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Jim Nichols

2.10.10
Summary on Kant's: On a supposed right to lie because of philanthropic concerns

This piece by Kant is in response to an ethical question/fallacies found in the periodical France.
An article by a Benjamin Constant from 1797 argues "[t]he moral principle stating that it is a
duty to tell the truth would make any society impossible if that principle were taken singly and
unconditionally" (p. 63 Hacket) Kant then points to the philosopher Constant [the same
person?] who refutes this argument by stating, "[i]t is a duty to tell the truth," and that this
concepts of duty and rights are inseparable (p. 63 Hacket).

Kant begins by asking if there is a there a right--he uses the term "warrant"--to be
untruthful. Kant responds to this question by stating that, "[t]ruthfulness in statements that
cannot be avoided is the formal duty of man to everyone" (p. 64 Hacket). Kant believes that
even if the lie does not hurt anyone individual that is does nonetheless harm, "the very source of
right" (p. 65 Hacket). The reason for this is that truthfulness is "sacred law." Kant believes that
objections to this come in the form of situations where telling the truth could cause an ever
greater wrong--such as telling the truth to someone who will use that knowledge to murder your
friend. But Kant believes one cannot know future events and therefore these examples are based
on causal presumptions that no one can possible make. Kant concludes by explaining how these
principles can be applied to real world applications in political situations by holding principles
must "contain rigorous truth," and in Kant's eyes universality is required in applying these
principles or else exceptions would undermine ethically permitted action.

I find Kant's position--as I understand it--as one that imposes the assumption that ethical
principles/laws must be universal or everything falls apart seems to be a broad assumption that
does not follow when one uses complex thought experiments. Kant attempts to circumvent the
kind of critique I use by stating a what if scenario that inevitably causes a wrong to happen
which you did not perceive and actually caused to happen by your efforts to avoid greater
wrongs such as murder through lessers wrongs such as lying. But this is a slippery slope which
one can play to Kant's challenge and further Kant would here be making an assumption that one
cause necessarily leads to another effect. What of the possibility that effects lead to causes?--
there are no grounds beyond our desire for logical consistency and certainty to believe this is not
also a possibility.

** Hackett 3rd ed. Groundy for the Metaphysics of Morals 1992

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