RULE 121

G.R. No. 164815.September 3, 2009.*

SR. INSP. JERRY C. VALEROSO, petitioner, vs. COURT
OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
respondents.
Actions; Pleadings and Practice; Motions for Reconsideration;
While a second motion for reconsideration is, as a general rule,
a prohibited pleading, it is within the sound discretion of the
Court to admit the same, provided it is filed with prior leave
whenever substantive justice may be better served thereby.
After considering anew Valerosos arguments through his LetterAppeal, together with the OSGs position recommending his
acquittal, and keeping in mind that substantial rights must
ultimately reign supreme over technicalities, this Court is
swayed to reconsider. The Letter-Appeal is actually in the nature
of a second motion for reconsideration. While a second motion
for reconsideration is, as a general rule, a prohibited pleading, it
is within the sound discretion of the Court to admit the same,
provided it is filed with prior leave whenever substantive justice
may be better served thereby.
Same; Same; Procedural Rules and Technicalities; Rules of
procedure are merely tools designed to facilitate the attainment
of justicecourts are not slaves to or robots of technical rules,
shorn of judicial discretion.Suspension of the rules of
procedure, to pave the way for the re-examination of the
findings of fact and conclusions of law earlier made, is not
without basis. We would like to stress that rules of procedure are
merely tools designed to facilitate the attainment of justice.
They are conceived and promulgated to effectively aid the
courts in the dispensation of justice. Courts are not slaves to or
robots of technical rules, shorn of judicial discretion. In
rendering justice, courts have always been, as they ought to be,
conscientiously guided by the norm that, on the balance,
technicalities take a backseat to substantive rights, and not the
other way around. Thus, if the application of the Rules would
tend to frustrate rather than to promote justice, it would always
be within our power to suspend the rules or except a particular
case from its operation.
Searches and Seizures; As a general rule, the procurement of a
warrant is required before a law enforcer can validly search or
seize the person, house, papers, or effects of any individual.
The right against unreasonable searches and seizures is secured
by Section 2, Article III of the Constitution which states: SEC.
2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures
of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and
no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon
probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and
the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the
place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.
From this constitutional provision, it can readily be gleaned that,
as a general rule, the procurement of a warrant is required
before a law enforcer can validly search or seize the person,
house, papers, or effects of any individual.
Same; Warrantless Searches; In the exceptional instances where
a warrant is not necessary to effect a valid search or seizure,
what constitutes a reasonable or unreasonable search or seizure
is purely a judicial question, determinable from the uniqueness
of the circumstances involved, including the purpose of the
search or seizure, the presence or absence of probable cause, the
manner in which the search and seizure was made, the place or
thing searched, and the character of the articles procured.The
above proscription is not, however, absolute. The following are
the well-recognized instances where searches and seizures are
allowed even without a valid warrant: 1. Warrantless search
incidental to a lawful arrest; 2. [Seizure] of evidence in plain
view. The elements are: a) a prior valid intrusion based on the

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

valid warrantless arrest in which the police are legally present in

the pursuit of their official duties; b) the evidence was
inadvertently discovered by the police who have the right to be
where they are; c) the evidence must be immediately apparent;
and d) plain view justified mere seizure of evidence without
further search; 3. Search of a moving vehicle. Highly regulated
by the government, the vehicles inherent mobility reduces
expectation of privacy especially when its transit in public
thoroughfares furnishes a highly reasonable suspicion
amounting to probable cause that the occupant committed a
criminal activity; 4. Consented warrantless search; 5. Customs
search; 6. Stop and Frisk; 7. Exigent and emergency
circumstances. 8. Search of vessels and aircraft; [and] 9.
Inspection of buildings and other premises for the enforcement
of fire, sanitary and building regulations. In the exceptional
instances where a warrant is not necessary to effect a valid
search or seizure, what constitutes a reasonable or unreasonable
search or seizure is purely a judicial question, determinable
from the uniqueness of the circumstances involved, including
the purpose of the search or seizure, the presence or absence of
probable cause, the manner in which the search and seizure was
made, the place or thing searched, and the character of the
articles procured.
Same; Same; Arrests; Searches Incident to Lawful Arrest; Words
and Phrases; When an arrest is made, it is reasonable for the
arresting officer to search the person arrested in order to remove
any weapon that the latter might use in order to resist arrest or
effect his escape, and, in addition, it is entirely reasonable for
the arresting officer to search for and seize any evidence on the
arrestees person in order to prevent its concealment or
destruction; A valid arrest allows the seizure of evidence or
dangerous weapons either on the person of the one arrested or
within the area of his immediate control; The phrase within the
area of his immediate control means the area from within
which he might gain possession of a weapon or destructible
evidence.We would like to stress that the scope of the
warrantless search is not without limitations. In People v.
Leangsiri (252 SCRA 213 [1996]), People v. Cubcubin, Jr. (360
SCRA 690 [2001]), and People v. Estella (395 SCRA 553
[2003]), we had the occasion to lay down the parameters of a
valid warrantless search and seizure as an incident to a lawful
arrest. When an arrest is made, it is reasonable for the arresting
officer to search the person arrested in order to remove any
weapon that the latter might use in order to resist arrest or effect
his escape. Otherwise, the officers safety might well be
endangered, and the arrest itself frustrated. In addition, it is
entirely reasonable for the arresting officer to search for and
seize any evidence on the arrestees person in order to prevent
its concealment or destruction. Moreover, in lawful arrests, it
becomes both the duty and the right of the apprehending officers
to conduct a warrantless search not only on the person of the
suspect, but also in the permissible area within the latters reach.
Otherwise stated, a valid arrest allows the seizure of evidence or
dangerous weapons either on the person of the one arrested or
within the area of his immediate control. The phrase within the
area of his immediate control means the area from within
which he might gain possession of a weapon or destructible
evidence. A gun on a table or in a drawer in front of one who is
arrested can be as dangerous to the arresting officer as one
concealed in the clothing of the person arrested.
Same; Same; Same; A cabinet which is locked could no longer
be considered as an area within the arrestees immediate control
because there is no way for him to take any weapon or to
destroy any evidence that could be used against him.We can
readily conclude that the arresting officers served the warrant of
arrest without any resistance from Valeroso. They placed him
immediately under their control by pulling him out of the bed,
and bringing him out of the room with his hands tied. To be
sure, the cabinet which, according to Valeroso, was locked,
[Valeroso vs. Court of Appeals, 598 SCRA 41(2009)]

RULE 121

could no longer be considered as an area within his immediate

control because there was no way for him to take any weapon
or to destroy any evidence that could be used against him. The
arresting officers would have been justified in searching the
person of Valeroso, as well as the tables or drawers in front of
him, for any concealed weapon that might be used against the
former. But under the circumstances obtaining, there was no
comparable justification to search through all the desk drawers
and cabinets or the other closed or concealed areas in that room
itself. It is worthy to note that the purpose of the exception
(warrantless search as an incident to a lawful arrest) is to protect
the arresting officer from being harmed by the person arrested,
who might be armed with a concealed weapon, and to prevent
the latter from destroying evidence within reach. The exception,
therefore, should not be strained beyond what is needed to serve
its purpose. In the case before us, search was made in the locked
cabinet which cannot be said to have been within Valerosos
immediate control. Thus, the search exceeded the bounds of
what may be considered as an incident to a lawful arrest.
Same; Same; Plain View Doctrine; The plain view doctrine
may not be used to launch unbridled searches and indiscriminate
seizures or to extend a general exploratory search made solely to
find evidence of defendants guilt.Nor can the warrantless
search in this case be justified under the plain view doctrine.
The plain view doctrine may not be used to launch unbridled
searches and indiscriminate seizures or to extend a general
exploratory search made solely to find evidence of defendants
guilt. The doctrine is usually applied where a police officer is
not searching for evidence against the accused, but nonetheless
inadvertently comes across an incriminating object.
Same; Same; Same; The plain view doctrine does not apply
where the police officers did not just accidentally discover the
subject firearm and ammunition but actually searched for the
evidence.The police officers were inside the boarding house
of Valerosos children, because they were supposed to serve a
warrant of arrest issued against Valeroso. In other words, the
police officers had a prior justification for the intrusion.
Consequently, any evidence that they would inadvertently
discover may be used against Valeroso. However, in this case,
the police officers did not just accidentally discover the subject
firearm and ammunition; they actually searched for evidence
against Valeroso. Clearly, the search made was illegal, a
violation of Valerosos right against unreasonable search and
seizure. Consequently, the evidence obtained in violation of said
right is inadmissible in evidence against him.
Same; Same; Presumption of Regularity; While the power to
search and seize may at times be necessary for public welfare,
still it may be exercised and the law enforced without
transgressing the constitutional rights of the citizens, for no
enforcement of any statute is of sufficient importance to justify
indifference to the basic principles of government; Because a
warrantless search is in derogation of a constitutional right,
peace officers who conduct it cannot invoke regularity in the
performance of official functions.Unreasonable searches and
seizures are the menace against which the constitutional
guarantees afford full protection. While the power to search and
seize may at times be necessary for public welfare, still it may
be exercised and the law enforced without transgressing the
constitutional rights of the citizens, for no enforcement of any
statute is of sufficient importance to justify indifference to the
basic principles of government. Those who are supposed to
enforce the law are not justified in disregarding the rights of an
individual in the name of order. Order is too high a price to pay
for the loss of liberty. Because a warrantless search is in
derogation of a constitutional right, peace officers who conduct
it cannot invoke regularity in the performance of official
functions.

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

Same; Same; Bill of Rights; Constitutional Law; The Bill of

Rights is the bedrock of constitutional government.The Bill of
Rights is the bedrock of constitutional government. If people are
stripped naked of their rights as human beings, democracy
cannot survive and government becomes meaningless. This
explains why the Bill of Rights, contained as it is in Article III
of the Constitution, occupies a position of primacy in the
fundamental law way above the articles on governmental power.
Same; Same; Same; Presumption of Innocence; It would be
better to set free ten men who might probably be guilty of the
crime charged than to convict one innocent man for a crime he
did not commit.Without the illegally seized firearm,
Valerosos conviction cannot stand. There is simply no sufficient
evidence to convict him. All told, the guilt of Valeroso was not
proven beyond reasonable doubt measured by the required
moral certainty for conviction. The evidence presented by the
prosecution was not enough to overcome the presumption of
innocence as constitutionally ordained. Indeed, it would be
better to set free ten men who might probably be guilty of the
crime charged than to convict one innocent man for a crime he
did not commit.
LETTER-APPEAL FOR REVIEW of the Decision and
Resolution of the Supreme Court.
The facts are stated in the resolution of the Court.
Pablito A. Carpio and Nicolas P. Lapea, Jr. for petitioner.
The Solicitor General for respondent.
RESOLUTION
NACHURA,J.:
For resolution is the Letter-Appeal1 of Senior Inspector (Sr.
Insp.) Jerry C. Valeroso (Valeroso) praying that our February 22,
2008 Decision2 and June 30, 2008 Resolution3 be set aside and
a new one be entered acquitting him of the crime of illegal
possession of firearm and ammunition.
The facts are briefly stated as follows:
Valeroso was charged with violation of Presidential Decree No.
1866, committed as follows:
That on or about the 10th day of July, 1996, in Quezon City,
Philippines, the said accused without any authority of law, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and knowingly have in
his/her possession and under his/her custody and control
One (1) cal. 38 Charter Arms revolver bearing serial no.
52315 with five (5) live ammo.
without first having secured the necessary license/permit issued
by the proper authorities.
CONTRARY TO LAW.4
When arraigned, Valeroso pleaded not guilty.5 Trial on the
merits ensued.
During trial, the prosecution presented two witnesses: Senior
Police Officer (SPO)2 Antonio Disuanco (Disuanco) of the
Criminal Investigation Division of the Central Police District
Command; and Epifanio Deriquito (Deriquito), Records Verifier
of the Firearms and Explosives Division in Camp Crame. Their
testimonies are summarized as follows:
On July 10, 1996, at around 9:30 a.m., Disuanco received a
Dispatch Order from the desk officer directing him and three (3)
other policemen to serve a Warrant of Arrest, issued by Judge
Ignacio Salvador, against Valeroso for a case of kidnapping with
ransom.6

[Valeroso vs. Court of Appeals, 598 SCRA 41(2009)]

RULE 121

After a briefing, the team conducted the necessary surveillance

on Valeroso checking his hideouts in Cavite, Caloocan, and
Bulacan. Eventually, the team members proceeded to the
Integrated National Police (INP) Central Police Station in
Culiat, Quezon City, where they saw Valeroso about to board a
tricyle. Disuanco and his team approached Valeroso. They put
him under arrest, informed him of his constitutional rights, and
bodily searched him. They found a Charter Arms revolver,
bearing Serial No. 52315, with five (5) pieces of live
ammunition, tucked in his waist.7
Valeroso was then brought to the police station for questioning.
Upon verification in the Firearms and Explosives Division in
Camp Crame, Deriquito presented a certification8 that the
subject firearm was not issued to Valeroso, but was licensed in
the name of a certain Raul Palencia Salvatierra of Sampaloc,
Manila.9
On the other hand, Valeroso, SPO3 Agustin R. Timbol, Jr.
(Timbol), and Adrian Yuson testified for the defense. Their
testimonies are summarized as follows:
On July 10, 1996, Valeroso was sleeping inside a room in the
boarding house of his children located at Sagana Homes,
Barangay New Era, Quezon City. He was awakened by four (4)
heavily armed men in civilian attire who pointed their guns at
him and pulled him out of the room.10 The raiding team tied his
hands and placed him near the faucet (outside the room) then
went back inside, searched and ransacked the room. Moments
later, an operative came out of the room and exclaimed, Hoy,
may nakuha akong baril sa loob!11
Disuanco informed Valeroso that there was a standing warrant
for his arrest. However, the raiding team was not armed with a
search warrant.12
Timbol testified that he issued to Valeroso a Memorandum
Receipt13 dated July 1, 1993 covering the subject firearm and
its ammunition, upon the verbal instruction of Col. Angelito
Moreno.14
On May 6, 1998, the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 97,
Quezon City, convicted Valeroso as charged and sentenced him
to suffer the indeterminate penalty of four (4) years, two (2)
months and one (1) day, as minimum, to six (6) years, as
maximum. The gun subject of the case was further ordered
confiscated in favor of the government.15
On appeal, the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed16 the RTC
decision but the minimum term of the indeterminate penalty was
lowered to four (4) years and two (2) months.
On petition for review, we affirmed17 in full the CA decision.
Valeroso filed a Motion for Reconsideration18 which was
denied with finality19 on June 30, 2008.
Valeroso is again before us through this Letter-Appeal20
imploring this Court to once more take a contemplative
reflection and deliberation on the case, focusing on his breached
constitutional rights against unreasonable search and seizure.21
Meanwhile, as the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) failed
to timely file its Comment on Valerosos Motion for
Reconsideration, it instead filed a Manifestation in Lieu of
Comment.22
In its Manifestation, the OSG changed its previous position and
now recommends Valerosos acquittal. After a second look at
the evidence presented, the OSG considers the testimonies of
the witnesses for the defense more credible and thus concludes
that Valeroso was arrested in a boarding house. More
importantly, the OSG agrees with Valeroso that the subject
firearm was obtained by the police officers in violation of
Valerosos constitutional right against illegal search and seizure,

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

and should thus be excluded from the evidence for the

prosecution. Lastly, assuming that the subject firearm was
admissible in evidence, still, Valeroso could not be convicted of
the crime, since he was able to establish his authority to possess
the gun through the Memorandum Receipt issued by his
superiors.
After considering anew Valerosos arguments through his LetterAppeal, together with the OSGs position recommending his
acquittal, and keeping in mind that substantial rights must
ultimately reign supreme over technicalities, this Court is
swayed to reconsider.23
The Letter-Appeal is actually in the nature of a second motion
for reconsideration. While a second motion for reconsideration
is, as a general rule, a prohibited pleading, it is within the sound
discretion of the Court to admit the same, provided it is filed
with prior leave whenever substantive justice may be better
served thereby.24
This is not the first time that this Court is suspending its own
rules or excepting a particular case from the operation of the
rules. In De Guzman v. Sandiganbayan,25 despite the denial of
De Guzmans motion for reconsideration, we still entertained his
Omnibus Motion, which was actually a second motion for
reconsideration. Eventually, we reconsidered our earlier
decision and remanded the case to the Sandiganbayan for
reception and appreciation of petitioners evidence. In that case,
we said that if we would not compassionately bend backwards
and flex technicalities, petitioner would surely experience the
disgrace and misery of incarceration for a crime which he might
not have committed after all.26 Also in Astorga v. People,27 on
a second motion for reconsideration, we set aside our earlier
decision, re-examined the records of the case, then finally
acquitted Benito Astorga of the crime of Arbitrary Detention on
the ground of reasonable doubt. And in Sta. Rosa Realty
Development Corporation v. Amante,28 by virtue of the January
13, 2004 En Banc Resolution, the Court authorized the Special
First Division to suspend the Rules, so as to allow it to consider
and resolve respondents second motion for reconsideration after
the motion was heard on oral arguments. After a re-examination
of the merits of the case, we granted the second motion for
reconsideration and set aside our earlier decision.
Clearly, suspension of the rules of procedure, to pave the way
for the re-examination of the findings of fact and conclusions of
law earlier made, is not without basis.
We would like to stress that rules of procedure are merely tools
designed to facilitate the attainment of justice. They are
conceived and promulgated to effectively aid the courts in the
dispensation of justice. Courts are not slaves to or robots of
technical rules, shorn of judicial discretion. In rendering justice,
courts have always been, as they ought to be, conscientiously
guided by the norm that, on the balance, technicalities take a
backseat to substantive rights, and not the other way around.
Thus, if the application of the Rules would tend to frustrate
rather than to promote justice, it would always be within our
power to suspend the rules or except a particular case from its
operation.29
Now on the substantive aspect.
The Court notes that the version of the prosecution, as to where
Valeroso was arrested, is different from the version of the
defense. The prosecution claims that Valeroso was arrested near
the INP Central Police Station in Culiat, Quezon City, while he
was about to board a tricycle. After placing Valeroso under
arrest, the arresting officers bodily searched him, and they found
the subject firearm and ammunition. The defense, on the other
hand, insists that he was arrested inside the boarding house of
his children. After serving the warrant of arrest (allegedly for
kidnapping with ransom), some of the police officers searched
[Valeroso vs. Court of Appeals, 598 SCRA 41(2009)]

RULE 121

the boarding house and forcibly opened a cabinet where they

discovered the subject firearm.
After a thorough re-examination of the records and
consideration of the joint appeal for acquittal by Valeroso and
the OSG, we find that we must give more credence to the
version of the defense.
Valerosos appeal for acquittal focuses on his constitutional right
against unreasonable search and seizure alleged to have been
violated by the arresting police officers; and if so, would render
the confiscated firearm and ammunition inadmissible in
evidence against him.
The right against unreasonable searches and seizures is secured
by Section 2, Article III of the Constitution which states:
SEC.2.The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and
seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be
inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue
except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the
judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly
describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to
be seized.
From this constitutional provision, it can readily be gleaned that,
as a general rule, the procurement of a warrant is required
before a law enforcer can validly search or seize the person,
house, papers, or effects of any individual.30
To underscore the significance the law attaches to the
fundamental right of an individual against unreasonable
searches and seizures, the Constitution succinctly declares in
Article III, Section 3(2), that any evidence obtained in violation
of this or the preceding section shall be inadmissible in evidence
for any purpose in any proceeding.31
The above proscription is not, however, absolute. The following
are the well-recognized instances where searches and seizures
are allowed even without a valid warrant:
1.Warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest;
2.[Seizure] of evidence in plain view. The elements are: a) a
prior valid intrusion based on the valid warrantless arrest in
which the police are legally present in the pursuit of their
official duties; b) the evidence was inadvertently discovered by
the police who have the right to be where they are; c) the
evidence must be immediately apparent; and d) plain view
justified mere seizure of evidence without further search;
3.Search of a moving vehicle. Highly regulated by the
government, the vehicles inherent mobility reduces expectation
of privacy especially when its transit in public thoroughfares
furnishes a highly reasonable suspicion amounting to probable
cause that the occupant committed a criminal activity;
4.Consented warrantless search;
5.Customs search;
6.Stop and Frisk;
7.Exigent and emergency circumstances.32
8.Search of vessels and aircraft; [and]
9.Inspection of buildings and other premises for the
enforcement of fire, sanitary and building regulations.33
In the exceptional instances where a warrant is not necessary to
effect a valid search or seizure, what constitutes a reasonable or
unreasonable search or seizure is purely a judicial question,
determinable from the uniqueness of the circumstances

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

involved, including the purpose of the search or seizure, the

presence or absence of probable cause, the manner in which the
search and seizure was made, the place or thing searched, and
the character of the articles procured.34
In light of the enumerated exceptions, and applying the test of
reasonableness laid down above, is the warrantless search and
seizure of the firearm and ammunition valid?
We answer in the negative.
For one, the warrantless search could not be justified as an
incident to a lawful arrest. Searches and seizures incident to
lawful arrests are governed by Section 13, Rule 126 of the Rules
of Court, which reads:
SEC.13.Search incident to lawful arrest.A person
lawfully arrested may be searched for dangerous weapons or
anything which may have been used or constitute proof in the
commission of an offense without a search warrant.
We would like to stress that the scope of the warrantless search
is not without limitations. In People v. Leangsiri,35 People v.
Cubcubin, Jr.,36 and People v. Estella,37 we had the occasion to
lay down the parameters of a valid warrantless search and
seizure as an incident to a lawful arrest.
When an arrest is made, it is reasonable for the arresting officer
to search the person arrested in order to remove any weapon that
the latter might use in order to resist arrest or effect his escape.
Otherwise, the officers safety might well be endangered, and
the arrest itself frustrated. In addition, it is entirely reasonable
for the arresting officer to search for and seize any evidence on
the arrestees person in order to prevent its concealment or
destruction.38
Moreover, in lawful arrests, it becomes both the duty and the
right of the apprehending officers to conduct a warrantless
search not only on the person of the suspect, but also in the
permissible area within the latters reach.39 Otherwise stated, a
valid arrest allows the seizure of evidence or dangerous
weapons either on the person of the one arrested or within the
area of his immediate control.40 The phrase within the area of
his immediate control means the area from within which he
might gain possession of a weapon or destructible evidence.41 A
gun on a table or in a drawer in front of one who is arrested can
be as dangerous to the arresting officer as one concealed in the
clothing of the person arrested.42
In the present case, Valeroso was arrested by virtue of a warrant
of arrest allegedly for kidnapping with ransom. At that time,
Valeroso was sleeping inside the boarding house of his children.
He was awakened by the arresting officers who were heavily
armed. They pulled him out of the room, placed him beside the
faucet outside the room, tied his hands, and then put him under
the care of Disuanco.43 The other police officers remained
inside the room and ransacked the locked cabinet44 where they
found the subject firearm and ammunition.45 With such
discovery, Valeroso was charged with illegal possession of
firearm and ammunition.
From the foregoing narration of facts, we can readily conclude
that the arresting officers served the warrant of arrest without
any resistance from Valeroso. They placed him immediately
under their control by pulling him out of the bed, and bringing
him out of the room with his hands tied. To be sure, the cabinet
which, according to Valeroso, was locked, could no longer be
considered as an area within his immediate control because
there was no way for him to take any weapon or to destroy any
evidence that could be used against him.
The arresting officers would have been justified in searching the
person of Valeroso, as well as the tables or drawers in front of
him, for any concealed weapon that might be used against the
[Valeroso vs. Court of Appeals, 598 SCRA 41(2009)]

RULE 121

former. But under the circumstances obtaining, there was no

comparable justification to search through all the desk drawers
and cabinets or the other closed or concealed areas in that room
itself.46
It is worthy to note that the purpose of the exception
(warrantless search as an incident to a lawful arrest) is to protect
the arresting officer from being harmed by the person arrested,
who might be armed with a concealed weapon, and to prevent
the latter from destroying evidence within reach. The exception,
therefore, should not be strained beyond what is needed to serve
its purpose.47 In the case before us, search was made in the
locked cabinet which cannot be said to have been within
Valerosos immediate control. Thus, the search exceeded the
bounds of what may be considered as an incident to a lawful
arrest.48
Nor can the warrantless search in this case be justified under the
plain view doctrine.
The plain view doctrine may not be used to launch unbridled
searches and indiscriminate seizures or to extend a general
exploratory search made solely to find evidence of defendants
guilt. The doctrine is usually applied where a police officer is
not searching for evidence against the accused, but nonetheless
inadvertently comes across an incriminating object.49
As enunciated in People v. Cubcubin, Jr.50 and People v.
Leangsiri:51
What the plain view cases have in common is that the police
officer in each of them had a prior justification for an intrusion
in the course of which[,] he came inadvertently across a piece of
evidence incriminating the accused. The doctrine serves to
supplement the prior justificationwhether it be a warrant for
another object, hot pursuit, search incident to lawful arrest, or
some other legitimate reason for being present unconnected with
a search directed against the accusedand permits the
warrantless seizure. Of course, the extension of the original
justification is legitimate only where it is immediately apparent
to the police that they have evidence before them; the plain
view doctrine may not be used to extend a general exploratory
search from one object to another until something incriminating
at last emerges.52
Indeed, the police officers were inside the boarding house of
Valerosos children, because they were supposed to serve a
warrant of arrest issued against Valeroso. In other words, the
police officers had a prior justification for the intrusion.
Consequently, any evidence that they would inadvertently
discover may be used against Valeroso. However, in this case,
the police officers did not just accidentally discover the subject
firearm and ammunition; they actually searched for evidence
against Valeroso.
Clearly, the search made was illegal, a violation of Valerosos
right against unreasonable search and seizure. Consequently, the

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

evidence obtained in violation of said right is inadmissible in

evidence against him.
Unreasonable searches and seizures are the menace against
which the constitutional guarantees afford full protection. While
the power to search and seize may at times be necessary for
public welfare, still it may be exercised and the law enforced
without transgressing the constitutional rights of the citizens, for
no enforcement of any statute is of sufficient importance to
justify indifference to the basic principles of government. Those
who are supposed to enforce the law are not justified in
disregarding the rights of an individual in the name of order.
Order is too high a price to pay for the loss of liberty.53
Because a warrantless search is in derogation of a constitutional
right, peace officers who conduct it cannot invoke regularity in
the performance of official functions.54
The Bill of Rights is the bedrock of constitutional government.
If people are stripped naked of their rights as human beings,
democracy cannot survive and government becomes
meaningless. This explains why the Bill of Rights, contained as
it is in Article III of the Constitution, occupies a position of
primacy in the fundamental law way above the articles on
governmental power.55
Without the illegally seized firearm, Valerosos conviction
cannot stand. There is simply no sufficient evidence to convict
him.56 All told, the guilt of Valeroso was not proven beyond
reasonable doubt measured by the required moral certainty for
conviction. The evidence presented by the prosecution was not
enough to overcome the presumption of innocence as
constitutionally ordained. Indeed, it would be better to set free
ten men who might probably be guilty of the crime charged than
to convict one innocent man for a crime he did not commit.57
With the foregoing disquisition, there is no more need to discuss
the other issues raised by Valeroso.
One final note. The Court values liberty and will always insist
on the observance of basic constitutional rights as a condition
sine qua non against the awesome investigative and prosecutory
powers of the government.58
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the February 22, 2008
Decision and June 30, 2008 Resolution are RECONSIDERED
and SET ASIDE. Sr. Insp. Jerry Valeroso is hereby
ACQUITTED of illegal possession of firearm and ammunition.
SO ORDERED.
Ynares-Santiago (Chairperson), Chico-Nazario, Velasco, Jr. and
Peralta, JJ., concur.
Judgment and resolution reconsidered and set aside, Sr. Insp.
Jerry Valeroso acquitted of illegal possession of firearm and
ammunition.

[Valeroso vs. Court of Appeals, 598 SCRA 41(2009)]