~ o o k by

s Robert C. Tucker
philosophy and Myth in Karl Marx
he Soviet Political Mind
p he

Grent Purge Trial (Co-Editor)

The Marxian Revolutionary Idea

STALINISM
Essays in
Historical Interpretation

The Marx-Engels Reader (Editor)

Stalin as Revolutionary, 1879-1929:
A Study in History and Persoilality
The Lenin Anthology (Editor)

Edited by Robert C . Tucker, Princeton University

with contributions by

W W . NORTON & COMPANY. INC

NEW YORK

't
76

-'

'1'. 11. Ri&

r e l a ~ i i ~ eIlCy[ , ( I ~ chief e x e c ~ ~ l i vrole.

e This prohnhly rcflects ili<rrc t l ~ anything
a ~ ~
~ r)ligarchy itsell; wl~uscnic~libersrecog.
else l>rotective me:lsures taken w i l l i i ~the
nize that a strong chief execolive might quickly rn:ikc l i i n ~ r e ldictator
f
i n ;Isystem ,
lacking serious x)ciclal cl~cckso t ~the supreme eclielot~o f powcr. I t re~iiainc
prirhlcniatical. Iiowevcr, w l ~ e t l ~ the
c r oligarcl~ic;~l
strilcllirc o f Ilowcr could sur. :
vive a profound or prolonged crisis situation requiring expeditious and dccisive
leadership.
Should sonie future chief executive attempt "to escape frcrni the control ofthr
collective," as Kl~rushchevwas alleged to be doing o r the eve o f his removd,
Robert C. Tucker
he w i l l need speedily l o assume the powers and methods o f a tyr:mt i f he i s to .,
escape a similar fate. Such an uutccrnie may now sertn i ~ ~ ~ p n i h nhut
h l ecannot ;
be ruled out. Should i t occur, we \\suuld ag;lin havc "a ~~i,~~~<)-orgitl~iz'~tiond
7
society ruled by a tyralitn-our definition of Stalinism. Ilut w t i i ~ l t il
l he Sluii~rism i
with a society so much richer, better educated, and more cotnplex t11a11that of !
1953, with a new political elite, and above all a di&ro>cty~.il~~t?
POTif, IS T~Istoy
Walern scholarsl~iphas bee11 tardy in fixing analytic attention upon Stalinism.
tells us, "all happy families rescrilble each other, every unhappy family is util~appy
A bulky historical literalure on the Stalin period and many biographies and
ill its own way," every tyralit w i l l impose his own particul;lr variant of ~~lisery; memoirs dealing will1 the m a l l Stalin coexist with a dearth o f interpretive discus-

Stalinism as
Revolution from Above

on his subjects. F o r the sanie reason, i t prnbably casts niore c<u~fi~si<rn

than light :
to extend the "Stalinist" label eveti to tliose ullicr Cnnitiiut~islregimes with
strolignle:l at the top; i t is colifusing ill the sanie way, lirr i ~ ~ s l a n cas
c , labcling
the various fascist dictatorsliips of tlie 1930's "Hitlerite." Still, as Stalin was thr
man whose tyranny was built i n tandem wit11 the first nio~~u-orgal~izational
:
society, there is some justice i n invoking his nanie whencvcr such n society lliron
up a new tyrant.

Gan of the "ism," by whicli I mean not alone the body o f t h o u g h t but the entire
Shlinisl p l l e ~ i o o i e ~ ~SI: o nan historical stage in the dcvelopnient o f tlie Russian
md other Com~nuriistrevolutions and o f Coni~nunismas a culture.
To sonie degree. Illis situation shows the impact o f Soviet thought patterns
upon our scholarsl~ip.F r o m the mid-1920's. i t became a firm article o f doctrine
~ist
illat 111eonly legitimate "ism" was Leninism-or
in the C o m t ~ ~ u ~movement
Marxisn~-Le~iinisti~,
to irse the subsequet~tlyadopted phrase. Stalin l~imselfnever
countenanced tlie use nf "Stalinism" because o f the deviational implications i t
would cot~seque~llly
have carricd. T h e forcible rnass collectivization, the ilidustri~lizationdrive, atld other events o f the Stalinist revolutiot~from above o f the
1930's were oficially described as Marxism-Leninism ill action-the natural and
logical u ~ i f o l d i n gol' l l l e original Leninist revolutionary impulse and program
There was a slrnlls l c ~ ~ < l ei n
~~
the
c ywester^^ sovietological literature o f the 1940's
md 1950's l o give c r e d e ~ ~ ctoc Illis claim. slbcit wit11 ;I difTcrent mural jr~clgment
on the process. As n snml)le or-and perhaps epitaph 011-the tendency ill quest ~ i and milst be defined as a pattern
tion, we may cite the fnllowing: " S t a l i ~ ~ i scall
o f t b o ~ ~ gand
l ~ t action illat flows directly from L e l i i t ~ i s n Stali~l's
~.
way o f looking
at thecontenlpornry world, llis prirfessed aitiis, the decisions lie made at varin~ice
with one another, his concel>ti~ns
o f the tasks facing the con~muniststate-these
md many specilic traits are entirely Lel~itlist."1 Froni sucli a standpoint, there
l ~ d sno special pri>blem o f interpretive t~ndersta!~ding
o f "Slalil~isti~."
Although S t a l i ~never,
~
not even at the l i e i g l ~ ot f his personality cult, tolerated
beuseortlie tern1 "Stalinis~n," he and his party allies o f the mid-1920's employed
(or, as Trotsky maintailled, concocted) the term "Trotskyism" as the emblem
ofa system o f political heresy agninst 1,enitiisni. F o r Trotsky and his followers,
however, the heresy was the political line that Stalili and his associates were
I.Alfred G. Meyer, LC)INII.?!II
(Catnbridp~.Mass.. 1957). pp. 282-83.

77

!.
78

Robert C

Tuck

W n i r m nq Rc~vI18tioslrnnn ,\hnre

pursuing and llie ideological tenets, like "socialis~i~

i n one country." wliich thq
were using illjustification o f the line. So i t is i n the Trotskyist poletnical literatulr ,
that we fitid the earliest interpretive and critical discussio~~
o f Stali~iism.In !hi ;
interpretation, Slalioisni appeared as lhe practice, and i l s rellectio~ii n the0ry.d
a cot~scrvativebureaucratic takeover o f t l ~ eBolshevik Revolutior~,a Soviet Thcr. ,
midor, o f which Stalin himself was merely the represe~~tative
figure and symbol? :
I n c ~ ~ t ~ t r n d i s t i n c tto
i o nthe lirst o f t h e two positiotls just mentioned. Ihold thr~ 1
S l a l i ~ ~ i s niust
rn
be recognized as an l~isloricallyd i s t i ~ ~and
c t specilic phenomenon '
whicll d i d !rut flow directly from Leni~rism,a l t h o u g l ~Leninist11 was an iti~portanl
contributory factor. I n contradistinction to the secotid, Iw i l l argue here (I)thsl
Slali~iism,despile conservative, reactiot~ary,or cout~ter-I-evolulio~~nry
elcnienti 1
i t 1 its makeup, was a revolutior~aryp l ~ e n o n ~ e n
i no essence;
~~
(2) that the Stalinin
revolutior~f r o m above, wl~ateverthe c o n t i ~ ~ g e ~ ~ict ~i evso l v t din i l s inceptiot~and :
pattern, was an integral phase o f the Russian revolutioi~aryprocess as a wholq j
a11d (3) that ilotable anlottg the causal factors explaining why the Staliriist pharr
occurred, or why i t took the form i t did, are the heritage o f Bolshevik revolutian. !
ism, the lieritage o f o l d Russia, and the mind and p e r s o ~ ~ a l i o
l yf Stalin.
i
Decaosc o f the presence and significant c o t ~ l r i h u l i <o) f~Illis
~ I;~sl, the prrsod 1
factor, wliich may he see,, as all 11isloric;tl accidettt (Slillin, lilr exan~ple,ntigh! ,
easily have died, like Jacob Sverdlov, in the great flu epidetiiic of 1918-I"!, m).
tl~esisthat the Stalinist revolution f r o n ~above was an "i~~tegl-al
phase" of tk
Russia11 revolutionary process as a whole is nut tlleallt to imply that the Stalinia 1
pliase was an unavoidable one given the nature o f the l~olshevikrnovenienl, d i
Russia, and o f the historical circumstances which prevailed i n the prelude. Giva
the diversity o f currents in the Bolshevik nioverllent o f 1l1e niid-1920's, we must j
allow that a different. IIOII-revolutiotiary f o r n ~o f further Soviet de\,elopnimtd ;
niovenlent was a possibility. That such a possibility d i d lot ti~alerializei s a lacL
but i t could have-given such an easily inlagillable dilfcrence i n the historical
situatioti as the rise o f some other political leader than Stalin to power i n succa- j
siun to Lenin. O n tlle other hand, nly stress here 011the culturalisl Cdctorsin tk ,
Stalinist revolulion from above implies that Stalin's personality alone niusl na
be seen as (he e x p l a ~ ~ a t i oonf why Soviel developn~entproceeded i n the revulution.
ary tnatiner that it did under his leadersl~ipi n the 1930's.

:
I

Tlie distinction between a palace revolutioti or coup d'Ctat and a full-scale sod.
apolitical revolution is familiar and generally accepted. I n Ihe one, a swifi and
more o r less violent chat~geo f a society's polilical l e a d e n l ~ i plnkes place without
c
itself. 111lhe other, a chanp
far-reaching inroads into the character of t l ~ society

,
:

2. For Trotsky's thesis on the anlilhesis belwecn Bolshevirn~and Slalisi\m, s e t his pamphh
S,olirri.r,t,ondRo/.~hcvir,n:Concen~b~gtbeHi.~toricolond
T h m r e r i c o / R w r r o f ~ k i b a r I binternnriod
(New York. 1927). The lherts is elaboralrd lurlhcr is his bnok Tile Rrb~o/rrrio,8Rc'tro.vcd(New Ymt .
19.17)

79

$political learlcrsl~ip,wllich may witness a coup <l'&tat at s u c l ~a critical point

oftransition as Noveniber 6-7, 1917, i n Russia, furthers a radical reconstitutiu~~
dthcswiupnlilical c o n ~ l n u n i t yand ;III attenipte<l brcak wit11 the social past. an
tfon lo refasllio~~
the sociely's culture o r habitl~alinode o f lil'e-its i ~ ~ s t i t ~ ~ t i o t i s ,
>ymbol-systen~s,beli;~vioral patlerns, rituals, art forms, values, ctc. 111 the later
spect, a sociolx~lilicalrevolution confortns to Wallace's notiotl o f a "revitaliza:!on movenient."
Asociopolitical revolution tiorrnally takes placc, to start wit11 at any rate, boll1
'Tmm above" :>lid "frorii bclaw." Masses of ordinary people 1,articip;ite ill the
pmess, while l l ~ etlew political leatlersllip which the revolutioti has brought to
pwer espouses the t r a n s f o r m a l i o ~of
~ the society as a prograin and actively
promotes it as a policy. Insofar as t l ~ crevolutiotiary leadership's ideology contains
rprevision of a lransfortr~cdsociety, Wallace describes this as its "goal culture."
The r~tethudsa(lvanced for conipletit~gthe transfort~~ative
process he calls the
"mnsfer culture."
Asociopolitical revolutior~may, therefore, be an liistorically protracted proc5,taking placc o\'er years o r decades, w i t h intervals ofquiescence, r i ~ t l i c rthan
only during lllr sltort time nf' spectacular social c h n ~ ~ gwhetl
e
i t is utiivcl-siilly
rmlized that a r e v o l t ~ l i <i sr ~i t~1 progress. ' l ' l ~ eRussia81cast illuslr;~tczIllis p o i ~ ~ t .
To mauy, "Russiat~ Revolution" rlleatls l l ~ eevents o f 1917 c u l n ~ i ~ l a t i ni gn the
Bolslieviks' sei7ure of power toward tltc end of t l ~ a year.
l
F r o n i a broader and
historically more a~leqoatestaodpoittt, the Russian llevolution wasa social epoch
mmprising l l i c tnanikrld social, political, ecotrotnic, and cultural transforn~ations
durine the period o f c i v i l W a r and War C o n ~ t i ~ u t i i sthat
i n ensued after 1917 and
b l e d u t ~ t ithe
l i ~ ~ i t i a t i o f~the
t N e w Eco~tomicPolicy ill 1921.5 A n d on llie still
i v e lhal is being advocated here, l l ~ e
Revolution exle~i(led
more c o m p r c l ~ c ~ ~ sview
over slightly illore than t w o decades. Otllerwise exprcssitig it, N E P society war
m inlcrval o f relative quiescet~cebetween two phases o f t h e Russian revolulionary
process: llle 1917-21 phase just nie~~lit,ned,and the Stalit~i-lphase t l ~ n ev~suetl
t
in 1929-39. 111 s a y i ~ ~this,
g
I do 11ot mean l o suggest that N E P society was
rnnden~~~ed
by the nalure o f Bolslievis~nto be n o niore than an "i~itel-val ol'
relative quiescer~ce."Other oulcon~es,as already suggested, are readily in~agittable. But given oil l l ~ cfaclors that wcrc operative, Slali~l'spersolla1 role included.
Iheoutcome WIS tlie one that history witnessed. The NEP, that is, proved i n fact
l
t w o phases of the Russian revolutionary process.
lo be ;a11 i ~ i t e r v ; ~hetween
Bolsl~evikpuhlic discussiol~d u r i ~ the
~ g early 1920's reflected a sensc o f the N E P
rran l~isloricalpause i n the cot~tmonlyen~ployeddescription o f W a r Communism
a a time o f revolutionary "advance" or o f the N E P as a rime of revolutionary
"retreat" and " t c g r u u p i ~ ~ofli,rces."
g
The Bolsheviks were aware-grinily so-of
king s u r r o u t ~ ~ l cby
d a vast mass o f prcdomitiantly peasant people whose tetiipo-

'

'

I See p. rv and ,,rl~e 5 . above.

4. Anthony F. C. Wallace. C~lrrrreond Personnlitv. 2nd ed. (New York. 1910). p. 192.
I. S u c l ~a vicw i\ I;>kcn,for eranlple, by W. I!. Clranberlin in, I t i s classic study in two vulun>es,
Tkt Rurihn Re~nlnrio!?19/7-1921

(New York. 1915).

f
Rcbl,crl C. Turks

SO

rary willingness to r e s p o ~ ~to

d revolutionary leadership in tlic 1917-1921
uplieaval went along w i t h a t e n a c i o ~ ~underlying
s
resistance to tlle resh;tpi~~g
of
their way of lire and t l i o u g l ~ l .The peasants who burned down nlanor l~ollsesin ..
1917 and parceled out thc estates had, for example, l i l t l c ; ~ ~ l i n ~against
us
thc
Russian Orthodox religio~rand, still more irnportal~t.110 w i s l ~to live and work .
i n agricultural conimunes under the Soviet regime. Wltence their eloquently
I ~ llte ilolslieviks
erlwessive s:tyirig, qu,~tcd b y L r ~ l i r ~ OIIC occasio~l." L C Mlive
down will1 llie Con11nu1iisls1"-the former b e i ~ l gtllosc w l ~ oItad b i d then1 lakc
the landow~lers'land and the latter those who [low wanted l o deprive thentof :
it. By early 1921 the Bolsheviks found that their continoed tenurc of potvcr
(lepended 11pcr11l l ~ sul~pression
e
o f t l i e Comn~unislsillside thcmselves to l l ~extent
r
of legalizing private prt,duction and trade under tlle N E P i n t l ~ crural economy.
small industry, and coriinierce. To niake peace witti l l ~ n
e v e r \ v l ~ e l l ~ i irnajorily
~ig
.
o f lhe p o p u l a t i o ~ ~to, reestablish the link, or snzyclrko. hetween workers and
peasants, they had to desist from herculean elforts toward rapid socialist transfor.
mation o f thecountry's economic way o f life and tolcratc, i f not actively encour. :
age, that small-scale c o m n ~ o d i t yproduction o r which Lenin wrote i n 1920 that
arid l l i e bourgeoisie c o n l i n ~ ~ , ~ ~ trl:rily.
s l y , I~ourly,sponta :
it "e,~gendcr.~capitalis~~l
~leuusly,a ~ ~OIIr l ;I mass scale."
The N E P Russia that emergecl from the Bolshevik Revolution of 1111: .21 :
coold he described as a society w i t h two uneasily cucxisti~lgcultures. There s8S
.
an olTicially dorninant Soviet culture comprising the Revolutiot~'stnyri;~dinnova.
tions i ~ ideology,
t
goverrin~e~ital
structure, political llrocedures. ecot~otnicorgani- .
zation, legal order, educatioti, tile intellectual p ~ ~ r s u i tvalues.
s,
itrt, daily life, and
ritual. Side by side w i t h i t was a scarcely suvictizcd Russian culture that l i d
on from the pre-1917 past as well as i n the stnall-scale rural : ~ r ~~dl r b a nprivaa
r s ,villagt
enterprise that flourished under the N E P . I t was a Russia of c l ~ t ~ r c l ~tile
mir, the patriarcl~alpeasant ramily, old valucs, old pastinles, old oullooks along
wit11 widespread illiteracy, niuddy roads, and all tliat Trotsky liad ill mind WIIO
Ile wrote that: "Essentially tlie Revolutioo means the people's final break with
the Asiatic. with the S e v e l i t e e ~ ~Cetttury,
tl~
\ v i l l ~l l o l y Russia, \*it11 icolls and
cockronclles." 7 I l ~ coexistcncc
e
of cultures mas conipetilive i n a one-sided way:
it was the declared objective of the new one to transforni the o l d one, so !ha&
as L e n i ~
declared
~
i n addressing the M(,scow Soviet 011 N o v e ~ n b e20.
r 1922. "oul
o f N E P Russia w i l l come socialist Russia."
Doubts o f this existed i n some quarters, including the emigre Russian intellsluals associated w i t h the s y n ~ p o s i u nStnola
~
vekh (Change of Landmarks). FM :
IJstrialov and his fellow smer~avekhovry.the N E P was !he beginning o f theend ,
o f Russian C o m m u ~ ~ i sas
m a revolutiol~aryculture-transfor~iiit~g
inovenlent, iB
incipient deradicalization, and Russia's imminent return l o naliunal foundationi
O n the Rolsl~eviks'behalf, Lenin anathematized that perspecti\,e. A n d replying ,

"

6. ..Lcfl-Wlnp" Conlrnullisll8-An lnfanlile Dirordcr, i n T11r Lerri,, Aalholow cd. R o k r l C

Tucker (New York. 1975). p. 553.
7. Lcun Trotsky. Lilerorurc ond Revohrio,t (Ann Arbor, Mlch.. 1960). p. 94,

lo lllose Metisl~evik-111i11ded
Marxists ("1111r European [)Iiilistines") who argued,
like Sukhanov, ~II:II i t had been a n~istakefor socialists to seize power i n so
culturally backw:~td:icaontry as Russia, Lcnio defiai~tlyreplied i n one of liis
last articles, " W l ~ ycould we not lirsl create such prereqtlisites o f civilization i n
our country as tlle e x p l l l s i o ~o~f the lando\vners and the Russia11capitalists, and
then start movitig tou'ard s o c i a l i s ~ ~ i ? ' Iaf definite level of c ~ ~ l t o was
r e needecl.
a they said, L I 1111.
~ 1>11ildiug~ ~ l ' s ~ c i i ~ l"iW
s ~l ~n y,ci~ntiotwe bcgir by l i r s t ;~cllicving l l ~ eprerequisilcs l'or that definite level o f culture i n a revolutionary way, and
{hen, wit11 the aid o f the workers' and peasants' govertilnent and tlie Soviet
systcnl, proceed to overtake llie other nations?" 8
Wllile o p l ~ [ ~ l c l i rl l~l cg hislnrical correctncsv o f l l ~ cBirlsl~evikdecisim l o takc
power i n 1917 and 10 pursuc thc revoluliu!iary political course Illat il d i d subsequcntly, Lenin ill 1'121 alld after redelinell the moven~e!it'sobjective and strategy
in the new situaliot~marked by retreat at home and delay o f otlier Marxist
of the N E P was to take place within the
revolutions abnr:~d. The transcendi~~g
framework oS thc NEP, by evolution 1101 revolutioti. Lenin could not have been
\
Rcvolutin~~
he, explained, "is a cllange wltich breaks
more explicit (III l l ~ ipoint.
the old orrlcr 10 if, urry f o ~ t n ~ l n l i ~ illid
~ r ~ s~,i u OUU
t
tlial C~III~~IISIY.
slowly i ~ r ~ c l
gradually ren~otlrlsit. takiug a r c l o bl.ci~kas little 11s pc~ssiblc..' War CO~III~~Inisnl, wilh its forcible Suod requisitioning, had represented a "revolulionary
approach" l o t l ~ hr u i l d i ~ l go f ;i socialist sociely; i t liad suugltt to break up thc
old social-ecor~o~nic
systcni cotnpletely at one stroke and substitute fur i t a new
o f~ Illat
l
i n favor o f a "reformist apone. The N E P signified an a h a n d o n ~ n c ~
proach" wl~oscn i e t l ~ o dwas "11ot to break rip the o l d social-economic systenltrade, petty pn,rl~~ctioli,petty pn~prielorsliip,capitalism-but
to revive trnrle,
pctty proprietol-sltip, cnpitalisnl, wllilc cautiously and gradually getting the upper
hand over thcni, or tnakitig it possible to subject tl1e111 to slate regulation UI@
lo ihc extent lllal lltey revive.''
Tlie transfer cullure, as Lenin now envisaged it, was t l ~ e"cooperating
(koopcrirovank) of Russia" alorig witli the development o f a popularly admi~lislered. ~~otl-bure;ruc~;~tizerl
society with a large-scale, adv;~nced inacl~inci ~ ~ d u s l l - y
bawd heavily on c l c c l r i l i c i l t i o ~and
~ operating according to plan. The c o o p e r a l i ~ ~ g
of Russia meatit l l ~ einvolve~ncntof the entire p o p u l a t i o ~i ~
n cooperative forrns
of\\,ork. This wuuld realize the utopian dreams a f the "old cooperators" like
Rol,erl Owell, wlrorc error l ~ a dbeen 1101 the vision o f a cooperative socialism b u l
the belief that il ccn~ldbe put into practice witliout a polilical revolution sucll
a the one that I l ~ Uolsl~eviks
c
had carried out. '1'0 acliieve tile cuoperated Russia
through tlie NEI', hy the reforniist methods that tiow defined the transfer culture
in 1.enin's n ~ i n d ,wnuld be the work o f "a whole l~istoricalepoch" comprising

"

8 . "Our R r v ~ ~ l ~li2pmpcns
~ l i n ~ nr
~ N. S u k l t a ~ ~ n vNola)."
's
in l%<
icnirr A ~ i r h o l o ~ pp.
y , 705~6.Fur
I*sfs's a~~alhenla
on Illr .Stnow vrkh l e n r l e ~ > rsee
g this report lo #be Elcvrnll~I'arly Congress III 1!122.
h l i i ~Leri8 A,irhokr8: p p 525-26 Uslrisl<,v was I l x i~>tcllwlual
leader of lhr a t ~ r , , n v e l l i o ~ ~ i ~ y .
q A l l quutalionr H I I l l i s pasqape arc rrom "Tllr lrnportroce of Gold Now snd Aner !he Cumpletc
V$rlory of Sc,cialisni," I I I Ihc I.e!,i,! A , r r b o i o ~ ,p. 512. The csray rvvr \vrillen in Navcnlhcl 1920.

82

1<11IrerfC'. 'hckn

one or t w u dccades a1 :I n l i n i ~ n u ~ 'Tlic

l i . nletliods tl~ctl~selves
\>rruld col~cirtvery
largely of "ci~lluralizing" (kul'rur~~iclrexrru),the r e r i ~ i ~ k i nOFp the IIOPLIIII~
nie~ltal.
ity ilntl ell~clsby ethicalive means starting will1 l l ~ oveccr,~lii~~g
c
o f illiter;tcy. Only
t l ~ r o u g l isuch a gradual, long-range "cultural rev[rlutirrn" would i t he pwsiblc
to gain the populatio~l'svoluntary accepliince o f couper;~tivr~ o c i i i l i s n i .IIt ~was
~
the p u s i t i o ~taken
~
by Leliin in "On Cooperalion" nncl other last articles that
Uukli;tril~subsequetitly elaborated as his c o n l r i b u t i [ ~ ~
t ol l l ~ cthcory o f building
socialisnl i n one country which he deknded against tlle Left oppositioti ill thc
inlra-parly conlruversies o f the early p o s t - L e n i ~period.ll
~
History, as we know, d i d no1 go the way that Lenin charted; i t wen1 the Slalinisl
w i y . This was radically dilTerent fro111 the p a t l ~d e l i ~ ~ c a t eill
d tl~ost.I.et1i11 ;irticla
of llie final period that U u k l l a r i ~ ~i n, tlie essay l l i a l Ile publisl~edi n Pravdain
Ja~iunry1929 for l l ~ efifth anniversary o f Lcrii~l'sdeath, described as "Lcnin's
Political T e s t a o ~ e ~ ~Stalinism
t."
i n its time o f self-assertion and triulnph. the
1930's, was a revi>lulion i n exactly the se~isethat Lenili had defincd i t ill warning
i ~ g a i ~ l sa trevolutionary approacli l o t l further
~
building o f Sovict socialisni: "a '
cllangc which bre;iks the o l d order to its very fourlclalions. and ~ i o tone t l ~ a t
cautiously, slowly, and gradually remodels it, laking care t o break as little as ,
possible." Instead o f trarisce~idingtlie N E P evnlutionarily. Slalillisn~ilbolisl1.4
i t revolutio~iarily,by decree a ~ l dby force. Itislead o f proceeding gra(lually ?.nd
by niealis of persoasion, i t proceeded at breakneck speed and wielded state p o w a
coercively t o sniash popular resistance by terrorizi~ig[lie populalio~i.Instead of
laking care t o break as little as possible, i t broke l l ~ spirit
e
a l o ~ l gwit11 the bodia
o f a great p r o p o r l i o ~o~f the generation that lrad come ofage during Llie first pharc
o f the Revolution a decilde beC11l-e. I t also co~isunledii very heavy proportion of
tllose party leaders and rnetnbers who had, i n the 1920's. bccn Stalinisls in the
'
simple sense of supporters of the general secretary and Ilia "getirral l i ~ i e "ill !he
fight wit11 the oppositions.
Tlie rural revolution called "mass collectivizntion" i l l o s l r ~ ~ t cthese
s
poillts. In
the space o f a few years and at llle cost o f untold suffering and :I Ca~ilineWIIOY
toll o f lives ran into Inany millions, a countryside will1 i ~ b o ut\ve~ity-live
l
nlillion
peasant farmsteads functioning o ~ natiorializcd
i
land was tratisfor~lledinto one
i n ivllicli the great majority o f t l i o s r peasants were orga~iizedinto some 200.WO
collective farms (kulkliozyl while many more were employed ns hired workerr
on state farrils lsuvkl?ozy). In the Shorr Cuurse uC parly llistory (1938). which
Stalin edited personally, the colleclivization is described as "a profourid revolu j

lion, a leap Crom an old qualitative slate of society l o :t new qualitative stale.
cquivalerit i n its consequences t o the revolution o f Oct<,her 1917." The Slrori
Course goes no: " l ' l ~ e d i s t i ~ i g ~ ~ i s l ~Ceat~~re
i n g o f Illis evolution in Illat i t was
acconiplished /rut71 ubove. on the i t ~ i l i a t i v eof tlic state. ;tnd directly supported
fmrn Oeluw by the ~ i ~ i l l i o nosf pcasnnts, wlio were f i g l t t i ~ ~t go I l ~ r o woff kttlak
bandage and tu live i n frer<lom i n the collective farnis." ' 2
I t was indeed a state-i~~itiatcd,
stale-directed. and statc-enrorced revolu~ion
from above-as was t l ~ cStalitiisl revolution as a ivholc-but the Slrurr Conrsr
lied when i t spoke o f niass peasant support from helow. Historical evidence
available l o us nuw in greal abundance attests tlrat not lone thc ones classified
in kulaks, whr~se"liquidation ;IS a class" was proclainlcrl as tlie banner of ihe
mllectivi7ation drive, hut the mass ofniiddle peasatits and even some o f t l ~ rural
c
pour were sullenly opposed t o the rural revolutiorl and iclilled llie ko1khoz.vonly
under duress or because o f fear. The claim i n Soviet publicity of' Stalio's time
and aftcr that tlie collectivizstioll was Lenin's "coopernfive plan" i n action is
t
eni~rt
groundless. N o t only was tllrre IO patierit, l o n g - d r a w ~ ~ o uecluc;~tin~~al
("cultural revolutiori") t o prepare l l ~ peasantry's
c
m i n d l i v voluntary acceptance
ofcooperative Carniing, atid n o anlececlent i ~ ~ d u s t r i a l i z ; ~ lsullicient
iol~
t o produce
the hur~rlrcdthousand tractors that Lcnin had Coreseen as ;I powerful inducen~cnt
to the peasatllc to farm conl1er;ttively; still more iniporl;~tit,the kolkhuz~,were
(and arc) socialist couperatives otily i n their formal faqade.
The rural revolutiorl I'ronl above o f 1929-33 proceeded simultn~ieouslyi\,ilh
Ihe heroic phase o f llie St;~linist industrial revolution f r o n ~ahove: 11i:it statedrive wllose very slogan.
directed, frantic, ~nililary-owicnledi~~dustrialization
n t
"Fulfill the Five-Year Plat ill Four," reflected the gap between ~ t ~ aclually
happened and the Plan as ollicially adopted i n 1929.13 T l i e relationship between
these two processes prcsents ;I Ilighly complex p r o b l c ~ non whicll scholarly opitiion has evolved as new Farl~r;il i n f o r n ~ a t i u nhas beconlc available i n the recent
past. I t was at one time widely believed that the fc)rcible mass collectivizatio~i
was a necessity for thc desired high-speed super-industrializalion i n that the
kolklioz syste~iienahled i l ~ cSoviet state t o extract otherwise onobtai~lable(or
uncertainly oblainable) agricultural surpluses t o finance such basic necds of
industrialization as the i n ~ p o r l a t i oo~fi foreign ~ i i a c l l i ~ i eand
r y technicians and t o
supply the urban population w i t h food and industry w i t h raw materials.14 Such,
indeed, appears t o have bee11tlie uoderlying conception on wliicll Stalili acted

10. All quotsliotls and the ideas sunrnlarizcd i n tl,is paragrapt) nre rronl "0sCoopetill
Tlw L C I I A~III,VIO~.V.
~~
pp. 707-13. The esray wins dirtalcd by 1.ellin in Jaltuary 1921.
I I. For ilukhar~o'srlnoughl in thin period, sec Stephen F. Cohe~>.
Oukborin orrd !he Bnrr,rent
Rswliirio,>:AA,lrrirol Oiogropl?y(New York. 1973). Chap. VI: atld Mo~llcLewi81. PoIilic.ol Uoder<sr(~).
retrii in Soviet Ec~onuazi<Ihburcc From Dukbori,~to ,he M o d m ~Rr./i,rmeo Il'ri~icclos. 19741. Chaa

305.
I 3 0s the dispnrily betweell plan ahd practicr. invulviog also ll~r
"\vilcl targel illcresses issued
.n 1930 and 1931," -ec Hollil!ld Ilunler. "The Ovrran~hiliouaFirs1 So\,iel Five-Year Plan." and the

12. Hismry ojrhr Co,,?n~~ni.?r

Pony of rhc Sovier Union (Bolshrviksj .S/!orl Ciurre (Moscow, 1945).

Sowr Pcwer A Srurly ojCollecrivr2o,ion ( E v a n r r o ~ ~1968).

.
proropu kornniu,!rimo (Munich. 19b0).

Chap. 12; and N Valenli~~or,

Dokl"no

1.

mmnlcnls on Hu~llcr'rarticle by Stcpl>ev~Cuhen and Morhe Lewin in 718,,.Tl,,,vrr Rei,iciviIto~te.1973).

Huntcr'r rcferc!>cel o (he wild Inreel incresxq appcan on p. 239.
14. For a rel>rerenlvliveslaLenlcn1 of this belief, see C . H. Carr aud R. W. Davits. ~ounrloiioar
ofa Plonncd Econo,n)r 1 9 2 6 2 9 , \'"I Osc. Purl I(London, 19b9). pp. 269-70, wbrrr the aulllo~s
wile. inter olio. "If ir~duslriali~.rlinr~
was a ro~~dition
of col1cctivii;tliun. colteclivirafion was a

candilion or i~tduslrializatiol~
"

f
Robert C. Tucks

84

at the titoe; collectiviza~io~i

was ellvisaged as the presupposition o f a form ol
i n d u s t r i a l i z a t i o ~geared
~
t o tlie priority of heavy industry and war induslry ova
es
greater dcvelopmet~tw < ~ u lhave
d
heert a sins
the cot~sunier-goodsi ~ ~ d u s t r i whose
quo nun o f a Soviet i n d u s t r i a l i z a t i o ~w~i l h i n the frame of a continuetl rural NEP.
I n llre event, howcver, the economic co~isequcr~ces
o f collcctivizntior~were ul
calastrophic that recent researches by Weslerr~scliolars. supporled by archival
data published i n 1968 and 1969 by the Soviet fiistoriar~ A . A. Barsov, have
reached the conclusior~sthat (I)"mass collectivizatio~~
o f Soviet agriculture must
be reckoned as an unmitigated ecol~omicpolicy disaster," axid (2) "the oppressive
state agricultural procurement system, rather than serving t o extract a inet contri.
bution iron1 agriculture as a whole, should be credited will1 preventing the
n
Ii
collectivization disaster from disrupting the i ~ ~ d u s l r i a l i z a t i odrive."

Winism nr

:
.
?

I
f

Only t w o major aspects o f the Stalinist revolution fro111above have been discussed
here. A n y adequate account, even o f fundaniet~rals,would have to consider also :
the state-building process which went on pari parrrr w i t h mass collectivization
and induslrializstio~~:
tlie expar~siuno f t h e bureaucratic state alrp;iratus, the huge
growl11 of the systen~o f forced labor, the c o ~ ~ c o ~ n i t g; ~r onw
t l l i o f the politic
economic police elripire which a d n i i ~ ~ i s l e r eit,d and t l ~ eexlrcme centralizati
o f t h e state power. Something more w i l l be said about this below. Concelltrati
for tlie present on collectivizatio~~
and industrialization, I want t o ask why they
;
took place i n the Stalinist way.
Accordilig t o a view which draws part o f its i ~ ~ s p i r a t if o
r o~mi Trotsky's thinking
and which achieved wide i l i f l u e ~ ~ cowing
e
t o its espousal hy Isaac Deutscher,
i
S t a l i ~ ~ ii~~dustrinlieatiost-cum-collcctiviz;~tioli
st
( w h i c l ~i>culscl~crcalls "lhe stt.
ond revolutio~i")was a l~ecessitaledresponse t o a "grave social crisis" o f the lata i
1920's. Citing Stalin'sstatistics, Deulscher states that in January 1928, in particu. !
lar. government grain purchases fell short by t w o million lolls o f [lie ~ n i ~ ~ i n i u r n
needed l o feed the urban populationl6 Emergency measures were applied by the :
g o v e r ~ ~ m e ot to extract grain that was being w i t l ~ t i e l dfro111 the marker. The
peasants were not, for the most part, polilically motivated against the Sovid
regime, but were driven by eco~iomiccircumstances, i n that the small farm
produced only enough t o meet the peasants' o w n food needs while the "big
farn~ers" w i t h surpluses were charging prices beyond the ability o f the town
population t o pay and also were demanding concessioos t o capitalist fartiiin& '
In this dilemma, yielding t o the peasants would antagonize the urban working i
class, and refusal t o yield would also bring a threat of famine and urban u l ~ r a t t
A "radical salutioo" was demanded, and Stalin, having u n t i l the very lasl rnw !

'

15, Janter R. Millar. "Mass Cotlecliviuliun and rheCor~lribuliot~olSovict

Agriculture l o llw Fim
Five-Year Plan: A Review Article," 7'1re Slavic Review, Dmenlber 1974. pp. 761, 765.
16. Isaac Dealrcl~cr,Slolin: A Puliricollliopropl~y.
21drd. (New York. 1967). p 313. Thephrur
"a grave a x i a l

cnrir" appears wn p. 312.

.
j

Rcut,lsli<,a

frosm Above

85

men1 shrunk from :III upl~eaval,acted "under l h r overwhelniir~gpressure of

menls" and enibarkcd upon tllc secon~lrevr~lutiuni t ) an "u~~premeditated,
prsgmalic n ~ a t ~ ~ ~I lccr was
. " "prucipiti~tcdillto collcctivizntiot~by tlie c l ~ r o n i crlnljgelo l f a r ~ ~iin~ ~
1928
e l t i d 1929." 17
Such, ill D c r i ~ s c l ~ c rc1;rssic
's
vcrsi<lt~,i s lllc " c i r c t ~ t ~ ~ r t : ~ nexplar~;tti<,n''
liaI
(nu
wc niay call i t ) of 1l1e inilial phase ul' lhc Stalinist r c v o l u l ~ c ~li-urn
n
above. 11 is
lollowed by Carr and Davies will1 specific rrferc~lcct o tlie collectiviznlion drive.
Having s11owt1Ilia1 party policy, i ~ ~ c l u d i n
tliat
g o f the Lefts such as Trolsky and
Preobrazhe~~sky,had always c~~visaged
a gradualistic approach i n co1lectiviz1tion, Carr and Davics find the enplanntiol~fur rhe abs~idonrnentof gradualisn~
in favor of "direct assault" ill "tlie now clironic alid il-remediable crisis of the
grain collections" and " t l ~ edire ~ i e e dfor grain l o feed town and lictories." They
goon: "111 this dcspcrate impasse, the lenders snatcl~rdeagerly at l l ~ cgrowing
belief i n the prospects o f collective agriculture and ill i l s capacity t o meet the
needs of a plarmed econuniy." Anrl, echoing Deutscher, they declare l h t ~ "llie
t
sudden decisiou reached at lhc e t ~ do f 1929 !*.as rlcill~erpreco~~ceived
riot premeditated." l 8This rest:lles Cnl-r'c c;~rlierargument (likewise an eello of Deutscl~er's)
ha1in the sulnnier of 1929 the system ofoflicial grain c o l l e c l i u ~ ~hat1
s eficlivcly
wmed :ahcad. T l ~ ep t o b l e ~ ioi f s u p p l y i ~ ~town
g
and faclories h;ld h e c o f ~ ~ctrme
lelely i~~traclahlc.
Gradualisni was rtot enough." 'I'lien, too, Carr 11:1d referred
1"lhe haphazard and irnpolsivc character o f the final decisioli." 1 ' Elsewl~ere.
,rRrrir~gl o the industrial revolutioli from above, Carr m e ~ ~ t i otlie
~ i sso-called war
a r e of 11127 after the severance o f diplomatic relstio~isw i t h Soviet Russia by
~ d on t o say that "the security molive i n the drive t o c a ~ c l ~
Great Britain, a ~ goes
up with the west by rapid industrialization should not be ovcrlooked." 2"
The C~~CLI~IISI:II~~I;II
c s p l : ~ ~ ~ :I!;,! l i ~hcctt
~ ~ ~~ ~ l l i i r c~
c l I:II still IIIOTC c x l r r m c ~ < I ~ I I I
by Alexatider G c r s c l i e l ~ k r oi ~
n ~lhis lhcsis t l ~ t r ltlie economic crisis ;)I t l i r end o f
the NEP era was alsr, a "polilic:rl crisis of the first rnagnilude." H e explains:
"Inability l o nlitinlitin llje k l ~ sd ~ ~ ~ > ptol i IIIU
m cities a t ~ t lhc
l g r n \ v i l ~ gI . C S ~ S ~ ~ I I ~ C
ofthe ~ n i l l i o l i or f the pcilsin~ts,SII.O~I~: i n I l ~ e i irl ~ l a l ~ g i bdifilsion,
lc
SC~IIIC~ to s ~ c I I
the doom o f t l ~ eSuviet dict:ilorsliip." A llircat existed l o the c o l ~ t i ~ l u a t i oonf t l i e
I1 Ibid. pp. 31 X. 322. Dcul\cl~errepeals Illis irllerprclaliw~181 lirieler lorn> 1%~.
Prupliri Ovirm,:
Tmoiiy, 1921)-/94O(NcwYork, l965), pp. 67-68 Fol a <<,mewhat diITcrent ;altrolpl lo expiair\ l11c
Slali~lislrevillstioat by rc<molnicitccesslty, sec Maurice Uobb. St13,icr ,?co,>o,,ric Uc~i',.lop,rirrrr.Since
1917, rev a).(Ne\v Yclrk, I9661, p. 214.
I8 Carr and Da%,irs,Fo,dndnrii~,~r
of,! P101111edEcorroml:
pp. ZM, 26% 269. Apropm Trnlsky and
Prmbrazhenrky. tlte;~olhorrlr<siltlout (p. 265) III;IIi n 1925 Trolsky wrote rrl"thc gradu;d lran~rltio~l
l o c o l l t i l i r c failmli8s" rrllicll would he possible wt>cnllre inrcrssi8ry Icch~licalbare !had heen created:
md that "Preob~;~rl~c~~sky'n
drastic ixnal?<s lhsd hcrn conducled \vitl>iwihc frail1c1\~0rhof NEI' and

onthe assulllp:ionr o l r in>;wkrlro,ll<,#~~y."

Farlber. "l'moh~rzbcnrkys1tcr\vnrd<spoke 01'?herapid
mnvcrrion olnlilliotl~
o l r l l ~ a lpcr5ntlt
l
lloldi~lgrlo colleclivc farms' as 'a llling r n o 1 1 ~01 US f t i l ~ s : $ ~ , . '
The laller starerllcr>l wss ~natlea! the S e r c r ~ t r e ~ l tPany
ll
O~ngresrit, 1934.
19. C.H. Carr. "Rrr<,lution rro8n Ahwe- Tllc Road loCullectiviralioa," ih, Tlte O c l o t r Rca,htiuri
8cj1rcond A J i e r ( N e a Ywk. 196'1). pp. 104. 109. I be cited r's:ly war lirrt puhlirllid ill 1967.
20. E II.C a r l . "llrllwtioos on Suvicl I~~dusl~isli,~~tic~~~,"
ihcd.. p. 121
"

t
86

Rubrrt C T u r k

Soviel repirile ill these c o n d i t i o ~ i s ,G e r s c l i e ~ i k r o ~

asserts,
i
atirl "it was under the
pressure o f Ilia1 threat that S l a l i n u n d c r w c n l :I r:idic;il c l l ; ~ ~ i g oe f riiitid and
erlibarked u p u r i the gamble o f t h e F i r s t Five-Year I'li~~i."
21
111 D e u l s c l ~ e r ' sr e r s i o n o f t h e c i r c u ~ ~ ~ s t a ~ei txi la~l l a t ~ a t i o
as~ lias
~ , been not&
Slaliti. l l i e p o l i t i c a l leader o f t l ~ er e v ~ , l u l i u t ~f r o t i i : ~ b ~ v e:ll>l)ears
,
as a gre! /
i m p r o v i s e r w h o responded to tile pressure o f extretiiely adverse national circum. '
stances i n "at] unpremeditated, pragmaric ~ i i a n n e r . " 111 consollance with thin
view, D e u t s c l ~ e calls
r
Stalia
~~
rn;iui of";~lrnosr i ~ n l ? c r s < ~ ipcrsc~tiality."
~:tI
2 2 A l l thii
received later elabnratiun in Cnrr's c l ~ n r a c l e r i z a l i cofS1:1li11
~~~
;IS"Ilie tilost irnpa.
sonal o f great historical figures." T o s l i o w what h e calls "tlie essentially is~pcr- .
sonal character o f Stalitlist policy," C a r r slates I l l a t n o element o f personal j
conviction, !!or any o r i g i n a l i t y o f conception, was i n v o l v e d wllen Slalin look !
E
leadership o f t h e i n d u s l r i a l r e v o l u l i o n from ahuvc. T l ~ c a i ~ ihe
i s rullilessly pursucd
w c r e those "dictated b y the d y n n n i i c force i n h e r e ~ i ti n l h e r e v o l u t i o n itself." His
qualities, l i k e liis convictions, w c r c those o f his milieu; t h e y "niirrored tl~ecurrenl

'

stage o f the historical process." H i s r u l e it1 Soviet l i i s t u r y was tliat o f "the g r e l

executor o f r e v o l u l i o ~ i a r ypolicy" w i t h "no visiuti of w h e r e i t w o u l d lead.""
111seeming inconsistelicy w i t h the image o f an a l l h o t niindlcss political i m p m
viscr ctrnjured u p b y the d e s c r i p t i a t ~o f Staliti cited ahove. I>eulsrhcr doesallor
lIi;~l
the I T ~ ~ I I w h o l c d Soviet l<ussin ill t h c r c v o l u t i u t ~fro111a l x ~ v eilcted OI cet!zin
ideas. B u t l i e niailitains tliat lllese were borruwed f r o m ulhers. " T h e i d e a s o f l k
secotid revolution w c r e not liis," Deutscher writes. " H e i i c i l h c r loresaw it nor

1
1

prepared for it. Y e l 11r. a n d i n n s c ~ ~ sliec alotlc. : ~ c c c ~ ~ i i ~ ~ lit."

i s h 2e4dWhcrsc idcas
were they, lhcn'? D e ~ t l s c l i c rdocs ~ i r l dl i r c c l l y say. ;illl111ogl1 sonic p:~yes l i ~ t c rIIC
n o t s 1l1at Y u r i Lzlrill, "a sccolld-rate e c o ~ ~ , n i i s tonce
,
a riglit-wing Met~slie~~ik."
had prup:~p:~tedt l l c i d c x o f a "seco~icl r c v u l u t i o l ~ " ill the c o t j ~ ~ t r y s i dase early ;IS
1925.2i W e arc lcfl 10 illfcr III:II t i l e i d m s ill questio!~w c r c thosc ~ r f r e p r c s c t l l i ~ t i v e s
of the Lest o l > p o s i t i o l ~l i k e I'reobrazlie~isky. w h o lhad pr,~poutided i n tlie carly
1920's the idca o f "pritnilive s t ~ c i a l i s l a c c i ~ n ~ ~ ~ l a l i o ni.e.,
." itirluslrinlizati~~~i
~ h r o u g el ~n l ~ l o i t i ~ t i cchiefly.
~r~.
d ' l h c r u r a l eccrnrIniy. Y e t I>eutscher :llso ~lerl;trcs.
and riplllly so i n I l l i s illsl;lllvc. I h n l "lllcrc was 11tr q t ~ c s t i o ~ill
i , l l t c vicw r r f l l l e
kft Bolslieviks, u f d r i v i t ~ gt h e peasants i l l t o collective farms b y force. 'l'he switcllover from private 111 colleclive Sarmitlg mas t u be carried o u t gradually, w i t h the
pcasa~its'own c o ~ ~ s e n l .2"" T h e strange upshot i s lh:~lSlalit! is tre:~ted b o t h as
a leader w l i o actcd u l i d e r rclcrltless pressure o f c i l - c u m s t s t ~ c e sw i l h o u l precolik v e d idcas, and as o r ~ ew l l ~ acted
r
will! o r o,r certain ideas which, however, were
not his OWII. B u t tllose whose ideas tllese presumably were d i d 1101 think. ill t h e
Slalinist w:ly, u f collectiviz;~tion as a r e v o l u l i o t ~ a ~leap
- y w l i i c l i t h e state w o u l d
ac~onlplislib y cuercive meatis. 111 sllorl, whatever ide;~s S l e l i t ~l o o k l i u m t h e
c n l w l ~ i l eL d t r~ppostion,the idca o f a cuercive r e v o l u t i o r ~Srum above \vas nut
one o f them.

It is a central thesis o f # l i e present essay that the circumstantial explan;ition.

n a ~ w i t l ~ s t a t i dai ~c~egr l a i ~speciuus
l
plausil)ilily, is fiit:~llyHawed, a n d tliat we shall
21. A1exall~lr.rG c r ~ c b e , ~ k r uE<o,?o,?irc
~~.
Bodw~ord,r,lrwin ili.~iorlcol/'err/,ecnve(Ncw Ynrk. 19ba
not al1:1i11 a tetlable view o f S t a l i r ~ i s nii n its f u t i d a ~ i i e l ~ l :abpcct
il
as r e v o l u l i o ~f r~o n i
1pp. 14445. Ge~scbet~kro~,
lutllrer rtatrs (p. 145). "Vipwed its a hIri,rl-rul~n>e:~rure,lhc p o r p x d
lhc Firs! Fivc.Yclr I'hts war lo break lhc disequilihri~rtrtIllrough i~lcrci~sc
in c o ~ ~ r ~ ~ c ~ ~
nulp.
r r . g n c ~above u l i l i l this is utrdel-sloud. T h e circutr~sl;lnliz~l
e x p l a l ~ a t i o tis~ fl:~wcd, first, ill
hssrd on i t x r w c in pl;#sl cdpacity." ulthuvgh once the peasant\ Ih;~dheen li,rcerl iltto tllc kolkhag
theutterly u l l p r o v c l l i l a t u r c of i l s a s s u l i l p t i ~ ~II:II
~ t ~ cullectivi7atio1i i t 1 i l i c terroris"the handr o l the xovcrnn,ent were unlied. lhcre war oo lklil~er
. a t l .v rcarrul lo ronard the EN
tic Torni that il t o o k =,as t h e o t ~ l yrealistic alternative Sor t h e Soviet regimc ill
Fiuc.Ycar t'liln as 3 sell-colltaincd brief ptriod ofrapid induslrialiralir,!l, and l l l ~
I)LII.~OSE o f i ~ ~ d u ~ l b
1929, niucli less a sitre qrro ~ l o r rof i l s survival as G e r s c l i c n k r o n suggests.
Eveti
rlization !?a$ no lollger in relieve llae sl~ortaeeof coirsunler gooclq'' (11. 146). I t clocr IIDI i l p p
allowing that l l t e regirrie was faced ill 1027-28 wit11 SOIIICI~I~I~~ l i k e a 1,c;rs;trlt
nccurale lo say 1I1al l l l e slsill lpurpo-e oftlle Brsl Plrn \va\ 111 illc!ra\c roo\o!#lrl.-gllodr pnrdaclim
ill nrly e%,elll,lhc Illrust ofthe i~~duslni~lizuti(m
drivcirn 1929 13 w i l l t~>\,icr<I
ll8~
th~8tlding~ ~ p o l h m v "grain strike" (10 use t l ~ clo:~dcrl Slrorr (i>arrctcrmi~~r,logy),~hel-cis IO seritrtls
ih>rlurlry.and cotlran,er-goods supply decli~~erl
ion Russia bnp011 I I ~ cI ~ t t r l ! ! ~ i ~ l i ~(sf
) # IIIC
l
NCP,
evidence o f i n c i p i c ~ ~ xt l l i l i c ; i l r e h c l l i u u s ~ ~ e si ns l l i e c u u r ~ f r y s i d en l I l l a t l i ~ n c iltid
;
22. Sri,li,i: A Poliiin~lBio~mopity.p. 273. Trotrky'r influore is rellwted ill Deutscher'i pond
there
is
evidence
o
f
gctieral
pensallt
:icceplallce
t
h
e
Soviet
regime,
wllalevcr
ul Slatit) ;aa prsgn~atirtand ~tnproviserwho would a r l w!llnottl pre!,trd6t;ction under prarurrd
hespecilic griev:lncer l l l a l cilllsed peasat!ls l o g r u m b l e or t o w i t h h o l d grain fro111
cirrumrlunces. See, for example, Trotsky's characteristic de%rripliosof Slillfn i s "a nlan ill w h a
Ihe niarket ill e x p e c t a t i ~ ~
o ft ~m o r e return. N o r , as already i t ~ d i c a t e dhas it lheet~
ctlerpy, wiil and reralutc~~ers
are conthincd witla nlq>irici%sl.~m).opia. an organic tnclirlalion 16
oppoMuc~irtdecisio>~r
ibi great qorrtiu~~s,
personal mdcut-5s.di4oy;llty itrmd i s rri~dinewlarhusr pm , showt~,i ~ o is
r i t true, tliat l l ~ eterroristic collectivation was a tieccssily fnr the
it! older to ?uppressl l l e party " Leon Trulrky, "A Contnhution lo llnr t'olitirsl MiographgofSlalio..
I
in Tlrt Stolirr Schuoi ofFi~Is$coriot> (Ncw York, 1'162). p. 198. 'The h o k w.ls nriglnally puhlirhol
; 24. Yoii,!: A Palli!kol Ifioyrr~~p~~.y.
is 1937.
11. 295.
23. E. H. Csrr, So~.io/ismin Oliv Coi,,zrry 1924-/926(Nrw York. 1'4681, Vol I,p p 177. I S 5 . T k ;
25. lhid.. 1., 319, Slalil,. 1)e~rtrchrrc~hserver.11 lhal earlier lime disnlirsed t.arivt's itaiun 8 % n
characlerization is repeated with only very slight nlodilicnlio8l in fourrdorio,>r ofo Plorzned Econcm~
?tanks 1de;t:'
(Vol. 11. p. 448) where Carr and Dsvies dese~.ihrSli,lio as "lhe repres~erllali~e
figure oilhe p c r i c
26. Ihid.. p 303. Elsewhere Deutrcher expands OIL the relauol~ofllle Stal~r>isl
course l o the Lefts'
potrant as follo~vs"The Oppoqitiorl w;t!lted i~~duslrialiiatio~t
and collectivirolion to he carried out
adding: "Slalin's personalily,combined with lhe primiliveand cruel tr8dllioor oflhe Kusian burmu.
rn lhc hnmd dayliplit o l proletarian denlocracy, with the cu~~rent
or the rnnrres aod frce initcativr
racy. imparted to llle revolutia~~
from nbove a parliculnrly hrutal cl>aractrr,which lhar romcilna
ohrcurrd the fut~damortalhistorical prnblenm iovolrcd." l h e aulhorr do not r a y what they maa , Ymm hlaw': wltcrc:.;lr Slalis !cliecl 1111 lhc I<ITCC
oftbe decree and coerciou froln shove. All l l ~ \ifime.
c
itol
by "the fundamental hirlorical prr,blenlr involved." hut vile tllc ilifere81cc lhar ihey are i,>vuk~ng: !kOppodlios~ 11;nd r l w d for ~vlvallhc war doing even if ihc wily lhc WRS dllilq il wi~st ~ l , ~ # g ~ >II,
what wr have called the eircsn,stantial expla!>nlin~>
of the revolulior> frolri ahovr.
, lhm " rht, PropI~eIOr,rrorl, p. 7U.
~

88

Rnhcrt C. TUC~I

results achieved i n the it~duslriali;.alion ellirrl during l l ~ cP l n t ~ycars. As for the

secnrity motive ro which C a r r referred, g r o w i ~ t gout o f l l ~ eexlernal ~ e ~ ~ s i of
ons
1926-27, a recent and carer111scholarly rcvicw o f the facts, while it indicates l l t a l
the war scare was niore than a mere s11at11and conlriv;~ncco f iolra-party co~~tlicls
of the tinlc and probably enjoyed a certain credence on l l ~ par1
e
o f uarious Soviel
leading fignres, also corlcludes lltat "thc war score was in facl grossly and crudely
manipulated b y Sovict politiciatts ill 1!)27." 2' There were. as I would put it,
grounds for Soviet concerli about external r e l a l i o ~ ~ins Europe, ;llthough nut, at
that liltte, for serious fear of an onconling crralilion war against lhe USSR; but
thepnr.ribilityof war was brandisl~edas a j u s t i l i c a t i o ~for
~ the developing Slalinisl
orientation ill inlernal policy.
T l l c c i r c u ~ t l s l ; l ~ ~c~x ip:l~aIn o l i o ~of~ fi,racrl 11las9~ ~ ~ l l e ~ l i v i 7 i 1Ililrtlly
l i 0 1 1 s(luare3
with the tiow d e ~ ~ ~ o t t s t ~ .conclusiun,
ated
cited carlier f r o n ~Millar, lltal thiscourse
proved ill practice a11 "unrr~itigated e c o ~ l o ~ ~policy
l i c disaster," nor is it cogenl
that a policy which directly and indirectly produced l l ~ worsl
e
fanline i n Russia's
famine-plagued history. that of 1932-34, wltich cost a conservatively estimated
five r n i l l i o ~ tlives,ZR was necessitated by l l ~ eneed to aver1 a famine. Altltough
historical "~nigl~l-11ave-bee~~s"
are just as d i f i c u l t to c s ~ a b l i s as
l ~ arc argumena
of the "(here-was-oo-other-possible-course" type, the i~~sistetitly
emerging conclusion from scholarly researches based on the more abundanl data now available
from Sovict sources is that "a c o ~ i l i n u a l i oo~fi the N e w Econonric Policy ofllte
1920s would have pcrmitted at least as rapid a rale o f iridustrialization n'ith leu
cost to the t ~ r b a ras
~ well as to thc rural populaliun o f the Soviet U ~ t i o n . " In
effect, infor~ltedand tliougl~tfttlltislorical lii~idsiglttis c o l ~ l i r ~ ~ l the
i t t gbasic ec*
noniic realisn~of the program for a bala~tcedi~tdustrializaliottpolicy within the
frame o f a colttinuing N E P that Bukharin presented in his Provdo article of
Seplcrltber 30, 1928, "Notes o f an Economist." ' 0 The Bukharinist non-revolu.
tionary alternative for Soviet i ~ ~ d u s t r i a l i z a l i opolicy
n
at the close rrf the twe~~lia,
an alter~tativeillspired ill large part hy the L e ~ ~ i l t itllinking
st
o f 1921-23 discussd
earlicr hcre, was real. H a d i t been adopted, i t could well have worked; had it
worked poorly, the cosl to the Soviet econorny could tot have curnparcd with

''

27. Jrlhn P. So!>lrg,"Tile Snviel War Scare of 192627," Tire Ruaian Revieis: Inltuary 1971. p.
77. See also Leonard Schitpiru. The Co,n,nu,iirr Puny vjrhv Soviri U~rio,,(New Yurk, 19591, p. 111.
where it is staled: "There war little prorpcct of any kind of invasion ill 1928."
2%. Dana 0.Dalrympl,le."The Soviel Famine of 1922-34," Sovir~iSiiidirr. Janonry 1964, 13. b l .
29. Milliw, up. cil., p. 766. One of the sources cilrd by Millar i n I l l i s rrvicw essay is a s ailick
hy Karr, who writes chat "thc dnmsgc done to agriculture within the first three years ofthe indunntl.
iration drive was so revere that it affwled adverselyi t * .hilily 10 cnnlrihute rig<liRcrt>tly
to furlhs
e~o!~~m
dcvelopmmt:'
ic
Karz concludes that "lhcre i s a sig~~ifi~nnl
probability" II1aI l l l e Savh
dilcmntil in agrarian policy toward the end of N E P was not one thal hod lo he rerulvd b
collcclivira~ionatad ihcaunciatcd con>pulrnryprocurement offarm products or by the nbasdonmml
ofa sendhle nnd innitial induaridliwliun dnve"Sre Jerzy F. Karz, "Frorn Slnlin t o Brrzl~ncu:SnwO
~griculturalPolicy is) Historical Pe'enpcctive:' in TheSovier R~trolC,~i>rt,izmit,: cd. Ja!ner R. Milk
(Urbana. 197th pp. 41. 51.
30. For recenl arguments lo this cfTmt, see Cohcn. B~kllorinond the Uoirhevik RevoIriio,l. Chap
9 and Epilogue, and Lewin. Polrrrcol Undercurrents. pp. 52-61.

Slslinirnn ss Rorolutivt~fro", Aborc

89

that which l ~ a dto bc paid ibr tile SL;~lit~ist

soluliur~.Suclt, also, is tlie p o s i t i o ~ ~
of an i ~ ~ f l u e t l l i ascltool
l
of colttentporary posl-Sfalin Soviel politico-eco~~ontic
lhougl~lwhose "scarcely veiled eodorsentent of Rukharin's induslrializalion
strategy" has been persuasively argued and documented by Moslie Lewirt.)l
At this poillt, a ~ n u d i f i c n t i oof
~ ~l l ~ ecircurnstat~tinle x p l ; ~ ~ ~ a t intighl
o r ~ suggest
itself: if Stalit~isrnwas riot the necessary or sole practicable course tltat it o ~ t c c
reenled l o be, i t was t~evel-lllelessso perceivedat tlte time by tlte decision-ntakers,
who after all had l o act w i t l ~ o o tforek~~owletlge
of the wllole sequence of erects,
including catastrophic cunsequenccs, w l ~ i c their
l ~ decisions would bring ah1111l.
The dilliculty with such n hypothetical fitllback position (and lltis 111ay explai~t
why still-livin! a r l l ~ e r e ~nf
~ l ctile circumstanlinl expl:i~tatic~tthave not lakc11 i t ) i s
[hat nuoicrous Dolshrvik 111inds ill Mcrscow a n d a r t ~ u r ~t ld~ ccoulltry, i ~ t c l u ~ l i n g
some and possibly even a majority ill tlie Polilburo, did trur perceiw rhe Sfo1i111:sr
course as the only possible nclion ru toke irr rhe circ~,~ii.rmncesrhor oblni/r;~ly.
Bukharin, in a c l a n d e s l i ~ ~conversalion
e
of July 1928 wit11 Kame~tevw l r i c l ~becanie widely known ill party circles. clearly lirresaw the catastropl~iccoltsequences of Stalin's c o ~ ~ l e ~ l ~ p l rur:%l
a t e d revolutior~from ahovc. 11 was, he s;~id.
aruinous policy cnurse s i g ~ ~ i r yai ~relllrn
~ g 10 War C o n ~ ~ i t t ~ ~a~cclurse
i s n ~ ,leitding
to civil war, l o an t~prisingl h ; ~ t \\,\.oold have l o be drowned i n bloud.32 Hi*
prevision proved well founded i n essence if not i n specific detail.
Thc hypothetical fallback position cannot save llte c i r c u m s ~ a ~ ~explanatiort
tial
because it leaves open and u~lexplainedIlle facl l h a l the r u l i ~ party
~ g was divided
l i t ~ f l u e ~ ~ tscctioti
ial
in its appraisal of the c i r c u n ~ s t a ~ ~ cine s1928-29 and t l ~ a an
of Soviel political o p i n i o ~opted
~
for a course i n a g r a r i a ~policy
~
and indusrrializalion that would l ~ a v ebeen cvolulionary, ill a c c o r d ; ~ ~ ~with
c e the lalcr Lenin's
counsel, rather t l i a ~rcvolulionary.
~
'l'l~e i ~ ~ e v i l a bnext
l e queslion-wl~y d i d {lie
cvoluliu~~ists
go down l o defeat i n l l ~ eparty slrugple, o r why d i d Slalinisn~
win?--ca~tnolbe answered b y refere~~c'e
l o the socioeco~lon~ic
circu~itsla~lces
nvcr
which I h e q n ~ ~ r rragcd
el
i n nolsl~evikcircles. 11can be answered o ~ ~by
l yrcfcrencc
to the factors lltal deterntinerl tlte Slolir~i.srrcrpu/r.rr l o 111ccircu~t~slnnccz
and i l s
polilical victory. Tlle circuti~stnr~ces
as such c a ~ ~ f~u ~
r ~o~ ti sthe
h explana~iono f
Ihe revolulio~ifro111 above.

One of tlic forccs ct~n(luciveto 3 Slalit~istr e v o l t ~ t i u ~ ~ a

respolise
ry
anlong 110Ishevik politicians was l l ~ eother L c n i ~ l - l l ~ c still very i ~ ~ l l t ~ e o trevolulioriary
ial
Lenin of the War Cununut~ismperiod and t l i r heritage o f Bolshevik revolulionism
[hat the oilier Leltin syn~bulized.1( is ttndersla~tdablethat Bukharin, involved
-

11. L.ewil>,I'olirb~~I
U,rdcrcvrro~l.?,Chap. 12.
32. Tllr Bukhari!l-Knnlenev co~tversstiaai s Ducurne~llTI 897 in the Trotsky Archives at Hiward
Univsrily. Funher llislorirnl tcslimul~yl a the eficl tlanl the disaslrour consequence< o l lhr Stalinist
murx were rore.icnl by sonic well.knuw!i Soviet solton~islr ill lltr later 1920's is given by
N. Vslentinov, "17 lpll~slllogo,"So~sio/i.ricikiivermik, April 1961, pp. 68-72.

911

Slolinirnl as

Ruherl C . 'I'wker

as lie was ill a politicel struggle agait~stStalin : ~ n dllie p ~ l i c i ~IIC

h W ~ ad\.ucitl~~~g
S
i n 1928-29, trealed Lc~titt's1;ist writings as Iiis "l~olitical testii~iic~it.";III~
11131
is certailily what L e ~ t i nhiniself itttct~dedillern to be. 13111 ihr llie 13olsllevik
Iiiovetiletlt a ~ part)',
~ d L~II~II's p i ~ l i t i ~ .Iie~sl I a i i ~ e ~W:IS~ t lltc c111i1.ecorpus (11his
I l ~ o u g l i tatid \vriling, the whole record o f his revolutionsry learlersltip of the
niovctnent up to, during, aud alter [lie Octobcr Revnlulint~:and Leilirl's political
lestilrtient ill tliis tilore c o n i p r e l ~ e ~ ~ sselise,
i v e o r L e ~ t i ~ t i s as
t n ;I wliole. c o ~ ~ t s i ~ i e d
very 11i11cl1I l i i t t Stalin :>!id S t a l i t t i s t ~had
~ goorl c l a i n ~10 as ;a11 autltoritative text
slid warralil fur tlie policies followed i n tile revolution lion1 above.
Tlte very idea o f ;I process o f "revolulio~t from nhove." 1skc11ill the must
gcner;il ternts. h;ls a Leninist pedigree. Evcn i t 1 o11e o f l ~ i slost a r t i c l e cited ahore,
Le1ti11spoke o f uvcrtaking other nations " ~ i t htlie aid 01' thc workc~s'and
pc;~sants' govcrtiiiient." Uut the idea o f r e v o l u t i o ~from
~
ahove liaz ;I deeper place
i n Leni~t'sthought. When he c o n t e ~ ~ d ei nd TIreSrure orrd Reloiririon i n 1917, and
i n s ~ c l si~hsequent
i
works as Tile P r o l ~ ~ r o r i ~Revolrr/iu,r
,r
a n d rhe Reliegode
Karrtsky, that tlie doctrine o f proletarian dictalorshil> was l l i c core idea of Marr.
is111atid t11;tl Marxisni callcd for a seizure o f power followed by rlictatol-ial rule
by violcnce against the i ~ l t e r l ~ ;bourgeoisie
tl
and associ;tted social rnrccs, he was
s a y i ~ ~ Tile
g : revolution docs not end \vitli the pnrly's taking i>fpower: tliat i s only
~ s o f historical transition beyolid which the party cottlinues its
a ~ n o m e t i l o ~point
revoluliotiary deslruction o f the o l d order froni above, i.c, by wielding the
coerci\'e instruments of state power against the revolution'? class rncn~ies.Lenin~
above meant tlie use o f state power for tlie continuation or
ist r e v o l u t i o ~frnm
class war of/cr the revolutiotiary party lias achieved sucli pouaerand furnled its
gover~tt~ient
under tlie title orUpn,letariat~dictatorship." 3 3 T11is basic idea round :
ils sharpest, tltouglt by 110 means its only, later expressioli i r t Lenin's prospectus
o f 1919 for a work (never conipleted) on the proletariar~dictarorsliip. Two pas.
sages are especially ~lolahle:"The dictatorsllip o f [lie prulctariat is the cotrri~rrro.
riot1 o r t l i e class struggle i n nea'forrns. That is tlic crux o f the ~ i i i i l t e rtltnt
:
is whal
they d o 1101 uliderstand." A n d : "The state is only a nrupurr o f tlie proletariat in
its class struggle. A special k i n d o f cudgel (~/uluDi~rka),riel1 dc plus." i4 Whether
Leniii cver used tlie phrase "from above" i t 1 arguing tliis i ~ o t i o tot f t h e proletarian
g
struggle lion1 tlte van1;tge-point of
dictatorship as a c o ~ i t i t ~ u i t irevolutionary
'
state power is o f 110 consequence; the idea was unrtiistakably present ill his
thougllt.
I t is lrue that as early as 1919, at the lieiglil o f the C i v i l War slid War Corniiturcisttt, we find inti~nariortsill Lenin o i t h e transition t o the later reformist approach ;
t o the building o f socialism tliat has been described earlier i n these pages. Tltis I
:

4
33. For ao argunlrnl by ihr young S t d i n slung thew liues, srr Itis esiey o l 1906, "Anarchiui?or
Socialinn7" in I.Stali,t. Sochi,~e,!,~ri( M u s o w . 1954), 1. 34546. Hc cited as hlr aulllorlly lherc no1 1
L c ~ ~but
i n lhe passage in TI,@Conit,!unirr Monfcsroaboul lhe pralclsn:!l's becouli8lg llle raliog clsrr :
and using its polilical powcr to deprive the bourgeoisie of i l s capitol slcl~hy slcp, r l c .
34. 7%c Lrniin AsrhuP,gy, p. 4'M. The prorpcctur waq firs1 publ~shrd
i n 1925 it8 Lrttt+~rkiiShornzk
I l l . Tllr "lhey" who "do not understand were not idenlkfied: Lcnili t r ~ i i yIrilve had in nliud such
people as Knutsky and the Russian Mcnrhevikr.

R c v e l l l l i ~ ~from
n
Al,c,rr

91

t r a ~ t s i t i ~was
t ~ associatec willt the idc:~tliat the f u ~ t d i ~ ~ i i robstacle
r ~ l i ~ l to soci;~lisn~
was fhe body of lhabit left over frotn the past a ~ that
~ d the r e v o l u t i ~ ~ ~ i i zof
ing
habit-in ollicr words, of culture-was o i l Jbrld an educatior~altask riltlter t l ~ a n
one to be resolvcil by n l c r u i r c inieil!~s. 111 Iiis article of M a y 1919, "A C;rc;it
Beginni~~g,"LCII~II
hailed a workers' iniliativc o f v u l u ~ t t a r yu ~ ~ p aSaturday
id
work
(Ihe Communist rrrbhr~r~lik)
;is ;I dcvclopment of enornious historical sigtiificaiice.
and observed ill Illis c o n ~ ~ r o t i oltli ~ a "the
l
dictat<~rsltipo i the prole1:tri;it i s ,lot
only llie ttse of rorce i ~ g c ~ i ~the
t s l exploiters, and not even n ~ a i r ~ the
l y osc of
force." 3 5
But it would not he proper tu (liscc!unt ~ I this
I
evidence tlie L c n i ~f~,r
~ wlinrn
revolutiolt \c.ils. ill Ilia rlwll laler worils, ";I cllnnge w l t i c l ~b r c a k llle old order
loils very fuundntiul~s,a l ~riot
l nrle t l ~ i ca~lli<rusly,
~t
slowly a i ~ dgradually r c ~ i i o d els it, titking cxre t o brcak as liltle as possible"-atid for w l ~ o r nstate power, once
in tile hands o f the revolution;iry party, s l ~ o u l dbe used as a cudgel against the
class nieniy. W~ICII Stalili ill Ilccember 1926 rl~eloricallyasked (he C o n ~ i l ~ t e r ~ ~
Executive what [lie b u i l d i t ~ gi~I'soci;disn~
rnrallt i n class terms and answered t l ~ a t
"building soci:~lictiiill t l ~ cUSSR o l e : ~ ~O>VsC I . C O O I ~ ~ ~1I1~111. 0 \ ~ 1 1S ~ l v i c O
l o~~~~~~oisic
by our IWU forces ~II
Ille c0111xe< ) f a slr!~gglc," l t e \v;t< sittiply dr;t\vi~tgU ~ C U lI l ~ e
Le~tin:ind L~II~~I~SIII
or IIICC i v i l War pcriud :tnd earlier. the L c ~ t i ~ t i sillnwhic11
~
thefunrlanie~ttnlqueslio~ifur a Marxist seeking tocreatc socialisrn was Kru-k<~g,~?.
or who w i l l vi~nquisllw h o ~ iin~ the class war? 'To this L.e~iil~isnt
o f Klo-koso, lie
did subseq~tenllyadd oile proposilioo tliat wasorigin;~lwith him: that the internal
wit11 the society's ~idvaocetoward socialism. He was
class slruggle i~tlet~silies
drawing upon the Lertinisni that had stood during 1918-21 for forcible food
req~~isilioning
f r o n ~the pe:tsant (prodruzv;rsrko).
fur s l i r r i ~ ~u gp of class war i n
the villages by nte;ins o f tlic c o i i ~ ~ n i t t e eofs tlic poor (ko~nbedy), lor the belief (to
cile Lenin) lliat the proletarian dic1;ilorship should tilean " i r o ~rule"
~
atid nut a
"jellylisb pnrlcl;lri:t~l g i r v c r ~ ~ ~ ~ tand
r ~ ~ fur
t . " tile rulltless resort l o terror SI; ;ttt
. i n s ~ r ~ i n ~of
e ~dictatorial
tt
rule. 7hi.5 war S~oli,ri.sr L e ~ r i r r i r ~n~~l t. r [lie
l ;~t~tii~.ti~i~ity
olStali~~is~n
clati111
's
to i t is not seriuusly d i ~ i i i ~ i i s h eby
d tlie i~tiportantfact ~II;II
\\,hill Lellinicnl stoorl fur ill 1.enin's own mind, as a conception of llo\$, l o h ~ l i l d
socialisn~ill llussi;~, u ~ i d c r w e grcnt
~ ~ l n~odificalio~
illt 1921-23.
Nor was tliis Stalinist Lenitlis~nSlalin's o t ~ l y A
. consider;il)le p r i ~ p o r t i oo~ft his
~eneratio~
nlen
~ , ~ v h oI I bcc(ime
~
Uolsheviks wlien Bolshevis~nwas still an antiregime revolulio~tarynloverne~tland wlio polilically came ofage, as Stalin i~irnsclf
did, during the era of W a r C o n ~ ~ i t u ~ t i sltared
s n ~ , his oulluok t o one or a n o t l ~ c r
degree. I itni not speaking here about general ideas alone o r about Le~iirrism
sintply as a system of political belief, but likewise about the ingrained habits of
niind, ways of ~ l e l i l t i ~and
i g responding 10 situations, ctyles of action, conlrnon
memories. n i y s t i q ~ ~ cetc.,
,
tliat collectively constitute the culture o f a polilical
movement insofar as a given age cohort o f its membership (and leadership) is
cuncerned. A s its name illdicates, War Cotnniunisn~had militarized [lie revolutionary polilical culture o f the Rolshevik ntovenient. The h e r i ~ a g cof that fornia35. The I.cvi,ni . l ~ ~ r l i n b p~ ~478.
,a

P.
92

Rnherl C. T u c h

Wlnirm RS Re~nlotionfrom A b ~ w

tive time ill tlic Soviet culture's history was rnartii~lzeal, r e v o l u l i u ~ ~ avolunh
ry
rism and elon, readiness to resort to coercion, rule by adniinistralivefial (fldlninu.
rrirovorri[,)), ccetralizcd administration. summary juslice, atid n o slllall dosed ,
that Conlmunist arrogance (kor~rchvansrvo) tlnit L e ~ l i nlater inveighed agaim.
I t was not simply the "heroic period of the greal Kussiall Revolution," as LO
K r i t z ~ n a tchristened
i
i t in the title of the book about War Coliilnunism that he
published in the nnd-I920's, but above all t l l e j g l r l i l l g period, the lime when in j
Rolshevik niinds the citadel uf socialisn~was l o be taker1 by s l o r n ~ . ~ "
i
War Conimunistt~had given way to the N E P i n 1921 as a Itlatter of o f f i d
party policy, and i n the ensuing new period there emerged. again under Letlin'j ?
political and ideological lcadersl~ip,s~trietliingthat could he called "NEP cul.
ture." This N E P culture comprised a many-sided [new way of Soviet lire which 1
four~denpressio~~
i n institutions, ideas, ltabits of nlitld, atid c o ~ ~ d u cAnlong
t.
itr i
elements were the restored monetary economy, the emergetlt bystem of Soviet
legality, the new stress o n a volul~tarysrnychko between workers and Peasantry, i
the primacy of persuasion and educative methods ill the reginle's approach lo
tlie people. the previously mentioned Lenitiist lotion of grarlualisn~atld cullunl
rcvolulion as the tr211isferculture, and a general at~nosphel-eof relative social 1
nornlalcy. But we must beware of inferring from the f a i ~ i i l i a rl~istory-booklinear
scheme o f d e ~ e l o ~ l i l e nfrom
t
War C o n ~ n i u t ~ i ston N
~ E P socielg l l ~ aN
t E P culture
di.yplocctl the culture of W a r C o n ~ ~ n u t ~ i isnn li l ~ etnind.; of l l l e gelleralion d j
1301sheviks who were moving into political leadership i n the later 1920's. It ;
certainly did in some, indeed many, instances; NEI' cultilrc ihad its powerrully 1
persuasive proponents not only i n Lenin but also illBukliarin, Rykov, at~dnuma.
ous ~ t h e r s ,sanle represen~itlgthc gifted party y o u t l ~ .But we have the weighly
testilllony
of sucll men as Valentinov, Piatakov, and Stnliti llinlself tllat the
~ l ~ i l i t a nvoluntarist
t,
political cultureattd mystique of W a r Conimnllisnl lived On i
amollg very many Communists. A t i d from about 1927 on, sorile sellsilive minds
among the expone~lfso f N E P c u l t u r e becanteapprelie~~sively
aware ofan impendillgllew social cataclysm, a second storming of the citadel as i t were." 1.0lh'i j
i t needs to be added that Lenin llitnself liad provided possible cues for such a
reslx,,,qe
ill the n l i ~ i t a r yimagery that he lt:td used i ~ ~ o lrl c~ i t OIICC
! ~ ill speaking
of the N E P itself: as a forced "retreat" which would ill good time be f~>llowd
by a "subsequent victorious advance." "

93

I n seeking to refulc 111e"circumstat~tialenpla~li~tion"

o f the i t ~ i l i ipliase
~l
of tllr
SIdinisl revolutiotl, i t is !lot llle i t ~ l r nofthis
l
essay to deny 1 1 i ~ t ~ ~ i ~ ; ~ l
to the circomstences lhcing the Soviet regiri~ci n 1927-29, tllost llofah~y [he
~ n - c o l l e c t i o ndiWcultics. 'l.l~epoilit is illat thcse c i r c u n ~ s t adid
~ ~,,,,I~ ~cilrry
a single unn~istakabled e l i ~ ~ i t i o fl ~the s i t u a ~ i ~and
n implicit prescril,[ion for
plicy. That widely dilferenl dt+nitiotts of the situation and w i ~ l e l y<lirerelll
policy prescriptiolls were possible is proved by the licrce debarcs and deep
differences that mmerged at t l ~ olin,e. Our- argtrrrictrt i
tliat l l ~ S~olirtist
c
dcfi~ii~ion
ollhesituatio~ii n lernls ol-class war with the kulak forces and the Staliliist policy
rapotlse in thc form of"Uw111-Siberian nielhods" o l forcible grain requisitiollillg
and then inass c o l l e c t i ~ i z a t i oreprece~~lcd,
~~
ill part, an appeal l o the no~q~,evik
mores of War Commonisnl. atid thiit Illis orientatio~lproved potell~ly l,ersuasive
llrgely because of the surviving strettpth o f those mores among the ~ o l s h ~ ~ i k ~
mdllot by
meal13 ollly, as some have thought, because o f S l a l i ~ i forlnidnhlr
'~
arganizdlio~ialpower SI: General Secrelary. From this viewpoint, the great strug.
$koverparl~policy ill 1928-29 hetweett Stalinisni and Bukltarinisnl was a figlit
klween policies conreivc~lill llnc spirit crf tltr ~ e v ~ r l o l i o ~cultnrc
~ a r ~ ,r wZlr
Camniut~isri~
and the e u o l ~ ~ t i o t ~ aNEI1
r y cultltrc--and t l ~ eli,rl~ler
prev;rilccl.
I t must br: added ihnl Sl;lli~tIlinlscIf slio~ald1101 he seen i r ~;,I1 this ;IS Z I lllilll
oforgartizalio~~al
powcl- orily. I t i s true 111;1t the s o c i a l i s ~ ~ ~ . i ~ ~ -cc,llcclll
~~~~~.c~~~~~,lr~
aiginaled \vitll l l u k l ~ a r atltl
i ~ ~ tltal Slalin on numerous occasiulls ill the ,llid.
192Ws eclloerl the Rtlkhal-inis1 version o f it, stressing NEI1, for ex;~m~de,
as the
mdiuln of the l n t l v e t i i e ~toward
~l
socialia~itand tlie peasa~it'sameoability tostlc)l
a nlovenlerrl. This has helped to foster f l ~ ei~tiageof llim as an ixnproviscr ~ i r h
hardly any policy ideas of his own at tllat time, or as one whose policy ideas were
purely R~tkharinist."' Agai~tstsuch a view, two points need to be made. First,
given the exigencies o f t l ~ ejoin1 Stalio-Bukharin f a c t i o ~ ~ battle
al
against tile Left
opposition. wllicll was pressillg thc need for rapid III~USII-ialiw~io~~,
i t was polifitally inlpossiblc for Stalin l o lake i.ssue ope~rlywith the Bttkllarirlist poljcy ,os.i
lion, or eve11 to fail 1 0 clrucur it1 il, beli~retile v a ~ i q u i s l i n ~ eo~f ~the
t 'I'rotskyist
Left at the end of 1927 Secun~lly,a chlsc reading o f the recon1 sl~nrr,ctI,:11 the
Sialinisr p o s i l i u ~:1lIl111ugli
~,
tot brouglit into the opeti as a policy p l a l f o ~ nbefore
~
1928, found expression sotto voce i n various Slalin pronouncements o f t l i c N E P
period, at Illevery Iiine u,Iten hegave to many tl~eappearallceofbei~ig
a Ilukharinin in tl~eoryand policy.
36. P , , ~the nrgun,m~t l n r War Communism brought about a milifarila:i~flofthe revnlutianW
One such prolloullcemellt, the slalcment of 1926 about huildine
- ~~~~o socialiqm
~~~....,-..
p a ~ i ~ i c auf~Dolst~evirm,lllr currelative argutnenl that we mast dislilleuisll two Leninism*
: througll L.ovcrcor~lj,,g
sovjc( btluregeojsie by uur
forces ill (he
i
wur
~onlmuni~m
and
!ha(
or
t
~
,
e
NEP,
and
(he
further
view
~
t
l
a
:
~
t
a
t
~
wrs
n
a
rryrcsentallrr
that
murse of a struggle," Itas :ilresdy been cited as at1 example of the Stalitlist
of llle War Conltou~iiststrain, see Rubcrl C. I'ucker. Sioli,, iir R e v o l r r i ~ ~ ~ i olcV79-192(r
rjr
A S~vdt :
,
irr 14irror)m nrrd P~.rronoliry(NewYork, 1973). pp. 208-9, 3954211.
19. Spcakit~gof Slalit?'raIli;~sccwilt# line "aklnnrin\ir~~.
Kolzr~V. Datnielr wrilcv " I t ? mzlllels of
37. Scc 9 o i ; n or ne~oiunio,torypp. 402.3. 413,415-16, fur dccurno~tationo~~
thc survival o r l b
dicy and drxcrinr lllclr l # l # ewas his guide; io r ~ ~ a l t e r s o r n r g a i ~ i ~ a lhis
i o opower
,
war llleir supper:."
War Comn~llnirlspirit during the NEP. According, lor example. to Vale~~finov,
who war a rcsid-I
3lalin.s Rise lo D~ctalnrship.1922-1939," i t ) Poliiitr jn rhc,Sovi~iUirion SCPC,~
Co.ws, ed. Alcxa~~rlcr
o f Moscow in the NEP years, "the pany, parliculrrly in irr lower ceNr, was instinctively, sukm
hitinmd Alan Wali!! ( N e w York. 1906). p. 2 7 'This slvlenlenl is hvnnhly c i l d hy Slepllerr Collerl
rciously, antagonistic toward Ihe NEP." As for the apprehensive awarenccs or the i8amifhcnce a l l
ulhcpoi~llwllerc lhc ihinlretf~rriler:'' I'ilere was. pctlrrally qpe;\king.r rough division<,fl;thorhel\rren
social cataclysm, see the above-cilcd article by Valesli!mv. "11 prorI~lnRn.''
Bukharin and Slatin, b e t w ~ c r lpolicy f i l r l t ~ u t i ~arid
l i ~ ~lbeory
>
un ooc side nncl urga~#i~olio~~nl
iuwscte
38. Foreclsmplc. i n "T1teln~porlanccolGold
Now and After l l l e Complete Viclrlry ofS<xlatirm.'
m th~olbrr."R u k i o n a arzd rirr ilr,hhevik Ken>lv,iio,t, p. 215.
The L ~ m i nAarbologv p. 517.

i
i

:
!

'

'3
'

77
~
~

Wbbm nr Hevotulion from ~ h o v r

Rcnlbert C.Turk

94

~
,,IKro.Xo~o?
~
O t l ~~c revidellce
i i~icludes:
~ Slalill's
~ i'ruw{a i article ~
d
~7, 1925, ill
~ w h i c l ~11e
~ d e l i ~ ~,cthe
d present
~ perio(l ~as all o ~ rbo l o ~ oo/lhfl
c ~

95

~
:o the leadership
~
itselS."' Still atlier, major diUerences callfor lllcrl~ioll:
lllc

1 ~ 1 7 i.e.,
,
the preludc to a llew revt)lutiollary slurnl; and
studied i-eslatemc,lt o f t h i s thcn~e,w i t h added dct;~il,i n 1926. Moreover. there
w;ls a
tlieoretical dilTerc~icebetweeti I ~ u k h i ~ ar il ~l ~lStalill
l
ill their w a P
(,(.arglliIlg
t 1 1 ~ ~ ~ ~ i ~ l i s n 1 - i 1 i - o 1 1 e - c notioli.
o u 1 1 i r yBuklinrin llwelt I I ~ r l i c u l a rUpon
l~
i
lllea,lllellt
ol'lllissocialism as all "agrarian-couperz~tive socialis~ii" of llle kind !
!
Ixojected ill ilellill.~
last articles; Stali~i's emphasis fell l l e a v i l ~011 the "one
b
coulllry'.
t l l m ~ eill a spirit of truculent Soviet Russia11 ~ ~ i i l i u n a l i srelllilliscenl
nl
of llisRllssocentric "creative Marxism" (as l ~ et h e ~ called
i
it) o f August 1917,
wllrll lie prophesied that Rossia, l l o l Europe, might show the uaorldthe way lo i
soci;llislll.A Great Russian ~ l a t i ~ l ~ i a lt ies~t i d e l ~ cnlay
y
be secll, llioreo~er.3%an
illgredielit
or (IleC i v i l W a r s y ~ ~ d r o u ii er ~Soviet culture, Illis war !laving hem
lbugl1t llo~a l o ~ l eagainst the Whites hut also against their fiireigrl supporters and
foreigti i ~ ~ t c r v e ~ ~ t i o n i s t s .
~ 1 ul~sl~ot
% ~ is 111x1 there were two versions of the s 0 ~ i a l i ~ 1 n - i l i - ~ l ~ e - c o u n t
l,ositioll ill {lie
lllid-~920's. A l t l ~ o u g hthe Stalinist versir~ll11:ld to be rr~uledthen
the a f o r e ~ n e ~ ~ t i o rpressures
~ed
o f tlie intr:~-p;~rlycolllest, the grml
because
i t s S~lll-scsleemerier~cei~rimedialelyu p o ~
tlie
~ defeat o f t h e Trotskyist
rapidity
~ ~ 1 furlher
. 1
altcsts to i t s prcsellce ill the witips o f thc Soviet lx>liticalscelle even 1
durillg the l~eydayoSR~~kharinisrn.'~This
is 1101l o d c ~ Illat
~ y S l a l i showed
~~
plenty

p,.~,.~)l.lo~pr

i
:

!
f

'i

~:olkhoz
~
system itself. w l l i c l ~hore sniall resembla!~ccto tllc agricultural conirnunes inilialed during the Civil War period; l l ~ euse u f p o l i c e terror as a llrinle
inslrun~ellto f g o v e r l ~ n ~ eill
r ~al rnarlllcr sl~arplydilTere~~tiated
fruni the Red terror
sponsored by Letlilt via tllc o r i g i ~ ~Cheka:
al
and illcinter-relntionsllip betweell
internal and exler11~1l
policy. Tlir brrsic u,r~icrlyi,~/"cr co,!fr,i,r/ilr
ic
lhur ,,,ho,
rhRus.riua r e v o l u ~ i o r ~ u r y p r r rrr~u,,red
~ ~ s . ~ i n [he S~a/it,;sr slr,gr. ;
Ihod d l ~ r e r r ~
rharacrer/itlt~r the revo/ulio,rary procrrr of desmrr,crjo,t of /heold
rno~e.
rhijr cr<wrion of rhe frc~vi h u l h a d rltarked rhe earlier, 1917-21
l}ri,y
dange o f charocler i r l o he u~rdersluodb t lerrns of a reversio,~l o o revo/t,riOlrory
pmcess sear earlier i n Rus.riot? hitrorp
I t has beell argued here Ilia1 the idea o f r e v o l u t i o ~f ~
r o n ~ahove had a ~ ~ ~ ~ i ~
pedigree. While that is i ~ i i ( n ~ r t a fnr
u t all ioterpretation of Stalinisln, i t milst now
bestressed that the p h e n o o i e o o ~of~ r e v o l u t i o ~from
~
above has a range or forms,
md that the Le~linistSorni-revolution fro111above as a victorious r e v o l u ~ i o t ~ a r y
prty's violent use lrf the "cudgel" of slate power t o repress its interlla] class
enemies-represe~~lcd(111lyo ~ ~ e e l c n i eioStali11isn1
ut
asaco1oplex~~d~~~~.~id~~1
revolution fro111 abirvc. W l ~ e r et h r Stalinist p l ~ e n o n ~ e werlt
~ l o ~ far
~ beyond [lie
Lcnin heritage lay ill its co~lstructiveaspect. Leninist r e v o l u t i o l ~from above
axlllially a destructivc process, a tearing dowtl o f t h e o l d order rrolll the vatltagc.
paintofslate power; Stalinist revolution frornabove used destructiveor repressive

polilic;~l
opportunism at illat lime, or at olllers. But l o treat o p p o r t u l l i ~ l i ~I meatls, among o l h c l ~ sor
. what was, both in intent and i n reality, a coiistructive
l ci t h deeply held beliek is to.tate a !, (as well as destructive) process. I t s slogan o r ideological banner was tlic building
bctlavior ill puliticiai~as i ~ ~ c o m p a l i b w
The ~ i c t u r eo f S t a l i l ~:IS ;I 1c:ldcr wl11l reprc~~lltcd
ofa socialist society. Hilt ill substi~tl~e.
S t a l i l ~ i s nBS
~ r e v o l ~ ~ t i ofrorll
ll
above w i l ~
Sillll,]is~ic (,f lloliti~iil iiii~ll.
Istale-buildillg process, the c o ~ ~ s t r u c t i o lf ~a pnwerrul, highly c e u t r a l i ~ , ~ d ,
orgallizntiollal powerwithout policy idc:~s atid who embarked upon the revolu.
" o l ~ ~ r e n ~ e d i t a t epragmatic
d,
r~~anaea
r " ~ will1
~ d "110 vision
tiull frool above ill
of wllere i t would lead" is a f i ~ ~ ~ d a m e ~nlisaollceptiull.
ital

bureaucratic, n l i l i t a r y - i ~ ~ d u s t r iSoviet
i~l
Russian state. Although i t was proclaimed "socialist" i n the illid-IY~O'S,i t dilfered i n v a r i ~ u svital ways lion) whtlt
most socialist thinkers-Marx, Engels, and L e ~ i i among
r~
them-had utidcntood
sxialisrn
l
o
mean.
Stalinist
"socialisni"
was
a
social
is^^^
o f mass poverty rather
VI
: lhan plenty; of sharp social s t r a l i f i c a t i o ~rather
~
than relative equality: of u l ~ i v e r lal,constalit fear r a l l ~ ethat1
r
emancipation ufperson;~Iity;ofnariollal c h a u v i l ~ i s ~ l
uut iftile surviuirlg
spirit o r War C o ~ n ~ ~ ~ u illflaencc~l
liisn~
t l ~ eway ill whicl~the
rather t h ~ l nbrotherliood o f man; and o f a n~orrstrouslyhypertrophied state power
drives fur c(illectivization atid iodustrializatio~iwcre col~ceiveda l ~ dcarricd out,
rather Illan the decreasingly statified commune-state delil~eatedby M a r x in Tile
i t does lrit follow tliat the Stalinist r e v o l u l i o ~repeated
~
1917-21 or that llle new
Civil War ill prance and by Leoilt in Tfrr Slare atrd Revolr~rion.
Slalinist order which look shape i n the 1930's was a retjival of the System ofwar
Comlnunisni. T o be sure, the start o f the new decade saw such renlillders of the
i t was not, however, by mere caprice or accident that this happened. Stalinist
lleroic period as food rationing, and other rese~nblal~ces
appeared. As Mashe : revolutiollisrn fro111 above had a prel~istoryi n the political culture o f Russian
ISarism; it e ~ i s t e das a patterrl in the Russiall past and hence could be seen by
Lewin
has pointed out, however, theearly Stalillist pnicess showed lrlarly distinca twelltieth-celitury stalesmall as both a precedent and legitimation of a political
live trails that differe~iliatedi t from its pre-NEP predecessor: ttie feverish itidustrial expansion. the emergence of anti-egalitarian tel~denciesi n cotllrast lo the : murse that would, i n essentials, recapitulate the liistorical pattern.42
egalitarinnist~~
of tlic C i v i l War period, the rise uf new elites c o ~ i ~ b i l ~with
e d the !
:

loss o f the relatively indepe~idel~t

political role of the lesser leadersl~ipranks at
the earlier linlr, and the political rnuzzli~igof the party rank-and-lilt i n relation

'

41. Pol;licul U!zlrrurres,r pp. 98-99.

41. This argumcnr. along will) theview !hat Stalinism i!~
essence war such n rccapvnllaliono r t ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ t
: molulinnirm from abuve, liar becn prcvnled in nly ssag "The Image of Dual Russia." in 76r
; Twn$nrlurnrorion cfRurrroti Society, e d . C. E. Dlnck (Cambridge. Mass.. 1960). The essay is r e p r i n ~ ~
1 h Roberl C. Tucker. The Sovim PolNicul Mitrd, 2nd cd. (New York, 1971). Chap 6~
f

40. his .nrpnmes~and the docurncnlatiot~of lhr evidcncc addseed ie ilr supporl have
prcsrstd in SluIi,, or R~~vlrrrionow.
CLat,. II.

bco,

r
96

Rnhrrt C. Tuck

I t was not, l~owever,by mere caprice or accident that this I ~ a p p e ~ ~ Stalind

ed.
revolutionism from above had a prehistory ill the politicel culture o f Russian
tsaristn; i t existed as a patter81 i n the Russian past and lierice c u ~ r l dbe seen by
a twe~~tietli-ceolury
statesnlan as b o l h a prccedcnt and legitit~iationof a political
course tbat would, ill essentials, recapitulate the historical patteni. Col~fronted
ill the aftermath of tlie two-century-long Mollgo1 d o r n i ~ i a t i o ~wii t l i liostile and
ill sorile cases more adva~tcedneiglibor-slates i n possessioti of p o r t i o ~ ~
ofs t k
extensive territories Illat had made u p the loosely coufcdcraled Kievan RUT:t k
princes-later tsars-f
Muscovy uridertook the building of a powerful "military
~ ~ a t i o nstate"
al
capable o f gatheritig the Russiari lands under itu aegis. Given the
primacy of the concern for e x t e r ~ ~ a
defense
l
and expansion arid the country's
relative economic backwardtiess, the goverririient proceeded by remo~lrlitigthe
soci;ll slructurr, at times by forcible nieatls, i n sucli a way illat all classes ofthe
population werc bound i n one or atrother for111 ofcon11,ulsory service to theslatr
"The fact is," writes Miliukov, "that it1 Russia the state exerted enormous influ.
elice upon the social organization whereas i n the West tlte social organization
cu~iditionedthe state system. . . . I t was the e l e m e ~ ~ t a rstate
y
of tlie ecoriornic
'base' (fundurt~e,rr) which ill Russia called forth the hypertrophy of thr stale
'superstructure' (nadsrroiku) aiid conditior~edthe powerful counter-influence d
this superstructure upon the 'base' itself." 4'
A salient expression o f t l l e tsarist patter11 of revolutionism from above was the
legalized imposition of serfdom upon tlie Russiari peasantry i o the sixteelilli and
seventee~itlice~itories,the peasa~it'sattaclirne~itby law to the soil, together wilh
the system of bar.rhchi~ra(the cnrv6c) t ~ ~ l n which
er
the peasant was b o u ~ ~tod
contribute a certain tiu~iiberof days of work on the l a ~ i d o i v ~ ~ e(or
r ' s state's) land
during tlie agricultural year. The Russian village cornniune, itself an archaic
institutio~i,was transformed by governmental aclion into a "coercive organiu.
lion" for ellsurirlg each nietnber's fulfillment of state-imposed obligalio~isunda
the principle of mutual responsibility (krugovui(r porrrka).+4 The Stalinist r u d
revolutioti from above was ill essence aa accelerated repelilion u f this tsarin
developn1etital patter^^. I t 11as bccn loted
ahtive t l ~ a ttlie kollchoz as it cnlcrgd
from the collectivizatio~~
process was a coopcrative only it1 its f o r ~ i ~ fal;ade
al
Underueatli, i t bore a far from superficial resen~blariceto the latided estate is ihc
fact tllat the holkltozwas actually
period of scrfdom; arid i t is a l ~ i g l i l y
perceived by maliy Russial
peasarlts as a revival o f serfdom. Westertters who
traveled in rural Russia in the early 1930's have reported that i t was a conirnoa
peasant practice t o refer to "V.K.P." (the initials t i f V'~,r,~irtznaiu ko,~rr,~un&i.
cheskuiu parriia. the A l l - U n i o n Communist party) in the esoleric nleanilig d
"seco~idserfdom" (vroroe kr<~pos~rro~provo).+
T w o features o f tlie kolkhuz ssyiem

'
;

:
i

i'

.
:
j

:
i

I
,
:
,

'

:
3

f
I

Wbbm ar Revolution frow Ahevc

97

mVes~ecial
poi1lt to this ~ c r c e l > l i o l 01le
l.
was tlial the ko/lchozycanie to operate
i m r d i l l g to arrallgenlellts under wllicli the pcasant owed the kolkhozall allnllal
*ligatory nlinilllulll,
s~ccifieclby Saviel lalv, of "work-day o ~ ~ i t s(rrvdm/,ri);this
"
YYarefUrll lo6u1'.s/lchfll(l. Second, when the internal passport sytern, a11ilistitu.
imnoftsarist Russia, was revived ill Soviet Russia by a g o v e r ~ ~ l i i e ~ decree
ital
of
December jl, 1932, as a 11le;llls of bureaucratic control over the movenients of
citizerls. Ihe film1 l P ~ ) l ~ ~ l l awils
t i ~ t lint
l
issued 1)assports. The deprivalioll
of~ass~orts
llle Peasallt l o the soil u f t h e k u l k l ~ o r o sovkhozas
r
securely
his serf
had heell ntfaclled l o the soil o f the l a ~ ~ d eestate.
d
Theculminating pllascoftsaris~iias a d y ~ i n m i cpolilical supcrstructllreellgaged
lube transforrniltillll
of Russia11society and developnlent o f its ecoriuriiic base
O
' r state-ordair1ed Purposes canle ill the lollg reigll of Peter I,that "crowned
"O1utio"ar~~" as H e r ~ eliltel.
~ l called him. N o w the pattern o f r c v o l o t i o ~iton1
i
hove
enler~edlllosg d i s l i l l c l l ~ ,olle
its i~~Olllillc111
aspects being all i ~ ~ d u s t r i ; l l
mOIutioll above ainled at b ~ i l d i l i ga puwerful Russian war-industrial base.
lMensifying serfdom. Peter clnployed state-owlled serfs a l o r ~ gw i t l i prisoriers of
frlr illcluslrial projects as well as the conslruction of canals (111
LakesLadoga, Oncga, alld c)tller.;: rllld 1111 rlccasion moved enlire townullips
P"pIe lothe constrllctioll
sites [f tile llew ellterpriscs i n wll;it are descril~cdas
"Peter's forced labour camps." 1('
*g"", 'lie
parallel
\vitll the S ~ a l i l l i sindustrial
l
revolution from above is strik.
i%s 'lie"lajordirerelice
beillg the greatly expanded scale o f the use of forced
labor
in llle
Stalillistcase. 1.0what has been said above abqut the relati011hetweerl
mllectivizatitlll itldusIria1izatioil. sornetliing o f importa~icehere ,iceds lobe
added. Durilg
First Five-Year plall, the SIO~~III
a110111 "liquidation of the
as a class"
was ~ l s c d*s a P r c l e ~ tk)r del~ortatiuno f peasant families c ~ i
ma"e-a
Process made all the Inore massive by the extrelne looseness w i t h which
Ihe
label
:11)17lied-to relllolc areas like the Urals, Siberia ;~ndthe
far North
lliey ~ c r set
e ( 0 work i n timbering or on the c o ~ l s t r u c t i oof~ ~
plants, such as the M ; l ~ . l l i t o g o n kiron atid sleel complex i n tlie Urals. The ";,st
ea~ansiutl
or Illelilrcect-l;lhllr Cnllll~elllpire dates f r n n ~lliis time. T o cite So17.11e.
"i's~ll, "In 1'329-15'30. Ihillowed and gushed the multimillion wave ofdispossec.yed
. . . In
size lllis llullrecurring tidal wave (it was an ocean) swelled
bolld
(liebounds o f a l l ~ t l l i l l gfile 11ellal sYsIe111o f even an inirne~isestate call
F ' " ~ ~ There was notllillg to be colilpared w i t h i t in all Russiari history.
lhe
I'
of a wllole people, an ethnic catastrophe." 47 Uut
size Ihere
was llolllillg ill Russian llistory to compare w i t h it, this l r i ; , ~ ~
4 6 [bid.. PP. 18-10.

4 7 Aleksandr 1. Solrl~a~ilr).~~.
The G ~ / o gArchipelqqo 1918-1956.
EX^^^^,,,^,, i,,
~i,~,,,,~
Innrngorio. 1-11, lrnllr. Tllornar P. Whilney (New York. IV73). p. 54. m,bbard ( ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ , ,
"tricuirure,
Pp. 17)cslirtlsteslllalduri~lpcollcclivila~iun
"probnbly not lw than livemillioll pwsa,,tr.
~
~
~
~
~
i
~
.
mcludillb families. were deported 11, Siberia and the Far North, and or lhac i r is
[hat 25
P cent perish&." More rece~llly.Lewin has written that .'whist i s cenaill is illat
,,itlion

43. P. Miliukov.~ ~ h ~ ~ k i kul

~ fury.
~ i~ ~ ~l ~ ~~ - i~ i i~~,~l , ,~~
peterburg,
~i ~ ( ~k ~
. 1901).
~ , ~j
:
pp. 133-34. For Miliukov's use of the term "nlilitrry-nilina1 state," see. e.g.. p. 143.
44. Ibid.. p. 238.
of ~ fllillloo
Persons. or more, murl have heen dcporled. or
45. See. for example. Leonard E. ff,,bbard. T ~ ECm o m i ~orf ,brier ~ ~ ~ i ~ ~ , l 1919~
r ~ ~ bdusd'atds.
~ ( ~ ~ lo
, a~ d ~
.
I many must have perished." Rossio,i Peusoals and sovier polver, 508,
pp. 115-16.

W B m as Revnlkrtion from Ahovc

a n d pl~ase,sllcll

use of deportation and forced labor for i ~ ~ d u s t r i a l i z a t had

i o ~ ~a definite l~istorial
precedent in Yetrine Russia. I n the Stali~iistir~dustrialrevolution fro111abovc,
therefore, just as i n the rural revolution f r o n ~above, there were eleznents ola
revival o f l l ~ e
tsarist pattern o f revolutionisn~from above. I n l l ~ i srespect, Stalin.
ism showed the influence not simply of the hislorically recent Witte system of
slate-spo~~sored
industrializalior~,hut o f the IIIIICIIearlier systcn? of direct exploi.
tation o f servile labor in the Russian state-building
encountered in
Here a brief comnietlt is called for 011 l l ~ eview, someti~l~es
Weslert~thought, that sees the Stalinist revolutio~tf r o m above under the aspsl
o f "moder~~izatiun."The difficulty w i t h this posilion-apart from the nebulow
character o f the very concept o f modernization-is its oblivious~~ess
o f the strong
element o f "archaiziition" it, Stalinism, its resurrection o f the historic tsarist
pattern o f building a powerful n ~ i l i t a r y - ~ ~ a l i o ustate
a l by revolutiot~arymeans
involving the extension o f direct coercive controls over the populatior~and ihc
growth of state power in the process. Unless "nioderoization" is reduced in
meaning m a i ~ ~ to
l y industrialization and illcrease o f the urban population (in
which cnse [he tern] becomes supcrlluous), the use of it to characterize Stalinism
is n~isleading.I f a formula for the state-building prcrcess is t~ccded,i t n ~ i g lk~ t t
be t l ~ eone that Kliucl~evsky.providedi a his s u n ~ r n a t i c io~f~n ~ o d e r nRussian
r ~ t h "'The slate swelled up; the
history from the sixteenth to the ~ ~ i r ~ e l e ecentury:
people grew lean." 49
The Russian historical perspective can c o ~ l l r i b u t ein still a furtller irnpurlanl
way to o u r understanding o f Stalinism: it helps l o make intelligible the relalionship between the first and s e c o ~ ~phases
d
o f the Stalinist revolution. Following
the phase that took place from 1928-29 to 1933, there was a k i n d of pause in
~ above moved into its second phase. Sigsal1934, after which the r e v o l u t i o ~from
ized by the murder of the party leader Sergei K i r o v i n Leningrad i n December
1 9 3 6 x 1 event conceived and organized frorn the center of power in Moscow
mass terror o f the Great Purge enveloped
as a pretext for w l ~ a tfollowed-the
e
I't~rgcdestroyed a generation
the party and country i n the later 1930's. T l ~ Great
not simply of O l d Bolshevik veterans ofthe anti-lsarist struggle but o f very many
of their juriiors who had joined the movement after 1917 and served as active
irnplementers of Stalinism i n its first phase. I t virtually transformed the composition of the Soviet regime and the managerial elite i n all fields. T h i s in turn was
accompanied by still other maoifestations o f the revolutior~f r o m above in its
48. Sergsi Witle war the Russian minister of finance hot" 1893 until 1903 0s the "Witte system"
and its inspiration it, Friedrich List's teaching that backward cou~>lrirr
could overcome "lhc p i 1
of remaining behind" by giving priority lo #hemachinc-building it~durtriain industrialiratiat. sn
Theodore H. Von Laue. S r a ~Wirreo,tdlhe
i
Indu.lriolr2oiionofRuuio(New York. 1973), especially
pp. 58-60.
49. V. 0. Kliuchevrky, Kun rurrkoi isrurii(Moscow, 1937). Vol. Ill,p. l I. 'l'llis is a Soviet-iuur
of a pre-rcvulutionarytreatise based on Professor Kliuchevsky'r lectures at Moscow lltliverrily. In
rupporl uf Ihc modernizalianhypothesis, HClkne Carrere D'Encausre pointed nut during uur Bellagto

discussion that Stalinism promoted nmdernily in the following inlportant dimension: an i!,tegralcd
Soviet Russian nalio!lhd. Her argunlcnt calls for careful consfideralio!~.

:
;

99

the destruction crf the Pokrovsky school of Bolshevik

hirtoriogrepl~y,the c o n c ~ ~ m i t a nre-npporpriation
t
n f major elements o f ihc Rus-tan past as part of the olliciel Soviet cullural herilage, the restoraliul~ofpre-I917
pttertls ill arl, c d u c a l i o ~ ~law
, and tllc L n ~ i l y 111
. thcse aspects, which entel~dcd
inlo the 1910'r, there were (listioctly reactio~~ary
o r c o u ~ ~ t e r - r e v o l u t i o ~ over~ary
tons in the revcilutio~~
f r o l ? ~;ihove.
I t has been said, r i p l ~ t l yin m y view. 1 1 1 i t l "Stiili~l's ~e\,oIutioni n i t g r i c u l t u r ~
md industry and his assaull on the party which consunl~naledIllis revolution
must be seen as integrated parts o f one a11<1the same process." 5" But it remaills
to explicate the nexus bet\\'een 111; t\\,o phases. I t does 11ot sullice to t;tke the
p i l i o n , as Schapiro does 2nd as Deutscher did after him, that "it was primarily
the need to perpetuate the Crr:tt C l ~ a r ~ gille the countryside that perpetualed the
~cnor." This line o f c x p l a ~ ~ a t is
i ostraitled
~~
and i n the end simply unsalisfaclory, i f o t ~ l ybecause-as the postwar Stalinist years i n Russia sho\ved--rule by
lerror can be en'eclive w i l h o u l being massive. I t is not a persuasive argument that
terror on the scale o f !he S l a l i ~ ~ iholocaust
sl
o f 19.14-39 was lnecessary either to
perpetuate c o l l e c l i v i r e l i o ~o~r l u l>rcvet\lSI:lliu fro!^^ Iosillg puwer. Yet. Illc poi111
about the two ph;tses lwiltg " i ! ~ l ~ . g r i ! l ~piil.ls
' I (11.01111 an11 IIIC
S:!IIC
III.IICCSS"
~.i$rric~
wnviclio~~.
A partial e s p l t ~ ~ ~ a toi of rthis
~ linkage C;II be derived r r o the
~ ~ thesis
~
that the
Stalinist revolution from above reuspitulated ill essc~~lials
iln tsarisl predecessor's
ptlern. The latter involved t l ~ cbinding izahreposl~chenie) o f all classes o f the
populatiot~,from thc lowest serf to the Ihighest noble, it1 compulsory service to
theslate. As the Ml~scoviteautocracy grew i n power, the hereditary land-owning
nobility was tr;t~~sforn~ed
illto a serving clilss (s11izhilyi kl<~..cs,to use Miliukov's
tern~inologyagain) whose title tu the land was made conditiol~alup011 the renderl
rci~~forced
ing of military service 111 the slate. 'l'lte Pelrille revolution l r o ~ rabove
this situation by i ~ ~ s l i l u t i an
~ t garistocracy o f rank (chi~rlbased upon lltc table
of fourtee11 t l ~ i l i l a r yand c o r r e s p ~ ~ ~ dci invgi l i i ~ nranks, u l ~ d e rwhich nohility becanlc a func1it111 li111k rather tl,;in vizc versa. 118 one
its pl~;tscs. nloret,ver.
the reduction o f f h e hoyar r u l i ~ ~
class
g o f Kievan and e;~rlyMuscovite Kussiii to
a serving class during the reign o f I\WIII
I V i n lhe s i x l ~ e n t ce11111ry,
l~
thc chief
isstrun~er~l
o f the process was the anti-boyar terror carried out under I\,an's
personal supervisi<i~~
by his private retinue and security police, l l ~ eo p r i c l i ~ z i ~ ~ o .
l v a t ~hirnself was the first of the Muscovite rulers to assume the title of tsar.
Tsarism as a systetn o f absolule autocracy was itself i n part a product of this
sixteenth-century purge, w h i c l ~ ,f r o m evidence at our disposal, we know that
Stalin consciously took as a model for emulation during the Great Purge o f the
SI;

50 khapiro, Tltc COI?I?INN~.CI Parry of i l w S o v i ~U,I~UI, p. 410.

JI. Isaac nrul\cher. 1.1~Prophet U~rcurr.p IOU. Scbapiro'e at.ganlent (7hr Comvxurev Por(b, o j
ihr Suuic,! Udrhnl ,r tlte i ; > l l # c rmvrc ccvnllrel~rr~rive
O C L CIllill. Ihavi~(gr!~ledhy levror i n l l ~ liril
e
plkasc
ofthr rcvululiun lrornt above, Slnlin war faced will, Ibc rlrong puwbilily o f losing power i f the terlcvr
rameloa~~
end, lhrncc chore terror as the ineanr ofl!i<renlaining co con?rnasd.To explain the colossal
row of lhr lurmr i l l the second pl,arc. Scllrpiru refers only lo ;, persurtal cbaiaclrrirlic-Slrlin'r
"lhur""gll,lcss.-

100

193rs;
llchad

Robert C. 'luckcr

?~
SWlnirrn sr Revolutier~frcm i\horr

101

to view
IVX,I
( i r o r ~ t y a d in11 :nlu~~c
l'clcl llle Great as a
orscnria~ist ibrmation. W i t h very few encepti~llls,the illdeler'd-

allenlpted to ~ ~ I I I cli~ss
~ I I I war i n n ]he coontryside by ,nakillg
(lie
pcanallls
slatcslnall
(bedniakil its allies i n 111ass collectivization.
what
lhis policy
was a
ellt.lnilded
o l d Bolsl~evikswere cast as his hoyars.
success i s not entirely p b i n , as tllere is evidence, illcludillg documentary evillc,lce
~h~ p e r t i l ~ e ~ ~ofc ethis t o the problem of the nexus b c t ~ e c nIhe
two phaws is
lrom t l ~ eSmolensk party arcl~ives,that mass c o ~ ~ ~ was
~ ~rlol i o,lly
~ i ~ ~ t i ~ ~
;lbsulute
~ 1 crcal
, ~ purgewas at ollce the crucible of l l ~ erc.;lol;llioll
. .
posed by the w e l l - u K i ~ ~~nidcllc
~d
peasants i n their greal
but ulll,upu~ar
i l t Russia-under Stalin lluw-alld
c m c o n l i t a l l t l ~ a col'tllluatlall
1 U well arnollg 1111 few of tile hpdn;(,ki.S2 E~~~ (,pd,,iak
grasl, wllal
of formatioit o f Stalin.9 neo-tsarisl vrr.;i~)n o r t l l e com~bl'sor~-servicc j "V.K.P."nlcarll and 110, like it.
for worker l,arliC~pBtiorl
ill m~~~tiViZRticl,,,
slate, all
Illat may properly be called "totalital.iall." 'Tile
pllasc
we have the case o f the t w e ~ ~ t y - f i vtllousa1,d
e
illdustrial workers who
ellworkillg 'lass
revolutio~~
rrorn above had seer! the bitlditlg of tile Peasalltry
mlled by llle party tu go into the villages as collectivizers. ~~t
also
illservitude t o t l ~ eever s\relling, every more centralized. ever lnore
bureauera
that at least sotrle portion of the utwe~~ty-fivc.thousaI1derSSS
joille,jthislnnvelllellt
tized, ever more police-dominated Stalinist slate;
this
mkrepOs'lc'icnb . under pressure of dire Cimily neerl colllbincd
Illaterial
illcenliv~s
lo
tigtller
in
later
years.
The
seco~ld
phase
brortgl~l
lllr
party
i~selland
j
i
the
collectiviei,,g.
grew
tile illlelligelllsia ill illat grcally cxpanded Soviet sellse of IlleIer1l1
(
~
em.
~ phijse.
~ the~~ u c i a~
l
~
;~ I n lllle secoud
c l ~ ~ sigllificalrtly.
~ , ~ ~ d wl1ile
,,o,od
braces managers, omcials, specialists, technicians, and profcssiollals Of
inmained basically passive-indeed more p a s i v e
inthe early
1930.s-large
whose
ilto line
wit11 the rest of society. They too became a ser'villg
dements of the first-phase o k r i v e x c l ~ a ~ gthe
~ drole
,,rilnplenlenters
re,,olu~
tangible
and
visible
will1
the
introductiofl
ill
tile
later 1930'3
cion for that
i l s victinls. very nlaIly
as suchwas
tllese lreople
died or went to
'
and 1 9 4 0 .af~,,
Stalinist table of ranks that bore a distillct resemblance-as did
during the Great Purge. 'To a far grenter ertcnl tllall tile first ,,llape, s e c o t , ~
. was a police ope~tltion,2nd t l ~ esuprcnlr c o ~ t c r t i v e viclin,
the ullirorms and insignia-to t l ~ ecorrespon(1ing lsarlsl sct-up. Colople'i'gthe
was ll,c~l,l,l,llll,lisl
process idculogically, the S t ~ l i n i s torder devclo~ledits i)wlt idec)log). of
Parly itselras curlsliluled ill the early 1!)30.s. B~this very
.
however, a
~~~~i~~~
starism, which was epitumized by Sta1in.s courtier. Georpi Maletl"v,
many whodid llot aclively participate i n the second phase,
tlley belollged
the state."
to a party conference i o 1941: "We arc all scrvallls
tothe okrivor the ~ a r o dnevcrtlteless became its beneficiaries, F~~ decinla.
\"hen he
lio11ofthe pre-1934 regime, party. and intelligerltsia intile ~~~~t porge opelle,.
~ t ~ l given
i ~ the
~ cue t w o years before, whefl, at tile Eidlteellth Party Con.
Eligels' (and by impticaliot, Marl's) rnist3kerzidea "la'
.,Ilo %how*
grcss, he
i career oP(wrt11llities on a vast scale t o thWe from] below ,
' mmbillcd with the acquiescent, state.oriented, and ~ t ~ l i ~ . ~Illat
~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~
ism
meall( the withering away of the state.
.I.* wllal extent was the Stalinist revolution "li-oln below" as
as. lrom
. were hallmarks o f t h e chirruvnik under full Stalillisrll.
hi^ ill~llx largely
this questlo"' .
above? ~~t until the social history of tile period is u'rittell
i. influx of the peasant-hnm o r of tliosc wllo llad ixc,, childrer, ofpeasallts, ~ i ~ , ~ , ~
pm"
fullya,,swera~lc.
Undoubtedly, we shuuld avrlid two ulllcllable,
Baris Pihiak's stalen~entof 1922 that '*the dark waters
lnuzl,ik ~~~~i~
lriive
tiolls:
that taken i n tile above-cited passage ill Stalin's Slzorrcourse
. . that lhc
! swept and swallowed the Petrille empire," ~ i ~vakar
h llas
~ argued
l ~ that
~
revolulinn fronl abovewas "directly supported from below by Illc
mil'ions. ,"
Slalinisl revolution, by lilling l l ~ e
Snviet hierarclly
persolls
peasalll slot.
adl
tile oppo)site view that the process had f~ suPI1ol.t final lhelow.
Rut given
. . and illfusillg age-old p e a : ~ r ~moles
f
values into tllc sovier
l,121r~e(~
state o f our kllowledpe, dimerencer rlf(~l~illion alld
ellplss
i lomplele P P f l s ~ l l l r i z ~ rOF
i ~ rthe
~ Russian Revolll(ioll,53
tl,c [r;,g,,lrn(ary
illevilable
we
beyond thisobviuus elartitlg-poilll. pcrlla~sit
he useful,
as a settilg
for arlalysis and discossiot~,l o obcerve two distilrctioni
VII
~ i ~the
~ diStillction
t ,
hetween the two pliases (1929-33 alld 1gA4-j9).
i
distinction
between two direrent possible ~neanillgsof "below": Pennns In : This essay has advallced a cultllralist i!~terpretationof the R u s s i a ~ ~
orclosely
associated with it, notnhly LIle nlenlbenhip
VrWess as ofle Illat took place ill two 111;tio stages wit11 an interval of quiesccllce
low~level roles ill
oftlle
,-onm
l usil t
party alld the Komsornol; and the t,oi)ulati~)ll at large. Using
'2, Forcolleclivirariun aq r?llecled in I I archive,
~
EPF MC~I*
9,iu/uni~
u,,dcrsovie,
the ukriv and the !lord
we may call
tilem
Soviet
i
mew
'Or',
1958).C 1 l a ~ 1 2 1x1 Hursior~Proronlr olid Sbl,icr Power fp 488). I.ewin implies
a
ativelr
small
a
~ l t lllu~nerically
~ ~ ~ substantial,
~ l ~ therornrer was no Inore
; H i v e , posilive 1,articit~aliotlI,T thc village pour: .-I,,
luu,,ders~s,,d
pr,,ceas I,r allolesalc
millority o f the latter.
aulakinlion. il is also essential to hear i n mind ihc ,,,isrry ill ~ 1 , i ~
,,,iih
liunr ,r bed,,yilrr lived
you''', . ,
flkl;r: o r large elements of it, including contirlgerlt or
dl lm "rm !he). werll 1,ongr~:lbey hild neilher slloes o shin^,
a,,y u,jE
lr
.jUIIITyjlU,,lS.. ,.be
hllill up in the cuunlrysidc, and ~ l l eeagerness 1,) dispossess kulaks,
a vitally
inlportant
iastrurnelltality
of the regime in lhe first pllase oftheStallnB : m i o n wllich
ill
bgcmeasure cuntribuled (0by the arotcl~cdnesrolzlre bednynk?' cilndi~iuns,and ,he llarrrd whici,
in alllectivlzation and industrialization driva
revolution, Many
capab1e
Or reeling un orcasioll for llleir more L ~ n u ~ t ~ %
~ cl ci ~ h b~~1 , ," , rxl
~,lo
~,red
,
,he,,,
only actively but entllus,astically
all,j selr.sacriflci~~gly.But i t is llut clear !
pllnrlg wbeacver they bnil the C ~ B I I C C t o do
w h e t l ~ e rany a,ndderablc p o d i o n of the rzorod gavc "leregi1ne its volunlaq
.
53. Nicholas Vakar, Tire Topruor ojsovier s ~ ~ ~ ~ , york,
, , ( Nitjhl).
~ ~ ,.he
by Pil,,iL,k,
sllpport during tllis phase. AS i n the time of War Communism, tllc r e ~ i m dcd by Vilknr al p. 16,
rronl !,isnovrl
Go!v80d

1
f

(I,~,,

..

''

.
;

'5

6
102

Ilobert C. l a r k s

S(ltinirmnr He?ululinnfnm Absrc

103
that make rcfetrncc l o the .;peci;rl I~istoricalrole 01' ~ e a ~ ~ ~ ~ . l , ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~
cultural anthropolngists have p o i ~ ~ tout,
e ~ l .'culture" :\lid "perrr,nality"
I,,
I collsiderahle dcpree, twn ways u f viewillg one alltl [Ilesanle p~lellonlcnoll,
culture being s o i n c l l ~ i ~wliich
~g
has its lheirlg inailllyi~iil,i,,l > c ~ p l eIn
. ~lcrllls
~
more irno)e~liatcly~ ~ c r l i l ~ to
e ruur
l l arguniel1l, ;Ilearjcrll,crsollnlilq.)~la~ity bce~l,les i,o[jli.
~a l l y ~acculturated
~
~ t~h n ~ lu g l ihis
l
y
life-experience
both ill cally years an(! duritlg
manhood. Thus. 1917 :tlld (Ile
C i v i l War
a fo,l,l;,~ive
:,cculluraling
life.
experience for Stalin axid many nthcrS of llisparly gerleratioIl,
leavillg
a deep
raidue of the rcvoluti<~narypolilical culture ol. WaK ~<,mmu~~isllr
witllir~tllelil.
~
~illto a~socialist
~ society.
i
In
a k n p i n g will1 the [sarist traditiurl, Illis
Stalillist On tliis levcl u l . c ~ ~ , l i ~ n ; ~ tStalin's
i o ~ ~ . llistorical role i n illulate 1920's was to make
Soviet Russian culture bore a prolloullced oflicial (kazgrl~'i)
character Not
himself, as elFeclivcly as he did, tile leader atid spokesl,,allofaII outlook Illat
1,"
unoflicia',
surprisillg~y. one colisequence was the rebirth ill Stalin's tillle of
shared with numerous others i n the party leadership : I ~II ~I alone
~ ~
tile
ullderground
b(,dy oft~lought, feeling, and art w l ~ i c hwas heretical wit11 referellce
his
ti^^^.
surl)risingly in view
Russian 1
to the St:llinist culture illid which. will
The recapiluliltio~lo f the lsarisl patteril of revoluLil,llislil fronl above presellts
tradilioli, emerged anlong tile nlucilled y ~ l u t h
ilteJ1igellsia;
'iris
Ihs
amuredificult prablerr~ofexplanatior~irt culturalist o,.,,ersollality ternls, iforlly
relrilll~
llrtl~e..dual Russia"pllnlon1eflol~ sect1
lirsLh'llrorlhc'lil'eleettlh
1 because Russian Isarislll, i n all its ~ n a n i f e s t ~ t iwas
o ~ ~\allat
~ , the Bolshevik revolu.
ce,llury. I n the l~ost-Stalinera, the underground Russia hascolne illtosenli-public
lionary movement had taken originall? as its mortal sociopolitical elieniy. Howand
which is
view
via
;u~ffizdarend the like. So llow again, in a
ever, the Russinl~~ ~ a l i o n a l i feeling
st
aroused iaa .iectic$r,of tllc party durillg tllc
tl1er.e a1.e tri'o cullurcs ill Kussia.
f Civil War years. t l t c revulutiut~-bortlspirit oi "Red Kit<sinll patriotism" against
lhi'
a d d i t i o ~l o~ i ~ ~ t e r p r e t i nthe
g Stalinist revolulioll in culturalist
which a party delegate from the Ukraine protested at tllc Tellth Party Congress
essay has altcmptcd t o caplaill i t so. The circumstatltial ex~lallation
in 1921, was a11 elenleu1 i n the culture tliat could predispose a Bolsllevik to
Ihe
tion fro111 above was rejected in favor of olle which stressed* first of
perceive certaill paucrlls out o f the heritage of "Id I<ussia as relevant to the
ill which the circo~nstanceso f 1927-28 suere Perceived and defined by a pDlitical circumstances of the present. 011the other hand, i t d i d lot d o so i n tlle generality
polilically
leadersliip inany of whose members, illcludillg Stalin, had come
of instances of w h i c l ~we know. I t is true that Bukhnrill grnspcd tile direc~iUrl
resl'ondcd
lo '
i,, the era o f the Octaher Revolution and War Cunlnluni~ln
of Stali~i'spolicy l l t i l i k i r ~ gi n 1928, will1 speci;,l
to f<,rced collccti,,izn.
in
tlluse c i r c u t ~ ~ s t ; ~ t ~ill
c cl lsl c rcvolutiollary nllirif of tl1e e;lrlicr railier tllatl
lion, and alluded Lrr 11s l s ; ~ ~ . i sinslrintliol~
l
hy ter~ningi t " ~ ~ t i I i t ; ~ r ~ - f e ucxplnitt~.
d;~l
!lieevolutiot~aryspirit of NEP Soviet culture. Further* (IlC
[ilrnl
take'1 hy lht
tion of the peasatilry." But the party resolution o f A l l ~ i 23,
l
1929, agailst
tile
'lie'IatuR
)
Bukhnrinist group stipmntizcd tlukl~arirl.s charge as ..a libelous attack , .
~ l ~ l i ~ ~ i ~ tthe relation between its IwU ~EIJU~pllases.
of tile rlrw Stalinist order tlial it created have beell treated as recal'i'ulation
draw11from the p;~rtyof Mili~lkov:' 5 C This was hardly
adn~issiuntllat Sl;llill's
ill esselltiaIs of the pattern of revolutionism fro111 above tl1;lt hell'nged lo
Ih' : neo-tsarist Marxis111(the use ofsuch a phrase may sou~l,lmonstrous to Marxists,
culture of old Russia and was visible i n tllc ( w r i s t state-bnilding prmm
but the Marxist Wel,o~lscharrrrn~iscapablc oftiyany nlelen;orphoses) had f,2ulld
fro,,,
the fifteenth trr the rightrenth c e n t i l r i s and the s~'Cio~olilical
"(Ier
it
favor with a snbstnntial hody o f party opiniot~.Hencc. i n this problem tile explanatory ctiipl~asisniust fall more o n "personalily" Illan on "oulturr."
pruduced.
" lhir
inevitably aripes. why did history rcciiPitr'late
~~t tile
To pul it otllerwise, acculturatios is not to be viewe<l simply as a process in
therllselves
illstalrce? Cultural patterris out of a llation's Past do llot
lhr ' which an individual i s arected by ionnative life-expericn~ces thereby internalpreserlt simply because they were there. N o r can we
'hr: pllcl'onlelon
by : izes culture paltertis, i ~ i c l u d i r ~patterr~s
g
out o f the past, as dictated by his psychore(erellce to like circumstances, such as NEP Russia's relative llltcrrlational isola
logical needs or predispositiul~s.Stali~i,the co~nnlissarfir natlorlality aflaim atld
do not
tion atid economic backwardness. for we have argued Illat
ssuch the presumable protector of the rights of the minority nations in[IleSoviet
carry their owti self-evident meaning, that what people and political leaders
f kdcratioa, was ill Rct, as Leoill discovered to his horror shortly before dying,
is always the circumsta~icesas perceived and dc.llcd 6.v LIrenl*
wllichlumone of tliose Bolsheviks most infected by "
~[ l e d patrio~ism..~
~
~~~,,i,,
~
i
~
persorlality
And
isinfluenced by culture. B u t also, we must now add,
[ shov'ed llis rcalictlion o f this ia the note? o n the tiatiollality question which Ile
end to \"hat was mentioned at the start as a third inlportal1L explana.
colne at
tory factor underlyillg tile revolution from above-thc mind and per5o"alitYol
..
, 54 See. Ivr cnatnptc. Wallace. C,zllt,rc und /'errunoli(~ 1,nlrnduc~ius:and Ralph I.intnn. The
Staltn.
C"!iurd Bockyround of Per.~o,toIi!~(NewYork, 1945). Cllaps. 6 5 .
.roa cer,aill
extelt
the perso~ialfactor iscovered by the culturalisl expla1latloa '
55. I;o~nmun;~!icherkrrivpor~iii?
rovclrkopo ioiuro r m l , u ~ . ~ ~ o ki h,rsheelkh r ' ~ c z ~ ~ konfcre,,l,7~~
ov,
itself.
111gelieral, there is n o cor~flictbetween culturnlist explanations arldfhov
ipirnu,nov r s , ~ M ~ 1954),
~ ~ ~ p,
. 555,

i t was held. produced a s i l t l a l i o ~c~l ~ a r a c t e r i ~ ~ d

durillg
NEP. ~h~ first
hy tile uneasy co-existence of two cultures, a llew S[lviet cultore
Srowir1gout
~
the Reuolulinn and n dll-survivirlg nld l ~ u s ~ cultltrc
i ~ l l with i t s s'n"lgbutd in
'
Tlie Soviet culture itself illlderwent collsiderable challge 'luril1g 'I1'
[Ile
sta!inist, ~1.g~of 111c Rcvolulion yielded. as llns hen
~
~ .l.lpIe
second,
,
indicated, an anialganlaled Slalil~istSoviet cultllre Illat ~
~
~
illvolvd
~
~
l.
at ullce the full-scale sovietirario~lof Russia11 ~ ( l c i e t yo l l d t h e itassiliciltirlll
or'h'
soviet culture. The Soviet U l l i o l l \*'as re-Russified ill the
.
thal purported l o complcle Russia's s ~ ~ v i c t i ~ i l l g ,lotralalbrm NEP

;,

'

'*

'

;,I,

dictaled on December 30-31, 1922 and in which he characterized S t a l i ~a~

,
foreriiost anlong those Russified minority represe~ltativesill the party w l ~ o
tended
l o err o n the side o f "true-Kussiar~is~i," (i.s/irrrro-rrr.~.~kie
~~msrrorniiu)
and "Greal
Russian chal~vinism." UII~~~II~WII
to L e ~ i i ~Stalin's
l,
sense o f Russian ~iationality,
if not his true-Russia~~ism,
had dated iron] his yo11111fulconversion to Le11in.s
lcadersl~ipand to Bolsl~evisn~,
w l ~ i c hhe s t ~ w11s thc " K o s s i a ~ ~
faction" in the
Empire's Marxist Party, Menshevism being the "Jewisl~faction." I t was 011 this
foundation that Stalin, during the 1920's. went forward i n his thinking and
appropriative self-acculturatio~~,
as the generality o f his Russia~i-nationalist-orieuted party comrades did ilot, to envisage the tsarist state-building process a,
a model for the Soviet Russian stale in its "building ofsocialis~n." r " A n d i t was
the great personal power that he acquired by 1929, will1 tlie ouster o f l l ~ opposi.
e
tior~sfrom tlie parly leadership, that made it possible for l ~ i ~l or iproceed tocarry
out his design.
I f tlie thesis c o n c e r ~ ~tlie
i ~ ~recapitulatio~l
g
of tlie state-building process placer
heavy emphasis upon persollalily even in the context o f a culturalist approach.
a final explanatory consideration concerning the Stalinist phenomenon narrows
the focus o ~ ~ pt eor s o ~ ~ a l ito
t y 11 still greater dcgrec. U l ~ l i k cany othcr llolshevik,
t o my knowledge, Stalin, as we have noted. defined the Soviet situation in 1925
and 1926 i n eve-of-October terms, i n ~ p l i c i t l ypresaging tllereby a revolutionary
assault against the existing order, i.e., the N E P , i n the drive to build socialism.
i ethe
~lts
Then, looking back in the S l ~ u r rCorrr.scof 1938 on the a c c o ~ n p l i s l ~ ~ ~or
Stalinist decade, he described thcm, and collectivizatior~i n particular, as eqoivalent in consequence to the October Kevolutiori o f 1917. U ~ ~ d e r l y i nboth
g the
definition of the situa~iooin t l ~ emid-1920's and t11c retrospeclive satisfaclion
expressed i n the late 1930's was Stalin's con~l,ulsive psychological need, born of
nei~rosis, to prove hin~selfa revolutionary hero o f Lenin-like proportions, lo
soprenle historical
match or surpass what all Bolsheviks considered IRII~II'S
cnploil, t l ~ cleadersliip n f the party ill i l ~ eworld-l~isloricr e v o l u t i o ~ ~ a rsuccess
y
of October 1917. ' l ' l ~ cgreat revolutionary drive t o c11;111gu Kusqia i n tlie early
d Stalin's October.
1930's was i t i t e ~ ~ d eas
I n practice i t achieved certain successes, notably in i ~ ~ d u s t r i a l i r a t i obut
~ i , at
a cost o f such havoc and misery ill Russia that Stalin, as the r e g i ~ i ~ esupreme
's
leader, aroused condemnation among many. This helps t u cxplail~,in psychologithat he visited upon r n i l l i o ~ ~ofs his party
cal terms, the lethal vi~~dictiveness
~ i g I t was his way
comrades, fellow countrymen, and others in the e ~ ~ s u iyears.
o f trying t o c o n ~ et o terms w i t h the repressed fact that he, Djugashvili, had failed
t o prove hinlself the charismatically Lenin-like Stalin that i t was his lifelollg goal
to he. If t l ~ i sinterpretatior~is well fouoded, he was l ~ a r d l ythe most impersonal
o f great historical figures.
56. The dernottslrslion aad documentation of this lhais is onr dthe aims ormy work i n progresr.
Slolin o,ld rlre Rewlurio,r/rum Above. 1929-1939 A Study in Hi.~loryond l'crorio/i(v Io Sliilin or
Revolu,ionory, 1879-1929. Ihave sought lodcmonrlra~ethe tl~rrirconcer!~i#>g
Stalin'r Greal Kurrian
nnliol,alirs>and i t s youll>rulorigins.

VIII
Having sketched here a primarily culturalist i ~ ~ t e r p r e t a t ioof~Stalinism
l
as revolulion iron] above, hasetl 011 l l ~ eSoviet 1930's, it remailis to co~iclutlew i t h a
comment on the hislorical scquel. I wish to indicate in p i ~ r t i c ~ ~the
l a r relevance
ofthe arlalysis to the Stalinisl ~ ~ l ~ e ~ i oill~ its
i ~suhseque~~l
e r ~ o ~ ~develop~r~ent.
We
may dislinguish two suhsequellf iwriods: Illat of the Soviet-Germall c o ~ ~ f l i of.
ct
1941-45 and that of puslwar S t i ~ l i l l i s (1946-53).
l~~
In this sequence. 1945 f o r n ~ s
a sort of historici~lpause or Iiiat~ls,rather as 1034 d i d betweell tile two phases
ofthe r e v o l u t i o ~from
~
alrovc o f the 1930's.
Thesecond World W a r was, ill a way, an i r ~ l e r i mi n Stalinism's d e v e l o p n ~ e ~ ~ t .
Not that the "Great Fatherland War," as it was callcd i n Stalin's Russia, had
no serious impact or1 Stalinist Soviet C o ~ n n l u ~ ~ ias
s t an sociopolitical culture, hut
that n ~ a i ~i ~
t reinforced
ly
tendelicies already present before the war began. Thus,
the war gave a p ~ ~ w e r f fuulr t l ~ e rimpetus to the Great Russia11~ ~ a t i o n a l i sw
ml ~ i c l ~
had becon~eevident i n Slalin's perso~lalpolitical niakeup by the beginning o f (he
1920's ;tnd a ~ ~ r n l l l i l l r rnnt o l i l i n Slnliuist 11101~g111
and polilics i n tile 1970's. The
official glorification o f n i ~ l i o ~ K
~ ua sl s i a ~tnilitary
~
I~eroeso f the prc-Soviet past,
notably G e ~ ~ e r aSl sa v o r o v a ~ i dKutuzov and Admiral N a k h i ~ n o vand
,
tl~eopening
of special Soviet officers' t r a i l ~ i r ~i~cadeniies
g
oarned after them, were among tile
many manifesli~lionso f Illis t r e ~ ~ Too,
d . ~the
~ war inte~isiliedthe inilitsrist strain
in Stalinism, which has here bee11traced hack to the t i ~ i ~
o feW a r C o n ~ n ~ u n i s n ~ .
Ilstrengthened and further dcvelolled the l~ierarcl~icalstruclureof
Stalinist Soviet
society as recollstilutal clllrillg the revolution from above o f 111e 1930's, and
augmented the alrcady f a r - r c ; ~ c h i ~S~tga l i ~ ~ i hypertrophy
st
of tlie slate machine.
isn~
There were also covert lrcnds st Ihst lime toward tlie oflicial a n t i - S e ~ ~ ~ i twhich
became blatant ill the poslwar Stalinist c a t ~ ~ p a i gagainst
n
"rootless cosrnopolitans," the murder F
I large t ~ u ~ n h e o
r sf Soviet Jewish inlellectuals. and 111einfa' % IIIOIII~IS
ill 1Y53.511
mous "doctors' arair" o f S l i ~ l i ~ tI~ISI
I n the pol\\,al- perin11 aflcr 1945, we see a situation w l ~ i c happears l o ronflict
with a revolulionary interpretatic~nof the Stalinist p l ~ c ~ ~ o n ~ e The
n o n .d o ~ r ~ i ~ ~ a n l
note i n Soviet internal policy during lhose years was conservatisn~,the recotlsolidati~sgof the Stalinist order that had taken shape i n l l ~ e1930's.FqAn example
ofsuch conservatisr~~
was the early post-war action of Stalin's regime i n cutting
57. On Stalinism nud Russiacl satio~lnlismaller 1919. see in parliculvr the informative accnslrl
by F. Barghuarn. "Stalinism and the Russian Cullural Herifape," Review o/Puli~icr, Vol 14, No.
2 (April. 1952), pp. 178-201: and his So~.ierRur.cion Norionol~m(New York, 1956).
58. In "New Bic,grnphie.i orSlalin." Sovie1Jlrwirh AffnR,. Val. 5. No. 2 (1975), p. 104. Jack Miller
has called alterllion to "Slalill's owen usc of antiscmitis~nnguiltrt Trolsky, Kanlenev and Zinouiev,
when in conlilion with Rtokllarin be was rumling tttem in 142527." and add?: "The exlent to which
&ntiselnitismappeared is llte Psrly rnachir~cd~trirtgthis phase or Slalin'r rise 10 suprenne power i s
of special ihlleresl in the 'nssiryinp' nf Mariism."
59. In '711e Slalin Heritage in Soviet I'olicy" (7'lte Sovie1 Politico1.Wind. Chap. 4), 1 hnvc vrgucd
!ha1 Slrtin turned conservative in lhis pos~-w~tr
illterlnnl poliUcr.

.~*:

Rol~eclC. Tuck#
106
-Ism
as Re*elution Iron, Above
101
hack tile p r i ~ ; garilcn
~ t ~ l , l o ~ wllicli-for
~
purlr,se\. o f h r t t l ~w:~l--ti~lle
inorole and
trkol place ill llusui;~ ill tlic l')1O's. l ' l i c y:~r,le I,l;,y
he silicl <,f 1 1 , ~ l,c,qt,v~lr
l l ~ ri~ntion'sfoocl supply-the
a>llectivizerl Soviet pe;lsallts ll;ld bccll allowed
rc~0~utirlll:lry
trallsf(~r1llillinl1i n N o r t h Kc~rca,wllicll llLld becll occupied by ,lie
surreptitiol~sly to illcrease in sizeduriog tlie war years. True. this was a "conscwSoviet Arlily :kt llle war's end. Cliina, a pote~itialgreiil power ill its o\vll rig[,[,
ative" actior~i n the special sense 01- reinstati~igw l ~ a thad bccn a revtrlulionar)
p m l i t e d for tllal very reason a special prohlern for Slslin-alrd
fclr ~talillisol.
Insofar as Ille Stalinisl rrv<~ltrtic,l~
f r o ~ nhrrve
~l
llad bcrll ai,led
at ~rnllffi,rrlli,lg
cliange at the time o f collectivizatio~~
lineell yciirs beinre.
Ullt Stalinism as revolulionism fro111ahove did 1101cild w i t h the colllp~e~i00
Soviet Russia into a grezil n i i l i l ; t r ~ - i r ~ d ~ ~ s fpower
r i ; ~ l ~:,~,;,bl~ fullydere,ldilg
of t l ~ e
state-directed revolutionary pruccsses o f the 193(l's and the conlillg o f t k
11% indepeodence a ~ illlerests
~ d
i n t l ~ cworld, S t : ~ l i t ~ i s r ~ l
likely to appeal
secolld W o r l d War. I t reappeared it1 1 9 3 9 4 0 and agirirl ill Llle late war and .
lothe very Rossia!~-nationalist-111i1idedStaliu n ;I prol,er prescrilltioll
for con\.
post-war Stalit~years ina new form: the e x t e r ~ ~ a l i z ; ~of
l i oStali~iist
~~
revolution
munislll 111 Cllilla. s:lve to the erlent t l ~ a fRussia c o u l ~ place
l
slid keep chilla
years 1 9 3 9 4 0 are singled out ill Illis c o ~ ~ ~ ~ e checause
t i o l l they : ~nderits calltrol. Very likely it was these coosider;ltio~~s,together
frorll above.
the
witllessed tllc Soviet takeover o f eastern Poland atid 111e three Baltic cou!~tria
rhrcwd realization orthe i~npossihilityof lotlg-ratigesucress ill keeping a c
~
~
~
~
durillg
llletillle of sovie[.Nazi collaboratiol~under tlie Stnlill-lliller pact of
nkt Cbilla ut~derR u s s i : ~conlrnl.
~~
w l ~ i c cl ~
x l , l : ~ i ~~
~ ~ :illll~liYi,lellee
~ l i ~ ~
tOWi.
lrd- ~
i\ugust 1939. Under illl organized sllani pretense o l popi11;lr dc~nalld,llle easlem
not lo say distasle f r ~ r - t l ~ cC ~ I I I ~ I I ~ I>(' the C h i ~ ~ e C
s cO I I I I ~ I ~ ~ t~o ~power.
S ~ ~ oy tile
polishterritories were i~icorporatedinto the Ukrainiau and Uclurussiall Sovifl
ume tukeli, we can see ill all this a key t o the atlr:~ction tli;lt cerlaill aspects or
Slalinislll, llot i ~ l c l u d i n gits Ruc5ien ~iationalism,had tilr Mae.
republics; arid Lithuallia, Latvia, and Estonia b e c a ~ i ~co~lslitucllt
e
("ullioll")
repllblics of the USSR. Meanwhile, under cover of the Red A r n v occupation
fiflally, despite what has he,.^^ said above ahout t l l c gellerally
co,lservative
lands, the soviet party, police, and economic authorities proceeded with
nature of Stalin's pcist-war ~II~<.~II;II
policy, i t III;I~be suggesle(l
fillat ill solllc
tllclorc,ble transp1alltation to them of Soviet political culture ill its Stalinized j paradoxical sense Stalinism as t e u o l u l i o ~froni
~
above rcturllec~ lo~~~~i~
durillg
1946-53 within the Settil~go r l l l c ct,nservntive i ~ i t e r n a la,licics
l
tlIcll be,,lp
fnrlIl, conlplc(e
with deportalio~lof all suspect elenle~llsof tlle p l l l ? u l * l i o ~inlo
rued. For Stalill's very e f i ~ r tto turn t l ~ cSoviet clock h,.k to tile 1 9 3 0 . ~
tile ~~~~i~~~
itllerior. ~ l revolutionary
~ e
transformatio~~s
l r o m :~bove,illterrupted
tllr
by the G
~ illvasion
~ of Russia
~
~
i n Julie~ 1941,,were ~
resunicd arid conlpletd . war carried will1 i t a sl~aduwyrerun o f t l ~ cdevelopmel~ts tllaf earlier
decalit.
In otller words, [lie post-war reactinn \\.as a renctio~lto ;I period of radical
,lpoll tllc soviet reoccupntion, later i n tlrc war, of what liad heen easterr1 I'oland
: change-froni above. IIIhis major postwar policy addrcss ~,r~ ~ h 9, ~1946,~ , ; ~ ~ ~
and t l ~ eindependent Rallic states.
agel,clil
;Is a gL,;lral,tce
~l~~~
tile ~ t ~ l ircvo~ulioll
~ ~ i ~ tfrom above was c:~rricd into tllc Balkans and ; Slalill vhced a series of furt11e1-livc-year p l a ~ l siln R~~ssi;t's
nlucll
of ~
~ ~ t~ . u~i n the
~ r n~a k e~~of the
l ~ Soviet
~ ~~ Arniy's
l
~~ccupatioll
of i agaillsl "all colltillge~~cics:' i.e.. 11, prepare the c u u ~ i t r yi;~r a possible rutlrrewar.
llulgaria,
~
~
H
~~
lllerest~of ~
~ol;,nd,
~ and
~~
[he eastern
~
~ parts~olGcr.
i
~:. ~This meat11
, , the re-cnacttnc~ito r the prc-war policy of givingpriority t o llaluy
'
~ ~ cl~t;liled for tile soviet
~
~
~
likewise
~
l succuo~be<l
~
~ to~ it h ll l o w~i ~ ~t l g~~ cC o l n~~ i i u ~k i i coup
st i
~ industry over ccrllsumer goods. \\,it11 all 111~. p r i v ; ~ t i oII,;,~
popula~ion.A minor rec<~llcctivizing
campaign was ~ L , I tllrougll fn~~owillg
(lie
or~ebruary
1948. yuEoslavia,
w \ l c r e s C o n ~ m u n i smovenrent
t
hndcometopuwa
abuve-nlellliolled early pnslwer decisioti l o cul back the size (,f the pcasnn(r.
illdepellderllly
through successful partisall warfare during [lie German occopa
but effeclivcly
c~lecked the subsequent enhrts n f Stalin's cmissaria : private garden 11lu1s. Purtl~ertriore,ill the dictatnr's fit^:,^
tllerc wcrr illtioll,
crensillgly clear inOiciltio~istllat IIEwas p r e l x r i j ~ g ,if
direct [heyugoslav
~l.lulsfornlatiol
rroni above i n such ;Iway as to ensore firm
a lesser scale, st,rl
nplica o f f l l e Gre;~t Porge of thc 1930's. Tllcre would be show trials
of the yugoslav
Communist politic:~l system; and as a resull
the so,,iet
soviet
Jcl~ishdoctors. accused o f c o l ~ ~ p l i c i tiyn a11 illlaginary ill~erna~iolla~
~
~
~
~
l
Yugoslavia was excommunicated by Stalin later i n 1948.""
Americall-Jewi.;ll co~ispir:~cy
to 41orte11(lie lives of Soviet leaders; alld
lI,itswar.lillle
alld post.war externalixed form, tlie Stalil~istrevolution from
dallht
w
as well. Tliesr \vould provide thc dranlatic symbolism rleeded
above comprised bolll the takeover (or atten~ptedtakeover) o r a given cuulltrY, , olller s l l ~ ~lrials
and t11e11the use o f a Soriel-directed nallvs . 8s an accolnpallilllrlit and justification of the purge, jurt as tile show trials or
llorlnally
,,iamilitary
~olnnlullist
party adl
its subsidiary orga~~izatiolis
as agents o f tlie c ~ u l l t r f i ! IheOId onlsllcviks of i . d t and R i g l ~ dt i d ill tile earlier version o f tile revolution
trallsforma~ion
into wllat was called at first a "people's deniocracy." The estab
lrom above."'
of
Muscovite
control
over
the
orgajrs
or
F
)
v
c
r
in
the
j
{isllment and
ofll~csi~o~vlri8l
:!?at> elen,ew olSlalinirt plilica~
cutture~,;,s bee,, lars,.,le~
coulltry collcerlled
was, as indicated above, an esser~tialelernait Of tile process. : 61 Aninler~refalicrl~
Ihc
Prr*nl
ill ''Sli~lill.Iluk11:trin. and Hislrry ns canspiracy:. tirs! puh~inherl
as ll,r
7.11ere were variatiolls
itl the rnet~lads and tinletables, b u t i n essence the East 1
Introihetionlo T%eGrror PINRP ?i.iol. c d ~ ~ cbyd KOIX~IC. ~
u alld sl
~ePllPl k r.C~~ J , ~(~, , N yI,,k,
~ ~
Europea~lrevolutiotl, illsofar
as it took place 'Ider
auspices in a liunlbcr
1061). alld reprillled III Thr Ji,s,rnPoiil,i.i?iMi,,das Cllapler 1. ~ ~
i , ,; ~~
, , ~ ~ hof
~ r~lr
~ ~~t i ,~, ,~, ) i ~ , i ~ ~
of smaller c o u ~ ~ t r i e involved
s,
the trallsfer 10 fc3reig11 Ia1lds
of inluch of
had
bow Ilia1 10 p,r$l-war Eulertt Europe. ~ z e ~ l ~ ~III ~p;,rticutar.
r l ~ v ~ discuSrd
k ~ ~
tl). 11 ~,,,rl~,,
1 Skillingin l l i s crsaY hclclw, and ;al%,iut Czt~'lcchosiorukri',
l , r ? ~ m , , p t e d n ~ , v , ,( iP, , ~, ~, l, ~ ~ N.J
, ~ ,,,1~76,.
.
! Chap. XIII.
m. 7.he c~a5ric ren~airaVlndirnir Drdijer, li,u (New Yurk. 1953).

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