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Book II is entirely devoted to a single concept, that of the transcendental.

The word transcendental is warranted here because it encapsulates my

recasting, with respect to Being and Event, of the primitive notion of situation,
replaced here by that of world. Where the earlier book followed
the thread of ontology, my current undertaking, placed under the rubric of
the transcendental, unravels the thread of logic. Previously, I identified
situations (worlds) with their strict multiple-neutrality. I now also envisage
them as the site of the being-there of beings. In Being and Event, I assumed
the dissemination of the indifferent multiple as the ground of all that there
is, and consequently affirmed the ontological non-being of relation. Without
going back on this judgment, I now show that being-there as
appearing-in-a-world has a relational consistency.
I have established that mathematics and being are one and the same
thing once we submit ourselves, as every philosophy must, to the axiom
of Parmenides: it is the same to think and to be. It is now a matter of
showing that logic and appearing are also one and the same thing. Transcendental
names the crucial operators of this second identity. Later, we
will see that this speculative equation greatly transforms the third constitutive
identity of my philosophy, the one which, under the sign of
evental chance, makes subject into a simple local determination of truth.
It effectively obliges us to mediate this determination through an entirely
original theory of the subject-body.
The first three sections of Book II follow the rule of triple exposition:
conceptual (and exemplifying), historical (an author) and formal. The
substance of what is presented three times can also be articulated in terms


of three motifs: the necessity of a transcendental organization of worlds;

the exposition of the transcendental; the question of what negation is
within appearing.
Since I declare that logic signifies purely and simply the cohesion of
appearing, I cannot avoid confronting this assertion with the astounding
fortunes of logic in its usual sense (the formal regulation of statements)
among those philosophies which believed they could turn the examination
of language into the centre of all thought, thereby consigning philosophy
to fastidious grammatical exercises. Its no mystery that in the final analysis
this is a matter of bringing philosophy into the space of university discourse,
a space which conservatives of every epoch have always argued it
should never have left. Today, it is also quite clear that if we allow ourselves
to be intimidated, philosophy will be nothing more than a scholastic
quarrel between liberal grammarians and pious phenomenologists. But
when it comes to logic I do not content myself with political polemic.
After all, I admire the great logicians, those whomlike Gdel, Tarski or
Cohencarried out a commendable mathematical incorporation of the
inherited forms of deductive fidelity. I will also carefully establish that
logic, in its usual linguistic sense, is entirely reducible to transcendental
operations. This will be the object of Section 4 of this Book.
We will then seeit is the object of Section 5that the simple consideration
of transcendental structures allows us to define what a classical world
is, that is a world which obeys what Aristotle already considered as a
major logical principle: the excluded middle. This principle declares that,
given a closed statement A, when we interpret this statement in a world we
necessarily have either the truth of A or that of non-A, without any third
possibility. A world for which this is the case is a classical world, which is an
entirely particular case of world. Without going into the details, I will
show that the world of ontology, that is the mathematics of the pure
multiple, is classical. In the history of thought up to the present day, this
point has had truly innumerable consequences.
The historical companion of this Book is Hegel, the thinker par
excellence of the dialectical correlation between being and being-there,
between essence and existence. We will be measuring ourselves up to his
Science of Logic.
Lets now quickly present what is at stake in each of three themes that
make up the main content of the first three sections.



The first section consists of a long demonstration. It is a matter of forcing
thought to accept that every situation of beingevery worldfar from
being reduced to the pure multiple (which is nonetheless its being as such)
contains a transcendental organization.
The meaning of this expression will transpire from the demonstration
itself. As in Kant, we are trying to resolve a problem of possibility. Not
however how is science possible or how are synthetic judgments a
priori possible but: how is it possible that the neutrality, inconsistency and
indifferent dissemination of being-qua-being comes to consist as beingthere?
Or: how can the essential unbinding of multiple-being give itself as a
local binding and, in the end, as the stability of worlds? Why and how are
there worlds rather than chaos?
As we know, for Kant the transcendental is a subjectivated construction.
With good reason, we speak of a transcendental subject, which in some
sense invests the cognitive power of empirical subjects. Ever since Descartes,
this is the essential trait of an idealist philosophy: that it calls upon
the subject not as a problem but as the solution to the aporias of the One
(the world is nothing but formless multiplicity, but there exists a unified
Dasein of this world). The materialist thrust of my own thought (but also
paradoxically of Hegels, as Lenin remarked in his Notebooks) derives from
the fact that within it the subject is a late and problematic construction, and
in no way the place of the solution to a problem of possibility or unity
(possibility of intuitive certainty for Descartes, of synthetic judgments a
priori for Kant).
The transcendental that is at stake in this book is altogether anterior to
every subjective constitution, for it is an immanent given of any situation
whatever. As we shall see, it is what imposes upon every situated multiplicity
the constraint of a logic, which is also the law of its appearing, or
the rule in accordance with which the there of being-there allows the
multiple to come forth as essentially bound. That every world possesses a
singular transcendental organization means that, since the thinking of
being cannot on its own account for the worlds manifestation, the
intelligibility of this manifestation must be made possible by immanent
operations. Transcendental is the name for these operations. The final
maxim can be stated as follows: with regard to the inconsistency of being,
logic and appearing are one and the same thing.