The Great Game, a phrase used to describe the continental struggle between the British and

Russian Empires for control of Central Asia, has continued to permeate all discussions
regarding the region, a poignant acknowledgment of the geopolitical machinations played out
by native and foreign states alike. When analyzing the complex cycles of conflict and rivalry
that beset the continent, understanding and meaning is often more easily derived through a
simpler wisdom that encapsulates certain immutable truths pertaining to the regions history:
old chessboard, new players. The current situation then, is indeed apt; America and China,
this ages hegemons, feint and parry around one another - one of their primary theatres of
competition? The focal point tying Western and Asian civilizations together: Afghanistan.
Encompassing the historical Central Asian junction that interlinks the Far East, South-East
Asia and Western trade routes, Afghanistan serves as a geo-strategic pivot state straddling
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Central Asia and South Asia. This juxtaposition provides Afghanistan with a unique capacity
for facilitating inter-regional nodes of commerce and cooperation. A capacity possessed by
whomever controls Afghanistan at the time. Control in this sense should be seen within the
larger concept of the balance of power, in which America and China each try to act as
determiners of Afghanistans future via influencing foreign policy interests. Each superpower
has in turn recognised and built connections around the two prime issues at the heart of
Afghanistans woes: security and economy. As is well known, America has devoted
substantial energies to both sectors, but with special emphasis on the former. From a
geopolitical perspective, Afghanistan represents a viable, geographic base from which US
forces (and their subsequent interests) could preside over the emerging power centers of
Central and South Asia. On the other hand, China has approached relations with Afghanistan
from a singular economic standpoint: trade-flows instead of bloodflows. However, Chinese
policymakers have acknowledged the symbiotic relationship existing between the two issues
in much the same manner as the Americans, however their promises of military aid are
ancillary to their offer of an economic package - as well as being far more opaque. It is then
that the conceptualization of a grand Silk Road policy was born, encompassing politicoeconomic variables that continued the tradition of Great Power politics being played out in
Central Asia. These two regional trends will be measured by their implementation of
Afghanistan as a conduit for shaping economic integration and interdependence in the region.
First: The US Silk Road Conception
In 2011, Secretary of State Hilary Clinton delivered a speech defining the USs Central Asia
policy, termed the New Silk Road Initiative. The US conceived of an international
economic and transit network stretching between Central Asia and South Asia, with
Afghanistan as the geographic node: Turkmen gas fields could help meet both Pakistans
and Indias growing energy needs and provide significant transit revenues for both
Afghanistan and Pakistan. Tajik cotton could be turned into Indian linens. Furniture and fruit
from Afghanistan could find its way to the markets of Astana or Mumbai and beyond.
Analysts consider this policy initiative as being aimed at pre-emptive neutralization of the
Chinese modus operandi for diplomatic engagements: civil infrastructure development and
trade deregulation as drivers of regional cooperation and foreign direct investment. US efforts
to minimize Chinese monopolization of regional markets can be discerned further in privatepublic partnerships such as the PamirEnergy hydropower station in southeastern Tajikistan,
which provides electricity along the Tajik-Afghan border. The scheme is also thought to
strengthen the Pakistan-Afghanistan Transit Trade Agreement, which would improve bilateral
dialogue on other disputes, such as water scarcity surrounding access to the Kabul River
Basin. The increased US focus on Afghanistans cross-border trade linkages has prompted the
Asian Development Bank, through the Central Asia Regional Economic Cooperation
(CAREC) program, to fund a project that will establish railway between the Afghan city of
Mazar-e-Sharif to Hairatan on the northern border with Uzbekistan.

Second: The Chinese Silk Road Conception

In 2013, faced with a dilution of their economic monopoly by the Trans-Pacific Partnership
(TPP), President Xi Jinping announced Chinas own interpretation of what constitutes a Silk
Road: an economic belt extending across Central Asia into Europe. The Chinese government
will focus on strengthening regional avenues of commerce in order to countermine the US
global posture strategy aimed at containing China. Chinese investment of $3.5B into
Afghanistans Aynak Mines project and development of the surrounding area, demonstrates
Chinas desire for regional economic integration. With recent estimates having identified $1T
worth of mineral deposits, Afghanistan will be at the forefront of a Central Asian framework
that could anchor Chinese interest, with initiatives such as the Turkmenistan Pakistan
Afghanistan India (TAPI) Pipline and the Heart of Asia Process, which is aimed at reviving
the spirit of the Silk Route with special focus on trade, transit, energy and communication
routes. This differentiates from the US conception in significant geographic fashion; instead
of a north-southeast direction, China seeks to shift the integration of Central Asia along an
east-northwest trajectory. There are two immediate consequences of such an initiative; first,
operating in Afghanistan would allow China to access Iran and the Caucasus, breaking US
attempts at containment and piercing the arc of instability, an area of volatility identified by
US foreign policymakers that runs from the eastern Atlantic Ocean through the south of
Europe, into the Middle East and up to the Caucasus. Second, Chinas focus on the importexport capacity of developing countries throughout Central Asia, emphasizing the need to
lower regulatory burdens and strengthen trade-enabling services, would create a unified,
intra-regional market plunging China into a new wave of hyper-capitalism and justify US
fears. This Silk Road would begin in Chinas Xinjiang province, with a two-fold model for
economic engagement in Eastern Europe and Central Asia respectively. Firstly, the
establishment of international railway networks with European nations, which set up
economic zones along transport corridors, the most prominent of which is the ChongqingXinjiang-Duisburg cargo rail route. The resulting economic growth would be detrimental to
the European Union; nations such as Turkey who do not meet the EUs strict requirements for
admittance would turn to the lucrative trade prospects with China, as would states that seek
foreign direct investment as a means to compensate for unattractive positions in local
markets, such as Greece. The second phase of Chinas economic model would be the
integration of regional energy sectors, particularly Turkmenistans Galkynsh gas field and
Kazakhstans Kashagan oil field. Afghanistan would be utilised as the locus point for these
projects; with the establishment of a Special Economic Zone in Kashgar in Western China,
investment flows will extend out via Afghanistans Wakhan Corridor and directly stimulate
economic development in Tajikistan, Pakistan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan an international
market with a 1.3 Billion population, which in itself will have ripple-on effects.
These policy initiatives serve to pose a crucial question: If the goal is to impede each others
reach in this particular geopolitical space, what will be the result when whomever emerges as
the disadvantaged opponent takes the opportunity to occupy another theatre ignored by the
victor, who in their efforts to reign supreme in Central Asia, has neglected other sectors of
importance? The simple answer is that a new theatre will be chosen, with Central Asias
importance dimming in foreign policy calculi. However, this is not to say that either state will
abandon its regional interests; America cannot afford to allow former satellite states to be
swayed solely by Russian and Chinese influences, whilst Chinas Middle Kingdom
philosophy requires tribute from the Outer Kingdoms of Asia. As this Great Game transitions
through its nascent stages of confrontation, the most prudent course of speculation on the
topic seems to follow that most overused of cliques: only time will tell.