Tecson vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 161434.

March 3, 2004
FACTS:

Victorino X. Fornier, petitioner initiated a petition before the

COMELEC to disqualify FPJ and to deny due course or to cancel his
certificate of candidacy upon the thesis that FPJ made a material
misrepresentation in his certificate of candidacy by claiming to be a
natural-born Filipino citizen when in truth, according to Fornier, his
parents were foreigners; his mother, Bessie Kelley Poe, was an
American, and his father, Allan Poe, was a Spanish national, being
the son of Lorenzo Pou, a Spanish subject. Granting, petitioner
asseverated, that Allan F. Poe was a Filipino citizen, he could not
have transmitted his Filipino citizenship to FPJ, the latter being an
illegitimate child of an alien mother. Petitioner based the allegation of
the illegitimate birth of respondent on two assertions - first, Allan F.
Poe contracted a prior marriage to a certain Paulita Gomez before
his marriage to Bessie Kelley and, second, even if no such prior
marriage had existed, Allan F. Poe, married Bessie Kelly only a year
after the birth of respondent.
Petitioners also questioned the jurisdiction of the
COMELEC in taking cognizance of and deciding the citizenship issue
affecting Fernando Poe Jr. They asserted that under Section 4(7),
Article VII of the 1987 Constituition, only the Supreme Court had
original and exclusive jurisdiction to resolve the basic issue of the
case.
ISSUES:
Whether or not FPJ is a natural born Filipino citizen?; Whether or not
the Supreme Court have jurisdiction over the qualifications of
presidential candidates?
HELD:

Where jurisprudence regarded an illegitimate child as

taking after the citizenship of its mother, it did so for the benefit the
child. It was to ensure a Filipino nationality for the illegitimate child of
an alien father in line with the assumption that the mother had
custody, would exercise parental authority and had the duty to
support her illegitimate child. It was to help the child, not to prejudice
or discriminate against him.
The fact of the matter perhaps the most significant
consideration is that the 1935 Constitution, the fundamental law
prevailing on the day, month and year of birth of respondent FPJ, can
never be more explicit than it is. Providing neither conditions nor
distinctions, the Constitution states that among the citizens of the
Philippines are "those whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines."
There utterly is no cogent justification to prescribe conditions or
distinctions where there clearly are none provided.

Republic vs. Lim, G.R. No. 153883, January 13, 2004

FACTS:
In 1999, Chuley Lim filed a petition for correction
ofentries in her birth certificate with the regional trial court of Lanao
del Norte. Her maiden name was Chuley Yu and thats how it
appears in all herofficial records except that in her birth certificate
where it appears as Chuley Yo. She said that it was misspelled.
The Republic of the Philippines through the local city prosecutor
raised the issue of citizenship because it appears that Lims birth
certificate shows that she is a Filipino. The prosecutor contends that
Lims father was aChinese; that she acquired her fathers citizenship
pursuant to the 1935 Constitution in place when she was born; that
she never elected Filipino citizenship when she reached the age of
majority (she is already 47 years old at that time); that since she is
a Chinese, her birth certificate should be amended to reflect that she
is a Chinese citizen. Lim contends that she is an illegitimate child
hence she is a Filipino.
ISSUE: Whether or not Lim is a Chinese citizen.
HELD:
Instead, in its first assignment of error, the Republic avers
that respondent did not comply with the constitutional requirement of
electing Filipino citizenship when she reached the age of majority. It

cites Article IV, Section 1(3) of the 1935 Constitution, which provides
that the citizenship of a legitimate child born of a Filipino mother and
an alien father followed the citizenship of the father, unless, upon
reaching the age of majority, the child elected Philippine citizenship.
Likewise, the Republic invokes the provision in Section 1 of
Commonwealth Act No. 625, that legitimate children born of Filipino
mothers may elect Philippine citizenship by expressing such intention
"in a statement to be signed and sworn to by the party concerned
before any officer authorized to administer oaths, and shall be filed
with the nearest civil registry. The said party shall accompany the
aforesaid statement with the oath of allegiance to the Constitution
and the Government of the Philippines."
Plainly, the above constitutional and statutory requirements
of electing Filipino citizenship apply only to legitimate children. These
do not apply in the case of respondent who was concededly an
illegitimate child, considering that her Chinese father and Filipino
mother were never married. As such, she was not required to comply
with said constitutional and statutory requirements to become a
Filipino citizen. By being an illegitimate child of a Filipino mother,
respondent automatically became a Filipino upon birth. Stated
differently, she is a Filipino since birth without having to elect Filipino
citizenship when she reached the age of majority.

Co vs. House of Representatives [G.R. Nos. 92191-92, July 30,

1991]
FACTS:

The HRET declared that respondent Jose Ong, Jr. is a

natural born Filipino citizen and a resident of Laoang, Northern
Samar for voting purposes. The congressional election for the
second district of Northern Samar was held. Among the candidates
who vied for the position of representative in the second legislative
district are the petitioners, Sixto Balinquit and Antonio Co and the
private respondent, Jose Ong, Jr. Respondent Ong was proclaimed
the duly elected representative of the second district of Northern
Samar.
The petitioners filed election protests on the grounds that
Jose Ong, Jr. is not a natural born citizen of the Philippines and not a
resident of the second district of Northern Samar.
ISSUE: Whether or not Jose Ong, Jr. is a citizen of the Philippines.
HELD:

FORMAL ELECTION OF CITIZENSHIP APPLIES ONLY

TO THOSE WHO HAVE YET TO ACQUIRE PHILIPPINE
CITIZENSHIP AND NOT TO THOSE WHO ARE ALREADY
FILIPINOS WHEN THE TIME TO ELECT COMES. Election becomes
material because Section 2 of Article IV of the Constitution accords
natural born status to children born of Filipino mothers before
January 17, 1973, if they elect citizenship upon reaching the age of
majority.
To expect the respondent to have formally or in writing
elected citizenship when he came of age is to ask for the unnatural
and unnecessary. The reason is obvious. He was already a citizen.
Not only was his mother a natural born citizen but his father had
been naturalized when the respondent was only nine (9) years old.
He could not have divined when he came of age that in 1973 and
1987 the Constitution would be amended to require him to have filed
a sworn statement in 1969 electing citizenship inspite of his already
having been a citizen since 1957. In 1969, election through a sworn
statement would have been an unusual and unnecessary procedure
for one who had been a citizen since he was nine years old.
We have jurisprudence that defines "election" as both a
formal and an informal process.
In the case of In Re: Florencio Mallare (59 SCRA 45
[1974]), the Court held that the exercise of the right of suffrage and
the participation in election exercises constitute a positive act of
election of Philippine citizenship. In the exact pronouncement of the
Court, we held:
Esteban's exercise of the right of suffrage when he came of
age, constitutes a positive act of election of Philippine citizenship". (p.
52; emphasis supplied)

The private respondent did more than merely exercise his

right of suffrage. He has established his life here in the Philippines.
For those in the peculiar situation of the respondent who
cannot be expected to have elected citizenship as they were already
citizens, we apply the In Re Mallare rule.
The respondent was born in an outlying rural town of
Samar where there are no alien enclaves and no racial distinctions.
The respondent has lived the life of a Filipino since birth. His father
applied for naturalization when the child was still a small boy. He is a
Roman Catholic. He has worked for a sensitive government agency.
His profession requires citizenship for taking the examinations and
getting a license. He has participated in political exercises as a
Filipino and has always considered himself a Filipino citizen. There is
nothing in the records to show that he does not embrace Philippine
customs and values, nothing to indicate any tinge of alien-ness, no
acts to show that this country is not his natural homeland. The mass
of voters of Northern Samar are fully aware of Mr. Ong's parentage.
They should know him better than any member of this Court will ever
know him. They voted by overwhelming numbers to have him
represent them in Congress. Because of his acts since childhood,
they have considered him as a Filipino.
The filing of sworn statement or formal declaration is a
requirement for those who still have to elect citizenship. For those
already Filipinos when the time to elect came up, there are acts of
deliberate choice which cannot be less binding. Entering a profession
open only to Filipinos, serving in public office where citizenship is a
qualification, voting during election time, running for public office, and
other categorical acts of similar nature are themselves formal
manifestations of choice for these persons.
An election of Philippine citizenship presupposes that the
person electing is an alien. Or his status is doubtful because he is a
national of two countries. There is no doubt in this case about Mr.
Ong's being a Filipino when he turned twenty-one (21).
We repeat that any election of Philippine citizenship on the
part of the private respondent would not only have been superfluous
but it would also have resulted in an absurdity. How can a Filipino
citizen elect Philippine citizenship?
The respondent HRET has an interesting view as to how
Mr. Ong elected citizenship. It observed that "when protestee was
only nine years of age, his father, Jose Ong Chuan became a
naturalized Filipino. Section 15 of the Revised Naturalization Act
squarely applies its benefit to him for he was then a minor residing in
this country. Concededly, it was the law itself that had already
elected Philippine citizenship for protestee by declaring him as such."
(Emphasis supplied)
RESIDENCE IN ELECTION LAW IS EQUIVALENT TO
DOMICILE. The petitioners lose sight of the meaning of "residence"
under the Constitution. The term "residence" has been understood as
synonymous with domicile not only under the previous Constitutions
but also under the 1987 Constitution.
The deliberations of the Constitutional Commission reveal
that the meaning of residence vis-a-vis the qualifications of a
candidate for Congress continues to remain the same as that of
domicile, to wit:
"Mr. Nolledo:
With respect to Section 5, I remember that in the
1971 Constitutional Convention, there was an
attempt to require residence in the place not less
than one year immediately preceding the day of
the elections. So my question is: What is the
Committee's concept of residence of a candidate
for the legislature? Is it actual residence or is it
the concept of domicile or constructive
residence?
Mr. Davide:
Madame President, insofar as the regular
members of the National Assembly are
concerned, the proposed section merely
provides, among others, 'and a resident thereof,

that is, in the district, for a period of not less than

one year preceding the day of the election. This
was in effect lifted from the 1973 Constitution, the
interpretation given to it was domicile." (Records
of the 1987 Constitutional Convention, Vol. II,
July 22, 1986, p. 87)
xxx

xxx

xxx

"Mrs. Rosario Braid:

The next question is on Section 7, page 2. I think
Commissioner Nolledo has raised the same point
that 'resident' has been interpreted at times as a
matter of intention rather than actual residence.
Mr. De los Reyes:
Domicile.
Ms. Rosario Braid:
Yes, So, would the gentlemen consider at the
proper time to go back to actual residence rather
than mere intention to reside?
Mr. De los Reyes:
But we might encounter some difficulty especially
considering that a provision in the Constitution in
the Article on Suffrage says that Filipinos living
abroad may vote as enacted by law. So, we have
to stick to the original concept that it should be by
domicile and not physical and actual residence."
(Records of the 1987 Constitutional Commission,
Vol. II, July 22, 1986, p. 110)
The framers of the Constitution adhered to the earlier
definition given to the word "residence" which regarded it as having
the same meaning as domicile.
The term "domicile" denotes a fixed permanent residence
to which when absent for business or pleasure, one intends to return.
(Ong Huan Tin v. Republic, 19 SCRA 966 [1967]) The absence of a
person from said permanent residence, no matter how long,
notwithstanding, it continues to be the domicile of that person. In
other words, domicile is characterized by animus revertendi. (Ujano
v. Republic, 17 SCRA 147 [1966])
The domicile of origin of the private respondent, which was
the domicile of his parents, is fixed at Laoang, Samar. Contrary to the
petitioners' imputation, Jose Ong, Jr. never abandoned said domicile;
it remained fixed therein even up to the present.
PROPERTY OWNERSHIP IS NOT MATERIAL IN
DETERMINING THE RESIDENCE. Even assuming that the private
respondent does not own any property in Samar, the Supreme Court
in the case of De los Reyes D. Solidum (61 Phil. 893 [1935]) held
that it is not required that a person should have a house in order to
establish his residence and domicile. It is enough that he should live
in the municipality or in a rented house or in that of a friend or
relative. (Emphasis supplied)
To require the private respondent to own property in order
to be eligible to run for Congress would be tantamount to a property
qualification. The Constitution only requires that the candidate meets
the age, citizenship, voting and residence requirements. Nowhere is
it required by the Constitution that the candidate should also own
property in order to be qualified to run. (see Maquera v. Borra, 122
Phil. 412 [1965])
It has also been settled that absence from residence to
pursue studies or practice a profession or registration as a voter
other than in the place where one is elected, does not constitute loss
of residence. (Faypon v. Quirino, 96 Phil. 294 [1954])
As previously stated, the private respondent stayed in
Manila for the purpose of finishing his studies and later to practice his

profession. There was no intention to abandon the residence in

Laoang, Samar. On the contrary, the periodical journeys made to his
home province reveal that he always had the animus revertendi.
In re: Application for Admission to the Bar of Vicente Ching
[B.M. No. 914, October 1, 1999]
FACTS:

In 1998, Vicente Ching finished his law degree at the Saint

Louis University in Baguio City. He eventually passed the bar but he
was advised that he needs to show proof that he is a Filipino citizen
before he be allowed to take his oath. Apparently, Chings father was
a Chinese citizen but his mother was a Filipino citizen. His parents
were married before he was born in 1963. Under the 1935
Constitution, a legitimate child, whose one parent is a foreigner,
acquires the foreign citizenship of the foreign parent. Ching
maintained that he has always considered himself as a Filipino; that
he is a certified public accountant a profession reserved for
Filipinos; that he even served as a councilor in a municipality in La
Union.
The Solicitor-General commented on the case by saying
that as a legitimate child of a Chinese and a Filipino, Ching should
have elected Filipino citizenship upon reaching the age of majority;
that under prevailing jurisprudence, upon reaching the age of
majority is construed as within 7 years after reaching the age of
majority (in his case 21 years old because he was born in 1964 while
the 1935 Constitution was in place).
Ching did elect Filipino citizenship but he only did so when
he was preparing for the bar in 1998 or 14 years after reaching the
age of majority. Nevertheless, the Solicitor-General recommended
that the rule be relaxed due to the special circumstance of Ching.
ISSUE: Whether or not he has elected Philippine citizenship within "a
reasonable time".
HELD:
ELECTION OF PHILIPPINE CITIZENSHIP IS A FORMAL
AND EXPRESS ACT. C.A. No. 625 which was enacted pursuant to
Section 1(3), Article IV of the 1935 Constitution, prescribes the
procedure that should be followed in order to make a valid election of
Philippine citizenship. Under Section 1 thereof, legitimate children
born of Filipino mothers may elect Philippine citizenship by
expressing such intention "in a statement to be signed and sworn to
by the party concerned before any officer authorized to administer
oaths, and shall be filed with the nearest civil registry. The said party
shall accompany the aforesaid statement with the oath of allegiance
to the Constitution and the Government of the Philippines."
However, the 1935 Constitution and C.A. No. 625 did not
prescribe a time period within which the election of Philippine
citizenship should be made. The 1935 Charter only provides that the
election should be made "upon reaching the age of majority." The
age of majority then commenced upon reaching twenty-one (21)
years. In the opinions of the Secretary of Justice on cases involving
the validity of election of Philippine citizenship, this dilemma was
resolved by basing the time period on the decisions of this Court prior
to the effectivity of the 1935 Constitution. In these decisions, the
proper period for electing Philippine citizenship was, in turn, based
on the pronouncements of the Department of State of the United
States Government to the effect that the election should be made
within a "reasonable time" after attaining the age of majority. The
phrase "reasonable time" has been interpreted to mean that the
election should be made within three (3) years from reaching the age
of majority. However, we held in Cuenco vs. Secretary of Justice,
that the three (3) year period is not an inflexible rule. We said:
It is true that this clause has been construed to
mean a reasonable period after reaching the age
of majority, and that the Secretary of Justice has
ruled that three (3) years is the reasonable time
to elect Philippine citizenship under the
constitutional provision adverted to above, which
period may be extended under certain
circumstances, as when the person concerned
has always considered himself a Filipino.

However, we cautioned in Cuenco that the extension of the

option to elect Philippine citizenship is not indefinite:
Regardless of the foregoing, petitioner was born on
February 16, 1923. He became of age on February 16, 1944. His
election of citizenship was made on May 15, 1951, when he was over
twenty-eight (28) years of age, or over seven (7) years after he had
reached the age of majority. It is clear that said election has not been
made "upon reaching the age of majority."
In the present case, Ching, having been born on 11 April
1964, was already thirty-five (35) years old when he complied with
the requirements of C.A. No. 625 on 15 June 1999, or over fourteen
(14) years after he had reached the age of majority. Based on the
interpretation of the phrase "upon reaching the age of majority,"
Ching's election was clearly beyond, by any reasonable yardstick, the
allowable period within which to exercise the privilege. It should be
stated, in this connection, that the special circumstances invoked by
Ching, i.e., his continuous and uninterrupted stay in the Philippines
and his being a certified public accountant, a registered voter and a
former elected public official, cannot vest in him Philippine citizenship
as the law specifically lays down the requirements for acquisition of
Philippine citizenship by election.
Cabiling Ma v Fernandez
Yu vs. Defensor-Santiago [G.R. No. 83882, January 24, 1989]
FACTS:
Petitioner Yu was originallyissued a Portuguese passportin
1971. On February 10, 1978,he was naturalized as a Philippine
citizen. Despite his naturalization, he applied for and was issued
Portuguese Passport by the
Consular
Section of the
PortugueseEmbassy in Tokyo on July 21, 1981. Said Consular Office
certifies that his Portuguese passport expired on 20 July 1986. He
also declared his nationality as Portuguese in commercial documents
he signed, specifically, the Companiesregistry of Tai Shun Estate
Ltd. filed in Hongkong sometime in April 1980.
The CID detained Yu pending his deportation case. Yu, in
turn, filed a petition for habeas corpus. An internal resolution of 7
November 1988 referred the case to the Court en banc. The Court en
banc denied the petition. When his Motion for Reconsideration was
denied, petitioner filed a Motion for Clarification.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners acts constitute renunciation of his
Philippine citizenship
HELD:
AQCUISITION
OF
FOREIGN
PASSPORT
IS
EQUIVALENT TO RENUNCIATION OF PHILIPPINE CITIZENSHIP.
To the mind of the Court, the foregoing acts considered together
constitute an express renunciation of petitioner's Philippine
citizenship acquired through naturalization. In Board of Immigration
Commissioners vs. Go Gallano, express renunciation was held to
mean a renunciation that is made known distinctly and explicitly and
not left to inference or implication. Petitioner, with full knowledge, and
legal capacity, after having renounced Portuguese citizenship upon
naturalization as a Philippine citizen resumed or reacquired his prior
status as a Portuguese citizen, applied for a renewal of his
Portuguese passport and represented himself as such in official
documents even after he had become a naturalized Philippine
citizen. Such resumption or reacquisition of Portuguese citizenship is
grossly inconsistent with his maintenance of Philippine citizenship.
Philippine citizenship, it must be stressed, is not a
commodity or ware to be displayed when required and suppressed
when convenient. This then resolves adverse to the petitioner his
motion for clarification and other motions mentioned in the second
paragraph, page 3 of this Decision.
Maquiling v COMELEC

Frivaldo vs. COMELEC [G.R. No. 87193, June 23, 1989]

FACTS:

Juan G. Frivaldo was proclaimed governor of the province

of Sorsogon and assumed office in due time. The League of
Municipalities filed with the COMELEC a petition for the annulment of
Frivaldo on the ground that he was not a Filipino citizen, having been
naturalized in the United States.
Frivaldo admitted the allegations but pleaded the special and
affirmative defenses that he was naturalized as American citizen only
to protect himself against President Marcos during the Martial Law
era.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Frivaldo is a Filipino citizen.
HELD:

LOST OF FOREIGN CITIZENSHIP ACQUIRED

THROUGH SUBSEQUENT NATURALIZATION DOES NOT
AUTOMATICALLY
CONFER
PREVIOUS
PHILIPPINE
CITIZENSHIP. While Frivaldo does not invoke either of the first two
methods, he nevertheless claims he has reacquired Philippine
citizenship by virtue of a valid repatriation. He claims that by actively
participating in the elections in this country, he automatically forfeited
American citizenship under the laws of the United States. Such laws
do not concern us here. The alleged forfeiture is between him and
the United States as his adopted country. It should be obvious that
even if he did lose his naturalized American citizenship, such
forfeiture did not and could not have the effect of automatically
restoring his citizenship in the Philippines that he had earlier
renounced. At best, what might have happened as a result of the loss
of his naturalized citizenship was that he became a stateless
individual.
Frivaldo's contention that he could not have repatriated
himself under LOI 270 because the Special Committee provided for
therein had not yet been constituted seems to suggest that the lack
of that body rendered his repatriation unnecessary. That is farfetched if not specious. Such a conclusion would open the
floodgates, as it were. It would allow all Filipinos who have
renounced this country to claim back their abandoned citizenship
without formally rejecting their adopted state and reaffirming their
allegiance to the Philippines.
It does not appear that Frivaldo has taken these categorical
acts. He contends that by simply filing his certificate of candidacy he
had, without more, already effectively recovered Philippine
citizenship. But that is hardly the formal declaration the law envisions
surely, Philippine citizenship previously disowned is not that
cheaply recovered. If the Special Committee had not yet been
convened, what that meant simply was that the petitioner had to wait
until this was done, or seek naturalization by legislative or judicial
proceedings.
It is true as the petitioner points out that the status of the
natural-born citizen is favored by the Constitution and our laws,
which is all the more reason why it should be treasured like a pearl of
great price. But once it is surrendered and renounced, the gift is gone
and cannot be lightly restored. This country of ours, for all its
difficulties and limitations, is like a jealous and possessive mother.
Once rejected, it is not quick to welcome back with eager arms its
prodigal if repentant children. The returning renegade must show, by
an express and unequivocal act, the renewal of his loyalty and love.

Republic vs. De la Rosa [G.R. No. 104654, June 6, 1994]

FACTS:
This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised
Rules of Court in relation to R.A. No. 5440 and Section 25 of the
Interim Rules, filed by the Republic of the Philippines: (1) to annul the
Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 28, Manila, which readmitted private respondent as a Filipino citizen under the Revised
Naturalization Law (C.A. No. 63 as amended by C.A. No. 473); and
(2) to nullify the oath of allegiance taken by private respondent on
February 27, 1992.

On September 20, 1991, petitioner filed a petition for

naturalization captioned to be re-admitted as citizen of th Philippines.
The respondent Judge set the petition for hearing on March
16, 1992, and directed the publication of the said order and petition in
the Official Gazette and a newspaper of general circulation, for three
consecutive weeks, the last publication of which should be at least
six months before the said date of hearing.
On January 14, 1992, private respondent filed a "Motion to
Set Hearing Ahead of Schedule, that it shall be done on January
instead of having it on March, " where he manifested his intention to
run for public office in the May 1992 elections. The motion was
granted and the hearing was moved on February.
Six days later, on February 27, respondent Judge rendered
the assailed Decision and held that Petitioner JUAN G. FRIVALDO,
is re-admitted as a citizen of the Republic of the Philippines by
naturalization, thereby vesiting upon him, all the rights and privileges
of a natural born Filipino citizen
After receiving a copy of the Decision on March 18, 1992,
the Solicitor General interposed a timely appeal directly with the
Supreme Court.
ISSUE: WON the petitioner was duly re-admitted o his citizenship as
Filipino.
HELD:

THE REQUIREMENTS UNDER THE NATURALIZATION

LAW IS JURISDICTIONAL IN NATURE. Private respondent, having
opted to reacquire Philippine citizenship thru naturalization under the
Revised Naturalization Law, is duty bound to follow the procedure
prescribed by the said law. It is not for an applicant to decide for
himself and to select the requirements which he believes, even
sincerely, are applicable to his case and discard those which be
believes are inconvenient or merely of nuisance value. The law does
not distinguish between an applicant who was formerly a Filipino
citizen and one who was never such a citizen. It does not provide a
special procedure for the reacquisition of Philippine citizenship by
former Filipino citizens akin to the repatriation of a woman who had
lost her Philippine citizenship by reason of her marriage to an alien.
The trial court never acquired jurisdiction to hear the
petition for naturalization of private respondent. The proceedings
conducted, the decision rendered and the oath of allegiance taken
therein, are null and void for failure to comply with the publication and
posting requirements under the Revised Naturalization Law.
Under Section 9 of the said law, both the petition for
naturalization and the order setting it for hearing must be published
once a week for three consecutive weeks in the Official Gazette and
a newspaper of general circulation. Compliance therewith is
jurisdictional (Po Yi Bo v. Republic, 205 SCRA 400 [1992]).
Moreover, the publication and posting of the petition and the order
must be in its full text for the court to acquire jurisdiction (Sy v.
Republic, 55 SCRA 724 [1974]).
The petition for naturalization lacks several allegations
required by Sections 2 and 6 of the Revised Naturalization Law,
particularly: (1) that the petitioner is of good moral character; (2) that
he resided continuously in the Philippines for at least ten years; (3)
that he is able to speak and write English and any one of the
principal dialects; (4) that he will reside continuously in the
Philippines from the date of the filing of the petition until his
admission to Philippine citizenship; and (5) that he has filed a
declaration of intention or if he is excused from said filing, the
justification therefor.
The absence of such allegations is fatal to the petition (Po
Yi Bi v. Republic, 205 SCRA 400 [1992]).
Likewise the petition is not supported by the affidavit of at
least two credible persons who vouched for the good moral character
of private respondent as required by Section 7 of the Revised
Naturalization Law. Private respondent also failed to attach a copy of
his certificate of arrival to the petition as required by Section 7 of the
said law.
The proceedings of the trial court was marred by the
following irregularities: (1) the hearing of the petition was set ahead
of the scheduled date of hearing, without a publication of the order
advancing the date of hearing, and the petition itself; (2) the petition
was heard within six months from the last publication of the petition;

(3) petitioner was allowed to take his oath of allegiance before the
finality of the judgment; and (4) petitioner took his oath of allegiance
without observing the two-year waiting period.
A decision in a petition for naturalization becomes final only
after 30 days from its promulgation and, insofar as the Solicitor
General is concerned, that period is counted from the date of his
receipt of the copy of the decision (Republic v. Court of First Instance
of Albay, 60 SCRA 195 [1974]).
Section 1 of R.A. No. 530 provides that no decision
granting citizenship in naturalization proceedings shall be executory
until after two years from its promulgation in order to be able to
observe if: (1) the applicant has left the country; (2) the applicant has
dedicated himself continously to a lawful calling or profession; (3) the
applicant has not been convicted of any offense or violation of
government promulgated rules; and (4) the applicant has committed
any act prejudicial to the interest of the country or contrary to
government announced policies.
Even discounting the provisions of R.A. No. 530, the courts
cannot implement any decision granting the petition for naturalization
before its finality.

Even if it be assumed that, as the petitioner asserts, his

naturalization in Australia was annulled after it was found that his
marriage to the Australian citizen was bigamous, that circumstance
alone did not automatically restore his Philippine citizenship. His
divestiture of Australian citizenship does not concern us here. That is
a matter between him and his adopted country. What we must
consider is the fact that he voluntarily and freely rejected Philippine
citizenship and willingly and knowingly embraced the citizenship of a
foreign country. The possibility that he may have been subsequently
rejected by Australia, as he claims, does not mean that he has been
automatically reinstated as a citizen of the Philippines.
RES JUDICATA DOES NOT APPLY TO QUESTIONS OF
CITIZENSHIP. There is also the claim that the decision can no longer
be reversed because of the doctrine of res judicata, but this too must
be dismissed. This doctrine does not apply to questions of
citizenship, as the Court has ruled in several cases. Moreover, it
does not appear that it was properly and seasonably pleaded, in a
motion to dismiss or in the answer, having been invoked only when
the petitioner filed his reply to the private respondent's comment.
Besides, one of the requisites of res judicata, to wit, identity of
parties, is not present in this case.

Labo vs. COMELEC [G.R. No. 86564, August 1, 1989]

FACTS:

Petitioner and Respondent were candidates for the office of

the Mayor of Baguio City during Elections. Having garnered the
highest number of votes, Petitioner was elected and proclaimed
winner while Respondent garnered the second highest number of
votes. Subsequently Respondent filed a petition for quo warranto
contesting the election of the Petitioner on the ground that the latter
is a naturalized Australian citizen and was divested of his Philippine
citizenship having sworn allegiance to the Queen of Australia.
Petitioner opposes to the contrary.
Section 42 of the Local Government Code provides for the
qualifications that an elective official must be a citizen of the
Philippines.
From the evidence adduced, it was found out that
citizenship requirements were not possessed by the petitioner during
elections. He was disqualified from running as mayor and, although
elected, is not now qualified to serve as such.
In 1988, Ramon Labo, Jr. was elected as mayor of Baguio
City. His rival, Luis Lardizabal filed a petition for quo warranto against
Labo as Lardizabal asserts that Labo is an Australian citizen hence
disqualified; that he was naturalized as an Australian after he married
an Australian. Labo avers that his marriage with an Australian did
not make him an Australian; that at best he has dual citizenship,
Australian and Filipino; that even if he indeed became an Australian
when he married an Australian citizen, such citizenship was lost
when his marriage with the Australian was later declared void for
being bigamous. Labo further asserts that even if hes considered as
an Australian, his lack of citizenship is just a mere technicality which
should not frustrate the will of the electorate of Baguio who voted for
him by a vast majority.
ISSUE: WON private respondent, having garnered the 2nd highest
number of votes, can replace the petitioner as mayor.
HELD:

FORFEITURE OF FOREIGN CITIZENSHIP DOES NOT

RESTORE PHILIPPINE CITIZENSHIP FORMERLY LOST. The
petitioner now claims that his naturalization in Australia made him at
worst only a dual national and did not divest him of his Philippine
citizenship. Such a specious argument cannot stand against the clear
provisions of CA No. 63, which enumerates the modes by which
Philippine citizenship may be lost. Among these are: (1)
naturalization in a foreign country; (2) express renunciation of
citizenship; and (3) subscribing to an oath of allegiance to support
the Constitution or laws of a foreign country, all of which are
applicable to the petitioner. It is also worth mentioning in this
connection that under Article IV, Section 5, of the present
Constitution, "Dual allegiance of citizens is inimical to the national
interest and shall be dealt with by law."

Aznar vs. COMELEC [G.R. No. 83820, May 25, 1990]

FACTS:
1) On November 19, 1987, private respondent Emilio "Lito"
Osmea filed his certificate of candidacy with the
COMELEC for the position of Provincial Governor of Cebu
Province in the January 18, 1988 local elections.
2) On January 22, 1988, petitioner Jose B. Aznar in his
capacity as its incumbent Provincial Chairman filed with the
COMELEC a petition for the disqualification of private
respondent on the ground that he is allegedly not a Filipino
citizen, being a citizen of the United States of America.
3) On January 27, 1988, petitioner filed a Formal
Manifestation submitting a Certificate issued by the then
Immigration and Deportation Commissioner Miriam
Defensor Santiago certifying that private respondent is an
American and is a holder of Alien Certificate of Registration
(ACR) No. B-21448 and Immigrant Certificate of Residence
(ICR) No. 133911, issued at Manila on March 27 and 28,
1958, respectively. (Annex "B-1").
4) During the hearing at the COMELEC Private respondent,
maintained that he is a Filipino citizen, alleging: that he is
the legitimate child of Dr. Emilio D. Osmea, a Filipino and
son of the late President Sergio Osmea, Sr.; that he is a
holder of a valid and subsisting Philippine Passport No.
0855103 issued on March 25, 1987; that he has been
continuously residing in the Philippines since birth and has
not gone out of the country for more than six months; and
that he has been a registered voter in the Philippines since
1965.
5) Thereafter, on June 11, 1988, COMELEC (First Division)
dismissed the petition for disqualification for not having
been timely filed and for lack of sufficient proof that private
respondent is not a Filipino citizen. Hence, the petition for
Certiorari.
ISSUE: Whether or not respondent Osmena is no longer a Filipino
citizen by acquiring dual-citizenship?
HELD:

THE FACT THAT A PERSON IS A HOLDER OF ALIEN

CERTIFICATE OF REGISTRATION DOES NOT CONCLUSIVELY
MEAN THAT THAT THE PERSON IS NOT A FILIPINO CITIZEN. In
the proceedings before the COMELEC, the petitioner failed to
present direct proof that private respondent had lost his Filipino
citizenship by any of the modes provided for under C.A. No. 63.
Among others, these are: (1) by naturalization in a foreign country;
(2) by express renunciation of citizenship; and (3) by subscribing to
an oath of allegiance to support the Constitution or laws of a foreign

country. From the evidence, it is clear that private respondent

Osmea did not lose his Philippine citizenship by any of the three
mentioned hereinabove or by any other mode of losing Philippine
citizenship.
In concluding that private respondent had been naturalized
as a citizen of the United States of America, the petitioner merely
relied on the fact that private respondent was issued alien certificate
of registration and was given clearance and permit to re-enter the
Philippines by the Commission on Immigration and Deportation.
Petitioner assumed that because of the foregoing, the respondent is
an American and "being an American", private respondent "must
have taken and sworn to the Oath of Allegiance required by the U.S.
Naturalization Laws." (p. 81, Rollo)
Philippine courts are only allowed to determine who are
Filipino citizens and who are not. Whether or not a person is
considered an American under the laws of the United States does
not concern Us here.
By virtue of his being the son of a Filipino father, the
presumption that private respondent is a Filipino remains. It was
incumbent upon the petitioner to prove that private respondent had
lost his Philippine citizenship. As earlier stated, however, the
petitioner failed to positively establish this fact.
In the learned dissent of Mr. Justice Teodoro Padilla, he
stresses the fact that because Osmea obtained Certificates of Alien
Registration as an American citizen, the first in 1958 when he was 24
years old and the second in 1979, he, Osmea should be regarded
as having expressly renounced Philippine citizenship. To Our mind,
this is a case of non sequitur (It does not follow). Considering the fact
that admittedly Osmea was both a Filipino and an American, the
mere fact that he has a Certificate stating he is an American does not
mean that he is not still a Filipino. Thus, by way of analogy, if a
person who has two brothers named Jose and Mario states or
certifies that he has a brother named Jose, this does not mean that
he does not have a brother named Mario; or if a person is enrolled as
student simultaneously in two universities, namely University X and
University Y, presents a Certification that he is a student of University
X, this does not necessarily mean that he is not still a student of
University Y. In the case of Osmea, the Certification that he is an
American does not mean that he is not still a Filipino, possessed as
he is, of both nationalities or citizenships. Indeed, there is no express
renunciation here of Philippine citizenship; truth to tell, there is even
no implied renunciation of said citizenship. When We consider that
the renunciation needed to lose Philippine citizenship must be
"express", it stands to reason that there can be no such loss of
Philippine citizenship when there is no renunciation, either "express"
or "implied ".
Parenthetically, the statement in the 1987 Constitution that
"dual allegiance of citizens is inimical to the national interest and
shall be dealt with by law" (Art. IV, Sec. 5) has no retroactive effect.
And while it is true that even before the 1987 Constitution, Our
country had already frowned upon the concept of dual citizenship or
allegiance, the fact is it actually existed. Be it noted further that under
the aforecited proviso, the effect of such dual citizenship or
allegiance shall be dealt with by a future law. Said law has not yet
been enacted.

Mercado vs. Manzano [G.R. No. 135083, May 26, 1999]

FACTS:

Petitioner Mercado and respondent Manzano were

candidates for vice mayor of the City of Makati in the May 11, 1998
elections. Respondent received the highest votes from the election
but his proclamation was suspended in view of a pending petition for
disqualification filed by Ernesto Mamaril who alleged that respondent
was not a Filipino citizen but a US citizen.
Manzano was born in San Francisco, California, USA and
acquired US citizenship by operation of the US Constitution & laws
under the principle of jus soli. However, he was also a natural born
Filipino citizen as both his parents were Filipinos at the time of his
birth. Judging from the foregoing facts, it would appear that
respondent is both a Filipino and a US citien a dual citizen.
Under Sec.40(d) of the LGC, those holding dual citizenship

are disqualified from running for any elective local position.

ISSUE: Whether under our laws, respondent is disqualified from the
position for which he filed his CoC and is thus disqualified from
holding the office for which he has been elected.
HELD:
DUAL ALLEGIANCE NOT DUAL CITIZENSHIP IS
PROSCRIBED BY THE CONSTITUTION. To begin with, dual
citizenship is different from dual allegiance. The former arises when,
as a result of the concurrent application of the different laws of two or
more states, a person is simultaneously considered a national by the
said states. For instance, such a situation may arise when a person
whose parents are citizens of a state which adheres to the principle
of jus sanguinis is born in a state which follows the doctrine of jus
soli. Such a person, ipso facto and without any voluntary act on his
part, is concurrently considered a citizen of both states. Considering
the citizenship clause (Art. IV) of our Constitution, it is possible for
the following classes of citizens of the Philippines to possess dual
citizenship:
(1)

Those born of Filipino fathers and/or mothers in foreign

countries which follow the principle of jus soli;

(2)

Those born in the Philippines of Filipino mothers and alien

fathers if by the laws of their fathers' country such children
are citizens of that country;

(3)

Those who marry aliens if by the laws of the latter's country

the former are considered citizens, unless by their act or
omission they are deemed to have renounced Philippine
citizenship.

There may be other situations in which a citizen of the

Philippines may, without performing any act, be also a citizen of
another state; but the above cases are clearly possible given the
constitutional provisions on citizenship.
Dual allegiance, on the other hand, refers to the situation in
which a person simultaneously owes, by some positive act, loyalty to
two or more states. While dual citizenship is involuntary, dual
allegiance is the result of an individual's volition.
With respect to dual allegiance, Article IV, 5 of the
Constitution provides: "Dual allegiance of citizens is inimical to the
national interest and shall be dealt with by law." This provision was
included in the 1987 Constitution at the instance of Commissioner
Blas F. Ople who explained its necessity as follows:
. . . I want to draw attention to the fact that dual
allegiance is not dual citizenship. I have
circulated a memorandum to the Bernas
Committee according to which a dual allegiance
and I reiterate a dual allegiance
is larger and more threatening than that of
mere double citizenship which is seldom
intentional and, perhaps, never insidious. That is
often a function of the accident of mixed
marriages or of birth on foreign soil. And so, I do
not question double citizenship at all.
What we would like the Committee to consider is
to take constitutional cognizance of the problem
of dual allegiance. For example, we all know
what happens in the triennial elections of the
Federation of Filipino-Chinese Chambers of
Commerce which consists of about 600 chapters
all over the country. There is a Peking ticket, as
well as a Taipei ticket. Not widely known is the
fact that the Filipino-Chinese community is
represented in the Legislative Yuan of the
Republic of China in Taiwan. And until recently,
the sponsor might recall, in Mainland China in the
People's Republic of China, they have the
Associated Legislative Council for overseas
Chinese wherein all of Southeast Asia including

some European and Latin countries were

represented, which was dissolved after several
years because of diplomatic friction. At that time,
the Filipino-Chinese were also represented in
that Overseas Council.
When I speak of double allegiance, therefore, I
speak of this unsettled kind of allegiance of
Filipinos, of citizens who are already Filipinos but
who, by their acts, may be said to be bound by a
second allegiance, either to Peking or Taiwan. I
also took close note of the concern expressed by
some Commissioners yesterday, including
Commissioner
Villacorta, who were concerned about the lack of
guarantees of thorough assimilation, and
especially Commissioner Concepcion who has
always been worried about minority claims on our
natural resources.
Dual allegiance can actually siphon scarce
national capital to Taiwan, Singapore, China or
Malaysia, and this is already happening. Some of
the great commercial places in downtown Taipei
are Filipino-owned, owned by Filipino-Chinese
it is of common knowledge in Manila. It can mean
a tragic capital outflow when we have to endure a
capital famine which also means economic
stagnation, worsening unemployment and social
unrest.
And so, this is exactly we ask that the
Committee kindly consider incorporating a new
section, probably Section 5, in the article on
Citizenship which will read as follows: DUAL
ALLEGIANCE IS INIMICAL TO CITIZENSHIP
AND SHALL BE DEALT WITH ACCORDING TO
LAW.
In another session of the Commission, Ople spoke on the problem of
these citizens with dual allegiance, thus:
. . . A significant number of Commissioners
expressed their concern about dual citizenship in
the sense that it implies a double allegiance
under a double sovereignty which some of us
who spoke then in a freewheeling debate thought
would be repugnant to the sovereignty which
pervades the Constitution and to citizenship itself
which implies a uniqueness and which elsewhere
in the Constitution is defined in terms of rights
and obligations exclusive to that citizenship
including, of course, the obligation to rise to the
defense of the State when it is threatened, and
back of this, Commissioner Bernas, is, of course,
the concern for national security. In the course of
those debates, I think some noted the fact that as
a result of the wave of naturalization since the
decision to establish diplomatic relations with the
People's Republic of China was made in 1975, a
good number of these naturalized Filipinos still
routinely go to Taipei every October 10; and it is
asserted that some of them do review their oath
of allegiance to a foreign government maybe so
as to enter into the spirit of the occasion when
the anniversary of the Sun Yat-Sen Republic is
commemorated. And so, I have detected a
genuine and deep concern about double
citizenship, with its attendant risk of double
allegiance which is repugnant to our sovereignty
and national security. I appreciate what the
Committee said that this could be left to the
determination of a future legislature. But
considering the scale of the problem, the real

impact on the security of this country, arising

from, let us say, potentially great numbers of
double citizens professing double allegiance, will
the Committee entertain a proposed amendment
at the proper time that will prohibit, in effect, or
regulate double citizenship?

Clearly, in including 5 in Article IV on citizenship, the concern of the

Constitutional Commission was not with dual citizens per se but with
naturalized citizens who maintain their allegiance to their countries of
origin even after their naturalization. Hence, the phrase "dual
citizenship" in R.A. No. 7160, 40(d) and in R.A. No. 7854, 20 must
be understood as referring to "dual allegiance." Consequently,
persons with mere dual citizenship do not fall under this
disqualification. Unlike those with dual allegiance, who must,
therefore, be subject to strict process with respect to the termination
of their status, for candidates with dual citizenship, it should suffice if,
upon the filing of their certificates of candidacy, they elect Philippine
citizenship to terminate their status as persons with dual citizenship
considering that their condition is the unavoidable consequence of
conflicting laws of different states. As
Joaquin G. Bernas, one of the most perceptive members of the
Constitutional Commission, pointed out: "[D]ual citizenship is just a
reality imposed on us because we have no control of the laws on
citizenship of other countries. We recognize a child of a Filipino
mother. But whether or not she is considered a citizen of another
country is something completely beyond our control."
By electing Philippine citizenship, such candidates at the same time
forswear allegiance to the other country of which they are also
citizens and thereby terminate their status as dual citizens. It may be
that, from the point of view of the foreign state and of its laws, such
an individual has not effectively renounced his foreign citizenship.
That is of no moment as the following discussion on 40(d) between
Senators Enrile and Pimentel clearly shows:
SENATOR ENRILE. Mr. President, I would like to
ask clarification of line 41, page 17:
"Any person with dual citizenship" is
disqualified to run for any elective local
position.
Under
the
present
Constitution, Mr. President, someone
whose mother is a citizen of the
Philippines but his father is a foreigner
is a natural-born citizen of the
Republic. There is no requirement that
such a natural born citizen, upon
reaching the age of majority, must elect
or give up Philippine citizenship.
On the assumption that this person
would carry two passports, one
belonging to the country of his or her
father and one belonging to the
Republic of the Philippines, may such a
situation disqualify the person to run for
a local government position?
SENATOR PIMENTEL. To my mind, Mr.
President, it only means that at the
moment when he would want to run for
public office, he has to repudiate one of
his citizenships.
SENATOR ENRILE. Suppose he carries only a
Philippine passport but the country of
origin or the country of the father
claims that person, nevertheless, as a
citizen? No one can renounce. There
are such countries in the world.

SENATOR PIMENTEL. Well, the very fact that

he is running for public office would, in
effect, be an election for him of his
desire to be considered as a Filipino
citizen.
SENATOR ENRILE. But, precisely, Mr.
President, the Constitution does not
require an election. Under the
Constitution, a person whose mother is
a citizen of the Philippines is, at birth, a
citizen without any overt act to claim
the citizenship.
SENATOR PIMENTEL. Yes. What we are saying
Mr. President, is: Under the
Gentleman's example, if he does not
renounce his other citizenship, then he
is opening himself to question. So, if he
is really interested to run, the first thing
he should do is to say in the Certificate
of Candidacy that: I am a Filipino
citizen, and I have only one
citizenship."
SENATOR ENRILE. But we are talking from the
viewpoint of Philippine law, Mr.
President. He will always have one
citizenship, and that is the citizenship
invested upon him or her in the
Constitution of the Republic.
SENATOR PIMENTEL. That is true,
Mr. President. But if he
exercises acts that will prove
that he also acknowledges
other citizenships, then he
will probably fall under this
disqualification.
This is similar to the requirement that an applicant for
naturalization must renounce "all allegiance and fidelity to
any foreign prince, potentate, state, or sovereignty" of
which at the time he is a subject or citizen before he can be
issued a Certificate of naturalization as a citizen of the
Philippines.

BENGSON vs. HRET and CRUZ

G.R. No. 142840 May 7, 2001
FACTS:

The citizenship of respondent Cruz is at issue in this case,

in view of the constitutional requirement that no person shall be a
Member of the House of Representatives unless he is a natural-born
citizen.
Cruz was a natural-born citizen of the Philippines. He was
born in Tarlac in 1960 of Filipino parents. In 1985, however, Cruz
enlisted in the US Marine Corps and without the consent of the
Republic of the Philippines, took an oath of allegiance to the USA. As
a Consequence, he lost his Filipino citizenship for under CA No. 63
[(An Act Providing for the Ways in Which Philippine Citizenship May
Be Lost or Reacquired (1936)] section 1(4), a Filipino citizen may
lose his citizenship by, among other, rendering service to or
accepting commission in the armed forces of a foreign country.
Whatever doubt that remained regarding his loss of
Philippine citizenship was erased by his naturalization as a U.S.
citizen in 1990, in connection with his service in the U.S. Marine
Corps.
In 1994, Cruz reacquired his Philippine citizenship through
repatriation under RA 2630 [(An Act Providing for Reacquisition of
Philippine Citizenship by Persons Who Lost Such Citizenship by

Rendering Service To, or Accepting Commission In, the Armed

Forces of the United States (1960)]. He ran for and was elected as
the Representative of the 2nd District of Pangasinan in the 1998
elections. He won over petitioner Bengson who was then running for
reelection.
Subsequently, petitioner filed a case for Quo Warranto Ad
Cautelam with respondent HRET claiming that Cruz was not qualified
to become a member of the HOR since he is not a natural-born
citizen as required under Article VI, section 6 of the Constitution.
HRET rendered its decision dismissing the petition for quo warranto
and declaring Cruz the duly elected Representative in the said
election.
ISSUE: WON Cruz, a natural-born Filipino who became an American
citizen, can still be considered a natural-born Filipino upon his
reacquisition of Philippine citizenship.
HELD:
REPATRIATION HAS THE EFFECT OF REGAINING THE
FORMER STATUS OF THE REPATRIATE. There are two ways of
acquiring citizenship: (1) by birth, and (2) by naturalization. These
ways of acquiring citizenship correspond to the two kinds of citizens:
the natural-born citizen, and the naturalized citizen. A person who at
the time of his birth is a citizen of a particular country, is a naturalborn citizen thereof.
As defined in the same Constitution, natural-born citizens
"are those citizens of the Philippines from birth without having to
perform any act to acquire or perfect his Philippine citizenship."
On the other hand, naturalized citizens are those who have become
Filipino citizens through naturalization, generally under
Commonwealth Act No. 473, otherwise known as the Revised
Naturalization Law, which repealed the former Naturalization Law
(Act No. 2927), and by Republic Act No. 530. To be naturalized, an
applicant has to prove that he possesses all the qualifications and
none of the disqualifications provided by law to become a Filipino
citizen. The decision granting Philippine citizenship becomes
executory only after two (2) years from its promulgation when the
court is satisfied that during the intervening period, the applicant has
(1) not left the Philippines; (2) has dedicated himself to a lawful
calling or profession; (3) has not been convicted of any offense or
violation of Government promulgated rules; or (4) committed any act
prejudicial to the interest of the nation or contrary to any Government
announced policies.
Filipino citizens who have lost their citizenship may
however reacquire the same in the manner provided by law.
Commonwealth Act No. 63 (CA No. 63), enumerates the three
modes by which Philippine citizenship may be reacquired by a former
citizen: (1) by naturalization, (2) by repatriation, and (3) by direct act
of Congress.
Naturalization is a mode for both acquisition and
reacquisition of Philippine citizenship. As a mode of initially acquiring
Philippine citizenship, naturalization is governed by Commonwealth
Act No. 473, as amended. On the other hand, naturalization as a
mode for reacquiring Philippine citizenship is governed by
Commonwealth Act No. 63. Under this law, a former Filipino citizen
who wishes to reacquire Philippine citizenship must possess certain
qualifications and none of the disqualifications mentioned in Section
4 of C.A. 473.
Repatriation, on the other hand, may be had under various
statutes by those who lost their citizenship due to: (1) desertion of the
armed forces; (2) service in the armed forces of the allied forces in
World War II; (3) service in the Armed Forces of the United States at
any other time; (4) marriage of a Filipino woman to an alien; and (5)
political and economic necessity.
As distinguished from the lengthy process of naturalization,
repatriation simply consists of the taking of an oath of allegiance to
the Republic of the Philippines and registering said oath in the Local
Civil Registry of the place where the person concerned resides or
last resided.
In Angara v. Republic, we held:
. . .. Parenthetically, under these statutes
[referring to RA Nos. 965 and 2630], the person

desiring to reacquire Philippine citizenship would

not even be required to file a petition in court,
and all that he had to do was to take an oath of
allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and
to register that fact with the civil registry in the
place of his residence or where he had last
resided in the Philippines. [Emphasis in the
original.]
Moreover, repatriation results in the recovery of the original
nationality. This means that a naturalized Filipino who lost his
citizenship will be restored to his prior status as a naturalized Filipino
citizen. On the other hand, if he was originally a natural-born citizen
before he lost his Philippine citizenship, he will be restored to his
former status as a natural-born Filipino.

Mo Ya Lim Yao vs. Commissioner of Immigration

GR L-21289, 4 October 1971
FACTS:

On 8 February 1961, Lau Yuen Yeung applied for a

passport visa to enter the Philippines as a non-immigrant, for a
temporary visitor's visa to enter the Philippines. She was permitted to
come into the Philippines on 13 March 1961. On the date of her
arrival, Asher Y, Cheng filed a bond in the amount of P1,000.00 to
undertake, among others, that said Lau Yuen Yeung would actually
depart from the Philippines on or before the expiration of her
authorized period of stay in this country or within the period as in his
discretion the Commissioner of Immigration. After repeated
extensions, she was allowed to stay in the Philippines up to 13
February 1962. On 25 January 1962, she contracted marriage with
Moy Ya Lim Yao alias Edilberto Aguinaldo Lim an alleged Filipino
citizen. Because of the contemplated action of the Commissioner of
Immigration to confiscate her bond and order her arrest and
immediate deportation, after the expiration of her authorized stay,
she brought an action for injunction with preliminary injunction. The
Court of First Instance of Manila (Civil Case 49705) denied the
prayer for preliminary injunction. Moya Lim Yao and Lau Yuen Yeung
appealed.
ISSUE:

Whether Lau Yuen Yeung ipso facto became a Filipino

citizen upon her marriage to a Filipino citizen.
HELD:
With all these considerations in mind, We are persuaded
that it is in the best interest of all concerned that Section 15 of the
Naturalization Law be given effect in the same way as it was
understood and construed when the phrase "who may be lawfully
naturalized," found in the American statute from which it was
borrowed and copied verbatim, was applied by the American courts
and administrative authorities. There is merit, of course in the view
that Philippine statutes should be construed in the light of Philippine
circumstances, and with particular reference to our naturalization
laws. We should realize the disparity in the circumstances between
the United States, as the so-called "melting pot" of peoples from all
over the world, and the Philippines as a developing country whose
Constitution is nationalistic almost in the come. Certainly, the writer
of this opinion cannot be the last in rather passionately insisting that
our jurisprudence should speak our own concepts and resort to
American authorities, to be sure, entitled to admiration, and respect,
should not be regarded as source of pride and indisputable authority.
Still, We cannot close our eyes to the undeniable fact that the
provision of law now under scrutiny has no local origin and
orientation; it is purely American, factually taken bodily from
American law when the Philippines was under the dominating
influence of statutes of the United States Congress. It is indeed a sad
commentary on the work of our own legislature of the late 1920's and
1930's that given the opportunity to break away from the old
American pattern, it took no step in that direction. Indeed, even after
America made it patently clear in the Act of Congress of September
22, 1922 that alien women marrying Americans cannot be citizens of

the United States without undergoing naturalization proceedings, our

legislators still chose to adopt the previous American law of August
10, 1855 as embodied later in Section 1994 of the Revised Statutes
of 1874, which, it is worth reiterating, was consistently and uniformly
understood as conferring American citizenship to alien women
marrying Americans ipso facto, without having to submit to any
naturalization proceeding and without having to prove that they
possess the special qualifications of residence, moral character,
adherence to American ideals and American constitution, provided
they show they did not suffer from any of the disqualifications
enumerated in the American Naturalization Law. Accordingly, We
now hold, all previous decisions of this Court indicating otherwise
notwithstanding, that under Section 15 of Commonwealth Act 473, an
alien woman marrying a Filipino, native born or naturalized, becomes
ipso facto a Filipina provided she is not disqualified to be a citizen of
the Philippines under Section 4 of the same law. Likewise, an alien
woman married to an alien who is subsequently naturalized here
follows the Philippine citizenship of her husband the moment he
takes his oath as Filipino citizen, provided that she does not suffer
from any of the disqualifications under said Section 4.
As under any other law rich in benefits for those coming
under it, doubtless there will be instances where unscrupulous
persons will attempt to take advantage of this provision of law by
entering into fake and fictitious marriages or mala fide matrimonies.
We cannot as a matter of law hold that just because of these
possibilities, the construction of the provision should be otherwise
than as dictated inexorably by more ponderous relevant
considerations, legal, juridical and practical. There can always be
means of discovering such undesirable practice and every case can
be dealt with accordingly as it arises.
The question that keeps bouncing back as a consequence
of the foregoing views is, what substitute is them for naturalization
proceedings to enable the alien wife of a Philippine citizen to have
the matter of her own citizenship settled and established so that she
may not have to be called upon to prove it everytime she has to
perform an act or enter in to a transaction or business or exercise a
right reserved only to Filipinos? The ready answer to such question is
that as the laws of our country, both substantive and procedural,
stand today, there is no such procedure, but such paucity is no proof
that the citizenship under discussion is not vested as of the date of
marriage or the husband's acquisition of citizenship, as the case may
be, for the truth is that the same situation objections even as to
native-born Filipinos. Everytime the citizenship of a person is material
or indispensable in a judicial or administrative case, whatever the
corresponding court or administrative authority decides therein as to
such citizenship is generally not considered as res adjudicata, hence
it has to be threshed out again and again as the occasion may
demand. This, as We view it, is the sense in which Justice Dizon
referred to "appropriate proceeding" in Brito v. Commissioner, supra.
Indeed, only the good sense and judgment of those subsequently
inquiring into the matter may make the effort easier or simpler for the
persons concerned by relying somehow on the antecedent official
findings, even if these are not really binding.

Altajeros vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 163256, November 10, 2004

Facts:

Petitioner Altarejos was a candidate for mayor in the

Municipality of San Jacinto, Masbate in the May 10, 2004 national
and local elections.

January 15, 2004 - Private respondents Jose Almie

Altiche and Vernon Versoza, registered voters of San Jacinto,
Masbate, filed with the COMELEC, a petition to disqualify and to
deny due course or cancel the certificate of candidacy of petitioner
on the ground that he is not a Filipino citizen and that he made a
false representation in his certificate of candidacy that "[he] was not a
permanent resident of or immigrant to a foreign country." Private
respondents alleged that based on a letter from the Bureau of
Immigration dated June 25, 2001, petitioner was a holder of a
permanent U.S. resident visa, an Alien Certificate of Registration
issued on November 3, 1997, and an Immigration Certificate of

Residence issued on November 3, 1997 by the Bureau of

Immigration.2

January 26, 2004 - Petitioner filed an Answer stating,

among others, that he did not commit false representation in his
application for candidacy as mayor because as early as December
17, 1997, he was already issued a Certificate of Repatriation by the
Special Committee on Naturalization, after he filed a petition for
repatriation pursuant to Republic Act No. 8171. Thus, petitioner
claimed that his Filipino citizenship was already restored, and he was
qualified to run as mayor in the May 10, 2004 elections. Petitioner
sought the dismissal of the petition.

Atty. Zacarias C. Zaragoza, Jr., regional election director

for Region V and hearing officer of this case, recommended that
petitioner Altarejos be disqualified from being a candidate for the
position of mayor on the following grounds:

The Local Government Code of 1991 requires that an

elective local official must be a citizen of the Philippines, and he must
not have a dual citizenship; must not be a permanent resident in a
foreign country or must not have acquired the right to reside abroad

It has been established by clear and convincing evidence

that respondent is a citizen of the United States of America. Such
fact is proven by his Alien Certificate of Registration and Immigration
Certificate of Residence (ICR) issued on 3 November 1997 by the
Alien Registration Division, Bureau of Immigration and Deportation.
This was further confirmed in a letter dated 25 June 2001 of then
Commissioner ANDREA D. DOMINGO of the Bureau of Immigration
and Deportation.

Although respondent had petitioned for his repatriation as a

Filipino citizen under Republic Act No. 8171 on 17 December 1997,
this did not restore to respondent his Filipino citizenship, because
Section 2 of the aforecited Republic Act No. 8171 specifically
provides that repatriation shall be effected by taking the necessary
oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and registration
in the proper civil registry and in the Bureau of Immigration.

Respondent has not submitted any document to prove that

he has taken his oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines
and that he has registered his fact of repatriation in the proper civil
registry and in the Bureau of Immigration.

COMELEC First Division adopted the recommendations of

Atty. Zaragosa and disqualified petitioner.

Petitioner filed a motion of reconsideration, attaching

documents that gave proof to his repatriation. This was subsequently
denied by COMELEC en banc, on the grounds that it should have
been submitted during the hearing.

On May 2004, election day itself, petitioner filed for

certiorari, with prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining
order and/or a writ of prohibitory and mandatory injunction, to set
aside the Resolution promulgated by the COMELEC.
ISSUES:
WON registration of petitioners repatriation with the proper civil
registry and with the Bureau of Immigration a prerequisite in effecting
repatriation; WON the COMELEC en banc committed grave abuse of
discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction in affirming the
Resolution of the COMELEC, First Division.
HELD:

Philippine citizenship is an indispensable requirement for

holding an elective public office, and the purpose of the citizenship
qualification is none other than to ensure that no alien, i.e., no person
owing allegiance to another nation, shall govern our people and our
country or a unit of territory thereof. Now, an official begins to govern
or to discharge his functions only upon his proclamation and on the
day the law mandates his term of office to begin. Since Frivaldo reassumed his citizenship on June 30, 1995the very day the term of
office of governor (and other elective officials) beganhe was
therefore already qualified to be proclaimed, to hold such office and
to discharge the functions and responsibilities thereof as of said date.
In short, at that time, he was already qualified to govern his native
Sorsogon. This is the liberal interpretation that should give spirit, life
and meaning to our law on qualifications consistent with the purpose
for which such law was enacted. x x x Paraphrasing this Court's
ruling in Vasquez v. Giap and Li Seng Giap & Sons, if the purpose of
the citizenship requirement is to ensure that our people and country

do not end up being governed by aliens, i.e., persons owing

allegiance to another nation, that aim or purpose would not be
thwarted but instead achieved by construing the citizenship
qualification as applying to the time of proclamation of the elected
official and at the start of his term. (Emphasis supplied.)
Moreover, in the case of Frivaldo v. Commission on
Elections, the Court ruled that "the repatriation of Frivaldo
RETROACTED to the date of the filing of his application." In said
case, the repatriation of Frivaldo was by virtue of Presidential Decree
No. 725, which took effect on June 5, 1975. The Court therein
declared that Presidential Decree No. 725 was a curative statute,
which is retroactive in nature. The retroactivity of Frivaldo's
repatriation to the date of filing of his application was justified by the
Court, thus:
The reason for this is simply that if, as in this
case, it was the intent of the legislative authority
that the law should apply to past events i.e.,
situations and transactions existing even before
the law came into beingin order to benefit the
greatest number of former Filipinos possible
thereby enabling them to enjoy and exercise the
constitutionally guaranteed right of citizenship,
and such legislative intention is to be given the
fullest effect and expression, then there is all the
more reason to have the law apply in a
retroactive or retrospective manner to situations,
events and transactions subsequent to the
passage of such law. That is, the repatriation
granted to Frivaldo x x x can and should be made
to take effect as of date of his application. As
earlier mentioned, there is nothing in the law that
would bar this or would show a contrary intention
on the part of the legislative authority; and there
is no showing that damage or prejudice to
anyone, or anything unjust or injurious would
result from giving retroactivity to his repatriation.
Neither has Lee shown that there will result the
impairment of any contractual obligation,
disturbance of any vested right or breach of
some constitutional guaranty.
Another argument for retroactivity to the date of filing is that
it would prevent prejudice to applicants. If P.D. 725 were not to be
given retroactive effect, and the Special Committee decides not to
act, i.e., to delay the processing of applications for any substantial
length of time, then the former Filipinos who may be stateless, as
Frivaldohaving already renounced his American citizenshipwas,
may be prejudiced for causes outside their control. This should not
be. In case of doubt in the interpretation or application of laws, it is to
be presumed that the law-making body intended right and justice to
prevail.
Republic Act No. 8171 has impliedly repealed Presidential
`Decree No. 725. They cover the same subject matter: Providing for
the repatriation of Filipino women who have lost their Philippine
citizenship by marriage to aliens and of natural-born Filipinos. The
Court's ruling in Frivaldo v. Commission on Elections that repatriation
retroacts to the date of filing of one's application for repatriation
subsists for the same reasons quoted above.
Accordingly, petitioner's repatriation retroacted to the date
he filed his application in 1997. Petitioner was, therefore, qualified to
run for a mayoralty position in the government in the May 10, 2004
elections. Apparently, the COMELEC was cognizant of this fact since
it did not implement the assailed Resolutions disqualifying petitioner
to run as mayor of San Jacinto, Masbate.