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Competition Policy Newsletter

CARTELS

The banana cartel decision


Vita Jukneviciute and Bjarke List(1)
1

On 15 October 2008, the Commission adopted


a prohibition decision against Dole, Chiquita,
Weichert and Del Monte for operating a cartel for
fresh bananas(2) in eight EU Member States. The
Commission imposed fines totalling 60.3 million
on Dole, Weichert and Del Monte. Dole, Chiquita
and Weichert participated in a single and continuous infringement of Article 81 of the EC Treaty for
three years from January 2000 to December 2002.
Del Monte is held jointly and severally liable for the
fine imposed on Weichert as it controlled Weichert
at the time of the infringement. Because it was the
first to inform the Commission of the existence
of the cartel, Chiquita was granted immunity from
fines.

their reference price (announced price) for the following week. While this reference price may be different from the transaction price obtained, changes
in the weekly reference prices did constitute an important pricing signal to the market. On many occasions over the three years covered by the decision
there were bilateral phone calls among the companies, usually the day before they set their price.
Through these pre-pricing communications the parties disclosed their pricing intentions to competitors. By concerting in advance on reference prices
set weekly and in particular on the development of
these prices, i.e. whether they would be going up,
going down or staying the same, the parties coordinated their price-setting behaviour instead of deciding upon their prices independently.

The product
The product covered by the decision is fresh bananas. Fresh bananas may be sold unripened (green) or
ripened (yellow). Bananas are bought all year round
by a large proportion of EU consumers.

Geographic scope of the decision


The infringement which is the subject of the decision relates to the supply of bananas to the northern European region of the EU. For the purposes
of the decision this region includes Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Luxembourg,
the Netherlands and Sweden. The Commission has
estimated that the annual retail value of the bananas
sold to consumers in the eight Member States affected by the cartel amounted to around 2.5 billion
in 2002.

The cartel
The decision relates to a concerted practice between
certain banana suppliers by which they coordinated
weekly reference prices for bananas.
The banana business is organised in weekly cycles.
During the relevant period the importers of leading
brands of bananas into the eight EU Member States
principally served by the north European ports each
set and then announced every Thursday morning
(1) The content of this article does not necessarily reflect the
official position of the European Commission. Responsibility for the information and views expressed lies entirely
with the authors.
(2) Case COMP/39.188 Bananas.

Number 1 2009

Fines
In setting the fines in accordance with the Guidelines on fines, the Commission also took into account the fact that at the time of the infringement
bananas were subject to a very specific regulatory
regime (not least under Council Regulation (EEC)
No 404/93(3) of 13 February 1993 on the common
organization of the market in bananas). The banana
import regime was based on import quotas and tariffs. Banana import quotas for the Community were
set annually and allocated on a quarterly basis with
some limited flexibility between the quarters of a
calendar year.
Furthermore, in setting the fine for Weichert/Del
Monte account was taken of the fact that, given the
circumstances of the case, it could not be established that Weichert was aware of the pre-pricing
communications between Dole and Chiquita or that
it could reasonably have foreseen them.

Application of the 2002 Leniency Notice


The Commissions investigation was triggered by an
application for immunity lodged by Chiquita in April
2005. Chiquita was the first to inform the Commission of the existence of a cartel. Chiquita was eventually granted immunity from any fines that would
otherwise have been imposed in this case.
(3) OJ L 47, 25.2.1993, p. 1.

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