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657666, 2012
2011 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
0305-750X/$ - see front matter
www.elsevier.com/locate/worlddev
doi:10.1016/j.worlddev.2011.09.014
and
PETER MONTIEL *
Williams College, Williamstown, USA
Summary. This paper addresses the complex and overlooked relationship between the receipt of workers remittances and institutional quality in the recipient country. Using a simple model, we show how an increase in remittance inows can lead to deterioration
of institutional qualityspecically, to an increase in the share of funds diverted by the government for its own purposes. In a cross
section of 111 countries we empirically verify this proposition and nd that a higher ratio of remittances to GDP leads to lower indices
of control of corruption, government eectiveness, and rule of law, even after controlling for potential reverse causality.
2011 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
Key words remittances, institutions, corruption
1. INTRODUCTION
658
WORLD DEVELOPMENT
where s stands for whatever the government keeps for its own
consumption. The government chooses how much of the resources that it collects to divert for its own purposes. It, therefore, chooses g to maximize (4) subject to the budget
constraint: 3
ty g s
b 1 Ry
s
by bR
g t by bR t b b Ry
s
R
b 1
y
y
659
@s =y
@s =
g
bt
b > 0 and;
>0
@R=y
@R=y
t b bR=y2
W
g b logty g 1 bfa loga1 ty R g
1 a log1 a1 ty R gg;
10
11
3. EVIDENCE
6
Note that the amount diverted does not depend on the tax
rate, but is increasing in both income and remittances. The
availability of remittances increases the households private
consumption of both goods (c, g), which allows the government to free ride and reduce its contribution to the public
good, thereby increasing its own consumption.
It is also clear that the governments proclivity to divert resources to its own consumption, measured by b, leaves the
household worse o in equilibrium. Substituting (3) and (7)
into (1) we have:
@U c ; g ; g
1
<0
@b
1 b
660
WORLD DEVELOPMENT
specication the signicance level improves to 5%. The coecient is very similar across both specications and implies a
quantitatively meaningful relation. The results suggest in fact
that an increase by one standard deviation in the ratio of
remittances to GDP results in a decline of around 0.56
(0.124.74) in the control of corruption variable, which
is around two thirds of a standard deviation in this variable.
The Conditional Likelihood Ratio test proposed by Moreira
(2003), which is robust to weak instruments, shows that the
coecient on instrumented remittances is signicant at the
5% level 10.
One problem with our instrument is that it may be correlated with institutional quality through channels other than
remittance ows. In that case, coastal area would be a poor
instrument, because the instrumented remittance variable
would still be correlated with the disturbance term (unless
these channels are explicitly accounted for in the regressions).
Coastal area indeed tends to be correlated with variables that
have been found to aect institutional quality through their effects on living standards, such as per capita real GDP itself and
a variety of demographic variables that are highly correlated
with per capita GDP. This is shown in Table 5 in Appendix
A. While we did control for real GDP per capita, we did not
control for the other demographic variables. This raises the
question of whether instrumenting for remittance ows with
coastal area while omitting these demographic variables from
the regression may result in a biased estimate of the eects of
remittance ows on institutional quality. 11
Table 1. Corruption and remittances: OLS regressions
Remit
(1)
Corrup
(2)
Corrup
(3)
Corrup
(4)
Corrup
0.0335*
(1.95)
0.0411**
(2.14)
0.0260**
(2.12)
0.0223*
(1.69)
0.0332***
(3.55)
0.388***
(7.58)
0.129
(0.54)
0.143
(0.64)
0.293
(0.82)
1.076**
(2.42)
0.00599
(0.02)
0.0278**
(2.06)
0.0357***
(3.80)
0.442***
(8.87)
Energy_av
Rgdp_av
Legal_UK
Legal_FR
Legal_GE
Legal_SC
Ethnic
Catho
Muslim
Other_NP
Constant
R2
0.0211
(0.22)
0.0345
0.0940
(0.88)
0.0753
2.754***
(6.48)
0.694
0.00399
(0.02)
0.00895***
(2.86)
0.00667**
(2.10)
0.00513
(1.45)
2.489***
(4.47)
0.683
t Statistics in parentheses.
OLS regressions: Table 1 shows the output from OLS regressions. The
dependent variable is a measure of control of corruption (inversely related
to the degree of corruption) taken from the World Bank governance
indicators in year 2000. Remit, Energy_av and Rgdp_av are 19902000
averages (see denitions in Table 9).
*
p < 0.10.
**
p < 0.05.
***
p < 0.01.
To address this potential bias we need to control for the effects of living standards on institutional quality. It is interesting to see that the coecient on the instrumented remittance
variable is negative and statistically signicant as long as we
control for either real GDP per capita itself or other variables
that are correlated with it, such as dependency ratios, mortality rates, and/or any combinations of such variables likely to
aect institutional quality and to be aected by our instrument. 12 In columns (3) and (4) of Table 3, for example, we
show the results from replacing per capita GDP by two demographic variables, dependence and urbanization. We can
clearly see that these 2SLS regressions with the coastal area
as instrument yield results similar to the ones in Table 2 columns (3) and (4).
But this procedure creates a second potential endogeneity
problem. Like remittances themselves, measures of living standards such as per capita GDP are potentially endogenous with
respect to institutional quality. Although we used the initial level of real GDP per capita in our estimation to mitigate this
problem, since institutional quality is generally very persistent
the endogeneity of GDP might still be an issue. Accordingly,
we also instrument for real per capita GDP by the distance
to the equator as in Treisman (2000). Columns (1) and (2) in
Table 3 show the results of 2SLS estimation where we
661
instrument for both remittances and real per capita GDP with
coastal area and distance to the equator as instruments. The
coecient on remittances remains negative and signicant in
these regressions.
Table 4 shows the result of the 2SLS regressions of Table 2
when we vary the endogenous regressors to look at other indicators of institutional quality. We only show the specication
with the religion variables since the results obtained using the
other specications are very similar. It is interesting to see that
remittances aect the three variables that are most related to
corruption and government quality. We nd a negative and
signicant coecient on remittances (instrumented by the
coastal area) in the regressions where the control of corruption, government eectiveness, and the rule of law measures
are the dependent variables. As one would expect, these three
endogenous variables are highly correlated in our sample. As
for regulatory quality and voice and accountability, they seem
unaected by remittances. This in itself is interesting since it
suggests that only specic aspects of domestic institutional
qualitythose associated with the diversion of resources by
the public sectortend to be aected by the receipt of remittance ows.
**
3.368
(2.08)
1.138***
(3.37)
0.670
(0.26)
0.0926
(0.04)
1.081
(0.42)
0.907
(0.41)
0.0546
(1.48)
5.444***
(2.67)
Catho
Muslim
Other_NP
(2)
Remit
R2
(4)
Corrup
***
***
3.615
(2.77)
1.026***
(3.27)
0.0472
(1.04)
5.611***
(2.90)
0.00907
(0.68)
0.0312
(1.41)
0.00229
(0.12)
Ethnic
0.343
(4.02)
0.310
(0.94)
0.0506
(0.14)
0.0996
(0.23)
0.874***
(2.70)
0.0349**
(2.42)
0.663
(1.11)
11.32***
(2.96)
0.274
Rgdp_90
***
Remit
Constant
(3)
Corrup
Remit
9.126***
(2.76)
0.312
0.129
(1.81)
2.004**
(2.35)
0.591
0.378
(5.20)
Catho
Muslim
Other_NP
Energy_av
(1)
Corrup
(2)
Corrup
(3)
Corrup
(4)
Corrup
0.161**
(2.29)
0.540***
(4.74)
0.405
(0.75)
0.00763
(1.39)
0.000408
(0.06)
0.00167
(0.27)
0.0396***
(2.63)
0.227*
(1.84)
0.621***
(3.50)
0.376
(0.49)
0.103**
(2.06)
0.106**
(2.07)
0.459
(1.19)
0.0156***
(3.60)
0.0157***
(3.45)
0.0154***
(3.06)
0.0298**
(2.27)
0.560
(1.48)
Legal_UK
**
0.0368
(2.14)
0.638
(1.29)
0.0111***
(3.29)
0.00677
(1.54)
0.00681*
(1.85)
0.120**
(2.02)
1.426*
(1.85)
0.621
t Statistics in parentheses.
2SLS regressions: The rst two columns show the results from the rst
stage regression for both specications. The third and fourth columns
show the results from the second stage for both specications. Note that
Rgdp_90 is the real per capital GDP in 1990.
*
p < 0.10.
**
p < 0.05.
***
p < 0.01.
Legal_FR
Legal_GE
Legal_SC
0.0418**
(2.06)
0.297
(0.61)
0.163
(0.35)
0.953
(1.06)
0.238
(0.23)
Dependence
Urban
Constant
R2
3.010**
(2.48)
0.447
3.712***
(2.64)
0.0255
2.442***
(3.64)
0.00301
(0.60)
3.467***
(4.42)
0.630
0.0286**
(2.18)
0.430
(1.43)
0.115
(0.40)
0.598
(1.42)
1.603***
(3.11)
1.934***
(2.94)
0.00598
(1.20)
1.328**
(1.99)
0.634
t Statistics in parentheses.
2SLS regressions (variations): Columns (1) and (2) show the 2SLS
regressions where the coastal area and distance to the equator are used as
instruments to real per capita GDP and remittances.
Columns (3) and (4) show the 2SLS regressions where dependence and
urbanization are on the right hand side, and the coastal area used as an
instrument for remittances.
*
p < 0.10.
**
p < 0.05.
***
p < 0.01.
662
WORLD DEVELOPMENT
(c) Robustness
In this subsection we try to evaluate the robustness of our
results by looking at some of the potential problems with
our instrumental variable estimation. For an instrumental variable to be appropriate it must satisfy two conditions: relevance and exogeneity. The rst can be veried empirically by
looking at the correlation between the instrument and the
endogenous regressor. In our case we showed that this correlation is strong and that in that respect our instrument is
not particularly weak. As for the exogeneity condition, it deserves further discussion. A clear advantage of our instrument
is that it is a geographical variable and, therefore, cannot be
endogenous to institutions. This, however, does not guarantee
exogeneity. Even if our instrument does not aect the dependent variable directly, it may do so indirectly through other
channels that are not controlled for in our regression. In the
rest of this section we rst examine how our results are aected
by controlling for a variety of other possible channels through
which coastal area may aect institutions and then consider
the use of an alternative instrument.
The alternative channels through which coastal area may affect institutions include the following:
Openness: Our instrument is positively correlated (although
weakly) with the ratio of trade to GDP in our data. This is
to be expected through the eect of access to the coast on
transportation costs. However, including the ratio of trade
to GDP on the right hand side does not aect our results, as
shown in the rst column of Table 6. The coecient on
trade to GDP is positive but not signicant.
Demographics: As shown in Table 5, our instrument is positively correlated with a measure of urbanization. This is
also mentioned in Gallup, Sachs, and Mellinger (1999). It
is also negatively correlated with the dependency ratio
and with infant mortality. As shown in column 2 of Table
6, however, controlling for these factors does not aect our
results materially, as the coecient on instrumented remittances remains negative and signicant.
Remit
Ethnic
Catho
Muslim
Other_NP
Energy_av
Rgdp_90
Constant
R2
(1)
Control of Corruption
(2)
Government Eectiveness
(3)
Rule of Law
(4)
Regulatory Quality
(5)
Accountability
0.120**
(2.20)
0.638
(1.43)
0.0111***
(2.58)
0.00677
(1.43)
0.00681
(1.43)
0.0368***
(2.96)
0.378***
(5.21)
1.426*
(1.74)
0.621
0.119**
(2.14)
0.611
(1.35)
0.00344
(0.79)
0.00148
(0.31)
0.000610
(0.13)
0.0289**
(2.28)
0.407***
(5.52)
2.295***
(2.75)
0.587
0.102**
(2.03)
0.547
(1.33)
0.00606
(1.49)
0.000479
(0.11)
0.000380
(0.08)
0.0305***
(2.62)
0.446***
(6.53)
2.606***
(3.37)
0.643
0.0185
(0.44)
0.313
(0.90)
0.00179
(0.52)
0.0000600
(0.02)
0.00177
(0.45)
0.0202**
(2.07)
0.279***
(4.88)
1.807***
(2.79)
0.564
0.0179
(0.35)
0.0117
(0.03)
0.00550
(1.38)
0.0135***
(3.07)
0.00272
(0.61)
0.0220*
(1.90)
0.310***
(4.60)
1.600**
(2.10)
0.613
t Statistics in parentheses.
2SLS regressions: where the IV is the coastal area- showing the regressions for dierent institutional measures. Complete denitions of these measures are
found in Table 10, Appendix B.
*
p < 0.10.
**
p < 0.05.
***
p < 0.01.
663
Rgdp_90
Trade_GDP
Dependence
Urban
Inf_mort
1.0000
0.1482
0.7493
0.7853
0.8533
1.0000
0.2331
0.1639
0.2785
1.0000
0.6631
0.8511
1.0000
0.6504
1.0000
1.0000
0.3544
0.1487
0.3405
0.2867
0.3348
Remit
Ethnic
Catho
Muslim
Other_NP
Energy_av
Rgdp_90
Trade_GDP
(2)
Corrup
(3)
Corrup
0.130**
(2.19)
0.659
(1.43)
0.0102**
(2.26)
0.00560
(1.10)
0.00588
(1.18)
0.0369***
(2.90)
0.369***
(4.88)
0.00237
(1.05)
0.125***
(2.78)
0.522
(1.33)
0.00801**
(1.98)
0.00452
(1.02)
0.00604
(1.29)
0.0239**
(2.02)
0.167
(1.27)
0.112**
(2.35)
0.491*
(1.67)
0.0101***
(2.98)
0.00969***
(2.69)
0.00593
(1.49)
0.0303***
(3.04)
0.207***
(2.66)
Dependence
Urban
Inf_mort
Constant
Region dummy
R2
(1)
Corrup
1.581*
(1.91)
NO
0.604
0.0695
(0.09)
0.00538
(0.98)
0.520**
(2.56)
2.250
(1.47)
NO
0.711
First stage
Distance
Rgdp_90
Legal_UK
Legal_FR
Legal_GE
Energy_av
Ethnic
Distance_EQ
(1)
Remit
(2)
Remit
3.223**
(2.54)
0.713
(1.33)
3.656
(1.55)
4.034*
(1.73)
2.612
(0.70)
0.00565
(0.08)
4.959**
(2.19)
2.688
(0.52)
2.935**
(2.40)
0.514
(0.90)
Catho
Muslim
0.0542
(0.06)
YES
0.765
t Statistics in parentheses.
2SLS regressions: This table shows the output from the second stage of
2SLS regressions with coastal area as an instrument for remittances. We
perform a robustness check by controlling for trade to GDP (column 1),
demographics (column 2), and regional dummies (column 3).
*
p < 0.10.
**
p < 0.05.
***
p < 0.01.
In Table 7, we show the results from the rst and second stages
of the 2SLS regressions when we use the distance measure as
an instrument and we exclude the European countries from
our sample. Column (3) shows a negative and signicant coefcient on remittances. Furthermore the coecient is comparable in magnitude to the one obtained from using the coastal
area. Column (4) shows a negative yet non-signicant coecient when we use the religion variables as regressors. In Table
8, we show that when we use the United States as the main
remitter for the European countries we obtain similar results.
Note that our instrument is correlated with the distance to the
equator for obvious reasons. In fact the correlation in our
sample is around 0.56. This is the reason why we control
for the distance to the equator in our regressions. Finally,
we take advantage of the availability of two dierent
Other_NP
0.0338
(0.45)
5.167**
(2.25)
3.431
(0.67)
0.0150
(0.30)
0.00263
(0.05)
0.0162
(0.31)
Remit
Constant
R2
30.59***
(2.88)
0.296
32.93***
(2.85)
0.272
Second stage
(3)
Corrup
(4)
Corrup
0.295***
(3.33)
0.673*
(1.79)
0.303
(0.80)
0.132
(0.27)
0.0215**
(2.05)
0.594
(1.30)
1.506*
(1.88)
0.346***
(4.45)
0.110**
(1.97)
2.502***
(3.31)
0.391
0.0243***
(2.69)
0.275
(0.69)
0.502
(0.89)
0.0101*
(1.73)
0.00708
(1.22)
0.00532
(0.84)
0.0582
(1.17)
1.812*
(1.95)
0.558
t Statistics in parentheses.
2SLS regressions: where the instrument is the distance to the closest
remitter. Europe is excluded from the sample: The F-test on the excluded
instrument is 6.45 in the rst regression and 5.75 in the second. Using the
legal variables as regressions the second stage lead negative and signicant
coecient (column 3) on remittances. Our distance instrument is clearly
correlated with the distance to the equator (correlation coecient = 0.56). This is why we control for this variable in the 2SLS.
*
p < 0.10.
**
p < 0.05.
***
p < 0.01.
instruments (distance and coastal variables) to test their validity using a Sargan overidentication test. We nd that the
Sargan test cannot reject the validity of our instruments. 15
4. CONCLUSIONS
We conclude that despite their nature as household-to-household private income transfers, remittance inows may have
adverse eects on domestic institutional qualityspecically,
664
WORLD DEVELOPMENT
Table 8. Using an alternative distance measure
First stage
distanceB
Rgdp_90
Legal_UK
Legal_FR
Legal_GE
Legal_SC
Energy_av
Ethnic
Distance_EQ
(1)
Remit
(2)
Remit
3.266***
(3.34)
0.714
(1.53)
3.509*
(1.68)
4.027*
(1.95)
3.206
(1.14)
2.350
(0.73)
0.0063
(0.09)
4.829**
(2.44)
2.557
(0.68)
2.512***
(2.70)
0.427
(0.85)
Catho
Muslim
Other_NP
0.0344
(0.50)
4.902**
(2.47)
2.030
(0.58)
0.00265
(0.10)
0.0127
(0.45)
0.00493
(0.16)
Remit
Constant
R2
30.95***
(4.47)
0.329
27.66***
(3.53)
0.302
Second stage
(3)
Corrup
(4)
Corrup
0.313***
(3.81)
0.618**
(2.03)
0.275
(0.92)
0.360
(0.94)
0.787*
(1.74)
0.0221**
(2.23)
0.400
(1.02)
1.538***
(2.70)
0.341***
(3.84)
0.0975**
(2.23)
2.711***
(3.97)
0.710
0.0264**
(2.51)
0.349
(0.76)
1.160**
(2.18)
0.00840**
(2.04)
0.00607
(1.35)
0.00601
(1.32)
0.106*
(1.87)
1.788*
(1.91)
0.677
t Statistics in parentheses.
2SLS regressions: where the instrument is the distance (distanceB) to the
closest remitter. We use the United States as the closest source of remittances to Europe. The F-test on the excluded instrument is 11.1 in the rst
regression and 7.3 in the second. The coecient on Remit will become
slightly larger (in absolute value) and more signicant when we include the
distance to the equator as a regressor. Results not shown here.
*
p < 0.10.
**
p < 0.05.
***
p < 0.01.
Description
Source
World Bank Development Indicators
Harvard University, Center for International Development
Andrei Shleifers website
Andrei Shleifers website.
Andrei Shleifers website.
Andrei Shleifers website.
World Bank Dev. Indicators
World Bank Dev. indicators
World Bank Dev. indicators
Andrei Shleifers website.
Andrei Shleifers website.
Andrei Shleifers website.
Andrei Shleifers website.
Andrei Shleifers website.
Andrei Shleifers website.
World Bank Dev. indicators
World Bank Dev. indicators
World Bank Dev. indicators
World Bank Dev. indicators
665
Government eectiveness
Voice and accountability
Regulatory quality
Rule of law
Description
Measures the exercise of public power for private gain, including both petty and grand
corruption and state capture.
The higher is the index the lower is corruption.
Measures the competence of the bureaucracy and the quality of public service delivery.
Measures political, civil, and human rights.
Measures the incidence of market-unfriendly policies. The higher is the index the better
is the outcome, that is, the lower is the level of market-unfriendly policies.
Measures the quality of contract enforcement, the police, and the courts, as well as the
likelihood of crime and violence.
Notes: The indicators are taken for the year 2000. They range between 2.5 and 2.5. Higher values indicate better governance. The data are taken from the
World Bank Governance Indicators, available online at: http://www.worldbank.org/wbi/governance/govdata/
NOTES
1. Presumably the government would not be able to maintain political
power if it did not care to some degree about the wellbeing of households.
2. Households in many developing countries that receive remittances use
these private income transfers to purchase goods and services (from
private suppliers) that are usually provided by the public sector (see, e.g.,
Roth, 1987). An example of this substitution between publicly and
privately funded services can be seen with the recent rise in the hometown
associations (HTA), which became very common in particular in Latin
America. These philanthropic organizations, comprised of emigrants from
a particular country, generally provide nancial assistance to their
communities in that country, by pooling the transfers among them, and
using them to nance projects back home. For example, HTAs are often
involved in providing support to public infrastructure activities such as
construction of roads, schools, and health facilities. In many cases,
however, their contributions dwarf that of the public works budget in their
countries of origin (see e.g., Mexican HTA, in Orozco & Lapointe, 2003).
3. The assumption that government chooses spending while holding
revenue constant is more realistic than the alternative, because taxes tend
not to be as volatile in general as government spending (see Poterba &
Rotemberg, 1990). However, this assumption is without loss of generality.
Since tax revenues and spending enter Eqn. (6) below only in the form ty
g, our conclusions would be unaected if we made the alternative
assumption.
4. For example, if all agents decreased their private consumption of the
public good they might be able to force the government to increase its own
spending; however, such an assumption would obviously be unrealistic.
13. Aside from these variables, since our endogenous regressor (the ratio of
remittances to GDP) is likely to be correlated with a measure of the ratio of
the stock of migrants to the total original population at home, one might be
concerned that our coecient might reect a negative impact of emigration
on institutions, rather than of remittances themselves. However, it is not at
666
WORLD DEVELOPMENT
14. This option might not be appropriate since this dummy might aect
directly institutions even after controlling for GDP and other religious and
legal variables.
15. The p-value from the Sargan test varies between 0.25 and 0.66
depending on the regression and the distance measure used (results not
shown).
16. See, for example, Hall and Jones (1999), Knack and Keefer (1995),
Mauro (1995a, 1995b), Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2002),
Easterly and Levine (2003), and Dollar and Kraay (2003).
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APPENDIX A
See Tables 18.
APPENDIX B
See Tables 9 and 10.