Monroy vs CA

Posted on March 5, 2013

20 SCRA 621
1973
FACTS
Monroy was the incumbent mayor of Navotas, Rizal when on September 15, 1961,
his certificate of candidacy as representative of the first district of Rizal in the
forthcoming elections was filed with the COMELEC. On September 18, Monroy filed a
letter withdrawing said certificate of candidacy. However, on September 21,
1961, R, then vice-mayor of Navotas, took his oath of office on the theory that
Monroy has forfeited the said office upon his filing of the certificate of candidacy in
question.
ISSUES
Whether R is entitled to the salary of the office from September 21, 1961 up to the
time he can reassume said office?
HELD
Yes. De facto officer liable to reimburse salaries received to rightful incumbent
General Rule: The rightful incumbent of a public office may recover from a de
facto officer the salary received by the latter during during the time of his wrongful
tenure, even though he entered into the office in good faith and under color of title.
The possession of the title of office is decisive. A de facto officer not having good
title takes the salaries at his risk and must account to the de jure officer the amount
of salary he received during his wrongful tenure.
Where a mayor withdrew his certificate of candidacy for Congressman and then
reassumed the position, thus preventing the vice-mayor from discharging the duties
of the position of mayor, the mayor should reimburse to the vice-mayor, as the
rightful occupant of the position of mayor, the salaries which he had received.
The Rodriguez ruling that reimbursement should not be made is not applicable since
it involved a duly proclaimed elective official who was later ousted.
The de facto doctrine was formulated for the protection of the public and individuals
who get involved in the official acts of persons discharging the duties of an office
without being lawful officers.
The withdrawal of the certifiate of candidacy does not restore Monroy to his former
position. It does not render the withdrawal void ab initio. Once filed, the permanent
legal effects produced thereby remain even if the certificate itself be subsequently
withdrawn.
Posted in Administrative Law, Uncategorized | Leave a reply
Radio Communications of the Philippines, Inc. vs Santiago

Posted on March 5, 2013

58 SCRA 493
1974
The Public Service Commission (PSC) imposed a fine on a radio company for failure
to render service expected of a radio operator.
FACTS
The PSC, acting on complaints by dissatisfied RCPI customers, penalized it with a
fine. RCPI alleged that the Commission was devoid of such competence since
the Public Service Act (C.A. No. 146) expressly exempted radio companies from
the jurisdiction, supervision, and control of such body over their franchises,
equipment, and other properties (Sec. 13[a] thereof) except with respect to the
fixing of rates. (Sec. 14 thereof)
The first paragraph of Sec.21 of the Act reads:
Every public service violating or failing to comply with the terms and
conditions of any certificate or any orders, decisions or regulations of the
Commission shall be subject to a fine of not exceeding P200 per day for
every day during which such default or violation continues; and the
Commission is hereby authorized and empowered to impose such fine,
after due notice and hearing.
ISSUE
Is there anything in Sec.21 of the Act which empowers the PSC to impose a fine?
HELD
None. The power is neither expressly nor impliedly granted.
In the face of the provision itself, it is rather apparent that the Public Service
Commission lacked the required power to proceed against petitioner.x x x a public
official must locate in the statute relied upon a grant of power before he can
exercise it. It need not be express. It may be implied from the wording of the law.
Absent such requisite, however, no warrant exists for the assumption of authority.
The act performed, if properly challenged, cannot meet the test of validity. It must
be set aside.
Posted in Administrative Law, Uncategorized | Leave a reply
Lo Cham v. Ocampo
Posted on March 5, 2013

77 Phil. 635
1946
A lawyer in the DOJ was temporarily detailed to assist the City Fiscal of Manila with
the same powers and functions of an Assistant Fiscal
FACTS
Sec.168 of the Revised Administrative Code, as amended, provides that
the Secretary of Justice may appoint any lawyer, either a subordinate from his office
or a competent person not in public service, temporarily to assist a fiscal or
prosecuting attorney in the discharge of his duties, and with the same authority as
might be exercised by the Attorney General or the Solicitor General.
Pursuant to such, Lo Cham, a doctor of medicine and lawyer, acting Chief, MedicoLegal Section in the DOJ, was temporarily detailed to assist the City Fiscal of Manila,
with the same powers and functions of an Assistant Fiscal, by the Acting Secretary
of Justice. He signed and filed the information in 3 cases at bar after conducting
preliminary investigation. The defendant's attorney filed a motion to quash due to
his lack of authority to sign informations.
ISSUE
Does Lo Cham have the power to sign informations?
HELD
YES. The powers and functions of an Assistant Fiscal may be entrusted.
The signing of complaints, making investigations, and conducting prosecutions are
not sacrosanct that only Presidential appointees or one expressly empowered by law
may be permitted to assume such functions. A lawyer invested with the same
authority as an Attorney General or Solicitor General is presumed to be competent
to be entrusted with any of the duties devolving on a prosecuting attorney, due to
the higher standard of training and experience required.
Scope of duties of a public office:

Those essential to the accomplishment of the main purpose for which the
office was created; or

Those, although incidental, or collateral are germane to and serve to promote

the accomplishment of the principal purpose.

The subject functions are inherent in the power to assist a prosecuting attorney, for
these are engrained in the office/designation itself. The powers of the Solicitor
General bestowed on the appointee should be deemed to be in addition to the
powers inherent to the appointment.
Posted in Administrative Law, Uncategorized | Leave a reply

Ochate vs Deling
Posted on March 5, 2013
105 PHIL 385
1959
FACTS
Ochate is the incumbent municipal Mayor of Clarin, Misamis Occidentak, while P and
Deling are the incumbent Provincial Governor of the Province and Vice-Mayor of the
said municipality, respectively.
In an administrative complaint, Ochate was charged before the Provincial Board of:
(1) organizing, participating, and tolerating illegal cockfights and other forms of
gambling; (2) committing grave public scandals and acts unbecoming of a public
official; (3) misconduct in office (in slapping his wife and daughter inside the
municipal building in front of many people); (4) neglect of duty; and (5) oppression.
On the same date that the priginal administrative charges was filed, the Governor
suspended Ochate from office, directing the latter to turn over the same to Deling,
the Vice-Mayor.
Ochate questions the legality of the administrative charges and of the order of
suspension. Hence, this action.
Under Sec.2188, Revised Administrative Code, the authority of the Provincial
Governor to receive and investigate complInys against municipal officials rests on 2
grounds:
1. neglect of duty, oppression, corruption or other forms of maladministration of
office, and
2. conviction by final judgment of any crime involving moral turpitude.
Pending action by the Provincial Board, the Provincial Government may suspend the
officer concerned if in his opinion the charge is one affecting the official integrity of
the officer charged.
ISSUE
Are the administrative charges above-stated grounds for the valid suspension of
Ochate?
HELD
No. Acts charged affect only his character as a private individual.
Ochate's acts cannot be safely said or considered to be related to the performance
of his official duties and he does not have to be a Mayor to commit the offenses
charged.
Misconduct in Office is misconduct such as affects the performance of
his duties as an officer and not such as only affects his character as a private

individual.
The misconduct, misfeasance or malfeasance warranting removal of an officer from
officemust have direct relation to and be connected with the performance of official
duties amounting to either maladministration or willful, intentional neglect and
failure to discharge the duties of the office.
In the instant case, the records fail to indicate that Ochate was motivated by any
official considerations when he committed the acts complained of. It appears that
the acts complained of were done for more personal reason.
Moreover, the alleged violation of the gambling law occurred within another
municipality. The charges of oppression seems too superficial to meet the
standard fixed in the legal definition of oppression. Ochate was accused and
convicted of slight physical injuries which did not involve moral turpitude; he does
not appear to have been convicted of the charges of illegal cockfighting and
assaults upon agents in authority. The charges do not constitute misconduct or
maladministration of office. As such, the order of suspension was not founded on
legal grounds.
Posted in Administrative Law | Leave a reply
Nera vs Garcin
Posted on March 5, 2013
106 PHIL 1031
1960
FACTS
Nera, a clerk in the Maternity and Children's Hospital (a gov't institution under the
Bureau of Hospitals and Dept. of Health), served as manager and cashier of the
Maternity Employee's Cooperative Association, Inc. He was charged before the
Court of First Instance with malversation for allegedly misappropriating funds
belonging to the association. On the basis of the said pending criminal case, an
administrative complaint charging him for dishonesty and misconduct was charged
against him.
Before he could file the answer required of him, he was suspended. He filed the
instant case where the court held that the suspension was illegal because it was
effected without notice and hearing, and assuming that he was guilty, the facts
constituting the charges against him have no relation to the performance of his
duties.
ISSUE
Is the suspension of Nera illegal?
HELD
No. The suspension in the instant case is merely a preventive measure, not a

punishment or penalty. There is, therefore, nothing improper in suspending an

officer pending his investigation and before charges against him are heard and he
be given an opportunity to prove his innocence.
Under the Civil Service Law of 1959 (R.A. No. 2260), when the person charged
is merely guilty of neglect, the same must be in the performance of his duty; but
when he is charged with dishonesty, oppression or grave misconduct, these need
have no relation to the performance of duty. Moreover, the act of misappropriation
cannot be said to be entirely disconnected with petitioner's office. While it is true
that the cooperative association that owns the funds is a private entity, petitioner
was designated as cashier and manager although he is a mere clerk because he
was a hospital employee.
An elective official stands on a different ground from that of an appointive officer or
employee. Being elected by popular vote, an election officer is directly responsible
only to the community that elected him. He is not ordinarily amenable to rules of
official conduct governing appointive officials, and so, he may not be forthwith and
summarily suspended, unless his conduct and acts of irregularity have some
connection with his office. He has a definite term of office, relatively of short
duration, and since suspension from his office definitely affects and shortens his
term of office, said suspension should not be ordered and done unless necessary to
prevent further damage or injury to the office, and to the people dealing with said
officer.
Posted in Administrative Law | Tagged Garcin, Nera | Leave a reply
Sarigumba vs Pasok
Posted on March 5, 2013
155 SCRA 646
1987
FACTS
On February 25, 1985, Pasok, deputy sheriff of Ozamis City, enforced in Ozamis
Occidental a writ of preliminary injunction issued by a Makati RTC. Immediately
thereafter, he turned over the possession of the personal properties to the plaintiffs.
He then shipped from Ozamis to Manila, in his name, the personal properties taken
under the writ upon the request of plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 9172.
ISSUE
Is Pasok guilty of misconduct to warrant removal from office?
HELD
Yes. Pasok's enforcement of the writ was irregular even if there was an order from
said Makati court authorizing respondent to enforce the writ. As a Court Officer,
respondent ought to have known that a writ of preliminary injunction issued by
a RTC may be enforced pnly within its region. Moreover, prudence dictated

that Pasok should have first cleared with the Executive Judge or the Clerk of Court
in Ozamis City whether he had the authority to implement in Misamis Occidental
the writ of preliminary injunction issued by the Makati RTC. He had failed to do this
wothout any explanation.
It should be noted that as of February 25, 1985, respondent's duties/functions as
special sheriff (apart from the irregularity in their performance), to enforce the writ
of preliminary injunction, ceased. He had no business to ship to the plaintiffs in
Manila the properties that he had already turned over to the plaintiffs. Clearly
therefore, the shipping of the personal properties to Manila is an uncalled for extra
service to the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 9172. It gives rise to the reasonable
conclusion that respondent went out of his way to unduly favor the plaintiffs in Civil
Case No. 9172 particularly when related to the fact that he implemented the writ of
preliminary injunction issued in said case, in excess of, or beyond his authority.
Posted in Administrative Law | Tagged 1987, Administrative
Law, Misconduct, Pasok, Public Officers,Sarigumba | Leave a reply
In Re: Rodolfo Manzano
Posted on December 8, 2012
Facts:
Judge Manzano filed a petition allowing him to accept the appointment by Ilocos Sur
Governor Rodolfo Farinas as the member of Ilocos Norte provincial Committee on
Justice created pursuant to a Presidential Order. He petitioned that his membership
in the Committee will not in any way amount to an abandonment to his present
position as Executive Judge of Branch XIX, RTC, 1st Judicial region and as a member
of judiciary.
Issue:
What is an administrative agency? Where does it draw the line insofar as
administrative functions are concerned?
Ruling:
The petition is denied. The Constitution prohibits the designation of members of the
Judiciary to any agency performing Quasi-Judicial or Administrative functions
(Sec.12,Art.VIII, 1987 Constitution).
Quasi-Judicial has a fairly clear meaning and Judges can confidently refrain from
participating in the work of any Administrative Agency which adjudicates disputes &
controversies involving the rights of parties within its jurisdiction.
Administrative functions are those which involve the regulation and control over
the conduct & affairs of individuals for their own welfare and the promulgation of
rules and regulations to better carry out the policy of the Legislature or such as are
devolved upon the administrative agency by the organic law of its existence.

Administrative functions as used in Sec. 12 refers to the Governments executive

machinery and its performance of governmental acts. It refers to the management
actions, determinations, and orders of executive officials as they administer the
laws and try to make government effective. There is an element of positive action,
of supervision or control.
In the dissenting opinion of Justice Gutierrez:
Administrative functions are those which involve the regulation and control over the
conduct and affairs of individuals for their own welfare and the promulgation of
rules and regulations to better carry out the policy of the legislature or such as are
devolved upon the administrative agency by the organic law of its existence we
can readily see that membership in the Provincial or City Committee on Justice
would not involve any regulation or control over the conduct and affairs of
individuals. Neither will the Committee on Justice promulgate rules and regulations
nor exercise any quasi-legislative functions. Its work is purely advisory. A member of
the judiciary joining any study group which concentrates on the administration of
justice as long as the group merely deliberates on problems involving the speedy
disposition of cases particularly those involving the poor and needy litigants-or
detainees, pools the expertise and experiences of the members, and limits itself to
recommendations which may be adopted or rejected by those who have the power
to legislate or administer the particular function involved in their implementation.
Posted in Administrative Law, Case Digests | Tagged Admin Agency, Admin
Functions, Admin Law,administrative agency, administrative
function, Administrative Law, Constitution, In Re: Rodolfo Manzano, QuasiJudicial | Leave a reply
Hilado vs Collector of Internal Revenue
Posted on December 6, 2012
100 Phil. 188
1956
Secretary of Finance revoked a general circular pursuant to which a taxpayer
claimed deductions from his gross income.
FACTS
Hilado filed his income tax return wherein he claimed the amount of P12,387.65 as
a deductible item from his gross income pursuant to the Collector of Internal
Revenues General Circular No. V-123, issued pursuant to certain rules laid down by
the Secretary of Finance.
Subsequently, the new Secretary of Finance, through the CIR, issued General
Circular No. V-139 which revoked General Circular No. V-123 and laid down the rule
that property losses which occurred during the World War II are deductible in the
year of actual loss/destruction of said property. As a consequence, the P12,387.65

was disallowed as a deduction from petitioners gross income for 1951 and the CIR
demanded from him the payment of P3,546 as deficiency income tax for the year.
ISSUE
Whether the Secretary of Finance acted with valid authority in revoking General
Circular No. V-123 and approving in lieu thereof, General Circular No. V-139.
HELD
Yes. The Secretary of Finance is vested with authority to revoke, repeal or
abrogate the acts or previous rulings of his predecessors in
office because the construction of a statute by those administering it is not
binding on their successors if the latter becomes satisfied that a different
construction should be given. General Circular No. V-123, having been issued on a
wrong construction by the law, cannot give rise to a vested right that can be
invoked by a taxpayer. A vested right cannot spring from a wrong
interpretation.
An administrative officer cannot change a law enacted by Congress. Once a
regulation which merely interprets a statute is determined erroneous, it
becomes a nullity. The CIRs erroneous construction of the law does not preclude
or stop the Government from collecting a tax legally due.
Under Art. 2254 of the Civil Code, no vested/acquired right can arise from
acts/omissions which are against the law or which infringe upon the rights
of others.
Posted in Administrative Law, Case Digests | Tagged 100 Phil.
188, 1956, Admin Law, Administrative Law, Civil Code, Collector of Internal
Revenue, construction, Hilado vs Collector of Internal
Revenue,Interpretative Law, Interpretative Regulation, Rule-Making
Powers, Secretary of Finance, Statutory Construction | Leave a reply
Fortich vs Corona 398 SCRA 685
Posted on December 6, 2012
100 SCAD 781
298 SCRA 685
1998
The Office of the President modified its decision which had already become final and
executory.
FACTS:
On November 7, 1997, the Office of the President (OP) issued a win-win Resolution
which reopened case O.P. Case No. 96-C-6424. The said Resolution substantially
modified its March 29, 1996 Decision. The OP had long declared the said Decision
final & executory after the DARs Motion for Reconsideration was denied for having

been filed beyond the 15-day reglementary period.

The SC then struck down as void the OPs act, it being in gross disregard of the rules
& basic legal precept that accord finality to administrative determinations.
The respondents contended in their instant motion that the win-win Resolution of
November 7, 1997 is not void since it seeks to correct an erroneous ruling, hence,
the March 29, 1996 decisioncould not as yet become final and executory as to be
beyond modification. They further explained that the DARs failure to file their
Motion for Reconsideration on time was excusable.
ISSUE:
Was the OPs modification of the Decision void or a valid exercise of its powers and
prerogatives?
1. Whether the DARs late filing of the Motion for Reconsideration is excusable.
2. Whether the respondents have shown a justifiable reason for the relaxation of
rules.
3. Whether the issue is a question of technicality.
HELD:
1.
No.
Sec.7 of Administrative Order No. 18, dated February 12, 1987, mandates that
decisions/resolutions/orders of the Office of the President shallbecome
final after the lapse of 15 days from receipt of a copy therof xxx unless a
Motion for Reconsideration thereof is filed within such period.
The respondents explanation that the DARs office procedure made it impossible
to file its Motion for Reconsideration on time since the said decision had to be
referred to its different departments cannot be considered a valid justification. While
there is nothing wrong with such referral, the DAR must not disregard the
reglementary period fixed by law, rule or regulation.
The rules relating to reglementary period should not be made subservient
to the internal office procedure of an administrative body.
2.
No. The final & executory character of the OP Decision can no longer be disturbed or
substantially modified. Res judicata has set in and the adjudicated affair should
forever be put to rest.
Procedural rules should be treated with utmost respect and due
regard since they are designed to facilitate the adjudication of
cases to remedy the worsening problem of delay in the resolution of rival
claims and in the administration of justice. TheConstitution guarantees that all
persons shall have a right to the speedy disposition of their cases before
all judicial, quasi-judicial and administrative bodies.
While a litigation is not a game of technicalities, every case must be prosecuted
in accordance with the prescribed procedure to ensure an orderly &
speedy administration of justice. The flexibility in the relaxation of rules was

never intended to forge a bastion for erring litigants to violate the rules with
impunity.
A liberal interpretation & application of the rules of procedure can only be
resorted to in proper cases and under justifiable causes and
circumstances.
3.
No. It is a question of substance & merit.
A decision/resolution/order of an administrative body, court or tribunal which is
declared void on the ground that the same was rendered Without or in Excess of
Jurisdiction, or with Grave Abuse of Discretion, is a mere technicality of law or
procedure. Jurisdiction is an essential and mandatory requirement before a
case or controversy can be acted on. Moreover, an act is still invalid if done in
excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion.
In the instant case, several fatal violations of law were committed. These grave
breaches of law, rules & settled jurisprudence are clearly substantial, not of
technical nature.
When the March 29, 1996 OP Decision was declared final and executory, vested
rights were acquired by the petitioners, and all others who should be benefited by
the said Decision.
In the words of the learned Justice Artemio V. Panganiban in Videogram Regulatory
Board vs CA, et al., just as a losing party has the right to file an appeal within the
prescribed period, the winning party also has the correlative right to enjoy the
finality of the resolution of his/her case.
Posted in Administrative Law, Case Digests, Reclassification of Lands
| Tagged 100 SCAD 781, 1998,298 SCRA 685, Admin Law, administrative
body, Administrative Law, Administrative Order No. 18, Case
Digest, Constitution, DAR, Digest, Fortich vs Corona, grave abuse of
discretion, Jurisdiction, Motion for Reconsideration, Office of the
President, Presidential Power, Presidential prerogatives, Procedural
Rules, regale entry period, Rule-Making Powers, speedy administration of
justice, without or in excess of jurisdiction | Leave a reply
Ollada vs Secretary of Finance
Posted on December 6, 2012
109 Phil. 1072
1960
The Secretary of Finance expressly authorized the non-retroactivity of regulation
which amended a previous one.

FACTS
Under Sec.334 (now Sec.232) of the National Internal Revenue Code, all
corporations, companies, partnerships or persons required by law to pay
internal revenue taxes whose gross quarterly sales, earnings, etc. do not
exceed P5000 are required to keep & use a simplified set of Bookkeeping
Records duly authorized by the Sec. of Finance. Pursuant to such authority,
the Sec. of Finance promulgated Revenue Regulations No. V-13 authorizing the use
by the taxpayers whose gross quarterly sales do not exceed P5000 a simplified set
of bookkeeping records.
The Secretary amended Revenue Regulations No. V-13 by promulgating Revenue
Regulations No. V-43, which requires that simplified set of bookkeeping records
should be especially designed for each class/kind of trade and prepared by a CPA.
The new regulation was not intended to have a retroactive effect and, therefore,
could not adversely affect those who had already acquired an accrued right under
the old regulation.
A CPA prepared & devised his own simplified sets of bookkeeping records under the
new regulation. He then instituted proceedings praying that respondent financial
officials be enjoined from further accepting, authorizing, and tolerating the publics
use of simplified sets of bookkeeping records not prepared in accordance with the
new regulation.
ISSUE
Whether the Secretary of Finance acted within his authority in not giving retroactive
effect to Revenue Regulations No. V-43.
HELD
Yes.
The Secretary if Finances Resolution that Revenue Regulations No. V-43 was not
intended to have retroactive effect was fully within his powers and authority and
becomes part of the regulation itself. The Resolution is not clearly unreasonable and
arbitrary, and is, thus, entitled to recognition & respect from the Courts. No one is
better qualified to interpret the intent behind the revenue regulations than the
authority that issued them.
Granting that the subsequent permission to use old bookkeeping forms was
incompatible with the new regulation, such incompatibility would not render the
permission illegal and void since the Secretary may, at any time, amend or
revoke any of the regulations he issued so long as it is in consonance with
the statute. The Secretary may change or repeal any of the regulations he issued
as he may see fit.