RP15 18 PDF

Recent developments in the Occupied
Palestinian Territories (OPTs)

RESEARCH PAPER 15/18 30 March 2015
Peace can happen in 24 hours just like war can happen in 24 hours.
Sari Nusseibeh, Professor of Philosophy and President of Al-Quds University, Jerusalem
Rob Page
International Affairs and Defence Section
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Research Paper 15/18
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ISSN 1368-8456
Contents
1
Summary
The Palestinian Territories before 2014
1.1
Historical background
1.2
Status of Jerusalem; borders
1.3
Israeli settlements
1.4
Palestinian refugees
1.5
Other sources of Israeli-Palestinian tension
1.6
Palestinian domestic politics
1.7
Gaza restrictions
1.8
Maritime Activity Zone
1.9
UK policy
10
Fatah-Hamas reconciliation
10
2.1
Chronology of events
10
2.2
Reaction by Israel
11
2.3
Reaction by international community
12
Israeli military operation in Gaza
13
3.1
13
3.2
Casualties
14
3.3
Terms of ceasefire deal
14
Status of the Palestinian Territories at the United Nations
16
4.1
2011: unsuccessful application to become a member state
16
4.2
2012: successful application to become a non-member observer state
16
4.3
2014: rejection of draft Security Council resolution
19
4.4
Palestinian response to Security Councils rebuff: joining the International
Criminal Court
20
Diplomatic recognition by UN member states
22
What does the future hold?
24
RESEARCH PAPER 15/18
Summary
The West Bank and Gaza were invaded by Israel in 1967, and are collectively known as the
Occupied Palestinian Territories (OPTs). Before the Israeli invasion, the West Bank was part
of Jordan whilst Gaza was part of Egypt. Both areas remained under full Israeli control until
the mid-1990s, when the Palestinian Authority (PA) was created. The PA controls some
areas of the OPTs, but other areas remain under Israeli control. Many in the international
community, including the Foreign & Commonwealth Office, still regard the Territories as
occupied in their entirety because Israel retains control of their borders. Many Israeli citizens
have moved into the OPTs, living in purpose-built Israeli settlements. The Fourth Geneva
Convention prohibits this practice, though Israel argues that it is not applicable in the OPTs.
It is widely accepted that the most likely solution to the conflict is a two-state solution in
other words, the creation of a Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza. (Egypt never
claimed permanent sovereignty over Gaza, seeing its administration as temporary pending
the creation of a Palestinian state, whilst Jordan renounced its claim to the West Bank in
1988.) Fatah, one of the two leading factions in Palestinian politics, supports this initiative.
Hamas, its rival, takes a more radical line. Under the Hamas vision, the entire area now
covered by the State of Israel would along with the OPTs form part of a future Palestinian
state.
With a view to achieving a two-state solution, there have in recent years been various sets of
talks between the Israeli and Palestinian administrations. The most recent set of talks,
mediated by US Secretary of State John Kerry, began in August 2013, but collapsed in April
2014 following the decision by Mahmoud Abbas, President of the Palestinian Authority and
leader of Fatah, to sign a reconciliation agreement with Hamas. Israel was opposed to such
an agreement and withdrew from the talks in protest.
Following the collapse of the talks, the remainder of 2014 saw Israeli-Palestinian relations
continue on a downward spiral. On 7 July, after rocket attacks by Hamas, Israel launched a
full-blown military operation (Operation Protective Edge) in Gaza. The hostilities ended on 26
August, when a ceasefire came into effect. During the Operation, 65 Israeli soldiers plus four
Israeli civilians (and one foreign national in Israel) were killed. Casualties amongst
Palestinians were far higher. According to UN figures, 2,104 Palestinians were killed,
including 1,462 civilians.
As part of the ceasefire agreement, Israel agreed to lift some of its restrictions on Gaza;
restrictions had been imposed for security reasons in 2007, when Hamas seized Gaza by
force. Hamas retained full control of the territory until the signing of its April 2014
reconciliation agreement with Fatah. Whilst some restrictions have been lifted, many remain
in place: for example, ordinary Gazans are not generally allowed to leave the territory.
The OPTs do not presently meet the criteria for statehood under international law. However,
this fact does not inhibit other states from granting diplomatic recognition to Palestine if they
so wish. Out of 193 UN member states, 135 have granted diplomatic recognition to
Palestine, though most Western countries have not. However, this is beginning to change.
Sweden recognised Palestine on 30 October 2014, and in a number of countries which have
not yet recognised Palestine (including the UK), national Parliaments have passed motions
(albeit non-binding ones) calling on their governments to do so.
The Palestinian Authority has in recent years made various attempts to upgrade its status at
the United Nations, some more successful than others. Following an unsuccessful
application for full membership in 2011, the State of Palestine was admitted as a nonmember observer state in 2012. Subsequently, in 2014, Jordan (a key Palestinian ally and
non-permanent member of the UN Security Council) submitted a draft resolution to the UN
Security Council, calling for an end to the occupation by 2017. This resolution was rejected
by the Security Council. In protest at the Security Councils decision, Palestine acceded to
the Rome Statute, the founding treaty of the International Criminal Court. Israel, and many in
the international community, had argued that it should refrain from acceding until agreement
was reached on a two-state solution. Palestines accession may lead the ICC to investigate
war crimes alleged to have been committed by Israeli forces during Operation Protective
Edge.
It is difficult to make any meaningful predictions about what the coming months will hold for
the OPTs. The early months of 2015 have been challenging. Following Palestines accession
to the Rome Statute, the Government of Israel announced its intention to withhold tax
revenues from the Palestinian Authority. (Ordinarily, Israel collects such revenues on the
Palestinians behalf.) In response, the Palestine Liberation Organisation (a federation of
political parties dominated by Fatah) called on the cash-strapped Palestinian Authority to
abdicate the responsibility it currently holds for security matters in parts of the West Bank. If
the Palestinian Authority were to implement this suggestion, control of security matters and
responsibility for funding the security forces would be handed back to Israel. Israel
released the tax funds in late March, and it remains to be seen whether the PA will
implement the PLOs suggestion: doing so would be a step into the unknown for the West
Bank.
There are nevertheless some limited grounds for optimism. The 2014 ceasefire agreement
provided for indirect talks between Israel, Hamas and the PA, mediated by Egypt. Whilst they
are far less ambitious in scope than the direct negotiations of August 2013 April 2014, at
present the indirect talks represent the only available opportunity to achieve meaningful
progress. If progress is to be made, both sides the Palestinians and the new Israeli
administration will have to make compromises. Whether there exists sufficient political will,
on either side, remains to be seen.
The Palestinian Territories before 2014
1.1
Historical background
The West Bank (to the east of Israel) and Gaza (to the west of Israel) were invaded by Israel
in 1967, and are collectively known as the Occupied Palestinian Territories. Before the Israeli
invasion, the West Bank was part of Jordan whilst Gaza was part of Egypt. Immediately after
Israels invasion, the UN Security Council passed a resolution calling for its withdrawal, but in
practice both areas remained under full Israeli control until the mid-1990s, when a set of
negotiations known as the Oslo Process led to the establishment albeit with limited
jurisdiction - of a unicameral Palestinian parliament (known as the Palestinian Legislative
Council) and a Palestinian government (known as the Palestinian Authority or PA).1
Under the Interim Agreement of September 1995, the West Bank (with the exception of
Hebron and East Jerusalem) was split into Areas A, B and C. The new Palestinian Authority
was given full control in Area A, and full control of civil matters in Area B (it shares control of
security matters with the Government of Israel). In Area C, however, the Government of
Israel retained full control. Initially, a similar approach was followed in Gaza, with some areas
under PA control and some under Israeli control. However, Israel unilaterally withdrew from
Gaza in 2005, leaving the entire area under PA control (with the exception of a buffer zone
along the border with Israel, which remains under Israeli control and in fact constitutes 40%
of Gazas entire surface area). All of these measures were nominally temporary: an
agreement over the permanent status of the territories remains elusive.2
Parsons, Nigel. Recent History (Palestinian Territories), in Europa World online. London, Routledge. House of
Commons. Retrieved 25 March 2015 from http://www.europaworld.com/entry/ps.hi
Ibid.
Map showing Palestinian-controlled (green) and Israeli-controlled (beige) areas of the OPTs.
Map relates to control of civil matters, so in West Bank Areas A and B are both shown in
green, with Area C in beige. Source: Ohio State University.
Moreover, the international community continues to regard the whole of the territories as
occupied, mainly because they do not fully control their own borders. Even in those areas
which are nominally under full Palestinian control, Israel retains the right to close borders. All
airports and sea ports in the OPTs were closed down several years ago, and Israel retains
control of the West Banks land borders. Gazas land borders technically returned to
Palestinian control in 2005, but the only two countries with which it shares a border are Israel
and Egypt, both of which have at various points imposed significant restrictions on the
border crossings.3
For a range of complex socio-political reasons, neither Hebron nor East Jerusalem were
included in Area A, B or C. Whilst East Jerusalem is part of the West Bank (unlike West
Jerusalem, which is part of Israel), Israel has ever since 1967 chosen to regard all of
3
Jerusalem as a part of its own territory. It therefore remains under full Israeli control. The city
of Hebron, meanwhile, has since 1997 been divided into two areas, known as H1 and H2. H2
is under full Israeli control, and contains a number of restricted areas where the activities of
Palestinians are heavily constrained. On many streets in these areas, Palestinian vehicles
are prohibited; some streets are off limits to all Palestinians, including pedestrians.4
Palestinian state
The idea of a Palestinian state dates back to the United Nations Partition Plan for Palestine,
adopted by the UN General Assembly in 1947. At this point, all of the areas now known as
Israel and the OPTs were under UK control as part of the British Mandate of Palestine. The
Plan proposed the division of this area into a Jewish state, a Palestinian state, and a UNadministered area around Jerusalem (as shown by the map below). The Jewish state
declared its independence as the State of Israel on 15 May 1948; was immediately invaded
by Jordan, Egypt and Syria; and emerged victorious from the war which followed. The
proposed Palestinian state, however, never came into being. Much of the territory allocated
to it was annexed by Israel during the war, with the exception of the West Bank and Gaza
which were incorporated respectively into Jordan and Egypt.5
Source: Ohio State University

More recently, there has been a series of attempts to end the occupation not by returning
the West Bank and Gaza to Jordanian and Egyptian control respectively, but by means of a
two-state solution - the creation of a Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza. (Egypt
never claimed permanent sovereignty over Gaza, seeing its administration as temporary
pending the creation of a Palestinian state, whilst Jordan renounced its claim to the West
Bank in 1988.6) To this end there have been various sets of direct talks between Israel and
the Palestinians since the 1990s to address the main disputed issues (so-called final status
issues).These final status issues are: borders, the status of Jerusalem, the status of Israeli
4
5
6
UNOCHA OPT, The humanitarian impact of Israeli settlements in Hebron city; November 2013
"Israel: History"; "Palestinian Territories: Recent History", Europa World Plus [accessed 13 August 2014]
J Salmon, The Proclamation of the State of Palestine, in Palestine Yearbook of International Law, 1989, p57
settlements and their residents, the status of Palestinian refugees, the status of Israeli
military bases in the OPTs, and foreign relations.7
The most recent set of direct talks began in August 2013, mediated by John Kerry, the US
Secretary of State. Each sides participation in the talks had been conditional on certain
concessions made by the other side. For example, Israel agreed to release 104 Palestinians
from prison, where they were serving sentences for terrorist attacks against Israelis. For its
part, the Palestinian Authority agreed to refrain from upgrading its membership of UN
organisations. Israel has consistently argued that such steps are inappropriate until
agreement is reached on a two-state solution.
However, the spirit of compromise which brought both sides to the negotiating table did not
last. In early April 2014 Israel demanded that the talks be placed under review, and
cancelled the release of the final tranche of Palestinian prisoners. This was a response to the
Palestinian Authoritys decision to resume its campaign for membership of 15 UN
organisations; for the Palestinians, the decision to pursue the UN route was itself a
response to delays in the prisoners release. The direct talks finally collapsed on 24 April
2014, following the announcement of a reconciliation agreement between Fatah the
governing party in the Palestinian Authority and Hamas.8 (This is covered in detail in
Section 2 below.)
1.2
Status of Jerusalem; borders
The status of Jerusalem is amongst the most intractable of the final status issues.
Palestinians see East Jerusalem as their future capital, but Israel now regards East
Jerusalem as part of its own territory rather than part of the occupied West Bank. For Israel,
the entire city of Jerusalem is its own undivided capital.
The question of borders is equally controversial. It has periodically been suggested that an
eventual two-state solution might include land swaps: in other words, making some modest
adjustments to the borders between Israel and the OPTs, incorporating some Palestinian
land into Israel and vice versa. However, some have argued that under the Geneva
Convention, no negotiations on land swaps should take place until the occupation has
ended.9
1.3
Israeli settlements
Following the beginning of the occupation in 1967, many Israelis moved into purpose-built
Jewish settlements in the West Bank and Gaza (though the settlements in Gaza were
demolished by the Israeli Government in 2005, and the settlers forcibly evacuated).10 When
the West Bank was divided into Areas A, B and C in the mid-1990s, areas containing Jewish
settlements were generally classed as Area C, and hence remained under Israeli control. In
Gaza, Jewish settlements were the only areas which remained under Israeli control from the
mis-1990s until the Israeli withdrawal in 2005.
Article 49 of the Fourth Geneva Convention states that: The occupying power shall not
deport or transfer parts of its own population into the territories it occupies. Some supporters
of Israel argue that its occupation of the OPTs is not covered by the Geneva Conventions
because prior to the Israeli occupation, the OPTs were not sovereign they were under
7
10
International Development Committee, The UKs Development Work in the Occupied Palestinian Territories, 6
August 2014, HC 565 2014-15, MID0053
International Development Committee, The UK's Development Work in the Occupied Palestinian Territories, 6
August 2014, HC 565 2014-15, MID0053
D McDowall, Clarity or ambiguity? The withdrawal clause of UN Security Council Resolution 242,
International Affairs, 6 November 2014, pp1367-1381
Ibid.
Egyptian/Jordanian occupation.11 Some also argue that settlers were not transferred since
they moved voluntarily.12 However, the international community (including the International
Court of Justice, International Committee of the Red Cross and UN Security Council)
maintains that the settlements contravene international law.13
1.4
Palestinian refugees
Another source of tension in the region is the position of Palestinian refugees. During the
Arab-Israeli war of 1948, thousands of Palestinians were displaced: many fled from their
homes in what was now Israel, often into the West Bank and Gaza. The UN Relief and
Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) was formed to provide
assistance for these refugees. Its existence is something of an anomaly, since all other
refugee populations worldwide receive assistance from the UN High Commissioner for
Refugees (UNHCR) rather than from a specially-created body. Unlike UNHCR, UNRWA
regards male refugees descendants as refugees in their own right. It also continues to
regard refugees as such even if they acquire new nationalities. The consequence of these
policies is that the total number of Palestine refugees today is around five million including
many who were born, and have lived throughout their lives, in the West Bank and/or Gaza.14
Amongst Palestinians almost universally it is argued that these refugees all have a right
to return to Israel though Daniel Levy, of the European Council on Foreign Relations, has
argued that this is merely a negotiating position on which Palestinians would compromise in
exchange for an end to the occupation.15
1.5
Other sources of Israeli-Palestinian tension
The Palestinian people are often said to be stateless. The Palestinian Authority issues its
own passports, but these are not universally accepted as travel documents, since many
countries do not recognise the Palestinian Authority as a state (see below). Generally
speaking, Gazans have been stateless for longer than West Bankers. The people of Gaza
were already stateless before Israels invasion in 1967: although Gaza was under Egyptian
control, Gazans were not generally granted Egyptian citizenship. West Bankers held full
Jordanian citizenship prior to 1967, and retained it until 1988, when Jordan formally
renounced its claim to the territory and agreed to support the creation of a Palestinian state. 16
In addition, since Israel regards East Jerusalem as part of its own territory, East
Jerusalemites were offered Israeli citizenship following the 1967 invasion though most
declined the offer, since accepting it would be tantamount to accepting Israels jurisdiction
over East Jerusalem.17
Access to water is a major source of tension in the OPTs. There is a large aquifer in the West
Bank, but under the terms of the Oslo Accords much of the water is extracted by the
Israeli water authority. Palestinians thus have to pay the Israeli water authority for access to
Palestinian water18 (though they do benefit from cheaper tariffs than Israeli users).19
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
T Einhorn, "The Status of Palestine/Land of Israel and Its Settlement Under Public International Law", NATIV
Online, vol. 1 (2003)
Diakonia, International Law and Israeli Settlements in the Occupied Palestinian Territory (2014)
International Court of Justice, Legal consequences of the construcion of a wall in the Occupied Palestinian
Territory: Advisory Opinion of 9 July 2004; P Maurer, "Challenges to international humanitarian law: Israel's
occupation policy", International Review of the Red Cross 94 (888), Winter 2012; UN Security Council
Resolutions 446 (1979), 452 (1979) and 465 (1980)
"Palestine Refugees", UNRWA [accessed 26 March 2015]
August 2014, HC 565 2014-15, Qq54-55
"'Egypt grants citizenship to 50,000 Palestinians'", Jerusalem Post, 10 November 2012; Human Rights Watch,
Stateless Again (2010)
"Who are East Jerusalem's 'permanent residents'?", Haaretz, 9 December 2014
Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip (1995)
1.6
Palestinian domestic politics
The two main factions in Palestinian politics are Fatah (the dominant party in the larger
federation known as the Palestine Liberation Organisation or PLO) and Hamas. Both are
committed to ending the occupation, but there the similarities end. Fatah is the more
moderate faction, and supports the internationally-backed idea of a two-state solution.
Hamas takes a more radical line, refusing to recognise the State of Israel. Under the Hamas
vision, the entire area presently covered by the State of Israel would along with the OPTs
form part of a future Palestinian state. Hamas is therefore almost by definition opposed to
negotiations with Israel; it has a long history of terrorist attacks against Israeli civilians, and
seeks the elimination of the Israeli state. Hamas has nevertheless indicated that if agreement
were reached on a two-state solution (most likely following negotiations between Israel and a
Palestinian administration in which Hamas would play no part), and if such a solution were
approved by a majority of Palestinians in a referendum, Hamas would accept the outcome.20
The most recent elections to the Palestinian Legislative Council took place in January 2006,
leaving Hamas as the largest party. Following the elections Hamas formed a coalition
administration alongside the more moderate (and previously ruling) Fatah. However, in June
2007, tensions between the two parties spilled over into armed conflict. Hamas seized
control of Gaza by force, leaving a separate Fatah administration in control of the West
Bank.21
It should be noted that whilst Fatah is now committed to pursuing its aims by peaceful
means, this has not always been the case. Before 1988, Fatahs position was similar to that
of Hamas today: it called for the entire area presently covered by the State of Israel to
become along with the OPTs part of a future Palestinian state. Fatah changed its position
on this in 1988, but continued to support the first intifada (uprising) a prolonged uprising
including terrorist attacks which had begun in 1987. In 1993 the intifada came to an end, and
Fatah officially renounced violence though it went on to participate in a second intifada
between 2000 and 2005.22
1.7
Gaza restrictions
In 2006, following the kidnapping of Israeli soldier Gilad Shalit by Palestinian militants, Israel
imposed restrictions on the movement of people and goods between its own territory and
Gaza. The restrictions were tightened significantly the following year when Hamas seized
control of Gaza by force.23
Restrictions on imports and exports have caused significant damage to the economy of the
Gaza Strip. By late 2013, the average number of truckloads of goods entering Gaza from
Israel through the main commercial crossing (Kerem Shalom) was between 4,000 and 6,000
per month; in 2005, before the imposition of restrictions, the average number of truckloads
per month was 10,400. With respect to construction materials (the import of which is
especially critical to Gazas economy after the destruction wreaked by various Israeli military
operations), the picture is much the same: by late 2013, the volume of construction materials
entering Gaza was fluctuating between zero (in November 2013) and 110,306 tons (in July
19
20
21
22
23
August 2014, HC 565 2014-15, MID0075
"For Israel, the beginning of wisdom is to admit its mistakes", Guardian, 7 September 2014
Ibid.
"Gaza conflict: Abbas backs Hamas ceasefire demands", BBC News website, 23 July 2014
2013), compared to an average of 171,211 tons per month in early 2007 before the
restrictions.24
With respect to exports, the number of truckloads of goods leaving Gaza by late 2013 was
generally between 4 and 11 per month (though there was a spike in December 2013 when
61 truckloads exited). None were bound for the West Bank, since exports to the West Bank
had been banned altogether. Prior to the imposition of restrictions, dozens of truckloads left
Gaza each day.25
The restrictions also made it extremely difficult for ordinary residents of Gaza to leave the
territory. All sea and air borders were completely closed, and vehicles were prevented from
crossing unless carrying commercial cargo. The only way for ordinary Gaza residents to
enter Israel was on foot through the Erez border crossing and this was open only for
exceptional humanitarian cases, especially urgent medical cases.26 By late 2013, the
average number of people leaving Gaza for Israel was very few: between 5,000 and 6,000
per month (including multiple exits by the same individual). This pales in comparison with the
flow before the imposition of restrictions. In the year 2000, for example, the average number
of monthly exits was 780,000.
The only other way for Gaza residents to leave is through the Gaza-Egypt border crossing at
Rafah. This is the only border crossing anywhere in the OPTs in which Israeli officials have
no involvement. For several years after Israels imposition of restrictions, this was the only
realistic route to the outside world for Gazas civilians. Yet following the change of
Government in Egypt in July 2013, traffic through Rafah crossing also became subject to
severe restrictions. (Prior to July 2013, Egypt was governed by the Muslim Brotherhood,
which is allied to Hamas; the new Egyptian regime, by contrast, is hostile to Hamas and
therefore imposed tighter travel restrictions on Gaza.)27 Under this new regime, the Rafah
crossing was open for exceptional cases only, and was sometimes closed altogether.28
1.8
Maritime Activity Zone
Under the terms of the 1994 Gaza-Jericho Agreement and the 1995 Interim Agreement on
the West Bank and the Gaza Strip (known as Oslo II), an area extending up to 20 nautical
miles off the coast of Gaza was designated as a Palestinian-controlled Maritime Activity
Zone. However, the agreements also gave Israel the right to restrict Palestinian access to its
territorial waters on security grounds. The limit was reduced on these grounds to 12 nautical
miles in 2002, and has since been further reduced in 2006 (to 6 nautical miles) and again in
2009 (to 3 nautical miles).
In 1999, a large gas field (known as Gaza Marine) was discovered, three-quarters of which
fell within the Palestinian Maritime Activity Zone. The PA signed a contract with BG plc
(formerly British Gas) for its development. Under the terms of the contract, BG was initially
granted 90% ownership of the gas field, with the remaining 10% owned by the PA. Once gas
production began, BG was to retain 60% ownership, with 10% owned by the PA and 30%
owned by Consolidated Contractors Company, a private Palestinian firm. BG was also
granted the right to explore for, extract and sell the gas.29
24
25
26
27
28
29
Based on graphs published by Gisha [accessed 27 March 2015]

Ibid.
Gisha, The Gaza Cheat Sheet, 19 January 2015
"Gaza border at Rafah tightly controlled as Egypt remains hostile to Hamas", Guardian, 1 August 2014
A. Antreasyan, Gas Finds in the Eastern Mediterranean, Journal of Palestine Studies, 42 (3), Spring 2013,
pp. 29-47
However, given the relative lack of demand for gas in the Palestinian Territories, BG was
unwilling to start production unless it were also able to sell gas to Israel. BG and Israel began
negotiations in 2000, but no deal was ever reached, partly due to disagreements about cost,
and partly due to Israeli concerns that by purchasing gas from BG (and hence indirectly from
the Palestinian Authority) it might indirectly be funding Palestinian militant groups.
Negotiations between BG and Israel officially came to an end in 2007.30
In September 2012, the PA and Israel entered into talks with a view to breaking the
deadlock, but no progress was made. A complicating factor was Hamas opposition to such
talks taking place without its involvement.31
1.9
UK policy
The UK Government strongly supports the idea of a two-state solution. The UKs Department
for International Development (DFID) has a large bilateral aid programme in the OPTs, which
consists of two main parts. It provides funding to UNRWA to support its work on health,
education, social protection, and the protection of refugees rights (106.5 million between
2012 and 2015); it also provides funding to the Palestinian Authority through the World
Banks Palestinian Reform Development Plan (PRDP) Trust Fund (129.5m between 2011
and 2015).32
Fatah-Hamas reconciliation
2.1
On 23 April 2014 it was announced that Fatah and Hamas had signed a reconciliation
agreement.33 On 29 May 2014 Mahmoud Abbas, the President of the Palestinian Authority,
asked Rami Hamdallah to form an interim unity government with jurisdiction over both the
West Bank and Gaza.34 Disputes promptly arose between Fatah and Hamas as to (i) who
should be appointed as Minister of Foreign Affairs; and (ii) whether there should be a
Minister of Prisoners Affairs: President Abbas had wanted to abolish the latter position, but
this was opposed by Hamas. Ultimately it was agreed that the role would be merged into
Rami Hamdallahs portfolio, and Hamdallah announced the makeup of his new Cabinet
within days.35
Whilst the Cabinet has the support of both Fatah and Hamas, its makeup is primarily
technocratic. There are no Hamas ministers in the Cabinet, and only one from Fatah (Prime
Minister Rami Hamdallah); all the other Cabinet ministers are unaffiliated.36 The full Cabinet
is as follows:
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
Prime Minister, Minister of the Interior: Rami Hamdallah

Deputy Prime Minister, Minister of Culture: Ziad Abu Amr
Deputy Prime Minister, Minister of National Economy: Muhammad Mustafa
Minister of Finance, Minister of Planning: Shuki Bishara
A. Antreasyan, Gas Finds in the Eastern Mediterranean, Journal of Palestine Studies, 42 (3), Spring 2013,
pp. 29-47
Ibid.
August 2014, HC 565 2014-15, MID0053
"Fatah and the Hamas agree unity government", The Telegraph, 23 April 2014
"Abbas asks PM Rami Hamdallah to head Fatah-Hamas unity cabinet", BBC News, 29 May 2014
Formation of new Palestinian government, House of Commons Library Standard Note SN06927, 1 July 2014
"Palestinian unity government of Fatah and Hamas sworn in", The Guardian, 2 June 2014
10
Minister of Foreign Affairs: Riyad al-Maliki

Minister of Justice: Salim al-Saqqa
Minister for Jerusalem Affairs: Adnan al-Husayni
Minister of Tourism & Antiquities: Rula Maaya
Minister of Health: Jawad Qutaish
Minister of Education & Higher Education: Khawla al-Shaksheer
Minister of Information, Minister of Transportation: Allam Said Musa
Minister of Public Works & Housing: Muhammad Salim al-Hasania
Minister of Agriculture, Minister of Social Affairs: Shawki Aleessa
Minister of Womens Affairs: Haifa Fahmi Hafez Aga
Minister of Labour: Maumoon Abdul Hadi Hassan Abu Shahla
Minister of Local Government: Nayef Abu Khalaf
Minister of Waqf & Religious Affairs: Yusuf Ismail al-Sheikh
Secretary-General of the Cabinet: Ali Mahmoud Abdullah Abu Diak37
Despite Hamas continuing refusal to recognise the state of Israel, the technocratic
government has committed itself to the so-called Quartet principles: recognition of Israel,
rejection of violence, and respect for existing agreements.38 So although Hamas itself refuses
to recognise Israel, it is happy to support a technocratic Government which takes a very
different line.
Although the new government was officially sworn in in June 2014, the de facto division of
the OPTs (with the West Bank controlled by Fatah and Gaza controlled by Hamas) has
continued, due to various disputes between Fatah and Hamas. In particular, Hamas is
insisting that the civil servants it employed in Gaza (including those manning border
crossings) be incorporated into the new administration, whereas Fatah is reluctant to agree.39
2.2
Reaction by Israel
Following the announcement of the Fatah-Hamas reconciliation on 23 April 2014, Israel said
that its US-brokered talks with the Palestinians would be placed on hold indefinitely. 40 Gazabased members of the new administration required Israeli permission to travel to the West
Bank for the swearing-in ceremony: three were refused such permission.41 (Travel between
Gaza and the West Bank involves passing through Israel: Israel maintains strict controls on
who is allowed to enter the country from Gaza.42)
Following the swearing-in ceremony, Israeli Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu said:
Today, Abu Mazen [an alternative name for President Abbas] said yes to terrorism and
no to peace. This is the direct continuation of Abu Mazen's policy of refusing peace.
While Israel has carried out courageous and painful steps on behalf of the diplomatic
process and continues to be committed to peace, Abu Mazen has refused to extend
the negotiations, has rejected the American framework document, continues to incite
against Israel, has unilaterally acceded to UN treaties and has now forged a pact with
the Hamas terrorist organization.
37
38
39
40
41
42
Jewish Virtual Library, Palestinian Authority: Unity Cabinet (accessed 30 June 2014)
"Palestinian unity government of Fatah and Hamas sworn in", The Guardian, 2 June 2014
H Balousha, "Hamas unwilling to jeopardize Palestinian reconciliation", Al-Monitor, 6 February 2015
"Israel halts peace talks as Hamas and Fatah strike unity deal", The Telegraph, 24 April 2014
"Fatah-Hamas unity government will strengthen terror, says Netanyahu", The Guardian, 1 June 2014
"Tales from Gaza: What is life really like in 'the world's largest outdoor prison'?", The Independent, 13 April
2013
11
Abu Mazen has forged a pact with the Hamas organization, which is responsible for
the murder of over 1,000 innocent Israelis and the firing of thousands of missiles at
Israeli cities.
Abu Mazen has forged a pact with Hamas, an organization which has been declared a
terrorist organization in the US, Europe, Egypt and throughout the world, and which
completely rejects the international community's conditions. The international
community needs to treat it accordingly.
In recent days, the leaders of the Hamas terrorist organization have reiterated their
commitment to the path of terrorism and to the elimination of the State of Israel.
The agreement with Hamas makes Abu Mazen directly responsible for the terrorism
emanating from Gaza.
The State of Israel will not conduct diplomatic negotiations with a Palestinian
government with backing from Hamas, a terrorist organization that calls for the
destruction of Israel.43
President Abbas claimed that Israel was set to withhold tax revenues from the PA.44 (Under
the Oslo Accords, the Israeli authorities collect certain taxes on behalf of the Palestinian
authority.)
2.3
Reaction by international community
Following the swearing-in of the new administration Jen Psaki, spokesperson for the US
State Department, said:
At this point, it appears that President Abbas has formed an interim technocratic
government that does not include ministers affiliated with Hamas. With what we know
now, we will work with this government.45
Israeli Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu declared himself deeply troubled by the US
statement, whilst his Communications Minister Gilad Erdan said:
Unfortunately, American naivety has broken all records. Any collaboration with Hamas
which kills women and children is unacceptable [] This American capitulation can
only damage chances of resuming [peace] negotiations. 46
An EU statement said:
We welcome [] the declaration by President Abbas that this new government is
committed to the principle of the two-state solution based on the 1967 borders, to the
recognition of Israels legitimate right to exist. The EUs engagement with the new
43
44
45
46
"Security Cabinet on the Hamas-PA government", Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2 June 2014
"Fatah-Hamas unity government will strengthen terror, says Netanyahu", The Guardian, 1 June 2014
"Israel condemns US for backing Palestinian unity government", The Guardian, 3 June 2014
Ibid.
12
Palestinian government will be based on its adherence to these policies and

commitments.47
China, Turkey and India also indicated their support for the new administration.48
Israeli military operation in Gaza
3.1
Tensions between Israel and Hamas increased markedly during June 2014, following the
abduction and murder of three Israeli teenagers in Area C of the West Bank. Israel claimed
that Hamas was responsible for the killings; Hamas has accepted that the attackers may
have been Hamas members, but claims that they were acting of their own accord rather than
on orders from Hamas HQ. Before the discovery of the bodies on 30 June, Israeli forces
entered Palestinian-controlled areas of the West Bank to search for the victims and arrested
over 300 suspects. The Palestinian Authority agreed to cooperate with the Israeli search
effort, but also criticised the perceived excesses of the Israeli operation. Many ordinary
Palestinians protested against the Israeli incursions. Some protests turned violent, with a
number of Palestinians being killed in clashes with Israeli forces. Another Palestinian boy
was killed in a suspected revenge attack by Israeli extremists.49
On 7 July 2014, following rocket attacks by Hamas,50 the Israeli military launched a large
military operation in Gaza, known as Operation Protective Edge. The operation followed a
similar pattern to a number of previous ones, including Operation Cast Lead (2008-09) and
Operation Pillar of Defence (2012). It initially consisted of air strikes alone, but from 17 July
the Israeli military began conducting ground incursions into the Gaza Strip.51 Israels
objectives were to target Hamas militants and the infrastructure used to launch attacks on
Israel. In particular, Israel was seeking to destroy underground tunnels leading from Gaza
into Israel. All known tunnels were successfully destroyed by early August, and the ground
incursions came to an end on 5 August52 though air strikes (and rocket attacks from Gaza)
continued.
The hostilities ended on 26 August, when an open-ended ceasefire came into effect following
mediation by Egypt.53 There were also a number of short-term ceasefires during the
Operation, some of which were more fully observed than others. Examples include the
following:
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
17 July: five-hour ceasefire;54
20 July: two-hour ceasefire, interrupted by crossfire but subsequently extended for a

further hour;55
Ibid.
Ibid.
Abduction and murder of Israeli teenagers, House of Commons Library Standard Note SN06928, as amended
3 July 2014
"How Politics and Lies Triggered an Unintended War in Gaza", Forward, 10 July 2014.
"Occupied Palestinian Territory: Gaza Emergency Situation Report (as of 18 July 2014, 1500 hrs)", OCHA, 19
July 2014
"New Gaza cease-fire begins as Israel withdraws troops", Los Angeles Times, 5 August 2014
"What's in the Gaza peace deal?", Reuters, 26 August 2014.
"Occupied Palestinian Territory: Gaza Emergency Situation Report (as of 16 July 2014, 1500 hours)", OCHA,
17 July 2014
July 2014
13
3.2
26 July: 12-hour ceasefire;56
From 1 August: 72-hour ceasefire, broke down almost immediately;57
From 5 August: 72-hour ceasefire;58
From 10 August, 72-hour ceasefire, extended for a further 120 hours from 13
August.59
Casualties
During the Operation, 65 Israeli soldiers plus four Israeli civilians (and one foreign national in
Israel) were killed. Casualties amongst Palestinians were far higher. According to UN Office
for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) figures, 2,131 Palestinians were killed,
including 1,473 civilians.60
3.3
Terms of ceasefire deal
The ceasefire agreement was signed not only by Israel and Hamas, but also by the
Palestinian Authority and by Islamic Jihad (another militant group operating in Gaza).61 As
part of the ceasefire deal, Israel agreed to loosen some of the restrictions on movement
between its own territory and Gaza. From 2 September 2014, for example, both the
Palestinian Water Authority and international aid organisations were allowed to import
construction materials; there is also a new mechanism allowing private firms to do so. Egypt
also agreed to loosen restrictions at the Egypt-Gaza border crossing at Rafah the only
border crossing anywhere in the OPTs in which Israeli officials have no involvement.62
Analysing the ceasefire deal Avi Shlaim, professor emeritus of international relations at St
Antonys College, Oxford, argued:
Both sides claimed victory but Netanyahus sounded rather hollow. Announcing the
ceasefire at a news conference, he claimed a major military as well as a diplomatic
achievement for the state of Israel. Hardly anyone shared this assessment. The public,
the media, the opposition, hawkish members of his Likud party, and some of his
coalition partners, accused him of accepting a ceasefire that failed to meet any of
Israels objectives. One newspaper gave the score as Hamas: 1; Israel: 0. Netanyahus
popularity plummeted from 85% at the beginning of the operation to 38%.63
There has been some progress in implementing the ceasefire agreement, though the
process has not been without its glitches. Despite the loosening of restrictions, imports of
construction materials of critical importance to Gazas economy have not increased
significantly. In other areas there has been slightly more progress. With respect to goods,
imports have increased since the war ended. During December 2014, 5,986 truckloads of
goods entered Gaza from Israel through the main commercial crossing (Kerem Shalom): the
highest monthly total since July 2013. However, this rate of imports remains lower than the
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
August 2014
"Occupied Palestinian Territory: Gaza Emergency Situation Report (as of 1 August 2014, 1500 hrs)", OCHA, 2
August 2014
"Gaza ceasefire enters second day as delegations prepare for Cairo talks", Guardian, 6 August 2014.
"Gaza conflict: Israel and Hamas agree to extend ceasefire by five days", Guardian, 13 August 2014.
"Occupied Palestinian Territory: Gaza Emergency Situation Report (as of 4 September 2014, 0800 hrs)",
OCHA, 4 September 2014
"Gaza ceasefire: Israel and Palestinians agree to halt weeks of fighting", Guardian, 27 August 2014.
14
equivalent figure before the imposition of the blockade. In 2005, the average number of
truckloads per month was 10,400.64
Exports from Gaza have increased significantly since the war ended. In December 2014, 87
truckloads left Gaza the highest level since December 2011. Much of the increase is
attributable to Israels decision (as of 6 November 2014) to allow exports from Gaza to the
West Bank. Of the 87 truckloads which left Gaza in December 2014, 44 were bound for the
West Bank. However, the present level of exports still pales in comparison with pre-blockade
levels. In the early months of 2007, as stated above, dozens of truckloads left Gaza each
day.65
The number of Gaza residents able to enter Israel is now significantly higher than before the
war. In the months leading up to the war, the average number of Gaza residents travelling
entering Israel through Erez crossing (including multiple entries by the same individual) was
between 6,000 and 7,000; in December 2014, the total was over 12,000. Nevertheless, this
remains far lower than before the imposition of the blockade. During the year 2000, as stated
above, the average number of exits per month was 780,000.66
Israel and the Palestinians also agreed to take part in further indirect talks. Commenting on
the launch of these talks, Avi Shlaim argued:
Israels main demand is the demilitarisation of the Gaza Strip. [] Hamas is calling for
the lifting of the illegal seven-year Israeli blockade of Gaza and the reopening of the
borders. Other Hamas demands include the rebuilding of Gaza international airport,
which Israel destroyed in 2001, the release of prisoners and the reopening of the safe
passage to the West Bank [allowing Palestinians to travel freely between Gaza and
the West Bank].67
The talks were due to begin on 23 September 2014, hosted by the Government of Egypt.68 It
is unclear how often the parties have met since then, or how much progress has been made:
there is very little information in the public domain. On the very day when talks were due to
begin, in the early hours, the two Palestinians suspected of murdering the three Israeli
teenagers were located by Israeli forces: the suspects opened fire on the soldiers and were
ultimately shot dead. Hamas considered withdrawing from the talks in response, and there
were a number of mutually contradictory reports as to whether the talks launch was
suspended.69
Israeli-Palestinian tensions escalated in early December 2014 when a junior Minister in the
Palestinian administration, Ziad Abu Ein, died from injuries sustained in a clash with Israeli
soldiers. Abu Ein, a Minister Without Portfolio and member of Fatah, had been attending a
demonstration to mark International Human Rights Day in the West Bank village of
Turmusayya. The circumstances of his death are unclear: the protest has been described as
peaceful by some international media sources, though Israeli officials described the
protestors as rioters. According to the Palestinian Maan news agency, Abu Ein died after
inhaling tear gas and being beaten by Israeli soldiers.70
64
65
66
67
68
69
70
Based on graphs published by Gisha [accessed 27 March 2015]

Ibid.
Ibid.
"Egypt to host post-Gaza war talks this week", Mail Online, 21 September 2014
"Israeli forces kill two Palestinians suspected of murdering teenagers", Guardian, 23 September 2014
"Palestinian minister dies after clash with Israeli soldiers", Financial Times, 10 December 2014
15
Status of the Palestinian Territories at the United Nations
4.1
2011: unsuccessful application to become a member state
Article 4 (2) of the United Nations Charter states:

The admission of any [] state to membership in the United Nations will be effected by
a decision of the General Assembly upon the recommendation of the Security Council.
Article 27 (3) states:

Decisions of the Security Council on all other matters [including the admission of new
member states] shall be made by an affirmative vote of nine members including the
concurring votes of the permanent members [].
In practice, this means that prior to a vote in the General Assembly, full member status would
have required the approval of nine members of the 15-member Security Council, with any of
the five permanent Members (the US, the UK, France, China and Russia) having the right to
veto such a decision.
The Palestinian Authority submitted an application to become a UN member state on 23
September 2011. The application was never likely to succeed since the US was expected to
use its veto. However, some suggested that the objective of the Palestinian Authority was
simply to obtain enough support (nine Security Council members) to force the US to use its
veto; Chris McGreal, writing for the Guardian, argued that this would be a moral victory.71
By November 2011, however, it became apparent that the bid would only be supported by
eight Security Council members (Russia, China, South Africa, India, Brazil, Lebanon, Nigeria
and Gabon). As a consequence, the Palestinian Authority decided not to force a vote on the
issue.72
The UK had indicated that it would abstain. In a statement to the House of Commons on 9
November 2011 (at which point a vote still looked likely), the then Foreign Secretary William
Hague said:
The United Kingdom judges that the Palestinian Authority largely fulfils criteria for UN
membership, including statehood, as far as the reality of the situation in the occupied
Palestinian territories allows, but its ability to function effectively as a state would be
impeded by that situation. A negotiated end to the occupation is the best way to allow
Palestinian aspirations to be met in reality and on the ground. We will not vote against
the application because of the progress the Palestinian leadership have made towards
meeting the criteria, but nor can we vote for it while our primary objective remains a
return to negotiations [i.e. Israeli-Palestinian negotiations aimed at ending Israels
occupation of the Palestinian Territories] through the Quartet process and the success
of those negotiations.
For those reasons, in common with France and in consultation with our European
partners, the United Kingdom will abstain on any vote on full Palestinian membership
of the UN.73
4.2
2012: successful application to become a non-member observer state
In 2012, the Palestinian Authority applied to become a non-member observer state. Unlike
full member status, non-member observer state status is granted by a simple majority vote in
71
72
73
"UN vote on Palestinian state put off amid lack of support", Guardian, 3 October 2014
Ibid.
HC Deb 9 November 2011 c290
16
the General Assembly. On 28 November 2012, the day before the vote, William Hague
outlined UK conditions for supporting the application in a statement to the House of
Commons:
I spoke to President Abbas on Monday and my right hon. Friend the Deputy Prime
Minister spoke to him yesterday. We explained that, while there is no question of the
United Kingdom voting against the resolution, in order to vote for it we would need
certain assurances or amendments. The first is that the Palestinian Authority should
indicate a clear commitment to return immediately to negotiationswithout
preconditions. This is the essential answer to the charge that by moving the resolution,
the Palestinians are taking a path away from negotiations. Given the great difficulty in
restarting negotiations in recent years and the risk that some will see this resolution as
a step that is inconsistent with such negotiations, this commitment is indispensable to
us.
The second assurance relates to membership of other specialised UN agencies and
action in the International Criminal Court. Our country is a strong supporter, across all
parties, of international justice and the International Criminal Court. We would
ultimately like to see a Palestinian state represented throughout all the organs of the
United Nations. However, we judge that if the Palestinians were to build on this
resolution by pursuing ICC jurisdiction over the occupied territories at this stage, it
could make a return to negotiations impossible. This is extremely important, given that
we see 2013 as a crucial yearfor the reasons I have describedfor the Middle East
peace process.74
We have also said to President Abbas that we would like to see language in the
resolution that does not prejudge any deliberations by the UN Security Council, and for
it to be clear that the resolution does not apply retrospectively. We believe these
changes would not be difficult to make; that if they were made either in the text of the
resolution or in accompanying statements as appropriate, they would win wider support
for the resolution without any prejudice to final status issues; and that they would
increase the prospects for negotiations moving ahead.
Up until the time of the vote itself, we will remain open to voting in favour of the
resolution if we see public assurances by the Palestinians on these points. However, in
the absence of these assurances, the United Kingdom would abstain on the vote. That
would be consistent with our strong support for the principle of Palestinian statehood,
but also with our concern that the resolution could set the peace process back.75
These conditions were not satisfied, so the UK decided to abstain.76 Despite the UKs
abstention, the resolution granting non-member observer state status was adopted by a vote
of 138 in favour to 9 against, with 41 abstentions, as follows:
In favour: Afghanistan, Algeria, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Armenia,
Austria, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Belarus, Belgium, Belize, Benin, Bhutan,
Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, Cape
Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, China, Comoros, Congo, Costa Rica,
Cte dIvoire, Cuba, Cyprus, Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea, Denmark,
Djibouti, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Eritrea, Ethiopia,
Finland, France, Gabon, Gambia, Georgia, Ghana, Greece, Grenada, Guinea, GuineaBissau, Guyana, Honduras, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Ireland, Italy, Jamaica,
Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Lao Peoples Democratic
74
75
76
For further details on the Palestinian application to the International Criminal Court, see section 4.4 below.
HC Deb 18 Dec 2012 cc768-9W
17
Republic, Lebanon, Lesotho, Libya, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Malaysia, Maldives,

Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Morocco, Mozambique, Myanmar, Namibia,
Nepal, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Peru,
Philippines, Portugal, Qatar, Russian Federation, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia,
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Sao Tome and Principe, Saudi Arabia, Senegal,
Serbia, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Solomon Islands, Somalia, South Africa, South
Sudan, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, Switzerland, Syria,
Tajikistan, Thailand, Timor-Leste, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey,
Turkmenistan, Tuvalu, Uganda, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Tanzania,
Uruguay, Uzbekistan, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Zambia, Zimbabwe.
Against: Canada, Czech Republic, Israel, Marshall Islands, Micronesia (Federated
States of), Nauru, Palau, Panama, United States.
Abstain: Albania, Andorra, Australia, Bahamas, Barbados, Bosnia and Herzegovina,
Bulgaria, Cameroon, Colombia, Croatia, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Estonia,
Fiji, Germany, Guatemala, Haiti, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malawi, Monaco,
Mongolia, Montenegro, Netherlands, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Poland, Republic
of Korea, Republic of Moldova, Romania, Rwanda, Samoa, San Marino, Singapore,
Slovakia, Slovenia, The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Togo, Tonga, United
Kingdom, Vanuatu.
Absent: Equatorial Guinea, Kiribati, Liberia, Madagascar, Ukraine. 77
Non-member observer state status means that Palestine is now able to take part in General
Assembly debates.78 It also enables Palestine to apply for accession to international
conventions and treaties. On 2 April 2014, Palestine applied for accession to the following
fifteen treaties and conventions:
77
78
The Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations

The Vienna Convention on Consular Relations
The Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) and the Optional Protocol to the
Convention on the Rights of the Child on the Involvement of Children in armed
conflict (CRC-OPAC)
The Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women
(CEDAW)
The Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CPRD)
The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties
The International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination
(CERD)
The Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment
or Punishment (CAT)
The United Nations Convention against Corruption
The Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide
The International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of
Apartheid
The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)
The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR)
The Four Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 and the First Additional Protocol
UN General Assembly Press Release, General Assembly votes overwhelmingly to accord Palestine 'nonmember observer state' status in United Nations, 29 November 2012
"Q&A: Palestinians' upgraded UN status", BBC website, 30 November 2012
18
The Hague Convention (IV) respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land and
its annex: Regulations Concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land.79
Palestine successfully acceded to five of these treaties on 2 May 2014 (CAT, CERD,
CEDAW, CRPD and CRC). It acceded to CRC-OPAC on 7 May 2014, and ICESCR and
ICCPR on 2 July 2014. 80
As stated above, Palestines attempts to accede to the above treaties/conventions led to
difficulties in the direct, US-brokered negotiations with Israel, which finally collapsed in late
April 2014.
4.3
2014: rejection of draft Security Council resolution
A draft resolution on the Israeli-Palestinian issue was presented to the Security Council by
Jordan, a Palestinian ally and Security Council member, on 17 December 2014. Its key
provisions called for:
Agreement to be reached on a two-state solution within a year of the resolutions

adoption;
Thereafter, a full Israeli withdrawal from the OPTs, and the coming-into-being of a
Palestinian state, by the end of 2017.81
The resolution did not explicitly provide for Palestinian membership of the UN, though it did
make reference to member states looking forward to future Palestinian membership.82 An
earlier draft calling for a full Israeli withdrawal by 2016 (as opposed to 2017 in the final draft)
had begun circulating on the internet several months previously,83 but the Government of
France persuaded the Government of Jordan to revise the draft to improve its chances of
approval.84
The Security Council voted on the resolution on 30 December 2014. The Security Council
has fifteen members, including five permanent members (the US, the UK, France, Russia
and China); and ten non-permanent members on a rotating basis (including Jordan between
1 January 2014 and 31 December 2015). In order to pass, Security Council resolutions
require the support of nine Council members, with none of the permanent members voting
against. In the event only eight Council members voted in favour of the resolution (Argentina,
Chad, Chile, China, Jordan, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Russia) with five abstaining (France,
Nigeria, Rwanda, South Korea, UK) and two voting against (Australia, US).85 There was
some suggestion that the US had in fact pressured Nigeria into abstaining (rather than voting
in favour). Had Nigeria voted in favour, only the US veto would have stood in the way of the
resolutions passage a potentially embarrassing result for the US.86
79
80
81
82
83
84
85
86
UN Secretary General Press Release, Note to Correspondents in response to questions asked at noon
concerning Palestinian letters for accession to international conventions and treaties, 2 April 2014
OHCHR, Press briefing notes on South Sudan, Ethiopia, United States, Palestine and Thailand / South East
Asia, 2 May 2014
UN Security Council Draft resolution S/2014/916
Ibid.
"Palestinians: Israeli occupation must end in 2016", Associated Press, 1 October 2014
"January 2015 Monthly Forecast", Security Council Report [accessed 29 March 2014]
UN Security Council, Provisional record of 7354th meeting, 30 December 2014, S/PV.7354
"US and Israeli intervention led UN to reject Palestinian resolution", Guardian, 31 December 2014
19
Palestinian response to Security Councils rebuff: joining the International

Criminal Court
4.4
Following the Security Councils rejection of the draft resolution, the Palestinian Authority
announced its accession to the Rome Statute, the founding treaty of the International
Criminal Court.87 Under the terms of its founding treaty, the Rome Statute, the ICCs remit is
to prosecute individuals (not states) for any of the following:
Genocide;
War crimes;
Crimes against humanity.
Generally speaking, the ICC has jurisdiction only in the case of crimes committed on the
territory of a State Party to the Rome Statute, or by a national of a State Party. The ICCs
Prosecutor is able to launch investigations of her own accord, but cases may also be referred
to the ICC by the UN Security Council and/or by States Parties to the Rome Statute.88
The prospect of Palestinian accession was the subject of much discussion long before the
recent announcement. Accession first emerged as a real prospect in 2012, when Palestine
was admitted as a non-member observer state in the United Nations. (States wishing to
accede to the ICC must be either full Members of the United Nations or non-member
observer states: an earlier Palestinian attempt to accede to the Rome Statute had failed on
this basis.)89
Palestine initially refrained from acceding to the Statute, for fear of jeopardising its relations
with the international community. Israel and its allies have historically been opposed to
Palestinian accession, arguing that it is inappropriate for Palestine to join the ICC until Israel
and the Palestinians reach agreement on a two-state solution. The UK has generally
followed the same line. The then Foreign Secretary, William Hague, stated in 2012 that the
UK would only consider supporting the (ultimately successful) Palestinian application for UN
non-member observer state status if the Palestinian Authority refrained from joining the
ICC.90 (The Palestinian Authority did indeed refrain from doing so at that time, but the UK still
chose to abstain in the vote.91) The more radical political elements in the OPTs had long
argued in favour of joining the ICC, with some maintaining that the Jordanian-sponsored
Security Council resolution was little more than a distraction.92
Following Palestines accession, it will formally become a State Party to the Statute on 1 April
2015. Additionally as of 1 January 2015 it has accepted the Courts jurisdiction over its
territory. This means that the ICCs Prosecutor is free to open an investigation into the
situation in Palestine.
No investigation has been opened as yet, but the Prosecutor opened a preliminary
examination on 16 January 2015.93 There has been some suggestion that she might
87
88
89
90
91
92
93
"The State of Palestine accedes to the Rome Statute", International Criminal Court, 7 January 2015
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court [accessed 18 February 2015]
"Palestine: Ratification and Implementation Status", International Criminal Court [accessed 24 February 2015]
HC Deb 18 Dec 2012 cc768-9W
"Dabbling in distraction: Abbas' costly failure", Gulf News, 13 January 2015
"Palestine: Ratification and Implementation Status", International Criminal Court [accessed 24 February 2015]
20
subsequently open an investigation into alleged war crimes committed by Israel in Gaza
during 2014.94
The Government of Israel has reacted forcefully to the developments. Following the
announcement of the Palestinian plan to accede, the Prime Minister of Israel, Binyamin
Netanyahu, said:
It is the Palestinian Authority which is in a unity government with Hamas, an avowed
terrorist organisation that, like Isis, perpetrates war crimes that needs to be
concerned about the international criminal court in The Hague. 95
The Government of Israel subsequently announced that it would withhold tax revenues from
the Palestinian Authority (Israel ordinarily collects taxes on the Palestinian Authoritys
behalf).96 Funds were withheld for a number of weeks before eventually being released in
late March.97
Following the Prosecutors decision to open a preliminary examination, Israels Foreign
Minister, Avigdor Lieberman, said:
This same court, which after more than 200,000 deaths didnt see fit to intervene in
what was taking place in Syria or in Libya or in other places, now finds it worthwhile to
examine the most moral army in the world. This decision entirely stems from antiIsrael political considerations.98
Writing in the Guardian, Julian Borger has argued that Palestinian militant group Hamas as
well as the Israeli military may find itself under investigation for war crimes:
ICC membership is a powerful weapon but it is also double-edged. It defines the
geographical area in which such crimes can be investigated, and the Palestinian
leadership could also define a time period for the prosecutors to examine, but it cannot
dictate the target of such an investigation. For example, if Abbas now seeks a
retroactive investigation of the last bloody bout of violence in Gaza last summer, as he
has the right to do, both the Israel Defence Forces and Hamas would be scrutinised for
their actions.99
The UK Government initially offered little comment on the developments, but Baroness
Anelay of St Johns, Minister of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, underlined the
UKs belief that direct Israeli-Palestinian talks are the best way to end the occupation:
We note the Palestinian Authoritys recent decisions to sign a number of conventions,
including the Rome statute of the International Criminal Court. While we understand
that the Palestinian Authority is seeking alternate ways to deliver the state that the
Palestinian people deserve, there can be no substitute for negotiations with Israel.
Negotiations must remain the focus.100
The US Government has echoed the Israeli line. On 8 January, a State Department
spokesperson said:
94
95
96
97
98
99
100
"ICC may investigate possible war crimes in Palestinian territories", Guardian, 16 January 2015
"Palestinian president signs up to join international criminal court", Guardian, 31 December 2014
"Israel threatens more retaliation against Palestinian court move after tax freeze", Telegraph, 4 January 2015
"Israel to resume tax transfers to Palestinian Authority", Guardian, 27 March 2015
"ICC may investigate possible war crimes in Palestinian territories", Guardian, 16 January 2015
"ICC membership could be a double-edged sword for Palestine", Guardian, 31 December 2014
HL Deb 5 Mar 2015 : Column GC115
21
As we have said previously, we have made clear our opposition to Palestinian action in
seeking to join the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. This step is
counter-productive, will damage the atmosphere with the very people with whom
Palestinians ultimately need to make peace, and will do nothing to further the
aspiration of the Palestinian people for a sovereign and independent state.
The view of the United States is that the Palestinians have not yet established a state.
Neither the steps that the Palestinians have taken, nor the actions the UN Secretariat
has taken in performing the Secretary-Generals functions as depositary for the Rome
Statute, warrant the conclusion that the Palestinians have established a state, or
have the legal competences necessary to fulfill the requirements of the Rome Statute.
The United States does not believe that the Palestinians are eligible to become a party
to the Rome Statute or any of the other treaties at issue, or that the United States is in
treaty relations with the Palestinians under any of the treaties that they are seeking to
join.
As the UN spokesperson said last April, and as the United Nations specifically
confirmed yesterday, the treatment of such documents by the depositary is an
administrative function performed by the Secretariat as part of the Secretary-Generals
responsibility as depositary, and it is for states to resolve any legal issues raised by
instruments circulated by the Secretary-General.
Ultimately, the parties can only realize their aspirations, including the desire of
Palestinians for statehood, through direct negotiations with each other. The United
States will continue to work to advance the interest we share in bringing about a lasting
peace between the Israelis and Palestinians. 101
Further to the Prosecutors decision to open a preliminary examination, State Department

representative Jeff Rathke said:
We strongly disagree with the ICC Prosecutor's action today. As we have said
repeatedly, we do not believe that Palestine is a state and therefore we do not believe
that it is eligible to join the ICC. It is a tragic irony that Israel, which has withstood
thousands of terrorist rockets fired at its civilians and its neighborhoods, is now being
scrutinized by the ICC. The place to resolve the differences between the parties is
through direct negotiations, not unilateral actions by either side. We will continue to
oppose actions against Israel at the ICC as counterproductive to the cause of peace. 102
Diplomatic recognition by UN member states
Under international law (the Montevideo Convention), the criteria for statehood include: a
permanent population, a defined territory, effective government, and the capacity to enter
into relations with other states. At present, the OPTs manifestly do not meet these criteria.
They have neither a defined territory (since the borders of a future Palestinian state would
have to be negotiated with Israel) nor effective government (since Israel retains varying
degrees of control over areas of the OPTs, and full control of their borders). However, this
fact does not inhibit the OPTs from applying to join the United Nations, nor does it stop other
states from granting diplomatic recognition to Palestine if they so wish. Out of 193 UN
member states, 135 have granted diplomatic recognition to Palestine. The list of the
countries which have done so is as follows:
101
102
US Department of State, question taken at the 7 January 2015 Daily Press Briefing, Regarding Palestinian
Efforts to Accede to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court
US Department of State press release, Statement on ICC Prosecutor's Decision, 16 January 2015
22
Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Angola, Antigua & Barbuda, Argentina, Azerbaijan,

Bahrain, Bangladesh, Belarus, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Bosnia & Herzegovina,
Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia,
Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, China, Comoros, Congo (Republic
of), Costa Rica, Cote dIvoire, Cuba, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Democratic Peoples
Republic of Korea, Democratic Republic of Congo, Djibouti, Dominica, Dominican
Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Gambia,
Georgia, Ghana, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti,
Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya,
Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Lao Peoples Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia,
Libya, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius,
Mongolia, Montenegro, Morocco, Mozambique, Namibia, Nepal, Nicaragua, Niger,
Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland,
Qatar, Romania, Russian Federation, Rwanda, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, Sao
Tome & Principe, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Serbia, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Slovakia,
Somalia, South Africa, South Sudan, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland,
Sweden, Syria, Tajikistan, Tanzania, Thailand, Timor-Leste, Togo, Tunisia, Turkey,
Turkmenistan, Uganda, United Arab Emirates, Ukraine, Uruguay, Uzbekistan,
Vanuatu, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Zambia, Zimbabwe.103
At present, the UK has not extended diplomatic recognition to the State of Palestine. On 9
November 2011 the then Foreign Secretary, William Hague, said: We reserve the right to
recognise a Palestinian state at a moment of our choosing and when it can best help bring
about peace.104
In December 2012 Baroness Warsi, then a Senior Minister of State at the Foreign &
Commonwealth Office, said:
The UK supports the principle of Palestinian statehood but a Palestinian state will only
be brought into reality when the occupation comes to an end through agreement
between both sides. The UK will continue to be one of the principal supporters of
Palestinian state building efforts, assisting the Palestinians to tackle poverty, build
institutions and boost their economy.105
Until 2014, no existing EU state had recognised Palestine (though a number of EU member
states, including Poland and the Czech Republic, had done so before EU accession). On 30
October 2014, Sweden extended diplomatic recognition to Palestine, thus breaking the
mould.106
In countries which have not yet extended diplomatic recognition to Palestine, a trend has
also emerged in recent months whereby national Parliaments hold non-binding votes to
express their view as to what position their Governments should take. In the UK, Ireland,
France, Portugal and Luxembourg, parliaments have called on their Governments to
recognise Palestine immediately. The Spanish and Italian parliaments called on their
Governments to recognise Palestine once agreement was reached on a two-state solution.
103
"Diplomatic Relations", website of the Permanent Observer Mission of The State of Palestine to the United
Nations [accessed 29 March 2015]
104 HC Deb 9 November 2011 c290
105 HL Deb 10 December 2012 WA204
106 Ibid.
23
The European Parliament has also passed a motion supporting recognition of Palestine
when a two-state agreement is reached.107
What does the future hold?
Perhaps inevitably, it is difficult to make any meaningful predictions about what the coming
months will hold for the OPTs. In a dramatic development on 5 March 2015 and perhaps a
taste of things to come the PLO called on the Palestinian Authority to abdicate
responsibility for security matters in Areas A and B, since following Israels withholding of
tax receipts the PA was short of funds. If the Palestinian Authority were to implement this
suggestion, control of security matters and responsibility for funding the security forces would
be handed back to Israel. (Ever since the Oslo Process, the PA has had full control of both
security matters in Area A, and has shared control of these matters with Israel in Area B. The
PA retains full control of civil matters in both Area A and B.) It remains to be seen whether
the PA will implement the PLOs suggestion, but the possibility cannot be ruled out,
notwithstanding Israels recent decision to release the tax funds. Whilst the PA is certainly
not bound by the PLOs suggestion, its President, Mahmoud Abbas, is the leader of Fatah
(the dominant party in the PLO), and its technocratic Government relies on Fatahs support.
Two decades after the Oslo Process, it would be a step into the unknown for the West Bank.
Despite these developments, and the traumas of 2014, there are some limited grounds for
confidence. For example Benjamin Pogrund, former chief foreign-sub-editor of the
Independent and former director of an Israeli NGO, is optimistic about a potential revival of
the 2002 Arab Peace Initiative, an Arab League-endorsed initiative to achieve a two-state
solution.108 There is very little information in the public domain about the Egypt-mediated talks
but optimists might draw some comfort from the fact that they are taking place, although
probably sporadically. Yet anyone expecting dramatic progress is likely to be disappointed.
Hugh Lovatt, Israel/Palestine Project Coordinator at the European Council on Foreign
Relations, has questioned Egypts capacity to act as a legitimate mediator: the Egyptian
Government is extremely hostile to Hamas, due to the latters alliance with Muhammed
Morsi, who was ousted as President of Egypt in 2013.109 For its part, Hamas argues that
Israel has not yet implemented its side of the ceasefire bargain in full, and has hinted at a
possible return to violence.110
Dimi Reider argues that Israel is now granting the OPTs slightly more autonomy than
previously. The restrictions on movement in and out of Gaza have been relaxed slightly (as
discussed above), whilst Israels opposition to the technocratic Palestinian government now
appears less entrenched. Yet Reider also points out that these are very small steps, unlikely
to have much impact on the daily lives of Palestinians. He goes on to argue that rather than
representing progress towards a two-state solution, such steps are indicative of Israels
intention to normalise the status quo.111
The internal politics of the OPTs remains challenging. As highlighted above, Gaza is still
under the de facto control of Hamas, notwithstanding the establishment of the technocractic
Government. Disputes between Fatah and Hamas about the payment of salaries to Gaza-
107
108
109
110
111
"Portugal's parliament calls for recognition of Palestinian state", Haaretz, 13 December 2014; European
Parliament resolution of 17 December 2014 on recognition of Palestine statehood (2014/2964(RSP));
"European Parliament passes motion in favor of Palestine recognition", Haaretz, 17 December 2014; "Italian
lawmakers urge recognition of Palestinian state", Reuters, 27 February 2015
B Pogrund, Time to revive the diplomatic track, The World Today 70 (5), October 2014.
H Lovatt, "What the Gaza deal (really) means for Hamas and Israel", European Council on Foreign Relations,
27 August 2014
"Gaza ripe for new explosion, analysts warn", Your Middle East, 23 December 2014
D Reider, "Gaza reconstruction: The new Israeli strategy", European Council on Foreign Relations, 14
October 2014
24
based civil servants continue. Meanwhile, some have argued that frustration amongst the
Palestinian public will ultimately lead to an uprising against the moderate, technocratic
Government.112
It could of course be argued that Israeli domestic politics is just as important to the long-term
prospects of the OPTs as is Palestinian domestic politics. If agreement is ever to be reached
on a two-state solution, both Israeli and Palestinian administrations will have to make
compromises and in Israel, just as in the OPTs, some parties are more willing than others
to countenance such compromises. In the recent general election in Israel, Likud the
centre-right party of Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu remained the largest party. A new
coalition administration is expected to be formed in the coming weeks, with Netanyahu
remaining as Prime Minister.
On the day before the election, Netanyahu had explicitly ruled out the notion of a two-state
solution during his premiership. He has since modified his stance slightly, but even before his
eve-of-poll declaration, many had begun to suspect that the Government of Israel had given
up on the idea of a two-state solution. Writing in October 2014, Dimi Reider highlighted two
developments which appeared to support this argument. One: shortly after the Gaza
ceasefire came into force, the Government of Israel had announced a further expansion of
Israeli settlements in the West Bank. Many argue that as the number of Israeli citizens living
in the West Bank increases, the likelihood of Israel agreeing to withdraw from the West Bank
declines not least because settlers (who retain the right to vote in Israeli elections despite
living in the West Bank) would be unlikely to vote for any pro-withdrawal party. Two:
Netanyahu was (and still is) seeking to pass a bill explicitly defining the country as a Jewish
state, despite 18% of its population being Muslim. This move is expected to damage
relations with the Palestinians.113
Where does all this leave us? It is difficult to predict how long the OPTs technocratic
government will last, whilst the lack of information on the Egypt-mediated talks makes it
almost impossible to gauge whether any progress is being made. The French Government
has recently indicated that it might submit a new resolution to the UN Security Council,
similar to the Jordanian resolution which was blocked in 2014. Some have suggested that
the US, disgruntled with Netanyahus eve-of-poll declaration, might now be more willing to
support such a move.114 Perhaps, then, the only certainty is that yet more uncertainty lies
ahead for the OPTs.
112
113
114
"'President Abbas may find himself with little choice but to act'", Your Middle East, 18 November 2014
Ibid.
"France says will propose UN Security Council draft on Israel", Associated Press, 27 March 2015
25

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Recent developments in the Occupied

Palestinian Territories (OPTs)

Recent Research Papers

House of Commons Commission Bill [Bill 169 of 2014-15]

Research Paper 15/18

This information is provided to Members of Parliament in support of their parliamentary

The Palestinian Territories before 2014

Status of Jerusalem; borders

Other sources of Israeli-Palestinian tension

Palestinian domestic politics

Maritime Activity Zone

Reaction by international community

Israeli military operation in Gaza

Terms of ceasefire deal

Status of the Palestinian Territories at the United Nations

2011: unsuccessful application to become a member state

2012: successful application to become a non-member observer state

2014: rejection of draft Security Council resolution

Palestinian response to Security Councils rebuff: joining the International

Diplomatic recognition by UN member states

What does the future hold?

RESEARCH PAPER 15/18

RESEARCH PAPER 15/18

RESEARCH PAPER 15/18

The Palestinian Territories before 2014

RESEARCH PAPER 15/18

RESEARCH PAPER 15/18

Source: Ohio State University

RESEARCH PAPER 15/18

Status of Jerusalem; borders

RESEARCH PAPER 15/18

Other sources of Israeli-Palestinian tension

RESEARCH PAPER 15/18

Palestinian domestic politics

RESEARCH PAPER 15/18

Maritime Activity Zone

Based on graphs published by Gisha [accessed 27 March 2015]

RESEARCH PAPER 15/18

Prime Minister, Minister of the Interior: Rami Hamdallah

RESEARCH PAPER 15/18

Minister of Foreign Affairs: Riyad al-Maliki

RESEARCH PAPER 15/18

Reaction by international community

RESEARCH PAPER 15/18

Palestinian government will be based on its adherence to these policies and

Israeli military operation in Gaza

17 July: five-hour ceasefire;54

20 July: two-hour ceasefire, interrupted by crossfire but subsequently extended for a

RESEARCH PAPER 15/18

26 July: 12-hour ceasefire;56

From 1 August: 72-hour ceasefire, broke down almost immediately;57

From 5 August: 72-hour ceasefire;58

Terms of ceasefire deal

RESEARCH PAPER 15/18

Based on graphs published by Gisha [accessed 27 March 2015]

RESEARCH PAPER 15/18

Status of the Palestinian Territories at the United Nations

2011: unsuccessful application to become a member state

Article 4 (2) of the United Nations Charter states:

Article 27 (3) states:

2012: successful application to become a non-member observer state

RESEARCH PAPER 15/18