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When it is assumed that the prohibition awakens the desire, one acquires knowledge

instead of ignorance, and in that case Adam must have had a knowledge of freedom, because
the desire was to use it.The explanation is therefore subsequent.The prohibition
induces in him anxiety, for the prohibition awakens in him freedoms possibility.What
passed by innocence as the nothing of anxiety has now entered into Adam, and here
again it is a nothingthe anxious possibility of being able. He has no conception of what
he is able to do; otherwiseand this is what usually happensthat which comes later,
the difference between good and evil, would have to be presupposed. Only the possibility
of being able is present as a higher form of ignorance, as a higher expression of
anxiety, . . . because in a higher sense he both loves it and flees from it. 42

Although this prohibition comes from outside, however, its effectsthe rise of the
anxiety of freedomcan still be accounted for in terms of psychology; the crucial
leap comes afterward:

Anxiety may be compared with dizziness. He whose eye happens to look down into the
yawning abyss becomes dizzy. . . . Hence anxiety is the dizziness of freedom, which
emerges when the spirit wants to posit the synthesis and freedom looks down into its
own possibility, laying hold of finiteness to support itself. Freedom succumbs in this
dizziness. Further than this, psychology cannot and will not go. In that very moment
everything is changed, and freedom, when it again rises, sees that it is guilty. Between
these two moments lies the leap, which no science has explained and which no science
can explain.43

The precise temporality is crucial here: dizzy with the abyss of its own freedom, the
spirit renounces it, searching for a support in some finite positivity (the theme which
later became popular under the name of escape from freedom);however, this fall into
finitude, conditioned by the spirits (subjects) weakness, is not yet the Fall proper.The
building blocks for a materialist theology

Fall occurs only when, after this fall into finitude, freedom rises again, it paradoxically
coincides with this riseit is only now that freedom perceives itself as guilty (and
another aspect of the same leapthat sexuality and the sensuous as such appear as sinful).
We enter the domain of sin and guilt only in the second rise of freedomwhy?
To explain this properly, I should introduce a further complication here.There is
somethinga crucial stepmissing in Kierkegaards description: that is, his otherwise
refined psychological sensibility leads him astray: the passage from primordial repose
filled with the joyous anxiety of nothing to prohibition is not direct; what comes
in between is what Schelling called Zusammenziehung, primordial self-withdrawal, primordial
egotistic contraction.44 For this reason, Kierkegaard proceeds too quickly in
ironically rejecting Schellings topic of the moods and states in God, of Gods suffering,
and so on, and other creative birth pangs of the deity45for Kierkegaard, God
is absolute transcendence to whom no such anthropomorphic predicate can be applied
(which is why Kierkegaard mockingly observes that, when Schelling focuses on
Gods frustration that pushes him to creativity, he compares God to Mr. Mller . . . );
however, if it does not apply to God, it certainly applies to human subjects.That is the
crucial insight of Freudian metapsychology emphasized by Lacan: the function of Prohibition
is not to introduce disturbance into the previous repose of paradisiacal innocence, but, on the
contrary,
to resolve some terrifying deadlock.
It is only now that we can reconstruct the full sequence: primordial repose is first
disturbed by the violent act of contraction, of self-withdrawal, which provides the
proper density of the subjects being; the result of this contraction is a deadlock that