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Germany:

__ -

A N e w History
.

"

_-

University
Press

cambridge,
~
~~
asachuw
~u
h n d m , England

beliewd that things could hardly get worse. Hitler's cons


backers took an optimistic view of the future, They we= cr

that Hitler was "hemmed in" with c~nservativecabinet minis

1
i

would keep him in linc. Papen told one of his friends, W h a


worried about? I have Hindenburg's full confidence. In two
wc'll have Hitler backed into a corner and whimpering.''
In order to understand the tenor of such remarks in re
one must keep in mind that in assessing the National Socialist
in 1933 Hider's coritemporaries had no experience to
Second World War and Auschwitz were still covered by the
time, and the few p o p l e who had read Mein Kamp!: Hitle
nouncement of his futurc program, tended not to take it s
Experience had shown that in general there was a large gap he
ideological declarations of principle and practical political
Furthermore the reversion to an authoritarian regime did n
as a shock. From 1930 on Germans became inured to the i
parliamentary control over political developments was tenu
best, and if they looked around the rest of Europe, things di
pear all that different elsewhere. Governments were headed b
last analysis he had only one goal:

tors in most countries, and where that was not the case,

rld dominance for a

popular front government in France, domestic political unres


such a

"superior lace" over the dead bod-

that i t hardly servcd as an advertisement f o r d

There wa3 a ~ i d e s ~ r c perception


ad
that the Great Depressi
,

hausted democratic go\:ernmenu, and that the immediate fut


longed to thc strong men of every countr?
Mussolini in Italy was a prime example, a dictator wh
received openly admiring commentary even from libera
dor Wolff, editor-in-chief of the Berlina Tagieblotc, and socialis
Kurt Hiller. If Hitler was totally mijudged by the public,

ors."Hr never took


xie;en,iiic iir"&g~

a: whc, p-

knotlomi

Iiis eyes off this aim, although he

~bn,
and io-raim a n form
ti~i:imp?i$ 1faumrc. Anyme
low,o
h e b ~ mr~ 01 d

often kept it concealed behind a

E.s

bha,8w

k r e , the kev ihc p n s ihe

=iwaokne%.

b i w i l i and mer" lHit

veil of tactical maneu~ers.


To reach it, Hitler first had to
establish Kationaf Socialist rule irreversibly and makc the party a

cause he was in fact not an ordinary politician but an ide

ominant presence eveq-where in thc country What is usually re-

natic and revolutionary. The traditional concepts of Europe

ferred to as the "seizure of power"was in reality a process that took a

were foreign to him; they meant nothing to him in any c

246

German Megolomania

a r and a half to complete. 'The first step consisted of eliminating the

German Megolomanio

247

mained for nonconforn~ingw ~ i t ers and artists until the outbrcak


C C ~ O)
Y

-mcer'ex&ted,

Of WJI.

The battle for hearts and minds


continued. At the universities, m5 b
4
. ~ o i i o n aj!o c i n i ; ~j~e

lone d k h h d i m i a n r ond
0-4Ge:mnr prsesed lhe .rm
hot e n d d ihcn lo rule ihe
vho lea calkd M oompioa

,mn,,ruc;ol
iecde-itscommandad
H:mmlei, Himm!ei guve h15
:i .ha oddsoral name of

( m o wb i k o d ahowed
1s for "pnrilive"

congenial prokssors and faci~lty


members wcre dismissed and often folred out of the ct)unti-):
while no small nuinbcr of their
cr~lleagueshastened to place the
institutions of higher learning,
which had once existed far from
the tumult of day-to-day politic.,
at thc disposal of the new rulers in

broiir, shirts. Similar devclopmellb occurred within the churches. In


Lutheran Church the German Christian movcment flourished,
ich took its orientation from the racist-nationalist ideology and
ircr-principle of the Nazis. At the Barmen Synod held in May i 934
opponents formed the Confessing Church, whose members
.lc:-cly attacked the National Socialis~sdespite government repri'iiitl arrests. Sympathy for the new regimc was not lacking among
e Catholic clera, especially after the concortlat signctl with the

tican on July 20, 1933. Yet resistance also increased within thc Roan Catholic Chui-ch as news spread of the Nazis' euthanasia plans,

its height with issuance of thc papal encyclical Mir brenncridcr


rge (With deep anxiety) in 1937.

Where attempts to silence intellectual leaders did not suffice, state


rror set in. It is associated ahove all with thc names Heinrich
or music declared "un-German" and attacked a? "degene
ter). From September 1933 on, cultural life in Germany

lmler and Reinhard Heydrich, and with the SS (Schurasraffel, deenst: Formation); this elite Natioiial Socialist "security unit" became

manipulated and made to serve the needs of the Nation


state by Joseph Goehbels, minister of propaganda, through

e supreme police force of the Third Reich, an all-powerful inswunt for punishing, terrori~,in%and purging the population of unde-

created National Chamber of Culture, although some latitn

252

Gsrmon M e g o l o m a n i a

Sirable elements. Its headquarters on Prince Albrecht Sweet in Berlin

housed adn~inistrativeofEces and

~crlabohnlin the~ermun
19"'

turture chambers, the main ofice


of the Gestapo (the shortened
form of CEheime STAuuPOlizei, Secret State Police), and the hcad
office of Keich Security. The campaign against enemies of the regilne was managed from Prince
iylbrecht ~ t ~ ~ political,
. ~ t : ideo.
logical, and racial enemies, meaninp first and foremost Jews. TIC
SS
spread its nets all over the country,

Pions lor suprhijhwqr be


A~~,
n,odai
d-1

ie0"
weirmr
con~n~c!~on
of he Brtt uuiobu
to run lrom amb burg lo ~a
uor inlerrupld ay (ha Greo
ihe Nuiionoi Social,sxr,,h,,of
Osc'n
p r d d conrl
turned them alo a speooculur
p,q(iiam in 1936 O S ~ U120.
P"~S

on
pqm. and
visors p ~ , ~ a sdhi r/ p l n k wwli
in cedar e giw wen mere ,no
mtltlory lind drclqic voiue of ih
lo ili3 srnoil,
i,,
'930s the om*dnlol
sins
we* e " ' p l v d

conrliuclion woa red&.


30 Ihal
.
,
j
m
w
,,
io!sc.ouid be in
indualiy

rrom police (lepartments to the , , h


sinister world of tlie concentratio~l

,,

camps. The SS also contained a sprxial unit at the personal disposa


the Fiihrer that latrr formed the core of the wartime

ivg

(Armed SS) and maintained tics with the Race anil Kesettl
I leadquarters, the lmreaucratic division formed to carry out
racial policies.
The muddletl Manichean racial rluc~-ineof National So
quired as a foil for "Aryans," thc bringers of light and redc
group of people who merely by belonging to a particular "ra
hodicd everything evil, bad, and deviant. The National Social'
no difficulty in identifying a group to occupy the position of o
givcn Europe's thousand-yea= t~nditionin this rcspect: It
Je.u,s.The persecution of the Jews was not planned and prepar

in advance; it depended on circumstances both abroad and w


country, but it always constituted one of the regime's ul

aching fevcr pitch with the Keichskrinallnochc, the night of shattered

logical aims. The campaign madc use of terror and propa

glass, on Noven~ber9, 1938.

tions designed by the party to appear as if they had erupted s

In alternation with such tactic-5, the government imposed new laws

ously from the population, "from below:'beginning with th


of Jewish merchants organized by Gocbbels on April 1, 19

254

G e r m o n Megalomania

from above." Among the very first was the Law for Restoration of the
rofcssional Civil Service, which empowered the government to dis-

.. ..
..,.

.."
,:&

miss Jewish officials, followed by the l)di:nse Law of May 21

ayl)(:alsto tradition played a major role in this success, on occasions

excluding Jr:ws from military service. The remaining rights of je,.,

sc;:h as I'otsdam Day on kpril2 1,1933, when the governing coalition

were greatly recluad with the proclalnation of thc Nu~~emberg


L ~ > ~ ~1)ctwcen revolutionary National Socialists and Yrussian-cot~servative
on September 15, 1935, which made proof of Aryan descel~t
Gernian Nationalists was ccle1)rated by a manipulatory but effective
requisite ibr exercising the rights of citizens or holding elective

invocation of the spirit of Frederick the Great, ox- when the annual

they deprived J<:tr,s of full citizenship, and prohilited ma


tween Jews and non-Jews. These measures, a twisted perve

t,arvest thanksgiving was celebrated on the Biickeberg in Wesq>halia


,?.ith splendid tributes to old agricultural customs that helped bind

the rule oflaw, created a juridical foundation for permanent d


nation and persecution of German Jows.

the loyalties of the agrarian middle class to the new state.


The staging of political events, the transformation of slogans into

Persecution and violence were one side of the regime, en

magnificent theater, and the insertion of potent symbolism into ev-

and fascination the other. It began with the fact that hardly

pryday l i f c r h e s e were techniques the government had perfected as

group, political interest, or collective hope existed that the N

never before in German history. From the Olyorpic Games in Berlin

Soaalists dirl not promote or furnish with some benefit. Blue

in 1936 to the annual party rallies in Nurcmberg, the National Social-

workers were impressed by spectacular job-a-eation program


the construction of the autobahns, improvements in workers' hen

ist regime

hands of comrnuniq- with precisely choreographed mass parades,

fits, and frre-time activities provided hy the party's own rccreat

ceremonies reminiscent of religious services, and magic rituals of re-

department, whose slogan was Kroji u'urch Frende, strength througl


joyment. Retail mcrchants profited from the fact that their co

dcmption that affected the participants deeply. Not even the British
ambassador Sir Nevile Henclerson could resist their spell completely;

tion, the despised big departmcnt stores, were required to pay

hc reported from Nuremherg that he found one performance "both

taxes, and rnrmhers of the skilled trades appreciated the s

solemn and beautiful,"anrl the cfkct ol'thc: light show " \ a s something
likc being inside a cathedral of ice."

measul-es limiting the o u m b ? ~of new master's licenses that m


issncd. Farmers welcomed protcctivc tariffs and domestic price

celebrated the gi-andeor of the nation and the indissoluble

'She "cathedral of ice'created with dozens of antiaircdt spotlights

ports, whilc industrialists were grateful for the abolition of workers'

revealed, more than any other symbol, the dual character of the Nwi

pal-ticipaticm in decision-making, the absence of conflicts with labor

appeal to the emotions: the last word in modern technology coupled

unions over wages, and d ~ rising


e
number ot'p>~cmmentcon

~ i i t harchaic ritual. This contrast was typical or the way the Third

particularly in the arrnarnents industry. Muchthe same applie

Reich presented itself, with autobalins, the Silver Arrow model Mer-

tually cl,ery profession, class, and type of organization. Almo

cedes Benz, the first inexpensive radio receiver, the affoi-dahle Volks-

"member of the national community" benefited in some way, n

wagen, and the world's first jet-propelled plane, on the one hand, and

materially, hut-what
was perhaps more important-in
ideals a111 a sense of solidarit)..

Germanic sagas, castles of the Teutonic knights where the Nazi elite
was educated, and solstice celebrations on the other. The newest in-

ter

The latter lay at the heart of the National Socialists' succ


the country. Unlike democracy, which had been perceived as austere
and rationalistic, the dictatorship satidicd pcople's emotions. Skillfill

ventions and invocatio~~


of the spirits of thc dead flowed together.
The undeniable approval felt by the majority of die population for
the Hidcr regime was increased by its successes in foreign affairs, a

f the Reichrwel~rthat

his policy woukl be "conquest of new Lcbenrroum

,he East and its ruthless Germanization": unfortunatelv we know


rg about how the generals responded. In a tactically cle:ver move
signaled German \\,illingncss to seek rapprochement with for,ign powers; this muted the hostile responsc to his sei7.ure of power in
the Western democracies, while all the time he was pushing forward
111

a plebiscite on January 13, 1935, the inhabitants of the Saar disvoted to rejoin the Reich, and on June 18 a British-German

asreement on the size of their respective na~ralfleets was signed; both


tIa.se events tcnded to show Hider

$1

the light of a su(r~essfu1politi-

cian, while the western powers appeared willing to retreat. Rounding

li' this impression was Hider's announcement on Mal-ch

16 that

compu1x)ry military service would bc rcintraduced in Germany in


conjunction with rearmament, in violation of thc Treaty of Versaillcs.
\,car latcr the army, now renamed the Wohrinacht, occupied the
Rilineland, and Britain ancl France offcrcd no more than formal protests. That same year the Rome-Berlin A d s was created and the
Antj-Cornintcrn I'act signed with Japan, both of then1 alliances with
sharp contrast from the record of

; K M ' ~ <C ,U

'9391

an t,xpressly anti-Soviet thrust.


IIitlcr leiled to achieve the desirctl rapprochement wit11 Brit-

its unfortunate democratic prede-

T 4 HiibrYo.lh, which war pr


olhcGl .r.;.le
organirot

air?, however, first of all because Joachim von Ribhcntrop, ihe Ger-

clew+ exploited the on(jngs o


dien and yomg pepk ia occ
group rind ianoa.ic mmpli:e ex
:" I940 membe:rhip in he Hibc Yo
mr,erponding Aaiacioi.c~~
d &man
k c m e mondoioy liitle: expbined
$ion d the Hide You* 01 !he pa

mall ambassador in London and later foreign minister, was pursuing

Youth Serve$ the Fohier

cessors. ~h~ general Public failed

to recognize the broader aims Hithis fOreip


ler was
policy, however: From his first
day as chancellor he wanted wa,;
&rough
he intended not
only to reverse the results of the
?ieaty ill^^ but to expand
the borders of Germany and estab-

,935:.h
lvli

,hejung

Folk7 codeir uili w!e: the H:


t l q w i i rew, for dury in he
.,d the
graupJ ~dhe SA
men *"I1

d d Y'epO"'a
~

C q r . cnd in lese ocganirosonithw


mobre into r?'dien of we pope."

lish world dominance for the Aryan race. Only four day5 after his ,,.
a
., .,,
pointment he announced with co~npletecandor to the comma$

258

German Megolemonio

pcnly anti-English policies, and s c a ~ n dbecausc the German-Japanest: alliance thrcatcned British interests in the Far Eart. Relations
coaled still further after Germany intervened in d1c Spanish Civil
\Val; where it could test the prq~arednessof its air force, the Lufrwafi.
A t the same time the German Foreign Office noted with interest the

egrec to which the British seemed anxious to avoid being drawn into
onflia on the Continent. Hitlcr had reason to assume he would
ave a largcly free hand in carrying out his plans to expand Germany's
By 1936 prcparatiom for the coming war were in full wing. Hitler

Germon Megalamanio

259

,...ene. The German populatiort I-cacted with jul)ilation to the anof Austria, and so did the majority of Austrians. The separaof 1866 hall heen overcome; Great Germany, the goal that both
liberals in the German il'ational Assembly of 1848 and the Soda1
emocrab of the 1919 National Assembly in Weimar had supported,
s now a reality. The nightmarish character of this reality was per-

d at first only by a minority of Austrian Jews, liberals, commitd Catholics, and sot:ialists who had failed to leave the country in
~ c ;they were swiftly rounded up in unannounced raids and ar-

The success of the ;lnschh$ showed Hider that he had Iittlc t o fear
om the Westcrn powers, and so only two weeks later, on March 28,
he made the deasion to annex Czechoslovakia as well. Two days after
wrote a memorandum creating
a bur-year plan, saying that the
German economy must be ready

Grorlh d Nazi Pa? Mem


l91%l945

a; the date of the iuwasion was set for October 1, 1938. Once again

?stern rcsistanrr was we& and limited to diplomatic protests in a


ring in Munich on Septemhel- 29, Britain, France, and Italy ac-

o,,he
0150

he sent orders to the U'chrmocht to preparc to crush C~echoslo\,a-

i l the qu-her

ted German annexation of the Sudetenland-a


tion were s~~borclinated
to this
goal. Yet in a meeting with the forthe armed forces on November 5,
I 937, a
of which is con-

i n c r c a i i ~rlawtya'ier '928.or
and ecol;>nic ciisa wrrsned. o
sesirly oiler lte Nciir come to

iC33, ihr ornDalon

hich had a large German-speaking population--in

order to avoid

ar. A British-Gcrman nonaggression pact signetl the next day hy


British I'rirnc Minister Neville Chamberlain and Hider strengthened

c gencral conviction in the Western countries that Hider would be

renbe,

ontcnt with a compromise and accept an offer of "colonial appease-

cdul: Gcc~onf-0s

Europe ran into resistance. The fore@ minister, Baron


von Neurah, pointed to the international risks, and Baro
von Fritsch, commander-in-chief oC the army, doubted
take extensive military operations. A year later both critics
[>lacedby mure accommodating men.
On March 12, 1938, the German Pi4hchrmochr marclled into
after assurances had been received that Britain and Italy wo

Germon Megolomania

tor) complising virtually the entire Crech-German border region,

.,<
, hYod
SV i945 a

tained in thc "Mossbach Protocol: Hitlcr's plans for expa

260

ring-shaped terri-

ent" meaning restoration to Germany of its former colonies.


It w a s the furthest thing from Hitlcr's mind. ;it the same time he

as ~fiscussin~
peace with Chamherlain, the ''2 plan" was being deloped to Luikl up a fleet to attack England. On March 15, 1939,
he Wehrmachr occupied tlle ''1-ump Czech state:' dcmonstratiug the
thlessness of diplomatic agreements between the Western deocracies and the Hitler dictatorship. Only now did ~ r i t a i nrousc itif to take counter-measures hy guaranteeing Polislr independence

d beyond that attempting to revive the old preu,ar British-Russian


German Megolomonia

261

li!ri,o Bnuac f4urenbeig, S!J:mei Verlog ' 936)

Nelioaal Socio'iit antSemitisn wor mwe


g b m l t h o eoiliei loins: idlgious I.oilrlb! to
ward Jews a: 'ear:adni:led ihe pubilih. o!
ccnvenion, and c;ilwol horiil,iy the psibiiity
d assimilation. Hiilcii o?l6emit:im, hy cq!,asi, riigno;izeo an enhs grcup on the borts
of usotleiob;edorocterrliis:A v n e w b ~ i e

i:ble ior we?; ieo~cr:ure


of he moderr v
made h m :ed onxious. Fo: .his iec
c:crd. Jews hod .o 0+ "~pcrmted1.0
vian comn.nihj ' :he Nozj
rrer I"Pne Qorm Trcopei*j s p c r m , d o
wriic~orlybmcl mo primilive form
Lmi!ic o.opcgaodo: its pistishers in
foieoeom had p c l k e d Judaism .emoined :nes &ig hiwght oo: on i!luur~& e d k
copcrk*; a jmu, and !he obiect cf h o z i i p-3- w:ided Ticv ke'neii Fuchr od arbn
ncld deluriau. 'iil!er imogned thd jewi ,+,ere :&:ern Jud bis e f m id!VTiit ro i o ~
ai w
,
r
ke v e y ~ l e r eundemi.ing !he laiilcgee" heali. ono no Je-uon h;s wtn"].
tiorr

d~

~ i ond
e bhe consciered.bvs iesoon.

alliance. However, Hitler got the jump on them. Foreign Minis e


Ribbentrop and Stalin signed an agreement creating a Nazi

Paris for German Soldiers

On m e 22, lG4C. the Geimn b!i:zkriw


F
, vros~
~ b,i ~on crrrisice,
~
ske f-r o;iei FnrceGerrnan amy%ri mrlie. in the io:eit of Came!n F,cnce ond i h b r e l w
ei wsie picceri er:der Germon niii.
dmiirlltra~io2, ~ c he
d
of F.ancs \vur ywemed by o
lnco odnroiriioho~wdrr ivlasihal
,?.
ih/ I, polis,
under~man

cmmand, p o d u olrodive D
idizrs t1.01 $!rid regulo~ionrhad lo
sued to i:mr virits by members ol the

almost reached his goal. He could


not conceive of the possibility that
the Western powers would prevent him &om carving up Poland
again. According to
report of
the Carl Jacob Burckhardt, High
Conimissioner of the League of
Nations in Danzig, in a meeting on
August 1 1 , 1939, Hitler spoke to
him openly about his purpose in all

is: 411 he wanted was to subject Russia. But if the West was too

nonaggression pact on .4ugust 23. In a secret protocol Hitler an

lix~cllcrlto support him, he would make terms with Russia, defeat the

lin divided eastern Europe into two spheres of influence; the li

Vat, and attack the Soviet Union afterward.

demarcation ran through the middle of Poland. Hitler believed h

262

German Megalomonio

On September 1, 1939, German troops marched into Poland, and

German Megolomonio

263

.O ~ a o r d
for NSDAP Announcwnentr.
re in Aparhenf Hourer and

,,me on ti?, 01- iF331


Gemoy ).heseie. the pan/, ond
rupaoreo te lev ood be
xopla
m. fie ? ' f l f a u n d ' T % e re&
ddrwr +a enhre paa'olioa. In fhs
1039 he Nazi P ~ divided
Y
~ecnon.,
>eIpcpcser, to iephce he ircdi~ooal
nO pr9,in- Bslow b &ue. the
.,hi o:gonimjian war subdivided info dir.

crL,,
vsl 'b!ockr,' to which filh, houss
o:!e~

bd i ~ v ed i i i i c ~ob-oining
.~
o w n on he p;ivate lib 6 amv
n llleir n w : h q could keep on eyr
~oaulo,on'ilovullv

ihs iegirne art?

German v i c t o ~over Poland,


aided by the Soviet in~zasion,was
achieved in only five weeks. Germany and the Soxpiet union divided Poland along the Bug River,
and while the SS and Gestapo and
the Soviet NKVD (the People's
Commissariat for Internal Affairs)
established control in their respecthe ~ ~ turned
j ~

tive

its military might ag.?inst wester~i


Europc. Reginning on itpril 9,
1940, Gcl.man troops bcgan occuticipating British and French plans

o scud n.oops to thcir defense; this sccured Germany's northern

ank frorn attack and gave dic Germans direct access to the Atlantic.
n atttackon the Ketherlands, Belgium, and France follo\\,ed on May
seventeen days later the Red Arnly crossed the R~lishborder
east. In contrast to 1914, the rnood ofthe German public, an
the Reichsiog delcgates in their Nazi Party uniiorms, was soln

of them belicved that this military a d v c n t u ~wonid end we


War-y to Ijitler's expectations, the Western po\vcrs did n

10. lb the surprise of military experts, including the lradcrs of the


Cl;chrmnch~,
thc western campaign proved a triumph for Hitlcr's saat-

in
success not only placed him at the peak of his
Germany l>ntalso silenccd opposition within the army officers' corps.
gj-, This

c had p i n e d unlimited authority in military affairs, and whatever

back but dedal-ed war on Gcrmany instead. The Second W


had begun, intentionally provoked by Ilitler's desire for con

esistance to the regime still existed xithin Germany bccame dis-

triggered hy Stalin's compliaty, and aided by the West's failure to


sis( German aggression until it was too late. Despitc all dle a

The next goal of the war was conquest of Great Britain. Hitler
,ontinued to hope that the Britishu.ould fall into line, and it I\GJ.S with

and war crimes committed in the following years by all par

reluctance that he gax8cthe order to begin the Battle of Britain, which

it is necessary to keep in mind that decisive responsibility for the outbreak of war lay with German leadership, and to a much lesser

d not end in the triumph for the German Lgtwafc that its comander-in-chief, Herinann Gbring, had promised his Fiihrer. Yet Hit-

with Soviet leaders, while the Western powers engaged in j


self-derensc.

r's main goal remained the war against the Soviet Union, as he dedared to the leaders of the Wehrmocht on July 31, 1940. Utlable to

Wall," a line of defense that would run from Archangelsk to


pian Sea, he intended to seal ofrhis huge realm from .Anglo-A
attack through bastions in the Middle East and northwest Afi

German Megolomonio

267

orcetl to spend time together in bomb shelters. All these factors

In western Europe, military occupation ibllowcd tllr classic


a large extent, although the Gestapo and Security Service

ded to wear down class distinctions, and the population grew

dienstFHeydrich's intelligence organization-comrnitte

ore homogeneous, as millions of people listened to the same slo-

tacks against the civilian population, contrary to interna

p n s from the ndio, stood in line for rationed goods, and took in the

insipid entertainment off~:red on the radio and in movie theatcrs as a

their pursuit of partisans and also in actions to round up

stnction from the

gypsies. In the east the SS left the population in no dou


what it could expect in thc event of a German victory. Poland offere,

remained for individuals was remeat

om the private sphere, while they avoided contact with the outside
rld as much as possible and concentrated on the most urgent task:

an opportunity to convert racist ideolugy into decds. The Polish,


per classes were systematically killed and millions of Jews d

xZatWhat

nding ways to surlive.

from their homes to malie room for ethnic Gerlxans fi-o

Meanwhile, the regime was making pians for the futul-e. A massive!.

Europe. Migration on a huge scale was set in motion, prec

project to rel~uilrlthe capital of the Reich was undrrtaken in thc

of 1945. Similar events took place in the occupied port


viet Union. Behind the German lines, the Wehrnrnch

capital city, Germania, would arise on thc site of the old Berlin. con^

sorted to tactics prohibited by international conventions far

structioil of a broad-gauge railway network was begun in Europe that

ten than it did in the west; it also bad the support of the

was to stretch to the Llrals arid make thc PI-evious railroads looL like

Servim. The latter executed Soviet pcditical officials (con1

toga. SS architects created plans for gargantuan monuments io the

without any pretense of formalities and systematically bunt


Jews. Russian prisoners of war were crammed into camps whe

dead that woilld also serve as "border foruessesnin Africa and on the

ditions wcrc designed to give the vast majority no chance of sur

.ff~eregime's main plans, howe\,er, concentrated on systematic

midst of the war, in preparation for the final victory: A gigantic world

elimination of its declared enemy, the Jews of Europe. Hitler had al-

For the German population in h e s e years thc u-ar

y a ~ n o u ~ ~ on
c r January
d
30, 1939, that a world war u,ould result

widespread hunger, as had been the case in the First World


1944 no serious food shortages existed, for the occupicd

11

battle for hegemony of thc type Enropc had known from time imme-

we1.e ruthlessly stripped of tbdr own resources. But th


tensified the tendencies of the totalitarian state, bringing

"the destruction of the Jewish race in Europe." His war was not a

\.

militarization of public life, increasing organization of the


private sphere, and social leveling. When rationing w

morial; it was a racial war. Hitier believed only select, hon~ogencons


p~:oples were capable of establishing a lasting empire, and that the
ryan race was hindered in its pursuit of one through the divisive and

the government understood how to exploit envy and dars diffe

corrupting nature of its age-old adversary, thc Jews. The Weimar Re-

for its own purposes. There were appeals to solidarity withi


"commnnity of the people"; party and state organizations

ublic and We$tern democracies, he was convinced, had in large

ated that included virtually every citizen in the cnd; block

ealthy racial communities the way bacteria attacked a healthy body.

kept an eye on their neighborhoods, and neighbors were enc


to spy on one another. When the Allicd air raids began, peopl

270

German Megolomania

easure succumbed to this "rot" (Zersetzungl, which broke down


e S o ~ eUnion
t
had the first go\.ernment supposedly permeated by
ewish influence, representing a source of infection for the rest of the

aorld. In Hitler's sick logic it folhnved incscapahiy that the Jews must
bc removed from the healthy German racial community, the "body of

d ~ cpeople," and that tlic Germans must seek Lehcnsraum in the wide
expanses of eastern Europe, space to which their superiority entitled
them. There they would play the role of masters, while the Slavs, another allegedly inferior race, would take the pnrt of colonial slaves.
The world war had to be Sought, according to this demented logic, in
order to exterminate the Jews.
The German leadership thus dk! not see revision of the outcome of

thc First World War as its primary goal in this war, as many of Hitleri
nservative political allies helirvcd and as a number of people still
bic1icr.e today. Nor was the goal political dominance in the sense of
classic European C<.rreignpolicy, conquest of territo11)- representing
addit.ional economic resources and larger markets, or release of internai tensions in military undertakings. None of the rationales foor war
own iu thc history of Europe up to that point apjilics to German acus in World War

[I. Instead thc goal was, in Nit1i.l-'s own ~ : o r d s ,

"initiation of the final stage of battle against thc mortal cncmy of


Jc~vish-Bolshevisln"in the Eurasian dominions or National Socialism.

.Ihe whole war effort prior to the campaign against the Soviet
~

Union had therefore amounted tn nothing more than tactical pveparacs. The

attack on Poland was designed to create a styirig area for

the JVehmmucht's march to the east; the invasion of Francc was intended
eliminate the danger of attack fron~the rear, as were Hitler's eforts to reach accommodation with Great Britain by dividing up the

Group of W e e

vorld. As soon as Poland was conquered, the Germans had begun

lisix hussbount, 19441


iriendi helpd iiz artis Felix Nusrbovm
l i B O 4 : 9 4 J ! oh-! his b m i b s hide in ih~r
poinling he hos 6eoictd himself as on o.:hc
duxlwr. wih a prqei s h a d ond yarwike; he
riondr belore a cop o, ,which the cnurs d
the Luu~anfmnf has been iloced, w:lh o hosd
raised ar if to war* aii o +irerr~.
The txy in ih
foreground is slj& ng :he +Is
6 penec~-

rounding up millions of Jews and confining them to ghettos in the ma-

rlorlewr wan icrced ia w a


woman I X I X , ~ ~ lhem h o iiswe
- d

yellow

imp. ihs N c s b u m r ' tdirg place war ie


pared. o d ,hey were deported to Auahwi!z
on jub 31. 1944, in he 10.i iionrporl d arir
m e i s to reach the camp.
.ere killec
snot:ty before he rrmp adrrinlrajtr Z I ~ ~
garring pnwnes in O&r
194

ior Polish cities. iust as thev had earlier com~elledlews within their
own country to wear i d e n t ~ f y i nbadges
~
But all these measures werc
erely preliminary, a preparation for the next step undertaken in di-

n~

F F ~

ct conjunction with the war on the Soviet Union: the deliberate and
emorseless extermination of the Jews as a prerequisite for the establ d m e n t of German world dommation

The Nazis had already acquired some experience in

rhc ea7t was knoxm, and hundreds of thousands of soldiers on

the euthanasia program had gone into operation in Oct

leave from tile Russian kont talker1 about mass shootings. At

the course of which some 80,000 people with mental


been shot, gasscd, or givr.11 fatal injections. The procedure was no,,
be extended to the Jcws. It is thought that FIitler gave th
the "linal solution" to thc "Jewish question" in the surnmc
The exact timing is a matter of controversy, for Hitler ten
on criminal directives orally, avoiding their inclusion
ords that mnld later betray him
After about six months of technical and administrat
tions, the heads of the agencies involved inct at a villa by th
a lake in Berlin, the Wnnnsee,on January 20, 1942, to make tl
arrangements. Organized inass murder had already been unde
for somc time, however. Security Servicc unit? (SD-Einsutzgr
Russia had been carrying out m a s exrcutions by firing sq
Lhe Germans had conquered the territory, and the first euth

peru arrived at the Cllelrnuo concentration camp in


to provide "special treatment" to 100,000 ]ews deemed inc
forced labor. Murder began at the Relzrc camp in Octobet
gassing at Auschwitz in January 1942.
The entire orgzanization of the mass-murder industry was
camouflage and deception from the stal-t; after the
had protested against the euthanasia program, the re
its most heinous crimes in secret. Nevcrthcless, the genocid
European Jews would not have been possible without the dire
direct participation of numerous government agenci
and departments, that is to say, a large number of people. Ev
extent of the extermination of the Jews, and the details of i
tion, did not become known during the war, there were enon
ences t o it and information about it to make the existence of
termination campaign a matter of publichowledge within G e m a
The dcportations took place in full public view; the transport

274

Germon Megolomania

least the general

had to have some suspidons of

but habitual defense mechanisms and falls-

hat was
us justifications pro\*ed strongcr than consciousness of guilt and re-

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