty by forcing
her to change her domicile and to avow the act
with impunity in the courts, while the person
who has lost her birthright of liberty has no
effective recourse. The great writ of liberty may not
thus be easily evaded.

Article III, Section 6 of the 1987 Constitution should be

interpreted to mean that while the liberty of travel may
be impaired even without Court Order, the appropriate
executive officers or administrative authorities are not
armed with arbitrary discretion to impose limitations.
They can impose limits only on the basis of "national
security, public safety, or public health" and "as may
be provided by law," a limitive phrase which did not
appear in the 1973 text (The Constitution, Bernas,
Joaquin G.,S.J., Vol. I, First Edition, 1987, p. 263).
Apparently, the phraseology in the 1987 Constitution
was a reaction to the ban on international travel
imposed under the previous regime when there was a
Travel Processing Center, which issued certificates of
eligibility to travel upon application of an interested
party (See Salonga vs. Hermoso & Travel Processing
Center, No. 53622, 25 April 1980, 97 SCRA 121).
Holding an accused in a criminal case within the reach
of the Courts by preventing his departure from the
Philippines must be considered as a valid restriction on
his right to travel so that he may be dealt with in
accordance with law. The offended party in any
criminal proceeding is the People of the Philippines. It
is to their best interest that criminal prosecutions
should run their course and proceed to finality without
undue delay, with an accused holding himself
amenable at all times to Court Orders and processes
Marcos v. Manglapus
Facts: Former President Ferdinand Marcos petitions
the SC for mandamus and prohibition asking to order
respondents to issue travel documents to him and his
immediate family and to enjoin the implementation of
the President "s decision to bar their return to the

Issue: WON the President may prohibit the Marcoses

from returning to the Philippines, in the exercise of the
powers granted in her by the Constitution.
Ruling: Affirmative. Although the 1987 Constitution
imposes limitations on the exercise of specific powers
of the President, it maintains intact what is traditionally
considered as within the scope of "executive power ".
The powers of the President cannot be said to be
limited only to the specific powers enumerated in the
Constitution. Whatever power inherent in the
government that is neither legislative nor judicial has
to be executive. Even the members of the Legislature
has recognized that indeed Mrs. Aquino has the power
under the Constitution to bar the Marcoses from
returning, as per House Resolution No. 1342.
Marcos v Manglapus, et. al.
Facts: Same as above, except that Ferdinand has died.
Held: Among the duties of the President under the
Constitution, in compliance with his (or her) oath of
office, is to protect and promote the interest and
welfare of the people. Her decision to bar the return of
the Marcoses and subsequently, the remains of Mr.
Marcos at the present time and under present
circumstances is in compliance with this bounden duty.
In the absence of a clear showing that she had acted
with arbitrariness or with grave abuse of discretion in
arriving at this decision, the Court will not enjoin the
implementation of this decision.

Facts: This case involves a petition of mandamus and
prohibition asking the court to order the respondents
Secretary of Foreign Affairs, etc. To issue a "travel
documents "to former Pres. Marcos and the immediate
members of his family and to enjoin the
implementation of the President's decision to bar their
return to the Philippines. Petitioners assert that the
right of the Marcoses "to return "in the
Philippines is guaranteed by "the Bill of Rights,
specifically "Sections "1 and 6. They contended
that Pres. Aquino is without power to impair the
liberty of abode of the Marcoses because only a
court may do so within the limits prescribed by
law. Nor the President impair their right to travel
because no law has authorized her to do so.
They further assert that under "international law, their
right "to return "to the Philippines is guaranteed
particularly by the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights and the International Covenant on "Civil "and
Political Rights, which has been ratified by the
Issue: "Whether or not, in the exercise of the powers
granted by "the constitution, the President (Aquino)
may prohibit the Marcoses from returning to the
Held: "It must be emphasized that the individual right
involved is not the right to "travel from "the Philippines
to other countries or within the Philippines. These are
what the right to travel would normally connote.
Essentially, the right involved in this case at bar

is the right "to return "to one's country, a

distinct right under "international law,
independent from although related to the right
to travel. Thus, the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights and the International Covenant on
"Civil "and Political Rights treat the right to
freedom of "movement "and abode within the
territory of a state, the right to leave the
country, and the right to enter one's country as
separate and distinct rights. What the
Declaration speaks of is the "right to freedom of
"movement "and residence within the borders of
each state". On the other hand, the Covenant
guarantees the right to liberty of "movement
"and freedom to choose his residence and the
right to be free to leave any country, including
his own. Such rights may only be restricted by
laws protecting the "national security, public
order, "public health "or morals or the separate
rights of others. However, right to enter one's
country cannot be arbitrarily deprived. It would be
therefore inappropriate to construe the limitations to
the right "to return "to ones country in the same
context as those pertaining to the liberty of abode and
the right to travel.
The Bill of rights "treats only the liberty of abode and
the right to travel, but it is a well considered view that
the right "to return "may be considered, as a generally
accepted principle of "International Law "and under our
Constitution as part of the law of the land. "
The court held that President did not act
arbitrarily or with grave abuse of discretion in
determining that the return of the Former Pres.
Marcos and his family poses a serious threat to
national interest and welfare. President Aquino
has determined that the destabilization caused
by the return of the Marcoses would wipe away
the gains achieved during the past few years
after the Marcos regime.
The return of the Marcoses poses a serious threat and
therefore prohibiting their return to the Philippines, the
instant petition is hereby DISMISSED.
PASEI VS. DRILON [163 SCRA 386; L-81958; 30 JUN
Facts: Petitioner, Phil association of Service Exporters,
Inc., is engaged principally in the recruitment of Filipino
workers, male and female of overseas employment. It
challenges the constitutional validity of Dept. Order No.
1 (1998) of DOLE entitled Guidelines Governing the
Temporary Suspension of Deployment of Filipino
Domestic and Household Workers. It claims that such
order is a discrimination against males and females.
The Order does not apply to all Filipino workers but
only to domestic helpers and females with similar
skills, and that it is in violation of the right to travel, it
also being an invalid exercise of the lawmaking power.
Further, PASEI invokes Sec 3 of Art 13 of the
Constitution, providing for worker participation in policy
and decision-making processes affecting their rights
and benefits as may be provided by law. Thereafter the
Solicitor General on behalf of DOLE submitting to the
validity of the challenged guidelines involving the
police power of the State and informed the court that

the respondent have lifted the deployment ban in some

states where there exists bilateral agreement with the
Philippines and existing mechanism providing for
sufficient safeguards to ensure the welfare and
protection of the Filipino workers.
Issue: Whether or not there has been a valid
classification in the challenged Department Order No.
Held: SC in dismissing the petition ruled that there has
been valid classification, the Filipino female domestics
working abroad were in a class by themselves, because
of the special risk to which their class was exposed.
There is no question that Order No.1 applies only to
female contract workers but it does not thereby make
an undue discrimination between sexes. It is well
settled hat equality before the law under the
constitution does not import a perfect identity of rights
among all men and women. It admits of classification,
provided that:

Such classification rests on substantial distinctions

That they are germane to the purpose of the law
They are not confined to existing conditions
They apply equally to al members of the same class

In the case at bar, the classifications made, rest on

substantial distinctions.
Dept. Order No. 1 does not impair the right to travel.
The consequence of the deployment ban has on
the right to travel does not impair the right, as
the right to travel is subjects among other
things, to the requirements of public safety as
may be provided by law. Deployment ban of female
domestic helper is a valid exercise of police power.
Police power as been defined as the state authority to
enact legislation that may interfere with personal
liberty or property in order to promote general welfare.
Neither is there merit in the contention that
Department Order No. 1 constitutes an invalid
exercise of legislative power as the labor code
vest the DOLE with rule making powers.

GONZALES VS. COMELEC [27 SCRA 835; G.R. L27833; 18 APR1969]
Facts: RA 4880 which took effect on June 17, 1967,
prohibiting the too early nomination of candidates and
limiting the period of election campaign or partisan
political activity was challenged on constitutional
grounds. More precisely, the basic liberties of free
speech and free press, freedom of assembly and
freedom of association are invoked to nullify the act.
Petitioner Cabigao was, at the time of the filing the
petition, an incumbent councilor in the 4th District of
Manila and the Nacionalista Party official candidate for
Vice-Mayor of Manila to which he was subsequently
elected on November 11, 1967; petitioner Gonzales, on
the other hand, is a private individual, a registered
voter in the City of Manila and a political leader of his
co-petitioner. There was the further allegation that the
nomination of a candidate and the fixing of period
of election campaign are matters of political
expediency and convenience which only political

parties can regulate or curtail by and among

themselves through self-restraint or mutual
understanding or agreement and that the regulation
and limitation of these political matters invoking the
police power, in the absence of clear and present
danger to the state, would render the constitutional
rights of petitioners meaningless and without effect.
Senator Lorenzo M. Taada was asked to appear as
amicus curiae, and elucidated that Act No. 4880 could
indeed be looked upon as a limitation on the preferred
rights of speech and press, of assembly and of
association. He did justify its enactment however
under the clear and present danger doctrine,
there being the substantive evil of elections,
whether for national or local officials, being
debased and degraded by unrestricted
campaigning, excess of partisan ship and undue
concentration in politics with the loss not only of
efficiency in government but of lives as well. The
Philippine Bar Association, the Civil Liberties Union, the
U.P. Law Center and the U.P. Women Lawyers' Circle
were requested to give their opinions. Respondents
contend that the act was based on the police power of
the state.
Issue: Whether or Not RA 4880 unconstitutional.
Held: Yes. As held in Cabansag v. Fernandez there are
two tests that may supply an acceptable criterion for
permissible restriction on freedom of speech. These are
the clear and present danger rule and the 'dangerous
tendency' rule. The first, means that the evil
consequence of the comment or utterance must be
extremely serious and the degree of imminence
extremely high before the utterance can be punished.
The danger to be guarded against is the
'substantive evil' sought to be prevented. It has
the advantage of establishing according to
the above decision a definite rule in
constitutional law. It provides the criterion as to
what words may be publicly established. The
"dangerous tendency rule" is such that If the words
uttered create a dangerous tendency which the state
has a right to prevent, then such words are
punishable. It is not necessary that some definite or
immediate acts of force, violence, or unlawfulness be
advocated. It is sufficient that such acts be advocated
in general terms. Nor is it necessary that the language
used be reasonably calculated to incite persons to acts
of force, violence, or unlawfulness. It is substantive evil
which the legislative body seeks to prevent. The
challenged statute could have been more narrowly
drawn and the practices prohibited more precisely
delineated to satisfy the constitutional requirements as
to a valid limitation under the clear and present danger
doctrine. As the author Taada clearly explained,
such provisions were deemed by the legislative
body to be part and parcel of the necessary and
appropriate response not merely to a clear
and present danger but to the actual existence
of a grave and substantive evil of excessive
partisanship, dishonesty and corruption aswell
as violence that of late has invariably marred
election campaigns and partisan political
activities in this country. The very idea of a
government, republican in form, implies a right on the
part of its citizens to meet peaceably for consultation
in respect to public affairs and to petition for redress of

grievances. As in the case of freedom of expression,

this right is not to be limited, much less denied, except
on a showing of a clear and present danger of a
substantive evil that Congress has a right to prevent.
The prohibition of any speeches, announcements or
commentaries, or the holding of interviews for or
against the election of any party or candidate for public
office and the prohibition of the publication or
distribution of campaign literature or materials, against
the solicitation of votes whether directly or indirectly,
or the undertaking of any campaign literature or
propaganda for or against any candidate or party is
repugnant to a constitutional command.
[AC-1928. December 19, 1980.]
In the matter of the IBP Membership Dues
Delinquency of Atty. MARCIAL A. EDILLION (IBP
Administrative Case No. MDD-1).
Atty. Marcial A. Edillon was disbarred on August 3, 1978
for his refusal to pay membership fees due the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines. Since then, he has
sought reinstatement, invoking his state of health, his
advanced age and the welfare of former clients who
still rely on him for counsel.
The Court, considering the change of his attitude and
the lapse of two years since he was barred from
practicing his profession, ordered his reinstatement
making certain that he pays his dues and accepts the
Court's competence to regulate the legal profession
and integrate the bar.
SSS Employee Asso. v CA 175 SCRA 686 (July 28,
Facts: The petitioners went on strike after the SSS
failed to act upon the unions demands concerning the
implementation of their collective bargaining
agreement (CBA). SSS filed before the court action for
damages with prayer for writ of preliminary injunction
against petitioners for staging an illegal strike. The
court issued a temporary restraining order pending the
resolution of the application for preliminary injunction
while petitioners filed a motion to dismiss alleging the
courts lack of jurisdiction over the subject
matter. Petitioners contend that the court made
reversible error in taking cognizance on the subject
matter since the jurisdiction lies on the DOLE or the
National Labor Relations Commission as the case
involves a labor dispute. The SSS contends on one
hand that the petitioners are covered by the Civil
Service laws, rules and regulation thus have no right to
strike. They are not covered by the NLRC or DOLE
therefore the court may enjoin the petitioners from
Issue: Whether or not SSS employers have the right to
Whether or not the CA erred in taking
jurisdiction over the subject matter.
Held: The Constitutional provisions enshrined on
Human Rights and Social Justice provides guarantee
among workers with the right to organize and conduct
peaceful concerted activities such as strikes. On one

hand, Section 14 of E.O No. 180 provides that

the Civil Service law and rules governing
concerted activities and strikes in the
government service shall be observed, subject to
any legislation that may be enacted by
Congress referring to Memorandum Circular No. 6, s.
1987 of the Civil Service Commission which states that
prior to the enactment by Congress of
applicable laws concerning strike by government
employees enjoins under pain of administrative
sanctions, all government officers and
employees from staging strikes, demonstrations,
mass leaves, walk-outs and other forms of mass
action which will result in temporary stoppage or
disruption of public service. Therefore in the
absence of any legislation allowing govt. employees to
strike they are prohibited from doing so.
In Sec. 1 of E.O. No. 180 the employees in the civil
service are denominated as government employees
and that the SSS is one such government-controlled
corporation with an original charter, having been
created under R.A. No. 1161, its employees are part of
the civil service and are covered by the Civil Service
Commissions memorandum prohibiting strikes.
Neither the DOLE nor the NLRC has jurisdiction over
the subject matter but instead it is the Public Sector
Labor-Management Council which is not granted by law
authority to issue writ of injunction in labor disputes
within its jurisdiction thus the resort of SSS before the
general court for the issuance of a writ of injunction to
enjoin the strike is appropriate

BRANCH 98, QUEZON CITY, respondents.
G.R. No. 85279
July 28, 1989
Facts: On June 11, 1987, the SSS filed with the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City a complaint for
damages with a prayer for a writ of preliminary
injunction against petitioners, alleging that on June 9,
1987, the officers and members of SSSEA staged an
illegal strike and baricaded the entrances to the SSS
Building, preventing non-striking employees from
reporting for work and SSS members from transacting
business with the SSS; that the strike was reported to
the Public Sector Labor - Management Council, which
ordered the strikers to return to work; that the strikers
refused to return to work; and that the SSS suffered
damages as a result of the strike. The complaint
prayed that a writ of preliminary injunction be issued to
enjoin the strike and that the strikers be ordered to
return to work; that the defendants (petitioners herein)

be ordered to pay damages; and that the strike be

declared illegal.
It appears that the SSSEA went on strike after the SSS
failed to act on the union's demands, which included:
implementation of the provisions of the old SSS-SSSEA
collective bargaining agreement (CBA) on check-off of
union dues; payment of accrued overtime pay, night
differential pay and holiday pay; conversion of
temporary or contractual employees with six (6)
months or more of service into regular and permanent
employees and their entitlement to the same salaries,
allowances and benefits given to other regular
employees of the SSS; and payment of the children's
allowance of P30.00, and after the SSS deducted
certain amounts from the salaries of the employees
and allegedly committed acts of discrimination and
unfair labor practices.
Issue: Whether or not employees of the Social
Security System (SSS) have the right to strike.
Held: The 1987 Constitution, in the Article on Social
Justice and Human Rights, provides that the State
"shall guarantee the rights of all workers to selforganization, collective bargaining and negotiations,
and peaceful concerted activities, including the right to
strike in accordance with law" [Art. XIII, Sec. 31].
Resort to the intent of the framers of the organic law
becomes helpful in understanding the meaning of
these provisions. A reading of the proceedings of the
Constitutional Commission that drafted the 1987
Constitution would show that in recognizing the right of
government employees to organize, the commissioners
intended to limit the right to the formation of unions or
associations only, without including the right to strike.
Considering that under the 1987 Constitution "the civil
service embraces all branches, subdivisions,
instrumentalities, and agencies of the Government,
including government-owned or controlled corporations
with original charters" [Art. IX(B), Sec. .2(l) see also
Sec. 1 of E.O. No. 180 where the employees in the civil
service are denominated as "government employees"]
and that the SSS is one such government-controlled
corporation with an original charter, having been
created under R.A. No. 1161, its employees are part of
the civil service [NASECO v. NLRC, G.R. Nos. 69870 &
70295, November 24,1988] and are covered by the
Civil Service Commission's memorandum prohibiting
strikes. This being the case, the strike staged by the
employees of the SSS was illegal.


Brief Fact Summary. The Respondent, Dale
(Respondent), was an eagle scout whose membership
in the boy scouts was revoked when the Petitioners,
the Boy Scouts of America (Petitioner), learned that he
was a homosexual.
Synopsis of Rule of Law. While individuals are given
a right to freely associate, associations are not forced
to include members whose beliefs may affect its own
ability to express the message it wishes to convey.

Facts. The Respondent, a life-long boy scout, was an

assistant scout master in New Jersey, when the
Petitioner learned of his homosexuality and revoked his
membership. The Respondent brought suit to enjoin
the action and the New Jersey court, under its public
accommodations law, required the Petitioner to admit
the Respondent.
Issue. This case questions whether an organization
can be compelled to accept a member whose activities
and beliefs may be against the very nature of the
Held. Reversed.
The court found that, while the Petitioners laws and
oaths do not mention sexuality, the purpose of the
organization to foster morally straight and clean
membership would be disregarded if the Petitioner was
forced to accept the Respondent. Further, the First
Amendment Rights of the association would be
violated if it were forced, under the guise of law, to
send a message that it accepted homosexual conduct
when, on its own assertions, it did not. The Supreme
Court of the United States (Supreme Court) held that to
require the Petitioner to accept Respondent was an
abridgment of the Petitioners freedom of expression.
Dissent. Justice John Paul Stevens (J. Stevens)
dissented, noting that by allowing the Petitioner to
revoke the Respondents membership, the Supreme
Court was allowing the organization to prevail over the
anti-discrimination laws of the state.
Discussion. An organization cannot be compelled to
accept a member whose beliefs do not align with the
tenants upon, which the organization stands. To do so
would violate the First Amendment constitutional rights
of the entire organization and its members, who also
align themselves with the principals on which the
organization stands.
Petitioners are the Boy Scouts of America and its
Monmouth Council (collectively, Boy Scouts). The Boy
Scouts is a private, not-for-profit organization engaged
in instilling its system of values in young people. It
asserts that homosexual conduct is inconsistent with
those values. Respondent Dale is an adult whose
position as assistant scoutmaster of a New Jersey troop
was revoked when the Boy Scouts learned that he is an
avowed homosexual and gay rights activist. He filed
suit in the New Jersey Superior Court, alleging, inter
alia, that the Boy Scouts had violated the state statute
prohibiting discrimination on the basis of sexual
orientation in places of public accommodation. That
court's Chancery Division granted summary judgment
for the Boy Scouts, but its Appellate Division reversed
in pertinent part and remanded. The State Supreme
Court affirmed, holding, inter alia, that the Boy Scouts
violated the State's public accommodations law by
revoking Dale's membership based on his avowed
homosexuality. Among other rulings, the court held
that application of that law did not violate the Boy
Scouts' First Amendment right of expressive
association because Dale's inclusion would not
significantly affect members' ability to carry out their

purposes; determined that New Jersey has a

compelling interest in eliminating the destructive
consequences of discrimination from society, and that
its public accommodations law abridges no more
speech than is necessary to accomplish its purpose;
and distinguished Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian
and Bisexual Group of Boston, Inc., 515 U. S. 557, on
the ground that Dale's reinstatement did not compel
the Boy Scouts to express any message.
Held: Applying New Jersey's public accommodations
law to require the Boy Scouts to admit Dale violates
the Boy Scouts' First Amendment right of expressive
association. Government actions that
unconstitutionally burden that right may take many
forms, one of which is intrusion into a group's internal
affairs by forcing it to accept a member it does not
desire. Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U. S. 609,
623. Such forced membership is unconstitutional if the
person's presence affects in a significant way the
group's ability to advocate public or private viewpoints.
New York State Club Assn., Inc. v. City of New York, 487
U. S. 1, 13. However, the freedom of expressive
association is not absolute; it can be overridden by
regulations adopted to serve compelling state
interests, unrelated to the suppression of ideas, that
cannot be achieved through means significantly less
restrictive of associational freedoms. Roberts, 468
U. S., at 623. To determine whether a group is
protected, this Court must determine whether the
group engages in "expressive association." The record
clearly reveals that the Boy Scouts does so when its
adult leaders inculcate its youth members with its
value system. See id., at 636. Thus, the Court must
determine whether the forced inclusion of Dale would
significantly affect the Boy Scouts' ability to advocate
public or private viewpoints. The Court first must
inquire, to a limited extent, into the nature of the Boy
Scouts' viewpoints. The Boy Scouts asserts that
homosexual conduct is inconsistent with the values
embodied in the Scout Oath and Law, particularly those
represented by the terms "morally straight" and
"clean," and that the organization does not want to
promote homosexual conduct as a legitimate form of
behavior. The Court gives deference to the Boy Scouts'
assertions regarding the nature of its expression, see,
Democratic Party of United States v. Wisconsin ex rel.
La Follette, 450 U. S. 107, 123-124. The Court then
inquires whether Dale's presence as an assistant
scoutmaster would significantly burden the expression
of those viewpoints. Dale, by his own admission, is one
of a group of gay Scouts who have become community
leaders and are open and honest about their sexual
orientation. His presence as an assistant scoutmaster
would interfere with the Scouts' choice not to propound
a point of view contrary to its beliefs. See Hurley, 515
U. S., at 576-577. This Court disagrees with the New
Jersey Supreme Court's determination that the Boy
Scouts' ability to disseminate its message would not be
significantly affected by the forced inclusion of Dale.
First, contrary to the state court's view, an association
need not associate for the purpose of disseminating a
certain message in order to be protected, but must
merely engage in expressive activity that could be
impaired. Second, even if the Boy Scouts discourages
Scout leaders from disseminating views on sexual
issues, its method of expression is protected. Third, the
First Amendment does not require that every member

of a group agree on every issue in order for the group's

policy to be "expressive association." Given that the
Boy Scouts' expression would be burdened, the Court
must inquire whether the application of New Jersey's
public accommodations law here runs afoul the Scouts'
freedom of expressive association, and concludes that
it does. Such a law is within a State's power to enact
when the legislature has reason to believe that a given
group is the target of discrimination and the law does
not violate the First Amendment. See, e.g., id., at 572.
The Court rejects Dale's contention that the
intermediate standard of review enunciated in United
States v. O'Brien, 391 U. S. 367, should be applied here
to evaluate the competing interests of the Boy Scouts
and the State. Rather, the Court applies an analysis
similar to the traditional First Amendment analysis it
applied in Hurley. A state requirement that the Boy
Scouts retain Dale would significantly burden the
organization's right to oppose or disfavor homosexual
conduct. The state interests embodied in New Jersey's
public accommodations law do not justify such a
severe intrusion on the freedom of expressive
association. In so ruling, the Court is not guided by its
view of whether the Boy Scouts' teachings with respect
to homosexual conduct are right or wrong; public or
judicial disapproval of an organization's expression
does not justify the State's effort to compel the
organization to accept members in derogation of the
organization's expressive message. While the law may
promote all sorts of conduct in place of harmful
behavior, it may not interfere with speech for no better
reason than promoting an approved message or
discouraging a disfavored one, however enlightened
either purpose may seem. Hurley, supra, at 579. Pp. 517.
160 N. J. 562, 734 A. 2d 1196, reversed and remanded.
Rehnquist, C. J., delivered the opinion of the Court,
in which O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas, JJ.,
joined. Stevens, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which
Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer, JJ., joined. Souter, J., filed
a dissenting opinion, in which Ginsburg and Breyer, JJ.,
G.R. No. 1010183, July 30, 1993
FACTS: The principal petitioners are all minors duly
represented and joined by their respective parents.
Impleaded as an additional plaintiff is the Philippine
Ecological Network, Inc. (PENI), a domestic, non-stock
and non-profit corporation organized for the purpose
of, inter alia, engaging in concerted action geared for
the protection of our environment and natural
resources. The original defendant was the Honorable
Fulgencio S. Factoran, Jr., then Secretary of the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources
The complaint was instituted as a taxpayers' class suit
and alleges that the plaintiffs "are all citizens of the
Republic of the Philippines, taxpayers, and entitled to
the full benefit, use and enjoyment of the natural
resource treasure that is the country's virgin tropical
forests." This instant petition was filed to seek for the
cancelation of all existing timber license agreements

(TLAs) in the country and to cease and desist from

receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or
approving new timber license agreements.
Minor petitioners contend that continued granting of
timber license constitutes a misappropriation or
impairment of the natural resource property and
violates their constitutional right to a balanced and
healthful ecology (Art. II, Sec. 16, 1987 Constitution)
and the protection by the State in its capacity as
parens patriae. Petitioners likewise rely on the
respondent's correlative obligation per Section 4 of E.O.
No. 192, to safeguard the people's right to a healthful
ISSUES: 1. Whether or not the petitioners have locus
2. Whether or not the petitioners failed to allege in
their complaint a specific legal right violated by the
respondent Secretary for which any relief is provided
by law.
HELD: 1. The Court finds no difficulty in ruling that
they can file a class suit because they represent their
generation as well as generations yet unborn. Their
personality to sue in behalf of the succeeding
generations can only be based on the concept of
intergenerational responsibility insofar as the right to a
balanced and healthful ecology is concerned. Such a
right, as hereinafter expounded, considers the "rhythm
and harmony of nature." Nature means the created
world in its entirety. Such rhythm and harmony
indispensably include, inter alia, the judicious
disposition, utilization, management, renewal and
conservation of the country's forest, mineral, land,
waters, fisheries, wildlife, off-shore areas and other
natural resources to the end that their exploration,
development and utilization be equitably accessible to
the present as well as future generations. Every
generation has a responsibility to the next to preserve
that rhythm and harmony for the full enjoyment of a
balanced and healthful ecology. Put a little differently,
the minors' assertion of their right to a sound
environment constitutes, at the same time, the
performance of their obligation to ensure the
protection of that right for the generations to come.
2. The Court does not agree with the trial court's
conclusions that the plaintiffs failed to allege with
sufficient definiteness a specific legal right involved or
a specific legal wrong committed, and that the
complaint is replete with vague assumptions and
conclusions based on unverified data.
The complaint focuses on one specific fundamental
legal right the right to a balanced and healthful
ecology which, for the first time in our nation's
constitutional history, is solemnly incorporated in the
fundamental law (Section 16, Article II of the 1987
While the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is
to be found under the Declaration of Principles and
State Policies and not under the Bill of Rights, it does

not follow that it is less important than any of the civil

and political rights enumerated in the latter. Such a
right belongs to a different category of rights
altogether for it concerns nothing less than selfpreservation and self-perpetuation aptly and fittingly
stressed by the petitioners the advancement of
which may even be said to predate all governments
and constitutions.
The right to a balanced and healthful ecology carries
with it the correlative duty to refrain from impairing the
environment. EO 192 and Admin Code of 1987 define
the powers and functions of DENR, under whose
authority and office the complaint falls. The petitioners
right to a balanced and healthful ecology is as clear as
DENRs duty to protect and advance the said right. The
petitioners personality to sue in behalf of their own as
well as the future generations behalf can only be
based on the concept of intergenerational
responsibility insofar as the said right is concerned.

Ortigas & Co. v. CA (G.R. No. 126102.

December 4, 2000)
FACTS: Ortigas & Co. sold to Emilia Hermoso a parcel
of land located in Greenhills Subdivision, San Juan with
several restrictions in the contract of sale that said lot
be used exclusively for residential purposes, among
others, until December 31, 2025. Later, a zoning
ordinance was issued by MMC (now MMDA)
reclassifying the area as commercial. Private
respondent (Ismael Mathay III) leased the subject lot
from Hermoso and built a single storey building for
Greenhills Autohaus, Inc., a car sales company. Ortigas
& Co. filed a petition a complaint which sought the
demolition of the constructed car sales company to
against Hermoso as it violated the terms and
conditions of the Deed of Sale. Trial court ruled in favor
of Ortigas & Co. Mathay raised the issue to the Court of
Appeals from which he sought favorable ruling. Hence,
the instant petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not the zoning ordinance may
impair contracts entered prior to its effectivity.
HELD: Yes. The zoning ordinance, as a valid exercise of
police power may be given effect over any standing
contract. Hence, petition is denied.
RATIO: A law enacted in the exercise of police power
to regulate or govern certain activities or transactions
could be given retroactive effect and may reasonably
impair vested rights or contracts. Police power
legislation is applicable not only to future contracts,
but equally to those already in existence. Nonimpairment of contracts or vested rights clauses will
have to yield to the superior and legitimate exercise by
the State of police power to promote the health,
morals, peace, education, good order, safety, and
general welfare of the people. Moreover, statutes in
exercise of valid police power must be read into every
contract. Noteworthy, in Sangalang vs. Intermediate
Appellate Court, the Supreme Court already upheld
subject ordinance as a legitimate police power